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**Ethnicity, Multiculturalism, and Islamophobia
Case Study: Arab Immigration to the United States of America
post 9/11**

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DEDICATION

To the memory of my father

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In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

While there were many who contributed to the completion of this dissertation, I would not have been able to begin or complete such an accomplishment without the blessing of God Almighty (Glorified and Exalted is He).

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Abstract

The tangled history of American immigration has long been circumfluent with the ambivalences of ethnicity, nativism, and assimilation. Since its primeval cradle, the American national portrait has been painted in sundry shades of immigrants from different arrays of the world along with a paradoxical sentiment of at times cherishing and other times damning their experiences in the American mainstream. The present study examines the mounting hues and cries raised over Arab immigration to the United States within anti-immigration animus climate of discrimination, Islamophobia and Multiculturalism. As a highly visible group in the aftermath of 9/11, islamophobic and anti-immigrant sentiments, particularly in the current President Donald Trump's tenure, have relentlessly made scapegoats of Arab immigrants for a myriad of social ills that ail the American national unity and hegemony. They have borne the brunt of the most hostile assaults on the grounds that the deep-seated Anglo-Protestant culture and American democratic values are undergoing undermining changes with threatening implications due to their immigration. As they have been viewed as a perpetual threat through media stereotypical vilifications, the duality of "good America" or "us" versus "evil enemy" or "them" has been successfully sedimented and institutionalized within a context of terrorism and War on Terror. Most pessimist nativists have flagrantly augmented fears and skepticism over Arab Americans' non-assimilation on the basis that their monolithic Islamic faith and Arab culture are discordant with the American values and liberties. In romanticizing the incontrovertible fact of the U.S.A. as a magnet and the beacon of hope to immigrants, the study, based on books and reliable media, demonstrates that Donald Trump's suspicions and Muslim bans are unwarranted since they are in fact an infringement over the kernel of the American Constitution and the axiomatic tradition of the U.S.A. as a land of opportunity. The illusory belief that the American society is characterized exclusively by the WASP culture is a plaint denunciation of the racial hodgepodge that deeply marked the outstanding reality of multiculturalism in the U.S.A. In reconsidering the trajectories of earlier immigrants' full assimilation, the fallacious allegations over Arab Americans' non-assimilation are overblown since the American mainstream is now broader to embrace newcomers than before. Indeed, Arab Americans are sharing the American dream with more desire for higher education, upward economic integration, political involvement, and acculturation. Thus, instead of blemishing them as immigrants, it is crucial to be viewed as an energetic presence that enriches not impoverishes, strengthens not undermines, nourishes not depletes, a nation whose national character has long mirrored a cultural kaleidoscope of ethnic groups.

Key words: Arab Americans, assimilation, ethnicity, immigration, Islamophobia, nativism, threat.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ALAC	American Law for American Court
APA	Administrative Procedure Act
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CVE	Counter Violent Extremism
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigations
INA	Immigration and Nationality Act
INS	Immigration and Naturalization Services
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and Levant
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSEERS	National Security Entry Exit Registration
PBUH	Peace Be Upon Him
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
RRA	Race Relation Act
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WASP	White Anglo-Saxon Protestant
WWI	First World War
WWII	Second World War

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Map of the Arab World

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Résumé

INTRODUCTION

At the most ostensible glance, for anyone, based on both the bygone and contemporaneous physical existence that appears to be undeniable verity, it might seem that immigration is the potent hallmark of the United States of America. It has performed as a distant magnet, luring millions of newcomers from different array of world countries. Since its early threads of birth, the U.S.A. was endowed with one of the greatest folk immigration in world history. Indeed, the American migratory patterns, though witness ebbs and flows, have never halted as it persists to current day. As immigration has been an inherent fact and incessant reality, the American racial hodgepodge has been deeply manifested as a peculiarity and a source of paradox as well. The U.S.A. is, and has always been, the home of immigrants and beacon of hope for newcomers across the globe. From the nation's earliest colonists to the more recent arrivals, with the exception of native Indians, Americans are immigrants or descendants of immigrants along with their quite diverse experiences. Accordingly, their mosaic, which has ever been more convoluted, is becoming more intricate.

Perhaps one of the most axiomatic enigmas of the United States, as nation distinctly featured by its best incandescent archetype of "City upon the Hill", is its historic ambivalence about immigration that is extremely intertwined in the vision of the American nation-at times malleably hosting immigrants and other times vehemently slamming doors for them. Henceforth, Anglo-Americans have enthusiastically been enthralled by their gist of the American Anglo-Saxon narratives through espousing heightened nativist resentments.

At the outset of the 19th century, in restoring Darwin theories and the new eugenic science, that virtually have bolstered the idea of Anglo-Protestant stock superiority and new immigrants' inferiority, the American gate keeping ideology has begun as safeguard to the American borders. To reprimand other immigrants of all the ails that ill the American society, the nativist drumbeat has grown impossible to ignore as White native-born Christians have felt victimized by the more visible threats from immigrants who were thought to be imperiling the American hegemony as un-American outsiders. To champion White-Protestant supremacy and to protect pure Americanism, they have bluntly contended that their Whiteness did not belong to the prototypical model of the Anglo-Saxon core. Fearing that new immigrants are harvesting greater impact, they are subject to fierce nativist

backlash that is interpreted in the support of a stranger nativist framework and subsequent akin restrictionist operations.

Surprisingly, what really makes the American mainstream a historical magnet is that newcomers who were formerly demeaned by one generation were the successful parents and the grandparents of the next generation. Possibly and not paradoxically, most of them or their progeny later pursued the same trajectory of those who despised and abased the new arrivals with analogous discriminatory trends that had targeted them or their forbears. Currently, it is up for debate whether nowadays nativism is a recent phenomenon, or it is simply a pervasive trend that has been persistently existent within ethnic and racial issues.

Whilst acknowledging the wide-range contexts of the ignominious American nativism against native population, Black Americans and Latinos, the U.S. has always raised hues and cries about the sweeping of new immigrants who have been rarely displayed an overly enthusiastic welcome into what was once perceived as the Anglo-Saxon land. Through anthropological and social lenses, as race is a socially constructed concept prone to adjustment, divergences in cultural and physical characteristics are initially foregrounded to categorize the other. Racial origin is emphasized and social hierarchy is constructed within the White skinned people at a superior status in comparison to those colored skin who are categorized nearer bottom. Generally, racial scapegoating affects newcomers in the American mainstream and; hence, the decision to label mixed-race individuals as non-White enshrines into policy the one-drop rule of race that segregationists have long championed. Accordingly, the role of race always accentuates, rather than diminishes, the segment of Whiteness and Eurocentric domination, largely perceiving other groups as inferior and dissonant with the American constitutional tenets and cultural values.

In this premise, like the Black race, Arab and Muslim races have incited an ambivalent lens through which a threat could be given a meaning. In fact, they have become thermalized, and racist attitudes against them; therefore, made a shift into being a mainstream controversy. From this transition can be mapped a direct and consequential set of exclusionary tendencies and law enforcement procedures, generating disillusionment, resentment, and mistrust between polarized lines of White race and other races. In this perspective, Islamophobia, as a catalyst for exclusionary procedures in the aftermath of 9/11,

may necessarily be understood and justifiably substantiated through imagined discourses as what Islam to Muslims is akin to White race to Blacks.

In an ever-mutable world, nativism and hatred against Muslims and Arab Americans have more likely protruded out of the grassroots situations being faced by them in divergent sociopolitical processes that do not; however, happen in vacuum. Thus, they have been both retrospective and transitory, evidencing the proceeding duality of Islam and West narratives. They have functioned through periodic intervals of quiescence and intensification that attained outrageous levels in the aftermath of certain major global events such as the 1993 bombing at the World Trade Center, the 2004 Madrid bombing , 2005 London hostile offense, and in particular 9/11 attacks.

These dreadful incidents have profoundly altered the world's political perspective and challenged interrelations between the West and Islam, announcing the beginning of a new history and a radical shift in the Westerns' perception of the self and the other. This perception is the upshot of a perpetual process that mirrors Western centric-vision and particular avails. The post 9/11 securitization of domestic and foreign policies, Arab Spring avalanche, and the resurgence of ISIS as a new global threat have all enshrined a discernable shift in danger assessment from probabilistic estimations of harm to a preemptive set of security discourses. In fact, they have heavily slatted to an unprecedented future legislation and undesirable form of surveillance that problematize Arab and Muslim minority groups.

9/11 was a turning point for Arab and Muslim Americans as they have grabbed a vast amount of attention and visibility across different spectrum related to race, ethnicity and politics. They have been negatively conceptualized long before 9/11 attacks as a unique set of persons from a specific place of origin, sharing a cluster of negative traits that promote violence and hatred. Further, they were categorized as White by the U.S. government, while several national rhetoric strenuously distinguished them from the American mainstream through considering them as inferior and not fully White.

Though paramount events have catalyzed Islamophobia and rendered it more blustering and normalized across various swatches of recent society, it is decisive to grasp that 9/11 has magically intensified it and consolidated the widespread belief that it is its consequential without question. At whatever level, the legacy of 9/11 can never be disregarded as it germinated Islamophobia and, to a further extent, nourished its mounting

sprite. Indeed, xenophobic and Islamophobic attitudes skyrocketed extensively post 9/11 since it relatively provided a pre-existent prejudice greater credibility.

Since 9/11 attacks, it is worthy to note that, at no point in contemporary history, there have been considerable grouts in literature on the American War on Terror as a post 9/11 era. It has inaugurated the beginning of a new century with new obscure perception of the other multi-faceted Islam. Most scholars have suggested the year 2001 as 'year zero' or the pivotal turning point in Arab-American relationship. As the American led War on Terror has thoroughly been cherished by a myriad of world events and international policies, the most influential cause-effect of 9/11 attacks, regarding the American traditional Orientalism, was to cement the epithet 'neo' to the overall political issues of the Arab world. In this vein, the deep-rooted notion of otherness, even though old, does not denote that the animosity toward Muslim and Arabs has evaporated. In contrast, it is still predominant and alive and has only been emphasized in recent political arena. Further, the American campaign against terrorists has been well engrained in the preexisting tendencies that have been embraced to secure its own socioeconomic and political interests.

With successive terrorism attacks underway, most of the world countries, particularly the United States, have adjusted in a way their foreign policy strategies that have not been witnessed for generations. In this regard, arguing that the American public still assumes the idea of war on terrorism, the United States has contrived a deceptive and a misleading depiction to represent Arab and Muslim Americans as a serious peril to the American values. Those miscreants have doubtless bent in nihilism, but they are in no way representatives of Islam and Muslims. Notably, one can argue that the unceasing War on Terror seems to neglect a crucial standpoint that not all Muslims are terrorists, but all terrorists are Muslims. The claim of course is exaggerated to an extent of being defective. Yet, the crux of such a crucial point lies on the fact that War on Terror is aimed at Islam and Muslims, and not terror in general since 9/11 events were a camouflage of an established struggle on Arabs, Muslims and Islamic religion. In this manner, the American intellectual prism constructs and promotes the otherness of Islam, along with defining the Orient as monolithic and unchangeable.

Arguably, regardless of Muslim and Arab culture's fabricated portrayals, even their religious garments do not escape that disdain at Western media. It is barely a novel tendency

as segments of Western opinions and entertainment media have depicted them with loose and inaccurate misconceptions for long decades. Tagging Muslims and Arabs with biased connotations like terrorism, Jihad, veiling, forced marriage, Islamic law, sharia, suicide bombers, and 9/11, is a predetermined disfigurement that distorts reality and denies individuals their individuality and diversity. By this way, stereotypes are hazardous and the misconception of any minority group is totally a perilous phenomenon that has detrimental consequences on different levels. They do not only impact minority groups, but they also affect those who believe in stereotypes as they culminate to fall in the trap of misjudgment and thwart themselves to discover the reality of human relationship with others. Central to the fact that Western media advances delusions about the essence of Islam, and such fallacies are gaining much attention across a broad of spectrum and undergoing a set of falsifications as a close alternative of peace violation. Correspondingly, they are stripped from their religious context and spiritual reference to be associated with more acts of terrorists, blood thirsty, and love violent Muslims.

Furthermore, nativist's strategies fulfil an ideological setting in which Arabs and Muslims are depicted as a brutal destructors of the West because they are not worth democracy, but they instead symbolize tyranny. Media depictions do not provide the overall embodiment of a group; rather they give us a highly edited and distorted image that resorts to back up the way they are perceived and treated in the society. The preponderance of such negative images has led the majority audience to view minorities as a social burden on society. Thus, the perspective of 'us' versus 'them' is reinforced to a more critical dimension.

With a significant spur of Arabs and Muslims to U.S.A., world tensions and technological advancement, the pervasiveness of media has instigated the emergence of observable fictitious stereotypes. In spite of its extensive worldwide influence, American mass media has undertaken detrimental and polarized role by splitting the world into two distinct entities: superior Occident versus inferior Orient. Unfortunately, during several decades, such a division has stimulated the America media to promulgate negative portrayals about Arabs and Muslims. Throughout the parlance of the present-day time, they have been cast as 'the green danger', 'the third millennium crusade' and 'the clash of civilization'. All such prejudiced expressions are omnipresent in Western and American media, and they are

used by all means to mislead the world's opinion that American democracy is undergoing increasing threats of Arab and Muslim Americans. Hereafter, all sort of military aggressions against such a menace are rationalized and any legitimate defense of violated Muslim land is belittled.

Western deleterious representations of Islam and Arabs are undoubtedly anchored on the basis of loathing against Islam and its culture. In this premise, it is obvious that Protestant Christians perceive Islam as a devilish religion that threatens the hitherto domination of the American cultural norms. Arab and Muslim Americans; therefore, have been an attribute of hordes and disports, spiritual mystifications and peculiar carnality. Confronting the East has been momentous for the West self-image as it yielded multiple identities through irrational considerations, ranging from cultural, racial, and moral superiority.

Arab and Muslim Americans have experienced exclusion and discrimination from the American mainstream as others through social processes that bore similar patterns to those experienced by other stigmatized minorities; nevertheless with significant differences. The main distinction is that their racialization is not an outcome of a local interest, but rather the consequence of increasing political and economic interests in preserving America's world image as a super power. Such a reliable difference doesn't only explain a distinct timing of Arab Americans' racialization process as it has much been manifested later comparing to natives, Africans, Latinos, and Asians. But, it is also astounding to confirm that they were once classified in a structurally more convenient status in the broader American White paradigm. Thus, they have been reimagined and reviewed as new and unknown immigrants though they set roots in the American society centuries before.

Today, Muslim and Arab Americans have become a perfect hotbed for heightened accusations and suspicion. Their situation is getting worse when amalgamated with racial, class, and gender discrimination. In fact, they are perfectly portrayed by negative hermeneutical images and widely believed that they are backward, inferior, and threatening. Similar to other different minority groups, native resentments against them have arisen proportionately from the perception that they are unassimilable to the Anglo-Saxon mold, even disruptive minority whose inferior race, customs and habits are a social menace to the American hegemony. They are deemed a burden to the process of assimilation as their

culture is always labeled not only as primitive and backward, but also as a constant challenge to the American democratic institutions.

Furthermore, policies of banning entry of individuals from Muslim-majority countries, a stance rooted in an anti-Muslim and anti-Arab animus, are well-conveyed messages that they are seen as worthless of a society's democratic values and inassimilable to the larger American cultural paradigm. In this regard, it seems that such attitudes, particularly the present presidential administration, are characterized by historical amnesia that has forgotten the American inbred values as a nation of immigration and immigrants. Basically, it is really essential to realize that the United States can maintain its national security and patriotism without necessarily perpetuating intolerance and discriminatory patterns based on religious animus. The mounting rates of prejudice, along the well-reported rise in hate crimes and violence against Muslim and Arab Americans or those perceived as Muslims, are not only upsetting and worrying, but are all at once an underlying threat to the multicultural landscape and the democratic nature of the U.S.A. as enshrined in its constitution.

The paradox of democracy has long conveyed an interesting irony to the Anglo Americans as it is primarily a parochialising not a cosmopolitanising process. To their eyes, the never-ending fight against violence, barbarism, and governmental despotism in the Middle East are the fundamental canon of new Orientalism although their enigmatic addresses disavow the veiled goals behind dominance and supremacy. The West, particularly the U.S.A., attempts to ensure its interests forward foremost. Its spread of democracy is; thus, self-serving, selective, episodic, and often delineated in an elusive sense of Orientalism along a legitimate justification of imperialists' ambitions.

The frequent use of the dichotomy 'barbarian world' against 'civilized world' alludes to implicit connotations as it implicates, particularly for the Americans, images of collective memories of perpetual struggle with indigenous Americans; the time when White Christian civilization was in opposition to the source of racial hegemony. Furthermore, through the use of civilization-barbarism narrative, several pundits argue that America national identity is soundly built and reaffirmed as an archetype of modern civilization, whereas terrorists and terror acts come to represent barbarism as an antipode of the United States and civilized people everywhere. The dualistic constructions of 'good' versus 'evil', or 'civilized' versus

'barbaric' have been fostered by America's popular culture and inculcated into a civil religion. Hence, the parlance of civilization efficiently and easily flips into the American popular culture and its constant diet of evil portrayals. It is worthy to note that the language of evil has played multiple distinct functions across different administrations. Indeed, the good America standpoint has been the backbone of current rhetoric that has provoked the construction of American national identity and the formulation of U.S. terrorism and counterterrorism. As the connotation of evil has multiple layers of meanings, it does not only rationalize and legitimize counterterrorism, but rather it dehumanizes their incentives.

The quintessential debate over Muslim and Arab Americans is thorny as its key constituent is based on racial and religious designation. Hence, Christianity operates as hallmark of Whiteness and citizenship for newcomers from the Arab world. Such an association would bitterly exclude a sheer number of Muslims and Arab American cohorts, as distinct alignment with non-whiteness, from the wider American society.

The jeopardy of categorizing Muslims and Arabs within one single group put people of different backgrounds into the otherizing class; denoting their distinctions across other identity classifications, including class, ethnicity, and race that are all merged under the core of a single religious identity category. Hence, differences are just eased through identity and people are more easily placed into a particular grid and then stigmatized, as in the Arab and Muslim Americans case. Obviously, this is absolutely consistent with the Western identity to consider one-dimensional image of all Muslims and Arabs. Such a controversy has shaped the American view of Arab and Muslim Americans who have been unconsciously susceptible to a dual commitment to both Islam and their homelands.

The long-stranding dualism of the West and Islam, dissimilar to other dualisms, has always mirrored a binary antipathy and opposition between superior Christianity and inferior Islamic religion, cultures and races. Such polarity is a system of categorization and a form of classification, playing a pivotal role in understanding who is desirable and who is not. It is not merely based on logical or psychological reasons, but to a further extent on social backgrounds. Indeed, social hierarchical orders are neither stirred up by the palpable world, nor derived without prelogical social views. Therefore, the analysis of dualism is fundamentally a thoughtless and a primitive way of categorization which is essentially at the danger of being a mean of achieving social interest of those who struggle to define it.

After heated discussions on the failure of multiculturalism in both scholarly and political arenas, mainly with the birth of Huntington's Clash of Civilizations, the discourse of Judeo-Christian culture supremacy has amalgamated with Islamophobia to imagine a new conjuncture of maintaining the United States' purity against foreign influences. The call of restoring the American hegemony is at the expense of alienating those who refuse to share the cultural and religious norms of the predetermined conception of 'us'. Overwhelmingly, Arab and Muslim immigrants are coupled with violence and honor crimes, and are typically viewed as potential bearers of illiberal attitudes. As they are seen as encumbrance to democratic principles of the welfare state, then multiculturalism also is at the same time seen an actual threat to the common moral standards of the nation. Yet, this perception can oppose the driving forces that uphold pluralism.

In many ways, escalating cries of multiculturalism are in fact a disguise for what pessimists are considering as the troubles linked to the presence and visibility of Islam, Muslims, and Arabs in the U.S.A. Currently, arguments over the relation of Islamophobia to multiculturalism has swung the possibility of a strong multicultural American society to another direction linked to the dilemmas of how to accommodate cultural diversity to assure assimilation. Though multiculturalism can basically help to bridge racial and ethnic divisions that current policies aggravate, it has begun recently to be understood as a way to further establish difference and autonomous cultural discourses.

It is apparent that the widespread assertion of multiculturalism's end is centered over the belief that it encourages racial separateness and values cultural segregation and isolation. Thus, the rhetoric, associating multiculturalism to the tropes of Islamophobia and tagging the presence of Islam with difference and separation, has become axiomatic in all recent articulations over Arab and Muslim Americans' threat. To some degree, much of current criticism against multiculturalism has been little more than a camouflaged offense against Arabs, Muslims and Muslim identity. In general, allegations over the veracity of the multicultural view implies that its continuous adoption will ruin or even annihilate the notion of identity, which is deeply built upon Christianity and Whiteness in the U.S.A. Similar to the United States of America, some European countries, whose liberal multiculturalism has been very currently heralded as being a social prototype for other countries to follow, have raised an overhaul of thought regarding cultural assimilation and civic integration. For

instance, the United States has long elevated contentious views on multiculturalism and immigration, particularly against Islam. Islamophobic attitudes, along with the adherence to the American values and WASP culture, have been vociferously stressed and decisively opened to all races of whatever origin.

In reworking multiculturalism as a fact in the U.S.A., the intense rhetoric against Arab and Muslim Americans can be interpreted as both a lack of particular dogma of Western society, and particularly the failure to incur the real factual standards in the modern American society. Increasing uncertainties regarding the issues of future of American multiculturalism and society cohesion have been just few of the sharp backlashes through which Arab and Muslim American's difference has remarkably been perceived to be a bother or, at a further extent, a challenge the American way of life. The abundance of divergent races and ethnicities among immigrants are compelling White radicals to foster the substitute version of multiculturalism that deplores the myth imposed forward by Whites.

As a refutation to the overblown speculations and in reemphasizing ideas about assimilation, one can confirm that the American mainstream, despite anxieties over non-assimilation and split, is broader to weave more newcomers than before. Despite nativists' exaggerations about Arab and Muslim immigrants in general, more proofs have demonstrated that they are sharing the American dream with more desire to blend politically, socially, and culturally. In fact, their integration remains always an incontrovertible fact in U.S.A. as a nation of immigrants. Nevertheless, it can be proclaimed that causative factors to the resurgence of nativism, anger, and xenophobia are almost endless. In other words, the exclusions and the sweeps of last century immigrants were not inordinately different from the heavy-handed nativism of current time to deport and assault racial groups.

In the midst of a fervent political discourse that interpellates for the racialization and stigmatization of suspect Arab and Muslim Americans as a pretext of having a mere involvement with Americaness and strong commitment to external violent forces, it has become necessary to create a strong Islamic or Arab political identity that boosts cohesion and union among Arab communities in opposition to the increasing levels of Islamophobia in their diaspora. Even though they have no common and shared nationality, Islamophobia has effectively served as form of displacement in fashioning strong ties and bounds among Muslims and Arabs together subsequent to the tragic terrorist events of 9/11. Arab American

youth are prone to societal pressures, and feel saddled with the shared responsibility when defending themselves against the atrocities committed by a bunch of Muslim perpetrators in the name of Islam. Most of them feel that is irrational to generalize on all Muslims on few extremists. Henceforth, Islamophobia has shivered Arab or Muslim sense of attachment and affiliation to their native countries. Further, it has set up a broad hiatus between Arabs or Muslims' sense of their identity and the way in which they are typically viewed by their host community. In reality, Arab and Muslim Americans are encountering such hassles, as they are required to forsake either their faith or their national loyalty. Accordingly, it is perplexing to define their identity regarding the receiving community, and; therefore, they are constrained either to adopt liturgical symbols and radical traits that serve as boundary markers, or integrate into the cultural standards of the mainstream society.

It is worthy to note that Arab or Muslim identity adoption has many predicaments of marginality and unacceptance. Hence, they impede the ability to acquire cultural capital as compulsory for social success. The assimilation into the American mainstream compels Muslims and Arab Americans to hide themselves, to appear as less religious, less cultural, and less ethnic, whereas those resistant of integration have to voice their ethnic identities openly.

In the same token, countering violent extremism policy desperately focuses on Arab and Muslim subjects, reintroducing the entrenched tropes that Islam is radical and violent. Countering violent extremism theory stands as the most noticeable and perhaps the most heinous form of Islamophobia, lulling the ability of Arab and Muslim Americans to freely practice their religion, curbing their civil liberties, jeopardizing their political involvement and free speech. Arab and Muslim Americans' surveillance and monitoring are blatant violation of constitutional guarantees of religious equality. Like the Patriot Act and other policy legislations, it has emboldened an increasing discrimination against them through wide range forms of harassment, attacks, distrust, and assault. Therefore, these initiatives are hazardous contributors that harm American public safety, disrupt attempts to reinforce the American community, and create a gateway for unwarranted racial surveillance, while promising a safe atmosphere to combat violence and discrimination.

As far as Arab and Muslim Americans are concerned, it is quite possible to allocate the 2016 as a new benchmark in America's nativist history that once again blossomed out

in contemporary America. Through describing Trump's presidential bid and consequent triumph as another outbreak of nativism, it seems that the preceding historical phenomenon has coalesced to once again bring another nativism to a fore. Yet, Trump's nativism is not a recent vintage at all, but one with a harsher tone and ardent implementation of Muslim and Arab travel bans to enter the U.S.A. Indeed, the 2017 Trump's extreme vetting and travel bans policies against Arab and Muslim countries are enveloped in trepidation-laden rhetoric along with the enforcement of anti-immigrant legislation, pointing to vacillate the pendulum back toward a pre-civil rights era outlook.

As the most acrimonious and influential presidential campaigns the United States has even seen, the 2016 elections were blemished by unprecedented political rhetoric, outburst of discriminatory tones and intact of Muslims and Arabs as others. As part and parcel of a larger anti-immigrant policies, Trumps obviously marks his overzealous doctrine that immigrants of Muslim and Arab background are deemed inherent threat to American Anglo-Saxon norms. His anti- Muslim and anti- Arab initiatives stem from his religious animus toward Islam, Muslims, and Arabs who are mistakenly viewed as inherently hostile to the American economic interests and discordant with the American democratic values. Trump's many official declaration about Islam explicitly unearthed who was pinpointing as being ideologically disqualified to migrate to the United States of America, and he has alluded to gender inequality, sexual orientation, and honor killing as inconvenient Islamic characteristics with American values. In other words, his rhetoric serves at galvanizing his political support base of the White underclass Americans, and further broadens an abrupt gap between Islam and the west, previously vitalized by 9/11 and America's so-called War on Terror.

Doubtless, scholars have struggled endeavoring to decipher the reasons for Donald Trump's stunning electoral victory, yet at least some of them must focus on his campaign's famous slogans: "Make America Great Again", 'America First', "Islam hates us". As Islamophobia significantly undergirded Trump's platform agenda, pundits have analyzed his statements through drawing parallels between good America's past and its current history. Such parallels invoke a rhetoric that grounds Muslim and Arab Americans as

recurring antipode to United States' cultural values, particularly the faulty speculation over their non-assimilation into the American mainstream.

The present research attempts to probe into a better understanding of recent events that have shaken not only the U.S.A., but also the world politics. For instance, events that took place in 2019 are specifically timely in context of the contemporary political and social controversies. All are stemming from immigration, ethnicity, Islamophobia and discriminatory hurdles facing Arab and Muslims living in the U.S.A along the divergent pathways to overcome them. As an interdisciplinary research, the study ultimate aim is to elucidate issues that are overwhelmingly bumped up over immigrants' threat of the purported American democratic values and its driving scenarios of assimilation into the Anglo-Saxon mold. Despite the inveterate fact that the U.S.A. is a nation of immigration and immigrants, the current American President Donald Trump is drastically halting immigrants from Arab and Muslim countries to enter the United States through the legislation of Muslim bans and extreme vetting.

In an attempt to find possible solutions to the above mentioned concerns, this study endeavors to answer the following research questions:

1- Is the more American racial and ethnic mosaic due to immigration , particularly Arab and Muslim Americans presence, really threatening and impeding the ingrained American Anglo-Saxon culture or not ?

2- Are the hues and cries raised against Arab and Muslim Americans' non-assimilation to the American mainstream, due to their Islamic religion, Arab culture and inferior race, a fact or a mere ongoing unwarranted allegation?

3- To what extent are Islamophobia, nativism and negative stereotypes relentlessly making scapegoats of Arab and Muslim Americans for the multiple social ills that ail the contemporary American hegemony?

4- Are President Donald Trump's current overzealous anti-Arab and anti-Muslim immigration and discrimination, as interpreted through his Muslim travel bans and extreme vetting policies, legitimized and justified on the grounds of Arab Americans' menace and dissonance with American democratic values or not?

5- To what degree has the association of multiculturalism to the tropes of Islamophobia played a pivotal role to otherize Arab and Muslim Americans and dampen their process of assimilation into the White American paradigm post 9/11?

For the sake of deciphering the main research problem and answering its sub-research questions, an endeavor has been made to rely on data from a variety of books on these issues, American critical press articles, TV programs and surveys, along the adoption of an eclectic method that combines descriptive, argumentative, and analytical approaches. As the kernel of the topic dictates, the descriptive part of this study has been useful to encompass the overall review as well as the theoretical concepts that imply a myriad of meaning to the terms within an entangled socio-historical context of the United States. Though scholars often refine well-elaborated definitions and distinction of whatever concept, I have tried to provide connotations that are more likely to match the nature of the topic as well as the public perceptions, and more constructively mirror the crux of more recurrently accepted definitions of the terms such as assimilation, nativism, identity, immigration, and Islamophobia. Argumentative approach has been adopted to demonstrate the general setting of Arab and Muslim American within blunt nativism that has grown impossible to overlook. As White natives have unwarrantedly risen speculations over the visible threat of the sheer number of immigrants, particularly Arab and Muslim Americans, they were seen as perilous to the American hegemony as well as dissonant to the inherent American democratic ideals. Basically, analysis has been used as way to rebut empirically the overstated allegations about Arab and Muslim Americans' non-assimilation to the broader American mainstream, and to probe deeply in understanding President Donald Trump's Muslim bans along the recent controversies about assimilation and multiculturalism. Therefore, conducting a study depending ultimately on testing hypothesis with data from a range of researches, surveys, and studies.

To advance an in-depth analysis of the foregoing research problem and questions, the study is conducted through the organization of four chapters' agenda.

Chapter one provides a historical background of Arab American migratory patterns that are basically divided into three different waves with distinct characteristics. It also sets the review of the sociological framework in which the concepts of Arabness, Arab and Muslim Americans have emerged and become salient within the American society through

a particular focus on Arab ethnic identity development, its dimensions, components, threat mechanism and adaptation.

Chapter two is devoted to discuss the setting of Islam in the West in general and in the United States in particular. It also shows the uncontested reality that Islamic religion and its cultural background are perceived in derogatory manner in the Western collective consciousness. Through shedding light on Edward Said's seminal work "*Orientalism*", the study also attempts to explain how the American media fabricates stereotyped portrayals of Muslim and Arab Americans in order to boost the binary opposition between the alleged superior Occident versus the inferior Orient. It then delves to analyze the heavy implications of 9/11 on the American War on Terror policies throughout subsequent administrations.

Chapter three analyses the driving forces behind Islamophobia against Arab and Muslim Americans and how the legacy of 9/11 instigated its intense. It also shows that mounting worries about new immigrants, particularly Arab and Muslim Americans, have prompted fierce hatred and animus that is interpreted in the support of vehement anti-immigration legislations and subsequent akin restrictionist operations. Further, this chapter aims to explain that Donald Trump's recent Muslim bans mirror his skepticism about the failure of Arab and Muslim Americans to assimilate into the deep-rooted multicultural mainstream.

The last chapter discusses the idea of American exceptionalism in relation to the heightened nativism against Arab and Muslim Americans. It also analyzes the different assimilation pathways that account for immigrants' incorporation into the broader American society, particularly segmented assimilation theory. Most importantly, it concludes that despite the overstated claims of Arab Americans' non-assimilation, multiple empirical research confirm that they are pursuing the same historical trajectory of incorporation of the earliest European immigrants.

Definition of Terms

Arab Americans: people who live in the United States, and whose ancestries are rooted in any of the following 22 Arab countries: Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Palestine, Iraq, Algeria, Bahrain, the 17 Comoros Islands, Djibouti, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen (Erickson & Al-Timimi, 2001).

Arabs: individuals with origins from Arabic-speaking countries are self-identified as Arabs (U.S. Census, 2000).

Assimilation: according to Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess (1924), assimilation is ‘a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons and groups and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life’ (p.18).

Ethnicity: is a construct that consists of two interrelated components: exploration through which individuals have explored their sense of belonging and commitment to a particular ethnic group, and affirmation which is a the positive or negative sense associated with individuals’ shared values, attitudes toward their group membership (Liebkind, 1999, 2006; Phinney, 1990, Roberts et al., 1999).

Immigration: is the international individuals’ movements between the new emerging nation states of which they are not natives or where they do not possess citizenship with the intention of permanent settlement or naturalization (Bartram, D; Poros, M; Monforte, P, 2014).

Islamophobia: is the fear, hatred, or hostility towards Islam, Muslims, and Islamic culture and history. It is characterized by the belief that all or most Muslims are fanatics, have violent tendencies against non-Muslims, and discordant with notions of tolerance, equality, and democracy.

Muslim Americans: are individuals who live in the United States and believe in Islam. They constitute a diverse and growing population, currently estimated at 3.45 million people of all ages, including 2.15 million adults. The U.S. Muslim community is made up overwhelmingly of immigrants and their offspring from around the world. On average, Muslim Americans are considerably younger than the overall the U.S. population.

Nativism: according to Higham (1988), “nativism as a habit of mind illuminates darkly some of the large contours of the American past; it has mirrored our anxieties and marked out the bounds of our tolerance’ (p. xi). He explained nativism as a complex ideology and

identified three strands of US nativism directed against Catholics, radicals, and racialized groups that were woven together to form the fabric of modern American nativism.

War on Terror: also known as the Global War on Terrorism or U.S. War on Terror, is an international military operations waged by the United States government and its allies in the aftermath of September 11 offensives. The ultimate goal of the campaigns is to curb anti-American global terrorist network, particularly Sunni Islamic fundamentalist armed groups in the Muslim world, with the most eminent organization of Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Taliban.

CHAPTER ONE

Ethnicity and Arab Americans Immigration to the United States of America

Introduction

The history of Arab migratory trends to the United States of America is definitely rife with the paucity of inaccuracy since Arab and Muslim cultural backgrounds cluster around divergent origins, linguistic and religious affiliations. In this regard, this chapter will examine the three main historical waves that have significantly marked the Arab American experience in the U.S.A. Overwhelmingly, pundits have generally contested the terms of Arab and Muslim Americans as rubrics of identity and; thus, most of Americans conflate the two entities. The interplay between the relevance of Arab American compared to Muslim American has reasonably led to the use of the two terms Arab and Muslim interchangeably, and one wonders to clarify how they have come to be conflated within the American history. As ethnicity has come to a fore with dynamic and multi-faceted issues of immigration, it has become crucial to grasp the wide-ranging implications of Arab ethnic identity, particularly its dimensions, components, and development. Because Arab ethnic and cultural identities have merged as salient part in the core of Arab minority's social identification and belonging, their multidimensional understanding mirrors the indispensability to manage a balance between prompting cultural maintenance and boosting adaptation to the broader society mainstream.

1-Arab Americans in the United States: Historical Immigration Trends and Background

The history of Arab immigration to the United States of America is predictably fraught with inaccuracy and tentativeness because the Arab heritage encompasses with diverse origins, religions affiliations, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds. Despite the fact that asserting the exact number of Arab immigrants to the United States has proved to be of a continuous challenge and being incomplete, there is a general consensus that Arab immigrants set tone for life in the United States and profoundly influenced the aspirations of other minorities. Arab immigration to U.S.A. has traditionally been divided into three waves. Each wave has its significance and particularities in the United States.

1-1-The First Wave: 1880 to 1925

The first wave was known as the great migration during which few Near East Arabs males from the Syrian Province of the Ottoman Empire came to the United States. It was overwhelmingly composed of Christian Lebanese, Syrians and fewer Palestinians (Haddad, 2004; Hitti, 1923; Naff, 1985, 1994; Suleiman, 1994, 1999; Younis 1995). Almost all hailed from semiautonomous administrative district of Jabal Lubnan, also called Mount Lebanon and the province of Palestine, whereas few migrated from the Ottoman province of Palestine and called themselves Palestinians. “All, however, came from the historic region of Greater Syria which, under Ottoman rule, had become, by the late nineteenth century, the province of Palestine and Syria” (Naff, 1985, p.15).

Before the World War I, the early Arab immigrants have been categorized and grouped under the larger label of Turkish of Asia; yet making an accurate estimation almost impossible for the first thirty year of Arab immigrants. Hence, their records did not distinguish between the different ethnic groups migrating from the Ottoman Empire as well as other areas around the Mediterranean. What is worthy to note that such an immigration from the geographic region of Jabal Lubnan was at a time of peace between 1861 and 1914 and it was marked by neither persecution nor famine (Hitti, 1923, p.447). It is important, however, to reassert that other provinces of the Ottoman Empire did not live in that peace. According to Arab American historian Alixa Naff, the first wave of Arab immigrants to the U.S.A. were Syrian-Lebanese, unskilled workers, farmers, or artisans, relatively poor and uneducated. In the same vein, historians Adele Younis, Hitti Philip, and Suleiman Michael also explained that the religious, political and economic understanding yearning have always shaped the Arab migration to U.S.A. As their ultimate goal in the New World was to turn opportunity into fortune while escaping religious persecution, they were emphatically sojourners and guest workers who left voluntarily in pursuit for better economic conditions. Thus, many of them embarked with the intent of returning to financially better off within a short time, proud of their gain wealth and prestige (Naff, 1994, p.13).

In the late nineteenth century, growing contact with Europeans and Americans, as visitors to birthplace of Christian religion in Near East and missionaries, was a pivotal factor in spreading the Western way of life in the Middle East and; thus, provided a further motivation for Near Eastern people to migrate to America. Indeed, the major world expositions of 1876, 1893, and 1904 in America were additional enticement for many

Lebanese, Syrian, and Palestinian Arabs to migrate. In his book: *Syrians in the United States*, Louis Seymour Houghton (1947) asserted that “the centennial Exposition at Philadelphia ...attracted few Syrians chiefly traders from Jerusalem, who brought olive, wood articles and other curios. These Syrians also went back to their home land, but their stories of fabulous profit fired the imagination of their people” (p.483). The impact of Arab participation in the world exposition became more evident and the New World had seemingly insatiable appetite for Arabs who learned more about America. Similarly, the historian Adele L. Lounis (1995), in his book: *The Coming of the Arabic-Speaking People*, explained how the Columbian exposition was a great opportunity for a tremendous number of Ottoman Empire’s citizens who rushed to exhibit their true products and artistic collections rarely seen in the West :

The Arab East and North Africa were extensively represented with true reproductions of their social and physical world. Here different Arab cultural groups enacted various aspects of their communal lives. The many groups invited to the United States were abundantly photographed in newspapers, journals, and portfolio collections, more so than representatives of other countries. This was not due only to the artistry displayed but also because of the showmanship (p. 152)

During the late 1800, Greater Syria was inhabited by heterogeneous ethnic groups who suffered economic decline because of the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. Indeed, the canal instantly became strategically very important because it facilitated trade between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean and permitted international shipping to pass freely. Furthermore, the Asian goods continued to flood the markets and compete with local Syrian products, particularly when Lebanese were unable to compete the declining prices of Japanese silk. Thus, trade eventually started to be eclipsed and the passage through the Suez Canal bypassed trade through Syria that had previously a standing position in transporting its goods through the Western markets. The over population growth of Syrian further overburdened the already insecure economy that could not absorb the workforce of a new population rise, both agriculturally and economically (Suleiman, 1999). Such a precarious economic situation of Greater Syria as well as the pressure of overpopulation served as a strong impetus for Arab immigration to the United States. The historian Thomas J.

Archdeacon (1983) further showed how the rapid growth of population played as a catalyst for immigration to the U.S.A:

In the final decades of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth, the countries of Asia and of southern and eastern Europe experienced the population explosions and dislocations that western Europe had earlier undergone. For the first time these countries surrendered hundreds of thousands of their subjects to the United States (p.117)

In addition to the economic causes of early Arab immigration to the United States, the political fate of the Near East was predetermined by European political mandates and religion, which created arbitrary internal political boundaries. With the creation of such political boundaries, formally granted by the League of Nations in 1922, the European powers began to pursue their imperial ambitions and competed to control Arab provinces through the protection system. Basically, France controlled Lebanon and Britain was responsible for Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq. In the wake of World War I, the division of Arab East into small entities brought up political instability and insecurity in form of religious tensions that prompted Near Easterners to leave Mount of Lebanon. Accordingly, its particular new administrative status resulted in more degeneration; thus, granting more freedom to migrate (Karpas, 1985). As most Arab immigrants resented religious persecution, which persisted to escalate at home, the incentives of immigration boomed again on the horizon. "The fact that most of the Syrian immigrants are Christians, whereas in Syria most Syrians are Muhammadan, seems to indicate that the religious situation has been a factor in their emigration" (Hitti, 1924, p.51).

At the outset of their immigration, many Arabs were classified by the official Immigration and Naturalization Service as Turks of Asia. Because they were heavily taxed and forced to join the Ottoman armies, they refused the Turkish designation and ran away from conscription and oppression which triggered large scale migration from Mount of Lebanon (Orfalea, 2006). In fact, the creation of the state of Israel was the most powerful catalyst for the displacement of a significant number of Palestinian Arab speakers who sought refuge in U.S.A. Like most of the early Italians and Eastern European newcomers to U.S.A., the majority of early Arab immigrants were uneducated and Christians. Their first experience of earning a living was generally as a travelling salesman of dry goods and notions, commonly named pack peddlers. Peddling was a prevalent job within the Middle East and;

therefore, it provided a familiar and popular job that was easy to open upon arrival as it required very little start-up capital, largely self-managing with no extensive command of English. It was also safer, tireless, and entrepreneurial job for those who had the will to make far more money than other occupations such as mining, factory, or farming jobs, which were appealing because of hourly wages, harsh weather conditions, and the risks and insecurity, involved in these tasks. (Suleiman, 1999).

Despite the small number of Syrians in American society, male Syrian peddlers frequently appeared in the American culture. Initially, peddling enabled Syrians to maintain their independence and secure stable income, which permitted them to integrate in the American middle class. The Syrian peddler travelled increasingly door to door to the outskirts of the city on foot or upgrade to a horse and buggy cart through rural areas of the Southern, Mid-Western, and Western United States. Generally, peddlers played a vital function because they satisfied the needs of their customers with the wares they sold. They carried a suitcase in each hand or a small trunk strapped to the back and hung the items in a case or a box around the neck. They also toted a knapsack filled with dry goods as well as small, various, and exotic notions. They represented primarily holy and sewing materials items that elicited fantasies of far-off places such as vials of water said to be from the river of Jordan, bottoms, oriental rags and linens, pieces of ribbon, soap, and household staples—generally aimed at women. Unlike farming, which necessitated illiquid investment, peddling business was easy to open, close, or sell, which allowed peddlers to cash out quickly, investing successfully in wholesale, retailing shops, and hiring more immigrants to do the peddling. Revenues from peddling provided better living conditions as well as the ability to host additional staffing and relatives who replaced their owners to return home for visits in the Middle East without being obliged to close or sell the store. (Rodley 2011, p. 20).

Peddling period, according to Naff, was an organizing and a simplifying strategy. In this perspective, she divided the early Syrian newcomers into two different periods. From 1880 to 1910, in which Syrians peddled in a huge number, as the pioneer period. The second was known as the “settled period” between 1910 to 1930. Such periodization depends on mobility, assimilation, class, and progress to move from one period to another. The former period is characterized by impermanence, colonization and adventure, while the latter is marked by the influx of more Syrian women and the shift from peddling to store ownership, which signifies the Syrians “confidence in the new land” (Naff, 1985, p. 12). Thus, peddling

was a temporary endeavor as well as a profession done because of ingenuity and necessity. Accordingly, it was referred as “a stepping stone” toward success in the middle class” (Naff, 1985, p. 30). Their presence in the U.S. with observable subjectivities, as immigrants transgressing cultural norms, was dependent on ideological baggage, interweaving gender, class, and sexuality.

It is important also to note that the reparative images of peddlers were loans of anxiety about the early Syrian sexual and gender deviance through Orientalist stereotypes. Eventually, the peddler was part and parcel of assimilating into Americanness, providing early Arab immigrants with natural prosperity, financial stability, which laid the foundation for some of the first permanent Arab communities as well as additional waves of immigration.

The decline of U.S. economic growth during World War II and the restrictive quotas to immigration greatly slowed down migration from the Middle East to the United States. All Such policies, which were enacted against migration from Asia and non-European countries, were aimed to “preserve the ideal of American hegemony” (Johnson-Reed Act, The1924 Immigration Act “Johnson-Reed Act”). Between 1917 and 1924, the passage of the Immigration Restriction Act of 1921, the 1924 Johnson –Reed Immigration Act as well as the great depression curtailed the flow of immigration from Asia and reduced the quotas of immigrants to 2 percent of the total number of people who were already living in the U.S.A. in 1890. In spite of such harsh quota restrictions, immigration of families, mainly women and children, did not pick back up after World War II (Naff, 1985). Female immigrants were allowed to join their families but replenishment of ethnicity by newcomers was still limited, resulting in the interrupted communication with homeland, subsequent length of stay in the United States, and sense of isolation from the homeland. The process of assimilation into the White standards progressed and refashioned them into American citizens. Seeking Whiteness, the early Syrian-Lebanese were eager to prove their worthiness to the American mainstream. Thus, Arab Americans almost became indistinguishable from their new society. In this regard, Najeeb Halaby, the first chairman of Nato’s Military Production and Supply Board stated:

The first generation of immigrant Arabs really wanted to be 100 percent American and changed their names and their religion even. They wanted to arrive socially, politically, professionally. And so when you’re raised in that kind of

atmosphere, you want to be all American .Yet...want to be all American .Yet really Lebanon, though the food , the atmosphere, the air, the sights, sounds you feel a root just comes without logic or intellectual activity. It just is down inside you. (Orfalea, 2006, p.139)

It is evident that such quotation is an illustration of a deeply desire of incorporation and trajectory of upward mobility that was experienced by Arab Americans and their offspring in U.S.A.

Following the WWI, the Ottoman Empire dismantled and its rule was replaced by the mandates of the French and the English who used brutal force and religious division, as methods of rule, to create a series of new colonial entities and new separate nation states of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Jordan. The new political upheavals in the region, along with the disturbances of Jewish Zionist movement fostered by the British in Palestine, coerced most of the Arabs to escape and migrate to U.S.A. (Orfalea, 2006). Under the influence of various ideological affiliations and social differences in post-World War II, the Arab American community formed a plethora of new political organizations that were a catalyst to maintain group cohesion, improve their conditions, and promote stronger ethnic bonds (Naff, 1985) as well as cultural activities related to music, dance, and food. Such organizations accelerated their activism, particularly in New York, Boston, and New Jersey post the establishment of Israel in 1948, which really marked the real embarking of Arabs toward the U.S.A.

1-2-The Second Wave: 1848-1965

The second wave of Arab immigration to the U.S.A. started after the WWII and lasted from 1948 to 1965. It spurred mainly by the 1948 Arab-Israeli War when Arab nationalism was nascent and the agitated Arabs began fighting for their independence from colonial powers. Most of the second wave immigrants hailed from a wider array of Arab nations, including diverse religious backgrounds, including Druze, Chaldeans, Copts, Nestorians, and a greater percentage of Sunni and Shia. Thus, post WWII Arab immigration witnessed unprecedented diverse migratory patterns in every sense.

First and foremost, the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 really marked a crucial shift in Arab migratory trends to the U.S., as many native Palestinians, after being displaced, sought temporary lodging in neighboring Arab states or political refugee status in a stable

political climate. Most of them still had their bags packed much longer with hopes of returning to the Middle East after their supposed temporary journey, while assisting the U.S. efforts and interests by toppling regimes and leading anti-government movement. (Haddad, 2011).

Unlike the first wave of Arab Americans who were predominantly uneducated Christians males, the second wave of immigrants, more likely fleeing revolutions and political tensions in the Middle East, were considerably the exiled elites who would be later called the brain drain from the newly independent Arab states of Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen. Those middle-Eastern elite were highly educated professionals and overwhelmingly literate from upper and middle classes with better financial status, strong English fluency, technical skills, and knowledge, especially scientists, doctors, lawyers, and engineers (Suleiman, 1999).

Following the establishment of state of Israel in Palestine and the resulting expulsion of many Palestinian refugees, the United States Congress passed the refugee Relief Act of 1953 and its extension in 1957, allowing nearly 12.5 percent of Palestinians from the total Arab population, to settle in U.S.A. (Seikaley, 1999). Additionally, during this period, the second wave of Arab immigrants were a diverse group with a large number of Sunni and Shi'a Muslims, including unskilled Yemeni men who worked in American shipyards, car industry, and farming in California.

While early Arab Americans were mobile peddlers and factory workers seeking better economic opportunities, good economic consideration and livelihood were a secondary pull to the second wave of Muslims who were looking for a more amenable home far from political turmoil and oppression of their homeland regimes (Orfalea, 2006). In this regard, many recent formed Arab states adopted free and fully accessible education and facilities access to scholarship abroad. As a result, a large number of Arab students started to seek education in the U.S.A. universities. Most of them were offered jobs, married Americans born spouses, and adapted the sophisticated postwar American society more quickly (Suleiman, 1999).

In the 1980s, nearly 216,000 Arab immigrants arrived to U.S.A., and approximately 142,000 influxed as Palestinian refugees. Unlike the early Arab immigrants and their progeny who shared the wholesale incorporation to the mores of the newly host nation and became invisible as an ethnic minority, the second wave of immigrants retained a sense of

Arab identity and continued to uphold homeland values and practices. Dissimilar to their forbears immigrants who focused on being socially active and identified specifically with their country of origin, the second wave started to become more politically active on both the local and national levels. As a matter of fact, they particularly campaigned for the rejection of secular Western norms and the Israeli state (Haddad, 2011).

Most of the post WWII Arab Americans became deeply aware and conscious about their political contest of their native lands since most of them left their families in the region. Though many of them were highly school educated, they were more spiritually alienated from the American society because 60 percent of them were Muslims. As they became more vocal about political issues of their homelands and possessed religious beliefs that hampered them from becoming real Americans, they were set apart from their other counterparts Americans. In this vein, differences between the early Christian Syrian immigrants and the second wave continued to be a source of profound strain; the two waves did not intermingle and socialize. To a degree that, the second wave of immigrants were not, due to their Palestinian origin and Muslim faith, only marginalized from the American mainstream, but also from early immigrants who demonstrated high levels of assimilation to the shared values of the American community (Orfalea, 2006).

Despite distinctions from the two waves of Arab immigrants, the creation of the state of Israel, the continuous influx of Palestinians from their homelands, and dismemberment of Palestine were precipitous events, which created a growing consciousness among Arab Americans, and to further extent instigated a real awareness over Arab identity (Orfalea, 2006). It was until the 1950s that Arab Americans started to develop an Arab identity and to think about their situation to counter the ignorance of their history in the new world. It is worthy to mention that more than half of Arab Americans of the second wave were Muslims who migrated to the U.S.A. following the passage of the 1953 Refugee Relief Act, just as they were escaping the Nakba of 1948. Such an event brought greater ethnic pride and politicized consciousness that sparked activism and the start of a united Arabness for Arab Americans in the U.S.A.

1-3-The Third Wave: 1865-2001

The sixties saw the end of the second wave of Arab immigrants, which came following a lull in immigration and marked the beginning of the third wave. Since the 1960,

a larger number of immigrants continued to influx to the U.S.A. as result of changes in immigration laws and the immediate Civil Right movements. Due to the loosening of the U.S. immigration restrictions in the 1960s, the American population has increased rapidly on a scale not seen since the mid-19th century. Number of significant political and cultural world events and various political turmoils in the Middle East acted as propelling that not only changed the ethnic makeup of the U.S.A., but also affected the patterns of immigration.

The passage of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, known as the Hart Celler Act, abolished the race-and nationality-based quotas of the previous 1924 immigration and allowed for the naturalization of the overall Asian immigrants. With the legislation of such a law, the American doors were opened for a large number of immigrants who had been previously barred to enter. As Rodney (2011) stated:

“SINCE THE PASSAGE of the U.S. Immigration Act of 1965, which abolished the use of national-origin quotas, more than 400,000 Arabs have arrived in America of national-origin quotas, more than 400,000 Arabs have arrived of new policies that gave preference to immigrants with professional skills. The reasons for this new migration, which is often referred to as the third wave, differ markedly from those of earlier periods. While economic objectives remain a major cause for migration, a number of related political factors have intermingled to increase the immigration of all Arab nationalities during this period. Political and social instability resulting from coup d'état, revolution, war, and military occupation appear to have accelerated the economic push-pull forces at work (p.97)

The third wave, post 1960, was escaping not only the volatile regional condition in the aftermath of the Israeli-Arab conflicts and squabble, but also the intra-Arab warfare and the intensified U.S. involvement in the region such as the Iraq-Iran, Iraq-Kuwaiti, and civil wars in Lebanon and Yemen (Suleiman,1999; Naff,1994). The spike in third wave immigration, according to Suleiman, prompted by the progress of means of transportation and communication as they permitted immigrants to conceive the world as one entity and; thus, more accepting the idea to migrate to further destinations in North America. Unlike the second wave of immigrants, the largest segments of the third wave were even Palestinians, although they arrived from Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Persian Gulf countries. It is worthy

to mention that the third Arab immigrants wave was, similar to the second wave, characterized by its particular composition of highly skilled, well-educated and prosperous professionals, continuing a cross-section of Arab brain drain phenomenon of 1950s and 1960s. Yet, the main distinction between skilled elite and their forefathers of the second wave is that the third wave was three times larger than the second one. Apart from the search of better livelihood and greater economic advantages, the major pull factor of the majority of Arab immigration was intra-Arab squabbles that were intensified with Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Consequently, more than 119.562 Lebanese migrated to the U.S.A., most of them Muslims who later rose dramatically and hit the peak in 1977 (Orfalea 2006).

