

French Colonial Policy for the Separation of the Algerian Sahara (1956–1962)

سياسة الاستعمار الفرنسي لفصل الصحراء الجزائرية (1956–1962م)

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Abstract:

This research paper addresses a highly significant topic, highlighting the schemes employed by the French colonial administration to separate the Algerian Sahara in various fields, following the successes achieved by the Algerian War of Liberation (1954-1962). This revolution inflicted heavy losses on French colonialism, leading to the initial loss of its sub-Saharan African colonies. France then attempted to cling solely to the colony of Algeria in an effort to compensate for its losses. Faced with the strength of the revolution's strikes, France desperately attempted to separate the Algerian Sahara from its northern region as a final opportunity to remain in Africa and revitalize "neo-colonialism" across the continent, especially after discovering immense energy resources, namely petroleum and gas, there. To achieve this, it utilized diverse economic, political, diplomatic, and propaganda methods. However, the leaders of the Revolution had a definitive counter-position on this matter.

Keywords: French Colonialism, Separation of the Sahara, Saharan Ministry, O.C.R.S., The Algerian Sahara.

الملخص: تتناول هذه الورقة البحثية موضوعا غاية في الأهمية، حيث تبرز تلك المخططات التي استخدمتها الإدارة الاستعمارية الفرنسية لفصل الصحراء الجزائرية في مختلف المجالات، وذلك على إثر تلك النجاحات التي حققتها ثورة التحرير الجزائرية (1954-1962م)، التي كبدت الاستعمار الفرنسي فقدان مستعمراته

في إفريقيا جنوب الصحراء أولاً، ومحاولا التثبيت بمستعمرة الجزائر لوحدها ثانيا حتى تعوضه ما فقد، وأمام قوة ضربات الثورة حاول جاهدا فصل الصحراء الجزائرية عن شمالها كآخر فرصة له للبقاء في إفريقيا لإعادة بعث "الاستعمار الجديد" في إفريقيا، خاصة وأنه اكتشف بها موارد طاقوية هائلة من البترول والغاز، واستعمل مختلف الأساليب الاقتصادية والسياسية والدبلوماسية والدعائية لتحقيق ذلك، لكن قادة الثورة كان لهم قول آخر في هذا الشأن.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الاستعمار الفرنسي، فصل الصحراء، وزارة الصحراء، OCRS، الصحراء الجزائرية.

1. INTRODUCTION:

The Algerian Sahara attracted the attention of the French colonial administration from the beginning of the twentieth century, once it had completely finished its occupation and subdued its inhabitants. It imposed military rule upon the region under the law issued on December 24, 1902, and gave it a budget independent of Algeria¹. This system remained in effect until the issuance of the decree dated September 20, 1947, whose Article 50 ended the state of military administration in the South, known as the "Régime of the Algerian Southern Territories," transforming them into *provinces* and merging their budget with that of Algeria². With the launch of the War of Liberation in 1954 and the increasing intensity of its strikes year after year, colonial France aimed to separate the largest part of Algerian territory. This was a direct result of the trajectory of the Revolution after 1956, the year when petroleum and gas were discovered in the Algerian Sahara (Hassi Messaoud and Hassi R'Mel). This aim was pursued by reviving certain projects that had been discussed in the French Parliament before the Revolution, proposing the direct annexation of the Sahara to France.³ To implement this, the administration issued several legislative and administrative measures and devised an economic exploitation program for the economic resources, alongside a series

of political, administrative, and military measures. This was all a bid to keep the region outside the sphere of revolutionary influence, in preparation for the future outcome of the Algerian Revolution.

Did this French colonial policy succeed in separating the Algerian Sahara?

2. French Policy for the Separation of the Sahara from an Economic Perspective:

The Common Organisation of Saharan Regions (Organisation Commune des Régions Sahariennes - O.C.R.S.) was established under the law of January 10, 1957, for the general exploitation of the Saharan region, including the Sahara within the colony of Algeria and excising the deserts of some adjacent countries that constituted the colonies of French West Africa (A.O.F.) and French Equatorial Africa (A.E.F.). Its goal was⁴:

