



## **The logistical supplies of the border army (1957-1960)**

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**Abstract:** This paper discusses the logistical supply chain of the Border Army. The Border Army contributed significantly to the support and arming of the Algerian Revolution and played a pivotal and effective role in its success, despite the difficulties and obstacles encountered, particularly the Challe and Maurice lines.

The issue of armament affected the future of the revolution from the very outset, in addition to the disagreements and confrontations that plagued the leadership and formed the core of the power struggle. Nevertheless, the collective will of the army and the people was ultimately able to undermine the

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machinations of colonialism and its malevolent plots to achieve the long-awaited dream of freedom and independence, since the brutal establishment of colonial rule.

**Keywords:** Border Army; Reinforcing; Supplying the liberation revolution; Tunisia; Morocco.

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## **1. INTRODUCTION**

The Border Army is one of the most important subjects in the history of the Algerian Revolution. Since its inception, it has served as a protective shield and a foundational pillar on which the Revolution has relied for most of its tasks, particularly in terms of preparation, organization, and military training of revolutionaries.

The idea of establishing a new military organization along Algeria's borders was a significant step in the history of the Revolution. Serving as a logistical support area for the revolution inside the country, it facilitated military operations. The Revolution was the main entry point for weapons, while the Border Army acted as a force for its operations abroad. Its contribution to the struggle for independence is regarded as invaluable.

To explore this topic further, we raise the following problem: What are the historical roots of the Border Army's formation, and what role did it play during the Algerian Revolution? Several questions help to clarify this problem, as follows:

- How did the Border Army develop?
- How were the Border Army's logistical supplies managed across the eastern and western borders?

The purpose of this paper is to highlight the importance of the Border Army during the Revolution as a significant milestone in the history of the liberation struggle, especially in terms of the military



development of the army, which played a crucial role in the continuation and achievement of its objectives. available sources and documents. This approach is necessary in our paper to properly review and analyze historical events.

### **Establishment and Tasks of the Border Army in the Algerian Revolution:**

## **2. The Origins and Tasks of the Border Army in the Algerian Revolution**

The first section opens with an introduction that presents the specific problem under study and describes the research strategy.

### **2.1. Border Army Formation**

The idea of forming an external liberation army was not initially proposed by any of the revolutionary leaders during the preparatory phase of armed actions in 1955–1956. Evidence shows that some early leaders, such as Didouche Mourad and Zighoud Youcef, were not fully convinced of waiting for arms from abroad to initiate armed action, or of delaying the revolution until sufficient military power had been accumulated. Ben Boulaid was the first field leader to take the initiative in preparing the project and establishing support bases abroad. This marked the first step in that direction during the summer of 1954. When Ben Boulaid met Ben Bella in Tripoli, it was decided to establish the Tripoli base, which was mandated to provide arms and logistical support to the Liberation Army following the outbreak of the revolution.

The rationale behind the Revolutionary Command's initiative to form a border army cannot be understood in isolation from several key factors that made it necessary. Among the most important was the intensification of disputes regarding strategic decisions between field commanders in all regions of the Aurès and Souk Ahras, alongside

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supporters of Ben Bella's positions and representatives of the First Coordination and Implementation Committee.

These disputes reflected a struggle to assert authority under the supreme and central leadership of the revolution. The subsequent departure of the propaganda leadership from the national territory to Egypt and Morocco further contributed to the transfer of influence and supervision of the ELN's support bases in Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco, enabling the CCISUA to succeed in neutralizing some of its opponents regarding the strategic decisions of the revolution<sup>1</sup>.

April 1958, decision-making authority was assigned to Karim Belkacem, who assumed responsibility for military affairs. He began to develop the idea of forming a unified command of the National Liberation Army, with sovereignty exercised abroad and the transfer of weapons into the country. This initiative is recognized as Karim Belkacem's idea<sup>2</sup>.