Furthermore, the offensive Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and its war of attrition with Khomeini's era led to heavy sanctions from the United Nations on Iraq and Saddam Hussein; therefore, such Gulf War backlash caused a million of casualties and drove more than 53.388 Iraqi to U.S.A. Additionally, the abusive and authoritarian Arab regime brought 71.033 disillusioned Syrian to America and caused the death of nearly 20.000 civilians. Another prominent push –pull factor in Arab immigration was in reality the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, which made the Christians Iraqi Chaldeans and Egyptian Copts increasingly undesirable and isolated in their home societies. Those Christian congregations continued to rush in large numbers to U.S.A., especially after the ascension of the Arab socialist Ba'th Party in Iraq. Many of Iraqi Chaldeans settled around Chicago and Detroit, whereas Egyptian Copts, who were alienated by the Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser regime, immigrated to New Jersey (Orfalea 2006). While the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 helped to trigger interest in collective ethnic politics and self-definition for Arab in U.S.A., the wake of Arab- Israeli war in 1967 was the first far-reaching and significant moment in the Arab political consciousness. In fact, it galvanized them to be more enthusiastic and visible group in the American society (Shain, 1996; Seikaly, 1999).

Though the lasted seven days, the 1967 war was considered as pivotal event that marked Arab American involvement with policies related to their ancestral homelands issues in order to fend off discrimination (Suleiman, 1999). Accordingly, Arab Americans were more likely to maintain strong ties to their ethnic bonds and communal attachment to their native lands. Self-identification as an Arab, rather than Lebanese, Palestinian or Egyptian, began to emerge in the wake of one-week war and the coverage of the America media that portrayed Arabs as rascals and aggressor. In fact, the 1967 crises revived a sense

of ethnic pride and nationalism of Arabness among Arab descendent who were largely disappointed to realize how clearly pro-Israeli and one sided American media were in reporting the Middle East events (Suleiman, 1999). Such a worst and semi-factored mainstream media of Arabs spurred a shared identity and ethnic cohesion, regardless of the country of origin.

Generally, the Yemeni who arrived to the U.S.A. after the civil war were from the capitalist Northern Yemen, which was under heated tensions. Unlike the community of Southern Yemen, the Northerners, who were more rural from poor working class, fled unfavorable conditions in search for better life in the U.S.A. Most of Yemeni immigrants were young without families or families back home, and they represented different and remarkable group within the Arab Americans. Indeed, Yemeni immigrants were generally hard workers as farmers in California or factory workers in the Midwest cities of Detroit and Michigan. In the same regard, toward the end of 1990s, corresponding with the civil war in Sudan, the number of Sudanese immigrants has also increased dramatically, particularly when the U.S.A. has accepted them as refugees. Most of them established in cities such as Maine and Nebraska that already had Sudanese immigrants there.

Similar to their Sudanese counterparts, Somali immigrants migrated essentially from Somalia to pursue higher studies in the 1960s and 1970s. However, it was not until the mid-1990, when the ongoing Somali civil war broke out, that Somali immigrants started to flood to the U.S.A. with heaviest concentration in the twin cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul in Minnesota. In the beginning of the 1980, a considerable number of Yemeni joined other ethnic Somali immigrants from other different backgrounds (Putman & Noor, 1993).

Finally, in contrast to immigration from Arab Occidental countries, migration from North African countries is very small. Recently, however, Arab North Africans from countries of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia began to arrive significantly in 1970 and they were sharing the same ethnic concerns with their Arab American fellows.

2-The Arab World and Arabness

People, who self-identify as Arabs, generally speak Arabic and live in the Arab world, which spans over the Asian and African continents. Arabs initially claim a link to a vast swath of land that stretches from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean, from Iraq and the Gulf states in the east to Morocco's Atlantic coast in the west. From Syria in the north to

Sudan in the south. The Arab world covers a territory of nearly 5000 miles including three main regions known as: the Mediterranean, the Aaden Gulf, and North Africa. From the early past, Arabia was considered as the southwest. Seventy two percent of the Arab homeland lies in Africa while 28 percent lies in Asia, comprising 23 separate countries. The Mediterranean Arabs come from Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and historic Palestine. Gulf Arabs come from Yemen, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Djibouti, Oman, the United Arab countries, and Saudi Arabia, while the Arabs of North Africa are from Algeria, Egypt, Somalia, Libya, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, and Mauritania. Each of these countries represents enormous diversity in religious beliefs, customs, traditions, cultures, and history (Nevo &Pappé,1994).

The phrase first Arab endually entails images of Arabia with arid desert, pre-Islamic bedouin history dating back to 1500 years ago. However, the binary periodization of pre-Islamic and Islamic Arab history is absolutely still unclear, and recent studies struggle over the empirical reliability to provide conations and definitions of Arabs. Generally, the notion of Arab race continues to conceptualize the original Arabs as Arab ethnos who were characterized by bedouinism, material underdevelopment, and tribal marring. Hence, most current scholarly researches use the word Arab only to denote Arabs from non-Arab nomads and demonstrate that pre-Islamic Arabian Peninsula was arable. There was no trace of the notion of Arabs in the early classical Arabian literary narratives, which did not reflect accounts of primordial bedouine life. The idea of pre-Islamic urban and Arabness of pre-Islamic people were unreservedly accepted because there was scant and suspicious correlation that Arabian culture of Yemen, Oman, and Bahrain were ethnically Arab. The inclusion of those ethnos into Arabness is doubtful and the pervasive association of Arabs with bedouinism is staunchly rejected. It is worthy to note that the divergent assumptions about pre-Islamic Arab ethnos cannot be accepted as a fatal corollary and that the original Arab is often depicted through composite of exotic distance, lusty tribal raiders, harsh desert, camel herds and tent dwellers. As still current in modern thought, such an archaic image and conceptual nexus of tribalist bedouinism were well scoured by Gibbon's *Decline and fall of the Roman Empire* (1994), as he stated:

In the dreary waste of Arabia, a boundless level of sand is intersected by sharp and naked mountains; and the face of the desert, without shade or shelter, is

scorched by the direct and intense rays of a tropical sun (231) ... The same life is uniformly pursued by the roving tribes of the desert; and in the portrait of the modern *Bedowens*, we may trace the features of their ancestors, who, in the age of Moses or Mohammed, dwelt under similar tents, and conducted their horses, and camels, and sheep to the same springs and the same pastures (234) ... Of the time of ignorance which preceded Mohammed, seventeen hundred battles are recorded by tradition: hostility was embittered with the rancour of civil faction (243) ... in Arabia, as well as in Greece, the perfection of language outstripped the refinement of manners; and [Arabic] speech could diversify the fourscore names of honey, the two hundred of a serpent, the five hundred of a lion, the thousand of a sword, at a time when this copious dictionary was intrusted to the memory of an illiterate people (pp.231-245).

Recent historians have confirmed the primordial evidence that the ancient Semitic lineage was related to the Arabs, and so have proved that they existed as desert bedouines for more than one thousand year before Islamic religion. Indeed, the Arab race is related to ancient Semitic people of Assyrians, Aramaeans, Cannanites, Hebrew, and Phoenicians, and later Arabs who migrated to the Fertile Crescent due to overpopulation. Henceforth, the majority of Arabs are descendants of those Semitic races who both spoke Arabic Hebrew and Amharic and shared similar linguistic structures. Prior the rise of Islam, the disparate Arab tribes, as quintessential Semitic community, shared a common Arabic poetic language as a proof to some cultural heritage. Their Arabic literary narratives were transmitted orally and then written during the 8th century. It is worthy to note that literature and language, particularly poetry, are crucial to understand the emergence of Arabs. Accordingly, the poets of pre-Islamic era composed lengthy lyrical poems that extolled values of bedouine lifestyle such as solidarity, honor, good manners, generosity, and loyalty. In this regard, such literary prosperity prompted Arab consciousness and yielded an outright rise of Islamic religion.

While there is no consensus about the depiction of the term Arab through scrutiny of an array of early writings that pointedly imbedded it into nomadism, it was until the rise of Islam that the Arab origin and Arabness were bestowed much greater clarity. Islam was in fact the catalyst for the emergence of Arabs on the world historical scene in the 7th century BC with the prophethood of Muhammad PBUH. Hence, the notion of Arabness had been

reconstructed and blossomed, and the Arab history was properly rewritten in the Arabian Peninsula. Accordingly, the genealogical Arab model had decisively refined and matured.

Arab people and Islam, as closely interwoven, both appeared centuries ago in the Arabian city of Mecca where the Prophet Muhammed 'PBUH' introduced his new religion and began preaching the new message on the basis of submission to the will of one God as well as the prophetic revelation that were compiled in the Holy book of Quran. As the prophet Muhammad delivered his divine mission based on the oneness of God, Arabs championed the cause of knowledge and science, resulting in great cultural and intellectual achievements within the broader realm of the Rightly Guided Caliphs, the Abbasids, and the Umayyads. Henceforth, the term Arab is both a cultural and a linguistic connotation linked to both people who share the Arab culture and Arabic language. In this vein, Haddad Yvonne (2011) focuses on a more specific description of the Arabs on the basis of culture, language and history and explains that "during the first half of the 20th century, Arab was used to refer to...resident of the Ottoman empire"(p.13).

The golden age of Islamic civilization permitted people of diverse ethnic backgrounds, who were united under the banner of Islam, to participate together in activating the mind. Within a short time after the birth of Islam in the 7th century, Muslim dynasties, including Arab Jews and Arab Christians, built a vast empire that bore witness of a vital Arab role in world civilization. Despite the fact that Muslims and Arabs had reached a zenith of triumph, their leading torch of expansion began to wane and their power became at an abrupt halt with the demise of the Ottoman Empire. By the 17th century, the balance of power had swung in favor of the colonial nations with gradual switch, which was to culminate into European colonization of the Arab world at the outset of the 20th century.

During WWII, Britain and France divided the Arab world between them; thus, their colonization resulted in a deep resentment and hatred against Western imperial rule whose legacy often interprets the contemporary misunderstanding between Arab nations and Westerners. Conflicts, for instance, prompted the recognition of Iraq, particularly when Britain granted it its independence in 1932. Taking into consideration the mounting skepticism about the sustainable economic and military commitment in governing Iraq, England succeeded to establish an amiable, but autonomous regime in that region. It applied such a regime by forging a nation of diverse ethnic groups including Arabs, Kurdish, Persians, Turks along religious congregations of Sunni, Shi'a and Christians. Henceforth,

the establishment of a separate sovereign Iraq was an important impetus for the development of states previously colonized by imperial powers, after WWII.

An assertion was increasingly placed on the growth of pro-Western autocratic regimes through encouraging governments to work often with diverse ethnic and religious groups. The continuous support of absolute autocratic doctrines revealed the real intentions, and; hence, Western governments were wittingly involved in tensions with Arab people. Coming to heels of the Western government support of Shah, Iran reaction has provoked mounting resentment that boosted a dissonant animosity between Iran and Western regimes (Keddie, 2003). A similar situation between Arab autocratic regimes and Muslim populations in Arab countries might be perceived in other states such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt where Arab people, enduring years of absolute totalitarianism, have been illegally deprived their rights by tyrannical government that were uphold by Westerners.

The first thread of Arab national struggle emerged with the dispossession of Palestinians' lands and the creation of the state of Israel, which led to the development of Arab consciousness. The perpetual disfranchisement of Arab people by supported autocratic regimes, along with the skirmishes of the Palestine issue, resulted in a tense strain between the West and the Arab governments. Such a strong stake of opposition besides the 1956 Suez crisis elicited potential misunderstanding and prejudice for both people and drove wedge between them.

In 1965, the Arab nationalism reached its climax when the Egyptian president at that time Gamal Abdel Nasser defied Britain's involvement by nationalizing the Suez Canal. The defeat of 1965 had dramatic and far-reaching effects on him, Arab nationalism, and secularism in general. In this regard, particular nationalism reached its pinnacle among Arab countries through advocating a revolutionary strategy of islamization of social and political systems, known as Islamism. The stirring strides of such particularism resulted in the 1991 Gulf War, which was Iraq's assault, invasion, and annexation of Kuwait arising from oil production and pricing. Hence, the Arab world was severely affected, and disruptions after the crisis culminated in the division of Arab people and their states. The triumph over the Shah's brutal regime and the success to establish an Islamic republic in the aftermath of Iranian revolution were strong stimulus in the emergence of the current political movements in the Arab world, including Algeria, Tunisia, Yemen and Egypt. Such political

movements and upheavals stimulated Arabs and Muslims' immigration to the United States of America.

3-Arab and Muslim Americans Epithets

Scholars have generally contested the terms Arab and Muslim Americans as rubrics of identity and most of Americans conflate the two entities. They are nationalist in scope and; therefore, addressed to non-Arab minorities in America. In this regard, American activists have clarified the interplay between the relevance of Arab American compared to Muslim American in accordance to the rise of Islamic movements as a mechanism against Western colonialism and Eurocentrism (Nader, 2006).

In some contexts, while some have privileged the term Arab American as a nation-based concept to the people of the Middle East, others tend to link the term Muslim American as a useful alternative on the basis that loyalty is originated in faith and divine. The close association of Arabs with the birth of Islamic religion has plausibly led to the misuse of the two terms "Arab" and "Muslim" interchangeably and one wonders to clarify how they have come to be conflated within the American history. The term Arab American is a complex label of identification. The Arab American institute defines Arab Americans as those immigrants of an ethnic group who trace their roots from 22 countries, covering a large area in Western Asia and Northern Africa and the Middle East. Hence, the identification that all Arabs are Muslims and all Muslims are Arabs is a pervasive connotation in the United States today (Debra Meskin, 2004). "Despite deep demographic, religious , and other differences between the two groups, both Arabs and Muslims have become the target to popular suspicion, resulting in 'Arabification' of Muslims, and the 'Muslification' of Arabs" (Bahdi, 2003, 259).

The Arab American implies a highly heterogeneous group that represent many distinctive cultural, traditional, and linguistic sets of features, in addition to variances in religious identification. In this regard, the conflation of Arab and Muslim American is deeply entrenched, and it became salient after 9/11. Significantly, the term Arab American has not a common usage until recently, particularly because most of immigrants during early waves of immigration referred to themselves as Syrian or Syrian Lebanese. Broadly, the term Arab American refers to those of Arab descent who share Arabic language and heritage. Though Arab Americans have been visible within the American society, their

population remains an inadequately described group because they account for nearly 18 percent of all Muslims (Jackson, 1997), with a predominant Christian group from Mount Lebanon and Greater Syria (Naff, 1985; Suleiman, 1999). Approximately 10 percent of Arab population identifies as non-Muslim, but rather Christians or members of other faiths (Jackson, 1997).

Despite the fact that Arab Muslims constitute nearly one third of total Arab American population and barely one fourth of the bulk of Muslims in America, the common misconception of the epithets 'Arab' and 'Muslim' are still prevalent among Americans who mistakenly overlap the two connotation and persist to consider both groups as cohesive ethnic entity. It is not surprising that many Americans assume that all Arab Americans are Muslims, it is as Muslims themselves in Arab world that presume Americans as wholly Christian also. The quintessential debate over Muslims and Arabs is thorny and illustrates that the basic distinction is based on racial and religious designation. Hence, it is Christianity that functions as hallmark of Whiteness and citizenship for newcomers from the Arab world. Such an association would bitterly exclude early Muslims cohorts as distinct alignment with non-Whiteness (Naff, 1985).

Concerning the relation between Islam and Arabness, the investigation delves into the essence of such a relation, which tempts to clarify the incorrect equation of Islam and Arabness. The inaccuracies delegitimize claims that Arab Americans form monolithic entity and demonstrate that Arab Americans are ethnically, politically, and religiously more diversified. Consequently, similar to different mainstream societies, they strongly retain multiple competing identities that frame their interaction toward their counterpart citizens and their political participation as active members. Therefore, the identification of Arab Americans, synonymously to Muslim American epithet, is nothing than a linguistic or a cultural designation.

Obviously, the overlap between Arab Americans and Muslim Americans obscures the fact that the two labels as mutually inclusive with slight regional difference. The consideration of all Arab Americans as Muslims is cursory and sketchy. The fact that most of the first wave Arabs sparked a considerable influx of poor, single, uneducated Christian sojourners driven from Greater Syria and Levant of Ottoman Empire. The majority were Christians in the host country where Muslims were skeptic about the preservation of

their cultural heritage in a Christian society that might impede their loyalty to Islamic principles (Naff, 1985).

It is worthy to mention that use of the labels Arab American or Muslim American became widely problematic. Actually, federal officials of Census Bureau have found it difficult to provide adequate and reliable data about new arrivals, their classification and self-identification. The early Arab immigrants lacked a nation-state origin, unlike their European counterparts who belonged to a nation state to which they self-identify. Unlike the Irish and Jews, for instance, the early Arab immigrants lacked one nation-state and the sense of national consciousness because they migrated from different array of countries. Thus, regardless of their Ottoman colonized Levant origin and their religious, ethnic, or linguistic backgrounds, early Arab immigrants to U.S.A. were recorded as Turkish from Asia instead of Arabs who refer to Arab-speaking immigrants only (Kayyali , 2006).

Though it was feasible to estimate the number of early Arab immigrants, it was impossible to know exactly the proportion of Muslims among them because of the lack of recorded data from the homeland origin about leaving cohorts and problems of estimation by American officials upon arrival of Turks, Ottomans, Africans, Asians and Greeks.

It was until the 1965 Immigration Law that the exodus of diverse settlers self-identify as Arab Americans, dissimilar for instance, to the Germans or Jewish Italian newcomers who were homogeneously cohesive. The question of citizenship was highly debated, and scholars have paid insufficient attention to the issue of naturalization among Arab Americans. Throughout the American history, they had confronted challenges over naturalization and they were denied citizenship because the naturalization system considered Arabs as synonymous with Muslims. Because Muslims were presumed to be non-White, Arabs were also considered illegible for citizenship.

During the naturalization era, judges rendered Arab and Muslim immigrants a non-White race and unassimilable to the American mainstream due to the lack of strict scientific criteria. The disqualification of Arabs from citizenship stemmed from discordant and often arbitrary courts' rulings. In this perspective, judges decisions of rebutting was based on the fact that Muslims didn't fit within statutory decision of the Caucasian race , and even on ignorance of the Arab world in general.

3-1-Muslim Americans

There is a thorny issue about the widespread misunderstanding of the labels ‘Muslim American’ and ‘Arab American’ who are often limped together as mutually inclusive, but mainly different ethnic groups. Partly due to this overlap, the current targeted group of Muslims and Arabs are imputed as single monolithic category due to their association with Islam. The non-availability of official Census data and the lack of accurate statistical image of the two groups make it more difficult to distinguish them among extremely diverse categories. In this regard, Muneer Ahmad stated that: “Arab racial category is sometimes conflated with ‘Muslim’ religious category, even though, most Arabs in America are not Muslims and most of the world’s Muslims are not Arabs.” Further complicating matters is the fact that racialized suspicion and even violence extend to persons who are neither Muslims nor Arabs, but are believed to ‘look’ like Arabs (Muneer, 2004). Despite the fact that Islam’s origin is in the Arabian Peninsula, the overwhelming majority of Muslims today do not identify as Arabs. Nevertheless, the birth of Islam in the Arabian Peninsula is considered as a fundamental factor underlying its close relation with Arab identity.

The rapid expansion of Islam beyond the Arabian Peninsula and its interaction with new cultures of conquered people soon turned its identity as a religion of Arab. Islam overseas expansion procured pluralist diversity as well as the emergence of an array distinct sects, schisms, and contesting ideas that progressively transformed the Islamic religion into a pluralist faith that reflects its diverse members. In fact, it is so difficult to assert how many Muslims in the U.S.A. because the U.S. Census Bureau is not allowed to gather data on the basis of religion. Unearthing the story of Muslim Americans means tracing the connections of them to their counterparts abroad. Thus, the story of Muslims in America yields to understand the realities that have unfolded a global stage shaped by international crossing. In fact, Islam in America has been bluntly international and cross-cultural form it beginning there.

Despite the fact that Islam and Muslims have been in existence for more than four hundred years in America, studies about Muslim American remain sparse in most university texts and materials. Such paucity of American Muslim history is explained by the fact that they, similar to other immigrant groups, are often split along boundaries of race, gender, class and ethnicity, and because they lacked knowledge about themselves. Muslims in the U.S.A. represent both the diversity of the Islamic world and the multicultural nature of

America where their lives collide with much more a diverse nation. In this regard, Jane Smith (1999), a professor of Islamic studies and co-director of the Macdonald Center for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations at Hartford Seminary, demonstrates both the diversity and the divide when she notes:

Immigrants have squabbled over differences in culture and custom...Blacks, Hispanics, Native Americans, and others struggle to find their identity both under the greater umbrella of American Islam and also specifically as members of their respective racial-ethnic groupings. African Americans who are followers of (mainstream Islam) are unhappy that Louis Farrakhan's Nation of Islam which they consider to be dangerously heterodox continues to get so much publicity in the American press. (pp. 166-167).

In this regard, some fail to account the fact of the Muslim community's rich pluralism and instead keep viewing it as a unified entity without distinctions and dissensions. However, there is a widespread agreement that the category Islam is often used, for political reasons, to describe Muslims as a monolithic entity (Hunter, 2001). It was until the tragic events of 9/11 events and its aftermath that Muslims in America gained more concerns, and inquiries about Islam and Muslims began to emerge. Basically, 9/11 instigated more critique about Islam and spawned mounting political discourse on both Muslims and Muslim Americans' culture. Hence, such political trope might have taken broader interest in America as an obvious signifier that consolidated the racialization of non-White others. In this sense, the invisible citizens among the American society became visible subject or even hyper-visible.

As the Muslim community has become salient, there is a growing interest on the part of Muslims, Christians and Jews to enter into dialogues of understanding on the basis of shared values and beliefs. Since the horrific events of 9/11, a growing number of immigrants from Muslim countries, who previously were identified with their homelands' ethnicity and culture, are now bound under a collective identity of Muslim Americans. They prefer to be identified by their religion despite their large variations in race, social class, and country of origin.

The most challenging factor in depicting Muslim Americans population is estimating their number. Inadequate tools and insufficient data make it hard to provide exact and adequate estimates. There is no way of knowing precisely the number of Muslims living in

the United States as the scope of result is based on different rates with different method. Accordingly, the number of Muslim Americans is contested and inaccurate, and major results in determining the size of Muslims in the U.S.A. are related to both erroneous self-identification and the pluralistic nature of the population itself. What is known, however, is that the American Muslims are extraordinarily diverse and equally vibrant. For instance, the American Muslim Poll 2004 found out that the first largest ethnic groups among American Muslims are South Asians with 34 percent, Arabs constituted 26 percent; African Americans represented 20 percent; and just seven percent for Africans (Pew Research Center, 2004).

3-2-Arab Americans

It is crucial to recognize the paradoxes that come with efforts to classify Arab Americans in the United States. Categorization of Arab Americans is contested and government officials have found it opaque to understand who is an Arab and what constitutes Arabness. The multi-lingual, multi-racial, and multi-faceted differences, that expounds classification schemes, are particularly arduous task. Popular U.S. discourses tend to emphasize on shifts in racial categories and criteria of Whiteness for citizenship. Whiteness is one of the fundamental paradoxes of immigrants to the U.S.A in general as well Arab American in particular. It is a matter of some contention to determine who is and is not an Arab; a category that may or not correlate with to what extent immigrants realize their origins.

Arab Americans trace their roots from 22 diverse countries of Arab lineage. Estimates of Americans of Arab ancestry in the U.S. range from roughly 12 million (Brittingham & de la Cruz, 2005) to more than 3.5 million according to Arab American Institute. The overall population of Arab immigrants was 860,354 in 1999, and it reached 1,290,000 in 2000. Yet, it attained nearly 1,680,000 in 2010. Approximately 80 percent of Arab residents in the U.S.A. are citizens and the majority of American Arabs are native born. Though the Arab American minority is witnessing an increasing growth recently, it still constitutes a mere 1 percent of the whole American population. It is worthy to note that the U.S. Census officials do not categorize Arabs as a minority. However, the American Census Bureau identifies the Arab population under the labels of White or others because of the absence of Arab American category in the ethnicity section as for other minorities. Henceforth, the official population calculations of Arabs are problematic; more immigrants

fail to be affiliated as Arabs because they are from a country that the Census Bureau does not consider as Arab. In addition, American academia relates the drawbacks of the population to the out marriage to non-Arabs, which leads to inaccuracies of self-identification. In exemplifying this perspective, some individuals are excluded from being of an Arab ancestry as in 2003 report, which primarily omitted large nationals of Arab origin.

Overwhelmingly, Arab Americans live in all American states and they are distributed throughout different regions; 26 percent live in the North East, 24 percent reside in the Midwest, 23 percent are in the West and 27 percent live in the South. Furthermore, they live in the largest American major cities: California, Michigan, New York, Texas, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Pennsylvania with heavy concentration in six metropolitan areas of Detroit, Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, Washington D.C. and Northern New Jersey. Though they are distributed in all American States, one third live in Detroit and Los Angeles. In 2011, the Lebanese were ranked the first with a population of 194.000, constitute almost 30 percent of the total Arab population. The next largest group were the Egyptians with a population of 197.000, constituting 12 percent of all the Arab Americans; whereas Syrians with 159.000 residents who are ranked the third. The number of people with Palestinian ancestry reached a population of 104.000 (6 percent of the Arab population) as a fourth cohort of the overall Arabs. People with Iraqi origins were ranked fifth with a proportion of 5 percent of the Arab American population. Immigrants from Iraq influxed in huge number to the U.S.A. as refugees, fleeing the American conquest of Iraq in 2001. Thus, their population increased dramatically from 37.714 in 2000 to 101.000 in 2010. The Moroccans, the Jordanian were also sizable (78.000 and 68.000 respectively). An Additional 2.86 percent of the Arab population identified themselves as 'other Arabs', which includes smaller communities of Yemeni, Algerians, Saudi Arabians, and Tunisians. Concerning religious affiliations, Arab American in the U.S.A. are primarily Christians who migrated from Greater Syria during the Ottoman Empire in 1880s. Approximately, 75 percent of them are Christians whereas nearly 24 percent believe in Islam. The Cristian Arabs are basically of Orthodox or Catholic faith (Arab American Institute, 2003).

Nowadays, many Arab Americans trace their origin to modern Arab world and construct their identities in relation to Pan-Arabic that is closely connected to Arab nationalism. Even though the Arab American group adheres to particular form of Arab

identity in terms of a shared language, a common culture, and a baseline of secularism, other national identifications are all also congealed as Arab in popular representation. Other national affiliations may include Berbers in Maghreb, Copts in Egypt, Kurds in the Levant and Gulf, Maronite Catholics in Lebanon, Jews throughout the Middle East and North Africa. Those indigenous populations have been marginalized and persecuted because they resisted Arab nationalism, as in Algeria and Egypt. They don't chose to accede on the grounds since it threatened their sectarian tribal nationalism (Weitzman, 2011).

The issue of the loss of rituals and the adherence to Christian sects began to become a debating point. In comparison to the broader adult population, Arab Americans are young and better educated. Most of them are not immigrants as they were born in the United States for families, which could trace their roots to Americans for more generations of residence. In addition, the 2000 U.S. Census Bureau reported that the majority of Arab Americans population is male with 57 percent, compared with 49 percent male of the total population.

4-Arab American Identity

While the concept is inescapable across a broad spectrum of disciplines, there is currently a proliferation of competing arguments, which emerge from acceptance, contestation and amalgam of valuable endeavors throughout time. Given a wide-range interest to identity in remarkable array of social science and politics, one might accept it easy and clear to capture what the exact meaning of identity is. Overwhelmingly, prominent scholars have long struggled over what rightly and precisely constitute its components. Ideed, the concept identity refers to something ineffable, unclear in both popular and academic discourses. Deep understanding of the term within political debates leads to engage more precisely on disciplines of race, class, ethnicity, citizenship, and gender. Areas of mainstream sociology, history, and politics of identity open up all sorts of inquiries regarding the considerable overlap among the fuzzy definitions and clarifications underlying it. Precisely, the growth interest, the breadth, and the scope of discussions on identity, as a form of belonging to the social group, stem largely from the skeptic polity of immigration and the diverse ethnic and racial landscape of the United States.

The widespread use of the term can be seen to reflate mounting awareness of significance in constructing an identity and that can best account for the ways to understand

people's sense of fitting and underpins their experiences and actions within globalization. Due to its indispensable use in recent political, sociological debates, it is quite manifold and have to come with all-encompassing definitions of identity. Indeed, scholars, academicians explain different alternative terms that evoke distinct meaning; thus none seems obviously false, despite diversity. The question over identity remains enigmatic and reflects a process of changes that are aligned to diverse understandings of how identity is constructed. It is likely that some consider it as a stable sense of oneself within space and time, whereas others conceive it as a sort of fluidity, dynamism, and interaction. Besides, there are also those who consider identity as more of a person psychological achievement and retain to the common identification within the larger society. Some tend at the same time to apply the term to define the continuity of a self, which is built upon the meaning that individuals pertain the multiple roles they play in the contemporary society (Stryker & Burke, 2000). In this regard, the meaning of identity entails the idea of self, selfhood, role, personality, position, subjectivity, and agent that are all used by scholars to show their allegiances and preferences to these diverse connotations of identity.

Obviously, identity implies a constructive understanding of the queries about self identity (personal), national identity (collective), or group identity (ethnic identity). Hence, identities answer the main questions of “Who am I? Who are we? What am I? What are we? Basically, it is understood as an individual psychological construct or a group sense of social belonging over time. The main distinction that can be drawn is that some psychologists perceive identity as something internal that persists through change, and others consider it as “something which is shaped by the society in which the individual finds himself” (Gleason, 1983, p.981). Though both individuals and groups have identities, persons within a society can find and identify their individual identities just in context of national identity, which requires temporal and spatial continuity of a nation. People can develop a feeling of belonging to a social group and orchestrate this new group membership with preexisting self-identity. Though self-categorization makes a basic distinction between personal and social identity as differing levels of membership, both personal and national identities are constructed as a result of interaction between the self and the group that are changeable in a particular time and situation. In this respect, personal identity refers to the individual identification as a unique person in terms of personal distinctive features from

other ingroup persons, whereas social identity defines the individual in terms of his shared similarities with members of the group he/she belongs to.

Although the term identity is applied randomly among scholars for many persuasions, it is likely nowadays that it rose to prominence in Erikson's psychological theory of the 1950s, which hypothesized and conceptualized matters of identity and identity crisis across a broad spectrum. It is common that the self needs the group to define itself as the group constitutes the self. Accordingly, the current understanding of identity evolution is derived from Eric Erikson's concept of identity crisis. Unlike others who have promoted a widely common model of identity development that emphasizes on the development of identity through the exploration as well as the commitment to the group, Erikson used the term identity as a way of making sense of some aspects or part of self-concept. Thus, people can identify themselves from a number of perspectives regarding multiple situations. Personal and group identities are used to explain the process that makes sense of the social world in relation of what matters to the individualistic 'me' or to the consequences of the collectivistic 'us' through the diverse perceptions about the self within a social context (Frale, 1997).

All in all, despite its slippery and ambiguous connotation, Erik Erikson (1956) clarified the fundamental paradox of identity and pioneered the innovative usage of the term identity crisis that is randomly linked to all fields of studies. In this regard, he states:

An optimal sense of identity is experienced mainly as a sense of psychological well-being. Its most obvious concomitants are a feeling of being at home in one's body, a sense of knowing where one 'is going', and an inner assuredness of anticipated recognition from who count... Identity is a dynamic fitting together of parts of the personality with the realities of the social world so that a person has a sense of both internal coherence and meaningful relatedness to the real world. (p.74)

Identity is seen as relational, shaped in relation to those who are similar as well as those who are different. In addition, dimensions of identification include self-categorization, importance, evaluation, attachment and commitment, social embeddedness, behavioral involvement, and context. Thus, personal identities are bound to person's goals, values, traits, characteristics, attitudes, and the way of being.

Whereas a group identity is a person's main social roles, interpersonal relationship and group belonging are themselves orchestrated by values, characteristics, attitudes, goals and traits matching with those roles and membership. The objective of the focus group is to find out the thorough of how Arabs can perceive their being as Americans as well as their relationship and belonging to the American society. Fostering a better understanding of Arab American identity yields to consider the complexities, challenges and opportunities inherent in the emergence of the Arab American community. Especially, when Arab Americans are prone to vicious stereotypes, prejudice, bad public and media images, insidious profiling that all together assault Arabs with terrorism and War on Terror. Henceforth, Arab Americans are torn between acceptance and exclusion that generate forms of resilience and resistance against experiences of discrimination, particularly how they self-identify within communal boundaries, which distinguish between who are fully members in the national mainstream and who are not.

5-Arab American Cultural Identity

Arab Americans' cultural identity has been an interwoven topic for academia. Scholars have long struggled to understand the effects of religion, gender, and nationality on the construction of cultural identity as well as attitudes toward the original and the host cultures. As with the concept of identity, there has been a great deal of concern to understand cultural identity as it has gained momentum in recent time. Cultural identity stands as a cornerstone of presenting the cultural heritage as a decisive force in a society. Its fundamental understanding suggests that particular group distinctiveness is related to cultural behaviors, customs, language, beliefs, and religion.

Obviously, a sense of cultural identity enables to answer the following questions: what attracts a group and distinguish it from others, what things that can differentiate it from others, and what shapes the group's identity. When people ask these questions, they are requiring into their culture. Through a historical perspective, culture is a pivotal element in shaping identity. However, the realm of identity and culture is often the subject of contestation. The importance of cultural sphere yields to understand that is not only a sense in the process of identification and belonging, but also one of the ways of constructing social relationships that underpins the links between the individuals and their societies' different classes and groups. In this regard, Spencer-Otay explains that culture itself remains

notoriously a complex term as he states: “Culture is a fuzzy set of basic assumptions and values... and behavioral conventions that are shared by a group of people and that influence each member’s behavior and his/her interpretations of the ‘meaning’ of other people’s behaviours” (Spencer-Otay, 2008, p.8). Thus, cultural identity is not static and constructs preexisting collective action of a social group. Indeed, it is a fluid and dynamic social process undergoing continuation. In other words, cultural identity, as a social practice, is changeable and built through history. It is ““a matter of “becoming” as well as “being”..., they (identities) are subject to the continuous “play” of history, culture and power.... Identities are the names we give to the different ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves within, the narratives of the past” (Hall, 1990, p. 324). It is a collective of cultural practices and memories of certain events that produce a shared historical background, thereby constructing and influencing how people engage in sharing a sense of their future and destiny.

Every nation has its own historical values and heritage to be preserved. In this regard, history often takes into account popular traditions and cultural interpretations of historical experiences in terms of past knowledge, customs, as well as artistic production that denote the identity of the social group and make it distinct from another. It is, thus a descriptor of geographic origin and a clear indicator of membership into the dominant culture.

Cultural identity construction involves a multi- faceted and a complex process of a range of experiences as well as the interaction of cultural realities. It is, first and foremost, a psychological phenomenon in the minority’s culture which cast the identification with the group representing their values, including past experiences, cultural milieu, present circumstances and future possibilities. Although, there has been a revitalized proliferation theory of research since Erikson, there is a significant paucity of empirical research regarding cultural identity that has almost ambivalent cultural connotation. Cultural identity formation theories purport that people begin their process of identification with an interwoven racial and cultural background, which is subject to devaluation, salience and denial. Within a social group, the individual feels, accordingly, the challenges of his experiences that render race or cultural personality skeptic and problematic. To face such challenges, the individual explores his cultural and racial identity through immersing himself in his appropriate culture specific to his racial and cultural norms. Hence, this process of

search in once cultural identity leads people to esteem cultural, racial, or minority group's belonging and merge it with other identities. (Phinney, 1997). Such a cycle of development occurs through life, and its phases can be understood as ego status and perceptions in treating racial and cultural information (Frable, 1997).

Besides, cultural identity is not fixed in the individual memory as unchangeable. It is not just about who we are, but it rather encompasses the continuous interaction of past events and the group cultural traits. In this vein, it is interpreted as a result of what we have become through denoting the various distinctive aggregate of cultural identity. Sociologists Jean Phinney and Dervic-Navarro (1995) suggested three fundamental and distinct phases in the process of constructing cultural identity: (1) cultural identity is not an issue and; thus, it is *unexplored* (2) an increase of an individual *awareness* about ethnicity is likely followed by experiences by the host country (3) coming to terms with one's cultural identity (*acceptance*). It is worthy to mention that the experiences of cultural identification imply a multi-faceted and complex contestation that may not always originate from the negative outcome of negative experiences like racism, as argued by Phinney and her colleagues.

The process of cultural identification globalizes the focus on communication from interaction between persons in the same group to mass communication outside the social group (Corcoran, 1993). In this regard, cultural identification plays a crucial role in shaping and constructing identity as well as social memory through critical and social perspectives. Ultimately, cultural identity is the process that is continuous and incomplete because it engages interactions between groups through emphasizing group boundaries that create binary system of difference between those who fit in the group and those who are marginalized. Such a system of distinctiveness generates a sense of 'them' and us' As Hall (1990) pointed out:

Cultural identities are the points of identification the unstable points of identification or suture, which are made within the discourses of history, and culture. Not an essence but a positioning .We ought to think ...identities as framed by the axis of vectors, simultaneously operate in the vector of similarity and continuity and the vector of difference and rupture. (p.223)

In essence, cultural identity is constructed by a myriad of internal and environmental identifications, which require full-fledged and vital members who embody the group's standards and norms. When societal and cultural expectations change, and when we move to another country, open possibilities of confusion and ambiguities of whether to statically maintain the cultural, intellectual or spiritual beliefs or react to cultural shock towards the host culture. Such open possibilities can entail a set of negative reactions to the loss of perpetual reinforcement of once native culture or cultural adjustment to the dominant mainstream. Basically, cultural identity, dissimilar to race as a biological construct, is a sense of membership to the national group through which the individual shares the basic background of ancestral heritage of institutions, beliefs, symbols, and practices.

6-Ethnicity and Ethnic Identity

Most scholars, working in a broad spectrum of disciplines, have taken a rich body of questions and findings concerning ethnic identity that itself remains complex, enigmatic, and multi-dimensional construct. Overwhelmingly, academic users of ethnic identity show that much effort has been applied in determining what rightly delineates its meaning, its structures, and its competing components, which emerge over a variety of arguments. Indeed, those who have approached the task have found themselves unable to achieve a consensus. Most usages are both vague and ambiguous in their application to empirical research. What some scholars have considered to be examples of ethnicity, others would consider to be cases of such other variables as regionalism, religion, sectarianism, class conflict, and even sheer opportunism (Ross, 1979, p.3).


Ethnicity has gained a particular attention in the last decade because the United States has become an important facet of diverse immigration, which has renewed interest in ethnic identity. Because it has merged as salient part in the core of social identification and issues related to minorities, it refers to a person's sense of belonging to his own ethnic group. Accordingly, it is dynamic as it encompasses the sum of feeling, emotional sense, thinking, and behaviours about one's status as ethnic group members as well as one sense of attachment and commitment to his minority group (Phinney, 2003). As such ethnicity would be perceived as thoughts or actions based on this identity.

As a psychological construct, Knight and Bernal (1993) provide a very comprehensive description of ethnic identity, which is a construct of self-ideas about one's own ethnic group membership. The emphasis in defining ethnic identity is on knowledge about one own ethnic group and the sense of self as a member (p.33).The individual's knowledge of belonging to a particular group results from inner-group relations as cognitive and affective representations of its fundamental constituents. Ethnic identity is different from ethnicity, which denotes where immigrants come from, and it is an ascribed status. In host countries, ethnic identity becomes pertinent upon arrival with sufficient cultural distance between the country of origin and the new country. Thus, it refers to the individual's categorization and comparison to others of the same or different ethnicity (Constant, Gataullina, & Zimmermann, 2006). It is the conception that draws a possible closeness or distance that one feels between affinity to, self-identification with the culture and norms of the native community as well as self-identification with the receiving country's culture.

Though Constant, Gataullina, and Zimmermann (2006) dealt with ethnic identity in relation to the positive commitment, they also raised other possibilities over the manifestation and formation of ethnic identities. A complete explanation of ethnic identity necessitates considering the extreme cases of “subvert” and negative revealment of migrants' ethnic identity. In this perspective, they explained the theoretical model of a general and a complete multidimensional ethnic identity in a formed plane of four quadrants and two basic axes, as it is illustrated in figure 1.

As figure 1 shows, the horizontal axis which gauges commitment to and self-identification with the country of origin, and the vertical axis which measures commitment to and self-identification with the host country.

Figure 1. Complete Illustration of Ethnic Identity; Retention, Relinquishment, and Subversion.



Source: Constant, A , Gataullina, L. and Zimmermann, K. F. (2006). Ethnosizing Immigrants. *IZA Discussion Paper, No. 2040*. file:///C:/Users/ASUS/Downloads/Ethnosizing_Immigrants.pdf (Accessed: 14th Nov 2019)

At point (0.0), the newcomer has lost his ethnic identity of the home country. Moving on the right to the positive part of the horizontal axis, a sign of the migrant’s ethnic maintenance and growing commitment to the country of origin. Commitment to the cultural background of the homeland reaches its climax at point (1.0). This means that the migrant adheres to the culture of origin and not with the receiving country. Migrants show a growing affinity to their ethnic baggage after changing the country of ancestors. Besides, the migrant can retain strong bonds to their ethnic identity, exceeding beyond point (1.0), giving him a more fanatical and distinctive sense of belonging. Such an excessive commitment to the home country can be explained in cases of radical or extremist views against them in comparison to their counterparts who stay in the home country. In the north-west quadrant, migrants also move left the point (0.0) on the negative axis of the horizontal vector. Accordingly, discontented individuals are compelled to strip of their own culture and attachment and embrace a new commitment and identification with the host country.

Figure 1 also depicts the complete theoretical possibilities of fanatical and subvert ethnic identity. Sense of belonging and identification toward the receiving country’s mainstream are shown by the vertical axis. A migrant at point (0.0) manifests neither ethnic

identification with the homeland nor native loyalties to any country. At point (0.1) on the positive rector of the vertical axis, migrants exhibit mounting solidarity and identification of adopting the host group culture. Thus, the immigrants attain similar ethnic identification and full incorporation process of natives to the new society. In other words, at the point (0.1), newcomers blend totally into the host society through the assimilation process.

It is worthy to mention that some migrants can exceed the point (0.1) when they exhibit over identification with the new country more than the natives themselves. However, immigrants can express their dissatisfaction with their new country's cultural patterns, and they actively object it through developing a form of subvert identification to it. Along the negative part of vertical axis, migrants can move either to the southeast or to the southwest quadrants. The southeast quadrant denotes those individuals who disprove with the host country while maintaining strong ethnic ties with the native land. Nevertheless, individuals may object both countries. This valid theoretical possibility is well illustrated in the southeast quadrant, but it is rather impossible to happen in the real world.

In fact, migrants can accommodate themselves to both native and host cultures. Such dual dimensional patterns of ethnic identity measurement suggests influential relation between the two countries commitment and coexistence of each other. In this regard, the levels of loyalties and adherence to the native land do not hinder the degree of adaptation. This preposition demonstrates that strong identifiers with cultural values of ancestors may or may not present advances stages of involvement with the culture of the host society. Likewise, the model can explain that the individual with strong adjustment to the host country may or may not completely identify with the origin culture.

Simultaneously, migrants may fail to totally identify with both home or host country. In this regard, Constant, Gataullina and Zimmermann explained another case of the two dimensional *ethnocizer*. This case shows that affinity to native and host countries, at any time, are linearly, dependent and reciprocal, and they can be one. In this regard, the more the migrant exhibits strong commitment to his country of origin, the less he or she commits and feels for the host one. For instance, the more immigrant melts and feels with the new country mainstream, the more he renounces and abandons his culture because he is similar to natives. The particularity of the linear representation is a restrictive case of ethnic

identity (figure 2) through the movement along diagonal (1.0) and (0.1). This measure of ethnic identity is called ethnocizer.

Figure 2. The two-Dimensional non-Negative Ethnosizer



Source: Constant, A, Gataullina, L. and Zimmermann, K. F. (2006). Ethnosizing Immigrants. *IZA Discussion Paper, No. 2040*.
file:///C:/Users/ASUS/Downloads/Ethnosizing_Immigrants.pdf (Accessed: 14th Novembber, 2019)

As in figure 2, the two dimensional ethnocizers explain the case of which the combination of commitment the migrant chooses to support. Figure 2 provides an answer to this question as well as shows where migrants are exactly in the positive quadrant. The ethnicizer consists of four main measures or theories of ethnic identity that are different by the degree of cultural and social affinities. Quadrants A, I, M, and S of figure 2 are related to: Assimilation (A), a migrant strongly identifies with the dominant culture of the host country as well as a deep adherence to its values, norms and code of conduct, and a low identification to the original culture; Integration (I), can be achieved if the person amalgamates, incorporates and manifests both strong devotion to the original culture and commitment to the receiving society; Marginalization (M), a weak affinity to or strong abandon of either the host culture or the origin one; and, Separation (S), a sole and exclusive commitment to the cultural pattern of the homeland even after long residence in the receiving society, coupled with a weak participation and involvement into the host country's society and its issues.

From point (1.0) onward, a migrant may face a more complex journey through different states, along with separation to integration, assimilation, marginalization, or remaining separate.

6-1-Dimensions of Ethnic Identity

Belonging to an ethnic group has wide-ranging implications on both personal and ethnic identity, particularly in multi-ethnic countries (Bank, 1996). Thus, there are several fundamental dimensions which ethnicity consists on both the collective and individual level. In this perspective, Isajiw Wsevolod (1990), a professor of sociology at the university of Toronto, explained the two dimensional phenomenon of ethnic identity and its maintenance in the Canadian society. He focused on the examination of differences among generations in the internal and external dimensions of diverse ethnic groups, instead of explaining the dimensional structure of ethnic identity at one time for specific ethnic group.

According to Isajiw, ethnicity has methodologically both an objective indicator that is characterized by a direct observability, and a subjective dimension that denotes an indirect observability. The internal dimension indicates attitudes, values, and preconceptions that can be interpreted within the context of communication. Accordingly, it can be divided into three aspects: the cognitive, the affective, and the moral. The cognitive aspect refers to the individual's self and images of his ethnic group, and the level of ethnic knowledge that people have about their ethnic group's cultural values, history and heritage such as how much information they know about their ceremonies, customs or traditions. The affective element refers to people's ethnic attachment and preferences about their ethnic culture, whether they are proud, indifferent, or embarrassed about it. Whereas, the moral aspect refers to the level of measurable feelings of the group's obligations and responsibilities that account for the commitment and affinity they have toward their group's values and norms. The external dimension of ethnic identity includes presence of the observable social and cultural behaviours of the community that are manifested in five overt objective areas: (1) cultural behavioral patterns such as the use of ethnic language, practicing ethnic traditions, rituals, and distinct every day customs; (2) interaction and participation within ethnic personal network such as kinship and some ethnic friends and families; (3) participation in ethnic institutions and organizations such as media of particular ethnic group; (4) the participation in associational organizations such as youth clubs; (5) participation in functions and roles sponsored by ethnic organization such as concerts, meetings, and public lectures (Isajiw, 1990).

6-2-Components of Ethnic Identity

According to Phinney, the components of ethnic identity can be grouped in the following four fashions: self-identification, a sense of belonging to an ethnic group, ethnic behaviours and practices, and ethnic identity achievement. Self-identification, self-definition, or labelling refers to the ethnic label one uses for one self. Subjects can rate or identify themselves according to particular criteria presented to them, and; thus, individuals answer the statements like: ‘I think of myself as...’ or questions such as ‘how do you define yourself?’(Phinney, 1989), and this is distinguished from an internal aspect of ethnicity. Self-identification is necessary and crucial because ambivalences between self-definition, appearance and origin can exist in any ethnic group, and individuals who do not consider themselves as the group members may inadvertently be included in the society. The sense of belonging to a group includes the importance attributed to the individual’s feeling of concern of one’s culture and ethnic pride, including a sense of peoplehood, experiences of exclusion and separateness from other ethnic group, or being happy and satisfied with one’s ethnic group membership. This component may answer the following statement: ‘How much difference do you feel between yourself and other members of another group? I’m an individual who (never, sometimes, often, very often) feels strong bonds toward my own group’. The component of ethnic identity behaviours and practices means the participation in cultural activities and the involvement in the social life of the group; including the use of heritage language, religion affiliation, political tendencies, area of residence, ingroup friendship, traditional celebrations, family roles, and food...etc. Finally, the concept of ethnic achievement is derived from the ego identity theory. In other words, identity achievement is the individual’s secure sense that is an essential consequence of identity exploration and affinity.

Ethnic identity’s relation to well-being is considered to act as prediction of an individual’s psychological well-being. (Phinney, 1992; Phinney and Ong, 2007; Roberts et al, 1999). Ethnic identity and its role in immigrant’s psychological well-being can be analyzed well in terms of characteristics of the host society. Accordingly, researchers have long taken into account the contextual factor when dealing with ethnic identity. Theoretically, they have argued that ethnic identity development is associated with psychological well-being during adolescence (Tajfel , 1981).

Ethnic identity is an essential component of a healthy identity as it is closely linked to many positive psychological outcomes, especially for youth of color. Several empirical studies have indicated its important role as predictor of optimal human functioning, social development, and well-established self-concept for minority youth. In fact, it is positively related to mental and physical health, psychological satisfaction, high self-esteem, competent work performance, and good grades in schools (Liebkind, 2001). Thus, such a relationship is very central in multicultural societies because ethnic identity serves as a buffer, particularly when a person is caught between the transition from the original culture and the newly acquired culture before he reaches ultimate assimilation.

An individual can be considered bicultural or multicultural if he adheres or identifies with more than one culture. There exists a bipolar perspective of a complicated balance between the different cultures a person belongs to, and there is at the same time a trigger to both positive and negative aspects. Hence, the relevance of ethnic identity appears to be moderated by how the individual adapts with the frequently contrasting movement from his ethnic culture to the host culture as well as the overall identity formation that differs from one person to another (Benet-Martinez & Haritatos, 2005). In this regard, being a multicultural individual is linked to self-esteem, mental health, and cultural conflict.

The potentiality of ethnic identity's positive effects can be interpreted in a sense of pride towards community and individuality; whereas negative effects of ethnic identity are evident at multivariate levels; including a sense of identity confusion and collision of both cultural values, stressors associated to racial stereotypes, coupled with processes to adhere to one culture over the other.

The facts described above are proved to hold true for different minority groups, which are prone to psychological stress arising from the process of acculturation. For instance, Arab Americans, a minority group that is subject to stressors culminating from prejudice, racism and discrimination. In this case, the role of ethnic identity is a mediator between psychological stress and well-being (Sheldon, Oliver, & Balaghi, 2015). Both social psychological and developmental perspectives suggest that securing a strong sense of ethnic identity makes a positive contribution to the well-being of any minority group. Henceforth, integrated adults, who are acculturated to both ethnic and host cultures, exhibit higher levels of psychological flexibility that enables them to cope to various societal

demands, and therefore avoid cultural problems in comparison to those who are acculturated to either the ethnic or host cultural values and norms only. It is obvious that the understanding of the relationship between cultural identification and well-being may be enhanced by considering marginalized groups within host societies. Individuals who have been discriminated and marginalized tend to have less levels of psychological well-being. Overall, ethnic identity is positively associated with life satisfaction and negatively associated with deficient mental health (Abubaker et al, 2012). One reason of such a result may be especially true in pluralist and diverse societies where people may be menaced by mounting worries and threats to their identities. In this case, ethnic group's belonging safeguards them with a psychological buffer that boosts their well-being. This view supports the importance of psychological functioning, particularly when ethnic identity encounters minimal threats. That's why it serves the purpose in promoting kinship, affinity, and group membership (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999).

Current studies have also found that ethnic identity is associated with positive psychological adjustment. In other words, high levels of ethnic identity leads to lower levels of youth depressive symptoms, which are considered the most general indications of stress, internalizing and externalizing signs of ethnic identity youth. In addition, positive behaviours of one's ethnic group are related to lower depressive symptoms and aggressive behaviours. Generally, adolescents who are strongly committed to their racial identity have been found to have a decrease in depressive symptoms (Mandara, Gaylord-Harden, Richards, & Ragsdale, 2009).