- **Creating Economic Mechanisms in the Sahara:** Foremost among these was the extraction of petroleum and gas and the exploitation of their significant revenues. Consequently, the organization sought to provide the necessary infrastructure for the operations of prospecting and extraction companies in the Sahara, dedicating 82% of its administrative and equipment budget to this end, estimated at approximately 290 million new francs in 1959. It also attempted to provide social services for the inhabitants by supporting projects in areas such as irrigation, electricity, and housing, which remained very scarce. The total amount spent by this organization over four years (1958-1962) was approximately 1,014,554,000 new francs, distributed between administrative and equipment expenditures.⁵
- **Establishing Saharan Development Companies:** These were created to support investment in accordance with the provisions of Order No. 58-1248 dated December 18, 1958. Two Saharan development companies, backed by French banks and insurance companies, emerged: the "Société

Française du Sahara" and the "Société pour le Développement des Régions Sahariennes." Their goal was to financially support French industrial and commercial companies to operate and establish themselves in the Sahara, taking equity participations in these companies of up to 35% of the investment amount and providing them with long-term loans. They invested in approximately 20 companies.⁶

- Creating Chambers of Commerce: Three of these emerged, based in Touggourt, Ghardaïa, and Béchar, with the aim of supporting commercial activity in the Sahara. These were grouped into an economic district headquartered in Ghardaïa.⁷
- Creating a Framework for the Administration of Saharan Regions: This was particularly for areas where industrial centers had appeared, such as the industrial center at In Amenas in December 1959 and the industrial center at Hassi Messaoud in July 1960. These were later upgraded to "development zones" in October 1961, under the supervision of the Common Organisation of Saharan Regions for transitional administrative management⁸Establishing a Transportation and Communication Network: This was intended to enhance the exploitation of the Sahara, especially with the appearance of the oil industry centers and investment companies, and to facilitate transportation and movement between them. This involved expanding the construction of roads, which reached 2,000 km of paved road by 1962, and nearly 7,000 km of drivable paths and tracks, with a financial cost estimated at 250 million new francs spent by the organization⁹Additionally, small airports were built, and larger ones, particularly those near the industrial centers, were expanded.

In general, the tasks and objectives of this organization were defined as: "valorizing the Sahara through the economic development of its regions and the

social advancement of its inhabitants." The first article of this law clarifies the role assigned to the organization: its superficial appearance is socio-economic, involving the promotion of all necessary means to improve the standard of living for the Saharan population. However, the core objective for which this organization was established was to facilitate and support the operations of French companies investing in the Sahara and to provide a framework for the exploitation of Saharan petroleum.¹⁰ France could not dispense with this, as the Governor-General of Algeria, Jacques Soustelle, stated: "There is no Saharan petroleum for France without a French Sahara, and there is no French Sahara without a French Algeria"¹¹. Thus, the organization was the fruit of the petroleum discoveries, while the social aspect of the organization remained merely a set of incentives aimed at winning over the Algerians of the Saharan regions.¹² Furthermore, the Common Organisation of Saharan Regions, despite its ostensibly economic and social nature, cannot be considered a political and administrative alternative framework to the previously applied Southern Territories regime.¹³

3. From a Political Perspective:

The colonial administration sought to establish a dedicated Ministry for Saharan Affairs in June 1957, headed by Max Lejeune, as a second organizational step in the administrative and legislative management of Saharan affairs, following the work of the Common Organisation of Saharan Regions (OCRS). The OCRS also came under the supervision of Max Lejeune until June 10, 1960, the month in which several countries of French West Africa (AOF) and French Equatorial Africa (AEF) gained independence.

France also implemented a new administrative and political division in the Algerian South. Its map divided the Algerian Sahara into two *provinces* : the "Province of Saoura" encompassing the Southeast region and the "Province of Oasis" encompassing the Southwest region. This was established by the decree

dated August 7, 1957, and further supported by the decree of December 7, 1960, which provided a more detailed organization for the *provinces* of Saoura and Oasis.¹⁴ The Oasis *province* had an area of 1,302,000 km² and a population density estimated at 348,000 inhabitants, while the Saoura *province* had an area estimated at 780,000 km² and a population density of 152,000 inhabitants.¹⁵

These political and economic measures were an attempt by the French colonial authorities to keep the Algerian Sahara under their control to exploit its natural resources, energy, and mineral wealth, particularly petroleum and gas. Some forecasts suggested achieving self-sufficiency by the end of the 1960s, and by the beginning of the 1970s, France would become an oil-exporting country, with a production rate exceeding 25 million tons of Saharan oil.¹⁶ This oil became a driving factor for the French economy. Furthermore, France saw this vital resource as a leverage point to assert itself on the international stage, in addition to the space the Sahara provided for its atomic and nuclear tests. Through these projects, especially the economic ones, France also sought to sever the link between the South and the North within the colony of Algeria, striving hard to find local, pro-French leaders who would accept and support the project of separating the Sahara into an independent entity or one subordinate to France.