He later presented the idea to the Coordination and Implementation Committee at its meeting on April 9, 1958, in Cairo, explaining that its goal was to assist the revolution in military operations, ensure communication between the forces abroad and the interior regions, and maintain the unity of the National Liberation Army. Its urgent tasks included disrupting the Morris and Shale service lines, sabotaging petroleum pipelines, and eliminating Belouni's supporters. Fearing that the Military Operation Committee might become a tool in the hands of Karim Belkacem, the official in charge of military affairs, to assert his authority, Ben Toubal and Boussof proposed that it be organized into two parallel branches with representatives from all regions: one in the east and the other in the west. They insisted on appointing Houari Boumedién as commander of the western branch. The eastern branch included Amhamedi Al-Said, head of the third region; Lamori of the first region; Bougellaz of the eastern base; and the return of the second mandate. The western branch was led by Colonel Houari Boumedién of the fifth region, with Sadek Dhilis serving as deputy of the fourth region<sup>3</sup>.

However, this committee encountered various difficulties in its work due to the existence of the Moriss line, which made internal



communication difficult and sometimes impossible. Additionally, there was a lack of compatibility and consensus between the members of the two committees, particularly within the eastern committee. As a result, Karim was forced to dissolve both committees and send many of their members, including Amouri, to neighboring Arab countries. In October 1958, the Army Staff was established under Karim, divided into two branches: the eastern branch and the Mohammedi staff, which was made responsible for overseeing operations.<sup>4</sup> .

The eastern base extends from the Mediterranean Sea in the north to Jebel Boukhadra in the south, and from the Tunisian border in the east, stretching from Marij to Ain Bab Bahr. It extends westward from the railway to the end of Nador and the Kaf, including its dams. This area is characterized by its rugged terrain and included some of the most important centers during this initial stage, used by therevolutionary factions to gather in Gafsa, Jreid, Stripmines, Hama, and Ghar al-Dam. As for the western base, the Oud Jda base, or the center of the fifth region, extends from the extreme northwest overlooking the Mediterranean, passing through the Rif Mountains and the Middle Atlas along the western border line, down to the southernmost part of Algeria. Some of its primary centers included Nazir, Melila, Tangier, Tetouan, Casablanca, Rabat, and Jeddah<sup>5</sup>.

However, this new organization did not gain sufficient authority to control military activity, and this weakness led to an internally intractable political and military crisis. According to the sources, there was a lack of harmony among the leadership members. Ben Ouda initiated a campaign against its president, Mohammedi Al-Said, considering himself more deserving of leadership and criticizing the exclusion of certain tribes from power. He also opposed Mohammedi Al-Said's preference for French army officers. In his view, he

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supported his comrades, Amouri and Bougellaz, who believed they had been deliberately removed from leadership positions in the first term and the eastern base, respectively, to extend control over them. On the other hand, Mohammedi Al-Said's group accused its opponents of strangling the third and fourth regions. This atmosphere of division and segregation led to a lack of coordination, prompting Mohammedi Al-Said to make unilateral decisions. This further angered his deputies and disrupted the committee. Consequently, it failed to coordinate military activity as required and did not provide adequate support to the regions, unlike the Western Operations Committee under Boumedién. When Karim learned of these issues, he decided to dismiss the deputies, try them, and move them abroad between 17 December 1959 and 18 January 1960. The National Revolutionary Council met in Tripoli to examine the preparatory work carried out by the ten colonels over three months. The discussions referenced some of the army's shortcomings and the failure of the Military Operations Commission to consolidate military action and maintain communication with the interior. Army commanders were affected by strikes from opposing movements and internal crises<sup>6</sup>.

The conferences decided to abolish the Ministry of War and replace it with a ministerial mini-supervisory committee and a leading staff. Three members were appointed to the ministerial mini-committee, and





**source** : Fatma bin Abdul Rahman , 2015-2016 , Houari Boumediene and his political and military role in the Algerian revolution ,University Mohamed Boudiaf of M'sila ,Algeria , p64<sup>7</sup>.

This body's project was far-reaching, aiming to control the military leadership of the revolution both abroad and within the country. Its mandated tasks were to restore order, enhance combat capabilities, and represent the military struggle at the border in coordination with the host states of Tunisia and Morocco <sup>8</sup>.

The General Staff focused on organizing and revitalizing the Border Army by acquiring modern weapons and continuing to recruit Algerians at the rear bases. On the eastern border, two military operations zones were established: the Northern Area of Operations, extending from Toubrek to Jebel Sidi Ahmed, and the Southern Area of Operations, stretching from Jebel Sidi Ahmed to the far south. Additionally, the leadership of the Sahraoui region was established along the Algerian-Tunisian-Libyan border. On the western border, two military zones were also established in the northern and southern regions, with the northern region extending from Saïda to southeastern Morocco. The Consortium made significant progress in organizing the Border Army in both eastern and western sectors, modernizing it into a regular army<sup>9</sup>.