In summary, examining the relationship between cultural identification and psychological well-being can be improved by taking into account the multiple dimensions within ethnic identity. The focus on some constructs of Arab cultural values and collective self-esteem, as an overall structure of ethnic identity, along with the constructs of the host cultural values of the American society may help to explore the specific relationships between acculturation and ethnic identity development.

6-3-Development of Ethnic Identity

In the context of an increasing multiculturalism in many countries, a successful development and integration of ethnic minorities have become a central concern of United States' future. It is particularly pivotal to better understand the complexity of identity development among ethnic group youth because it may present skeptical stances, specific challenges, and ambivalences for both societies and ethnic groups. The development of ethnic identity is a critical facet during adolescence, particularly for people of color who have gained increasing empirical and practical salience. The number of adolescents and emerging adults of color is growing, and they are eventually outnumbering American children of European descent; hence raising issues relating to the key aspect of psychological development among ethnic youth. What is worthy to note that the existing understanding of ethnic identities development has been initially cross-cultural, sectional, limited, and fragmented (Titzmann & Lee, 2018).

The status of ethnic group youth is subject to various factors, ranging from historical context, policies, and ethnic group's reaction to those policies. Multiple models of ethnic identity development have been suggested for African Americans, Hispanic Americans, and Arab Americans. There is; therefore, an ongoing discussion whether their ethnic identity development is viewed as similar to their counterparts in the mainstream society, or it should be examined as distinct (Sam & Berry, 2010).

Few theories of ethnic identity development stem from Erik Erikson (1968) who applied the term to identity crisis in adolescence, perceiving it as a developmental process involving exploration and affinity to achieve identity. Despite the fact that there seem to be a consensus among researchers that ethnic identity is fluid and flexible concept, few researches have relatively conceptualized its changing nature throughout time in different frameworks.

William Cross (1991), a theorist in ethnic identity development and the best known of his Nigrescence Model, relates the transition of Black identity through five stages in the process of ethnic identity development. The theory of Nigrescence, which is translated as "the process of becoming black", describes the "Negro-to-Black conversion experience" during and after the Civil Rights and Negritude or Black movements in the late fifteenth and sixteenth. Cross's five stages are as follows: Pre-encounter (stage 1); Encounter (stage 2); Immersion-Emersion (stage 3); Internalization (stage 4); and (stage 5) Internalization-

Commitment. The Pre-encounter describes identity before the encounter, and therefore refers to the frame of reference that changes after facing the White dominant culture. It is a questioned self-view that is presented by parents and society with low salience to race neutrality and anti-Black. In this stage, the individual is largely unaware of race or social implications related to it. Typically, Black Americans do not realize that they have been raised in Western values as well as programmed to assimilate to the White culture that favors the Eurocentric perspective. The Encounter stage is precipitated by an event or series of events to acknowledge the impact of racialized reference frame and the reality that steers him to be resistant to any information that threatens this racial perspective. Thus, when an individual withstands an experience that sharply evokes a call of race, it is generally interpreted as racial awareness. The Encounter makes the person receptive and vulnerable to a new understanding of the Black American identity, especially when someone is treated differently because of skin color. The Immersion-Emersion stage “is a strong powerful dominating sensation that is constantly energized by rage [at White people and culture], guilt [at having once been tricked into thinking Black ideas], and developing a sense of pride [in one’s Black self, Black people, and Black culture]” (Cross, 1991, p.203). The individual becomes firm in supporting Nigrescence and in providing his Blackness; surrounding himself simultaneously with visible symbols of his identity that actively disparage Whiteness. This stage is characterized by a sense of rage that is a catalyst part for full-fledged immersion into the Black culture and community as well as a way far from the White culture. In this vein, the Black people decompress all the vortex of negative attitudes against Black culture and endeavor to an almost obsessive search for Black identity. Accordingly, the Black individual starts to think more highly of fellow ingroup members than outgroup, leading to a sense of attachment and commitment. In the Internalization stage, the individual becomes more comfortable to adhere to the mainstream society with his more expansive, open, and less defensive Black culture and attitudes. In this stage, the individual is able to establish a meaningful relationship with members of another ethnic group who acknowledges one self-definition. In this regard, the Black person feels Black enough, and becomes clear about his Black cultural values, and he perceives the values of the others’ cultures positively. The final stage of Internalization-Commitment is considered the ultimate transformation toward Black self-definition and healthy social identity through attaining an equilibrium of comfort in one’s ethnic identity and others’ ethnic identities. In other words,

the Black interprets his same Blackness through a general sense of commitment in issues of Blacks as a group, while engaging in meaningful activities and affairs of other groups over a long term. In this regard, Benjamin and his colleagues explained (1998):

Healthy racial identity development is achieved when Blacks progress through a series of linear stages commencing with degrading thoughts and feelings about themselves and other Blacks accompanied by idealized beliefs about Whites, and ends with internalized positive feelings about themselves, other Blacks, and other racial groups. (p. 96)

Furthermore, Jean Phinney (1990) proposed a model of ethnic identity development, based on Erikson (1980) theory of development, following James Marcia's (1993) framework research on identity statures of adolescents and other models of ethnic identity, and he applied it to high school and college students from multicultural and diverse ethnic groups in the United States of America. The majority of studies on change and development have focused over the question of identity during adolescence through exploration and commitment. However, they lack an extensive focus on culture and ethnicity. Later, Marcia (1993) elaborated Erik's research to include identity formation in a variety of life spans. Indeed, his achievement ultimately leads to two processes that can be applied to ethnic identity development; exploration of identity and commitment (Marcia, Matteson, Archer, & Orlofsky, 1993). But, his efforts to better understand the complexity of an individuals' identity have rarely been discussed by him.

Phinney's multidimensional model of ethnic identity classifies ethnic identity development of Asian American, African American, Hispanic / Latino, and European/ White adolescent into four identity statuses. The first status is unexamined ethnic identity, which is characterized by little or no exploration of one's ethnic identity and issues related to one's ethnicity. Prior adolescence, children give little attention to their ethnic identity or are supposed to drive it from others, rather than engaging in the process of socialization. Similarly, in this status, adolescents usually have not explored ethnicity in their lives; and therefore, may lack interest and thought in ethnicity, or the foreclosure state through which individuals have adopted behaviors, perceptions, values and attitudes from family, peers, and larger society without any self-questioning. Accordingly, individual of this classification are influenced by their contextual system and might have both positive and

negative perceptions of belonging toward ethnic group, depending on the changes they are exposed to. For example, adolescents who descent from families with strong ethnic pride tend to feel positively about their ethnic cultural norms.

Yet, adolescents are not considered to have achieved ethnic identity because they have experienced no period of exploration. The second status is crucial to ethnic identity development since it is an explorative period in the development process. Typically, adolescents express interest and greater understanding of their culture with personal implication and questioning of being a member of their ethnic group in a more abstract sense. Most minority adolescents, however, attempt to answer the questions: ‘Who am I from an ethnic perspective?’ Those adolescents, who are experiencing a significant moratorium, have heightened awareness of ethnicity such as discrimination. Observers might explain their adolescents’ engagement in some form of exploration, including the interest in learning about their ethnic culture and actively involving in practices such as thinking about current future identification of their ethnicity, discussing issues of ethnicity with others, reading books related to the subject (Phinney, 1989). The third stage is the achieved identity. It is characterized by clarity, acceptance, and internalization about one’s ethnic group. It is the ultimate outcome of identity process; the adolescent achieves a phase that includes a secure, a confident, and a stable sense of self. This is a stage where individuals come to term with a realistic assessment of one’s ethnic group and the dominant culture. More researches have shown that adolescents of White European descent experience less exploration of their ethnic identity, but they exhibit strong commitment to their ethnic group. Though Phinney’s model is considered as an important variable since it offers a good understanding of the process of ethnic identity formation and provides a clear understanding across three groups of Asians, Blacks, Mexicans Americans, he studied only three groups in his research without focusing on mixed ethnic groups.

7-Ethnic Identity and Acculturation

Acculturation is generally viewed as a multidimensional process of cultural change that occurs as a result of continuous first hand contact between native and host cultures. The contact between two or more distant cultural groups makes migrants in critical choices related to their cultural preferences, particularly when adhering to the duality of home and receiving country’s cultural backgrounds. According to Berry (1990-1997), acculturation is

a process of cultural transition in which the immigrant must take two related decisions in regard to his native cultural norms and that of the host country.

The relationship between the ethnic culture and the host culture is considered as orthogonal. Hence, immigrants' acculturation focuses on the effects of being subject to the host culture to which immigrants must choose how much they will embrace the value of the dominant culture and interact positively with natives, as well as the extent of their home cultural identity retention. As opposed to the unilinear process that compels individuals to assimilate into the larger society, the multidimensional understanding of acculturation equates decision about cultural change in terms of home cultural heritage maintenance as well as preferences of interaction and involvement in the dominant cultural mainstream.

Contrary to early studies, acculturation should be conceptualized through a psychological, value-oriented, and behavioral dimension. A clear dimension between the ethnic identity's constructs and acculturation seems to be impossible. It is striking that the two terms refer to a common underlying concept. However, almost every one evokes a sense of meaning. Acculturation is a broad construct that marks a variety of arguments on attitudes, values, and behaviors that are changeable due to cultural contact. Ethnic identity generally refers to that objective aspect of acculturation that focuses on the subjective sense of belonging to a group (Phinney, 1990). The two dimensional process of acculturation, basically the preservation of ancestors' cultural heritage and the adjustment to the receiving country, are viewed as independent and distinct, and they yield to four different acculturation strategies that the immigrant uses to react regarding the two cultures.

A better understanding of those four strategies underlies answering the following Berry's two questions as means to clarify them: 'Is it considered to be of value to preserve one's cultural heritage? Is it considered to be of value to develop a relationship with the dominant society? Positive answers to both questions lead us to define integration. In other words, immigrants adopt the cultural norms of the host culture along the retention of the cultural heritage and practices. However, marginalization is defined through negative answers to both questions. Thus, this type of acculturation results when individuals reject both the ancestors' culture and the dominant one. Marginalized individuals are prone to experience stress, alienation, or identity confusion because they feel disconnected to either cultures. The separation strategy is defined by positive answer to the first question and negative to the second that is to say that the individual chooses to fully keep this native

culture and identity without any wish to be involved in the majority cultural group. By contrast, when immigrants respond negatively to the first question and positively to the second, the assimilation strategy is selected. Henceforth, assimilation occurs when one accommodates himself to the culture of the dominant group and refuses to retain his own native cultural traits (Berry, 1997).

Berry's (1990-1997) model of acculturation proved to be useful because it highlights the fact that acculturation can take multiple ways and the migrant is not compelled to strip his cultural heritage in order to integrate to the new country's mainstream. In comparison to earlier research on acculturation which dealt with assimilation or marginalization, the findings of this model suggest that they are too exclusive and do not consider multiculturalism as an axiomatic fact in many countries. However, Berry model presents a very broad theoretical framework for understanding the variation of identity that asserts their coexistence in a diverse society.

In the same token, psychologists Teresa LaFromboise , Hardin Coleman, and Jennifer Gerton (1993) developed a model of acculturation that includes six dimensions. They explore the psychological impact of biculturalism competence and determine to what extent they are normative for an individual who live in two cultures. The first dimension is the knowledge of cultural beliefs and values of the two culture, including histories, rituals, every day and religious practices, and political issues. The second dimension is positive attitudes towards both groups that the individual holds in minority and majority groups, but not essentially in equal degrees. Thus, negative feelings toward both groups result in negative psychological and behavioral outcomes, and the individual will not be able to interact positively with the targeted group. The third dimension is bicultural efficacy, which is the belief that the individual can live effectively within the two groups and maintain confidence towards two cultures without compromising one's sense of cultural identity. The fourth dimension is communication, which refers to the individual's capacity and effectiveness to communicate ideas and feelings to individuals of a given culture, both verbally and non-verbally. In this case, language proficiency and competence are vital mediations between the two cultures. The fifth dimension is role repertoire, which refers to the set of appropriate roles or behaviors that the individual has developed culturally. The last dimension is groundedness, which refer to a sense of being grounded, and the individual must have skills

in using and recruiting the external support systems that exist in both cultures (Lafromboise, Coleman, & Jerton, 1993).

The relationship between ethnic identity and a sense of belonging is orthogonal; that is, the two constructs are not significantly and negatively correlated. The orthogonal perspective suggests an independent and non-hierarchical relationship between an individual identification in the ethnic and host cultures. In this regard, for people who are prone to two cultures, it is possible to feel a sense of belonging without necessarily comprising one's sense of ethnic identity. Furthermore, individuals can alter their behavioral patterns to adapt a particular social context and can also have the choice of what extent they would affiliate with either two cultures.

It has become obvious that societies need to manage a balance between prompting and inducing cultural maintenance and reinforcing adaptation to the larger society mainstream. Attempting to manage this balance requires considering immigrants' attitudes, perceptions and feelings, which are supposed to be divergent. Henceforth, for better and positive outcomes, migrants should be provided with multiple opportunities that enable them to make right choices related to their ethnic identity and adaptation within their new country.

8-Ethnic Identity Threat Mechanism and Adaptation

While there are frequent accolades that value diversity, there is at the same time much acrimony toward it. Diversity has stripped up much reaction to ethnic identity as well as a response to stigmatization and perceived discrimination. Besides, globalization has been accompanied by reactionary movement, aiming to narrow the ingroup and exclude minorities.

In many multicultural societies, foreign influx evokes a motive that engenders identity threat mechanism. Ethnic identity threat can depend on myriad factors related to the differences between the groups involved. Generally, those factors are external and internal to the ethnic group and culture. Thus, a clear understanding of ethnic identity change requires accounting both factors. The external factors refer chiefly to changes across geographical, political, and social aspects; whereas the external factors are related to membership in groups, significant ingroup bias or the person position in the social matrix. In other words, the exposure to menaces makes the ethnic identity salient, and it impacts the individual's reaction and identification toward both the ingroup and the outgroup.

When an individual experiences a threatened ethnic identity, their sense of threat can be interpreted in different ways according to the social environment. It can heighten their identification with an ethnic group, show no degree of identification, hide or renounce it. The better understanding of ethnic interaction's dynamics offers a framework for explaining how individuals adapt with ethnic identity threat, leading to three possible choices of reaction: avoidance, behavior modulation and regulation, or outgroup devaluation and derogation. Such three threats target the individual personal identity; while others are directed at their ethnic identity. Despite the fact that ethnic identity takes different forms, people's responses share overlapping ideas in regards to their defensive manner. In this perspective, the rush of immigrants can imply social threats, and both he and the native can realize that their identities are changing and evolving, especially in the wide gamut of ethnic and national identities.

As Individual's ethnic identity is malleable and evolve through time and space, it is challenged, altered, or normalized. Such alteration and challenges may result in the individuals' necessity to renegotiate their ethnic identities and group belonging. In this perspective, several researches have described several aspects of social change that foster identity renegotiation: (1) to rearrange the social context in terms of organization and composition of groups within the social system, (2) to revise group's ideologies, (3) to consider disturbances in the social environment that generate at the same time a disturbance in the existing social relation (Breakwell, 1986).

Practically, like individuals, societies also determine their boundaries that mark exclusion of what is viewed a threat. Cultural differences, histories, and ethnic group institutions determine the nature of such boundaries, which define those full members of the social group and who are out. The identification of other individuals, as members of an ethnic group, requires a sharing judgment and evaluation. Accordingly, the identification of others as strangers, as atypical to other ethnics, implies a general realization of group limitation, distinctiveness in criteria for judgmental performance. Thus, boundaries are demarcations, which are crucial to provide an essential framework for conceptualization of differential parts within a group. Claiming membership; therefore, depends on the need of both inclusiveness and uniqueness (Brewer, 1999). The challenges to ethnic identity may engender renegotiations in reaction to different changes that affect the ethnic group's

responses. For instance, perilous circumstances (9/11), mass media (propaganda), and past conflicts (trauma and memories of past experiences) play as an impetus for strengthening, hiding, or substituting ethnic identity.

Conclusion

Arabs immigration has significantly been mirrored by the rush of heterogeneous ethnic groups that marked deep-seated roots in the American mainstream. Indeed, the United States has long been the enticement for Arab immigrants who were overburdened by religious persecution, the pressure of overpopulation and insecure economy at home. All such incentives paralleled simultaneously an escalating boom in Arab immigration post 1965. Apart from the irresistible American magnet of better livelihood and greater economic opportunities, the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the passage of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, , the Gulf war, Civil wars in Lebanon and Yemen, the 2001 American military intervention in Iraq, and Arab Spring have all served as pivotal catalysts for more Arab and Muslim immigration to the U.S.A. As ethnicity is malleable and evolves through time and space, Arab ethnic identity has been challenged, altered, or normalized. Accordingly, all the Middle East turmoils have refashioned and renegotiated their self-identification with both the ancestral homes as well as their host society. In this regard, they have spurred a shared Arab identity and ethnic cohesion, regardless of the country of origin. A sense of group belonging has well entailed rational responses regarding the revival of Arabness and ethnic pride among Arab descendents who were overwhelmingly disillusioned to realize how clearly pro-Israeli and one-sided American media were in reporting the Middle East events.

CHAPTER TWO

Islam, Orientalism and Arab Americans' Stereotypes

Introduction

This chapter deals with the inherent controversy over Islam, Muslims and Arabs in the Western mind, particularly in the United States of America. Indeed, Islam has haunted the collective consciousness of the West for centuries. The obsession with the Islamic faith dates back to its spread and the intense wars that aroused in the crusades campaigns. What is lamentably odd is that heightened loathing and crudeness against Arabs and Muslims have dramatically been intensified through a myriad of negative stereotypes and distorted portrayals. Western negative representations are undoubtedly anchored on the basis of the flawed Western view of Islam, portraying Muslims as heretics and emphasizing the claim that Islam is a devilish religion. In fact, the persistence of such distorted portrayals in the Western mind, as a potential enemy and a threat to the world's security, have overwhelmingly been revived as an entrenched past of the post 9/11 new-Orientalists' thoughts. The chapter also sheds light on Edward Said's prominent work *Orientalism* in an attempt to decipher the dichotomous corollary between the inferior oriental cultures in opposition to the superior occidental cultures. Westerners have long heartened a revolutionary framework in which the Orient is perceived as a degeneration of the furthest truth and the Occident as the conclusive end of the evolutionary process. The key element defining such a binary opposition is the global War on Terror that has begun to serve the American interests amidst the rise of vexed entanglements over reinforcing the predominance of the United States in the geopolitical condition. Arguably, discourses across subsequent American presidents have recycled the fallacy of Arabs and Muslims' threat that has itself induced the irrational continuation of War on Terror, particularly the current American president Donald Trump's flagrant assaults against Muslim and Arab Americans.

1-Islam in the West

Continuous tensions and misunderstandings of the Islamic religion in the Western mind dated back to the spread of Islam, and the intense wars that exalted in the crusades campaigns along lengthy conflicts and periods of relative truce. Arabs and Muslims have

felt that they have always been at the receiving end owing to the uncontested reality that Westerners always depict Islamic religion and its cultural background in derogatory manner. In fact, mounting loathing and crudeness against Arab and Muslims have dramatically been arisen since early Muslim access to Western writing and media. Historical documents have shown negative portrayals of Arabs in the West even prior the birth of Islam in the Arabian Peninsula. What is lamentably odd is that Arabs and Muslims are represented with distorted images in historical documents. The American diplomat and historian Frederick Quinn (2008) wrote in his book, "The Sun of All Heresies that: "The Bible was the great anti-Islamic text. Compiled centuries before the Prophet's birth, it made no mention of Muslims, but its apocalyptic passages would soon be used against Islam."(p.25)

Malicious statements intensified when religious figures, particularly Mohammed PBUH, became under lenses of Western Christians in the Middle Ages and still continue till nowadays. The early Western representation of Islam and Arabs were undoubtedly anchored on the basis of religion that generated a dismiss of Islamic religion. Accordingly, it is obvious that Protestant Christians perceive Islam as a devilish religion that threatens the hitherto domination of the church. The two centuries attempt to recapture the holy land failed, and it was stained with a mere relative shift of power between the East and the West. With the setback of the second siege of Vienna in 1693 and the emergence of the European colonial power, the balance swayed toward the West. Hence, the modern era has witnessed a breakdown or a deterioration of Islam-West relation, particularly when Western Christian powers have brought huge estates of Muslim swathes within their orbit (Lewis, 1990, pp.4-6).

The Islamic world has been under the sovereignty of the Western church-sanctioned influence and; thus, its control culminated in heightening anchor between the West and Islam. Fundamental to Islam is its monotheist religion, which, in contrast to polytheist idol-worshipping Arab world, embraced people from whatever racial and ethnic background. Within a short period of time after the birth of Islam in the 7th century, the Arabs built a vast empire the likely of which was not contemporaneously found anywhere in the world, stretching from Spain and Portugal (Andalusia) in the west all the way to the Indian sub-continent in the east. Islam henceforth embedded its universal principles in the social and political life at that time. The expansion of Islam in such a rapid pace was deemed a threat

to the West that started to sound the alarm of danger. From this standpoint, the overall image of Islam and Muslims was closely confined to barbarism, blood, and violence.

The West antagonism against Islam has long historical roots during its first centuries in the belief that it expanded at sword point. In this regard, the Pope Regensburg' speech, quoted from a dialogue between the Byzantine Emperor Manuel II Palaiologos with an educated Muslim in the winter of 1391, asserted the traditional violence of Islam and the intolerance of Muhammed PBUH :

Show me just what Mohammed brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached.' The emperor, after having expressed himself so forcefully, goes on to explain in detail the reasons why spreading the faith through violence is something unreasonable. Violence is incompatible with the nature of God and the nature of the soul. 'God', 'is not pleased by blood – and not acting reasonably is contrary to God's nature. Faith is born of the soul, not the body. Whoever would lead someone to faith needs the ability to speak well and to reason properly, without violence and threats ... To convince a reasonable soul, one does not need a strong arm, or weapons of any kind, or any other means of threatening a person with death ... (Ratzinger Joseph Alois 'Pope Benedict XVI', Vatican, 2006)

Understanding the intent of Westerners' violent discourse against Islam does echo a historic emphasis that the success of Islam was due solely to the sword. Clearly, the success of Christianity as benign and peaceful religion to malevolent and aggressive Islam is mythical. This is an outrageous mystification and ignorance about the fact that violence has often accompanied the expansion of Christianity, and peaceable abiding precepts that have gone along the prevalence of Islam. Such a myth represents the deep-seated Western fear that has always influential and predominant in the collective imagination of being literally overrun by sectarian groups. The crusades had performed impacts over such a fast spread of inferior representation about the Muslim.

When explaining the negative perceptions between the West and the Arab-Islamic world, it is paramount to return back to the historical origin of centuries of conflicts and

clash between their changeable and dominant relationships. Many historians divide this relevant history into four periods. The first period began in 622 and lasted until the fall of Granada in 1492. This period witnessed the hegemony of the Muslim world and the dramatic expansion of Islam from the Arabian Peninsula to North Africa, parts of Asia, and Europe. The second period coincided with the Crusades, beginning in the 11th century when Christians, under the call of Urban II in 1095, launched their religious war against Muslims for the sake of recovering the Holy land. This period lasted until the overthrow of Vienna, and it was characterized by a relative number of shared victories and defeats for both sides. The end of the Crusades corresponded with the beginning of the third period, which became notorious by the colonial occupation of the Middle East and North Africa by European powers (Shadid & Van Koningsveld, 1996). What is worthy to note that Muslims and Arabs' distorted representations are not recent fabrications, but it had been deeply rooted and operational in the Western mind even since the earliest confrontations with Arabs and Muslims. The ascribed terms of Arabs, although they change according to time, are promoted with disparagement, free-floating hostility and unrestrained Eurocentrism. The lurid depictions of Arabs are diverse and largely known as primitive, erotic, slave traders, primitive, ignorant ...etc. Indeed, the image of an active, vibrant and progressive West was congenial to colonial systems. Ironically, George Yancy, in his book: *Colonial Gazing: The Production of the Body as "Other"* (2008), provides a repulsive dichotomy to designate the Western colonial and Muslim colonized, he wrote:

“Colonial invasive powers bring with them their own myths, beliefs, and forms of colonial ordering, which create a bifurcated form of hierarchy that is designed to distinguish between the natives and the colonizers, a form of hierarchy where the colonizer (white, good, intelligent, ethical, beautiful, civilized) is superior in all things, while the native (dark, exotic, sexually uncontrollable, bad, stupid, ugly, savage, backward) is inferior. (p. 4)

Obviously, European colonization of the Muslim world are bluntly foregrounded on binary conceptions between the West and the Orient, Islam and Christianity, Arabs and Europeans or Americans.

2-History of Islam in the United States of America

Islam has only become a focal religion in worldwide discourses post 9/11, despite being a crucial force in the New World for more than 600 years. In fact, Muslims had been significant contributors who enriched the spirit of the American nation. The examination of a number of archeological, linguistic and cultural proofs concludes that Muslims from Spain and West Africa landed in the Americas in the pre-Columbian era, and they had profound influence on the native population and the civilization that existed at that time. The unquestionable contact of Muslims with the New World in pre-Columbian America is absolutely absent from Western sources. In fact, Muslims were trading with indigenous people and they set voyages to the Americas before Cristopher Columbus even thought of reaching America. Thus, the American misconception of Islam, as menacing and exotic foreign presence coming from far overseas lands, is completely a mistaken claim and furthest from truth. The historical background of Islam's negative portrayals in the Western mind, as potential enemy, are overwhelmingly gaining acceptance. Such concerns totally overlook the fundamental existence of Muslims in America decades upon decades.

No longer existing as a hidden presence in the New World, it has been shown that Muslims landed on the American soil about seven centuries before Cristopher Columbus's discovery voyage. Unfortunately, the pre-Columbian people were subject to historical amnesia like people before them who were similarly forgotten.

A variety of historical sources have proved that Muslims Moorish from Spain set foot on the American soil centuries before Columbus due to their expertise and excellence in marine navigation and cartography (Sorenson & Johannessen, 2005). Proofs have asserted that the New World was not isolated from the Old World. Accordingly, Muslims made their way to the Americas, and suggested the possible contact between Muslim seamen and native peoples in the American isles. In this regard, Barry Fells argues that there were different races, in addition to the Viking who reached North America, including North Africans (Berbers), Phoenicians (Lebanese), Arabs Iberians (Moors) and even Arabs who crossed the Atlantic Ocean (as cited in Dame, 2013, p. 52). Between 1200 BC and 145 BC, the Phoenicians were famous seafarers and a prevalent power in the Mediterranean Sea, and they sailed long distances to reach America. Many scholars have confirmed that the Phoenicians left indelible marks in the pre-Columbian era. Many of their iron stones inscriptions and Phoenician alphabetical letters were found near in Patee Caves in North

Salem, New Hampshire and Pennsylvania near Mechanics bung (Matthew as cited in Delish, 1976, pp. 28-33).

One of the reasons that led to inter American exchange of Islamic culture was the motivation to spread Islam in the new land and to trade. The evidence; therefore, put forward that American natives had been able to speak Arabic. As a difficult language to be mastered within few contacts and compulsory for trade exchanges with Muslims, natives' use of Arabic language confirms that the Arabic-speaking Muslims traders or sailors led several and regular visits to American Isles (Quick, 2015).

What is also important is that Muslims had made great progress in sciences that intensified their curiosity of unknown universe, and they intrigued by the mysterious water of the Atlantic Ocean. When Cristopher Columbus undertook his voyage to India, he had among his crew the Moor Spanish Louis de Torre who was the primary Arab interpreter when encountering with the Grand Khan would take place. Torre was converted to Christianity after the fall of Granada in 1492, and he might be the first Arab of Islamic culture who set foot in America (Mehdi, 1978, p.1).

Furthermore, despite the fact that several written historical and religious accounts have demonstrated the appearance of Islam in the New World before Columbus, there were also more evidences that serve to validate reports of Muslim geographers and historians about their early expeditions along the Atlantic. The following quotation clarifies the ample evidence of encounter between Muslims navigators in Spain and indigenous people of the Americas; exchanging products and sciences:

Long before Columbus became aware of the possibility of land in the west, Muslims, among other people, had made contact with the Americas and had already left an impression on the Native culture. Knowledge, agricultural products, livestock, metals, and other commercial items were exchanged between the two worlds. Evidence leading to establishing the presence of Muslims in ancient America comes from a number of sculptures, oral traditions, eye-witness reports, artifacts, Arabic documents, coins, and inscriptions. In Mesoamerican art, we see Africans and Semites in positions of power and prestige, especially in trading communities of Mexico (Quick, 2015).

As reported by Cyrus Herzl Gordon (1971) in his book: *'Before Columbus*, the discovery of coins and archeological excavation add more evidence validity and credibility

to their previous report. The considerable quantity of Mediterranean coins that were found in the south of the Caribbean areas, as well as the mass number of duplicates, explicitly reveal the intensive voyages from Andalusia to the Americas. Those coins, discovered particularly of the coast of Venezuela, were Roman coins approximately derived from the rule of Augustus in the 4th century BC as well as two Arab coins dated back to the 8th century C.E. The availability of such currency is obviously a flagrant proof that Muslims Moorish had crossed the Atlantic heading to the New World about 800 C.E. (p.138).

In his book: *They came before Columbus*, Ivan Van Sertima (1976) showed how the thread of Islamic culture and thought were predominant elements in early American cultural norms, and how significant was the relation between the early African people with the American Indians. The significant fact he offered was the use of native American names such as Ges, Zomoras, Marabidine and Marabios. The words Marabidine and Marabios refer to the Moorish Empire Murabut.

On November 15th, 2004, at the closing ceremony of the first Latin American leader's summit in Istanbul, the Turkish president Tayyab Erdogan ceased the occasion to assert that American wasn't discovered by Cristopher Columbus. President Endogan explained that Columbus himself admitted in his memories that he noticed the existence of a mosque on the top of a mountain in Cuba, including inscriptions of Quranic verses. In fact, some navigators among Columbus's crew were Muslims converts or Crypto Muslims who accompanied him in 1492 (Delmonte, 2010). It is worthy to mention that after the collapse of the Islamic power in Spain, Muslims and Jews influxed to America, particularly in the south, fleeing the persecution and inquisition of the Spanish Christian Catholics.

The obvious reality that America is not a familiar land to Muslims can be drawn from African proofs that cannot be denied. Indeed, the Islamic civilization was influential on the West thanks to Black African Muslims explorers who were present in several parts of America hundreds of years before the arrival of Columbus. The claim of Black African presence in pre-Colombian period is acknowledged by many researchers who provided several linguistic, religious, cultural and eye-witness proof that are still existent till now. In this regard, the prominent Harvard scholar Leo Wiener wrote three volume works about the presence of Negroes and the influence of Arab Africans cultural heritage on the American civilization. The Mandingos, according to Wiener, arrived to America before Columbus, bringing West African cultural baggage with them. Thus, he stated:

The presence of Negroes with their trading masters in America before Columbus is proved by the representation of Negroes in American sculpture and design, by the occurrence of a black nation at Darien early in the XVI century, but more specifically by Columbus' emphatic reference to Negro traders from Guinea, who trafficked in gold alloy, guanine, of precisely the same composition and bearing the same name, frequently referred to by early writers in Africa (As cited in Rashad, 1995, p. 37)

After Christopher Columbus' landing in the New World in 1492, the real history of colonial North America centered primarily around the struggle of naval super powers at that time, particularly Spain and Portugal. These countries began steadily to gain control along the Pacific Ocean, Central America, and the Southern part of North America. The rapid flourishing sugar plantations and gold mining harsh working conditions caused a new labor shortage. To relieve lack of laborers, Europeans colonists sought to transport Muslim African slaves. Thus, Muslims were a significant part within the American society from the 16th century, especially with the introduction of trans-Atlantic trafficking of slave trade. However, slave traders or owners were barely aware of the African slaves' religion, and they gave a little concern of their ritual traits.

From the early colonial period until the American Revolution, Anglo- Americans totally ignored a large majority of African Muslims who were living among them. As Muslims were forcibly brought to the Americas from the slave trade, their religion, culture and rituals were gradually lost. They were compelled to renounce Islam, convert to Christianity and christianize their names. In spite of such harsh treatment against personal beliefs, history has well marked the presence of Muslims slaves in America. In this regard, Rodney asserts that:

“The first large group of Muslims to arrive in America were brought as slaves from the West African territories now known as Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Algeria between 1530 and 1851. Historians estimate that between 14 and 30 percent of all slaves in the United States were Muslims. In 1717 Arabic-speaking slaves arrived with the slave trade in the American colonies. They used the words “Allah” and “Muhammad,” refused to eat pork,

and went by names such as Omar Ibn Said, Job Ben Solomon, Paul Lahman Kibby, Prince Omar, and Ben Ali. Many African Americans today have rediscovered these connections to Arabic culture and the religion of Islam.” (Rodney, 2011, p.3)

Multiple tangible evidences such as hand-written verses of Quran and collection of documents in Arabic have been discovered across the United States of America. Such documents, written in Arabic letters and hidden in boxes, were crucial proofs of the African Muslims’ life as slaves in the United States (Austin, 1997). Additionally, most of them were not illiterate since they had high level of education. Before their captivity, they exercised high status jobs such as religious and tribal advisors, quranic scholars and teachers; that’s why, they were typically chosen to be supervisors by their masters. Due to their competence and intelligence, more demand of such kind of slaves was in a perpetual increase (Diouf, 1998).

By the end of colonial period and the building of the nation, the treaties of Barbary Wars show more evidence that Islam is not foreign to the United States as it is always claimed. In response to renewed attacks and to ensure continued safe passage of ships along the Mediterranean shores of North Atlantic, the four Barbary states of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Tripoli compelled the newly established nation to conclude the Tripoli treaties by 1797, requiring substantial amounts of tribute in exchange of the release of captives. In 1787, the kingdom of Morocco was the first world country to officially recognize the independence of the U.S.A. (Mehdi, 1978, p.2), and it remained one of the America’s oldest and closest allies in North Africa. It is perhaps thanks to the signature of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the two nations in 1786 that immigrants from Morocco were treated as White and not Black Africans under the Laws of the South Carolina House of Representatives in 1790. In this regard, President Obama’s speech, in his address at the University of Cairo in 2009, asserted that:

Islam have always been in the U.S.A., even before the existence of America. It has always been a part of America’s story. The first nation to recognize my country was Morocco. In signing the treaty of Tripoli in 1796, our second president John Adams wrote, “The United States has itself no character of enmity

against the law, religion or tranquility of Muslims. And since our founding American Muslims have enriched the United States. They have fought in our wars, served in government, stood for civil rights” (Obama, 2009).

From the end of the American Revolution until 1215, ransom between Muslim North African states and the U.S. elucidates the fact that Muslims had never ceased to be important for shaping the American history for one hundred and thirty years of peace agreement and challenges (Prothero, 2003). The history of early African Muslims is similar to the broader African American history since they, too, went back to the American Revolution during which the Continental congress, according to historical reports, negotiated with Algeria about the importation of Algerian horses for George Washington’s army.

For the first 150 years after the emergence of the U.S.A. as an independent nation, the American policies toward Muslims and Arabs both reflected a sustainable view of Islam as a violent, dangerous and distant religion from the American shores. The origin of these misconceptions are well described by Edward Said’s Orientalism, which contributed to the creation of the dichotomy West and the East; whereby the first controls the second, and where the East was denigrated by media as both a stereotype and a source of its identity.

3-Blurring Lines between Muslims and Westerners

The constant spreading of negative images is an undeniable fact of the flawed Western view of Islam. This entails that Muslims are not only designated as ‘others’, but reveals the hidden intentions and the unstated purpose to implement an effective strategy aiming at creating a religious sense of belonging to the Christian community, especially when an increasing sense of European nationalism began to threaten the authority of the church. Henceforth, skeptic stances and perpetual vilification of Muslim other are self-defining mechanism and targeted premises against the outsider.

During the Umayyad reign, Caliphate in Muslim Spain had been really an enlightened society that bore witness to a harmonious religious belief with an idealized model of the coexistence between Muslims, Christians and Jews. Spanish Andalusia offered a culture of pluralism that shaped religions tolerance, particularly at its prime. In spite of the short peaceful congruence between the three faiths, Christian theologians sought to raise

impediments against the attraction of Islam that might have exercised over their leading elite by transmitting a convincing evidence of the superiority of Christianity over Islam. Among barriers they encountered was portraying Muslims as heretics, and emphasizing the claim that Islam is a devilish religion and that the prophet Muhammad PBUH is an unscrupulous impostor, predecessor of the anti-Christ. In this line of thought, Westerners have placed a revolutionary framework with the upshot of Islam that was perceived as a degeneration of the furthest truth and Christianity as the conclusive end of the evolutionary process (Esposito, 1992, pp. 37-42).

By the end of the 11th century, the collapse of the Ummayyad state by the Abbasids, particularly the decline of Granada in 1492, marked the successive relapses for Islam in which Christians shifted the balance of power toward them. During the outset of the 17th and the 18th centuries, the Islamic world's power and its political influence began to fade, especially with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. At the start of World War I, the mightiest and long lasting dynasties of Ottomans were already in decline, resulting in the extensive loss of Islamic lands and radical transformation in the West. The consequence was the creation of nation states and the emergence of European colonial powers such as France, Spain and Italy...etc. These superpowers abstained from targeting conspicuously Islam through historical Christian attacks. Rather, their assault took another alternative, built upon modern Darwinist foundations.

Around the 20th century, Islam has become a fatal validity in all over the world, especially in post-colonial era, which freed most countries. The massive flood of Muslim immigrants to Western countries like France, Britain, and the United States, fleeing bad living conditions in their homelands, constituted another troublesome issue that was a complex outcome of Islam presence. The origin of such complexities was the heightened sense of nationalism and the consciousness of Muslim countries of the colonial exploitative regimes. To add insult to injury, the establishment of the state of Israel was another impulse that triggered more skepticism around the West-Islam relationship. In this regard, the most prominent cause of animosity toward Islam in recent times is the plausible West, especially the United States' support of Israel. The U.S.A aids of Israel's militarization and expansion have reflected its ultimate power in the Middle East; the effect has been to turn Israel completely dependent on the U.S.

A lot of researchers have demonstrated that modern clashes between the West and Islam had its roots to the end of the Cold War. According to Naber (2008): “Many scholars have compared the backlash against Arab immigrant communities after the attacks of September 11, 2001...the fact that Arab Americans were negatively conceptualized long before 9/11 attacks as unique set of persons from a specific place of origin who share a cluster of negative traits that promotes violence and hatred” (Naber, 2008, p 74). Several incidents; therefore, have grabbed a vast amount of attention to better understand the negative perceptions about Muslims and their religion.

Furthermore, the Middle East has seen defining elements that further shaped the current American foreign policy decisions, which have had aggressive attitudes against Arabs, including racism, prejudice, and discrimination. Shaheen Jack (2001) confirmed that the negative portrayals of Muslims began intensively prior 9/11 events, and particularly in 1960 onward, particularly turmoils over oil, the embargo of 1975, the outbreak of the Persian-Gulf war, and lastly 9/11 events (p.265).

Stereotypes in Media and statements by government officials have long painted Islam and Muslims as intrinsically violent, destructive and incapable of self- regulation or democracy, whether on the basis of theology or genetics (Mamdani, 2004). The shift toward anti-Muslim concepts, representing a fearful aspect of Islam, can be traced to the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. In this context, the watershed moment of the emergence of Arabs and Muslims’ discrimination and racialization is closely linked to the outcome of the Gulf War and the Palestinian resistance. These events represented the stage for scapegoating Islam and Muslims as a menacing source with multipronged level of marginalization and prejudice.

Anti-Muslim sentiments are also constructed on the basis of clash of civilizations and enemy creation. Magnifying distinctions and forging them into a threat is in the clash of civilizations core. Precisely, the concept provides a racist framework as a source of difference and antagonism. Structuring anti-Islam discourses and affirming a Western worldview are ideological funnels that aim to fabricate a model of an idealized ‘us’ against the menacing ‘other’. In this regard, the prominent Harvard scholar and politician Samuel Huntington is considered the pioneer to draw the attention of academia to the notion of clash of civilizations. His theory is another backup device of racism that represents a renewed

signpost of the pre-described discriminatory attitudes that prevailed in the past. “In the case of Islam, this threat is compounded by geographical adjacency and historical antagonism and also the overtly political role that Islam plays in the lives of its followers. Rivalry with the West is made more potent by the fact that Islam is still itself a vigorous and expanding collective identity” (Al-Jabri, 1999, p. 67). Thus, the clash of civilizations or conflict is sparked by the fact that most Westerners claim that their values and concepts are fundamentally different from those of other civilizations. Such fundamental differences set political and ideological boundaries that might lead to crisis and bloodshed. Any perception of clash of civilizations might be distinctively a religious motivation and a cultural stance vis à vis the other.

Religious sensitiveness are awakened when one side acts in a way that is understood to subvert the other. Advances of universal claims on the basis of superiority and inferiority hamper peaceful coexistence. Predominant perpetual clashes between the West and Islam necessitate to put forward an in-depth comprehension that unravel realities about Islam in the United States of America, and how Islam’s perception can decipher the nature of hatred toward Arabs.

4-Orientalism: the Perception of Arabs and Muslims in the West

The ambivalence of the West toward the East is age-old. The richness of the East cultures, ancient wisdom and great civilizations of the Orient are really widespread. However, as Westerners claim, the menaces of its hideous mysteries and daft, hailing from its past, have abominated at least as many. Fantasy instigated overstatement, and fictitious fabrications, along with a set of prejudicial stereotypes, have been primordial to popular conceptions. The Orient; therefore, has been an attribute of hordes and disports, spiritual mystifications, and peculiar carnality. Confronting the East has been momentous for the West self-image as it yielded multiple identities, which have been constructed through irrational factors, ranging from cultural, racial, and moral superiority. In fact, no work has reignited a debate, a direct explanatory, and interpretive stance of the binary relevance between the Orient and the Occident as Edward Said’s (1935-2003) vastly criticized book: *Orientalism* (1978), which really embarks on understanding the corollary of the dichotomous perception of oriental cultures in opposition to occidental ones.

Said's seminal work demonstrates that the antagonistic perception of Islam as other is not a recent phenomenon, which is concomitant to the tragic events of 9/11. In contrast, it refers and owes to a great extent to the French modernist Michael Foucault's theory of coercion and power exercise through the propagation of knowledge and discourse. Said elucidates that the advancement of Islam as other has been arranged out to the early and mid-eighteenth century to overly uphold the plan of the Western colonial domination. Thus, he analyzed the relationship between the European colonization and the convoluted discursive structures that have long constructed the Western European experience of orientalism. As a kind of Western projection and a will to govern the Orient, Said defines Orientalism as "a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between "the Orient" and (most of the time) "the Occident"', anchoring itself through history in "a Western style for dominating restructuring, and having authority over the Orient" (Said, 1978, pp.2-3). "The discipline by which the Orient was (and is) approached systematically, as a topic of learning, discovering, and practice... to designate that collection of dreams, images and vocabularies available to anyone who has tried to talk about what lies east of the dividing line." (Said, 1978, p.73).

Said's words show that Orientalism is basically a form of thought exalted upon the epistemological distinction between the Orient and the Occident, historically establishing itself in Western patterns of domination, reconstruction and authority over the Orient. Thus, the prime argument of Orientalism is premised on the questions of knowledge of the other, the fashion of this knowledge, and the incentives behind its dissemination in the West. Said argues; therefore, that the production as well as the attainment of knowledge about the Orient is neither objective nor unbiased. Instead, it is the upshot of perpetual process that mirrors the Western centric-vision and particular avails. Accordingly, the Orient is perfectly portrayed by negative and hermeneutical images and, henceforth; Islam is widely believed as backward, inferior, and threatening. Said's attention on how the Western intellectual prism constructs and fosters the otherness of Islam, along with defining the Orient as monolithic and unchanging, leaves no little doubt that the phenomenon has existed for centuries in the Western society. He said:

Islamic Orientalists never saw their estrangement from Islam either as salutary or as an attitude with implications for the better understanding of their own culture. Rather, their estrangement from Islam simply intensified their feelings of

superiority about European culture, even as their antipathy spread to include the entire Orient, of which Islam was considered a degraded (and usually, a virulently dangerous) representative. Such tendencies [...] became built into the very traditions of Orientalist study throughout the nineteenth century, and in time became a standard component of most Orientalist training, handed on from generation to generation. (Said, 1978, p. 260)

The consistent trend of judging Islam, as being central to a perception of bad Orient, is originated from a mindset of Western superiority that would not only distort and otherize the Orient, but would ultimately rationalize the West hidden goals for its economic, geographic and political colonization. Specifically, Said stresses the point that Orientalists, often through disguised and legitimized representations, have long tended to perceive the countries of the Orient through an exploitative lens of their richness by colonial superpowers. Oriental despotism and knowledge on the Orient, from Napoleon Bonaparte's campaign against the Ottoman territories of Egypt and Syria to the French and British imperial empires, sought not only to illustrate the instinct hostility and military subjugation of eastern colonies, but to idealize Europeans as a source of White supremacy and an example of civilization and culture.

What distinguishes the weak Orient in contrast to the powerful Occident, according to Said, is the White man colonists' position regarding the color of their skin as superior ontological status and the power to dominate the rest of the world. For colonists, the absolute demarcation of the Occident and the Orient developed over time, and the growing contact brought by colonial encounter consolidated this demarcation. The long-stranding dualism of the West and Islam, not dissimilar to other dualism, has always reflected as a binary antipathy and opposition between superior Christianity and inferior Islamic religion, cultures and races. Such dualism is a way of categorization and a form of classification, playing a pivotal role in human understanding. It is not merely based on logical or psychological factors, but to a further extent on social backgrounds. Indeed, Social hierarchical orders are neither stirred by the tangible world, nor derived without prelogical social perceptions. Thus, the analysis of dualism is mainly a premature and a primitive way of categorization, which is essentially at the jeopardy of being a mean of attaining social interest of those who struggle to define it. According to said, Orientalism has been, after all, a political view of reality

promoting clear declaration of difference between the West /us and the Orient/them. In brief, Orientalism endeavors to conceptualize thought into two different entities, coexisting in perpetual tension. Hence, the weak Orient has been always contrasted with the strong Western privilege that has been able to penetrate, wrestle with, and provide a frame and meaning to the Orient mysteries. Orientalism focus on Western power and Eastern weakness has indeed created a sort of idealist essence that had made the Oriental mind retrograde into untruthfulness and lack of accuracy. The difference between races as well as civilizations are apparently radical and indissoluble; the Oriental conception of the self and identity has become rigid along with religion and cultures as well. The Orientalist classification has been broadened beyond Christian and Muslim polarity to encompass origin, race, color and traditions. Said concludes that the significant query of Orientalism underlies behind the misunderstanding of dualism between Westerners and Orientals in history of all hitherto societies that present another version of dualism in the realm of human interaction:

“We divide human society, as indeed human reality seems to be genuinely divided, into clearly different cultures, histories, traditions, societies, even races and survive the consequences humanly? By surviving the consequences humanly, I mean to ask whether there is any way of avoiding the hostility expressed by the divisions, say, of men into “us” (Westerners) and “they” (Orientals)... the result is usually to polarize the distinction -the Oriental becomes more Oriental, the Westerner more Westerner-and limit the human encounter between different cultures, traditions, and societies.” (Said, 1995, p.45)

According to Said, orientalist’s experiences of the Arab show that the White man supremacy has always been observant in separating himself and his group from the other, stripping of anything that annoys the distinctiveness of his imagined Western mind, and depriving his normal progress of history. For the orientalist, the Arab is always opposed to the Western. Thus, he, according to Said, is expected to act like a Westerner, and any exception from the standardized norms has always been viewed as unnatural. These views are aimed to serve as hegemonic strategies to legitimize colonization and to pave the path to its destructive machinery.

The West has distinguished two types of Arabs: good and bad Arabs. Good Arabs are those who enabled Western colonialism and those who act as they are told by Westerners;

whereas bad Arabs are those who object colonialism and are often labeled as terrorist. Obviously, there is a kind of discursive uniformity in Orientalists' representations in forming a historical and a cultural praxis and providing a compendium of possible assertions about the Orient on the basis of specific faulty discourses. Said hence tried to represent the unquestioned assumption of Western words on Islam, suggesting a West and Islam dualism across a broad spectrum of views. In fact, he attempted to give a remarkable example of the Orientalist Hamilton Alexander Rosskeen Gibb's thought of Islam. Said states that Gibb associated Islam to all Muslim life as he foresaw Islam as "cultural synthesis" that could be studied apart from economy, sociology, and politics of the Muslims. Gibb stated that there are two possible alternatives of change: "The Orient is much too important to the left of the Orientalists" (Said, 1978, p.106). As a second alternative, the new approach was announced as a traditional approach. What we need from of nowadays Islam, according to Gibb, is "the traditional Orientalist plus good social scientist working together: between them the two will do interdisciplinary work" (Said, 1978, p.107).

It has become a necessity to change the trend of the study from a philosophical approach to a social science research; suggesting a need to have Orientalists and social scientists work together, but sadly the traditional orientalist approach adopted by American Orientalists dealt with Islam as ahistorical monolith. Said cynically revert back to the much admired Massignon Gibb who maintained a very orthodoxly view about Islam, weighted heavily with all the conventional and traditional attitudes and perspectives. In this regard, Gibb equated Islamic religion to all issues related to Muslims' life to the Islamic law, the communist insurgents, jihadists, Islamic orthodoxy, the community of believers, and to orders and values of Muslims. Gibb sharply assigns all of these facts to Islam without manifesting the impacts of imperial power and colonization on modern Islamic countries. Additionally, he totally overlooked the diverse political systems and regimes when scrutinizing Islamic government. Gibb disregarded the value of political system which can be public, monarchs, or feudal. Furthermore, as said states, he uses Islam and appropriate timing as abstractions without a clearly precision where in time and space Islam existed, leaving much ambiguity. Thus, Said continuously contends Gibb's analysis of Islam by restating that his approach is based on metaphysical premise and general similarities. Said explains that the research on Islam is still confused within a traditional scope. "Gibb's *oeuvre* purports to be Islam (or Mohammedanism) both as *it is* and *as it might be*. Metaphysically-

and only metaphysically-essence and potential are made one” (Said, 1978, p.283). This clarifies that Gibb’s Islam status is different from the present Islam in being more than or above ordinary Westerners can understand and interpret the endless complexity of the Arabs and Muslims. Hence, Orientalists have reduced a character typology that has generated an opposing dichotomy of the West and the Orient.

The implication that there is a Western status of truth is not real as it is totally absent in Massignon’s representation, which cruelly abuses the real meaning of Islam. In fact, there is much unsolved suspicion that revolves around the fact whether Orientalists’ view reflects real misrepresentations or sketchy representations, entrenching in the power of colonialism. A dualism of the West and Islam is theorized in European and American intellectual sphere through history, they seem to be responsible for disproving this flawed and destructive ideology. The battle against Western imagined supremacy and its imperialist goals seems to be endless. Thus, Muslims should ponder the question whether the gap between reality and presentation can lead to common comprehensions or generate more enabling ones; thus, reinforcing a progressive anti-Islam images.

Despite the fact that the concept of Orientalism has come under sarcastic implications in objecting the world by strategies of a firm and reductionist binary opposition, Bernard Lewis, a British historian and Orientalist of Jewish origin, promoted another different point of view about Orientalism, seeking to exculpate it from the burden of the Western colonial alienation. More than anything else, Lewis took prominence and notability through his deep historical analysis and philological investigation in the Middle Eastern studies and post-war Islam. Thus, behind this extreme criticism of Islam and frivolous oppositional hierarchy against the Orient, Said displayed incessant facts rebutting Lewis’ polemic arguments. For Lewis, under his parochial historical version of cultural synthesis, the Muslims are currently backward and their collapse was basically self-inflected condition owing to the Islamic religion and its culture (Lewis, 2004). For Said, Lewis is still a persistent follower of the old-fashioned paradigm of the West and Islam. Against the polemic claim that Orientalism has been developed as a facet of European humanism far from the politics of European colonial dominance, Said asserted that the scope of Orientalists, including Lewis, has been typically a political intellectualism bound to self-affirmation and subjectivity rather than objective analysis. In fact, it has been full of prejudice and an effective tool of imperialists’ colonization (Windschuttle, 1999).

The British, French, and American focus on the alleged Middle East is beyond doubt, and such focus is fostered purposely by war-like machinery that puts the Orient within a political power game. According to Said, Lewis got trapped into excessiveness, albeit from contradictory distinctions. Ultimately, the derogatory position against Islam is a ramification of his improvident and biased knowledge about the Middle East. He; therefore, treats Islam as monolithic cultural code for all Muslims without subtle nuances of its diversity, inner dynamism and huge historical complexities. Henceforth, Orientalist's opinion, including Lewis, were produced by the darkness of traditional Western ignorance. It seems that such unconsciousness is a symptom of an abiding historical illusion about the East, which is profoundly impacted by the shortcomings and differences of the West. It is worthy to mention that both the West and Islam are heterogeneous with huge pluralism and dynamism. It is a grave and a daring oversimplification to disregard the clashing and different thoughts in both Islam and the West. Furthermore, it would be unacceptable ignorance to renounce all the tangible historical realities that prove the deep-rooted exchange of knowledge between both Islam and the West over several centuries of their encounter. Lewis' reductionist understanding of Islamic religion, as a violent and unchangeable entity, is straightforward amnesia of brutal violence in the West like the World Wars I and II of the nineteenth century. As an absolute biased ideology, the Orientalist chooses the worst stand in Islam and the best as his own to idealize the ostensible dualism. The traditional Western worldview implicitly reveals disdainful portrayals, not coming close in touch to matching the recent global issues, and a fanatical vision that overrides the divergent aspects of Islam for the sake of escalating the unchangeable superiority of the Christian West. "According to Lewis, Islam does not develop, and neither do Muslims...he always takes care to say that of course the Muslims are not anti-Semitic the way the Nazis were, but their religion can too easily accommodate itself to anti-Semitism and has done so."(Said, 1978, p.317).