Despite the fact that the French project concerning the Sahara was not limited to the Algerian Sahara alone, but included the deserts of adjacent African countries (Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad), this allowed France to internationalize the Sahara issue by attempting to pass the project on the premise that the Sahara was an inland sea shared by all neighboring countries. Consequently, the aim was to create a separate entity from these African states, annexed to France in the Sahara, under various names, including "French Saharan Africa".¹⁷

4. From a Military Perspective:

France significantly reinforced its military presence in the Sahara to protect the petroleum and gas prospecting facilities and to secure the foreign companies with which it had concluded contracts. This was particularly intensified after the Soummam Congress in 1956 created a sixth *Wilaya* (military region) in the political and military organization of the Algerian War of Liberation.

Consequently, the French authorities worked to secure the borders against arms smuggling and to control the movement of individuals by issuing "travel permits." They formed *méhariste* (camel-corps) units and developed them into air and land-mobile forces as a rapid intervention force to pursue the revolutionaries. They also warned neighboring countries of the consequences of cooperation or of allowing their territories to be used as supply or launch points for the Revolution's elements.

Max Lejeune called for a reorganization of the military structure of the Saharan regions, which was stipulated in the law of January 10, 1957, and its further updating, placing the Sahara under a unified military command according to Decree 58-298 dated March 21, 1958, specifically for the *provinces* of Oasis and Saoura. Beginning on September 3, 1959, per Decree 59-1044, this became known as the Military Command of the various forces.

The composition of the *méhariste* units was also reviewed, with the proportion of French conscripts reaching 50%, whereas they had previously been composed of Chaâmba individuals, whom the French no longer trusted. These adjustments resulted in the creation of 3 mixed *méhariste* battalions, 13 mobile battalions, 8 infantry battalions, and 3 mechanized desert units. Furthermore, forbidden zones were established, which authorized its various forces to open fire directly on anyone without prior authorization.¹⁸

The Revolution's Reaction to the Issue of Separating the Sahara:

4.1 Political and Media Response:

- ❖ The leaders of the Revolution were fully aware of the French colonial intent to separate the Sahara—the Great South, which constitutes four-fifths of Algeria's area—following France's failure to suppress the Algerian War of Liberation, especially after the establishment of the political and administrative framework of the Common Organisation of Saharan Regions (O CRS).¹⁹ This organization aimed to exploit the Sahara's petroleum and gas as vast energy resources that must remain for the benefit of France, while also leveraging the Sahara's expansive territory for the continuation of its nuclear and ballistic tests. These intentions were falsely disguised under the pretext of developing and valorizing the Saharan regions and improving the inhabitants' standard of living. This spurred the media officials of the National Liberation Front (FLN) to work tirelessly to expose this French policy in the Sahara across various international forums and through numerous press conferences and diplomatic statements held abroad by members of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA), denouncing the deceitful French policy of attempting to excise the Great South from the north of Algeria.²⁰
- ❖ Ferhat Abbas, President of the GPRA, asserted on multiple occasions that the Provisional Government consistently affirms the legitimate right of the Algerian people to the Sahara, which is an integral part of Algeria. He declared that no one has the right to exploit its energy resources and hydrocarbons, particularly foreign companies colluding with France, and that any contract concluded with them would be considered null and void upon the restoration of sovereignty²¹. The FLN also worked to raise local

and international public awareness regarding the falsity of France's proposals and policy in the Sahara. It actively countered the deceptive propaganda leaflets about Saharan development, alerting the populace and warning against being misled by the French agenda, which sought to undermine territorial integrity and fragment the united Algerian nation²².

- ❖ Furthermore, the Algerian Liberation Front sought to alert neighboring countries to the deceptions and pitfalls that could arise from following France's Saharan policy. The GPRA issued a foundational memorandum on this subject when France attempted to involve neighboring states by persuading them to exploit and valorize the Sahara's resources within a Franco-African framework or bloc. The role of these Sub-Saharan African countries—especially those considered partners with France under the concept of the "French Community" by the Constitution of October 4, 1958—was to contribute their resources, secure their transport routes, and later renounce any border claims. In return, France's role was to assist with technicians and funds to exploit and share these resources according to equitable contributions, and to bring in foreign international investors who would also have a share²³. This was a cunning French policy designed to internationalize the issue of Saharan separation, which was later rejected by most African countries who stood firm in preserving the integrity of their entire territories, particularly Mali²⁴ and Niger, which supported the Algerian people's struggle to regain their sovereignty.

The Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic also urged international parties not to participate in the perpetuation of French colonialism in Algeria by allowing their petroleum companies to comply with France's policy of investing in Saharan oil and gas. The American company "Standard Oil of New Jersey" and several other companies from countries such as Canada, Germany, and England

responded to this call. By doing so, they were supporting neo-economic colonialism, which ran counter to the tide of history that saw global liberation movements as the hallmark of the 20th century. Consequently, the GPRA called on these countries to rectify their mistake and withdraw their companies so as not to contribute to the killing of Algerians and the prolongation of the War of Liberation²⁵. The political and diplomatic activity of the Revolution's leaders in this regard was articulated in various international conferences and forums, such as the Arab Petroleum Congress in Cairo on April 23, 1959, the World Petroleum Congress in New York in June 1959, and the Arab Petroleum Congress in Jeddah in October 1959. This garnered some sympathy and support, as was the case with the Italian company "ENI," which stood by the Algerian Revolution.²⁶

The Revolution organized Algerians to participate in demonstrations across the country to express the unity of Algerian territory and their unwavering support for the National Liberation Front. Examples include the National Day Against Partition demonstrations on July 1, 1961, and the demonstrations on February 27, 1962, in Ouargla in the Algerian South, where the inhabitants affirmed the unity of the people and national territory, shouting slogans in support of the Army and the FLN, and confirming that the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic was their sole and legitimate representative.

4.2 Military Response :

- The leaders of the Liberation Revolution realized that the project to separate the Sahara from Northern Algeria, which had been a significant topic of discussion in the French Parliament since approximately 1951 across several proposed bills²⁷, must be countered with military action in parallel with political and media efforts. This was achieved by expanding the revolutionary area into the South. The Soummam Congress, held on August 20, 1956, established a Sixth Wilaya (Military Region) to oversee

revolutionary organization in the Saharan regions, which were previously subordinate (the Southeast to Wilaya I and the Southwest to Wilaya V). It was first led by Colonel Ali Mellah, known as "Si Chérif," who was martyred on March 31, 1957. The Sixth Wilaya was reorganized again in March 1958 under the leadership of Colonel Si Haouès, along with Tayeb Djeglali and Omar Idriss, further expanding the Revolution's reach in the South against the French enemy.²⁸

- The National Liberation Front also worked to open a military front in the far Algerian South, known as the "Malian Front," extending from the borders of Mali and Niger in the west to the border of Libya in the east. The National Liberation Army (ALN) Command tasked a group of prominent officers with activating military operations against French interests in the Great South. Among them were Abdallah Belhouchet, Mohamed Chérif Messaadia, Abdelaziz Bouteflika (known as "Si Abdelkader"), and M'hamed Draia. Their goal was to raise awareness among the local populations, both in the far Algerian South and in the north of the Sahel and Saharan countries (Mali and Niger in particular), about the danger of enrolling in the French project calling for the independence of the Sahara in an entity subordinate to France. They also sought to draw closer to local leaders and tribal chiefs to form an impenetrable barrier against any French project aimed at prolonging colonialism and remaining in Africa²⁹. Concurrently, they aimed to transfer military operations to the far South, thereby Shattering the perception of a tranquil Sahara, and to target the vital installations of the French enemy and its allies involved in the extraction of petroleum and gas, thus disrupting their schemes in the region.

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5. The Sahara in the Franco-Algerian Negotiations:

The issue of the Sahara represented another facet of the French Gaullist maneuvers aimed at separating it from the northern part³⁰. The Sahara file progressed from an initial stage of refusal to include it in the talks to a stage of recognizing the legitimacy of the Algerian demands.