## **2.2. Border Army's Tasks in the Revolution**

The Border Army is one of the most important achievements of the revolution. It played a major role in its success due to its continuous and invaluable contributions. The Border Army carried out numerous actions and tasks, including the following:

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## 1. Arms Financing and Transfer:

In December 1959, during the meeting of the Coordination and Implementation Committee, it was decided to redistribute responsibilities by establishing several departments, including the Armament and Public Supply Service. This service later became the Ministry of Armaments and Public Supply following the announcement of the formation of the Interim Algerian Government.




**Source:** Abdullah Maqlati , military history of the Algerian Revolution, major battles , Dar Shams Al-Zayban , Algeria , d.t , p 309<sup>10</sup>.

During this period, the Algerian issue evolved considerably at both the military and political levels. Weapons centers underwent a remarkable transformation in terms of resources and activities. Two senior directorates were established: the Eastern Armaments Directorate and the Western Armaments Directorate, in addition to representation in Europe. Arms obtained from abroad were acquired either through purchases using revolutionary funds or as donations from friendly countries. Ships from friendly countries delivered their



cargo at the ports of Alexandria, Tripoli, and Tunisia, while storage bases were maintained in Libya and Egypt to ensure security, with a few also located in Tunisia<sup>11</sup>.

Map illustrating the movement of weapons and the location of rear bases in Tunisia and Lybia, See figure:



Source: AbdAllah Maqlati , *The military strategy and political history of the Algerian revolution* Previous reference, p 647 .

Revolutionary leaders were compelled to seek alternative external sources of arms by rallying international public opinion in support of the revolution's legitimacy. This task was entrusted to designated delegations. As a result of their efforts abroad, the revolution's leaders succeeded in securing several sources of weaponry, particularly from socialist countries that supported the revolution, such as China, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union<sup>13</sup>.

As for the transportation of weapons, it was generally carried out overland, starting from storage bases located in Egypt and extending to the country's eastern borders. Between three hundred and four hundred tons of arms were moved monthly by convoys consisting of four to six large trucks, operating through two to three patrols per month. This excludes urgent requests or exceptional operations, such as the arrival of 30,000 tons of weapons from China, which were

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unloaded at the port of Alexandria. A highly efficient accounting service closely monitored the receipt and delivery of arms, with detailed lists submitted monthly to the Ministry and regularly cross-checked with senior border commanders.<sup>14</sup>.



**source :** Hadjer Majdal, 2016-2017 , and others , Armament during the Algerian Revolution 1947-1962 , University of Guelma , Algeria , p 75<sup>15</sup>.

In this context, General Sallan admitted in July 1957 that 500 weapons were officially smuggled into Algeria each month, noting that three-quarters of these weapons came from Tunisia. A French historian also reported that the number of weapons transported from Tunisia to Algeria during the first half of 1957 was estimated at more than eight thousand pieces<sup>16</sup>.

### **3.Establishment of training centers for activities:**

Tunisia's base has been vital in supplying weapons to the interior. It also served as an important support base for the Liberation Army. Along the border areas, a series of training and rest centers, as well as specialized instructors, were established. Units and battalions were assembled at locations such as Ain al-Drahm, Kaf, El-Sageh, Tagroen, Sinan Castle, Friyana, and Tala<sup>17</sup>.

### **4. Establishment of training Centers For Fighters:**

The Tunisian base played a vital role not only in supplying weapons to the interior but also as an important rear base where the Liberation Army was stationed. A network of training and



rest centers, along with specialized schools, was established along the border regions. These centers served as gathering points for combat units and battalions. Notable examples included Ain Drahm, EL Kaf, Sakiet, Tajerouine, Kalaat Sinan, Feriana, and Tala<sup>18</sup>.

The Tunisian base was vital in supplying weapons to the interior and also served as an important rear base where the Liberation Army was stationed. A number of training and rest centers, as well as specialized schools, were established along the border areas. These centers gathered units and combat battalions. Examples include:

- **Zaytouna Center:**  
This included three small centers used for military training, located near the General Command Center in Ghardimaou.
- **Qarn Al-Halfaya Center:**  
Located near El Kaf, it was one of the most important schools for training military leaders.
- **Ouad Milz Center:**  
Situated east of Ghardimaou, it was primarily used for storing weapons.
- **Hammama Sayala Center:**  
Located near Beja, it was designated for military training and for the stationing of National Liberation Army units<sup>19</sup>.