In this perspective, Said deeply and comprehensibly challenged the magnificent corpus of the Orientalist-Western literature on Islam and elucidated that what was thought to be authentic branch of knowledge has been almost a blow of falsifiable records in favor of the Western political interests. Another trend holds that though several events are no longer existent as being accountable for the crystallization of the Orientalist discourse, it would be foolish to believe that the old patterns of history had been eliminated in framing the West-Islam. Nevertheless, they have been revised, reconstituted and renewed within a

globalized setting. All have together given birth to a new paradigm that can be called neo-Orientalism.

5-Neo-orientalism

In academia, the issues at stake have remarkably evolved and been reconstituted over the recent decades. Currently, the question is not so much about Orientalism, but about neo-Orientalism, referring to the set of research and analysis that proliferated Edward Said's wake so as to understand the alternative productions toward the perceived dichotomy of the Islamic East and Christian West, particularly against the cultural legendary of Imperialism. From the birth of Said's distinct work '*Orientalism*' (1978), a wide ranging of disciplines have witnessed no dearth devotion to discuss Westerners' new tendencies in explaining the facets of Muslims, Arabs, and Western societies. The patent thing is that neo-colonialism discourse is not grounded on any new changing intensity of Islam, but a basic reformulation and rebirth of the traditional Orientalism in order to advocate the American imperialism and its racist attitudes toward Muslim and Arab countries. In other words, the new political reality in the Middle East after WWI did not alter the essence of Orientalism, but shifted its main concerns as Westerners have become more intrigued in the new Arab issues after centuries of propagating knowledge about Islam. Unlike the traditional Orientalism, the neo-orientalism has increasingly viewed Islam as the revived enemy and a global danger to Western civilization. In this regard, Behdad Ali and Juliet Williams explain neo-Orientalism to be "a mode of representation which, while indebted to classical Orientalism, engenders new tropes of othering....Neo-Orientalism entails a popular mode of representing, a kind of doxa about the Middle East and Muslims which is disseminated, thanks to new technologies of communication, throughout the world." (Behdad & Williams, 2010, p.281).

In this ever-changing world, new political issues of the new era have challenged the traditional Western view of Islam and have profoundly influenced the interrelations between the West and Islam. With successive terrorism attacks underway, most of the world countries, particularly the United States, have changed in a way their foreign policy strategies that had not been seen for generations. In fact, several terrorist attacks, such as 1993 bombing at the World Trade Center, the attacks on the U.S. embassies in both Tanzania and Kenya, the 2004 terrorists attacks in Madrid, 2005 London hostile offense, and in particular 9/11 attacks, reanimated increasing worries and coined a new image of radical

Islam. These terrible events profoundly changed the world's political perspective, marking the beginning of a new history and radical shift in Westerners' perception of the self and the other. As John Lewis Gaddis states: "It was not just the Twin Towers that collapsed on the morning of September 2001: so too did some of most fundamental assumption about international, national, and personal security." (Gaddis, 2004, p.80)

The United States has contemplated all kinds of drastic measures to combat an invisible enemy who lacks governments, borders and conventional war strategies. It is worthy to mention that, at no point in contemporary history, there was no great surge in political investigation as Post 9/11, which has really inaugurated a century of a new sophisticated perception of the other multi-faceted Islam. Most scholars have suggested the year 2001 is 'year zero' or the pivotal turning point in Arab-American relationship. Thus, the most influential cause-effect of 2011 attacks on the American traditional Orientalism is to cement the epithet 'neo' to the Arab world's political discourses and issues. In this vein, the notion of otherness, even though old, does not imply that the animosity toward Muslim and Arabs has vanished. On the contrary, it is still prevalent and alive and has only been emphasized in recent political arena. The straightforward scope of new-orientalism can be interpreted by the sudden development "from a faintly outlined stereotype as a camel-riding nomad to an accepted caricature as the embodiment of incompetence and easy defeat" (Said, 1978, p.285). However, Islamic insurgence in major Islamic countries and disillusionment with the West, which were sprung out from the Islamic revolution in Iran, the Arab oil embargo and the Arab-Israeli war, induced the emergence of a new Muslim and Arab. Thus, he is seen as the main obstacle to the establishment of Israel in 1948, "at the bottom of all oil shortage trouble" in the West as well a threat to the continuing existent of the West in the Middle East (Said, 1978, 261).

Overwhelmingly, the United States' recent conflicts in the Middle East are ultimately a well-planned choice. Indeed, its foreign policy has apparently adopted multiplying new judicious strategies of exploitation in the oil-rich region of the Middle East. Neo-Orientalism's tendencies are seemingly reduplicated to satisfy the outrageous imperialistic expectations. Westerners have excelled to implicitly present the other as an absurd terrorist within the global War on Terror narratives. As far as the United States is concerned, it is only a slight overstatement to say that Muslims and Arabs are essentially seen either oil suppliers or potential terrorists.

Such concerns for the Middle East oil has plainly marked the beginning of a new coming era that culminated in an immediate global control and a considerable awareness for future armed interventions. More skepticism and fears have been engendered about the importance of oil that American was running at. In this regard, the U.S.A. has intentionally turned a keen eye to the Middle East to guarantee the constant request of oil supplies beyond its boundaries. Lured by huge oil revenue along the Gulf region, the United States found herself continuously involved in the War of Terror. Accordingly, the U.S.A. launched its wars in Afghanistan in October 2001, successfully driving the Taliban from power in order to reject Al-Qaeda as a secure base of military operation in Afghanistan. However, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's government in 2003 reflected the deep economic aspect of the American invasion of Iraq, which was over-shadowed behind the endless War of Terror bluffing.

Issues of national security and the government intervention in providing political safety strategies have reemerged as one of the most decisive controversies in the American political arena, resurfacing at time when the U.S.A. have raised hue and cry about such threats. For instance, the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan has uncovered basically the biased intention and abstraction behind its occupation. One can notify that American soldiers were absent to fight Taliban in the Afghan high lands. Rather they were protecting the pipelines routes, under the banner of promoting democracy and fighting terrorism. In this vein, the Department of Energy reported in September 2001 that:

Afghanistan's significance from an energy standpoint stems from its geographical position as a potential transit route for oil and natural gas exports from Central Asia to the Arabian Sea. This potential includes the possible construction of oil and natural gas export pipelines through Afghanistan which was under serious consideration in the mid-1990's. The idea has since been undermined by Afghanistan's instability. Since 1996, most of Afghanistan has been controlled by the Taliban movement, which the United States does not recognize as the Government of Afghanistan. (U.S. Energy Information Administration eia.gov).

The striving over oil reserves has long been the rooted motive of the U.S. military involvement in the Middle East. The misrepresentation of Arabs as barbarians has become dominant in post 9/11 American political issues. In the course of a session with the

Palestinian Foreign Minister Nabil Shaath, Bush asserted imprudently that he was on divine assignment when he commanded the outbreak of wars against Iraq and Afghanistan. His speech on Iraq military involvement is shaded by religious and virtuous influence than colonial wars; a divine of the emergency to get rid of the aggressive Middle East. “I am driven with a mission from God'. God would tell me, 'George go and fight these terrorists in Afghanistan'. And I did. And then God would tell me 'George, go and end the tyranny in Iraq'. And I did. And now, again, I feel God's words coming to me, 'Go get the Palestinians their state and get the Israelis their security, and get peace in the Middle East'. And, by God, I'm gonna do it.” (Sturcke, 2005). Bush’s forgoing quotation explains his irrational divine mission as the prime cause for a better understanding of Iraq invasion as well as the American grand strategy that was initiated by him to conduct a forcible emphasis on global authority. In the aftermath of 9/11 attacks, the Bush’s administration and the national security strategy approved the compelling assertion of full spectrum dominance; a strategic plan that permitted a complete overriding on Iraq without the consent of the United Nation. Certainly, the 2003 invasion of Iraq represented an indispensable backbone in the American strategy of reshaping the Middle East and the recurrent American hegemony, particularly dominating “the world oil reserves” in the region (Hinnebusch, 2007, p.220).

The irrational American invasion of Iraq has been bolstered by different arguments. Washington’s official and widely accepted assertion was motivated by Saddam Hussein’s mass destruction agenda, his support of international terrorism, along with Al-Qaida, and; therefore, Iraq deemed sufficiently an alarming threat to the United States and the entire West. These murky hypothesis and wrong claims were complicated within a widespread campaign of propaganda over the run up to war. Indeed, most government intentionally misread the evidences of Hussein dangers, which were spurred into reality on the basis of purported goals such as the desire to spread democracy. The trail of destruction and chaos in the Middle East, especially Iraq, were all viewed as outcomes of excuse about worldwide spread of democracy. In this regard, the linguist Noam Chomsky (2005) confirms that:

As the pretexts for the invasion of Iraq have collapsed—no weapons of mass destruction, no Al Qaeda tie to Iraq, no connection between Iraq and 9/11... When Bush gave his speech announcing his new vision ... He described the Iraq war as perhaps "the most idealistic war fought in modern times—a war whose only coherent rationale, for all the misleading hype about weapons of mass

destruction and al Qaeda terrorists, is that it toppled a tyrant and created the possibility of a democratic future." This vision of a "democratic future" is led, according to Ignatius, by the "idealist in chief," Paul Wolfowitz, who has probably the most extreme record of passionate hatred of democracy of anybody in the administration. (p.117)

The paradox of democracy brought an interesting irony to Westerners as it is inherently a parochialising not a cosmopolitanising process. To their eyes, the uninterrupted fight against violence, barbarism, and governmental despotism in the Middle East are the fundamental canon of new-Orientalism although their paradoxical addresses disavow the importance of dominance and supremacy. The West, and particularly the U.S.A., attempts to follow its interests forward foremost. Its spread of democracy is; thus, self-serving, selective, episodic, and often outlined in heightened oriental sense and legitimate justification for imperialist ambitions. Hegemony of the Orient is another example of keeping Western interests under the guise of 9/11, which opportunistically encored the Arab world as being a hot spot of War on Terror.

6-American War on Terror and Arab and Muslim Enemy Creation

At exactly 8:46 of September 2011, the magnitude of a series of attacks patently propelled the globe into a new speech of an intense change. Four trade airlines were hijacked by a handful of Arab Muslims. Two of the planes were cracked into the World Trade Center known as the Twin Tower of New York city, the third struck into the Pentagon in Washington D.C. and another fourth had flown into a field near Pennsylvania. The immediate and tangible outcome of Al-Qaeda and its allies' attacks-the death of nearly 8000 civilians and the constant carved gash in the sky live of the United States most densely populated city- is comparatively evanescent to the aftermath reaction to 9/11. Regardless of being acknowledged, recognized or confirmed, 9/11 events and worldwide response thereto provoked a fledging regime that would provide alternations as well as new ways to the nation states to implement the rule of law in fighting terrorism. Immediately, a wave of unprecedented anti-terrorism sentiments has become a dominant concern, which underscored a striking shift in threat spectrum among policy makers and the general public. While the contemporary discourse of 9/11 has often been used to mark a watershed moment,

it brought the international community to stand behind the United States in disclosing who was responsible of the atrocious offensives.

Besides, the United Nations expressed its sympathy toward the United States and underpinned the international community to eradicate the terrorist (Resolution 1368, Resolution 1386 United Nations un.org). The counter terrorism efforts intensified to claim that the instigators of 9/11 were radical Islamists whose leader Osama Bin Ladin proclaimed “to kill Americans and their allies...civilians and military –is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which is possible to do it ” (Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, 23 February 1998). While Bin Ladin was declared to be the cause of incalculable lives’ loss in a horrific fashion, the U.S.A. and its supporters, as a response, are effecting profoundly the international metamorphose of the international world’s landscape under the effect of Islamic religious impulses. This evoked to an extent an era of a grown menace, which was outraged along with an anti-Arab and anti-Muslim feelings across the public level.

The War on Terror has focused heavily on practical and different 9/11 implications and policy. The key element defining the circulation of them is that the global War on Terror began to characterize and denigrate the enemy other as a network of criminals who have become more group based, enjoying stealthily the assistance of some terrorist states. Besides, terrorism is not only a continuing international threat, but it is also becoming increasingly difficult to end. Thus, maintaining international security and protecting global interests have become a challenge for the American policy makers and a serious problem on international level. The centerpiece of that was the President Bush’s declaration of War on Terror, in which the aim, as iterated by him, was to smash the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and especially to bring the leader of Al-Qaeda Osama Bin Ladin to justice, to prevent future terrorists’ acts as well as the reemergence of terrorist network.

Indeed, 9/11 incidents have reinforced the absolute view of the U.S. as a primary target of jihadist operations. His 1990 “Declaration of War against the American Occupying the Lands of the Two Holy Palaces”, Bin Ladin provided key insights towards understanding his vision of jihad as a justification against the United States that he saw as not just an enemy, but as a constant source of all the Arab world crisis. Osama asserted that current Muslim disillusionment is rooted in the contemporary religious resurgence. The reasons of Jihad have been religio-cultural, political and socio-economic, and have emphasized on political

tensions and social justice such as abusive authoritarian regime, lack of social services, and perpetual exploitation. All intertwined as a catalyst for vindicating the Jihad against the United States' foreign policies that have repulsed many Muslims under the slogan of modernization. As the first initiative, the United States embarked on the War on Terror enterprise with the aid of many other countries including, the United Kingdom, the Nato, no-Nato countries such as Pakistan and China whose support and contribution far exceeded their strength and size (Jonathan,2004).

As a part of the ongoing mission of the War on Terror, the allegations over Saddam Hussein's possession of mass destruction weapons created a ground swell alarm, which was seen as a threat to the American homeland security. In March 2003, the Bush administration, along the British coalition forces, invaded Iraq without the United Nations' Council approval.

Probably, the most flagrant acknowledgment of neo-colonialism was successfully signaled when the President George W. Bush described the American War on Terror as Crusade on September 16, 2001. Bush's statement: "This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while" was controversial, and it animated great anger across the Muslim world because it was perceived as an initiative plan for launching war against Afghanistan and later Iraq as well as a strategy that necessitated international and interior backup. As Islam has come at height after 9/11, Bush championed the reason of the American capitalists and imperialists' designs. The expression such as "Islamic Terror" or "Muslim Jihad" are fundamental cornerstones of cultural talk that lacks rational ability to examine issues from a de facto standpoint by its assertive tendency to attribute criminal activities to religion or culture (White House, 2001). The War on Terror hence did not start in vacuum. It started and continues amidst the background of several imitations, aiming to promote the preeminence of the United States in world geopolitical conditions.

Given the intense interest in terrorism and War on Terror across a broad spectrum of fields, one might think it is quite simple to locate simple definitions and assertions of what it is meant when people use these concepts. Predominantly, scholars as well academicians have struggled to provide more concrete and precise definitions to readers. In political discourses, there is a proliferation of definitions and clarifications in many references. Nevertheless, the Department of Defense, in its dictionary of military words, provides the

following definition for terrorism: “the awful use of violence or threat of violence, other motivated by religion, political, or other ideological beliefs, to instill fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are usually political.” (Department of Defense). It is noticeable that the Department of Defense’s definition seems to refer to a common underlying concept present in a majority of other clarifications about terrorism such as illegal violence, to spread and instill fear, to achieve political aims. As it has become overly overridden and a requisite part of the argot of the 21st century, Bruce Hoffman shows that the term is a complex political concept that has been roused by modern Media, and referring to abhorrent acts of violence against societies or individuals. Bruce states that that most elucidations are disappointingly unsatisfying. Terrorism is “fundamentally and inherently political. It is also ineluctably about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and the use of power to achieve political change. Terrorism is thus violence—or, equally important, the threat of violence—used and directed in pursuit of, or in service of, a political aim.”(Hoffman, 2006, pp.2-3).

The War on Terror, particularly 9/11 incidents, had strong connections with the Cold War conflicts during the 1980s. Accordingly, the role of Al-Qaeda can be dated back to the Soviet-Afghan War when the Soviet Union succeeded to take a far-reaching step in conquering Afghanistan in December 1979 to curtail fundamentalists’ revolts against the Kabul regime and frustrate the prospect of Western intervention in the Civil War. The United Kingdom, the United States of America, Pakistan and China buttressed the Afghan Jihadists guerillas against the powerful military forces of the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. In the early 1980 and before becoming the prominent figure of Jihad, Osama Bin Ladin was recalled to Afghanistan where he consciously rallied and even funded the Arab Afghan volunteers resisting Afghanistan’s Soviet invaders. Victory in finding one of the world’s superpowers exerted arguably a lasting influence on Bin Ladin. As it was astutely understood by him, the Russian Red Army submission in Afghanistan set in motion the chain of events that resulted in the decline of the U.S.S.R. and the demise of communism. Indeed, it is this certainty and self- confidence, along with enduring sense of divine impetus, that have optimistically prompted Bin Ladin and his fellow Jihadists’ triumph in the fight against the U.S.A. For instance , the U.S. is described as ‘the enemy’ by Bin Ladin on the edge of the financial ruin and complete decline—with the strength of Islam poised to pull America over the precipice because of its hostility towards Islam and Muslims.

Clearly, the Jihadists have realized that guerilla operations are indispensable to circumvent the efforts of the United States and its allies to target the Muslim world. Guerrilla tactics, as the most effective weapons Muslims have, had successfully challenge the better-equipped enemies and continued to be the best method of warfare against the Crusader enemy.

In spite of the supposedly unending controversy about the legal definition of terrorism, it has been suggested that there is actually an understanding of what is meant by terror and terrorism as well. In the light of the multiple influential reasons which states have put forward in substantiating some terrorist's acts, this proportion cannot completely correct the ongoing debates on the definition of terrorism, which seems to be interminable due to the necessity to investigate causes, rather than tagging the offender of terrorist's act randomly. Despite being plagued by subjectivity, indeterminacy and political disagreement, terrorism has challenged unnecessarily consensus of meaning, and become a new phenomenon worldwide. In this regard, the rise of vexed questions on terrorism and its incidence has mirrored the increasing debates outraising of discussions on the subject in the recent international system. The phrase War on Terror has exclusively captured a worldwide attention than any other word, particularly after 9/11. It is an old and has been on for long time. The erroneous claim, however, is to reckon that it was the innovation of the U.S. President George Bush. Nevertheless, the reality asserts that the expression only gained significance during his presidency onward; particularly after 9/11 incidents and was in no way his origination. It might thus be true to assert that the expression War on Terror authentically achieved prominence as much as it does not before 9/11.

Obviously, history demonstrates that the War on Terror, accordingly, did not start in vacuum. It never stops to serve the continuous American interest amidst the backdrops and context put at reinforcing the predominance of the United States in the wholly geopolitical condition. The U.S.A. led War on Terror has exhaustively been cherished by a myriad of events and international policies. Further, the American campaign against terrorists has been entrenched in preexisting tendencies that were embraced to secure its own socioeconomic and political interests. Consequently, the United States' entanglements with the new war on terrorism predicated 9/11 responses as a compulsory decision to undertake their own long-persisting tensions with forces of anarchy and instability. Ironically, the War on Terror was initially used around the late 1940 to designate the British colonial regime's attempt to halt the Zionist Jew's extensive violence against Palestine. The British authority described the

succession of aggressive attacks as terroristic and announced a War on Terror to retrain the abuse of Zionists Jew. It has progressively become salient when President Harry Truman and successive Cold War presidents sought to frame the Cold War and its dangerous and uncertain geopolitical circumstances as an existential threat. With the quasi-total devastation of Europe, Truman tried to “scare the hell” out the Americans by portraying the country under the U.S.S.R. threat. A rhetoric that entailed the necessity to put the U.S. and Americans in a stark cross road with U.S.S.R. and Soviet Union (Widmaier, 2007).

Eventually, the Cold War outcomes profoundly affected the American policy makers of a pervasive Communist menace that have not just threatened the American freedom and democracy, but also the American way of life (Rojecki, 2008). The dramatic fall of the rival U.S.S.R. left the U.S.A in a distinct new era that challenged its defining relationships with supporters and enemies. Policy makers and politicians suggested to structure new guiding foreign policy framework for a better comprehensive understanding of terrorism, which started to increase in notoriety, regularity, and scale; stimulating a renewed response to the villain of peace (Olson, 2004).

6-1-War on Terror across Different American Administrations

The expression War on Terror has systematically gone out of use during the American president Ronald Reagan who retrieved it back to usage corresponding with the 1986 retaliatory attacks. Libya and Nicaragua presenting the most compelling action fostered before Bill Clinton administration (Kosnik, 2000). In international arena, the United States promoted different coercive measures, including targeting terrorist organizations and state sponsors of terrorism, guiding military strikes, and the development of a sanction regime. For instance, the 1979 Export Administration Act permitted sanctions against state sponsors of terrorism, which at almost of time comprising: Cuba, Libya, Sudan, Syria, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. Besides, counter terrorism policies assisted the 1989 Anti-terrorism and America Export amendments, which surpassed the 1979 Act to more curb terrorists from state demanding back up as well as to punish states that sponsor them (Donohue, 2001). Indeed the United States, under the presidency of Ronald Reagan, launched air strikes against Libya. Reagan declared that the use of air strikes was the U.S. self-defense against Libya’s state sponsored terrorism. In this regard, he emphasized that: “self-defense is not only our duty. It is the purpose behind the mission ... a mission fully consistent in the Article

51 of the U.N. Charter.” (Reagan, 1986). One would argue that the nature of terrorism requires a particular understanding as a key defining War on Terror.

Since 9/11 attacks, there have been substantial growths in literature on the American War on Terror. Yet most of researches have endeavored to shed light on President Bush’s counter terrorism approaches. Nevertheless, while Bush’s War on Terror is still witnessing ample studies, there is a scarce attention on President Bill Clinton’s and President Reagan’s agenda to counterterrorism. In this regard, Clinton arrived to cut a revolutionized White House as the first President elected after the Cold War. As the United States has become the world’s smart superpower after the U.S.S.R. decline, Clinton found himself in a new distinctively and controversial era with no previous guiding foreign policy patterns. (Brinkley, 1997).

As the precedent guiding foreign policy approaches toward rivals lacked meaning in their recent changeable atmosphere, dealing and controlling enemies have proved to be complex in comparison to the former fifteen years. During his eight years of presidency, the Clinton administration encountered various terrorists’ attacks on both the domestic and international levels, resulting in the immediate development of War on Terror policies and the reinforcement of early existing ones. Several questions should be raised to understand an in-depth analysis of the President Clinton’s counterterrorism policies that lead to fully decipher the current led War on Terror; what was Clinton’s interpretation of War on Terror? What were the main characteristics of his counterterrorism initiatives? Was Clinton’s War on Terror a different rhetoric from his predecessors? Overwhelmingly, though Bill Clinton was democratic and objected a lot his predecessors George H. W Bush and Ronald Reagan, the overall paradigm of War on Terror continued to be the same. Accordingly, there is in reality an obvious continuity of the American last War on Terror from President Reagan to President Clinton, and to President George W. Bush. Such a real continuity in the United States’ counterterrorism policy across different presidencies is manifested through the early seeds of the global War on Terror, which truly lies on precedent eras, particularly the Reagan and Clinton’s administrations. Hence, the flagrant declaration of War on Terror post 9/11 did not in any way picture a revolutionary foreign policy shift as claimed by some academicians (Daalder & Lindsay, 2003). Each President’s counterterrorism policies were broadly structured upon the bedrocks of his antecedent’s War on Terror attempts and interest around logic rational. It can be asserted that the Bush doctrine of War on Terror did not

represent a radical shift of the U.S. foreign and security policy because maintaining peace and spreading American democratic values, as fundamental core of Bush's doctrine, corresponds with the traditional security firm of the founding fathers. As Leffler (2001) states:

The goals of George W. Bush's foreign policy 'rekindle Thomas Jefferson's vision of an empire of liberty. They were integral to Woodrow Wilson's missive that "the world must be made safe for democracy." They flow from Franklin Roosevelt's four freedoms. They echo the notable rhetoric of John F. Kennedy's inaugural address, to "oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty." (p. 22)

Leffler's statement explains that the United States, since the early colonial period, explicitly distinguished its foreign policy against potential threats as being interrelated and dependent on past experiences. As literature on American led War on Terror lacks a notable discussion on Clinton's administrative efforts, it is paramount to shed light on the discursive construction of the so-called new terrorism or 'catastrophic terrorism', which still remains an ambiguous gap to a full understanding of the continuities of the U.S. counterterrorism policies. During Clinton's presidency, the United States and its allies endured a considerable number of terrorist attacks. In the immediate response to 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1995 attacks on the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, and the offensive against embassies and governmental properties overseas, policy maker elites, including Bill Clinton, constantly stressed the discursive construction of catastrophic terrorism. President Clinton's catastrophic terrorism against mass destruction weapon continued plausibly to develop a counterterrorism strategy that played an effective role and a fundamental basis for President Bush to respond to 2001 terrorist' attacks. Eliciting from past policies, Clinton and his national team recalled preceding presidents' counter terrorism experiences and articulated four point strategy after the 1993 World Trade Center attacks, emphasizing on economic isolation, multi-lateral cooperation and rising (Badey, 2006).

As terrorists' attacks reached its climax in his presidency and in response to 1996 general warning about Bin Ladin, the CIA founded a special unit of office to analyze intelligence received by Bin Ladin in order to set an operation against him. It was for the

first time that Bin Ladin was not just seen as a terrorist symbol, but a real commander of global threat network of terrorist operations in Afghanistan as a basis. Furthermore, as a reaction to the 1998 simultaneous bombing against the U.S. embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, and Tanzania, Clinton, having confirmed Bin Ladin was the responsible of the offence by the CIA, adopted the 'Operation Infinite Reach'. It involved 79 cruise missiles against Al-Qaeda military training camps in Afghanistan near Khost, Jalalabad, and Al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan, where Bin Ladin was suspected of manufacturing and harbouring chemical weapons. Clinton's cruise missile strikes on Al-Qaeda proved to be unsuccessful because the CIA asserted that Bin Ladin had not been killed, but fled in few hours (Benjamin & Simon, 2003).

In 1992, Bill Clinton began an interest to formulate a good strategy that could cover foreign and domestic policies as a distinct one from the existing ones. In fact, he issued the National Security of role economy internationally, promoting democracy overseas, rebuilding and adopting the American military, and security capacity (Brinkley, 1997). Despite the growing interest in Clinton's administration on national security strategy and geoeconomics, the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the particular demographic enlargement plan, his administration's counterterrorism policy officials contributed to implement dual approach in the Middle East. They targeted Iraq and Iran in the Gulf region, especially Clinton's efforts to revise the Persian-Gulf strategy following the Gulf War. Anthony Lake, Clinton's first-term National Security advisor, drew the President's attention to the threat from the so-called "backlash states" that were later known as "rogue states". As a prominent member within Clinton's National Security team, Lake's debate of dual Containment Strategy demonstrated, in his foreign policy article entitled: "*Confronting Backlash States*" and his speech at John Hopkins University, that Iran and Iraq, Israel's two most remarkable foes in the Middle East, posed concerns for all who sought to make the Israeli-Palestinian plan an ultimate priority in his counterterrorism foreign policy.

Due to their extremist ideologies, what those outlaw countries, as claimed by Clinton and his proponents, had in common and the military strength they enjoyed will reveal when possessing missile delivery system and mass destruction weapons in the future. Clinton relied on multilateral cooperation and the United Nation, as a fundamental instrument, to stimulate wide international cooperation and to combat terrorism worldwide. Along his time,

he continuously augmented the counterterrorism budget on a large scale for various agencies such as the FBI, CIA, Defense Department, and the Federal Aviation Administration (Badey, 2006). In hindsight, it is now apparent that Clinton's dual containment, based mainly on the strategic concerns of geopolitics and balance of power theory, led to a fiercely anti-Muslim, Arab overseas operation, and military strikes in the Middle East against the alleged terrorist regimes, including Operation Desert Strike of 1996, Operation Infinite Reach in August 1998, and Operation Desert Fox in December 1998.

Many scholars such as Daniel Byman (2003) and David Hendrickson (2002) explained that transnational terrorism, although currently salient, does not definitely substitute or even change the traditional discourses of international politics, but rather subsists among them. In this regard, the United States has managed these interlocking challenges with military approach of counter-rogue states with a determination to secure the U.S. primacy amid the appearance of many powers, and a need to pay greater attention to the necessity of legitimizing the use of force by opinion-shaping leaders and policy making elites. For instance, in their collection of essays entitled *Collateral Language: A User's Guide to America's New War*, John Collins and Ross Glover (2002) explained how policy makers' language was used and misused to legitimize and justify the War on Terror. The authors demonstrated that frequent words of policy makers' rhetoric on terrorism such as barbarism, targets, cowardice, and evil fulfilled certain political purposes. In this regard, the violent terms the elites utilized are not just a particular conceptualization about individuals' understanding about terrorism, but also dictate a particular tendency in which those subjects should be dealt with.

Given that terrorists were inherently a threat and deemed a perpetual evil, multiple policies aimed at suppressing them were; thus, successfully sedimented and institutionalized in the American society (Collins, J., & Ross, G, 2002). As a matter of fact, Bill Clinton accentuated an avant-garde strategy through amalgamating old counterterrorism narratives with a new framework of war metaphor in order to remind the Americans of the threat they encountered, as he pointed out:

I'm pleased that our summit partners here agreed with me to direct our agenda to the work we can do together to fight terrorism and international crime ... While the international perils of the 20th century, fascism and communism, have been

defeated, new dangers are rising up to take their place as we enter the 21st ... Unlike the previous great struggle of this century, we must confront these threats along a moving front ... Working with our partners around the world, we will take on the forces of terror. As a result of United States leadership, here in Lyons we have adopted specific recommendations to combat crime and terrorism. (Clinton, 1996m).

Obviously, Clinton's speech demonstrates that such a specific association of the 21st century with fascism and communism is well pointed to fulfill some functions of political aims. The other enemy was interpreted as a justification or racialization that aligns the United States and its allies to realize the mounting threat of terror and to unite together to fight it in the post-Cold war. Similarly, he and his advisors expressed their insistence on the emergency of military counterattacks "because of the threat they present to our national security. I have said many times that terrorism is one of the greatest dangers we face in this new global era... Our objective was to damage their capacity to strike at Americans and other innocent people" (Clinton, 1998f).

Following Bin Ladin's religious fatwa that was the most influential jihadist document in 1998, Clinton's second term counterterrorism policies were chiefly military base and harsher regarding the violent language adopted by key advisors as his administration, and its practical tenets were supplemented by laws and presidential decisions. In 1995, terrorism continued to be the focal point of Clinton's administration since he issued new Presidential Decisions (PDDs) such as PDD 39, which was signed on June, 1995 to define responsive policies to threats or criminal acts, including nuclear, biological, chemical materials, or mass destruction weapons. In April 24, 1996, the United States enacted Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act as a reaction to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. Furthermore, Clinton's Administration ratified the Protection against Unconventional Threats to homeland and America known as PDD 62, and the Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection PDD 63 in 1998. The two laws contributed to outline areas of critical infrastructure for protection and helped to create the position of National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism. In the context of these influential changes, the conflation of particular American goals with universal problems enlightened the American leaders that international

security could be attained when crippling El-Qaeda and Osama Bin Ladin. In this regard, Madelaine Albright, Clinton's second term secretary of state, recurred Clinton's same words after the incident of the U.S.A. Cole bombing in 2000 at Adan, Yemen. Both the President and his state secretary considered this incident as an act of terrorism. Besides, Clinton claimed that it was despicable and cowardly act committed by hate-filled terrorist cowards (Clinton, 2000a).

A net assessment of Clinton's administration efforts consolidate the U.S. hegemony to develop a crime frame rather than a war metaphor to respond to the offensive. However, prominent figures of the administration restored to use harsher language to illustrate how specific depiction of terrorism provided an impulse to law-based counterterrorism policy to find intentional solution for the future.

Both Reagan and Clinton justified the use of force in post terrorist attacks as legitimate and self-defense. In this vein, Clinton, as a Democrat, was not radically different from Reagan regarding the use of force in counter terrorism. However, Reagan counterterrorism administration adopted forcefully a war paradigm approach to combat terrorism; whereas Clinton's administration manifested a law enforcement paradigm with the focus on the apprehension, condemnation and detention of terrorists. One can argue that on the basis of President Reagan's first war on terrorism narrative, which was orchestrated by both international terrorism and state-sponsored terrorism, President Clinton structured and constructed 'new terrorism' or 'catastrophic terrorism'. Such a new terrorism is distinguished by its unlimited threats and its possession of mass destruction weapons that could be utilized by terrorists and region states in contemporary time.

Apart from the emphasis on home grown terrorism discourse, there was also quintessence of Clinton's new terrorism. In fact, Clinton and his advisors emphasized on the nexus of new threat shaped by terrorist rogue states, international criminals, and drug traffickers, particularly the impact of globalization, which has deliberated frontier of national state. In this regard, Clinton states that "there is a nexus of new threats: terrorists, rogue states, international criminals, drug traffickers. They, too, menace our security, and they will do more of it in the new century" (Clinton, 1996y). Thus, whether international acquiescence to the enormity and sheer scale of the 9/11 attacks against the United States evince a conscious consensus of anticipatory counterterrorism war or not, the broad based invasion of 9/11 clearly conceptualized and articulated appropriate conflicts between "good"

and “evil”, “innocent” and “victim” perceptions. The legalization of “good” and “evil” has eclipsed anything pervasively seen in terrorism as it has been soared to the level of global sacred myth in American discourses. Thus, frequent issues regarding counterterrorism have been widely discussed in the scholarship of international relations with considerable arguments on President Bush administration and his distinct global War on Terror.

Bush’s distinctive approach generated a remarkable foreign policy that represented a block with past foreign policies and strategies after 9/11. His foreign policy “was not a revolution in America’s goals abroad, but rather in how to achieve them.” (Daalder & Lindsay, 2003). 9/11 events didn’t only provide a meaningfully discussed framework of Bush’s responses to acute danger, but rather propelled Washington elites to reconsider the revolutionary foreign policy shift and to rethink about the U.S. new national security policies in the post 9/11 era. In order to understand the Bush’s administration and the use of force paradigm in the international global War on Terror, it is fundamental and necessary to understand the underlying foreign policy framework regarding conflicts.

Most scholars have indicated that President Bush, particularly his democracy promotion in the Middle East and regime change in Iraq, first entered office pledging allegiance to the principle approach of neoconservative worldview. After the terrorist attacks, his administration subtly shifted to a specific U.S. political ideal shared by neoconservatives. Hence, the majority of them were, at the time, serving a policy shaping elites under the Bush administration. The neoconservative view, which was commonly known as the ‘Bush doctrine’, was grounded on the commitment to American international leadership and universal values that seek to maintain its hegemony and best interests (Schmidt & Williams, 2008: 193).

Bush’s neoconservative administration provided a robust instrument for the U.S. administration to defend universal values such as human dignity, freedom, and democratic values in global crusade. The latter resonates strongly in the context of American cultural discourse as the defense for liberty and democratic values in the world. This practical idealistic strain fostered Bush administration policies towards War on Terror. Thus, the Bush doctrine is neither new nor it existed in legal vacuum. It was really embedded within a comprehensive religio-political culture that idealized the American crusade against terrorism and force of evil, seeking to destroy those ideals. In his speech given on September 16, 2001, Bush asserted that “this is a new kind of thing-a new kind of evil-and we

understand. And the American people are beginning to understand. This crusade, this war on terror is going to take a while.” (White House, 2001).

Obviously, though the use of the word crusade might have been universal from both political and public point of views, it is; nonetheless, an appropriate description of a campaign upon which the Bush administration had planned his policies. Indeed, it is emphasized that the association of terrorism with Islamic world has been a core factor that enables war on terrorism to become an ideological war against Islam. In this regard, to argue that the American public still adopts the idea of war on terrorism, the United States has contrived a deceptive misleading depiction to represent Islamic states as a serious threat to the American values. Thus, the Bush administration started to characterize terrorists as a handful of criminals who benefited from the protection of Taliban in Afghanistan, but enjoyed little superiority among the rest majority of Muslims. Those miscreants have probably bent in nihilism, but they are in no way representatives of Islam and Muslims. Notably, while making comments on Bush doctrine, one can argue that the persistent War on Terror seems to neglect a crucial point that not all Muslims are terrorists, but all terrorists are Muslims. The claim of course is overstated to an extent of being faulty. However, the essence of such a crucial point lies on the fact that War on Terror is aimed at Islam and Muslims, and not terror in general. Tracing back most president’s statements, it is obvious that 9/11 events were in reality a camouflage of a deep-rooted struggle on Muslims and Islamic religion.

After 9/11, the issue of terrorism has become under the lenses of Bush administration’s principles and policy makers who realized the unprecedented challenge of terrorism. They attempted to encounter the crisis with more awareness, adopting an extensive range of long term policies and regulating the endless junctures of counterterrorism. After defining and framing the 9/11 attacks as a real existential menace that threatens the American way of life, Bush began accomplishing several initiatives. One the on hand, he magnified the terrorist threat to the threat of nuclear extermination that overcasted particularly the Cold War. On the other hand, his sort of language exalted the ideology of terrorism into the interior impotence of totalitarian ideologies such as Fascism and Communism. Accordingly, through drawing an analogy between terrorism and prior fascism and communism, both vanquished during the war; Bush and his advisors concluded that terrorism could be clobbered by military intervention, similar to Fascism in WWII and

Communism in the Cold War (Cole, 2003). Though Bush and his foreign policy makers have succumbed to see multinational problems through the tendency of military metaphysics, his administration rhetoric has grown immediately with the effective concept of evil that profoundly contributed not only to construct an effective narrative, but also the upcoming policies of the administration. In his solemn speeches, Bush drew the public attention to terrorism with an incredible rhetoric and an effective language of moral duals, claiming that “the enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country” (Bush, 2001). The association of moral binaries and making the world as a contention between good and evil, with a recourse to the American victories in the Cold War and WWI, soon gained resonance with the United States (Murphy, 2003).

As Bush depicted 9/11 attacks as an act of evil and terrorism, one could understand that the U.S.A. is veracious with an ultimate reverse characteristics, positioning the U.S.A. as military good in contrast to evil of terrorists. Furthermore, the U.S. use of metanarratives of civilization to form its War on Terror, one can also understand that, in ambivalence to humanistic and civilized features of the United States, terrorism committers were barbarians and their action were barbaric. When critically examining the targeted language adopted by policy makers of Bush cabinet, the portrayals of terrorism as barbarism not only delegitimized the terrorists, but further depoliticized their rational causes of pursuing aggressive actions.

President Bush, similar to his precedent President policies, used the rise of civilization and barbarism concepts to condemn terrorist’s outrage as well as to structure his War on Terror discourse. Throughout his years of presidency, Bush frequently promoted out that terrorists are barbarians and brutals who are perverted opponents of civilization. Using such rhetoric, War on Terror effectively stressed the importance of discursive international cooperation to combat and exclude terrorist from civilized society because they loathed the universal values of civilization and freedom loving people, and; thus, the foes of democracy and peace. As terrorism is officially interpreted as a visible and a bestial threat to modern civilization, they disingenuously eliminate the possibility of reasonable and rational political dialogue to disband the problem peacefully. The metaphor of civilization was clearly articulated by Bush to promote War on Terror and to forge counterterrorism policies through creating a clash between civilization and barbarism. In several occasions, Bush resorted to murderous attacks as an affront to civilized world: “the terror that targeted New York and

Washington could next strike any center of civilization. Against such an enemy, there is no immunity, and there can be no neutrality.” (Bush, 2002). “These people were barbaric. It’s hard for the American mind to comprehend how backwards and barbaric these people were.” (Bush, 2004c).

Throughout the American history, the image of civilization- barbarism discourse has become recurrent among prominent figures in successive administrations as well as the U.S. counterterrorism narrative. According to Jackson (2005), the repeatedly employment of the dichotomous of ‘barbarian world’ against ‘civilized world’ implicates implicit connotation as it indices, particularly for the Americans, images of collective memories linked to the perpetual struggle with indigenous Americans. The time when White Christian civilization was in opposition to source of racial hegemony (Jackson , 2005). Furthermore, through the use of civilization-barbarism narrative, several pundits argue that American national identity is reasonably built and reaffirmed as a representation of modern civilization; whereas terrorists and terror acts attain to represent barbarism as antipode of the United States and civilized people everywhere. In this sort, a journalist stated that the construction of ‘ good’ versus ‘evil’, or ‘civilized’ versus ‘barbaric’ have been nourished by America’s popular culture and inculcated into a civil religion because the parlance of civilization efficiently and easily flips into and mirrors the American popular culture and its constant diet of evil portrayals. It is worthy to note that the language of evil has played many distinct functions for different administrations. The good America standpoint has been the backbone of contemporary rhetoric that induced the formulation of the U.S. terrorism and counterterrorism as well as the construction of American national identity. The connotation of evil has multiple layers of meaning. Not only did it rationalize and legitimize counterterrorism, but rather it dehumanized their incentives. Besides, nowadays rhetoric has asserted the continuous re-emphasis on strong negative images to view terrorism as a clear opposite to the ideal of the U.S.A. The confirmation is that the persistent comprehension of terrorists and terrorism have been induced into the American public; they have been demonized as religious fanatics, cold-blooded murders, and psychopaths. Such a sharp distortion of terrorists indeed set boundaries of White belonging in order to simultaneously sustain counterterrorism strategies. The political demonization of rivals as religious committers of killing acts, instead of understanding the acts of distortion to attain political objectives, is compulsory to point the impulses behind terrorism. As America and American

deem to see themselves as real Christian, the language of evil holds particular cultural meaning for both. Actually, Bush asserted in 2005 that: “we’re not facing a set of grievances that can be soothed and addressed. We’re facing a radical ideology with inalterable objectives” (Bush, 2005). Bush’s words show clearly a particular type of language. Apparently, in the context of his speech, the evil cannot be contained or arranged, and the sole mean to mitigate the threat is to eliminate it. Since evil is inherent in terrorist and cannot be bargained with; it constitutes a continuous bluster to America’s intrinsic values, freedom, and way of life. Therefore, Americans are under perpetual onslaught as long as the terrorists hate the U.S.A., which cannot change its principles and way of life. Henceforth, the administration of Presidents Reagan, Clinton, and Bush consolidated purposely the U.S. civil religion by involving divine themes to set framework of terror and to assert counterterrorism strategies as moral acts.

Despite the fact that President Barack Obama severely criticized George W. Bush administrative policies concerning War on Terror framework, he intended to strengthen the American hegemony by maintaining the same vision through more orientalist policies. The United States’ War on Terror has by no means used different structural strategies throughout presidency agendas. However, its main objectives have remained constant overtime. President’s Barack Obama has echoed the same objectives of President Bush. They both pursued objectives that are summarized in multiple strategy documents published by the White House, avoiding terror attacks and protecting all Americans, defeating particular terror groups, and decreasing the condition that supports terrorism (Telegraph , 2011).

Similarly, it is not true to claim that Obama’s administration’s foreign policy has abandoned Bush’s administrative vision regarding the interpretation of 9/11 and terrorism as pivotal threat targeting the United States hegemony. However, he tried to follow more rational strategies that associated war on terrorism with American values and identity. Though the Bush administration was not successful as it dragged the basic facet of American hegemony into deeper crisis, the Obama administration did not underestimate its importance in the American political life, but rather he tried primarily to restore the consent dimension of the American hegemony through an emphasis on more effective and smooth policies. While Bush administration succeeded to collapse the enemy regimes of Afghanistan and Iraq in a short period, it was too hard to refrain potent government bodies that perform smoothly. The fall of Iraq and Afghanistan governmental regimes did not assure the

expectation of Bush administration regarding obstructive effects on anti-American regimes. In this regard, European countries as well as the United States, their close supporter, were pointedly opposing wars in Iraq and Iran because unsuccessful conclusions of Bush's policies debilitated the process of American hegemony (Brzezinski, 2009). Furthermore, global superpowers such as China and Russia overly voiced other nuisance about several world issues because they were in disfavor of the U.S.A hegemonic situation, which reflected its failure on different levels. Despite the dramatic and the hidden costs that have unearthed half trillion dollars in Iraq war and the steady flow of American soldiers by 2001, the controversy about the legitimacy of the war, along with human rights infringement in Guantanamo and Abu Ghrib prisons, raised hues and cries about the international society's negative view on the soft power of the United States (Douglas ,2007).

The Bush administration's elicited action, during session of questioning and sentences of terrorism suspects, has also augmented suspicion about the credibility of the United States' interim of values rather than laws. These clumsy actions provoked both the international society to reconsider their assert toward the U.S.A. strategies in combatting El-Qaeda and Taliban terrorism in order to gain more strength and impulses to launch more raids. Accordingly, President Obama was required to devote much effort to create an order based on broad measures to fight terrorism. Hence, Obama realized that the United States ought to embrace an ethic and collaborative combat method against terrorists, which are corresponding the principles and values that are the cornerstone of the United Nation (McKrisken, 2011).

During his six years of presidency, President Obama tried successfully to create a change within the previous Bush administration by focusing on a desire to alter the counter terrorism narratives. This does not mean that Obama was completely successful in attaining his goals concerning the fight against terrorist organization, prevention threat of mass destruction weapons and democracy promotion, but it is possible to aver that his strategies proved to achieve better results than Bush in terms of similar underlying policies.

Actually, Obama excluded inappropriate terms and expressions such as radical Islam, War on Terror, Jihadists from his official speeches and he asserted in his 2009 interview with Al-Arabiya that "the language we use matters." Accordingly, successes have been gained during Obama's administration regarding the solution of some disputable issues. For instance, after his election as a president, he took an important step for the closure of

Guantanamo prison facility by issuing the executive Order 13492 on January 2009 (Executive Order, January 2001) as he realized its unfavorable conditions of torture and detention. As Obama encountered a fierce objection of the Congress, which prevented the closure of Guantanamo, he has endeavored to both handle such obstacles and strived to end the Afghanistan war for the sake of expediting and facilitating its closure. In this regard, Obama was with the standpoint that the fight against terrorism worldwide should be pursued more attentively of its core purpose.

As it would be impractical to combat terrorist organization at the international level, Obama suggested a strategy to escalate military operations against Al-Qaeda and to assure the withdrawal of American soldiers from Afghanistan by 2014. On the surface, this strategy was explicitly seen as war carried out to dismantle intentionally Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but its implicit target was Obama's desire to found a balance between the U.S. policies and policy initiatives in order not to weaken its hegemonic strength (Obama, 2009). Additionally, the most crucial pillar of Obama's administration was the Middle East region where Bush administration associated terrorism threat with the alleged anti-democratic states across the Islamic world. The Obama administration did not pay attention or demonstrate real and concrete drives. Despite the fact that he stated his welcome and support, in his most speeches, of the democratization of the Middle East, his administration prioritized to maintain its security and economic interest than democracy promotion. As matter of fact, the first American initiative of democratization of the Middle East was in Iraq when it just and solely settled security to drive out the American soldiers successfully.

It is worthy to note that Obama administration also relinquished its democratization efforts in Iran as its focus was intentionally given to curb its nuclear agenda to secure its interests, similar to Bush administration. Recently, and during the Arab Spring riots, which instigated popular anger against authoritative Arab regimes, the Obama administration interestingly preferred to uphold the former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak's regime, an intimate proponent of America. However, his administration sought to adapt this unexpected transition through killing the Egyptian army. What was important is that the United States did not respond against the military camp of Mohammed Morsi who was appointed officially as the candidate of brotherhood, and he even turned a blind eye about the possibility of Morsi's return to his position, as a rightful president of Egypt (Martin, Beck, 2013). In this vein, the Obama administration was careful about following its interests more

conventionally through keeping survival of arocratic regimes that were allies to the U.S.A. such as Bahrain, Tunisia, and Yemen.

Recently, although the Obama administration sought to abandon the War on Terror in the official lexien, its essence has been institutionalized in the wider American society. Regardless of his sobriety toward the most provocative discourse of Bush and his slight change of political reorientation of the American War on Terror, Obama, to a further extent, adopted W. Parke's counterterrorism incentives. Notably, when he ascended office, many anticipated that the newly elected president would appeal his predecessor's War on Terror policies. An examination of the U.S.-related discourse shows a clear continuity and a lack of change within counterterrorism policies of the President Bush. Indeed, it has not faded or been placed, instead it has continued to exist as a clef lens through which to better view the U.S.A. counterterrorism policies. That is to say, although the U.S. administration tried to alter and modify the usage of specific labels such as 'rogue states' 'outlaw states' or 'evil' due to specific suggested policies, terrorism and terrorists still abided to be inherently evil, religious fanatics, and irrational who are deemed a threat to the American way of life and national security. Though Obama's administration attempted to bring considerable modifications through several policies such as the promise to close the Guantanamo detention, banning torture, reorientation of the war to Pakistan and Afghanistan and the retreat from Iraq, he has reluctant to frame a new discourse or promote a real change.

From the early past, the sociopolitical reality of terrorist, according to the American policy makers, was constructed and institutionalized through the U.S. official documents and policy practices as a grid of intelligibility, and largely understood as a hegemonic discourse, or a regime of truth by American majority (Jackson, 2014). For instance, like president Obama and the secretary of state Hillary Clinton prudently changed the political terms regarding counterterrorism by adopting the word 'extremism' instead of terrorism and recoinng the war to Afghanistan and Pakistan. As Hillary Clinton explained: "the administration has stopped using the phrase and I think that speaks for itself" (as Cited in McCrisken, 2011, p. 782). Nevertheless, terrorism discourse constructions remains a defining interpretation of threat, officials would repeatedly argue that terrorism challenged the values of America and its way of life. Thus, such prevailing discourses have played a crucial role in excluding all other alternative measures, restrain dissent, quiet other values, and quell substantial future argument of terrorism actions.

It is quite difficult for policy makers, even the president of the United States, to defy the beliefs and presumption underscoring the discourse and shift of the current policy in a radically new policy. Once a set of opinion, beliefs, and practices have been instilled in any society as a true regime, it is hardly to expect a distinct policy alternative or change (Jackson, 2014). The concept of terrorism has become a fundamental political reality in the American society and a kind of policy based on a common sense shared by the majority of the American public. Obama has always remained a true believer regarding 9/11 attacks and his comprehension of its discourse was to a further extent akin to president Bush principles. Though unaccustomed in Obama's official speeches, the War on Terror has not escaped from his statements and remained symbolically a key element defining his policy in political arena. In his inaugural address in 2009, Obama overly stated that: "we are in the midst of crisis is now well understood. Our nation is at war, against a far-reaching network of violence and hatred" (Obama, 2009). Furthermore, in his 2009 Nobel Prize speech, Obama introduced the idea of 'good war' and promoted this notion in his speech of the 22nd of October, 2002 when he asserted that "the world, too, was united against the perpetrators of this evil act, as old allies, new friends, and even long-time adversaries stood by our side" (Obama, 2002). Accordingly, while not utilizing the exact phrase, Obama substantially adopted the War on Terror discourses and accepted the assumption that terrorism constitutes existential menace to America.

It can be argued that Obama's belief in the existential terrorists' threat, along with the U.S. involvement in the real global war, induced the logic continuation of predecessors' counterterrorism efforts, particularly Bush discursive construction of new terrorism. In this regard, Jackson (2014) confirms that when a set of practices have become embedded in a society and functions as a 'true regime', it is difficult to expect any significant change; previous practices will likely to be preserved even from the higher political position. In the aftermath of Obama's victory in 2009 election, many waited for a new era that would bear witness to an end of global War on Terror and the expectation for a radical change in counterterrorism policies and narrative. Even though he realized the influence of political language and promised a restart on the War on Terror, his administration advocated the former tendency of the U.S. counterterrorism policies and functioned to promote the institutionalization and normalization of many strategies. All in all, Obama's counterterrorism policies were remarkably similar to Bush's policies. Regardless of the war

in Iraq, the Obama administration directly retained many of Bush's prominent advisers in office (Pious, 2011). With the help of the same policy makers in place, Obama continued and expanded his operations against the Islamic world, despite his flagrant disdain of Iraq war and misstep from the U.S. counterterrorism policy. Apart from Afghanistan and Iraq, Obama administration intensified drone strike against Somalia and Yemen; while it raised a number of drone attacks to Al-Qaeda targets in Pakistan so as to destroy its organization throughout the country. The essence of Obama administration is leaned on an expansive drone program with an embrace of a holistic point of view towards the war against Al-Qaeda together with Afghanistan and Pakistan. (McKrisken, 2011).