In the early stages, the French negotiator, Georges Pompidou, expressed France's position at the Lausanne, Switzerland meeting (February 20–March 5, 1961), stating: "It is not in our interest to raise the problem of sovereignty over the Sahara; raising this problem means seeking difficulties not only with France but also with other countries. France is now proceeding with the division of this territory according to the broadest formula within an international framework... The Sahara is an inland sea with its neighbors, and among them is Algeria, and France will commit to consulting them all." The Algerian negotiators, represented by Ahmed Boumendjel and Tayeb Boulahrouf, countered: "When did France extend from Dunkirk to Tamenrasset without passing through Algeria?"³¹

Due to the Sahara file and the attempt to isolate it from the motherland, Algeria, the first Évian negotiations (May 20–June 13, 1961) failed. The Algerian negotiator (represented by Louis Joxe on the French side) refused to accept the French insistence on neutralizing the Sahara from the negotiations, demanding that it not be linked to Northern Algeria (the 13 *provinces* in the north) and that it be postponed until after the referendum. France intended to address it later between France, on the one hand, and all neighboring countries of the Sahara, including Algeria, on the other. The Algerian negotiator viewed the unity of the people and the territory as a fundamental prerequisite for any progress in the negotiations, arguing that the omission of the Sahara would constitute a betrayal of the Algerian people and the loss of four–fifths of Algeria's area.³²

This led to the suspension of negotiations as both parties held firm to their positions. During this period, France sought to play the card of convincing the Saharan inhabitants to separate and hold their own referendum. It also tried to dilute the Sahara issue with neighboring countries, portraying it as a matter of decolonization in the region rather than as an integral part of Algeria. France referred to it as "African Sahara" in accordance with the OCRS project instead of the "Algerian Sahara" championed by the Algerian negotiator in Évian.³³

Despite the ambitions of some countries, such as Tunisia and Morocco, to claim a share of the Algerian Sahara, the GPRA diplomacy successfully navigated this test. The government declared July 5, 1961, as a National Day Against Separation and Partition, during which all Algerians took to the streets in massive demonstrations across all Algerian cities, expressing their adherence to the unity of the homeland—people and territory. This greatly embarrassed the French, who responded with killing and beatings, as was their custom. Despite the resumption of negotiations a month later at Lugrin (July 20–28, 1961), the matter remained unchanged on this point, and the negotiations failed once more.³⁴

6. De Gaulle's Recognition of Algerian Sovereignty over the Sahara:

Upon his accession to power in the Fifth Republic of France at the end of 1958, General Charles de Gaulle gambled on ending the Algerian Revolution by launching several economic projects, particularly funded by Saharan petroleum revenues. He stated: "In order for France to complete its mission in and with Algeria, France has the necessary means to achieve this. When we see drilling rigs erected in the heart of the Sahara at Hassi Messaoud and Edjeleh, and when we see gas flares alight at Hassi R'Mel, we are certain that a portion of the energy we extract from the ground will ensure industrial development for Algeria, which will truly be its genuine revolution".³⁵ He believed that the problem in Algeria was primarily economic, which he expressed by proposing the Constantine Plan,

aimed at establishing certain industries based mainly on oil and gas extraction, such as: building an oil refinery near the capital with an annual production capacity of 2 million tons of crude oil, establishing a petrochemical complex near Arzew, constructing a thermal power station for electricity production at Hassi R'Mel and exporting it outside Algeria to Europe, and setting up an iron and steel complex in Annaba with an annual production capacity of 500,000 tons of steel.³⁶

Algerian Revolution. Faced with escalating tensions, such as the continuous criminal acts of the "Organisation Armée Secrète" (OAS), the events of the Bizerte massacre, the Generals' Putsch in France in April 1961, and the discontent of the European settlers in Algeria with De Gaulle's policy, it became necessary for General Charles de Gaulle to adjust his stance and push for negotiations anew.

In his statement on September 5, 1961, De Gaulle recognized the territorial unity of Algeria, stating: "...As for the Sahara, our course of action is one that preserves our interests and takes realities into account. Our interests are the freedom of our exploitation of the oil and gas we have discovered and will discover. As for the realities: they are that there is not a single Algerian, and I am certain of this, who does not believe that the Sahara must be an integral part of Algeria, and that there will not be a single Algerian government, regardless of its orientation towards France, that will accept to relinquish the claim to sovereignty over the Sahara. Finally, the reality is that if an Algerian state were established and partnered with France, the majority of the Saharan inhabitants would lean toward associating with it, even if they had not openly demanded it before. This means that in the Algerian-French dialogue, which will be revived with the National Liberation Front or with any other representative body, such as the body of elected officials, the issue of sovereignty over the Sahara will not be taken into consideration, at least on the

part of France... but what matters to us is that this agreement yields a partnership that preserves our interests".³⁷