Several other centers were also established along the Algerian-Tunisian border, including Ain Drahem, El Kef, Sakiet, Tajerouine, Kalaat Senan, Feriana, and Tala<sup>20</sup>.

French intelligence reports also confirmed this. A French military report dated February 7, 1957, indicated that Algerian fighters were stationed in groups at specific points along the Algerian-Tunisian border. It highlighted several strategic centers for the National Liberation Army, such as Souk El Arbaa and Gafsa, which hosted a large contingent of Algerian fighters led by Taleb El Arbi.

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The report confirmed that the mission of these fighters was to smuggle weapons into Algeria<sup>21</sup>.

Look at the military base of the National Liberation Army in Tunisia :



**source** : Wahiba Saidi , *The Algerian Revolution and the Arms Problem 1954-1962* ,Dar Al Knowledge , Algeria , 2009 , p77<sup>22</sup>.

As for the western front, the Algerian Revolution benefited from its close relations with the Moroccan Resistance Movement (MRM), which provided important assistance. This included the establishment of camps and rear bases for training and the storage of weapons<sup>23</sup>.

In addition, observation posts and bases were established, including 105 military posts and 320 observation towers. The Liberation Army maintained more than 60 positions along the western border<sup>24</sup>.

This situation led state officials—particularly Boussof and Boumediene—to intensify their focus on adopting revolutionary activity centers along the western border regions. In 1956, three centers were established in the rural border areas near the Volcano region: *Al-Zawiya*, *Mellia*, and *Jebel Al-Lout*. Their primary mission was the rapid training and preparation of new recruits before sending them to the interior. The Fifth Wilaya adopted the Nadour area as its headquarters and as a major center for weapons storage, explosives manufacturing, training, and military formation<sup>25</sup>.



## **5. Confronting the lines of Challe and Moriss**

Experience has shown that armies resort to defensive strategies only when necessary. This was the approach adopted by France during the Algerian Liberation War, as it believed it had found a secret weapon to end the revolution—the establishment of the Shale and Moriss lines. However, the National Liberation Army was

## **6. Confronting the Challe and Maurice Lines:**

Experience has shown that armies resort to defensive strategies only when compelled by weakness, and this was precisely the case with France during the Algerian War of Independence. France believed it had found a secret weapon to resolve the Algerian question and bring an end to the conflict: the Challe Line, established in 1958 along the Algerian-Tunisian border. This fortification was named after General Maurice Challe, who served as the commander of French forces between 1959 and 1960.

General Challe subsequently undertook the construction of a second electrified line behind the first, on its eastern side, stretching from north to south to reinforce the Maurice Line. Work on this secondary line began in early September 1959, starting from the west and east of El Kala. The first section extended eastward to reach the Tunisian border, then curved southward in a circular path, joining the other section and encompassing all towns and villages along the border strip before reconnecting with the Maurice Line near the city of Souk Ahras, where both lines continued southward together

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However, these barriers were not completely impenetrable. The National Liberation Army succeeded in breaching them through a series of operations that unfolded in three main phases, as follows:

### **6.1 stage First:**

This phase primarily consisted of avoiding minefields and

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electrified fences by passing through valleys and rugged ravines. Soon after, new tactics emerged, including digging tunnels beneath the barriers and lifting the electrified wires using wooden poles, given that wood is an insulating material. Soldiers also crossed minefields by placing stones to create narrow safe paths. These operations were extremely perilous, as they were carried out at night, and even the slightest mistake could lead to fatal consequences.

### **6.2 stage The second:**

Special scissors were used to cut the high-voltage electrified wires. These tools were of two types: scissors with rubber-coated handles, and blacksmith-type cutters used for cutting iron, whose arms were reinforced with wooden coverings. Additionally, rubber-coated ropes were employed for handling and lifting the wires<sup>27</sup>.