Seeking the defeat of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic world, Obama has echoed Bush's doctrine and added the Islamic states to the list, particularly in Africa where he unfortunately was not so much signaling the end of the American involvement and opportunism. Through directing the war toward a new arena in fresh packaging, the veil is lifted slightly when Obama asked the congress of five billion to train and equip African governments, particularly Somalia, Libya, and Mali for counterterrorism activities. The escalation of the United States to African activities underlies a disconcerting commitment to a strategy based on dominance and exploitation, at the same expense of elevating sustainable economic development and democracy. Obama's pretentious War on Terror along the interests over oil supplies have basically kept the same approach in Africa, which was the main hallmark of his predecessors George Bush and Bill Clinton. Yet, all the available evidence demonstrates a clear determination from Obama to continue America's military adventurism, which was imitated by Bill Clinton in the late 1990's and dramatically escalated during President Bush from 2001 to 2009. Additionally, his speech has been widely interpreted as hailing for a new foreign policy based on the use of military force to guarantee America's continuous addiction to African oil. In fact, Africa is genuinely thought to be as central battlefield in America's military policies against the threat posed by Al-Qaeda and other Islamic groups, rather than a new path of cooperation with Africa and other countries to foster democracy promotion, human rights, and sustainable economic development in Africa. As counterterrorism cooperation seems innocuous, probably when presented politically as an alternative to justify war, many American military analysts argue that Obama's strategy of military force, as in Afghanistan, Somalia and Mali, would only strengthen terrorist group and jeopardize security interests.

After fifteen years of a common tone during the presidency of George Bush and Barack Obama, Donald Trump now is taking another stance-having promised to “bomb the shit” out of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria “ISIS” and defeat them fast. Since Trump took office, War on Terror has become more strong and powerful within a short-term. His total approach is based on militaristic aims that undermine America’s soft power assets (Neumann, 2020). The new Orientalist discourses match better the American new imperialism in the Middle East that shed light on violence and discrimination against Arabs and Muslims. In this regard, Dag Tuastad (2003) suggested that modern representative of Arab violence is a kind of a new barbarism that is a substantial constituent of new Orientalism. The neo-Arab barbarism, as a threat to the world’s security, is an entrenched past of the post 9/11 new-Orientalists’ emergency thoughts to catalyze and facilitate the revisited new imperialist ambitions, which seek to dominate the whole small Gulf countries and rationalize the ongoing political and economic contracts over new targeted regime (Tuastad, 2003, p.594). Potentially, the U.S. efforts have inadvertently triggered favorable conditions for terrorist’s attacks. All increased both grievances and impulses to join terrorist organization and to commit terrorist actions.

6-2-Donald Trumps’ War on Terror

During his most acrimonious and influential presidential campaigns in the American history, President Donald Trump successfully and peculiarly exploited anti-Muslim incentives, along with other factors, to win the White House. In fact, the 2016 presidential election was blemished by unprecedented political rhetoric, outburst of discriminatory tones and intact of Muslims as others (Nuruzzaman, 2017). Several research and studies have shown that the election of Donald Trump, in spite of his political background deficiency, was a real astonishment that left the world and many pundits, international politicians, and citizens, even his partisans and party advocates surprised due to his extraordinary campaign.

Before his election, Trump hopefully promised to ban Islam, and branded it as a religion of violence. Through his 2016 presidential period, Trump’s speeches and declarations were full of dissension and anger not only domestically in the United States, but also on the global scope. Immediately, after pledging oath as the U.S.’s president on January 20, 2017, Trump and his future administration started to become clearer as it would follow in the footsteps of his predecessors and stickled to interpret terrorism as Islam or

Muslims' problem. Most importantly, he enacted an executive order of "protecting the nation from foreign terrorist entry into the United States" on January 27th 2017, outlawing Muslim entry from seven Muslim-majority states of Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. This law was followed by a watered down version of the executive order, which was officially ratified on March 6th, excepting Iraqi from the ban (Hussain, 2018).

It is worthy to note that post San Bernardino attacks in December 2015, the ex-president Barack Obama asserted that the U.S.A. is at war against terrorism, not Muslims, as he called Americans for justice and tolerance toward the Islamic world. Surprisingly, Donald Trump, short after, suggested his Muslim ban proposal in response to Obama's desire for indulgence and concord with Muslim community. Even his advocates and party leaders, such as Mitch McConnell, Paul Ryan, and Mike Pence, severely expressed their criticism regarding this debatable Muslim ban. Trump's historical statement 'Muslim ban' stirred a rampage of traumatic news among Muslim world since it was unexpected. His hatred and anti-Muslim tirades have been excessively on an increase in the United States of America since his presidency. In an interview on CNN in March 9th, 2016, Trump expressed his discriminatory attitudes when he responded to Anderson Cooper, arguing that: "I think Islam hates us. There's something there that there's a tremendous hatred there. There's a tremendous hatred. We have to get to the bottom of it. There's a vulnerable hatred to us" (Trump, 2016). The American and International press found it an engrossing bone of contention and started to shore up the President rhetoric and policies and to tag Trump's political initiative as trumpism. Whatever the interpretations and implications of trumpism, President Trump is the pioneer self-declared anti-Muslim American President throughout the American history. In fact, throughout his pre and post efforts to the White House, he neither stove his anti-Muslim bias nor he canceled his rife antipathy for Islamic religion. Through historical and political perspectives, Trump's anti-Muslim rhetoric can be better grasped in context of two major narratives: the Cold War consensus and War on Terror, which defined the basic parameters of America's foreign policy, particularly the Middle East and North Africa. They also located pits reaction to confront potential threats and to reinvigorate its global status and supremacy in the world (Thompson, 2017). Thus, president Trump's frequent use of the term 'America First' is partly a persistence and a continuation of the Bush administration's anti-Muslim stance. In fact, it is rationalized under the precept of War on Terror; partially a hidden response to overmaster America's interior

weaknesses first, and ultimately to strengthen the American global standing. In other words, his anti-Muslim rhetoric serves at galvanizing his political support base of the White underclass Americans, and further broadens an abrupt gap between Islam and the west, previously vitalized by 9/11 and America's so-called War on Terror.

President Trump enthralled the Americans by his gist of America first narrative through the injection of fresh ideas into America's domestic and foreign policies. His decision of America first arose out of the necessity to target a culturally conservative public. The latter dislikes Muslims and is assiduous to master America's global decline as it is terrified by the negative consequences of a globalized world and weary of the continuous collapse of the American economy (Thompson, 2016). Though considered unconstitutional and directed particularly against Muslims and Islam, the ban; as a result of Trump's anti-Muslim biases, to a further extent set a preamble to a welcome of other policy alterations that he is endeavoring to follow in the issues of Iran nuclear weapons, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Bush's democracy promotion. As a matter of fact, Islamic world, for Trump, is his top concern as he declared several times his flagrant announcements. The fight against Islam, which is also known by the acronym ISIS or Da'esh, has to be reactivated for a total eradication of terrorism. More importantly, during the Republican National Convention speech in late July, 2016, he rebuked the United States' reaction to topple the regime in Iraq, Egypt, and Libya by both Bush and Obama administrations and dubbed democracy promotion in the Middle East as a failed policy of governmental system alteration. He went further to strongly argue that Bush policies were in fact undermining the American security and counterterrorism efforts.

What certainly made Trump's uneasy was his radical position toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. To exactly hurt the Muslim emotions and in an attempt to gain the backup of the Jewish voters in his campaign, he plighted to relocate the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. As the latter is a symbolic holy place for Muslims, the Muslim and Arab community beheld such a promise as an affront to Islam and started to criticize trump's intention, and have even halted him not to do previously (CNN, 2016). Through a dismissal view, he has not stood up to pursue the traditional policy to bolster the time state solution and resolve the tension, but rather he has revitalized the Israeli wig forces in order to dismiss or elongate peace talks for both sides. Thus, Trump's dereliction and neglect, regarding a possible Israeli-Palestinian solution, have animated much ambiguity about the future

prospect of the Palestinian state. All such anti-Muslim reactions and speeches against the Muslim Middle East have worsened Muslim- American relations as they have been interpreted as a malice against their religious beliefs. In this regard, the open- siding with Israel and Trump's official refusal for mutual talks between the two states was perhaps more surprising as the complete shutdown of Muslim entry to the U.S.A.

In order to construct a broader impact, Trump utilized the striking slogan of 'Make America Great Again', as a presidential campaign technique and populism, to create bonds between ingroup members. Therefore, by this compelling expression, he attempted to establish a strong link between him as a president and the U.S. glorious past. In this vein, he sought to maintain a particular categorization in his declaration through which he viewed himself and his strategies as beneficial and effective; while all ex- politicians' policies and his rivals as bad and insufficient. Through grounding Muslims as recurring antipode to the United States' cultural values, Trump draws parallels between good America's past and its current history and invokes a rhetoric that links the struggle of the past to those of the current era.

To sway the American public toward waging a war against Islam, he began to reconsider "a conversation about how to make America safe again" (Trump, August 15th, 2016). Thus, he mistakenly claimed that the United States had been secure and safe in the past, but sudden threats have interfered and begot a danger that terrified America. This is quite a forgetful aberration from Trump to overlook the struggling part of the United States from its early thread of its birth. Through the repetitive association of the newest threats to past wars and previous enemies to the United States, Trumps acknowledged a coordinate pattern that equates the claims of Islamic terrorism to past evils that America had incurred. Trump further craved to confirm that "the United States defeated Fascism, Nazism, and Communism." (Trump, 25th, 2016). Thus, those radical ideologies, according to Trump, are analogous to Islamic fundamentalism and the violence it breeds. Trump's crystal clear anti-Muslim sentiments were well recorded across a proliferation of official declarations, statements, and speeches. For instance, in his interview with Fox Business on March 22nd, 2016, and in confirming his call for the Muslim ban, he stated that: "we're having problems with Muslims, and we're having problems with Muslims coming into the country" (Hensch & Byrnes, 2016). Similarly, when questioned to explain whether "the Muslim ban still

stands”, Trump replied that: “the Muslim ban is something that in some form has morphed into a[n] extreme vetting from certain areas of the world.” (Strauss, 2016).

From the first days of his tenure in office, advisors, holding anti-Islam voices, took steps into the White House and started to occupy central roles within his administration. A triad of advisors: Steve Bannon, the President’s Senior Advisor; Michael Flynn, the President’s National Security Advisor; and Sebastian Gorka, President’s Deputy assistant, appeared to be the main hand in issuing atrocious racist policies as the Muslim ban and the extreme vetting. Relatedly, most of these advisors cloaked in the U.S.A. safeness reasoning and began to launch their aggressive campaigns against Muslims and Islam, repressing Arab and Muslim Americans at home through tight surveillance, racial and religious sketching, and jettisoning of the main constitutional protections of religious freedom. For instance, Sebastian Gorka has repulsively argued that accepting Muslims refugees in the United States would be “a national suicide” and argued that Islam and Koran are the main source of much of terrorism (Stampler, 2017). Similarly, Michael Flynn endorsed the idea of suspecting Islam and subjecting Muslims to extensive unrelenting hostility, and he has described Islam as “vicious cancer inside the body of 1.7 billion people” that should be “excised” and explained that “fear of Muslims is rational” (Kaczynski, 2017). Besides, Steve Bannon ostensibly targeted Islam through ginning up an increasing fear about the safety of Americans from Muslims. According to him , “Islam is not a religion of peace. Islam is a religion of submission” henceforth ruminating the dichotomous battle in which the West is at war with Islam. All of these mentor’s agendas should be perceived as an amplification and an extension of former policies that have become dominant in post 9/11 America. The same violent extremism against Islam found its bedrock in Frank Gaffney legislations. As the head of the Center of Security Policy, he promoted a highly controversial agenda and suggested ample opportunities for anti-Islam law enforcement. Indeed, he took the same veins in having made a more aggressive step of forbidding Sharia in the U.S. courts, as a backbone of Islamic law and legislation, including the five pillars of Islam faith (Elliott, 2011). As one of the most remarkable islamophobes, Gaffney’s anti-Sharia law, which was the origin of inflammatory debates and a solution in search of another problem, was obviously considered by federal courts as a scandalous violation of the American constitution (Khan, 2012). He went further to claim that Islam, as a tyrannical and totalitarian faith, has not the potential of protection according to the First Amendment of the

Constitution (Posner, 2011). Trump and his advisors' political decision thrust a strapping resistance from Muslims who protested against their right of entry to the United States. This is an abrupt continuation as it reminisces the political circumstances in the Middle East since 9/11 attacks.

Trump is simply espousing his predecessors' doctrines in a new American frame. The dilemma of Muslim-American relations have destabilized the entire Middle East. A concrete solution is likely to linger as long as Trump stays in the White House and his administration keeps shaping new laws and policies between the two sides. Probably, the starkest initiative of Trump; however, comes from his new plan of 'Extreme Vetting' from Muslim entering to the United States.

As the world's most rigorous act, the vetting system operated as a de facto Muslim shutdown, and it was regarded as just a transient measure, projected to pave the way for the indefinite stoppage of immigration from certain countries as well as extreme vetting. After being elected and taking office in January 2017, Trump fulfilled his promise by implementing an extreme vetting process for visa application and requiring the Department of Homeland Security to more rigorously scrutinize foreign nationals' visa procedures. Beginning in May 2017, the State Department started applying such procedures with certain categories of visa applicants; the encumbrance of which will likely fall most excessively on Muslims. The President Trump made his aim limpid repeatedly on September 24th, 2017 when he released a proclamation that infinitely barred almost immigrants to the United States from six Muslim countries: Chad, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen, and underwent Iraqis to additional scrutiny and information (Proclamation No. 9645, 2017). Trump's claim, regarding travel bans as well as extreme vetting as indispensable to maintain security against terrorists' threat, is unsupported by proofs. Particularly the precedent policies of barring Muslims, which seem at the same time spurious. In his second presidential election, Trump himself stated that: "Muslim ban is something that is in some form has morphed into an extreme vetting from certain areas of the world ..." (Full transcript: Second 2016 presidential debate, 2016). Lately, with the immigrants ban restrained campaigns by courts, President Trump was more conspicuous, tweeting: "In any event we are EXTREME VETTING people coming into the U.S. in order to help keep our country safe. The Courts are slow and political!!" (Donald Trump, Twitter 2017).

Despite the fact that Trump's Muslim ban and extreme vetting are clearly intertwined, the extreme vetting is very infused with religious and ideological bases. As Trump's ultimate ideological target, he assumed the responsibility to recapture the Cold War style "ideological screening test" (Iaconangelo, 2016). He openly declared, at Phoenix rally, that 'extreme meeting' would require that the U.S. distinguishes between the 'right people' and the 'bad people', implementing "ideological certification to make sure that those we are admitting to our country share our values and love our people." (Transcript: Donald Trump, 2016). Trump's many official declaration about Islam explicitly explained who is pinpointing as being ideologically disqualified to migrate to the United States of America, and he has alluded to gender inequality, sexual orientation, and honor killing as inconvenient Islamic characteristics to the America values (Transcript: Donald Trump, 2016).

The aims behind the implementation of ideological test is reflected in Trump's Executive Order 13769 known as the travel ban and the Executive Order of 13780. For instance, with several detected signals to Islam, Executive Order 13769 was enacted to expel people who place violent ideologies over American law (Beauchamp, 2017). Such a declaration is a lucid indication to Jihad as 'violent ideology'. In fact, it is a priority of Trump's counterterrorism policy since it corresponds the vision held by islamophobes who have been allowed to decide within his administration. For them, Muslims are not eligible to be part in democratic societies because they hold Islam as a "higher law" (Beauchamp, 2017). The democratic order would have exempted Jihadists or those who committed 'honor killing', or would discriminate between Americans on the ground of racial differences, gender, and sex (82 Fed. Reg. 8977, 2017). Actually, through all such reprehensible attitudes are common in many world countries; including the United States, the Western mind always attributes them to Islam (Mayell, 2002). Furthermore, the executive order would have excluded religious minorities and Muslim countries, and he keenly mentioned Muslim bad treatment toward Christians in the Muslim world, as they have become frequently unforgettable within Trump rhetoric (Burke, 2017). The other version, known as Executive Order 1378, was intended to counter plain burdens of anti-Muslim as such it impeded the first version in court. Thus, it stripped many of the references to Islam, considering that the White House has realized that the original version of stereotypes was objectionable (82 Fed. Reg. 8977, 2017). The White House didn't purge them completely, but retained them; for example, an instruction to Department of Homeland Security Secretary to provide reports

on the number of honor killing by foreigners in the U.S. (82 Fed. Reg. 8977, 2017). In fact, it appears that the first order corresponds more with the administration's real intention, and Trump himself realized that the sharp discrimination that characterized the first order bricked its former. The most astonishing is that the Department of Homeland Security officials view that Trump's ideological screening would interrogate travelers about women's role in the society, honor killing and legitimate military targets (Meckler, 2017). One can see no connection between an immigrant's view of women's role in the society and terrorism; however, the relation between such queries and criticism upon the rights of women in the Muslim societies is quite evident. Particularly, travelers have started to deal encroaching questions about their beliefs; while others have been subject to more peculiar questions related to Sunni or Shiite denominations, and whether they are carrying Quran in their baggage or not (Kreiter, 2017).

Such firm questions led the federal in Maryland to conclude that: “ direct statements of President Trump's animus towards Muslims and intention to impose a ban on Muslims entering the United States, present a convincing case that the First Executive Order was issued to accomplish, as nearly as possible, President Trump's promised Muslim ban” (International Refugee Assistance Project, 2017). While these policies seem to be applicable on worldwide visitors, the emphasis on ideological matters, that are predominantly related to Islam, means that it is quite certain to be incommensurately aimed at Muslims. There is; however, little doubt that targeting Muslims carries serious costs. Restrictive travel policies and increasing hurdles of the U.S., which practically discriminate on the basis of religion, ideology, or national origin, would likely to undermine the values that define America. The permanent regime of Trump's extreme vetting and Muslim ban would seemingly subvert the historical tradition of the U.S. as a multicultural and an embracing country. Such policies do not maintain the character of the American democracy hence conveying to the world that the United States is no longer adherent to openness and non-racism. As openness, equality, and freedom of religion are the central blocks of the American democracy, President Trump's extreme vetting and travel ban policies are enveloped in trepidation-laden rhetoric along with the backup of anti-immigrant legislation, pointing to vacillate the pendulum back toward a pre-civil rights era outlook (Serwer, 2017). Accordingly, State Department officials criticized Trump's bans and over fervent vetting as they emphasized that:

A policy, which closes our doors to 200 million legitimate travelers in the hopes of preventing a small number of travelers who intend to harm Americans from using the visa system to enter the United States, will not achieve its aim of making our country safer. Moreover, such a policy runs counter to core American values and non-discrimination, fair play, and extending a warm welcome to foreign visitors and immigrants (Jeffrey, 2017).

As the American core structure depends on equality and the separation of religion from the state, Trump's overzealous Muslim suspensions of entry to the U.S. are unlikely to secure borders and protect the nation from foreign terrorists. Instead, they will assuredly dampen the inherent cultural norms that characterize the American pluralistic nature and erode the nation's strength in order to promote mutual contact, economic cooperation with other world countries. Simply, trumpism might affect Muslims in the United States. In other words, restrictive bans and ardent vetting would lessen the temporary visitors coming to America for business and tourism. They would; therefore, lead to less foreign investments, less trade, little talent immigration, fewer scientific and cultural exchange (Neumayer, 2010). A perfunctory examination of Trump's goal demonstrates his clear flaws. On the one hand, the Muslim ban would probably fail to evaluate an individual as a positive contributor to the American national interests. Apparently, such standards of an immigrant's evaluation proved to be weak as they judge temporary visitors of businessmen and students for just limited periods. Resilient societal notions of value and national interests are obscured to maintain Muslims and Arabs on theory as a perpetual threat to the American values. Trump's anti-Muslim steps and animus emanate from his religious animus that the Arab culture is hostile to the American economic interests and values. As part and parcel of a larger anti-immigrant policies, Trump's skepticism about Muslim threat is ungrounded. Henceforth, for the sake of ensuring safety, equality, and justice for all the Americans, Trump should reconsider his anti-Muslim agenda, and his policy makers have to keep a keen eye to strongly voice their objection to laws, practices aroused by prejudice against Muslims.

7-Arab and Muslim Americans' Stereotypes in the American Mass Media

In spite of its considerable worldwide influence, Western mass media, particularly in the United States, has been undertaking detrimental and polarized function role by shifting the world into two entities: Occident versus Orient. Unfortunately, during several decades, the United States media has disseminated negative stereotyped portrayals about Islam and Muslims. A proliferation of research has shown that negative images of the Muslim world in the American media, specifically in Hollywood, are deep-rooted fabrications inherited from the old world guild tradition of the Orientalist school.

This considerable growth of biased attitudes, which still prevail in the Western mind, is profoundly rooted in Western history of colonization and Orientalist discourses. Nowadays, the American mass media is recurring this inherited negative conceptualization of the Muslim world and conveying them in a new fashion to the world. In this regard, William John Thomas Mitchell, in his book: *Cloning Terror: The War of Images, 9/11 to the Present* (2011), explains how history can have another alternative through which representations can be reframed with new facts:

Every history really is two histories. There is the history of what actually happened, and there is the history of the perception of what happened. The first kind of history focuses on the facts and figures; the second concentrates on the images and words that define the framework within which these facts and figures make sense (p.xi).

Drawing an analogy between the past view and the present portrayals demonstrates that the juxtaposition of two different eras explains the constant perpetuation of Western negative images against the Arabs and Muslims and that the single distinction lies primarily in the Media means and not in the context.

From the foregone centuries of the Middle Ages till the third millennium, Westerners promote persisting portrayals and the same stereotypes of Arabs and Muslims as alien others or enemies, although both communication means and depicting terminology have witnessed some changes. Since their early confrontation with Arabs and Muslims, the West relied on fictional and non-fictional images or to travel accounts and comments; however, in recent time, the Westerners recourse to different media sources. Unsurprisingly, the misconceptions of Arabs, despite their change through time, have come into convergence

aims of derogation. For instance, in the past, Arabs and Muslims were distorted in the West as primitive, erotic, ignorant along with other contemptuous descriptions. Recently, Islam, Muslims, and Arabs have been synonymous to terrorism, violence, extremist fundamentalism, anti-democracy, and anti-freedom in the American media. Those negative images of Arabs and Muslims have considerably exalted as a hallmark in the American imagination after 9/11 attacks (Shaheen, 2001). The significant spur in Muslims and Arabs' immigration to the U.S.A., tensions around the world, technological advancement, and the pervasiveness of media have all instigated the emergence of observable fabricated stereotypes such as 'the green danger', 'the clash of civilization', and 'the third millennium crusade'. All such fabricated images are omnipresent in the Western and the American media, and they are employed by all means of communication, whether printed or televised, to demonstrate that American democracy is under the threats terrorism. Hence, all sort of military aggressions against such menace are rationalized, and any legitimate defense of violated Muslim land is dismissed.

What is odd is that the widespread of the American media coverage to a further extent matches the arbitrary view of Muslims' role as a threatening entity, barbaric and anti-rational. By labelling Muslims as violent and the Middle East as a land of barbarism, the mass media upholds binary opposition between civilized and uncivilized and consolidates narratives of the other. As such, pejorative casting of Arabs and Muslims helps the media "to stigmatize and expel anything which is defined as impure, abnormal. However, paradoxically, it also makes 'difference' powerful, strangely attractive precisely because it is forbidden, taboo, threatening to cultural order" (Hall, 1997) as well as to advance its political agendas, such as launching wars and civil liberties constraints.

Central to the fact that Western media introduces loose and inaccurate misconceptions about the essence of Islam through targeting religious concepts. In this vein, the concept of Jihad has gained much attention across a broad of spectrum and undergone a set of disfigurement as a close substitute or alternative to peace violation. Accordingly, it is stripped from its religious and spiritual contextual reference to be associated to more terrorists' acts, blood thirsty, and love violent Muslims. In fact, the Jihad, as a concept, is more likely confined to violent acts and war as it is frequently portrayed and recognized by Westerners. Nevertheless, it is more unfolded to a variety of acts that can be performed by Muslims. For example, Jihad can be interpreted as an individual's repenting from wrong

deeds, as a man endeavoring or struggling to raise his children and fairly, furthermore, launching a holy war as a defense, but never as an aggressive offensive. Hence, the equation of violent action to the pillars of Islam is a real mystification and a deliberate ignorance of facts from Westerners.

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 are etched into people's minds throughout the world, as they did not only bumped people outside and inside America, but they also inspired artists and writers as well. Media works have propagated extensively in response to the attacks, and their aftermath has become as a favorable predicate of cultural discussions about how to deal with the offence and how to perceive Muslims and Arabs. Journalists, writers, and film directors started to reproduce the so-called Muslim-other. Those non-westerners, who are followers of the Islamic faith, have been prone to stereotypical discourse along discriminatory measures. Indeed, in an attempt to a better understanding the Western perception of the Arab Muslims, Mohammad Amiri Abid (2012), in his study: *Muslim Americans and the Media after 9/11*, explains that the U.S. media had a crucial role in shaping public depiction about Muslims and Arabs. According to him, Muslim public perception can be divided into two distinct periods: the first six months and one to three years post 9/11. On the one hand, during the first six months after 9/11, the Muslim Arabs were conferred numerous opportunities and interviews to defend Islam and clarify issues related to their faith. While the one year anniversary after 9/11 was characterized by a shift from a positive-assisting attitude to a negative-critical one, with little opportunities to discuss their faith as it represents the main headings in newspapers and magazines such as New York time. Events such as the Iranian revolution, the Rushdi Affair, the Gulf War, the Islamic scarf controversy, the Prophet Mohammed PBUH's cartoons crisis, and aggressive episodes in the Middle East have all exalted the media's spotlight on Muslims.

In their book, *Framing Muslims: Stereotyping and Representations after 9/11*, Amina Yaquin and Peter Morey (2011) state that they have oppressively stigmatized by Western media to preclude them from the privileges of the American society. According to them, the racialization of Muslim Arabs is the result of the encounter between Western and Muslim civilizations. Such encounter has become a confrontation due to the different cultural patterns between the East and the West, but primarily, as Yakin and Morey note, due to the media overstatement (Morsey & Yaqin, 2011). Similarly, Ewing Katherine Pratt demonstrates that the Western secular tendency establishes barriers against Muslim

assimilation in the American mainstream, including discrimination, social and political exclusion, and prejudice. She goes on to confirm that these obstacles are the outcome of pervasive media and not the result of clash of civilization (Ewing, 2008). Muslim misrepresentations have progressively constructed a frame of reference to the world about Islam. In this vein, Dyed M. Reza (2011) states:

Coverage of Islam and Muslims in the media today is inherited from historical representation. From European writers, to the French song of Roland, Dante, Martin Luther and historical grudges have crafted misrepresentations on Islam and Muslims. Many of them are resurrected in popular press coverage today. The motion picture industry and particularly Hollywood has taken part in framing misrepresentations as well. From 1896, Muslims and Arabs have played antagonistic roles in popular cinema in over 900 movies (p.234).

Other academicians, sharing the same perspective, are Amaney Jamal and Nadin Naber (2008) who explained, in their book: *Race and Arab Americans before and after 9/11: from Invisible Citizens to Visible Subjects*, that the media influence has shaped Muslim and Arab Americans through racialization, playing a pivotal role in structuring it post 9/11. Scholars Jamal and Naber demonstrate that 9/11 was a turning point for Arab and Muslim American who have gained attention and visibility in different spectrum related to race, ethnicity and politics. In this perspective, they were categorized as White by the U.S. government; while several national rhetoric has strenuously distinguished them from the American mainstream through describing them as inferior and not fully White.

After 9/11, the mainstream media and other editorial sources changed their information strategies, shifting from moderate approaches to classical Orientalist framework. In this regard, Kumar Deepa (2010), author of *"Framing Islam: Media Construction of the Middle East post 9/11"*, noticed that Muslims are viewed as the forces of destruction, represented by Muslim extremists; whereas the United States of America represents democracy and freedom. In other words, media strategy implemented an ideological setting in which Arab Muslims are depicted as violent destructors of the West because they are not worth democracy, but they instead symbolize tyranny. Media depictions do not provide the whole picture of a group; rather they give us highly edited and distorted images that resort to back up the way they are perceived and treated in the society. The preponderance of such images; thus, has led the majority audience to see minorities as a

social burden to the society and the perspective of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ is carried to a more critical dimension (Gorham, 2010).

As entertainment industry, radio shows, cinema, children TV program, news telecast, and even commercials have further dwelled on negative images of Arabs and Muslims, Americans have become obsessed with them in an endless way. Additionally, what they know about them has been fueled from the influence of fictional and non-fictional sources. Similar stereotypical images are often viewed in newspaper because social media, popular culture and news reporting are interrelated, and they feed on one another. Nevertheless, media stands out to be the most influential source as it sums up Islam, Arabs, and Muslims for the majority public. Due to the fact that people are currently too busy, there is really little time to confirm assumptions and claims about minority groups who are considered different; hence, most readers or viewers trust and rely on them too much, even without evident proofs.

In the American popular media, particularly Hollywood movies, the magnitude of stereotypes has had detrimental consequences on Muslim Arabs. Though stereotyped representations of Muslim Arabs have historically grounded in and inherited from European orientalist, the West cannot only frame the orient, but also to dominate it. Arab Muslims are frequently depicted through patterns that may contribute to the perception that they are threatening, villains, negative, even deviant characters in cartoons, Disney movies, computer games, and comic books. For instance, Shaheen asserts that Arabs in Hollywood movies are “hardly ever seen as ordinary people, practicing laws, driving taxis, singing lullabies or healing the sick” (Shaheen, 2001, p.10). Tagging the whole Arab Muslims with connotative words like Jihad, veiling, forced marriage, Islamic law, sharia, suicide bombers, and 9/11, is a fixed preconception that deforms reality and denies individuals their individuality and diversity. In this regard, stereotypes are dangerous, and the misconception of any minority group is totally a damaging phenomenon, which has detrimental consequences on different levels. They do not only impact stereotyped groups, but they also affect those who apply and believe the stereotypes as they tend to fall in the trap of misjudgment and disavow themselves to discover the reality of human relationship with others. As Nelson (2009) argued:

Stereotypes can arise from, and sustain, intergroup hostility. They are sometimes linked to prejudices based on race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, nationality, and just about other social category. They can serve to maintain and

justify hegemonic and exploitative hierarchies of power and status. They can corrupt interpersonal relations, warp public policy, and play a role in the worst social abuses, such as mass murder and genocide. For all these reasons, social scientists- and especially psychologists-have understandably approached stereotypes as a kind of social toxin (p.199).

The process of stereotypes' formation in people minds starts initially through definitions before experience; people who stereotype generally start to define and to see them. Accordingly, what the West knows about Muslims is not what they have actually experienced, but instead what they have been frequently told to be true as fixed pictures in head. Every day coverage of Muslims, as radical terrorist, motivates people to believe that they are actually terrorists. Hence, racism and hatred are generated from that anti-Muslim source. They named the phenomenon the agenda-setting theory in which it rises an issue to be reported of high importance and value to the audience (Severin & Tankard, 1997). It is worthy to mention that negative portrayals of Muslim and Arab Americans have changed from overwhelmingly frequent, contextual, positive, descriptive, and comprehensive to mostly stereotypical, negative, and exclusive coverage. The positive and the quick public sequence of Muslims, which was created in the immediate period of 9/11, was not long lasting. Eventually, it has soon diminished and changed following the first anniversary of 9/11 through manifesting negative Muslim perception and anti-Islamic riots and hatred. In other words, due to the fact that early reports, following the six months of 9/11 attacks, were thematic and mainly explained by people and commentators who hadn't sufficient knowledge about the religion of Muslims or their way of life, Muslim and Arab Americans were covered in depth in comparison to the anniversary of 9/11.

Most of the coverage was based on negative stereotypical perception after 2002. According to a research conducted by Columbia University, positive news reporting in CNN, Fox, New York times, and Washington Post decreased dramatically from 42 percent in the immediate six month post 9/11 attacks to 25 percent after the first anniversary of 9/11 (table 1). Such a decline in positive new articles and new shows paralleled an increase of Muslim negative coverage with 21 percent during the same period (table 1). Alarming, increased negative coverage of Islamic cultures and traditions has made the Muslim world

alarmed by how Muslim cultural norms are to such an extent portrayed .They get frustrated over what they consider as a sacred notion related to Islam.

Table 1: Depictions of Muslim Americans in the News

	6 Month After 9/11	After the First 9/11 Anniversary
Positive/Supportive	42%4	21%
Neutral	36%	37%
Negative	22%	43%

Source: Amiri, M. A. (2012). Muslim Americans and the Media after 9/11. *Islam and Muslim Societies : A Social Science Journal* Vol. 5, No. 2 . www.muslimsocieties.org.

Westerners often claim that Islam is unjust, authoritarian, and oppressive against women who are often the consequence reality of their treatment in Muslim societies. However, this is fostered by the repeatedly emphasis in media and public debates on matters related to forced marriages, gender inequality, and female cimcursion. In this regard, Jack Shaheen (2001) stated that while Arabs and Muslim women have historically been portrayed as sexual temptresses by the Western media, a new image of them has emerged in order to link the portrayal of veiled women with the news about terrorism and violence in contemporary time. Accordingly, mounting arguments over the headscarf (Hijab) along with other cultural symbols of Muslim women offer a base for cultural analysis and continuous controversy.

Arguably, along with the fabrication of stereotyped portrayals of the Islamic culture, Arab religious garments do not escape that scorn at Western media. It is hardly a novel trend as, for decades, segments of Western views and entertainment media have depicted Hijabi women as a fanatic terrorist. The headscarf and the veil are distorted to the level of a mask put on by a terrorist to be disguised. They are; henceforth, stripped from their religious and cultural connotations of prudery and chastity by Westerners. Covered behind their scarf veil, Muslims women are associated to masqueraded terrorist and evil performers. Some Westerners go beyond that to claim that wearing a veil does not symbolize Islam principles, but it is a simple garb worn to evade face ugliness.

Like the Christian cross during the inquisition, the veil should be considered as a religious and political symbol. From the Algerian revolution in 1954 to nowadays Hamas in Palestine, the veil has been regarded as a political token that has carried great political height as a symbol of defense. Nevertheless, since 9/11, the veil has represented inferiority, the

victimization of women, backwardness, and despotism for Westerners; whereas Muslims have profoundly viewed it as symbol of opposition against colonialists' influence and their cultural invasion (Ahmad, 2006). For instance, the New York Times and the Washington Times negatively shape the American public attention on veiling by providing stories within an accusative setting. Most of the newspaper's headlines anticipate the news story to an extent that readers can have an idea about the veil and veiled women already before reading the post article. Well targeted heading such as '*Clash over Hijab ban Tearing away the Veil*' and '*Your Veil is Battleground*' all share explicit notions that the veil is a negative and problematic bias and shallow. Media coverage activates readers' thought and further triggers other ideas linked to what they read. In this regard, the use of non-Muslim sources, inaccurate references, and interviews with non-Muslims lead often to portray veiling as traditional, deeply religious, and something forced, particularly failing to understand why some Muslim women prefer the veil when residing in America. In order to reinforce prejudicial attitudes and stereotypes, the scarf itself has received more attacks in comparison to few negative vocabulary and language words against Muslims, which can carry heavy predatory perceptions about Islamic cultural traditions to the American audience.

Overwhelmingly, the New York Times is the cradle of sarcastic and cynical undertones of veiling. For instance, an American female journalist, in her New York Times article: "*Behind the Veil*", tried on the burqa and lamented "for those few moments under the burqa, I glimpsed a life in which both air and vision were so restricted that I was overwhelmed by claustrophobia. It was suffocating, emotionally as well as physically." She also quotes a young Muslim girl on the burqa "This isn't clothing; it's a jail cell." (Hilton, 2002). Similarly, a New York Times journalist targeted the veil in his sardonic article entitled: "*A New Battle Begin over the Veil*", as he said: "FORGET about widespread poverty, dilapidated schools, chronic unemployment or public anger over police brutality. What brings Egyptian officials to their feet, what makes them shouting mad, what inspires a minister's resignation?" (Slackman, 2007). Such offensive press articles explain the overall idea of veil as wacky idea, evidencing by all means that the Islamic culture and traditions are practically oppressive, and not compatible with human rights and modern democratic societies. Such a well-targeted articles make anyone feel aversion toward Islam as religion for compelling its women to wear something that minimizes her in front of her counterpart man and restrict not only her sight, but also her way of life.

The examination of the New York Times and the Washington Times shows many common stereotypical portrayals of veiled Muslims, thus excluding them as out-group. In relation to stereotypical theory, such characteristics are considered to be shared by all Muslims, and; thereby, all veiled women are categorized as part of the out-group. When the American media views Muslim women through gender inequality lenses, they are assertively perceived through victimization, backwardness, and gender inequality (Gottschalk and Greenberg, 2008). In other words, there is an enduring penchant to assume that the Western American norms and values are the sole standards of reference in any analysis and discussion, and to consider them as incompatible with those of Islam. The allegations of the incompatibility between Western culture, particularly the American culture, and Islamic one should be considered a mythical, a discordant and a false assumption that generated unfounded prejudices towards Muslims. In this regard, Fred Halliday (1995) demonstrates that the use of such terms toward Muslims is a signal of an ethnic identity as stereotypical projection, which is reinforced by politicians, pundits and scientists who intend to exclude people of Islamic background through a pretext of their non-assimilation to the American mainstream (Halliday, 1995).

As Muslims and Arabs were never fully accepted as integrative part of the American melting pot, they have often been stereotyped and seen solely as bearded mullahs, sheiks in their harem, homeless, backward Bedouin, belly dancers, harem maiden, and submissive housewives. In recent time, Muslim men are described as bearded and mustached, putting on kaffiyeh or turban and brown-skinned (Gottschalk, 2014). Questions over the misrepresentation of Islam and Muslims has generated a considerable media substance, particularly in Hollywood films. Jack Shaheen (2001), author of the book: *“Bad Arabs :How Hollywood Vilifies People”*, revealed in a documentary realized on the basis of his book how Arabs and Muslims have been stereotyped and disparaged in Hollywood films across the course of its history. In his study of more than 900 films from the earliest Hollywood films to nowadays, Shaheen also found out a dangerous mythologisation and a persistent path of odious Arab stereotypes and awkward fantasy throughout Hollywood cinema production. According to him: “Muslim Arabs have been the most maligned group in the history of cinema, characterized by excessive stereotyping that exceeded negative images of Blacks, Native Americans, Asians, Hispanics and Jews” (p.12). Inexorably, Hollywood has served as a socioeconomic and political development in the United States through the creation of

an approach that has intensified the adjustment of new stereotypes and failed to cast suspicion on the existing one, keeping the hateful pattern against Islam and Muslims unscathed.

The White House policy makers have long employed Hollywood as a targeted media mean to pinpoint its political ambitions. In this vein, the former President and CEO of Nation Picture Association of America confirms that: “Washington and Hollywood spring from the same DNA.” Hollywood misrepresentations have been an influential contributor in shaping the Muslim and Arab perception in people’s minds. People are in general unaware of Hollywood’s distorted realities and its pedagogical machinery in critically altering values into educational and political power. According to Kellner and Share (2007):

media culture is a form of pedagogy that teaches proper and improper behaviour, gender roles, values and knowledge of the world. Individuals are often not aware that they are being educated and positioned by media culture, as its pedagogy is frequently invisible and is absorbed unconsciously. This situation calls for critical approaches that make us aware of how media construct meanings, influence and educate audiences, and impose their message and values (p.4).

A deep examination of the pre 9/11 movie: *Rules of Engagement* (2000) and post 9/11 movie: *The Kingdom* (2007) shows how stereotyped portrayals of Islam and Muslims in Hollywood movies reflect the American political agenda toward the Muslim world. Those two movies offer a good example of how Hollywood movies fuel negative public feeling and images about members in order to boost economic control and military intervention in solving tensions between the United States and the Arab world countries. It is worthy to mention that those two movies’ context turn around the articulation of the American War on Terror during the Bush tenure, and how his administration considerably focused on movies and television production to induct their efforts in promoting the idea of threat and terror in public education during the war.

A deep focus on *The Kingdom* movie’s content, one can easily understand that it is an action thriller genre as it functions profoundly as a promoter of the U.S. engagement with terror. Hence, it has become crucial to understand that *The Kingdom* does not only provide an accretion Muslim’s fear, but also props classical stereotypes that Orientalists have earlier managed to deploy. As cinema production of 9/11, the movie setting was inspired by a true

suicide bombing attack that took place in an American compound in Saudi Arabia (Riyadh) where a team of FBI agents are sent to scrutinize the incident, to capture the offenders, and bring justice to American victims who died in the bombing. From the early scenes towards its ending, the Saudi Arabia, a country that symbolizes Islam, was portrayed with a retrograde and primeval images, in contrast to a modernistic and sophisticated aspect of the West in general and America in particular with sharp distinction between the two cultures. The movie intentionally addresses a marred message about Arabs and Muslims by visual and clichéd representation molding upon an open desert with camels and recycled old stereotypes of Arabs as rich and incompetent and hence in need of the Americans to pump the oil and secure their safety. The movie draws the viewer's attention to a peaceful American life in both the American compound in Riyadh where Americans are playing a softball game as well as in Washington D.C. where an FBI agent is in his son's kindergarten talking to the headmaster about his new baby's birth. With an exceeding violent scene, the movie sets the stage to depict that such peace is shuttered by sudden gun shots and bombs. Clearly, the movie seeks to portray Arabs and Muslims as ruthless, evil terrorist, and enemy to the West, in contrast how innocent Americans are callously getting killed and how they become victim of Arab violent guile. As the narrator said: "they (Saudis) want America to be there in the kingdom because we are their securitythe Saudi elite became notorious big spenders." For the sake to remind the viewer of 9/11 events, the character of Hamza is depicted as a disturbed man who was incarnated as another Osama Bin Ladin to fix the idea that there will be more Bin Ladin in the Muslim world, even though the real one is dead. Further, the movie also reconfirms the main paradigm that Hollywood disseminates that violence is ingrained in the Muslim world through the association of Islamic religion with Jihad. Throughout movie, some instances of female role are very obvious; the Saudi women are ironically depicted as anti-development prehistoric other, weak, and as a tool to old sheikh, in contrast to the American woman who is portrayed, like the character of Janet Mayes, as a free, civilized, strong, an educated woman, and equal to her counterpart man.

Similar to *The Kingdom*, *Rules of Engagement* is another Hollywood action movie that arises potential political implication of Muslim misrepresentation as villains. The movie's plot turns around anti- American Yemeni protestation in front of the American embassy in Sana'a, Yemen, another symbol of Arab and Muslim civilizations. As the plot develops, 83 Yemeni demonstrators and three Americans marines were killed; while the

others were wounded due to an American marine squad attacks, seeking to save the American ambassador and his family against the Yemeni demonstrators who started to throw the American embassy with rocks and snipers. At the beginning, the movie starts with a flash back about the U.S. navy mission in Vietnam in the 1966 to intentionally serve as a mystification of American military intervention and violence. In fact, the movie early scenes mislead the viewer to the killing of innocent Yemeni is a wrong deed; however, at the end and as a frequent theme in the movie, the murderer of Yemeni people is legitimized and justified in order to ensure the American safety and security. To devaluate and degrade Sana'a as one of the most architectural and cultural gems, the city was badly depicted as a clay mud, a desert with oasis and palm trees with no sign of modern urbanization and civilization. The intension of painting the city as old and uncivilized is to accentuate the link of geography and landscape to cultural backwardness and degradation. The movie doesn't give any reason behind Yemeni's demonstration in front of the American embassy, leaving the viewer understand how irrational, violent and evil the Yemeni are, in opposition to the representation of Americans as peaceful, human, and beautiful. Once again, intensifying the Orientalist view of binary opposition between good Americans versus bad Yemeni.

For long, the cinema has become a well-oriented and an influential mean of entertainment; it does not only play a crucial role in providing diversified information, but it contributes to a further extent in reshaping values and norms. Its impact can make people accept and integrate particular images about the other. Films point and orient thoughts, and enjoin us to abhor, love, trust, or sympathize the other. With repetitive and persistent images of any subject, the viewer's judgment, decision as well as reaction lean of conviction because portrayals will be mythologized. Almost of Western movies mythologize Arab and Muslim identities with permanent cliché and platitude to the viewer. Thus, most of Hollywood movies have been inherently conservative and functioned as a leftwing source producing a movie after a movie across decades. Many of which were vociferous in their criticism of Arab and Muslim identities, and whole-heartedly embraced the anti-Muslim ideology in the new millennium. The pre 9/11 films, such as *Power* (1986), *Reds* (1981), *Samurai* (1992), *Puppet Master II* (1990), *Cloack and Dagger* (1984), *Point of No Return* (1993) are progressive and contemptible movies through which the American cinema directors and producers intentionally conjugate stereotypical images that slander Arab Muslim identities.

Worthy to note that among all the Arabs, the Libyans are increasingly targeted because they are in part Arabs and at the same time pro-Reds.

Excessive negative portrayals of Libyans are well emphasized in the movie *Back to Future* (1985), *Broadcast News* (1987), and *Patriot Game* (1992) in which Libyans are misrepresented in complex bloodthirsty characters who perpetrate murder in cold blood, emboldening other terrorists to launch attacks against the U.S.A. Still with the scope of Muslim Arab identity, Western artists resort down right to their imaginative cartoons that lack an empirical view of the real Arab and Islamic artistic role along with a considerable variety in their themes. For instance, Walt Disney's well-known and animated cartoon Aladin sketches Arabs in a distorted way. As the cartoon story revolves around the Arab cultural background, Aladin is fabricated to the extent that it appears to the viewer as more American than Arab. Disney did not only westernize the characters' general look, but also Americanize their names. Women's clothes were subject to radical changes as their apparel makes them look more than a seductive belly dancer than a princess. Thus, Disney Orientalism pointedly sought to provide a highly sexualized image of a princess to distort her from her true identity as royal prestige and noble princess.

What is also clearly observable, in the Western artistic fantasies, is the controversy between the dark skin of the Arab man compared with the white complexion of the female, although they originate from the same geographical and climatic landscape. Such extravagant discrepancy of complexion that discerns the dark male is an outstanding example of the way how Westerners project their fantasized ideals, pairing unbridled sexuality. For the sake of making firm of the Arabic art, to obliterate it, or render it valueless compared to the Western art, Westerners resort to a more complex strategy with a blunt violation of the Muslim harem. Though White Arabs and Muslims were assertively notable in taking excessive care and protection to women in general, and their wives-harem in particular, Western painters and artists have followed a multi-dimensional objective to allocate more eroticized and pornographied images of harem. It is quite bizarre and illogical that the Arab Muslim man, obsessed by the reticence of even to reveal or call his wife's name, can relinquish his Arab manhood to permit a stranger to paint a naked portrait of her. Hence, such fabrications of nude women portrayals is a clear violation of Muslim women's real social role through narrowly confining her to sexual fascination. Such a focus on

stereotypical sexy and exotic portrayals is indeed a continuation or a rather a sort of renewal of past misrepresentations of women's identity, disparaging her and fixing inflexible characteristics as backward, Bedouin, uneducated, enslaved being, sexual products to appeal abusive sheiks' fascination.

Still another best framework of misrepresentation of Arab identity comprises the cartoon of Ali Baba as an Arab male personality. As widely shown in most of Western channels, the personality of Ali Baba, in the cartoon of ALI BABA THE MAD DOG OF THE DESERT, is introduced with ravaging, lustful, violent image of Arabs and Muslims along willful predisposition of devilish acts. Throughout different episodes of the cartoon, Ali Baba is portrayed as a descent being to a point that he is demonized from head to foot, without leaving any part of his body from derogatory traits. What is really astonishing is that the devilish characteristics and stratagems have become inflexible homogeneous features that typify Ali Baba in a different cartoon dealing with his personality. Disney animators provide stereotypical facial characteristics that break the malice. Lineaments of face, including a heavy bow, large-budged eyes, large flat and sharp teeth, fleshy fingers, hooked nose, thick lips with a missing teeth, and thin legs are emblematically symbols of satanic acts. The portrayal of Ali Baba, as Arab Muslim legendary and factious personality, is a substantive substitution that is correlated to both Middle Easters together with North Africans without paying head to other ethnicities, races, and faiths. Once the negative images are inculcated, they are relatedly attributed to the Arab race. Accordingly, the deformed thought, intentionally linked to imaginative figures, are actually incarnated as real characteristics of Arabs and Muslims. The Western viewer or reader assimilates the fictive and artificial idea with the real current Muslim and Arab. In this regard, Richard Dyer examine the stereotyped representation regarding "how social groups are treated in cultural representation is part and parcel of how they are treated in life, [...] how we are seen determines in part how we are treated; how we treat others is based on how we see them; such seeing comes from representation" (Dyer, 2002, p.1).

Just as Western cartoon producers stick up for the fabricated views in representing both males and females, the 21st century Arab and Muslim media misconceptions have changed so as to fit the historical context, although their connotative essence persists. The Western media attribution of Arabs and Muslims with terrorists is a common phenomenon,

as it has become inescapably part of their quotidian practice. Stressing the persistence of too old stereotypes, terrorism has become an ambivalent issue as it went back to the 7th century.

Indeed, the Danish Media in September 2005, particularly Jyllands-Posten newspaper, edited 12 cartoons that described the prophet Mohammed PBUH, a symbol of Islamic religion, in a violent, terrorist and fundamentalist way. Under the headline: “*The Face of Mohammed*”, one of the cartoons presented the prophet Muhammad PBUH wearing a bomb in his turban, and the other cartoon described him saluting a suicide bomber in heaven with the caption: “Stop Stop, we have run out of virgins”. Thus, such representations link the act of terrorism to a prophet who lived in a period when the notion of terrorism hadn’t even existed. Following the Danish crisis of Mohammed PBUH cartoons, the prophet Muhammad PBUH has become again a target of Charlie Hebdo, a satirical French weekly, which has published controversial cartoons, sometimes presenting the prophet Muhammad PBUH naked, other times showing him as ill in a wheelchair.

In a year and a half after the indignation over the Danish cartoon, the distortion of the prophet Muhammad PBUH reached its peak when the Swedish artist Lars Vilks exhibited coarse drawings, which depicted the prophet Muhammad PBUH as a roundabout dog in a Stockholm art exhibition under the theme: “Dog in Art”. Brutal media offence against Islam has brought the specter of terrorism threat that liberated itself from historical claims and becomes an ahistorical concept. Despite the fact that the drawings were meant to be disgruntled and sarcastic, they still stereotyped Islam in a brusque manner and fabricated stereotypes about Muslims as terrorists, violent, and fanatics (Bernard, 2007). What is worthy to mention is that Western media commonly use the word terrorism with great attention and reservation when describing offenders who are not of Arab descent. Instead, they replace the word terrorism with more smooth and milder terms such as attacks. The best illustration of that can be mentioned in the 1995 Oklahoma bombing when the media adapted a regressive method all throughout the incident investigation from the beginning until the recognition of the violent actor. Immediately, after any bombing, the U.S.A. news is always accustomed to associate whatever violent operation to Arabs, arousing the first implication towards Muslims, deploying the incident as a terrorist act. Like the U.S.A. news, the same early step was taken by CNN, providing hastily the names of some suspicious Arab and terrorists who were detained for interrogation. However, after the identification and the arresting of the real operator who is not automatically an Arab or a Muslim, the term terrorist will be ignored

and substituted by more moderate concepts such as incursions or attacks to adapt it with the American mainstream.

Conclusion

By casting Muslim and Arabs as intrinsically violent and the Middle East as a land of barbarism and bloodshed, the mass media boosts the binary opposition between civilized and uncivilized, and reinforces narratives of an alien other or enemy. Such pejorative labels help to stigmatize them as a threat to cultural order. Thus, the Western view is an outrageous mystification and an ignorance about the fact that violence and barbarism have also accompanied the expansion of Christianity. Such a myth of the deep-rooted Western fear, as influential and predominant in the collective imagination, is another backup device of racism that represents a regenerate signpost of the pre-described discriminatory attitudes that predominated in the past. The West, and particularly the U.S.A., attempts to follow its interests forward foremost. The adoption of the War on Terror, under the slogan of democracy spread, is; thus, self-serving as it basically outlined in an increasing oriental sense and a legitimate justification of imperialists' ambitions. Hegemony of the Orient is another pretext of maintaining the American interests under the guise of 9/11, which opportunistically encored the Arab world as being a hot spot of menace. Such incessant claims have profoundly catalyzed the American hidden aims that seek to stigmatize the whole Arab countries and rationalize the ongoing political and economic interests across subsequent administrations. As a matter of fact, Trump administration is the best illustration of hostile anti-immigration legislations and prejudice against Muslims and Arabs who are viewed as a threat to the idealized source of the White supremacy, civilization, and culture.

CHAPTER THREE

Islamophobia, Discriminatory Other, and Hate Crimes

Introduction

As religious prejudices and animus against Islam, Muslims and Arabs cover an intricate range of subjectivity in the orbit of intolerance to others, Islamophobia has more likely emerged out of a myriad of world incidents faced by them in different sociopolitical situations. In fact, nativist attitudes never happen in vacuum as they more likely supplement what has been subtle and Eurocentric extremism against Arabo-Islamic people as well as their culture. Islamophobia is; therefore, a process by which ethnic and group boundaries are perceived through race, understood as colour or biological difference. At whatsoever level, the 9/11 incidents played a pivotal role in triggering nativism and, to a further extent, provided it a legitimate pretext. The chapter also demonstrates that through championing the ideal of multiculturalism as a fact in the American society, its multidimensional debate constitutes shrill challenges, putting forth subordinate troubles long settled into continuous questions. In this perspective, the potent relation between Islamophobia and multiculturalism, as prompt for exclusionary procedures particularly in the aftermath of 9/11, is not only an unproven bigotry against Islam, Arabs, and Muslims, but also a hostility that has its deep roots in increasing worries over multiculturalism in the United States. In this perspective, as an explicit fear of multiculturalism and anti-Muslim and Arab immigration to the U.S.A., political Islamophobia is plainly operationalized in the current Trump's administration. Perhaps the most explicit form of nativism based on religion and national origin is his deployment of islamophobic legislations of Muslim Bans 1, 2, 3, and 4 in 2007.