De Gaulle's speech on September 5, 1961, provided a qualitative leap in the Franco-Algerian negotiations and paved the way for a series of secret meetings between the two sides from the end of October 1961 until January 27, 1962, during which issues of economic cooperation and French strategic and military interests in Algeria were discussed. At the Bâle (Switzerland) meeting on October 28–29, 1961, the Algerian side inquired about the issue of Algerian sovereignty over the Sahara. Louis Joxe, the head of the French negotiating delegation, replied: "For us, the issue of sovereignty over the Sahara is not a matter for consideration once Algeria and France are united by partnership and cooperation agreements"³⁸. Furthermore, at the meeting on December 9, 1961, it was agreed to hold a unified referendum in Algeria, North and South. However, the French side insisted on the idea of considering the specificities of the Tuareg and nomads in the referendum and rejected the principle of a unified sorting of referendum results. The Algerian negotiator saw this as a new Gaullist maneuver that required all precautions to thwart it. The Algerian negotiator stood firm until January 27, 1962, when they succeeded in extracting a formal recognition of the unification of the voting and sorting process and the results across the entire national territory, North and South³⁹.

During the meetings on December 23, 1961, and January 28, 1962, the French defined their demands:

1. France's determination to continue its nuclear and missile tests and its retention of the Reggane and Bechar bases for a period of 5 to 10 years.
2. The authority to exercise police duties in the two zones, with a commitment to guaranteeing the security and safety of the inhabitants.

3. France retains the Ain Amguel, Reggane, Béchar, and Boufarik airports for the same duration.
4. Authorization for its aircraft to land in Biskra, Ouargla, Tindouf, and Téliergma for the same duration.

The Algerian side, however, viewed these demands as detracting from sovereignty and attempted to introduce certain amendments in both form and content. Between March 7 and 18, this effort resulted in the signing of the Evian Agreements text on March 18, 1962, along with the ceasefire agreement which entered into force at noon on March 19, 1962.

With regard to the Sahara, the Agreements included the following⁴⁰:

1. Recognition of the territorial unity of the entire Algerian territory.
2. The French recognition of Algerian sovereignty over the Sahara.
3. The independent Algerian state commits to applying the mining legislation known as the Petroleum Law.
4. France retains military installations in Reggane, Ain Eker, and Béchar for 5 years only.
5. Non-use of these bases to strike the interests of other states.
6. France benefits from facilities for 5 years and takeoff and landing services.

7. Conclusion:

The Algerian Sahara was one of the pivotal issues that formed a fundamental axis of French strategy in its African colonies from all perspectives: political, military, and economic. It represented the stumbling block in all negotiations and contacts between the two parties. The Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic expended significant efforts to achieve national territorial unity because, for Algeria, it was an issue of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and a sacred principle that could not be relinquished, considering the sacrifices made by the Algerian people throughout 132 years of brutal colonialism.

With these outcomes, the Algerian Revolution successfully achieved the objectives set forth on November 1, 1954, by recovering complete and indivisible sovereignty for the Algerian nation. The aforementioned issues cannot be considered a diminution of sovereignty given that they were time-limited, and there existed a political will capable of nullifying them before their expiry date—an outcome that was indeed realized only a few years after the restoration of national sovereignty.

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²⁷ Piére Boilley: *Les Touaregs Kel Adagh*. Karthala, Paris, 1994, p. 314.

²⁸ Redha Malek: *Op. Cit.* p. 47.

²⁹ Idem.

³⁰ *El-Modjahid*. "Unité du peuple, intégrité du territoire" (*Unity of the People, Integrity of the Territory*), N° 81, 4 juin. 1961, Vol. 3, p. 488.

³¹ *El-Modjahid*. N° 82, 25 juin. 1961, Vol. 3, p. 508.

³² Redha Malek: *Op. Cit.* pp. 147-156.

³³ André Passeron: *De Gaulle parle : 1962-1966*. Ed. Fayard, Paris, 1966, pp. 175-182

³⁴ "Le pétrol et l'économie Algérienne", *Eurafrique*, N° 13, Alger, 1958, pp. 73-75; Sahara : *Bulletin d'information de l'O.C.R.S.*, N° 4, Avril 1959, pp. 12-13

³⁵ Passeron A.: *Op. Cit.*, pp. 313-314

³⁶ Ben-Dara M. *Op. Cit.*, pp. 243-245

³⁷ Idem.

³⁸ Passeron A.: *Op. Cit.*, pp. 313-314

³⁹ Idem.

⁴⁰ Redha Malek : *Op. Cit.* pp. 333-335