### **6.3 stage Third:**

The Bangalore tube was manually developed as a standard elongated metal cylinder filled with explosives and used to create breaches in obstacles such as barbed wire and minefields. It measures between 1.5 and 2 meters in length, with a diameter of approximately 6 cm, and weighs between 6 and 10 kilograms. The explosive charge it contains is equivalent to 270 kilograms per linear meter of Bangalore<sup>28</sup>.

## **6.4 Logistical Supplies for the Border Army :**

### **6.4.1 Supplies across the eastern border :**

The states bordering the eastern region of Algeria provided support to the revolution by offering both material and moral assistance, motivated by national and religious sentiments. This support was also fueled by the popular impulse generated by the very nature of the Algerian Revolution, as well as by the general conditions prevailing in Tunisia and Libya at the time<sup>29</sup>.

#### **6.4.1.1 Tunisia:**

The eastern border served as the gateway for the Algerian Revolution, facilitating the entry of weapons and the movement of combatants. Many mujahideen confirmed that the Tunisian border was one of the most important crossing points for both fighters and the



transfer of arms arriving from Libya and Egypt. The Tunisian government supported the opening of its borders to the Algerian Revolution and the establishment of weapons collection centers, despite the political volatility of the Bourguiba regime, which sought to maintain favorable relations with France<sup>30</sup>.

Tunisia did not renounce its support for the revolution, and through its territory, arms continued to flow into Algeria. Despite the internal challenges faced by the Tunisian government in its policies and the presence of some opponents, it contributed significantly to facilitating the armament of the Algerian Revolution. Given Tunisia's strategic geographical position, it served as a vital base for positioning, training, and planning military operations and attacks. Approximately 20,000 soldiers conducted military operations against French forces and carried out sabotage on electrified barbed-wire defenses. The Tunisian government also provided the Liberation Army with five military trucks as gifts to facilitate the transport of supplies. Equipment reaching the Liberation Army inside Algeria was exempt from customs duties<sup>31</sup>.

#### **6.4.1.2Libya :**

The Libyan Arab people were at the forefront of supporting the Algerian struggle against French colonialism, playing a prominent and distinctive role. Among their contributions, Libya established a committee to raise funds for the National Liberation Army. Through grassroots gatherings, lecture fairs, and scientific symposiums, the committee organized fundraising efforts. Receipts were issued across different financial categories, and a dedicated fund was established for these contributions. Libya played a significant role in supporting Algeria militarily by facilitating arms transfers and assisting with their concealment and maintenance<sup>32</sup>.

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Arms transfers across the northern land route continued between the 15th and 22nd of 1957, with approximately 1,500 weapons transported from Libya into Tunisian cities. On the 20th of the same month, about six trucks carried roughly 900 weapons across the border. Five days later, around 800 weapons were transported and unloaded in the Zawarah area, approximately 100 km west of Tripoli<sup>33</sup>.

The revolution seized 200 hidden armored vehicles, 2,400 Thompson submachine guns, and 120 grenades. These weapons would not have reached the revolutionaries in Algeria without Libya's assistance, which provided all possible support to facilitate the protection, collection, and transportation of arms. Libya employed every available means and strategy to move these weapons across the Libyan-Tunisian border and subsequently into Algeria. Regarding the participation of foreign volunteers in the ranks of the Algerian Revolution, the influx of volunteers had a significant impact on the Libyan population. Once the news became public, the fundraising committee for the revolution quickly opened a register for Libyan volunteers eager to join the jihad in defense of Algeria. The Algerian Revolution Donor Committee was able to recruit approximately 675 Libyans willing to volunteer for the revolution, all of whom were officially registered with their names, ages, and residential addresses<sup>34</sup>.

The revolution shifted from a struggle against French colonialism to a war of positions and strategic confrontation. This shift prompted its leaders to work on expanding the scope of combat. In this context, the opening of the Sahara front, particularly along the Algerian-Libyan border, aimed to disperse French colonial forces and relieve pressure on the Liberation Army units in the north. Additionally, the opening of the Sahara front served as a response to colonial claims seeking to separate the Algerian Sahara from the northern regions. Through the various forms of support provided by Algeria's neighboring states, Libya found itself involved, directly or indirectly, in Algeria's war against French colonialism<sup>35</sup>.