1-Islamophobia

Islamophobia, as unfounded prejudice and hostility toward Islam and hence fear or hatred of Muslims, has significantly surfaced at the beginning of the 21st century and made obvious how easy bigotry against ethnic group can manifest to pit one part of the humanity against the other, generating a form of cultural fault lines in recent socio-economic and neo-

liberalist status. The unthoughtful or ill-mannered actions, abiding the groundless and irrational phobia of Muslim other, bred by unwanted consequences on both Muslim and Arab minority to an extent that it requires a critical review of the current state of Islamophobia through the lenses of immigration issues, globalization, and multiculturalism.

It is overwhelmingly believed that nowadays' Islamophobia, as a neologism and notion, has its tie origins in the Anglo-Saxon countries, particularly in the United Kingdom. It refers to Muslims who are living in the West and susceptible to prejudice and discriminatory actions. The Oxford English dictionary shares the same view, suggesting that the term came to be used in print in the American periodical 'Insight', in 1991. Whilst these views may not completely true, it would often be considered that the term was first used by the Muslim French painter Etienne Dinet, known as Nacereddine after his conversion to Islam, and the Algerian intellectual Sliman Ben Ibrahim in their 1925 Biography of Islam's Prophet Mohamed "accès de délire islamophobe". As much markedly and particularly an occult term, Islamophobia has triggered contesting claims, including Caroline Fourest and Fiammetta Venner's assertion that the concept was used by the 'Mullahs' to depict Iranian women who rejected to wear Hijab during the Iranian Revolution, as well as Chahdortt Djavann and Carla Amina Baghajati who shared the same confirmation. However, Dinet and Ibrahim's use of the concept Islamphobia in 1925 did not necessarily equate with nowadays usage as the context is different and not reflecting contemporary setting. Despite the fact that Islamophobia was primarily a historical and a paradigmatic anti-Muslim phenomenon that has long existed in the memory of the Western consciousness during the times of the Crusades and its junctures, contemporary Islamophobia, serving too much in the similar vein as anti-Semitism, is rather a modern and an anti-Islamic discourse and practice. It has appeared in the public sphere with the integration of Muslim immigrants and the effects of 9/11. Thus, the term was both retrospective and transitory, evidencing the proceeding duality of Islam and West narratives and functioning through periodic intervals of quiescence and intensification that attained outrageous levels in the aftermath of certain major global events such as 9/11, the incidents the 7 of July 2007, London terrorist bombing (7/7), Madrid bombing (2004) (Allen, 2004). Indeed, all such incidents have catalyzed Islamophobia, making it more blustering and normalized across various swatches of recent society. However, it is requisite to grasp that 9/11 has magically intensified it and strengthened the widespread belief that it is its consequential without question.

At whatever level, the legacy of 9/11 can never be dismantled as it germinated Islamophobia and, to a further extent, fed the increasing spright of it. Surely, the manifestation of xenophobic and Islamophobic attitudes draw extensively upon long historical premises; however, 9/11 relatively “gave a pre-existent prejudice a much greater credibility and validity” (Allen & Nielsen, 2002, p.16).

While there can be little doubt that the concept of Islamophobia covers a complex range of subjectivity and social constructions in the orbit of intolerance to others, nowadays Islamophobia supplements what has been subtle and Eurocentric extremism against Arabo-Islamic people as well as their culture. In this regard, the conceptualization of Islamophobia, as Stuart Hall described it, is another facet of “cultural racism” (Hall, 1992). Though a proliferation of sources argue that the term has been used before the English Think Tank report named Runnymede, the latter played a significant role in spreading Islamophobia. The Runnymede report on religious prejudices and Muslim problems has considerable repercussions in academic arena. It stated that Islam is a huge static, indifferent to change, unresponsive to new realities, and an isolated other neither affecting by nor influencing. Henceforth, it is viewed as inferior, sexist, irrational, primitive, terrorist and engaged in clash of civilizations since its ideology is used for political or armed benefits with no accordance with the Western civilization (Welty, 1997).

Islamophobia has more likely developed out of the grassroots situations being faced by Arabs and Muslims in different sociopolitical processes, which do not happen in vacuum. Distinct Muslim hatred and prejudice have been identified almost simultaneously with immigration and the newly established immigrant communities. Such emerging immigrant countries, particularly the U.S.A., have witnessed shifting points from color in the 1950s and the 1960s to race and Blackness during the 1970s and the 1980s. Initially, the underlying racism was a reality within the heightened political and legislative laboring that characterized the role of immigrant countries in controlling immigration. Therefore, Islamophobia does not necessarily evoke cultural racism, but it “both results from and contributes to the racial ideology of the United States, which is based on socially constructive categories of phenotypical characteristics” (Love, 2009, p.412). A deeper examination of the racial dynamics, which long existed in the U.S.A. society, brings an analogical advantage for a better understanding of Islamophobia. This draws on patterns of

racialization, discrimination, and prejudice targeted towards groups of particular physical traits such as those who are Asian Arab looking (love, 2009).

While race is a socio-cultural category, its ideology can be understood as a social construct, prone to adjustment (Banton, 1998, p.196). Individuals are viewed to belong to social categories, and, hence; the racial scapegoating affects all the members in the American society. The role of race has also brought to the segment of Whiteness and Eurocentric perspective, perceiving other groups as inferior. The other and its identity are continuously evolving. Accordingly, many researchers have argued that the human identity is in a process of perpetual change within time and context (Comack, 1999; Said, 1978, Memmi, 1982). Similarly, the other identity emerges from the process of other group construction that is flexible, changeable, and is influenced by specific political, social, historical, cultural and economic contexts. As Comack said: “race is not a homogenous or one dimensional category...it is a social construct with changing meanings that are historically specific” (p. 60). In this sense, identities are molded and manipulated in a way that they emphasize further domination of some groups over others. Racist ideology, like Islamophobia, provides the conceptual framework for building lines within a society to understand systems of dominance based on ideas of differences in ethnicity, race, gender, and class.

As race is a socially constructed concept, differences in cultural and physical characteristics are generally emphasized to categorize the other. Accordingly, many scholars, working in different arrays of social and political fields, argue that racial origin and purity are emphasized, and social hierarchy is constructed within the White skinned people at a superior position in comparison to those darker skin categorized nearer bottom. From this backdrop, it is not surprising that race has come to dominate the political discourse. It was a response to the legalization of Race Relation Act of 1976 (RRA76) that really established and in fact pressed upon the consensus around the term Black; first within a particular narrow view and in the larger sociopolitical sphere (Modood, 1994). According to Modood Tariq, the term Black, as prevalent and integral to any discourse of race relation, has played a fundamental role in marginalizing people of color, particularly Asians. It is worthy to mention that the hegemonic term of Black, according to him, created a mistaken essentialism through which all non-Whites are perceived to have some shared and common

characteristics. The focus on color, as equitable with Blackness, has led to a tight vision toward Asians and other non-Black ethnic groups, including Muslims. Through anthropological and social lenses, Arab Americans have experienced racialization in the American society and excluded from its mainstream as others through social processes that bore similar pattern to those experienced by other racialized ethnic group; nevertheless with considerable differences.

The main distinctive divergence is that Arab Americans' racialization is not an outcome of local interest, but rather the result of increasing political and economic interests in maintaining America's international image as a super power. Such an important difference doesn't only explain a distinct timing of Arab Americans' racialization process as much occurring later comparing to natives, Africans, Latinos, and Asians, but also the prodigious conditions that Arabs were once classified in a structurally more convenient status in the broader American White paradigm. However, such a favorable status of Arab Americans could be easily altered with the end of the Cold War and during a time of massive immigration to the U.S.A. In fact, they were reimagined and reviewed as new and unknown immigrants, though they set roots in the American society hundred years ago. Thus, while most governments' definitions have categorized Arab Americans as White, the U.S.A. discourses have classified them as different and inferior to White. Exemplifying this perspective, Arab American scholars have emphasized the metaphorical term of invisibility to refer to the position of Arab Americans in the American discourses on ethnicity and race. In this vein, the invisible citizens have become visible individuals in the aftermath of 9/11. Dissimilar to the old forms of racism, new racism is viewed to overstate explicitly the markers of difference as they are based on religion and cultural divergence. The signs of difference are not established to uphold explicit prejudice and hatred, but to openly generalize direct threats to the American way of life. In fact, such a distinction is rigorously created to an extent that it has to be accepted as a description of the unsuitable other with deeply rooted norms.

Basically, it can be argued that the contemporary situation of Arab and Muslim Americans reflects the one facing the Black minority in the late 1970 since the Black race has come to signify the basis of those who are seen to be the problem. According to Hall (1978), "Black males give the "Arena in which complex fears, tensions and anxieties [could]

be most conveniently and explicitly projected and worked through.”(Hall et al., 1978). In this premise, like the Black race, Arab and Muslim Americans have been used to provide the lens through which a threat could be given a meaning. Arab and Muslim races became thermalized, and racism against them; therefore, made a shift into being a mainstream trouble. From this transition, Americans can map direct and consequential set of exclusionary perceptions and law enforcement procedures, creating disillusionment, resentment, and mistrust between polarized lines of White race and other races. In this way, Islamophobia, as a catalyst for exclusionary procedure particularly after 9/11, may necessarily be understood and justifiably substantiated through imagined discourses.

As a variety of research refers to racism as overlapping and being similar to Islamophobia, Hispanophobia, as an interconnected phenomenon of racism towards Hispanics, is also another kind of phobia with analogous fears and skepticism towards minorities. Thus, it is quite appropriate to confirm that both phobias are not different and unconnected similar processes, but they are a linear consequence of the colonial matrix of power as well as the racial classification whose past formation and transformation can be traced back to the 16th and 17th centuries. Accordingly, the concepts of phobia and racism toward minorities were a construct of changing historical circumstances; henceforth, any similar and preexistent phenomenon would have been framed on the grounds of Eurocentrism or xenophobia. Many possible examples of anti-German, anti-Jewish predated anti-Hispanic and anti-Muslim in the contemporary time. As interconnected to Whiteness, Eurocentrism and phobia were indispensable exigencies to advance the classification of people in hierarchical and moral order through the mystification of priority, the idea of global development, homogeneity, and democracy. From this consideration, what constitutes Islamophobia and the requirement of its conceptualization would; therefore, seem to have more subtle specifics from pre-existent or similar phenomenon. For instance, Islamophobia can only be conceptualized solely as independent and distinct when alluding to the setting or context in which it is projected toward Muslims and Islam, while Latinos and Catholicism are imagined by Hispanophobia.

Whilst acknowledging the wide-range of different contexts of different individuals, the concept of phobia and threat can be deployed in an equally inflammatory way. Indeed, largely interchangeable and substitutional visible identifiers are utilized in different

contexts. In the United States, Samuel Huntington, a prominent American scholar in politics, is considered the ideologist who linked both the bogey of Islam to the bogey of Hispanophobia in his two highly publicized and most reviewed books: *the Clash of Civilization and the Making of the World Order* (1995) published after the fall of the Soviet Union, and *Who Are We? The Challenges to American National Identity* (2004) that was published after 9/11 attacks to augment the call for strong unity, the defense of Anglo-Saxon culture, identity, and the maintenance of its purity against outside influences. In Huntington's *Who Are We?*, he raised controversial questions regarding Latinos in general and Mexicans in particular, asserting mounting worries of the Hispanic challenge that will split the United States into two languages: English and Spanish and two cultures: Hispanic and Anglo-Protestant (Huntington, 2004, p.xvi). In his both books, Huntington focused a large part on American identity's accusation, demonstrating both the Islamic and the Hispanic threat in an impassioned and polemic analysis. Such speculations and social imaginaries have not escaped unfavorable criticism, particularly because they are neither objective nor a natural happening, but rather an invention of an excuse to serve American interests. In this regard, though such a link between Islamophobia and Hispanophobia has become one of the most debatable issues of 9/11, Hatem Brazian (2018) demonstrated that it has been protruded from Huntington's clash of civilizations and associated to his concept of Islamic extremism.

For Huntington and his proponents, the future challenge will flow from an emerging Confucian-Islamic connection, basically the focus around the underlying right to develop and diffuse nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass-destruction, which are considered a menace to the Western powers. In the clash of civilizations, the Western elites and policy makers created a new enemy of choice in order to assure the maintenance and the spread of religious, social, military, and economic power. Thus, Huntington's thesis '*Clash of Civilizations*' transposes Islamophobia into a foreign policy pattern, which strengthens Western states' policies towards facing Islamic-Chinese alliance. It has been used as a necessary mean for both generating and arranging the new world order. In this regard, Islamophobia has become an ideological policy repression through which Islam and Muslim subjects, according to Huntington, are utilized as foils to forge political, economic, and military ambitions and to rationalize the new world's order.

The acute concentration on Islam, as being discordant with the West, is considered as a reductionist and irrational analysis of the real reasons behind the world conflicts, and encourages scholars to examine different Muslim cultural norms for a deeper understanding of their unjustified hatred as well as the best way to counter the continuous prejudice. Together, Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations and Who Are We?* offer an ideological plan for a new vision of the problem that has raised mounting suspicion and skepticism; particularly clash of civilization which equates Islamophobia in framing discourses around Islam and Muslims.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Red Evil Empire, the machinery of Islamophobia took a different frame in Huntington's thesis, which demonstrated a requisite shift in using cultural racism as the basis for multipronged processes of discrimination, otherization against Muslims and Arabs. Hence, perpetual Islamophobia is an indispensable ideological component, as presupposed Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations*, which is required to assert the self-identification of the West and the U.S.A. at a time of perceived fragmentation after the decline of the Soviet Union. Accordingly, Islamophobia hasn't come out uniquely from stereotypical portrayals of media, but instead from the clash of civilization's advocates who have renewed post-Cold war ideology in a form of Islamophobic attitudes because they previously lacked a singular threat through which to define the American future.

Throughout history, dealing with Islamophobia has been an integral part of the theorization underway by many scientists in different research arrays since it has a variety of resumptions and beginnings in accordance to eras and contexts as well. In contemporary period, the scholars Narzanin Massoumi, Tom Mills, and David Miller (2017) provide, in their book: *What is Islamophobia ? Racism, Social Movement and State*, a special analysis of how best to position the issue of Islamophobia and its processes through which the West is demonizing Islam and Muslims in recent time. Those scholars offer a more critical approach to the subject by examining what they call "five pillars of Islamophobia", which are the following: (1) the institution and machinery of the state; (2) the far right, incorporating the counterjihad movement; (3) the neoconservative movement; (4) the transnational Zionist movement; (5) and assorted liberal groupings including the pro-war left and the new atheist movement. According to them, though aggressive crimes against

Muslims and Arabs are understandably a key issue of discrimination, it would be a mistaken claim to think that Islamophobia is just a matter of racism committed by an American citizen in the street or by a politician on the fringed of politics (Narzanin, Mills, and Miller, 2017). But rather, it is actually produced, institutionalized, and spread in the American politics and society. Furthermore, while a variety of research consider that anti-Muslim racism is merely a matter of prejudice that should be understood as simple racist ideas, the reality demonstrates that it is deeply embedded in the institutions of the U.S.A.; most remarkably the sprawling of counterterrorism approaches, and key nexus of institutions and practices. Obviously, maintaining the prevalence of anti-Muslim hates is one of the visible results that makes Islamophobia more serious, evident, and a sustainable phenomenon.

1-2-Islamophobia and Racialization

Similarly, the engagement with Islamophobia and racialization is a process by which ethnic and group boundaries are defined through race and understood as colour or biological difference. The two sociologists Karim Murji and John Solomos (2005) state that racialization can be applied to different institutions such as education or legal system, police, religions, and countries, similar to Islam racialization. Though the term racialization is ambiguous at times, it has served as a useful process to describe people who are associated to particular issues. For instance, the accused men, who prepared the plot to bomb the building near CN Tower in Toronto in 2006, were described as brown, and they were at the same time racialized by depicting them as either Arabs or South Asians. Nevertheless, Muslims and Arabs are in reality characterized by ethnic and cultural diversity. It is worthy to mention that practical and ideological racializations are always useful to understand how individuals subconsciously racialize as well as fail to explain how the cultural background otherizes particular people with certain stereotypical characteristics (Murji & Solomos , 2005).

Khayati Joshi (2006) also states that North Americans, because of different forms of cultural production (movies and museums), have created a society where Whiteness and Christianity are ultimately associated with common standards against other races and religions. Accordingly, those who are not under the broader umbrella of the White Christian norms are racially and theologically devalued. Joshi goes on to explain that the association of the resemblance between South Asians and Arabs and the influence of Orientalism, as an

old instilled discourse, disparage other outcomes of Muslim racialization. At the same time, Islamophobia proponents see it fundamental to label a social reality and draw the attention to the Muslims and Arabs' injustices as a way to justify the American harmful rhetoric. The engagement with Islamophobia leads to understand that it is "simply a fig leaf behind which 'backward' social practices and totalitarian political ambitions are covered up and afforded bogus exception from legitimate criticism and challenge" (Salman & Vakil, 2010, p.1). In this regard, Abdoolkarim Vakil and Salman Sayyid demonstrate that politics of exclusion, hatred, and scapegoating are historical components of old panics that necessitate contemporary Islamophobia. Accordingly, such realities require a new identification and construction of another enemy.

The perception of Muslims as enemies implies that their actions are to be manipulative than genuine. It means that Western Orientalists contributed greatly in freezing Islam in its medieval form to prove that Islam, modernity, and democracy are dissonant entities. In other words, harsh, and faulty generalizations have been an endemic features of the historical and contemporary psyche. Therefore, Islamophobia tends to favor and evaluate the ingroup and the self as more positive, particularly in comparison to the outgroup. Following 9/11 attacks, the hysteria about Muslims' menace gave a strong impetus to the recognition of prejudice as an emergent response to the historical and archetypal Muslim enemy. The significance of 9/11 and its legacy have invented its ghost. Nevertheless interpreting it, as 9/11 consequential phenomenon, permits to provide a logic assumption that is to stop Islamic terrorism and Islamophobia will cease (Allen, 2001).

The contemporary acuteness of Islamophobia has generated unity as well as conflicts between different generations, particularly between the host society and the Muslim societies (Afshar et al., 2005). Its recent context has reinforced division among generations, in terms of politics and social adherence, that can be easily overcome as it has become pronounced. Islam has become a more significant identity signifier for the current generation of young Muslims that it is for their parents (Afshar et al., 2005). Accordingly, ethnic identity has become subsumed within the emphasis on religious identity. The impact of 9/11 attacks along with the media influence have produced attributive identities and new tags to Muslims that estranged them from the host society and connected them to their faith group. Such an alienation had deeply affected the Muslim youth who reacted by defining

themselves as true Muslims through the manifestation of religious practices. Those practices, which were regarded primarily as religious, have become the symbol of their identity. In other words, Muslim youth have a universalist Islamic consciousness along Islam as a core constituent of their personal identity, but their view of it is different from their parents. Their identification is the result of the reconfiguration of the real meaning of Muslim, and it is the product of exclusion and Islamophobia, particularly difference in relation to others (Hall, 1996). Thus, the Islamic identity is a symbol of protestation as it is built upon political opposition. Most Arab and Muslim youth in the U.S. are increasingly becoming religiously adherent partially because of an increasing Islamophobia and marginalization. Yet, such an identity adoption has many entanglements: marginality as well as the lack of acceptance that affect the ability to acquire cultural capital as crucial for social success (Mir, 2001). Shabana Mir (2001) states that the integration into the American mainstream compels Muslims and Arab Americans to “disguise themselves, and should normalize as less religious, less cultural, and less ethnic ,while those seeking to resist assimilation have the option of loud identities”(Mir, 2011, p.559).

Several researches have shown that identity conflicts are common among Muslim and Arab youth. In this vein, Arab and Muslim identities are perceived as a defense process of change, depending on cultural, social, and political context. Arab or Muslim identity has a meaning in the context of strong relations and stratification. Such relations are generally defined through oppression, which are linked to subjection and ascendancy. The predominant identity of the group enables the self to be built in bipolar oppositional manner in which one pole is empowered and advantageous at the expense of the other pole that is stigmatized and disempowered (Sarwar & Yasmin, 1996, p. 15).

The stigmatization of Arab and Muslims has been pointed out by Shryock’s concept of hyphenated selves in his book entitled: *Islamophobia/Islamophilia: Beyond the Politics of Enemy and Friend* (2010). Shryock demonstrates that though there exist a collapse of identities overseas, Afghans, Iraqis and other Muslim communities are united all together in a uniform class of Muslim enemies by the majority of American civilians who themselves share the same tendency against their counterparts at home. The danger of categorizing Muslims into a single group put different people into the otherizing class; indicating their distinction across other identity categories such as class, ethnicity, and race that are all

merged under the core of a single religious identity category. Thus, differences are just eased through identity, and people are more easily inserted into a particular grid and then marginalized and oppressed, as in the Muslim case. Obviously, this is totally consistent with the Western identity to provide one-dimensional image of Muslims and Arabs. This question has shaped the American view of Muslim who has the most dangerous binary commitment to both Islam and their home nations (Shryock, 2010). Another study of Ghail and Haywood's (2015) highlights the extent to which the effects of Islamophobia helps to solidify religious identity. Ghail and Haywood's research demonstrates a shift from ethnicity to religion as the first official signifier to their racial identity. The religious exception of the group from the national collectivity has led to a process of racialization. Accordingly, people of color, as with Muslim and Arab minorities, used to categorize themselves with the broader scope of origins and places. They have all historically functioned as different signs, and now they have become a salient religious identification. Therefore, such an attributive Muslim affiliation does not completely determine ones identity as it lacks the essential interplay of socioeconomic status, local and regional identities.

The calls for the racialization and stigmatization of suspect Muslims, as having fragile involvement with Americaness and allegiance to external violent forces, lead to create a form of contractive Islamic political identity to boost cohesion and union among Arab Muslim communities in opposition to the increasing levels of Islamophobia in their host society. Even though Muslims have no common and shared nationality, Islamophobia has played a form of displacement in fashioning strong ties and bounds among Muslims together. It shivers Muslim sense of attachment and affiliation to their homeland. Besides, it creates a large hiatus between Muslims' sense of their identity and the way in which they are perceived by their receiving community. Arab and Muslim Americans are facing such challenges as they are demanded to abandon either their faith or their national allegiance. Accordingly, it is hard to define their identity regarding the host community as they are compelled either to embrace liturgical symbols and radical ideologies, or assimilate into the cultural norms of the mainstream society. Muslim and Arab American citizens are even discursively subject to exclusion from the wider American society. In this regard, some scholars confirm that Muslims and Arabs can be racialized in accordance to their religious markers. For instance, almost Arab Americans and south Asians are prone to citizenship

denial when identifying as Muslims. They therefore attempt to favor anti-Western, particularly anti-American identity, as a false sense of protection that further their distance from the American mainstream and cast them as refusing to assimilate into the larger multicultural society (Garner & Selod, 2015).

Islamophobic discourses generate strong religious identity and challenging sentiments among Arabs and Muslims in diaspora. In fact, Muslims and Arabs have constructed their identity subsequent to the tragic terrorist events of 9/11 and the intensity of Islamophobia. What emerged from an in-depth is that it prompts a strong adherence to Islamic identity as Arab and Muslims' lives have been immensely impacted by acute surveillance. Arab American youth are living under a strong societal pressures, and feel saddled with the shared responsibility and frustration when responding for atrocities carried out by Muslim perpetrators in the name of Islam. Most of them have felt that it is absurd to generalize on all Muslims on few radicals. Thus, they are compelled into defensive positions, expressing regret and frequently wider suspicion. Such a constant defense of one's faith places serious stress and torturous emotion among Arab American youth who do not remain silent in the face of Islamophobia rhetoric and continuous condemnation of others' actions. In this regard, it spurs an engagement with a counter-strategy, particularly a re-definition of social dynamism parameters.

The challenge of Islamophobia creates in them a responsibility around the issue of misrepresentation and a particular feeling of attitude since they represent the whole Arab and Muslim community. Thus, this motivates them to be best representatives of Muslims and Arabs through exercising a kind of effort to counteract stereotypes. Besides, they are also prone to an undue pressure to present themselves always in a good image to face the conventional and inherent distorted image of Muslims as dangerous and violent as well as to enlighten others about the reality of Islam.

As a resistance to Islamophobia, Yasmine Zine's research (2000) on Muslim American youth examines the importance of schools to be the place of activism and resistance against Eurocentrism by Muslim students as they think for their own identities. Arab and Muslim students' association are featured as a medium through which they can promote Muslim subcultures in school. Resistance against Islamophobia in schools can be interpreted as an indispensable for students to assert their voices and improve their image

and visibility in the campus. Zine goes further to assert that race and ethnicity are requisite for resistance against the subordination and marginalization by Eurocentric norms and policies. Arab and Muslim resistance, in the context of Islamophobia, can be interpreted through their activism in promoting dialogue, educating, and informing non-Muslims about Islam. In this vein, findings from multiple studies of different scholars such as Ali-Khan (2009), and Sirin and Fine (2008) showed that many young Muslim Americans felt a strong responsibility to correct the predominant distorted stereotypes about Muslims and to represent Islamic religion positively. Ali-Khan also highlighted that his participants' responsibility is to educate other Americans about the necessity to change their negative perception of Islam despite the challenges that might confront them (Ali-Khan, 2009). Similar to Ali-Khan's findings, Sirin and Fine's study (2008) showed that many young girl participants manifested a strong spirit of resistance and responsibility for educating other people to alter their biased misconceptions. Within a fervent context of increasing Islamophobia, it is essential to be aware of the importance of education as well as the significance of institutional challenges (Sirin & Fine, 2008).

Islamophobia is generally perceived as a fear of the other Muslims, and such fearfulness doesn't come from random; however, it is the outcome of knowledge and recognition of Muslims and their communities. It is worthy to note that the knowledge and understanding of real Muslims, within the context of Islamophobia, stimulate them to consider the challenges of shattering negative stereotypes and keeping increasing levels of consciousness in themselves about such aspect of their identities. This can be achieved through education that helps to spread Islamic religion and create awareness and dialogue with non-Muslims (Zine, 2000). Muslims and Arabs have become thirstier for knowledge about their own religion and started to voice a need to force xenophobic attitudes. As Arab students are expected to boost accurate knowledge about Islam, they have become keen and conscious to register in courses about Islam and Muslim and the Arab world. However, in the current political climate of Islamophobia, such courses might be stressful milieu where Muslims were previously prone to academic and critical scrutiny (Mir, 2014).

Arab Americans have learnt to surpass and cross ethnic boundaries to perceive themselves as Muslim and Arab first. For instance, Muslim identification is viewed as a more primary source of Muslim identification than adherence to ethnicity. Despite the fact

that other different identities certainly frame individual's experiences as well as responses to them, Islamic identity remains the outstanding identity over the others, providing them with more salience. This is consistent with the idea that several studies have asserted that religion has become a source of collective identity in reaction to Islamophobia; a resort from prejudicial medium of being frequently labeled in stereotypical portrayals. It is evident that ethnicity imposes sets of limits on one's self-definition that is mainly given or natural by being born into it, but not the country of origin. However, religion is viewed as a matter of personal choice that is primarily grounded on the basis of self-consciousness and determination (Jacobson, 1998). While race and ethnicity are based on biological and cultural grounds, respectively, Islam as a religion is overwhelmingly relevant to a sense of belonging to the global Islamic community, the Umma (Hussain & Bagguley, 2007).

Islamophobia has compelled Arab and Muslim Americans to strengthen themselves through a collective sense of affiliation rather than to identify themselves with ethnic identity, which has connotations with particularism, traditions, culture, and a sense of origin (Hussain & Bagguley, 2007). The resurgence of Muslim consciousness means that Arab and Muslim Americans, precisely in the socio-political context, can have a powerful propellant force in reacting in a collective defense of Muslim brotherhood. The sense of Muslim brotherhood permits Muslim and Arab Americans to feel that they are part of the worldwide trend, which attracts them politically to the global Umma (Jacobson, 1997). Unsurprisingly, Islamic identity serves, in a wake of Islamophobia, to create new group boundaries to reinforce bonds and solidarity with Arab community in the United States. Asserting the importance of Islamophobia on young Muslims, Bayat and Herrera (2010) state:

Whether as radical or moderate, principled or pragmatic, the current cohort of young Muslims constitutes the globalized generation of the post-9/11 era that has felt, experienced, and been overwhelmed by the overbearing politics and discourse in the West that prejudice Islam and Muslims. Very simply put recent Islamophobia in the West has rendered even 'secular' youth in Muslim societies to identify with Islam (Bayat & Herrera, 2010, p.21)

This is because of their common Islamic faith and consciousness that Muslim and Arab Americans have become distinguishable, particularly when they feel the necessity to

organize communally to get recognition. To request specific needs, they find themselves object of prejudice or discrimination. Largely, their activism is anchored in the spirituality of young Muslims and Arab Americans who have felt engaged and empowered by activities such as decreasing islamophobic violence, promoting dialogue, increasing awareness, and being active in class setting. As a challenge to islamophobic environments, Arab and Muslim activism is conceived as a form of solidarity and collective actions along the credence in Islam as a solution (Wiktorowicz, 2004). This vivid activism is regarded as a dynamism targeted at reconfiguring identity and rendering it hyper-visible through education.

Many scholars have gone to relate Islamophobia to multiculturalism, demonstrating that it is not an unfounded hostility against Islam and Muslims. However, a hostility that has its deep roots in the fear of multiculturalism and its consequences in most of pluralist societies. Politicians, journalists as well as political figures have fallen over themselves to attack multiculturalism as a divisive and a subversive failure. The deemed acceptable fact of the U.S. rapid development, as a multicultural, multiethnic and multi-faith society, is considered a kind of scapegoat of social problems and issues that the U.S. government and society are unable to confront. In fact, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 have led to the reevaluation of multiculturalism as a feasible discourse in the American society. In a moment of societal turmoils, the critique of multiculturalism turns to be afar of governmentally utilized legacy by White Christians to steer those societal requests due to the ongoing and ungrounded feeling of insecurity and threat.

In fact, frequent Islamophobic attitudes have been generated from the willingness to contemplate multiculturalism through Muslim minority. In other words, the stigmatization and prejudice against Muslims and Arabs are perceived as a reproduction of public discourse favoring ethno-cultural and religious homogeneity, and rejecting multiculturalism and diversity. As Arab and Muslim Americans are typically viewed as potential bearer of illiberal attitudes, non-democratic principles and as encumbrance on the welfare state, then multiculturalism also constitutes an actual threat to the common moral standards of the nation, and this perception can oppose the driving forces that uphold multiculturalism. Based on historical amnesia, quashing Islamophobia tends to be a popular discourse that is generally revised in time of crisis, particularly the ascendancy of political rhetoric over the end of multiculturalism. After the prominence of the end of multiculturalism discourse both

in scholarly and political arenas, particularly with the birth of Huntington's Clash of Civilizations, the fallacy of Judeo-Christian culture supremacy has amalgamated with Islamophobia and built a new assumption. It seeks to restore the hegemony of the United States along a positive identity at the expense of alienating those who do not share the cultural and religious norms of the predetermined conception of 'us'.

In many ways, mounting cries over multiculturalism are a dissimulation for what many are considering as the troubles linked to the presence and visibility of Islam and Muslims in the U.S.A. Recently, debates over the relationship between Islamophobia and multiculturalism has shifted the possibility of a prosperous multicultural American society to another direction related to issues of how to accommodate cultural diversity on the basis of integration and assimilation. Though the concept of multiculturalism basically implies tolerance, respect, and compromise, it began recently to be understood as a way to further establish difference, autonomous cultural discourses, and cultural archipelagoes (Cesari et al.2006).

It seems that the widespread proclamation of multiculturalism failure is premised on the belief that it encourages separateness, cultural segregation, and isolation. The rhetoric, attaching multiculturalism to the tropes of Islamophobia and conflating the presence of Islam in the West with difference and separation, has become axiomatic in all articulations of the new consensus. To some degree, many of recent attacks against multiculturalism have been little more than thinly masked offense on Muslims and Muslim identity. Broadly speaking, speculations against the ongoing veracity of the multicultural view suggests that its continuous adoption will dilute or even annihilate the notion of identity that is being deeply structured upon Christianity and Whiteness. Similar to the U.S.A., some European countries, whose liberal multiculturalism has been recently heralded as being a social model for other countries to imitate, have raised an overhaul of thinking about identity, cultural assimilation, and civic integration as significant policy focus. For instance, the assassinated Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn raised controversial views over multiculturalism and immigration, particularly against Islam. Islamophobic attitudes, along with the maintenance of the Dutch liberal values and ethnic composition, have been vociferously articulated and resolutely open to all races of whatever background. Regarding multiculturalism, Pim Fortuyn's fervent rhetoric against Muslims and Islam can be interpreted as both a lack of particular

dogma of Western society and a failure to incur the modern Dutch society (Cesari, 2006). The evolution of questions, regarding the issues of multiculturalism future and society cohesion, have been just few of the problems through which Muslim difference has been viewed to be menacing or at a further extent challenging the 'our way of life'. In recent public and political sphere, many politicians and scholars believe that multiculturalism is dying because of the threat outcomes that have been posed to the Western way of life, and have become typically clear along the lines of new islamophobic discourse where Islam and Muslims are understood to be jarring with the overriding 'our culture' and its heritage.

The increasing distance between the life worlds of the majority communities and their allochthonous Arab and Muslim minorities has become quite noticeable. In this hysterical climate, the impacts of 9/11 have increased the awareness of such differences as problematic, depending on one specific dimension and; therefore, exalted them many times over. The animosity against Muslims has spread like an oil slick from one European country to another during the policy of multiculturalism. For instance, in October 2011, swiftly before Angela Merkel's overt rejection of multiculturalism policy as having "failed utterly", the president of Bavaria: Horst Seehofer, announced that multiculturalism is dead, confirming that there were no more opportunities of "alien cultures", and that Muslims immigration to Germany must be curtailed. The failure of multiculturalism has also become a catchphrase for the ex-French president Nicolas Sarkozy's declaration that multiculturalism is a "failed concept". Furthermore, the Dutch leader of Freedom Party Geert Wilders has not apologized for contending that the Christ "should be proud that our culture is better than Islamic culture" (Der Spiegel, 11 September 2010). In 2010, the notorious islamophobe and the former Finance Senator of the Executive Board of the Bundes bank of Berlin Thilo Sarrazin has argued, in his bestselling book: "*Deutschland schafft sich ab* (Germany abolishes itself), that Germany is becoming naturally more stupid on average due to Muslim immigrants who were characterized by lower intelligence and elevated rates of fertility that would eventually lead Germany to "a nation of dunces". Jürgen Habermas, in his critic of Thilo Sarrazin's controversial book, asserts that German leading culture is contemporarily being explained by religion instead of German culture (Habermas, 2010).

Every incident of social, political, and cultural discrimination have required scapegoats to the tune of many failures and conflicts within. Condemning the Muslim world

and scapegoating Muslims is a kind of reassurance of Western failure to face recent realities. But, such realities can never be solved by reactionary declarations from political leaders announcing the flaws and demise of multiculturalism. Instead of combatting multiculturalism, Islamophobia can be mitigated by suitable solution. For example, stereotypes and negative representation can be eradicated through an integrated education on Islam. Regardless of which solution is used to reduce Islamophobia, it all necessitates a strong ability to destroy the myths of Arabs Muslims' peril that are profoundly engrained in contemporary American minds. The removal of the inner core of Islamophobia can be achieved through a strong education that promotes cultural learning, diversity, and multiculturalism (Malbouisson, 2007). Despite difficulties around its recognition, many local and regional organizations work hard through electoral activism, legal assistance, and political lobbying to go up against islamophobic hate crimes and discrimination (Leonard, 2003).

1-2-Anti-Arab and Muslim Hate crimes and Discrimination

Several researches have shown that national security issues have become an axial political concern in most of the Western countries, particularly the United States post 9/11 attacks. Since that time, a severe anti-Muslim and anti- Arab hate crimes have raised dramatically, reflecting contemporary irrational fear of Muslims along different forms of racism. A hurdle of security experts, academicians, policy makers, and elites have postulated that the prospectively catastrophic nature of new terrorism of Islamic fundamentalist network requires government pre-emptive modes of legislation and policing. The constellation of threat stereotype has surfaced and led to the uplift of future danger detection's tools, such as scanning, scenario testing, and scrutiny. The post 9/11 securitization of domestic and foreign policies, Arab Spring avalanche and the resurgence of ISIS, as a new global threat, have enshrined a discernable shift in danger assessment from retrospective and probabilistic estimations of harm to a preemptive set of security discourses. All have heavily slatted to an unprecedented future legislation and an undesirable form of surveillance that problematize Arab and Muslim minority groups. Today, the practices, habits, experiences, cultural values, and identities of young Muslims and Arabs have become a perfect hotbed for heightened claims, steady suspicion and hostility; a situation worsened when amalgamated with racial, class, and gender discrimination.

It is commonplace that a rich body of empirical research has already shown that minority groups are disproportionately prone to criminal justice intervention and penal sanctions (Heaven & Hudson, 2007, p.367). While it has been fair for the U.S.A. and the whole world to come together to mourn for the loss of innocents' life and strive for strengthening efforts to counter atrocities, a very slight number of people outside academia have really paid attention to the impactful outcomes of 9/11 on thousands of Arab and Muslim Americans. They have all been menaced under the auspices of the American purported legislative initiatives. Thus, a range of controversial sentiments have emerged, inferring suspicion and culpability of all Arab and Muslims who have become conflated and understood as one. To the extent that within few hours of 9/11 attacks, phone calls flooded into the Arab American Institute in Washington D.C. throughout the U.S., and the Arab American Institute's members were receiving threat and didn't know what to do or how to deal with the situation. The next day (10/11), Dr. Zoghby, the founder and the president of the Arab American Institute, received threats as he stated:

“[T]he second day, I got the first death threat. It was, ‘Zogby you Arab dog. You'll die. I'll murder you and slit the throats of your children.’ It stung. It stung both because of the personal threat of what it represented, but also as I described it, we were in mourning collectively as a country and then someone decided to say to me, ‘you can't be part of this,’ and pulled me away. I had to look over my shoulder; I couldn't just be part of this process of grief that was engulfing the rest of the country.” (Dr. James Zogby, Arab American Institute).

Immediately within few hours after 9/11 attacks, there has been a considerable increase in hate crimes against Muslims and Arabs in the United States. The rise of hostility and hate crimes, increasingly in the wake of 9/11, have appeared to top in the months that followed. Indeed, they have led to internal security problems and the fragmentation of the society cohesion, fueled drastic discourses, and positioned Muslims' lives under the impacts of suspicion. In their book: *Arab Detroit 9/11: Life in the Terror Decade* (2011), Nabeel Abraham, Sally Howell, and Andrew Shryock highlighted such frantic decade after 9/11 attacks and reinvigorated the detrimental treatment of Arabs and Muslims in the United States. Examining the situation of Arabs and Muslims of Detroit, the authors depicted the first decade of post 9/11 as a space in which Arab and Muslim Americans were

associated to the “enemy other” and were required to prove their loyalty in ways other Americans were not expected to do (Nabeel, Howell and Shryock 2011). The author’s work goes on to explain the means through which the concept of a “target of opportunity” was reallocated by the U.S. national security officials as primarily a setting for initiating a veiled institutional racism towards Arabs and Muslims. In addition to hate crimes, most Arab and Muslim Americans have deeply endured further discrimination in their everyday lives. They have reported several cases of housing, education, and employment discrimination to the federal and state agencies that superintend these issues. Further, some Arab and Muslim Americans have brought many cases of distrust, aversion from the part of non-Muslim neighbors, colleagues, friends, and classmates. Many of them have realized that 9/11 introduced a period of an exalted suspicion, law enforcement, homeland security agents, and elected politicians. All have shifted into a systematic and sometimes extralegal scrutiny of Arab and Muslim communities (Margulies, 2013).

The Federal Bureau of Investigation ‘FBI’ reported that the early threats of violent acts and hate crimes against Arab and Muslim Americans occurred within few hours following 9/11 attacks. The FBI showed 1.6000 percent raise in anti-Arab and Muslim hate crime incidents during the next three weeks after 9/11, lately stabilizing, but never decreasing below the percentages recorded before 9/11. Even though, hate crimes lessened after the first three weeks, it immediately took another bias related incidents, including religious, employment, and education discrimination. For instance, in the month post 9/11 in Detroit, one of the largest Muslim American population, thousands of Muslim and Arab ancestry have been arrested, convicted, detained, and deported by FBI officials because of their national origin or religion. Besides, the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Program registered, in his Annual Hate Crimes Statistics Report of November 25, 2002, 481 hate crimes against Arab and Muslim in the U.S.A. in 2001; a considerable increase from 28 cases reported during the year of 2000. The Department of Justice reported more than 350 backlash-related criminal complaints during the first few months after 9/11, resulting in not less than 70 state and local criminal prosecutions and 12 federal prosecution. These crimes took a range of negative feelings against Arab and Muslims, their religion, schools and mosques. They have been overly manifested in verbal and physical harassment, mob incidents, social exclusion and violence, and anti-Arab and Muslim protests. It is worthy to mention that in few days after the attacks, the American Patrick Cuning has tried to set fire

to cars in the parking of the mosque and then fired a gun at worshippers. In the same day, attacks on Seattle mosque by James Herrick poured gasoline on and inflamed the wall of Pakistani-American restaurant in Salt Lake City, Utah (Arab American Institute, www.aaiusa.org). In 2001, Illinois State Police collected and reported data on hate crimes on annual basis, registering 49 hate crimes against Arab Americans, up from 9 recorded in 2000 (Wronski, 2002, p.1). Similarly, the Chicago Police Department counted 60 hate crimes against Arabs in 2001, up from four reported in 2000 (Chicago Police Department, 2001, p.11).

Moreover, violence and hatred against Arab Americans and those Muslim looking skyrocketed after 9/11. In the immediate wake of 9/11, most of them, particularly those thought to be Muslims sheikh, were killed because they are generally bearded and wear turbans that are much the same to the turbans worn by Osama Bin Ladin and the Taliban (Aziz, 2009). In 2007, the Council on American Islamic Relations noticed the reception of 1.000 grievances of abuse, and reported that anti-Muslim physical violence rose by 52 percent between the years of 2003 and 2004 (Moore, 2010).

The American anti-Arab and Muslim vehement is to some extent a new phenomenon with many groups emerging only after 9/11. That is not to confirm that generalized bigotry and discrimination against Muslim and Arab did not exist in previous decades as it certainly targeted people of color, including hatred against blacks, Jews, Catholics, and others. Nevertheless, the rise of a sophisticated network, whose fret is addressed particularly to Muslims and Arab communities, is quite contemporary. The roots of many of nowadays anti-Muslim organizations originated in the years after terrorists' attacks in Oklahoma when President Bill Clinton officially signed the 1996 Federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act in efforts to reinforce the U.S.A. defense agent terrorist. Though the terrorists in Oklahoma City were American citizens, the Federal Antiterrorism and Effective Penalty Act had great impact on Arabs and Muslims. Most of all imprisoned immigrants were of Arab and Muslim descent without any clear evidence of their culpability. The 1996 Act has been largely criticized by Arab and Muslim leaders and advocates of liberties as a discriminatory initiative (Michigan Advisory Committee, Civil Rights Issues Facing Arab Americans, p.2). In this regard, Michael J. Whidden confirmed that:

“FBI statistics indicate that most act of domestic terrorism are not committed by Muslims or Arab groups. Indeed, from 1984 to 1998, 95 percent of the terrorist incidents in the United States were attributed to domestic groups .In the three years after the Oklahoma City bombing , 1996 to 1998, almost 70 percent of all potential terrorist events were attributed to domestic sources, and the figure climbs to 96 percent if we discount one series of intercepted letter bombs in 1997....Indeed , when AEDPA was passed in 1996, the looming threat was extreme right-wing domestic groups, particularly militias.” (Whidden, 2001).

As Islamophobia has three main dimensions: structural policy, private animus and the dialectical process, the immediate post 9/11 attacks played a crucial role in inducing the Congress, and particularly the President George Bush to perpetuate fear and suspicion of Muslims. Such mounting fears were interpreted in the enactment and the expansion of profiling measures, surveillance, and immigration policy such as his signature of a law known as Unity and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Terrorism Act of 2001 (U.S.A. Patriot Act). After two months of 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration established Department of Home Security ‘DHS’, concentrating particularly on Islamic extremism and culminating in the passage of the Patriotic Act as the most salient examples of structural Islamophobia. This law has reinforced the 1996 anti-terrorism law by providing the government the ability to proceed secret search, allowing for the indefinite detention of non-citizens who are not terrorist on slight visa violations if they can’t be deported. The Patriotic Act largely enabled close electronic surveillance and monitoring of noncitizens and citizens suspected of terrorism, belong or having links to transnational entities designated as terrorist affiliated. Such harsh attitudes harshly inhibited the religious and political activity of Arab and Muslim Americans. Thus, the Patriotic Act was the first initiative in executing institutionalized discrimination against Arabs, Muslims, and Southeast Asians in the U.S.A. Perhaps, its most detrimental impacts were the far-reaching degree of government encroachment on American civil liberties, particularly for Arab and Muslim Americans (Abolian & Takooshian, 2003).

Similar to 1996 Anti-Terrorism Act, the U.S.A. Patriotic Act has been widely rebutted as it didn’t reinforce the protection of Arab and Muslim Americans’ civil rights, but rather condemned the civil rights of ethnicities and religion and unfairly targeted them

through subjection to a broader scope of suspicion and law enforcement. Few years earlier, the sentiment that concluded the Anti-Terrorism Act was subrogated by social approval and ambivalence toward an overhaul in the American intelligence apparatus (Abolian & Takooshian, 2003). While the newly policy swelled up the previously immigration policies, glossing over the specifics of the Patriot Act and the United States' two wars abroad, the post 9/11 witnessed the imitation of a program that mandated certain non-immigrants to register with the United States Immigration Services (INS). It required men and boys from Iran, Libya, Sudan, Syria, and Iraq to be documented, photographed, and interrogated or should face criminal prosecution and deportation. Along with the two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the expansive domestic surveillance, Attorney General of National Entry-Exit Registration System: John Ashcroft implemented the National Security Entry Exit Registration System (NSEERS) that was almost instituted against Muslim immigrants, non-immigrants as well as permanent residents. The Special Provision of NSEERS required men, boys, and male teens of 16 years of 25 countries to be finger printed, registered, and interviewed under oath by the federal government or an immediate deportable offense in case of failure to comply with the requirement of the program. With the unique exception of North Korea that was removed from the list as result of significant lobbying and political pressures, the program showed the American government's discriminatory intention to watch every single of the other 25 countries on the special registration as solely an Arab or Muslim enemy (Brazian, 2014).

Though the NSEERS was resolved in 2011, it arguably renewed the Orientalist baseline that Arabs and Muslims were deemed a national security threat and functioned to some extent as a "Muslim ban". Indeed, the controversial of special registration program, as a more scrutinized piece of 9/11 legislation, resulted in the detention of approximately 1.200 Arab and Muslim nationals and has sparked new skepticism and worries in Muslim communities. In December 2002, the Los Angeles INS offices detained nearly 400 male teen and adult nationals from Iraq, Iran, Libya, Sudan, and Syria during the first phase of the application of the "Call-in" procedures. (John & Sahs, 2002). Upon the voluntarily representation before INS, in compliance with special registration program, a lot of individuals were subject to detention on the pretext that their visas were not up-dated, though they have correctly filled permanent residency application that were pending due to INS backlogs (Dan & Aizenman, 2003). Due to several negative social and economic impacts of

NSEERS, many families have been separated geographically because of the deportation of a male family member to his native country after trying to comply with NSEERS. Arabs and Muslims were not only under continuous fears of loss or unintended separation from belonged ones, but rather unprepared to a sudden loss of the main source of income and, hence; resulting homelessness. Besides, Amnesty International recorded violent behavior and drastic treatment toward detainees while in INS custody. For instance, detainees were placed in handcuffs and legs shackles and sprayed with cold water. They also reported that they were compelled to sleep standing up due to the overcrowded prisons and moved to different facilities without the possibility to call family members or having the opportunity to obtain legal council. Since its inception, the NSEERS elicited heavy negative reactions over the ineffectiveness and the discriminatory nature of the program that continues to devastate individuals on the basis of racial profiling and false assumption of Arabs and Muslims' ability of committing terrorist crimes. As Senator Dick Durbin (D-Illinois) stated:

In the national trauma caused by 9/11, civil liberties came face to face with national security. Arab-Americans, American Muslims, and South-Asian Americans faced national origin and religious profiling... Terrorism experts have since concluded that Special Registration wasted homeland security resources and alienated Arab Americans and American Muslims...13,000 were placed in deportation proceedings. Even today, many innocent Arabs and Muslims face deportation because of Special Registration. How many terrorists were identified by Special Registration? None. (Senator Dick Durbin, 2012).

In the light of the substantial new burden created by the program on government bureaucracy, the unclarity and inconvenience of its tactics, the Department of Homeland Security indefinitely suspended it in 2011 under the Obama administration, and the whole of the regulation was dismantled in 2006. However, the legacy of the mistrust in Arab and Muslim still echoes a perpetual struggle against discrimination that tosses a shadow on a deep prejudice of the American government practices.

Nowadays mounting discrimination and hatred against Muslims and Arabs drive the current extension of counter-radicalization, or Countering Violent Extreme (CVE). The latter has been part of the U.S. conversation about the terrorism issue over decades, but the initiative became more prominent in the United States in 2011 when the White House issued

its National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States. Engaging communities in counterterrorism efforts, the U.S. government established the CVE under the Obama administration to supplement law enforcement and counterterrorism tactics such as investigations, prosecutions, and surveillance along with a secondary set of prevention measures. In fact, the American CVE initiative has been both problematic and counterproductive, stigmatizing communities and menacing their human rights and civil liberties. It's controversial framework aimed at preventing violent extremists as well as those assisting them from "inspiring, radicalizing, financing, or recruiting individuals or groups in the United States to commit acts of violence" (Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, White House, December 2011).

Regardless of whether CVE is called Countering Radical Islam or not, Obama's initiatives, while couched in neutral terms, have particularly targeted almost exclusively the Arab and Muslim communities. Though the American government's purported goals appear laudable in strengthening communities against violence prevention, the initiatives unjustifiably and unfairly target Muslims and Arabs and infringe upon constitutional rights. The fact that several studies has demonstrated that the CVE initiatives are baseless, unscientific, and discredited as they raise discriminatory and unconstitutional practices.

CVE policing desperately focuses on Muslim subjects, renewing the embedded tropes that Islam is radical and violent. Its theory stands as the most salient and perhaps the most heinous form of Islamophobia, lulling the ability of Muslim Americans to freely practice their faith, curtailing their civil liberties, and jeopardizing their political participation and free speech. Muslim's surveillance and monitoring are flagrant violation of constitutional guarantees of religious equality. Like the Patriot Act and other policy legislations, CVE emboldened an increasing discrimination against Muslims and Arabs through a wide range forms of harassment, attacks, distrust, and assault. Therefore, CVE initiatives are dangerous contributors that harm American public safety, disrupts attempts to reinforce the American community, and create a gateway for unwarranted racial surveillance while promising a safe atmosphere to combat violence and discrimination.

It has been largely believed that islamophobic attitudes would decrease in post 9/11 attacks. Nevertheless, current events, government legislations, biased political rhetoric

denote otherwise. Islamophobia, that has attained climax rates in the 2016 presidential campaigns, did not increase in random. Instead, it was to a further extent spurred and stoked by structural discrimination that was well articulated through legislatives, particularly the Anti-Sharia enactments, CVE and sweeping anti-terrorist policies.

Due to the ripe conditions following the racial resentment as a reaction to the election of the nation's first Black president in 2008, the climate of economic uncertainty and anxiety against the backdrop of 2007-2008 subprime mortgage, financial crisis and the rise of the Tea Party and Birther movement, many White American conservatives lobbied state legislatives to pass Anti-Sharia laws. Such legislatives are a way to tighten the scrutiny of Muslim and Arab Americans and entrench the notion that Islam, Arab and Muslims are inherently un-American into the American constitution and values. To scapegoat others for economic and social challenges, Arab and Muslim Americans have become susceptible to growing influence of the Anti-Sharia movement that launched its efforts in 2010. For instance, following the creation of the anti-Muslim state model act, American Laws for American Court (ALAC) was drafted by lawyer David Yerushlmci. Because of all those converging movements and the mounting visibility of non-Christian population as threat to the standing hierarchy and political domination of White, the Anti-Sharia movement launched its efforts in 2010 when the Birther movement and Tea Party have paved the path for a welcoming atmosphere of a new wave of xenophobia and Islamophobia to thrive. Precisely, the deligitimization, foreignization, and skepticism of the newly elected Barack Obama's Christian faith by the Birther movement, along the zealous accusations against his health and policies in the late 2008, are irrefutably linked to the birth of an undercurrent racial animosity and hatred, ushering in the ALAC (Willer, Feinberg, & Wetts, 2016).

In 2009, Yerushalmi received over \$153,000 in consulting fees from Frank Caffney Center for Security to the ALAC model legislation, and the early bills have been modeled across the U.S.A. in the late of 2010 (Elliot, 2011). In this vein, the American Public Policy Alliance explains that the ALAC was issued "to protect American citizens' constitutional rights against the infiltration and incursion of foreign laws and foreign legal doctrines, especially Islamic Sharia law...we are preserving individual liberties and freedoms which become eroded by the encroachment of foreign laws and foreign legal doctrines, such as Sharia" (American Public Policy Alliance). Between 2010 and 2016, 194 Anti-Sharia bills

were modeled in 39 legislatures throughout the U.S.A. Precisely, eighteen bills were enacted into law, while many legislators in Louisiana, North Carolina, Texas, and Tennessee enacted multiple Anti-Sharia legislation in their own states. Through framing Islam as a competing political ideology of Islamo-Fascism, projecting the need to protect American citizens from Sharia and relying on principle of islamophobic baselines, Sharia law abolitionists sought dual aims. On the one hand, they perpetuate to spread the idea that Islam is a homogenized other and a threat to Judeo-Christian American values, White American national identity as well as individual's constitutional rights. On the other hand, they embellish the fervent rhetoric that Muslims and Sharia are inherently discriminatory, misogynistic, and oppressive towards women. Though the Sharia bills are championed as means to enshrine the defense of American constitutional liberties against foreign laws and specifically Sharia, their opponents argue that these bills provide a solution in search of a problem, emphasizing that its legislative infiltration and foreign law in the American court don't represent the islamization of the West and; therefore, constitutes a threat to the American freedom (Mach & Dakwar, 2001). The Anti-Sharia proponents' inflammatory misconception, that Muslim and Arab Americans seek to replace the U.S. legal system and law with sharia, is a fallacy. However, they are in fact unconstitutional and flagrantly violate the First Amendment of the American Constitution as it specifies the applicability of foreign laws and Sharia law without replacing or superseding the American one. To consolidate the unfounded fear of Sharia and the unsubstantiated need to legislate the Anti-Sharia law, the American Laws for Courts (ALAC) and model legislation forbid judges from applying foreign laws in their courts, which is blatantly contrary to the constitution and religious freedom enshrined in the Bills of Rights:

Any court, arbitration, tribunal, or administrative agency ruling or decision shall violate the public policy of this State and be void and unenforceable if the court, arbitration, tribunal, or administrative agency bases its rulings or decisions in the matter at issue in whole or in part on any law, legal code or system that would not grant the parties affected by the ruling or decision the same fundamental liberties, rights, and privileges granted under the U.S. and [State] Constitutions... (American Public Policy Alliance, American Laws for American Courts).

The most satisfactory description of the Anti-Sharia legislation are non-sense in search of a problem because it undermines the constitutional system and the authority entrusted to the

U.S. state judges though casting doubt over important issues including trusts, wills, marriage and divorce decrees, and contract that necessitate foreign law. At its core, the Anti-Sharia legislative campaigns provided insight into how the movement aims to disfranchise Muslim and Arab Americans, eventually interning their belonging and impending an equal standard of religious freedom and inclusive society. Building from common themes that were extracted solely from the analysis of the bills' language between 2010 and 2016, one can identify an overwhelming discriminatory effects in the bills and their affiliated campaigns.

As a compartmentalized, racist, and anti-Muslim agenda, the islamophobic Anti-Sharia movement has become the operationalized tool to single out Arab and Muslims with all forms of exclusion and discrimination. These discriminatory effects are interpreted in the form of instigating an unfounded and baseless fear in the American society that Sharia will infiltrate the U.S. constitutional and legal system. Thus, Muslims and Arabs have been hampered from engaging with their religion as related to marriage and divorce contracts, trusts and estates. The bills also trigger a climate of intolerance that increases hate crimes and xenophobic attitudes against Muslims and those perceived to be Muslims. Additionally, campaigning for anti-Muslim laws does not ultimately satisfy the intentions of Anti-Sharia groups and anti-Muslim outstanding activists. Instead, they are seeking to advocate for anti-refuge policies, coupling anti-Muslim and anti-refuge efforts to further alienate and disenfranchise marginalized groups in the U.S. Indeed, in the aftermath of Paris attacks in November 2015, two third of the American governors expressed skepticism and fears about the American public safety from Syrian refugees (Fantz & Brumfield, 2015).

Fearing that terrorists would disguise themselves as Syrian refugees, state governors voiced concerns for the American security from the danger of fake refugees, announcing the barring of Syrian refugees to resettle in the U.S. In a couple of years, groups like ACT have been active in propagating this narrative. In the summer of 2015, ACT advanced Refugee Awareness Coalition to limit the rates of refugees admitted to the U.S.A. during the Obama tenet (ACT for America, Accomplishments). One year before the 2016 presidential election, the backup of Anti-Sharia legislation by lawmakers played a crucial role to legalize, normalize, and spread islamophobic and anti-Muslim attitudes among the American public. The launching of Anti-Sharia bills has been used as an opportunity to inflame the American public's fear of Muslims and Islam, fortifying a base for politicians to exploit and negatively stereotype Muslims and Arabs in order to secure more support of voters during elections, as

in 2016 Trump presidential campaign. Narrowly distinguished as explicit bigotry, political Islamophobia is manifested both plainly and explicitly. It can be disclosed bluntly from the hostile rhetoric or expressed by policy makers who pass decisions targeting Muslim and Arab Americans or insulating them completely. Perhaps the most flagrant form of Islamophobia and discrimination, based on religion and national origin, is the President Trump's deployment of islamophobic campaign strategy, which foreshadowed the legislation of the spirited policies targeting Arab and Muslims and their communities.

“Make America Great Again” was the ultimate version of the United States that not only alienated Islam, but distorted it and its adherents. Trump, the presidency candidate, used it as a leading cataphrase of his bid for presidency. However, the message underlying this tagline was in fact deliberately purposive. What is worthy to mention that part and parcel of clash of civilizations narratives, as fathered by Bernard Lewis and replicated by Samuel Huntington, are not only pertinent and pivotal, but serve as an ideological and political cornerstone for anti-Muslim policies and demagogy in Trump administration (Scott, 2017). Indeed, he bolstered his call to reclaim the American greatness with insolent islamophobic declaration announcing: “I think Islam hate us”. On December 7, 2005, he disreputably called for “a total and complete shutdown of Muslim entering the United States until our country representatives can figure out what is going on” (Schleifer, 2016). While many rejected Trump's campaign rhetoric as unconstitutional and almost inscrutable, his statements have since become real policy aims that are being followed through, as proved the enactment of the Executive Order 13780 (Executive Order No. 13780, 82 FR 13209 , 2017).

2-Donald Trumps' Islamophobia

2-1-Donald Trump's Muslim Ban 1.0

Widely known as the Muslim shutdown, Trump's Muslim Ban 1.0 set off a rapid outrageous media controversy and stimulated proponents who supported the framing of Muslim immigrants as presumptive American national security threat. The Muslim Ban 1.0, offering a glimpse of the country the candidate promised and hoped to deliver, was only the tip of xenophobia and racist iceberg raised with his grand vision of 2016 presidential election. On January 27th , 2017, Trump enacted the first Executive Order (No.13769, FR 8977) with the objective of “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entering into The

United States.”(Executive Order No. 13769, 82 FR 8977, 2017). Though the First Executive Order focuses on national security as a compelling state interest and an intent practice to Arab terrorism, Muslim and Arab visa holders and legal permanent residents outside the U.S.A. were swiftly impacted by; whereas those inside the U.S. territory were obliged to remain in the country. Soon after the ban, different personal stories have become frequent among impacted individuals. Students were pulled away from universities, couples were obliged to annul their wedding plans, families had to wait to be reunited with their family members, and ill persons coming to the U.S. for medical purposes found themselves obliged to annul their appointments. The application of the ban was without notice or previous notifications, causing chaos at airports. Additionally, it had more negative effects on American citizens and institutions since researchers and doctors were banned from entering the U.S.A., resulting in job loss, university program setback, and annulment of critical appointments.

The order temporarily banned entry of foreigners from seven Muslim-majority countries, including Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Iran, Somalia, Libya, and Yemen (U.S. Department of Homeland Security). In addition to the seven states, it included a provision that exalted the executive branch to the U.S. Refugee Program. In general, the ban banned both immigrant and non-immigrant entry, including the unexpected procedures of initially prohibiting the lawful visa and green card holders. For a better enforcement of state-sanctioned Islamophobia, the Executive Order declared the implementation of new security practices and revoked visa interview waiver program, ordering in-person interviews for all visa applicants. In this vein, the revision of all visa reciprocity programs were requested to guarantee that they were effectively applied (Executive Order No. 13769, 82 FR 8977, 8980, and 2017). Worse of all, the Executive Order requested for the publication of negative information about immigrants as a pretext to indefinitely restrain the influx of Syrian refugees to the United States (Executive Order 13769, *supra* vote 5).

Tagging Syrian refugees as prejudicial to the U.S.A., the Executive Order put a cap of 50,000 refugees for 2017 fiscal year, decreasing the whole number from nearly 85,000, of which 38,901 were of Muslim and Arab origins, and barred entry of all refugees for a period of 120 days (Executive. Order No. 13769, 82 FR 8977, 8979). Though the common language of the Order didn't openly point out Islam and Muslims as a particular objective,

the Muslim fabric of the seven states made it an equivalent to a Muslim Ban. The investigation over religious affiliation and identification at airport checkpoints is a violation of domestic and international law, including the American constitution, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the principle of non-refoulement. Moreover, this confirms that the states aren't allowed to return asylum seekers to their native country where they are probably threatened (Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint For Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, *Darweesh v. Trump*, 2017). Few minutes after its legislation into a law, officials at international airports received directives from the White House to enforce the Order. Thus, the Ban was to a further extent effective, spurring disarray and disorder at airports, and provoked immeasurable fear within Muslim households and community (Torbati, Mason, & Rosenberg, 2017). With a deliberate implementation of the law without notice, thousands of lawful visa and green card holders outside the U.S.A. found themselves denied entry or reentry to the country and indefinitely arrested at the airport.

Moreover, a great number of people were in a big worry as they were illegible to return because of the non-void or invalid visas or allowed to make connecting air-flights to join their family members in the United States of America (Stefansky, 2017). Arab and Muslim reactions and activism soon met with an immediate wake of the Ban; hence, oppositions were manifested in the eruption of protests at airports where travelers were detained. Non-Muslims joined Muslims in calling for the reentry of lawful visa and green card holders. Accordingly, wherever the Muslim Ban was executed, it became a lively spot of resistance and cross-racial, religious, and professional union. Civil right attorney, hurrying into airport, presented their solidarity and grassroots collaboration toward the detainees, particularly after the legal challenge cases against Muslim Ban filled the U.S. federal courts. Many provided informational materials related to the Order and legal advice about their up-coming travel plan because the impacted individuals could not fully understand the complexity of the Order as well as the difficulty of immigration law and policy at large. Heated battles in the courts at the same time flared up forward as airports became sites of mounting outcries, reaching its climax with restraining orders based on a likelihood success of several federal courts' cases, including the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. The Trump administration challenged the District Courts' decision, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld later the temporary restraining orders in an agreed decision. At the outset, Trump declared that he would appeal

the district court's order to the American Supreme Court, but he obviated that position in favor of enacting an alternative Executive Order Ban 2.0.

2-2-Donald Trump's Muslim Ban 2.0

As reaction to the potent legislation and reprimand from the federal courts, on March 6th, 2017, President Trump signed a new Executive Order 'Muslim Ban 2.0' named "Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States" that repealed and substituted the January 27 Executive Order (Executive Order No. 13780, 82 FR 13209 2017). Based on judicial concerns, the alternative new Executive Order keeps the ban on all individuals entering from the six Muslim-majority countries, vindicating it on the grounds of national security threats and presence of terrorist group in these countries. Nevertheless, it excepts Iraq, as a special case, owing to the American and Iraqi efforts to decrease ISIS influence along with the Iraqi governmental initiatives regarding the improvement of travel documentation and information sharing (Executive Order No. 13780, 82 FR 13209,13211-12).

Though Iraq was suspended from the Ban, it demands more additional screening practices for its visa applicants. There are at least three main differences between the first and the second ban; the new Executive Order confines the scope of the former ban, specifically that the Syrians indefinite ban was dropped. The ban on the Iraqi was also eliminated, and the effective state of the Order was delayed for ten days. Moreover, the second ban explicitly spelled out the exception with more limpidity in accordance to the ambiguity resulted after the first ban. The exclusions of the second ban doesn't apply to lawful permanent residents, particularly those paroled or admitted into the U.S.A., those dual nationals of a country travelling on diplomatic visa, and those already granted asylum refuge-related relief. Besides, Muslim Ban 2.0 also maintains the suspension of the visa interview program as well as the reciprocity programs reviews. Many parties, officially fleeing actions against the first Executive Order, renewed their complaints to include the second version of the travel ban, and many federal courts released injunction, demanding the temporal suspension of the Ban. On July 26th, 2017, however, the Supreme Court issued an interim decision limiting the lower courts' injunction to only those national with a "bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States, effectively, maintaining the plan in place for those who couldn't prove a bona fide relationship". This means that only

individuals, who demonstrate close family relationship or formal letter from the U.S.A. institution, would be exempted from the Ban. Since the Supreme Court could not define what precisely constituted a bone fide relationship, Hawaii federal court found that those parameters of bona fide relationship, put by the State Department, were too limiting and infringing the Supreme Court's orders (Jordan, 2017).

2-3-Donald Trump's Muslim Ban 3.0

On September 24th, 2017, the ninety days Muslim Ban 2.0 on individuals from six Muslim countries was set to expire and President Trump issued Muslim Ban 3.0, including the Supreme Court to repeal oral arguments on Muslim Ban 2.0. As a form of xenophobia and discrimination on religion and national origin, transformation Safety aimed to single out and exploit Muslims as proxy for racial anxiety through the Laptop Ban. In March of 2017, it prohibited most electronic items, including laptops, tablets, and communication devices larger than smart phones in cabinet or flights heading to the U.S.A. from ten airports in eight Muslim majority countries (Farewell & Newman, 2017). Though the Trump administration claimed that the laptop Ban was issued as an anti-terrorism measure, many were impacted by new rules, contending that the Ban is a protectionist initiative in subterfuge. As a racist measure, the Ban targeted Muslim-majority countries despite the fact that any one of whatever country could use electronic device to do harm; thus, a threat is not at all peculiar to a group of Middle Eastern airlines, nor it is specific to Muslim-majority countries (Elgot & Chulov, 2017). Overwhelmingly, the Ban's critics purported that it was issued to single out foreign airlines that have been accused of receiving government subsidies; in particular Emirates, Etihad Airways and Qatar Airways. In this regard, David Lapan, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for DHS, urged to confirm that the ban was applied because of terrorism and concerns about the smuggling of explosive appliances in consumers' things (Ostrower, 2017) as if other countries travelers can't bring or smuggle explosive items while travelling to the U.S.A. Due to the Ban's impacts on the nine-Muslim airlines and ten airports, DHS assured, on July 20th, 2017, that most constraints on personal electronic devices had been abolished.

As a third version, Muslim Ban 3.0 was signed as a Presidential Proclamation on September 24th, 2017. Such Proclamation of 9645 or Muslim Ban 3.0 is similar to, but not identical to the Executive Order in its form. Under such a ban, certain individuals from Chad,

Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, Yemen or North Korea and some government officials from Venezuela, are indefinitely blocked from obtaining most immigrant and non-immigrant visas to the United States. Those countries were apparently selected on the basis of the threat they presented (Proclamation No 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45, 161, 45, 163, 2017). With the exception of Sudan, being listed as a banned country in the former two Muslim bans, which was eliminated from the list of suspended countries in this Ban. Under Muslim Ban 3.0, there are no longer exceptions for qualifying “bona fide relationship”. The restrictions imposed on nationals from eight countries in the third version are indefinite in duration. Similar to its prior Ban, it comprises exceptions for lawful permanent residents, refugees, those granted asylum, and dual nationals. At the same time, the Ban lists a waiver as well as examples identical to the language used in the second version. Only nationals who can obtain a waiver scheme under the proclamation may be granted the U.S. visa (Proclamation No 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45, 161, 45, 163, 2017)

Muslim Ban 3.0 was prone to legal action in the federal district courts of Hawaii and Maryland, issuing temporary restraining orders against it. The valid arguments are plausibly stronger than it due to its terms since the text infinitely prevent the entry of all national immigrants from the seven countries with further restriction (Proclamation No 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45, 161, 45, 163, 2017). As the injunctions surrounding previous versions of the Bans, plaintiffs contended that Ban 3.0 is a violation of both the U.S. migratory patterns and the American Constitution. While appealing the Hawaii and Maryland court’s injunctions to the appellate courts, the federal government petitioned the Supreme Court for a stay of injunctions. On December 4th, 2017, the Supreme Court granted the Government’s wish and allowed Muslim Ban 3.0 to go into full effects while pending the cases through the lower courts. Because the timing of the Supreme Court’s decision of Ban 3.0 approval was surprising both procedurally and practically, the impacts of this decision was immediate and devastating. Procedurally, restraining Muslim Ban 3.0 on Monday, prior the appellate courts were given opportunity to consider oral arguments on appeals about the Ban’s legality, complicated its ordinary process. Practically, December is well chosen month during which family members apply for a visa or schedule a travel to enter the U.S.A. to reunite with family members during holidays, or attend university students’ graduation. Thus, thousands of people waiting for their American visa to unite them with their families, pursue a

university studies in the U.S., get a medical care were all issued mass denials of waivers and an overlong refusal of visas under the proclamation.

Once again, the Ninth and Fourth Circuit Appeal upheld their lower court's injunctions about Muslim Ban 3.0. On December 22nd, 2017, depending on the statutory arguments and constitutional questions, the Ninth Circuit realized that the ban violates the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the American constitution. In this regard, the Supreme Court had set arguments in Trump against Hawaii, resulting in the signature of an order that removed Chad, a Muslim country, from the list of countries under the proclamation. Concluding that the proclamation does not conflict with the non-discrimination along the failure to demonstrate its unconstitutionality, the Supreme Court issued a 5-4 decision boosting Muslim Ban 3.0, on June 26th, 2018. However, many American activists across the U.S.A. are dissenting the proclamation, focusing on the conclusion that Trump's proclamation is driven by animus toward Arabs and Muslims along a clear violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. In this vein, the Chair of the Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus Judy Chu denounced the discriminatory policy of Trump in the occasion of one year anniversary following the Muslim Ban 1.0 in Washington D.C. on January 27th, 2018 when hundreds gathered to mark the event. She said:

One year ago, President Trump enacted the first iteration of his discriminatory Muslim travel ban in order to fulfill a campaign promise rooted in hatred and xenophobia. This policy will always be remembered for its blatant bigotry and the chaos it caused in our nation's airports on the day it was hastily unveiled. But it will also be remembered as a day when thousands of Americans across the country came together to denounce hate. (Alvarez , 2018)

Under Muslim Ban 3.0, the sole way and hope for individuals from banned countries to enter the U.S.A. is by procuring a waiver. Obtaining waivers requires discriminatory conditions as they find it too hard to meet certain conditions: (1) being denied access to the U.S. would cause them undue hardship, (2) the entry to U.S.A. would not threaten its national security or public safety, and (3) their entry would be for national interest of the U.S.A. At the same time, the proclamation consists of ten different exemplar

situations in which the accord of waiver would be appropriate such as cases when an immigrant medical care is required or when a young child applies for the visa. However, such cases were not followed at all, causing heartbreaking circumstances for families demanding a waiver. Compounding the lack of clarity over applications and confusion of waiver led to total waiver denials for millions of nationals, despite of providing one or more appropriate exemplar situations that the proclamation states may guarantee it.

2-4-Donald Trump's Muslim Ban 4.0 and Extreme Vetting

Trump's troths of Muslim Ban and Extreme Vetting are tightly interconnected .The anterior version of the Muslim Ban has been substituted by a new and indefinite iteration, which was enacted on September 24th, 2017. This new interaction of Muslim Ban 4.0 effectively imposed 90 days ban as well as the resettlement of Muslim refugees from Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya , Mali, North Korea, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Syria or Yemen , who are previously subject to rising scrutiny, and subjecting them to supplemental extreme vetting measures before permitting them to enter the U.S.A. It is worthy to mention that President Trump coined the expression "Extreme Vetting" in different occasions of his tenure, emphasizing on the extra collection and the renew of both biometric and biographical data, improving documentation verification and requirement, increasing security by Customs and Border Protection and agencies related to them. On the surface, these procedures of applicants seem reasonable, but Extreme Vetting disproportionately discriminates Arab and Muslim refugees by categorically blocking their entry to the United States. As experts described the Extreme Vetting visa system as one of the toughest in the world, many are; thereby, stalled and denied under its effects. Even though the U.S. visa process is already one of the most rigorous processes, this new policy does not only permit to customs officials to not broaden their scope of visa application and requests for entry to the U.S., but also to have discretion to choose who they feel must be subject to additional form, leaving more compartment to discrimination.

Having no clear standards for how to deal with the ambiguous system, airport officers, determined by their whim, make arbitrary decision on who is the threat and who is not. Accordingly, the U.S.A. Refugee Admission Program caused the resettlement of nearly 80 percent of all Muslim refugees who have been severely targeted in the past two years in the U.S.A. There has been, thus, 91 percent decrease in the total number of Muslim refugees

entering to the U.S.A. (Bier, 2018). Precisely, the Trump administration vehemently decreased the annual refugee admission cap for the fiscal year 2018 from 111,000 refugees to just 45,000 in September 27th, 2017. On September 2nd, 2018, the refugee admission cap witnessed a further decline, from 45,000 to 30,000 for the fiscal year of 2019. It is worthy to mention that 2018 and 2019 caps are the lowest since 1980. A deep analysis of Trump's Extreme Vetting impacts on Muslims and Arabs demonstrates that refugees' admission to the U.S.A. has been decreased, mirroring his administration national agenda of refugees and the American historic policy of response to persons prone to oppression and persecution in their native lands. Such increasing annual caps, in combination with the impacts of Extreme Vetting, means that the U.S. resettled less than half of the total number of refugees apparently permitted entry to the U.S.A. in 2018. This small rate of Muslim and Arab refugees represents a decline of 91 percent between 2016 and 2018, and it dropped dramatically from 44 percent to 15 percent between the fiscal year 2017 and fiscal year 2018. Due to the lingering efforts of Muslim Ban 4.0 and the Extreme Vetting imposed on Muslim countries, the dramatic decrease of the percentage of Muslim refugees in subsequent years means that the expectation of fewer refugees will be accepted entry to the U.S.A.

For more two centuries, national security has been always used a disguise to justify immigration laws that exclude and marginalize people on the basis of race, religion, and related factors. The scale and nature of Islamophobia, and its connection with bigotries against Muslims and Arabs, suggests that Trump's bans against the otherized Arabs and Muslims are unprecedented and seemingly intractable. In fact, reasons of Muslim bans and Extreme Vetting are not open to public so it is hard to determine the goals met by policy, leaving much room of anxiety due to its vagueness and uncertainty. Because of a short one year period of the Extreme Vetting policy, there have been clear impacts on international students and scholar population. Those international students and scholars from Muslim and Arab countries have not been able to comfortably travel to the U.S.A. due to the fear of inability to return home. According to the Institute of International Education's Open Door Report, the percentage of increase over the last year international student's enrollment was 7.1 percent (2010). However, in 2017, the rate dropped to only 3.4 percent for international student enrollment in the previous year. These noticeable declines in international students in the American universities demonstrates that there has been discriminatory way in visa processing and treatment, leading the society to significant delays from 6 to 8 months to

receive visa stamps to come to the U.S.A. Thus, international scholars and researchers have been turned away by consular officers and customs agents and deterred entry to the U.S.A., causing a loss in the contribution of international students to higher education and intellectual richness to the American universities along with the significant lack of respected scientist's foreign share to the U.S.A scientific exchange. Because of heightened bureaucratic hurdles for entry into the U.S.A., most prominent scholars have had to miss important international professional conferences and prospect collaboration meeting; basically those scholars who prefer to hold their periodically personal meeting, elsewhere, hurting scientific, economic and technological competitiveness.

Far from the direct impacts of Muslim bans on either barring or discouraging Muslims from entering the U.S.A., the domestic effects of the Muslim bans have taken extensive tragic forms. Anti-Muslim bigotry, coming from the highest levels of Trump's government, is echoed and manifested on the group. In fact, even during his campaign and since his election and inauguration, hate crimes against Muslims, according to FBI, reached nearly 67 percent during 2015. Immediately, the Council on American-Islamic Relations published a report to show that 2016 was considered as the worst year concerning detrimental attacks against mosques. Additionally, the early three first months of 2017 witnessed a double rise in violence, aggression, and subversion against mosques in comparison to 2016. Between November 2017 and November 2018, there have been a minimum of 213 hate crimes perpetrated against individuals who identify as, or are perceived to be Muslim Arabs, Middle Easterners, Hindu sikhs, with 63 percent rise in comparison to nearly about 130 incidents reported in 2016. In the same regard, the 2018 South Asian Americans Leading Together's report (SAALT) demonstrates that there is obviously a strong link between Trump's xenophobic political policies and hate crimes incidents. Unfortunately, the schoolhouse walls do not shield Arab and Muslim children or those perceived Muslims from free harassment and animus. Generally, while Muslim and Arab students already bore the brunt of heightened levels of discrimination and bullying from other students, matters have amplified and worsened since President Trump's Bans. In November 2016 survey of 10,000 educators, 80 percent of interviewers reported heightened levels of anxiety by marginalized students, particularly Muslims (The Trump Effect, Southern Poverty Law Center, 2016). Due to Trump effect, several interviewed educators echoed the same finding, reporting remarkable uptick in language and discriminatory

commits and bullying against Arab and Muslims. Interviewed instructors support this observation, reporting that bullying related to politics has risen, particularly against female students wearing hijab since the beginning of the election. An interviewed educator reported, after the enactment of the first Executive Order in January 2017, several incidents abound of Muslim and Arab students such as pulling hijab off their heads at school. With a considerable number of anti-Muslim incidents across the country, students have particularly mentioned Trump's name on his anti-Muslim message to bully a classmate (Samaha, Hayes, & Ansari, 2017).

Worthy to mention that when students are harassed or bullied because of their discriminatory animus targeted at their actual or perceived Muslim or Arab identity, they suffer significant negative effects, including depression, anxiety, decreasing academic performance, and higher rates of truancy and drop-outs. Like Trump's stigmatization of Muslims and Arabs through the back up of Muslim Bans, bullying doesn't not only impacts Muslim students negatively, but it hurts the educational climate, creates a hostile learning environment, and rises the risks to mental health and academic achievement in the country. Trump's policies of banning entry of individuals from Muslim-majority countries, a stance rooted in an anti-Muslim and Arab animus, is a well-conveyed message that they are not worthy of a society's equal respect and they are seen as inassimilable to the American mainstream. In this regard, it seems that current presidential administration is characterized by historical amnesia since it has forgotten the American inbred values as a nation of immigration and immigrants. Basically, it is really important to understand that the United States can preserve its national security and patriotism without necessarily perpetuating intolerance and discriminatory patterns based on religious animus. The increasing rates of xenophobia in Trump's administration, along the well-reported increase in hate crimes and violence against Muslim and Arab Americans or those perceived as Muslims, are not only distressing and alarming, but are at the same time an underlying threat to the multicultural landscape and the democratic nature of the U.S.A., as enshrined in its constitution. The brazen Islamophobia, emanating from Trump's policies, is neither novel in substance nor new in form. The fearmorgening is not unfolded within vacuum, but rather it is an extension of an old system. Thus, such incessant campaigns of American Islamophobia should be perceived as a violation of the American axiomatic tradition as a land of opportunity. Perpetuating anti-immigration and anti-Muslim rhetoric, which the world has well

understood from the new presidential administration, has caused the U.S.A. to be seen as unwelcoming to immigrants from different arrays of the world. Considering the future of the U.S.A. as a leader of globalization, it is obvious that the general outlook of immigration will continue to witness perpetual changes, especially with Trump's withstanding policies, but it will also be crucial to realize that suspicion espoused with Muslim immigration will need to be counteracted through championing the welcome and acceptance of immigrants.

Given the inimical aspect of all Muslim bans to the Americans' interests and fundamental values, the broader anti-immigrant agenda should be defended and repealed to prevent future administrations from enacting new and similar bans. In addition, Islamophobia should be exposed and challenged in all arenas, and the legitimization of the marginalized Muslim and Arab Americans must not be accepted to bolster the basic American principles of equality before lawful institutions, the belief in democracy, and commitment to the magnet of the American society into which all desire to assimilate. In order to guarantee security, equality and liberty, measures should be anticipated in order to keep a keen watch and stand ready to object laws animated by hatred to Muslims and Arabs. For instance, Arab and Muslim governments should implement boosterish ways to encourage political involvement in their own societies and in the United States in order to protect them from further abusive rights. The adoption of the next interaction of the no-Muslim ban campaign will be a good initiative that will focus on revoking all bans through legal and legislative strategies, including the provision of more visibility over their opacity. The welcome of the new congress, with new members and new majority in the House of Representatives, is a pivotal time to offer the new legislative session an opportunity to prompt legislative efforts, to undo or at least restrict Trump's harmful policies, and to start laying the larger term foundation for restraining any future enforcement of discriminatory bans.

3-Diversity in the United States of America

At the most superficial gland, anyone, based on both past and contemporary physical existence that seems to be undeniable, it might seem that diversity is the potent hallmark of the United States. Since the early colonial periods, the U.S.A. was endowed with one of the greatest migratory patterns in history. It has played as a distant magnet, attracting millions of newcomers from different world countries. Indeed, the American immigration, though

witnesses ebbs and flows, has never stopped as it continues to this day. As immigration has been an inherent reality from 1607 to the present, diversity has been deeply manifested as the American peculiarity and a source of controversy as well. The United States is, and has always been, the home of immigrants and beacon for newcomers across the globe.

From the nation's earliest colonists to the more contemporary arrivals, with the exception of native Indians, Americans are descended from immigrants along with their quite diverse experiences. Thus, while many Americans usually seem to perceive immigration as a new issue, diversity has been incontrovertible fact from the first thread of birth. The decade of heavy immigration are swiftly remaking the American racial and ethnic mix. The American mosaic, which has ever more convoluted, is becoming more complicated. Henceforth, the history of American diversity has been shaped by changes in the underlying roots and benefits of immigration as well as by the considerable shifts in contemporary pattern policies. Although many mistakenly claim that multiculturalism is a new social phenomenon associated to recent changes in governmental policies, an ongoing fact is that it has been incessant reality in the U.S.A., not just since its birth as a nation, but even in its early colonial foundations. Diversity is; thus, a standard posture toward which most Americans express strong adherence. Multiculturalism, while fairly a recent vintage, is not a new social phenomenon despite predominant beliefs that the U.S. was culturally homogeneous from its primordial colonial cradle.

A better understanding of the sociocultural facts of linguistic, racial, cultural, and ethnic diversity of the early American history demonstrates a more reasonable belief that America's past diverse nature is linked to its contemporary multicultural picture. The cultural diversity that is prevailing in America today should not be perceived as an erroneous phenomenon, but a continuation of its past picture. America has managed to construct one nation out of different immigrants' backgrounds for a variety of reasons. Substantial cultural diversity in colonial America became the rife feature of newcomers who came from divergent backgrounds and spoke different languages. Their historical perspective is particularly pivotal in discussing the important roles that had played in the American society. These new immigrants presented different identity categories and; hence, their identities are differentiated from one another according to cannon affiliations such as language, religion, race, culture, and identity. Indeed, the high cost of crossing the Atlantic in the 17th and 18th

centuries gave small number of immigrants. With revolution in shipping technology and corresponding decline in immigration costs, the number of unencumbered newcomers to the U.S.A. rose substantially, ushering in a constant age of mass migration from Europe (1820-1920). Throughout the century of mass immigration, about 5 million immigrants were recorded between 1820 and 1860 along the influx of 26 million between 1870 and 1920, the total number exceeded the whole American population as counted in Census of 1970 (Jones, 1960, p.21). However due to the underlying costs and the benefits in immigration policy, the majority of immigrants came from the British Isles (2 million in Ireland and 150.000 in England and Scotland), largely fleeing the Irish potato famine, overpopulation and unfavorable economic conditions in Europe.

Following the English-Scot-Welsh group, German and Irish came to dominate the U.S. immigration, with 1.5 million German to which must be included 200.000 French-speaking German from Alsace and Loraine. At that time, there existed some slight number of immigrants from other nations: Netherland 20.000, Switzerland (40.000), Scandinavians (40.000) (Ertel, Fabre, and Marienstras, 1971). Between 1890 and 1920, the American diversity reached its climax when a stunning variety of unfamiliar immigrants rushed to the U.S. This new phase of immigration is considered as a watershed separating the old migration from the new (Schuck, 2003, p.82). During that period, most of those immigrants arrived from southern and eastern Europe, the Pacific, and Caribbean islands. Poles, Hebrews, Italians rushed to the U.S., as did Scandinavians, Canadians, British, Irish, Mexicans, non-Polish slaves, Magyars, Greeks, and Japanese. In addition, unskilled land workers, tailors, Jewish merchant and tradesmen, and few farmers joined as well. Obviously, all those group of immigrants provided the most diverse racial picture about the 13 colonies. It is noteworthy at that time that different ethnic groups founded their own social institutions, schools, churches, newspapers as well as national aid societies. The remarkable exception of early American diversity was well emphasized through the creation of different settlements with autonomous minority enclaves referred by names of country and origin. In this regard, Vincent N. Parillo states:

“Analysis of the white ethnic colonial population is essential to understanding our multicultural past, for it is here that the cultural homogeneity myth rests. Each settlement was typically a separate ethnic enclave, demonstrated by names such

as New England, New Belgium, New Netherland, New Sweden, New Smyrna, New Hamburg, New Iberia, or New Oklahoma. Despite their dissimilarities from one another, as a separate entities, most colonial settlement during their formative years were culturally homogeneous, although many quickly became multicultural.” (Parrillo, 1994, p. 528)

Linguistic diversity was the legacy from the American multicultural past as it was really a polyglot nation containing a diverse array of languages. At the outset of independence, non-English European newcomers consisted one quarter of the whole population of Pennsylvania while two thirds of them spoke German Language (Shell, 1993).

Additionally, with the huge influx of Africans, African American culture began to evolve with the preservation of the native tongue along significant share of indigenous people who spoke American Indian, representing more than a third of the whole population that spoke the mother tongue other than English. With 1803 Louisiana Purchase, the Adams-Onís treaty with Spain and 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, millions of French and Spanish speakers along with more Africans slaves and the diverse local inhabitants of those acquired territories were merged to a larger linguistic mix of colonial America. Despite the fact that the acquisition of large territories in the 18th and 19th centuries played a fundamental role, linguistic diversity has been prompted basically by immigration. Indeed, the great linguistic diversity has been well demonstrated in 1910 Census, which registered a national population of 92 million and 10 million newcomers who spoke their native language than English or Celtic (Irish, Scot, Welsh). There were 2.8 million speaking German, 1.4 million speaker of Italian, 1.1 million speaker of Yiddish, 944.000 speaker of Polish, 683.000 speakers of Swedish, 529.000 speakers of French, 403.000 speakers of Norwegian, and 258,000 speakers of Spanish (Rumbaut & Massy, 2003).

The extensive variety of spoken languages was accompanied with the emergence of more than 35000 papers with different languages, including 276 papers in German language, 118 publications in Spanish and Portuguese, 111 papers in Scandinavian language, 98 in Italian, 76 Polish, 51 Czech, 46 French, 42 Slovack, and 39 Yiddish and many others in Finn, Japanese, Greek, and Russian languages (Ertel, Fabre, and Marienstras, 1971, p.24).

The most significant condensation of cultural diversity was in the New Netherland with an extraordinary heterogeneous population. As early as 1660, there existed 18 spoken

languages at near the Fort Amsterdam at the tip of Manhattan Island. Though still a small colonial city in 1780, its inhabitants were diverse including Danes, Dutch, Finns, French, German, Irish, Scots, and Swedes. Like the New Amsterdam, Philadelphia provided another archetype of cultural pluralism (Glazer & Moynihan, 1970, p.1). It was baffling to anyone to grasp the apparent discrepancy between high levels of religious identity and an overwhelming secular popular culture in the U.S.A. There was also a truth that captures a religious toleration as one of the legacies from America's multicultural past. The breadth of religious diversity and its historical development provide a more nuanced portrait of the American religious landscape. More significantly, hundreds of different Christian denominations coexisted, and a proliferation of religious groups and sects founded normative ideal of religious pluralism. In this direction, the director of the center of religious liberty explained that the American nation embraced religious pluralism since its founding:

From the time of earliest European settlement in the sixteenth century, America's face has been one of religious diversity .In the South and West, Spanish and French explorations resulted in the spread of the Roman catholic faith .Along the earliest seaboard, English, German, Dutch, and Swedish settlements in the seventeenth century brought a diversity of Protestants, most of whom sought to escape the religious persecutions they had experienced in the Old World. By 1700, the colonies were dotted with Congregationalists, Separatists, Baptists, Quakers, Calvinists, Lutherrans, Anglicans, Presbyterians, Moravians, Dunkers, Pietists, Huguenots, and Mennonites. (Davis, 2004).

The United States was quite serious about absorbing religious pluralism, and the nation immediately turned to be a heaven for all religious groups that arrived to America in unimaginable influx. While the experiment of equal fooling of all religious groups along the competing forces of legalized religious freedom policy created controversy, they; nonetheless, fostered harmony. In this regard, nowadays multiculturalism finds its bedrock in the colonial religious pluralism as the United States led a broad experiment with the separation of state from the church. A formal separation that appeared as the best solution to maintain the government far from religion and to maximize freedom for Christians and other religious groups as well. In fact, the United States has long struggled over religious pluralism since the founding era, but it is still unresolved. Overwhelmingly, the increasing

tensions generated by the commitment to religious diversity are many. The ongoing tensions lie over the consideration of the U.S.A. as being culturally Christian or constitutionally secular. In this regard, it was largely recognized that cultural pluralism is embedded in the principles of liberty, justice, good governance, and that these elements mirrored the American constitution for which guaranteed the protection of religious liberty. Though its emblem was basically the unity of the thirteen colonies, it also was, and remains, a normative epitome of the U.S.A. as pluralist society, not solely religiously, but politically, ethnically, and socially as well. Whether the White American population admits it or not, the American nation has witnessed more diverse landscape in the last three decades of the 20th century. The American cultural and ethnic diversity has dramatically grown due to immigration policies that have been basically the cause of the rapid increase of the American population from less than 4 million in 1790 to more than 270 million in 2000. In the 1980, a new crossroad in American history has rapidly reshaped the ethnic mix of the U.S.A. Minorities have made up roughly one third of the whole nation's population that are increasingly faster than the White majority population with third world immigrants outnumbering European newcomers. Largely, this was the result of the Immigration Act of 1965 that revoked the effect of the long-standing national quota system of immigration since 1920's (Alba & Nee, 2003). Permitting the influx of greater number of immigrants from other continents other than Europe, the 1965 Immigration Act has had a deep impact on American migratory pattern and on the general U.S. demographic fabric. The American mosaic, which has always been intricate, is becoming hard to draw.

The following table demonstrates the new America's changes faces regarding diverse minorities. In the year 1970, roughly 99 percent of the overall U.S. residents could be identified as either only Whites or only Blacks. However, the year 2000 witnessed a steady decrease of population categorizing itself either White or Black to somewhat less than 88 percent, despite the actual rise of Black population share with a percentage point. Such a fall of 12 percent point in the White share of population was simultaneously paralleled by considerable increase in the share of the population that identified itself with a race other than White or Black only such as Asian race, American Indians or multiracial. The percentage of the other share increased from 1.4 percent in 1970 to 12.5 percent in the 2000. Clearly, a notable growth in the share of the other category mirrors the rapid growth in the size of America's Latino and Asian minorities due to immigration, emphasizing the

fact that national narrative on diversity will no longer be only about Whites and Blacks. As can be seen in the table 2, there is tremendous increase in the size of the Hispanic minority to White race, 42 percent categorized themselves with other race. Another possible interpretation is the heightened numbers of the Asians who bore witness to dramatic growth. Between 1980 and 2000, the category of Asian rose more than a double percentage according to the whole population. They increased from 1.7 percent to 3.6 percent, including those who self-identify as Asian race only or 4.2 percent of those who categorized themselves as Asian only or Asian and some other race. The further other trend is the mounting number of multiracial categorization. In Census 2000, 6.8 million individual (nearly 2.4 percent of the population) self-identified with two or more races. About three out of four of multiracial individuals categorized their races as White. The general combined identification was of White and some other race (32.3 %); 15.9 percent as White and American Indian or Alaska natives; 12.7 percent as White and Asian; and 11.5 percent as White or Black or African American. The tremendous increases in Hispanic and Latino immigrants clarify that America is becoming more diverse and the estimation of its communities has broadened too

Table 2: U.S. Population by Race, Age, and Hispanic Population, 1970-2000 Percentage ^a

<i>Category</i>	<i>1970</i>	<i>1980</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>2000</i>	<i>Difference, 1970-2000</i>
<i>Race</i>					
Total					
White	87.4	83.2	80.3	75.1	-12.3
Black	11.1	11.7	12.0	12.3	1.2
Other ^b	1.4	5.2	7.6	12.5	11.1
Children ^c					
White	84.8	78.6	75.1	68.6	-16.2
Black	13.7	14.7	15.0	15.1	1.4
Other ^b	1.5	6.7	9.9	16.3	14.8
Adults ^d					
White	88.9	84.9	82.2	77.4	-11.5
Black	9.8	10.5	11.0	11.4	1.6
Other ^b	1.4	4.5	6.8	11.2	9.9
<i>Ethnicity</i>					
Hispanic background ^e	...	6.4	9.0	12.5	6.1 ^f

Sources: Census of Population 1980, Characteristics of Population, vol. 1, ch. B, part 1; Census of Population and Housing, 1990: Summary Tape File 3 on CD-ROM; Census 2000 Summary File 1.

a. Rounding may affect totals.

b. For 1970,1980, and 1990, "Other" refers to individuals who marked any race other than black or white, which included American Indian, Eskimo or Aleut, Asian and Pacific Islander, and some other race. In 2000, "Other" refers to American Indian and Alaska Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian, and some other race. In addition, the 2000 Census allowed individuals to mark more than one race; those individuals are included in the "Other" category.

c. Children defined as 0-17 years.

d. Adults defined as 18 and older.

e. Hispanic or Latino ethnicity is collected separately from race in the Census. Hispanics may be of any race; therefore race and Hispanic background are not additive.

f. Difference between 1980 and 2000.

Current immigration is totally different from the old immigration as the source of newcomers has changed at the same time. During the classical era of immigration, most immigrants arrived from Europe while the rest came from the Americas and little came from the Asian continent. Such a change in immigrants' regional and racial distribution was intentional and reflected purposeful government policy. Indeed, due to the deliberate American policy regarding Asians, the effect of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 lessened dramatically the entry of Asians to the U.S.A. However, such decrease in Asians was accompanied by huge influx of legal immigrants from Europe during the first two decades of the twentieth century, largely southern and eastern Europe. In contrast, the impact of the 1965 Immigration Act has been dramatic as the number of Asian immigrants grew from 21,000 in 1965 to 93,000 just five years later.

The divergence in the recent U.S.A. demographic fabric points to an opening experiments with Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, and Cuban immigrants who have been bound to the considerable number of Dominicans, Guatemalans, Salvadorians, and Columbians during the past three decades. Historically, people of Chinese and Japanese descent dominated the American Asian community. While Chinese still remain the prevalent Asian minority, other Asians such as Pilipino, Asian Indians, Vietnamese, and Korean minorities have all surpassed the Japanese community in number. Another factor responsible for increasing diversity in the United States is the sustainable growth that occurred in the number of residents from the West Indies; large number of them are Afro-Caribbean (Alba & Nee, 2003, pp.175-176). Though these minorities are to some extent close culturally and linguistically in comparison to a diverse American Asian population, they; nevertheless, reflect a variety of nationalities with different histories and experiences. In this vein, these minorities are not as united as in the case of Asians, Hispanics or Latinos (Etzioni, 2007).

The generational differences in diversity demonstrates that today's immigrants and their progenitors are almost Latino, or more precisely, overwhelmingly Mexicans. Such a potential of Mexican immigrants has become more politically salient, particularly with undocumented immigrants. Despite of the American restrictive policies, Mexicans continue to be the largest and the leading country for both legal and illegal immigrants to the United States. As a first initiative, due to the imposition of a restrictive quota system on Western countries along with a number of interrelated economic and political development, the U.S.

has entered a new crucial era in its contemporary immigration history, which has plagued the U.S. immigration policy makers ever since (Alba & Nee, 2003, pp.175-176).

Mongering anxieties about the dilemma of documented as opposed to undocumented immigrants have risen tremendously because it has been impossible to manage illegal pathways to the U.S.A. Increasing racial and ethnic diversity can also be felt in interracial unions. Upon arrival to the United States, most immigrants start to have families, and their offsprings start also to represent a piece of the diverse patchwork of races and ethnicities. The dwindling of social disapproval over interracial marriages has generated a corresponding growth in the number of interracial children. The 2000 Census showed that children were identified twice as likely as adult to be multiracial; nearly 4 percent in comparison to 2 percent adults. It is worthy to note that 6 percent of all 2000 marriages crossed boundaries of race and ethnicity, with an increase of 3 percent in 1980. In the southwest, these intermarriages reflect Hispanic or Asian mixed races. Such high rates in multiracial marriages and children reinforce the history of the U.S.A. as a diverse nation and perpetuate America's growing multiculturalism tomorrow (Suro, 1999).

When nowadays multiracial offsprings attain adulthood, the U.S. is more likely to witness an ever broad spate in multiracial identity. In this regard, it becomes more defensible since multiracial children are acceptable within the larger mainstream (Kent & Mather, 2002). Although these rates about interracial marriages and children demonstrate more racial and ethnic face, diversity is not well mirrored properly throughout the U.S.A, basically enclosed to California, Texas, New York, Chicago, and Florida. However, what is really surprising is the exceptional growth of Hispanic rates in other cities and regions where Hispanics historically have settled. For instance, 900 percent increase of Hispanic population in metropolitan areas of southeast can be interpreted as new wave of immigration that is now reaching across the country over the past twenty years. The overall Latino suburban population increased from 71 percent, raising the share of Latinos living in suburbs to 54 percent in 2000 (Suro and Singer, 2002). In the same regard, the Census of 2000, for instance, showed that one in five Americans (nearly 20 percent) were foreign-born or the progeniture of foreign-born parents. Because of the tendency to concentrate in metropolitan areas rather than randomly dispersed across the country, new migration has disproportionate impacts on broader states and ports of entry, hosting huge numbers of arrivals. Taking

California as an example of diversity, Alba and Nee (2003) assert that Hispanic and Asian populations presented the highest rates, with Hispanics increasing by one third and the Asians by more than 40 percent. These rates even surpassed African Americans as the most major minority group, and displaced non-Hispanics Whites (Alba and Nee, 2003, pp.8-9). It is no overstatement to anyone to claim that the U.S. is really remaking its multicultural mainstream. The new immigration does not only rise the non-White population in the U.S., but it also offers tremendous diversity perspectives, particularly in terms of culture and language. The flooding of a large number of Asians and Hispanics has ultimately brought a dizzying proliferation of denominations of Christians, attitudes, regional dialects as well as a myriad of different religious beliefs. Accordingly, the increase of foreign language speakers, particularly Spanish, has resulted in new powerful trends in the American society.

Today's, necessary units on diversity are being implemented within curricula. Of course, the focus on diversity is being offered and required for children whose native language is not English. Thus, the arguments about diversity proceeds from the irrefutable fact of its increase, particularly the resurgence of foreign language speaking that is not being felt uniformly in the U.S. Some have augmented mounting fears and alarmist cases that this new wave is pushing the U.S.A. toward "democratic balkanization" along its threats over the Anglo-Saxon culture. Thus, a grist of these claims are well emphasized in the talks of bilingual education schemes and multiculturalism that seem to embrace an alternative language for social communication, portending that Spanish language is stirring up an acrimonious challenge to both English language and Anglo-Protestant identity. In this regard, their future vision of regional differences are to a further extent pessimist and far-fetched, foreseeing the provocative assertion of the likelihood of the *La requensista* by most of Hispanic activists. That is to say that a large scale of Hispanics are endangering the core of American identity. Eventually, the perpetual influx of Mexicans will split the U.S.A. into two languages: Spanish and English and between two cultures: Hispanic and Anglo-Saxon (Huntington, 2004, p. xvi).

Similar to Huntington, many scholars have voiced questions about the future of American identity, advancing exaggerations about American secession. As Brad Edmondson concurs: "We are seeing the emergence of two different Americas: One that is young, urban hip, and multiracial, and another that is aging, village traditional, and mostly

white” (Edmondson, 2000, p.320). In reworking realities of diversity and apart from Hispanics, nowadays debates are centered upon worries of Arabs and Muslims, and the overstated consequences of their immigration to the U.S.A. This should be surprising because today descendants of White ethnics are defending their traditional American culture and making determined effects to reconfirm their position as the rightful prevalent group in the American mainstream. To the White protestant conservatives, the changes forces of the American society are more merely changes in the color of its individuals. Nevertheless, the influx of such great mosaic of immigrants has contributed in more non-White immigrants with a variance of cultures and religion from the previous American population. In the face of the ungrounded theoretical speculation about the future of the U.S.A. and its immigrants, a growing number of anthropological and sociological studies have reasserted that the contention about the diversity of recent immigrants, significantly different from the past diversity, is unwarranted and groundless. Even though today types of immigrants may seem ethnically different and strange in their non-Christian religion practices, their spoken languages and cultural traditions, they have incorporated to the dominant society and become part of the larger magnet along visible pride to the forefathers’ cultural norms. All such important projection of data and analysis provides further evidence that the United States fabric is marked by cultural kaleidoscope of diverse ethnic groups with a variety of origins. This is why the U.S.A. has always speckled its existence with diversity and that’s why it is predominantly tagged as being multicultural.

4-Multiculturalism in the United States of American

The heightened ethnic diversity has obviously spurred the emergence of multicultural society and multiculturalism as important key words describing contemporary modern nations. Cultural and racial diversity have greatly increased as a result of immigration policies in the twentieth century. Internationally, migration has been one of the most crucial factors of global change as it has increased in both volume and significance. Currently, the United States, Canada and Australia are the world’s foremost recipients of immigrants from different arrays, and they constitute for more than a half of legal immigration. Multiculturalism perspective has been espoused by public policies with cultural ethnic plurality. During past decades, the politics of multiculturalism have been confronted with

the dilemma of equality and the demand of the recognition of racial and cultural differences. In this respect, its issue has been broadly discussed and analyzed across a broad of spectrum.

Though different terms and concepts are being frequently used in media and academia, reporters and even scholars have often failed to use and understand them as they are used indiscriminately and interchangeably. The most critical hurdle is the failure to distinguish between multicultural society as a fact and multiculturalism as a policy and ideology. The multidimensional debate that surrounds multiculturalism is necessarily troubling, putting forth underlying and long settled issues into continuous questions. In fact, multiculturalism is an emotionally loaded connotation that has been both hotly discussed and used in a variety of ways. As a vague and mutable concept, the term can refer to an ideology or a governmental policy that advocates cultural pluralism or the demographic fact of cultural diversity, which basically tends to precede those policies. Principally, as a broad concept that defies definition, multiculturalism can refer to “a system of beliefs and behaviours that recognizes and respects the presence of all diverse groups in an organization or society, acknowledges and values their sociocultural differences, and encourages and enables their continued contribution within an inclusive cultural context which empowers all within the organization or society” (Rosado, 1996, p.2). Thus, multiculturalism is the demographic fact that describes the co-existence of different groups from a variety of ethnic and religious backgrounds in a single society while celebrating inclusion.

As a practical matter, the phenomenon of multiculturalism in the United States is manifestly opened to a core of political arguments over the problematic language of diversity and pluralism. As catch words in the American life, diversity and cultural pluralism have become entrenched progressively and almost unconsciously in the fabric of recent speech. It is through championing the ideal of diversity as a fact of the American society, one can regard the historical particularities of the American nation. It is likely obvious that contemporary multiculturalism emerges in the context of older arguments over cultural pluralism. Seemingly, the American cultural pluralism and multiculturalism are indeed, in their simplest meanings, indistinguishable and allied; nevertheless, the two concepts are somehow divergent. Recently, the dissimilarity, in fact, lies over their political interpretation. While cultural pluralism mirrors the traditional principles, furthering the liberal doctrine of religious toleration that extends to social and cultural diversity,

contemporary multiculturalism focuses on a different approach of reference to the broader realm of ethnicity and other sub-political concerns, arising out of the American civil right movement and the new commitment to anti-discrimination in the American life.