#### **6.4.2. Supplies across western borders:**

For any war or revolution to succeed, rear bases must be established to secure supplies of war materials, weapons, and ammunition, as well as to provide care for the wounded and sick, and to facilitate the training and organization of soldiers. The leaders of the revolution also turned their attention to Arab countries in Greater Morocco. In March 1955, officials of the Liberation Front in the Fifth State settled in the Moroccan city of Nadour, where they benefited from the support of the Moroccan National Liberation Army. On 19 September, the FLNKS was established in the city of Jeddah, which developed cells across all Moroccan cities and formed hospitals and welfare centers. Given the importance of the arms industry, the National Liberation Army also created workshops and factories to support arms production<sup>36</sup>.

Especially after the Conference, the revolutionary command considered establishing facilities for the manufacture of weapons and military ammunition, including handguns, bazookas, machine guns, grenades, explosives, mines, and melee weapons. Laboratories for this purpose were set up on the outskirts of Rabat and Casablanca, operating under various aliases. Specialists from Germany, the Netherlands, England, and Greece contributed to these efforts in Morocco, as detailed in the following table:

Region	Year of beginning of manufacturing	Weapon's type
Titouane	1958	English type grenades
Souk Arba	1958	Installation of English grenades and grenades
Bouznika	1959	Installation of American bombs and white weapons

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Tamara	1960	Light machine gun, 49-type machine gun and white weapons
Sakhiran	1960	45 calibre portable on the back and explosives
Mahama dia	1960	45-and 80 calibre explosives and white weapons

**Source:** Djebraj Laraj , Previous reference , p253<sup>37</sup>.

The Moroccan population played a prominent role in the transfer of weapons from the west into Algeria. The revolutionary command enlisted a craftsman in the city of Fes to manufacture pottery pots, which were then used to conceal weapons. These weapons were subsequently smuggled into Algeria through the merchant Mohamed Seyassi, a key figure in the import and export of pottery from Oran. Additionally, convoys of weapons transported on the backs of mules originated from mountainous rural areas in Morocco, where the revolution received extensive support from the local population. Once across the border, the arms were distributed among the National Liberation Army units. The shipments primarily included pistols, machine guns, and ammunition of various calibers<sup>38</sup>.

The Moroccan people and government played a prominent role in supporting the Algerian Revolution, particularly through their assistance in Algerian diplomatic efforts between Morocco and Spain. To facilitate the acquisition and transfer of weapons into Algeria, Europe became a major source of arms. These weapons, including some from the Republic of Korea, were transported by ship to Spanish or Moroccan ports, where Moroccan and Algerian operatives coordinated their unloading and integrated them into the arms smuggling network for transfer into Algeria. The Moroccan government and its people also contributed to creating a supportive environment for the National Liberation Army (ELN) by establishing reception centers. The government provided all necessary administrative facilities to support the activities of Algerian revolutionaries based in Morocco, thereby strengthening the military capabilities of the Fifth State<sup>39</sup>.



## 7 CONCLUSION

The new organization, known as the National Liberation Army (ALN), provided the revolution with significant cohesion and strengthened its branches abroad, enabling it to resist brutal colonialism, particularly following the establishment of an external army.

The formation of the Army's General Staff was the most important military event in the history of the revolution, given its crucial role in unifying the Border Army, which had previously been scattered under several leaders.

The General Staff focused on organizing and revitalizing the Border Army, acquiring modern weapons, and continuing to recruit Algerians at the rear bases.

The External Border Army successfully met challenges, achieved victories, and inflicted losses on French forces despite their numerical and technological superiority.

Border fronts were of great strategic importance to the liberation revolution, particularly for the passage of weapons, as the borders served as the main entry point for arms that fueled the revolution.

These strategic advantages persisted even when borders were closed, as southern crossings allowed for continued transfers. The Border Army also carried out executions following swift trials, reflecting the difficult situation of the National Liberation Army (ELN) within Algeria, which faced blockades first by the enemy and then by the Border Army's units.

France sought to implement a counter-revolutionary strategy aimed at suppressing and isolating the revolution by extending electrified barriers along the eastern and western borders, establishing buffer zones, and creating "no-man's land." This coincided with the activation of the Border Army. With the construction of the electrified

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Challe and Morris Lines, intended to block the passage of weapons into Algeria, arms were concentrated in border warehouses, which benefited the growing Border Army. By 1960, the Border Army had developed into a strike force equipped with modern and heavy weapons, playing a decisive role in asserting Algeria's independence and strengthening the prestige of emerging states.

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