In his prominent book entitled: *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (1995), the sociologist Will Kymlicka provides a more subtle understanding of cultural diversity and he states that the term multiculturalism can refer to two different types of cultural diversity (Kymlicka, 1995, p.15). On the one hand, he uses the term multiculturalism to depict polities that include nations of this sort. In this regard, Canada is considered as a multinational state in that it is a federation of coexisting nations: Quebec, the first nation, and English Canada. Multicultural states are basically formed when one nation is colonized by settlers, or invaded or conquered as in the case of French Canadians who were conquered by the English. Despite the fact that multinational cultural diversity constitutes shrill challenges, a distinct kind of cultural diversity, on the other hand, results when individuals of a polity have emigrated from different nations and are let and heartened to maintain some of their ethnic particularities while participating in the mainstream institution of the host community. Nations that contain multiple ethnic or immigrant groups exhibit a cultural diversity that is well pictured as being polyethnic (Kymlicka, 1995, p.15).

As a pluralist society, the U.S.A. represents a polyethnic diversity that inevitably raises the question of how to include different immigrants in their new society as it still faces problems of continuous cultural misunderstanding and integration policies that are not quite innovative. In fact, the past policies of liberal democratic nations, in dealing with different newcomers and their incorporation, were to a further extent dissimilar from current United States policy. Until the 1960's, the unique feature of the United States was the Anglo-conformity model into which immigrants from different backgrounds are compelled to strip from their cultural and ethnic heritage and assimilate fully to the culture of the host country. Just a uniquely American culture would emerge and accommodate language, food, dress, and any other ethnic particularities into a single Anglo-Saxon based culture. From the outset of the 1970's; however, this tendency began to change along with its policy. The inevitable disappointment of social justice resulted in a series of defection. The Anglo-Saxon model was shattered due to its failure to recognize the existing cultural differences and it has become largely accepted that immigrants should be free to preserve their old cultural norms

regarding food, dress, religion, and to collaborate to maintain these practices (Kymlicka, 1995, p.14).

Immigrants' traditional way of life was not only allowed, but they were even encouraged by their government to manifest it. This can be well reflected in the policies of the three leading countries of the United States, Canada, and Australia, which they highlighted a shift from the Anglo-conformity to polyethnicity. Such a shift was interpreted in a form of multiculturalism. Henceforth, it is difficult to explain or just claim how these changes emanate. 'Ethnic revival' or 'ethnic fever' movements in the U.S.A. paved the path for such policies to come about. Kymlicka states that immigrants were dismissing the Anglo-conformity model, and; thus, they were simultaneously successful in appealing for their ethnic identity recognition. Nevertheless, it is not quite clear to confirm that the adoption of multiculturalism, as an alternative to the Anglo-conformity, was the effect of ethnic groups' demand (Kymlicka, 1995, p.61). Accordingly, the American liberal theories are promoting multiculturalism as a model of cultural rights defense, deriving its source in the universal right of an individual. Through the lenses of the liberal viewpoint, multiculturalism seeks to further the existence and the recognition of cultural ethnic plurality, but this is still sought to be a plurality of cultures as closed units. Such tendencies of multiculturalism have been criticized to endorse divergences and to articulate stereotypes through using culture as a way to resolve political and social inequalities in the society.

Besides, the liberal concept of a nation state, as the United States, has failed to counter cultural relativism since it has disregarded the idea of culture as a system of dependency on multiple relations and meanings. In this regard, they all surpass nation-states boundaries as well as cultural distinctions that are intended as positive variations living side by side. In his article: "*Multiculturalism: E Pluribus Plures*" (1990), Diane Ravitch, a prominent historian in education, epitomized all multicultural controversies as he distinguishes between two types of multiculturalism: a good pluralistic multiculturalism that she backups and bad particularistic multiculturalism that she refutes. Due to political and social changes of recent decades, cultural pluralism is now generally recognized as an ongoing principle of the American society. In this regard, Ravitch stated:

In contrast to the idea of the melting pot which promised to erase ethnic and groups' differences, children now learn that variety is the price of life. They learn

that cultural pluralism is one of the norms of a free society, that differences among groups are a national resource rather than a problem to be solved. Indeed, the unique fortune of the United States is that its common culture has been formed by the interaction of its subsidiary cultures ...Paradoxical through it may seem, the United States has a common culture that is multicultural. (Ravich, 1990).

Multiculturalism, according to Ravitch, refers to the benign pluralistic multiculturalism that favors the acceptance and the equality of all cultures in the making up of the American fabric. In this perspective, the United States has a unique feature that its common culture has been shaped by the co-existence and interaction of ethnic group's cultures within the American society. Such an understanding of the American culture, whose sole formative cornerstone is diversity ties, had taken long time to forge. All such considerable painstaking efforts to expand a sense of a richer culture, to which all belong, have started to develop around an agreed-upon vision of liberty, justice, and democracy. Further, the idea of cultural democracy implies that the enduring norms of the American common culture promote intergroup tolerance and assistance, particularly as response to the ethnically heterogeneous American society. The large scale influx of overseas workers, to satisfy the severe shortage of blossoming labor markets, has been a factual impetus that confirmed the American democratic pluralism and its concomitant failure to emphasize the traditional Eurocentric arrogance.

In making this assertion, the different races and ethnicities of the United States' immigrants are compelling White radicals to foster the alternative version of multiculturalism that denounces the myth put forward by White power structure. It is worthy to mention that from the early thread of the nation, the United States' cultural pluralism was historically unwarranted, simply because the U.S.A. has always been viewed, in its basic frame and character, as an Anglo-Saxon prototypical model. As corollary of the dominant White Protestant culture, into which immigrants were assimilating, current American diverse cultures have been the debunking of the old-fashioned WASP character and norms. Nowadays, in order to encompass the perpetual ethnic diversity, it is compulsory to understand the United States as staunchly a pluralist and a liberal recipient of a monocultural entity. In fact, the United States, from the early colonial period, was an Anglo-monoculture that had been modified and enriched by changeable conglomeration of cultures.

Hence, adhering to the idea of the American WASP values means that the U.S.A. had not only been primarily constructed by individuals of multiple backgrounds and talents to a gradually modified culture, but by one ethnocentric culture that was overly an obstacle to people of color's inclusion. The sociologist Nathan Glazer confirms that multiculturalism has always been a reality from the first encounter between indigenous people and Europeans, "one might think there is nothing left to say. The idea that it would happen, that it should happen, has been simply discredited, and we live with a new reality. This new reality was once called cultural pluralism; it is now called multiculturalism" (Glazer, 1997, p.97). According to Glazer, multiculturalism in the United States is best understood as a positive generalized or universalized emphasis on the American civil right movement. In this vein, no one can deny people of color's fate and history, particularly blacks, among the powerful prompts making multiculturalism in America. As diversity is both a historical and a current determined identity, multiculturalism is the response to a variety of complicated and troubling issues, including the unwillingness to assimilate African Americans, Native Americans, Hispanics, Asians, Arabs and Muslims into the larger society, as it incorporated so many groups. What really makes people of color the storm troops in the battle of multiculturalism lies in the fundamental refusal of other Americans to accept them, in spite of their ability and fervor to assimilate.

Despite the fact that people of color couldn't be, because of racial characteristics, indistinguishable from Whites, it is preferable that they have become assimilated as simply Americans with different skin color. The racial difference and the tragic history of hatred and discrimination, distinguishing other groups of color from Whites, cannot be easily debated. Instead, this separation is, in fact, the enduring impetus for multiculturalism and for the objection of the Eurocentric tendency of assimilation. The notion of the melting pot; however, did not deal with the problems of slaves' descendants after the emancipation, and even the rush of Hispanics who were more likely to retain their Spanish language and solid ties with their native countries. The main political crisis encountering the United States since 1945, simultaneously when European countries were dealing with their diverse immigrants, hence was that of how its Black Africans would be equally treated as their White counterparts and incorporate in a society whose basic institutions have been framed to solve primarily the problems of European immigrants. Indeed, it was this movement of civil rights that care to prevail the political arena about intergroup relations, rather that of cultural

diversity. Therefore, it was only when Latinos have become the leading migratory pattern to the United States that the question of multiculturalism reverted to the political agenda. Essentially, the failure of people of color, particularly the emergence of hatred against Blacks in schools, pushed Black intellectuals to argue that the curriculum was not sufficiently multicultural. From this point, they asserted that Blacks Latinos' cultures were distinctive to the predominant Anglo-Saxon culture and; hence, they could be corrected by multicultural education in the U.S.A. In this perspective, one can assert that unlike Canada whose multiculturalism was, from the outset, bound up with two founding nations, the United States' multiculturalism has so solidly established itself around issues related to education, women's rights, culture, and disillusionment of people of color. The new ethnic group's line of argument was not; however, merely related to education or limited to academia. Rather many ethnic groups are viewed as marginalized, distinct cultural groups, and even separate nations within the U.S.A. The immediate response to the traditional liberal view of minorities, particularly Blacks, Latinos, Arabs and Muslims, was quite foreseeable and it has been obviously asserted by past and contemporary authorities.

In '*The Disunity of America: Reflections on a multicultural society*', Arthur Schlesinger (1992) raised mounting cries about the disunity of the American fabric that has been built solely upon the fusion of all immigrants' cultures within a single set of the new nation's institutions. The American society functions because it succeeded to incorporate diverse people to the American culture and English language. What he perceived nowadays is the disunity of the U.S.A. and skepticism about its future due to the influx of Hispanics who refuse to adhere to the dominant Anglo-Saxon culture along the secessionist teaching of extremist Blacks. As a defense of American unity, he calls for the recognition of what he describes as extremists' secessionist teaching that can only be achieved through European cultures' adherence. What is worth remarkable that historical circumstances of multi-ethnicity in the United States are usually viewed to exclude other non-European cultures, and that the political design of the American creed did not precisely provide a satisfactory solution to the dichotomy White-Black or White-non-White races (Schlesinger, 1992).

Similar to Arthur Schlesinger who raised hues and cries about the disunity of the United States, the same assumptions were clearly adopted and well interpreted in Andrew Hacker famous book: *Two Nations: Black and White: Separate, Hostile and Unequal*

(1992). What is questionable about Hacker's argument is that the notion of unity between Blacks and Whites could not be achieved or restored. A great deal of his account lies on the suggestion that both White and Black opinions no longer visualize a real compromise. Accordingly, Whites have reverted to consider Blacks as outsiders of their community and Blacks imagined themselves secessionist (Hacker, 1992). Nonetheless, what is misleading, in Schlesinger and Hacker's skepticism against the split and the disunity of the U.S.A., is to think of all minorities' rights as simply the output of a European culture or an Anglo-Saxon culture in particular. Instead of considering the contribution of non-European minorities' cultures to the development of a larger civic culture and recognizing the achievement of their rights through struggle, Schlesinger and Hacker continued to separate and dismiss them as a dangerous threat.

Multiculturalism is seen by many radicals as a movement of disunity and a kind of secession from the Eurocentric perspectives. At this point, there will be always subjective controversies between those who backup the view and those who are only willing to acknowledge the existence of a simpler benign and cultural framework of multiculturalism policy. In fact, the purpose behind this policy is to deal with the structural outcomes of the historic wrong that had targeted Black Africans by dreadful slavery and, eventually, by racial discrimination toward later minority groups of Hispanics and Muslims. This has obviously prompted the U.S.A. to supplement its multicultural institutions, attempting to solve particularly the problems of visible ethnic minorities or misunderstanding over race conflicts. Though it is likely uneasy to oversimplify American intergroup race conflict and to deal with distinguished cultural markers, it has become requisite for the United States to patronize a much more sophisticated vision that endeavors to take into account the intricate variables with individual cases. It seems that what emerges from such a vision is the possibility of promoting an ideal of egalitarian multiculturalism that considers both the value of cultural diversity and the inescapable democratic rights for minorities to struggle against prejudice and hatred.

Contemporary American academia discourse about the two facets of diversity and discrimination is multilayered and contested landscape, with intersecting tendencies within the field of education. Recently, it has become indispensable for the U.S.A. to keep a way a monolithic vehicle for this multifaceted tumult that holds diversity near its heart, but

surpassing a bit the contestation over multicultural education. As rebuttal and cogent arguments against anti-multiculturalism, abundant evidence demonstrates that the U.S.A. has undergone, despite its relatively brief history, further transformations in response to its dynamic and inconstant milieu. As a fact, Multiculturalism is always interpreted as pervasive notion that the U.S.A. has always stood for harmony and acceptance. There is an inevitable call for the models of anti-racist and multicultural education. Admittedly, an anti-racist education has merged from the multicultural milieu of the U.S.A that has basically been highly in opposition to White discrimination. Progressive educational reform activists and multicultural scholars have strived for a broader pedagogy of postmodern multiculturalism in the U.S.A. There is a mounting recognition of the politicized nature of multicultural scholar around issues of pluralism, anti-racism and of the imperious need for coalition construction to encompass awareness of the complex interplay of issues around class, race, gender, sexuality, disability, and special educational needs (Reed, 1993).

Instead of focusing fundamentally on harmonious intergroup relations through anti-discrimination strategies aimed at reducing ignorance of other culture, many scholars and grass-root activists in the U.S.A. have more avowed a critical multicultural position toward education, particularly examining the convenience of the curriculum along anti-racism educational goals. In this vein, an obvious indication of the transformative power of the anti-discrimination debate is visible in its influence upon American educational reform. Multicultural education, as a representation of the new civic American education, is the root of the disadvantages of culturally deprived children due to their isolation and insulation from the American mainstream. It is through considering the overlapping issues and the divergent political and historical contextual situation of diversity, educational scholars and activists may find more convenient strategies to solve ingroup conflicts and boundaries. In this regard, Ravitch cherishes the innovative initiatives in current decades to bring cultural democracy to disenfranchised groups in American school:

This understanding of the pluralistic nature of American culture has taken a long time to forge. It is based on sound scholarship has led to major revisions in what children are taught and what they read in school. The new history is-indeed, must be –a warts-and-all history; it demands an unflinching examination of racism and discrimination in our history. (Ravitch, 1990, pp.339-340).

Despite the fact of cultural pluralism is important as primary condition favorable to the rise of multiculturalism in the U.S.A., the prime source and the most obvious evidence of its rise is independent. The straightforward political meaning of educational efforts and the renewal of cultural differences over cultural deprivation is central to the emergence of American multiculturalism. Besides, an account of cultural depreciation and cultural inferiority debates, as a simplest explanation of the emergence of the American multiculturalism, was articulated when the broader aspiration of civil right movement incarnated in a variety of anti-discrimination policies. All came to include groups' anti-racism and a new understanding of the American justice and equality. Multiculturalism in the U.S.A. may mean several things to its advocates, but it does not mean just anything since multiculturalism founders and reformers are self-conscious of the differences among them. Unencumbered by a wide range of political and historical theories, proponent of American multicultural education are more to the point in providing clear vision of their political logic and giving an unmediated way to redefine the country through new anti-discrimination. In this regard, Banks (1992) stated:

In the United States multicultural education emerged from the civil rights and other protest movement of the 1960s and 1970s...Regardless of what is perceived as the limitations of multicultural education in the United States, it is usually considered by both its advocates and critics as a metaphor for equal educational opportunities for victimized cultural, racism, sexism and social class inequality”
(Banks, 1992)

Yet, all of such wide array of different forms of multiculturalism, across world countries throughout time, is typically bewildering. Since its official introduction to Canada in 1971, multiculturalism has significantly evolved within other countries, especially in the United States through successive decades in regards to its basic focus, raising unexpected problems and suggesting solutions.

Despite the existence of an enormous variation in the forms of multiculturalism due to the response to specific circumstances of different countries, current time has ultimately witnessed considerable upsurge criticism of all types of multiculturalism in the political sphere. Such criticism was made at the end of a decade in which multiple arguments have been debated intensely over two policy approaches managing the cultural diversity in

contemporary U.S.A.: interculturalism and multiculturalism. While some scholars such as Meer and Modoom (2012) argue that interculturalism is not different from multiculturalism. Yet, it simply refocuses on some of the key elements that are already essential within nowadays multiculturalism, others argue that they both represent different conceptions. It is worthy to mention that interculturalism shares much features with multiculturalism. Particularly, they both celebrate cultural diversity and pluralism. Like multiculturalism, interculturalism also values the importance of social inclusion in the broader society where integration is intended as a dual way process through which both the larger group and ethnic minorities make accommodation to each others. Moreover, alike multiculturalism, interculturalism deals with the primacy structural political, social and economic inequalities, and prejudices that frequently impact individuals of ethnic minorities. It requires immediate reaction to face discrimination through affirmative action in order to provide assistance to marginalized group, and make further initiatives to get rid of systematic educational racism within schools. That is to say, interculturalism constructs its foundations upon the grounds of multiculturalism. Nevertheless, all of these common similar features and concepts of multiculturalism are positively oppositional with interculturalism, notably as political ideas (Meer & Modoom, 2012). Whereas some proponents of political interculturalism wish to highlight its positive characteristics for the sake of promoting communication, recognizing dynamic identities, bolstering unity and denouncing illiberal cultural practices, each of all of these qualities are already indispensable features of multiculturalism. Precisely, interculturalism places more emphasis on intercultural dialogue, interaction, and exchange. In this regard, the emphasis on the interactive and dynamic cultural exchange, as a prime feature and an opposing distinction to multiculturalism, indicates that it “tends to preserve a cultural heritage, while interculturalism acknowledges and enables cultures to have currency, to be exchanged, to circulate, to be modified and evolve” (Sze and Powell, 2004).

This characterization of multiculturalism is then viewed by advocates of interculturalism as encouragement of fragmentations and disunity because it ignores the needs of the majority and places much interests upon ethnic differences. Such a disunity and fragmentation with the mainstream community can be alternatively solved and avoided through the call of interculturalism that does not only encourage cultural equality of diverse cultures, but also fosters mutual understanding, cooperation, and participation.

Booth's standpoint elucidates the predilection of interculturalism over multiculturalism since he explains that interculturalism is concerned with the task of developing cohesive civil societies by turning notions of singular identities into those of multiple ones, and by developing a shared and common value system and public culture. In building a deep sharing form of cultural differences, it encourages the formation of interdependencies that structure personal identities and go beyond nations or simplified ethnicities (Booth, 2003, p. 432). Those common grounds embody a type of communality through which interculturalism aims at generating a strong sense of cohesive society on the basis of shared universal values. Thus, they should be developed through the support of intercultural dialogue and the rejection of moral relativism on the ground of cultural differences. It is the adherence to a critical stance of illiberal cultural practices that shuts universal values and intellectual dialogue. Structural barriers such as discrimination and marginalization affect individuals who will be less able to participate in the intellectual dialogue and, thus, setting more boundaries for their integration.

The more common criticism of multiculturalism stems from the fact that it underestimates the structural problems encountered by ethnic groups and minorities because they are unavoidably impacted by powerful relations among individuals within dialogue. In fact, individuals who occupy higher positions of power determine the decisions on their own cultural perspective. Compelled with this concern, all individuals within the mainstream community hold several cultural affiliations and identities (ethnic, religious, cultural, and linguistic), which they shift in a free-flowing manner according to particular context and even situations. Accordingly, it will be impossible to expect a dialogue to occur since it is impossible to identify the nature of culture. Obviously, multiculturalism surpasses interculturalism as a political orientation that is expected to recognize cultural diversity and differences between minority groups within the larger society, and that they both require to be provided equal distribution of powers. As such, one can assert that until interculturalism can be considered as a political orientation and able to provide an original perspective to matters related to complex identities and diversity in a more convincing way, that at present, it cannot, scientifically at least, exceed multiculturalism, and so sought to be perceived as complementary to multiculturalism.

Conclusion

The considerable repercussions of Islamophobia, on the grounds that Islam, Muslims, and Arabs are discordant with the American democratic values, are unwarranted since the essence of nativism is linked to the Western clash of civilization's view. In this perspective, Islamophobia, as an explicit catalyst for exclusionary restraints particularly in the aftermath of 9/11, may necessarily be understood and justifiably substantiated through irrational allegations of threat to the American national security and way of life. Accordingly, hate crimes have been generated from the willingness to target multiculturalism through Muslim and Arab minorities in the U.S.A. In other words, discrimination and prejudice against them are considered as a regurgitation of past discourses favoring the WASP culture and refuting multiculturalism and diversity. Thus, Arabs and Muslims immigrants are falsely linked to honor crimes and violence, and mistakenly viewed as potential bearer of non-democratic principles of the welfare state. Then, multiculturalism also constitutes a prospective threat to the common moral standards of the nation. Yet, this perception is an open contradiction to the driving forces that uphold multiculturalism. America's failure to deal with its multiple social and political controversies has long required scapegoats as a kind of reassurance of its inability to face them. For instance, condemning the Arab world and scapegoating Arab and Muslim Americans are subversive failure of the U.S. government to confront its recent realities.

9/11 attacks have undoubtedly led to the reevaluation of multiculturalism as a feasible discourse in the American politics. In a moment of societal turmoils, the critique of multiculturalism turns to be a far of governmentally utilized legacy by White Christians to guide those questions of the society into baseless feeling of insecurity and threat. The recent fervent Trump's anti-Muslim immigration law are to a further extent a transgression against the inherent ideal of the U.S.A. as a nation of immigrants. Therefore, Instead of announcing the flaws and demise of multiculturalism and immigration, Islamophobia should be gradually mitigated by suitable solutions. For instance, Trump's Muslim bans can be combatted through the strong ability to destroy the myths of Arabs and Muslims' peril that are profoundly engrained in contemporary American minds.

CHAPTER FOUR

Arab Americans' Assimilation to American Mainstream

Introduction

The idea of recent American exceptionalism, as a debatable issue over ethnic diversity and multiculturalism, is not merely a new characteristic of the contemporary issues, but it has instead a strong echo throughout the American political history. The resurgence of serious considerations over multiculturalism has led to an American exceptionalist reassertion along the exhortism of racial diversity within an avowed political aims. While the advocates of the traditional American exceptionalism fundamentally associate the U.S.A. to superiority and uniqueness in spreading universal values of democracy, many others consider such a particular exceptionalism as rather controversial and unjustifiable. This chapter demonstrates that American nativism is not a recent phenomenon within ethnic and racial issues, but rather an old trend that is reminiscent to those committed against other minorities such as Jews, Poles, Asians, and Latinos. In this regard, the deportations and sweeps of immigrants during the early history of the U.S. immigration were not comparatively disparate from the intensive handed stances of current nativism. What is odd is that when American nativists seek national identity and unity, they disregard the driving force of nativism a cornerstone in defining the foundational basics of the American nation. The genocide of Native Americans, the enslavement of Africans and the conquest of the Mexican lands are undeniable facts that have long marked a forgetfulness in building the American nation. Thus, the recent debates over newcomers' troubles, particularly Muslim and Arab Americans, point the need to reconsider the different pathways of assimilation as a social process stemming from immigration. As Arab and Muslim Americans continue to haunt the contours of assimilation, multiple speculations are unwarrently grounded against their non-assimilation into the American mainstream. Nevertheless, there are in fact telltale signs of full integration regarding political involvement, economic success, and cultural integration.

1-American Exeptionalism

America marches to a different drummer. Its uniqueness is explained by any or all of a variety of reasons: history, size, geography, political institutions, and culture. In the recent

American political culture, allegations of American exceptionalism and anxieties over its effectiveness have reswelled as an overarching question in national political discourse. Nevertheless, very far from such arguments lie lively fears associated to race. Worries about the loss of national identity and loyalty frequently draw awareness to looming alterations in the ethnic and racial demographics of the body politics. Up the spout of these controversies are the complex legacies of hybrid race within the U.S.A. community. Though American history activists are skeptic and anxious about the destruction of the American national identity core components, they likewise forget how these issues echo past worries over racial and cultural differences as they also reaffirm the perpetual power of the changeable nature of the American society and its social interaction. The resurgence of recent American exceptionalism, as a disputable debate over cultural pluralism and multiculturalism, is not simply a new feature of the contemporary political issues; however, it is instead an echoic dynamism through the American political history. By recent contentions over multicultural diversity with the broader frame of American exceptionalism, it has become clear that racial minorities continue to haunt the contours of American national identity.

As immigration to the United States soared from the early threads of European settlement, the U.S. has been portrayed as pervasively distinctive and exceptional. From this standpoint, emphasizing the idea that the U.S. is qualitatively different from the rest of the world, the essence of American exceptionalism runs as a red thread through its historical and cultural backgrounds. American exceptionalism is an intricate concept. Observing its use, which has overwhelmingly reached the peak of political and cultural influence and looking back at the obscure origin of the term, one can ponder how it managed to run so far. Similar to any entangled signifier, the term American exceptionalism has comprised different and even controversial concepts and entered new rounds of interpretation along with mythological meanings. In fact, despite its widespread use in recent political debates, the term exceptionalism ascribes authorship to French historian Alexis de Tocqueville who apparently used it as a description of the United States in his classic work: *Democracy in America* (1945). In 1840, the French intellectual wrote that “the position of Americans is quite exceptional, and it may be believed that no democratic people will ever be placed in similar one”. (De Tocqueville, 36-37). Alexis, travelling to the United States in 1830’s, was stunned by the only successful democrats at the time, emphasizing the difference between the Old and the New worlds. Only once, he used the term “exceptionalism”, but in a context

in which it referred to the American uniqueness, far from the feudal past of European nations in manifesting more social egalitarianism, meritocracy and individualism as well as adherence to rights in comparison to other countries. The unique American features were promoted by the country's religious commitment to the "nonconformist" and congregationally organized Protestant sects, as Tocqueville noticed, which depended on the individual's personal relation with God (Lipset & Gary, 2000). In this regard, when Tocqueville coined the term exceptionalism to the American people, he was referring to American continuous and exceptional political system, comparing the democracy in America against the backdrops of his monarchial and revolution-ridden in France (Bryce, 1887 p.351).

De Tocqueville himself admitted to never writing anything about the U.S. without thinking of France, as noted by Seymour Martin Lipset. Despite the fact that he was the first to explicitly link the concept of exceptionalism to America, the roots of American exceptionalism is embedded in early centuries. It was mirrored through the sermons of the Puritans who imagined a new American nation and a new American man as ideal epitome chosen by god to the rest of the world. Thus, the puritans reckoned their newfound land as a biblical promised asylum. The exemplary image of the "City upon a Hill" would be the essence of American exceptional in which the U.S. is viewed as a distinct from the rest of the world. In this vein, Arthur Schlesinger observed that: "the New Englanders felt they had been called from hearth and home to endure unimaginable rigor and ordeal in dangerous land; so they supposed someone of importance had called them, and for important reasons."(Schlesinger, 1977, p. 514). The American Revolution also reverberated with the American exceptionalism voices of independence, liberty, opportunities, and potential.

From Toqueville onward, the thought regarding the notion of American exceptionalism was transitional one. The objective concept of traditional American exceptionalism has been developed through a comparative approach of the United States and its political institutions to its European cousins. Thus, such an endeavor of conceptualizing American exceptionalism simply involves pointing out the distinctiveness of American political and economic institutions (Lipset, 1996). Its traditional thought is primarily based on the belief that the U.S. is a superior nation. Although the notion of American exceptionalism does not denote, in its original core essence, superiority to other nations, this fact is an aberration that

many neoconservatives have frequently provided it for multiple reasons. While never alleging to be gutless in the pursuance of political ends, Americans have come to believe in contemporary time that taking into account the other motives available, their experiment has appeared to offer the ultimate model of hope for the world. Many Historians and politicians emphasize American historical experiences to be American exceptionalism's defining features. All such experiences were not haphazard; however, largely considered by generations of Americans to be foundational components-they especially included the Puritan covenant in the new world, the drafting of the Declaration of Independence, the American Constitution and its values, and Abraham Lincoln's virtue during the Civil War. Hence, the collective power of all such experiences offered a sense of superiority and moral standards through which gauge the action of the U.S.A.

It is worthy to mention that the concept of superiority is at the heart of American exceptionalism idea. Accordingly, it doesn't mean that there existed so similar concept or previous theory that suggested as well the U.S.A. distinctiveness. In fact, there were a variety of them, but they had distinct labels: Manifest Destiny, Frontier theory, concepts of Anglo-Saxon superiority, the American Dream, the American Creed, and many others. What should be noted here is that one concept does not exclude the other. All of them have aspects that overlap and intervene. Yet, they are also different as they appeared in an unlikely environment. For instance, nineteenth century American exceptionalism is close to, and might be easily confused with other notions of Manifest Destiny, Wilsonianism, or Westward Expansion. Indeed, they held that the U.S. had messianic and God-given right to expand westward, as having an obligation to spread the beliefs of liberty and Enlightenment in the world in common; nevertheless, a difference is that American exceptionalism is more a broader phenomenon in accordance to a prescriptive policy of Manifest Destiny or Westward Expansion. This explains that the assumption of Westward Expansion, as a natural development of the U.S., internalized the myth of Manifest Destiny. All such assumptions can be viewed as a variation, components, or expressions of its wider framework, rather than as separate concepts (Kissinger, 1994).

A range of American exceptionalism studies have been formulated and reinforced through the course of American history, considering the interpreted from John Withrop's "City upon a Hill" speech to Abraham Lincoln's "Last best hope on earth" to Frederick J.

Turner's "Frontier" to James T. Adams' "American Dream" to Ronald Reagan's "Shining City on a hill". The recent embodiment of this conviction is primarily articulated among neo-conservative scientists and politicians who emphasize that the qualities of democracy, openness, individualism and freedom, as a legacy of the American cultural heritage, have characterized America as unique model of liberty and an example of self-government.

It was nearly a decade after Alexis Toqueville's first labeled America as exceptional that the exact phrase of American exceptionalism came into use. Its actual phrase was originally used by the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in 1929, as a disagreement against the leader of the Communist Party in America Jay Lovestone who argued that America was unique, making it too independent from the Marxist doctrine (Pease, 2009, p. 10). Stalin's arguments generated an influx of articles of American exceptionalism between 1920 and 1935. Though most of them were in Russian, they were intensely critical. In the 1980's, the definition of American exceptionalism developed somewhat differently with a new overtone of national superiority. It was around the 1900s that the concept of American exceptionalism was intentionally used to specify the cultural and political uniqueness of the U.S.A. (Taussig, 2014, p.20).

Following the Vietnam War and Watergate, President Donald Reagan, for example, willingly employed the imagery of American exceptionalism to revitalize the spirit of the Americans by emphasizing the beliefs and ideas that made U.S. great. Professor of political science Byron fairly also affirms America's greatness by asserting "the notion that the United States was created differently, developed differently, and thus has to be understood differently-essentially on its own term and within its own context [and] a sense of critical distinctiveness in political , economic , religious , or cultural life." (Shafer, 1991, p. v). In strict sense, whereas exceptionalism has been attached to a number of historical myths that inherited the best political and social institutions, other scholars, particularly the key political sociologist of American exceptionalism Seymour Martin Lipset, would point at the same time that it could imply that the U.S. is acting more than other nations at some levels. On the one hand, he advocates the idea that the American exceptionalism is a constant force and a unique mixture of distinct characters that are different from other countries. He emphasizes the exceptional nature of the U.S.A. In this regard, G.K. Chesterton put it:

America in the only nation in the world that is founded on a creed. That creed is set forth with dogmatic and even theological lucidity in the Declaration of Independence....” [The American] ideology can be described in five words: liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism, and laissez-faire. The revolutionary ideology which became the American Creed is liberalism in the eighteenth –and nineteenth-century meanings, as distinct from conservatism Toryism, statist communitarianism, mercantilism, and noblesse oblige dominant in monarchial state-church formed cultures (Lipset, supra n. 7, at 31, as cited in G.k. Chesterton, 1922)

In his book: *It didn't Happen here: Why Socialism failed in the United States* (2000), Lipset used the notion of exceptionalism to analyze American domestic affairs, particularly as a reason of socialism absence in the U.S.A. Additionally, in *The American Exeptionalism: A Double-Edged Swords* (1996), he also refutes the dark underside of American individualism, highlighting the national decline and the moral decay that he affirms is spreading in the American society. He believes that American exceptionalism is a double-edged sword and a set of moral values of liberty, egalitarianism, populism, and laissez fair that culminate in the decadence of American moralism and the decline of economic strength (p. 19). Still, it is not until the 2000s that the concept of American exceptionalism became largely used among politicians and world leaders, and from academic and social debate. Asked in 2009 at a press conference in Strasbourg, France, if he believed in American exceptionalism or not, President Obama answered, “I believe in American exceptionalism, just as I suspect that the Brits believe in British exceptionalism and the Greeks believe in Greek exceptionalism.” (New Conference by Obama, 2009). Despite anti-immigration Hysteria, banning laws and historical amnesia, the belief in American exceptionalism has not faded or diminished. Indeed, President Obama has not given up to express his embrace of the idea to an extent that he invoked it more than any other American president did during the previous eighty two years (Schlesinger, 2011).

Because of the mounting interest over the Syrian civil war and the possibility of American intervention in 2013, both Obama and Russian President Vladimir Putin entered a hassle about American exceptionalism, with President Putin responded in CNN that “it is

extremely dangerous to encourage people to see themselves as exceptional, whatever the motivation ”(Mullen, 2013). While the proponents of the traditional American exceptionalism strongly ties the U.S.A. to superiority, uniqueness and a sense of responsibility as God’s mission to spread democracy in the world, many scholars consider such a particular mission as rather controversial and unjustifiable. In this regard, though the United States endeavors explicitly to bring democracy to the world, American involvement in the world is induced by exceptional features since that would help her to be more secure and safe. For other different reasons, Harold Koh demonstrated that there is no link between the American sense of superiority and exceptionalism to its mission in the world. It is quite unlikely to the United States to start a clear mission in the world without a real commitment to its own causes and interests, regardless of how superior or chosen and destined by god it may consider itself. Thus, the progressive American exceptionalism, in contrast to the traditional exceptionalism, is more critical and debatable. Adherents of the progressive American exceptionalism criticize this sense of superiority as a kind of arrogance and hypocrisy (Koh, 2015). Actually, a panel of socialists and scholars disparage the superiority as a broader idea, arguing that it indicates a variety of meaning with different views on its consequences. For instance, the political scientist John McCormick expresses worries that the belief in the U.S.A. superiority to other states may result in arrogance, which was initially felt by the early Anglo- Americans as Tocqueville stated in his book: *Democracy*:

At the same time that the Anglo-Americans are united among themselves in this way by common ideas, they are separated from all other people by a sentiment of pride .For fifty years, it has been constantly repeated to the inhabitants of the United States that they form the only religious , enlightened , and free people. They see that up to now, democratic institutions have prospered among them, while they have failed in the rest of the world ; they therefore have an immense opinion of themselves, and they are not far from believing that they form species apart in the human race (Tocqueville, 1955, p.359).

This sentiment of arrogance, according to McCormick, can to a further extent lead to a shatter between the country’s power and its ability to take decisive acts. He clearly explains that the American military involvement in Vietnam and Iraq proved to be an ultimate failure despite superiority in military power. In this vein, he goes further to clarify the notion of

exceptionalism as a possible outcome of superiority sense. Accordingly, it can be interpreted through hypocrisy or performing dual standards. McCormick states that the several cases of the U.S., excluding itself from international law, demonstrates how exceptionalism could catalyze the idea that the ends justify the means (Sanders, 2011, pp.204-205).

Additionally, the American exemption means that the U.S.A. can disprove the rule through adopting an isolationist attitude. In fact, the intention to take a decision alone, under the exceptionalist rights along the pursuit of one's own interest instead of multilateral action, may lead the U.S.A. to be particularly unwilling to arrange international relations in order to encourage compromise (Luck, 2003). Similarly, it has been frequently debated that the essence of superiority and American exceptionalism could result in practicing binary standards. Advocates of this tendency of thought suggest that American universal values as well as righteousness of its principle make America convinced to engage in actions that are often condemned when practiced by other countries to an extent that it criticizes itself and its supporters in a more indulgent way than its enemies (Ignatieff, 2005). Henceforth, such double standards are America's greatest problematic matters as the United States has the absolute capacity, under the claimed American exceptionalism and democracy spread, to use its power and place its sovereignty above international human rights standards as it implements those norms in a selective and self-serving manner on both the interior and foreign levels (Mertus, 2004, p.33).

Overall, it seems that exceptionalism makes the United States incompetent and incapable to restrain the limits of its powers, involving the nation into both military and economic troubles. In this line of thought, the potent link between American exceptionalism and religion, particularly the divine will behind the American world mission, is associated with considerable forgetful facts that are taken for granted, particularly when unveiling the historical amnesia over Native American genocide and nativism toward racial minorities.

2-Historical Amnesia in the Founding of the American Nation

The issue of American nation building, self-conscious construction, and the foundation of a sense of belonging have long been inherent implications throughout the American history. They have all a more basic concerns regarding national identity in the United States. Seeking unity, American nativists disregard the undeniable facts that have

long marked the founding of the American nation from its early inceptions. Thus, many fail to admit the driving force of nativism as cornerstone in defining the foundational basics of the American nation. Given that the foundation of the American nation is associated with the powerful American nativism, failure to impute nativist to the wide-range American immigration policies is notable. Through fostering nativist sentiments, Americans have been able to cease nativism as a vehicle of their sense of belonging and national consciousness that shape the image of the U.S. The Anglo-Americans have long strived to define themselves and their national belonging with exclusionary patterns, targeting the unwanted and excluding the stranger. The focus on race and culture, the absence of nativism and racial exclusion in the American identity debates reflect a historical amnesia of the persistent nativist paradigm through the past eras of anti-immigrant sentiment in the U.S.A. history. In this regard, the social scientist Ali Behdad raised two basic questions regarding historical amnesia; what is about nativism and xenophobia that liberal American want to forget?, And what role does the forgetting of nativism play in the construction of national consciousness in the U.S.?" According to him, the forgetful part of American history has ultimately enabled Americans to visualize a hegemonic national community (Behdad, 2005, p. 10).

The controversy over national belonging assumed more crucial questions. However, the dilemma later was underlined by the French historian and philosopher Ernest Renan in his famous lecture: "What is a Nation?" expounding by examples taken from the Middle East and Europe that neither race, language, religion, nor geography-separately or in combination-are sufficient to explain the relationship inherent in national belonging. A nation, as Renan states, is basically "a spiritual principle" drawn from "a rich legacy of minorities" and presenting itself in a present-day consent (Renan, 1990, p.19). According to him, the forgetfulness of the past are fundamental in the foundation of a nation and the construction of a sense of national belonging. The consent to continue a common life of the nation depends on two interconnected facets: the possession of past memories as well as their forgetfulness. As Renan stated:

"Forgetting , I would even go so far to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation, which is why progress in historical studies often constitutes a danger for [The principle of] nationality. Indeed, historical enquiry brings to light deeds of violence which took place at the origin of all political

formations, even those whose consequences have been altogether beneficial. Unity is always affected by means of brutality” (Renan, 1990, p.11).

The forgetfulness potential resentment and vision with a nation, which can be in a form of historical amnesia, are imperative in building it. Accordingly, the legitimization of nationhood and the imagination of homogeneous national community necessitate the renouncement of all the violent acts through which the nation was founded. In this vein, Renan assertion that nations emerge from brutality possesses a clear entanglement for the foundation of the American nation. Brutal deeds, constituting the formation of homogeneous nation, are typically hidden and obscured in the honored accounts of official national histories (Behdad, 2005, p.11). This literature of such national histories are obvious in the multiple procedures of violence and oppression that legitimized the rise of the American nation.

The founding of the American nation, overwhelmingly manifested in the form of narrative, appears to have the current nationhood as only one result. Nevertheless, such a representation of the genesis, continuity as well destiny appear to create a reflective illusion. Hence, taking just projects and destiny into accounts lead to an illusion of national identity. From the outset of the 18th century, the normative view that the American nation is uniquely founded by the Anglo-Protestant norms of freedom and democracy involve a disavowal of democracy adherents who were eager to defend their new nation from foreign threats. They were vitalized by the early favorable images that the nation was created by Protestant pilgrims who were united by their strong attachment and loyalty to the political standards of equality, liberty, and democracy. Nevertheless, the incongruous beginning of the U.S.A. was complicated and burdened by the legacy of the colonists’ wresting of land from Natives, their enslavement of African Americans, their extermination of indigenous populations, and their parallel contradictory appeal to the idealization of American liberty and democracy as universal principles.

The systematic racial repression, in the legacy of two hundred years of African slavery and the genocide against American Indians that framed the new American republic, were also profoundly complicated by the forgetting component to national unity. The overall indignant recollection of brutality belies the ideology of democratic principles because the ideal of American democracy was employed to uphold the status of the existing population

and exceedingly dismiss to avow that the American republic was constructed through the confiscation and the annexation of the native American lands, the merciless African savages, the lust for mercantile interests, and the imperialist ambitions to join more territories in North America. All those who are interested to provide benign images of American nationhood found themselves compelled not only to describe the legacy of the past, suppressing all what was disgraceful, but at the same time to ignore persistent indignities within the imaginary nation. Effacing all what was shameful is a central augmentation that is deeply imbedded in official history narratives because it cannot be dismissed or eliminated, but instead divested of their entanglement for the creation of a nation. The White Anglo-American thus tapped into a form of amnesia that had long history in rendering the nation's culture usefully blind to its own imperialistic ambitions and racial oppression. Through blurring the line of reality, this specular form of forgetfulness was tightly bound to a motivated disavowal that enabled them to provide amnesiac representations of sediment normality, most notably those grooved in the conquest of local populations and in the history of slavery while rationalizing imperial subordination more broadly. To imagine the U.S. as an accomplishment of the democratic plan, all those barbaric occurrences have been renounced and disregarded as an aberration in America's exceptional destiny (Behdad, 2005, pp.5-6).

In '*A Forgetful Nation*', Ali Behdad (2005) asserts that the concept of forgetfulness serves well as a crucial factor in the political project of founding the nation. Through the analysis of various texts fundamental to the United States' image, Ali Behdad concludes that "the nation forgetful representation of its immigrant heritage is part of a broader form of historical amnesia about the formation of the United States as an imagined community." (Behdad, 2005, p. 9). Upon arrival of immigrants, the U.S., as he claims, has swung contradictionally between welcoming and hostility. Thus, the nation's continuous forgetfulness of this history serves to extend, quoting the same Behdad's terms, "retrospective illusion". Such an illusionary vision displaces brutality and conquest in favor of freedom and equality as major principles of the nation foundation. The retrospective illusion falls not on either trust or suspicion of its pervasiveness or even on its rejection, but on how its potential effect could be magnified in the presence of Arab and Muslim immigrants' problem in the U.S.A.

The factitious view, featuring the American society uniquely by White and Anglo-Protestant core culture, obscures the powerful fact that the American culture is influenced by ethnos of cultural pluralism as a truism of American experience. It is still believed that the different immigrant ethnic groups, with non-Anglo or non-Protestant background, had long constructed prototypically a motor for cultural democracy. Thus, the mounting worries about the threats of ethnic culture, particularly recent Trump's overt assaults against Arabs and Muslims, are extremely overstated. Through historizing America as a nation of immigrants, fears of immigrant's non-assimilation to the superior Anglo-Protestant culture clash with democratic ideals of the forefathers. Instead of labeling newcomers, particularly Muslims and Arabs in current political discourse, immigrant groups should be viewed as the solution to stagnation and social decay with perpetual menace. Most who augmented skepticism about the inability of ethnic groups to adopt the Anglo-Saxon cultural norms, frequently overlook the ideology of Manifest Destiny in their historical discourse. Manifest Destiny, in this line of thought, was conceptualized as an ideology through which Anglo-Protestant imperialist fervently rationalized other inferior races. What especially noteworthy is that Anglo-Americans generally view, for examples, Latinos and Muslims as foreign and different. Surprisingly, their differences are considered as inferior and never fit the Anglo-Saxons who are distinctively depicted as superior and pure. As a matter of fact, Mexicans, as Huntington states, "[H]ave not assimilated into the mainstream U.S. culture forming instead their own political and linguistic enclaves, and refusing "Anglo-Protestant values that built the American dream" (Huntington, 2004, p.10).

The theorization that the building of the American nation had its provenance in the sole cultural values of the Anglo-Saxons are meant to be agreed upon an audacity that they exclusively built the American nation. The forgetful narrative is based on the belief that Americans are conjointly attached to one single core culture that preponderates the American society. Henceforth, this assertive denial takes a form of apparent historical amnesia about the nation building. The Anglo-Saxon myth fails to acknowledge that it could never imagine a cohesive national identity without subjecting the deeply-rooted racial minorities as an inseparable part of the overall history of the U.S.A. For instance, Blacks, Latinos, and Muslims, despite their apparent involvement and success, are generally depicted as outsiders from the realm of American society. Such patterns of denunciation and

dismissal enable the Anglos to define themselves as real American in opposition to the inferior aliens (Huntington, 2004).

Hostility and atrocities committed against native population, Black Africans, Latinos, and Muslims, according to Anglo-Americans, have been the true policies for the survival of a cohesive American identity; realities that have drawn many current historians to characterize American expansionist ambitions as hostile invasion rather than settlement.

3-Nativism and Racial Minorities' Threat

Scholars have long struggled endeavoring to decipher the reasons of Donald Trump's stunning electoral victory, yet at least some of them must focus on his campaign's famous slogan: "Make America Great Again". Pinpointing the main forces behind the rise to the recent wave of nativist thought is a challenging attempt, particularly because the past is still so fresh. Undoubtedly, the phrase, perhaps the last word 'again', was one of the factors that inspired millions of Americans to elect Trump as the 45th president of the U.S.A. In essence, the word 'again' renders the expression a commitment to recreate a specific historical era when America was great. Thus, it is quite possible to allocate the 2016 as a new benchmark in America's nativist history that once again blossomed out in contemporary time. Through describing Trump's presidential bid and consequent triumph as another outbreak of nativism, it seems that previous historical phenomenon have coalesced to once again bring another nativism to a fore. Yet, Trump's nativism is not new at all, but one with greater influence. Indeed, the United States has always been preoccupied with the pivotal question as to who counts as an American? Plausibly, being viewed as un-American constitutes a big threat to every American. Analyzing the detriments of racial public policy attitudes toward racial outgroups is nothing new in the political discourse.

Some political scientists have asserted that it is impossible to understand American policies without at the same time taking into account the tradition of racial exclusion and inequalities among both the mass public and the elite who fashion public policy. Thus, the question that should be raised is how can one understand and explain the fundamental motives of nativism as well as its consequences through the American history? Due to its relatively short history, the U.S.A. has recourse to nativism as indispensable factor to understand American national identity. What makes nativism significant in the U.S.A. is that it has run around the racial and ethnic setting. In this regard, the nativist stance is a

recurring phenomenon in American political history and as a different movement that has appealed to the innate sense of national identity. To put it into the American political context, one of the continuous ways to understand people's fear is through redefining the boundaries regarding who is considered as a prototypical American or a marginalized one. It is; therefore, through such a vision that nativism has become pervasive in social and political debates.

Before delving into the myriad controversies over nativism as in the case of any ideological concepts, the term was initially coined by Louis Dow Scisco at the beginning of the nineteenth century to describe the inability of America to cope with the rampant tide of Catholic imagination over the protestant ideas; resulting in the birth of the Know Nothing Party along the promotion of anti-foreigners and anti-Catholics principles in 1850s (Anbinder, 1992). From 1850s onward, the concept has been used essentially to describe the American context, but in irregular way. Perhaps, it was until the late 1930 when the phenomenon of nativism drew the attention of American scholars. Precisely, the most earliest seminal and academic work on nativism is the American historian John Higham's '*Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American' Nativism* (1988). Higham explains that "nativism as habit of mind illuminates darkly some of the large contours of the American past; it has mirrored our anxieties and marked out the bounds of our tolerance" (Higham, 1988). According to him, nativism is a convoluted ideology, and; thus, he identified traditions of American nativism targeted against Catholics, radicals, and racial groups that were interrelated together to shape its fabric. The first tradition of anti-Catholicism sprouted out of Protestant evangelical robust, the second tradition of anti-radicalism nativism directed stranger who sought to topple stable institution, and the third and the most significant type of nativism was racial nativism which was framed out of the credence of the Anglo-Saxon origin of the United States. Hence, the essence of nativism is concerned with the vehement opposition against the outgroup individuals who are seen as alien people by the ingroup for the sake of securing and protecting the interests of those native born.

American nativism stand is not a recent phenomenon in the American political history, but rather an old attitude that is reminiscent to those perpetrated nearly century ago. For that start, immigrants' sweeps and arrests of the early American. Immigration history were not comparatively different from the heavy-handed stances of recent nativism. However, it is

worthy to understand that nativism and exclusion are barely exclusively American phenomenon. What makes them remarkable is that they generally raise suspicions about the American nation's founding ideals. Probably, since the enshrinement of enlightenment notions of justice and democracy in the American founding documents, being a nativist is a violation to the American creed.

From the founding of the American nation, Americans have strived about the same quests: who belongs to the American mainstream? Who is the American? Or who is the good American and who is the alien? It is obvious that the American nativism and its historic ambivalence about immigration-at times rigorously welcoming immigrants and other times slamming doors for them-are extremely intertwined in the vision of the American nation. It is obvious that the self-image "City upon the Hill", the world best shining archetype, has entailed a particular kind of people. But, what kind of immigrants America called for? Apart from the ignominious American nativism against native population, Black Americans and Latinos, the U.S. raised hues and cries about the sweeping of new immigrants into what was viewed as the Anglo-Saxon land. The United States stood firm in its identification as a society built upon the Anglo-Saxon culture during great migration and the Anglo-Americans were stuck by fear of the destruction of their virgin land. As they felt threatened by newcomers with different religious and social backgrounds, these dispossessed attempted to seek a solace by attempting to regain the good old days, particularly when White Anglo-Saxon Protestant hegemony went almost unchallenged. Realizing their nation slipping away and their Anglo-Saxon dream retrograding, Anglo-Americans enthusiastically espoused increasing nativist resentment, aspiring to blend new immigrants into the Anglo-Saxon model. It was through the setting of racial boundaries between deserving ingroup and the undeserving outgroup that nativist surpassed their worries and sensed order and stability.

Throughout the 1800 and the 1960, the U.S. bore witness of the nativist first large scale eruption because of substantial waves of penniless and guilty criminals of Catholic background, almost from Ireland and Germany, who began to rush to the U.S. fleeing religious oppression and gravest famines in the old world. Those newcomers' religion instigated powerful nativist repercussions since the unbridled Catholicism was deemed dissonant with the American constitutional tenets and American cultural values. Fearing that

Catholic Irish and German Jews were harvesting greater impact, they were subject to fierce nativist backlash and were discouraged entry into the Anglo-Protestant colonies.

Around the 1850s and 1870s, the paradigm of anti-Catholic nativism continued to be the American distinctive characteristic on inquiries about American identity. To an extent that the founding father Benjamin Franklin aroused plain warning about the Englishness of Pennsylvania that was becoming “a colony of aliens, who will shortly be so numerous as to Germanize us instead of our anglicizing them and will never adopt our language or customs, any more than they can acquire our complexion.” Subsequently, Thomas Jefferson, in his *‘Notes on the State of Virginia’* (1785), augmented similar worries that immigrants stemming from foreign distances “will infuse into American legislation, their spirit, warp and bias its directions, and render it a heterogeneous, incoherent, distracted mass.” In a decade preceding the Civil War, for most of the concerns was the worry that Irish and German Catholics, escaping the Old World disastrous potato famine to the Promised Land, would impede and change the peculiar nature of the city upon the hill. Because this sweeping tide of Catholics differed measurably from their forefathers as they “were the most impoverished destitute, unskilled group ever to arrive to the United States”, they became more assertive on various realm (Anbinder, 1992, p.7). Indeed, fearing the Catholic plot of taking over the country alongside the education controversy, anti-Catholicism gave rise to the full-blown nativism of the Know Nothing movement (Bennett, 1988, pp.61-79). Unsurprisingly the ultimate cry was that “Americans must rule America”, and they vowed to solely keep elect-native-born in decision making process (Anbinder, 1992, p.25). In the wake of the 20th century, immediately after WWI, the Knights of Ku Klux Klan reignited new nativist sentiments and the aftermath of the war resulted in many wide ranging changes in the American society. Owing to the second Industrial Revolution, social changes led to an urbanized industrial economy that was accompanied by the influx of huge number of Catholic immigrants to American shores (Lipset & Earl, 1970).

Once again, White native-born Christians felt victimized by the more visible threats from Southern and Eastern Europeans as well as African Americans who were assaulted as un-American outsiders imperiling the American hegemony. To champion White-Protestant supremacy and to protect pure Americanism, the Klan tried to epistemologize as a counterweight. It functioned against the massive shifting landscape in the society through

targeting the 1965 Civil Right movement militating for new freedom and opportunities for Americans. Restoring to Darwinism theories and confirming the Anglo-Protestant stock superiority, the Ku Klux's members fervently applied a larger nationalist agenda through which African Americans, Southern and Eastern Catholics stood no chance to be categorized as American, but still identified as a different and an inferior race than the Anglo-Saxons (Pegram ,2011).

Though the Southern and Eastern Europeans were of White race, the Ku Klux Klan still bluntly contended that their Whiteness did not belong to the prototypical model of the Anglo-Saxon core. Though the huge swarm of Catholics and their White complexion offered them considerable privileges in comparison to other minorities, they were likewise considered as dawn to the America's future. Along with such upheavals, a heightened skepticism emerged along with panic in a variety of circles about Southern and Eastern immigrants' driven racial degeneration. Probably, the most influential voice of Southern and Eastern immigration hysteria was the Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts in the 1880s and the subsequent decade. Such a hysteria resounded through his articles and speeches, warning the dangers of the increasing waves of Southern and Eastern immigrants. To blame other immigrant of all the American ails at that time, they were depicted as ' birds of passage' who only migrated to make little money and return back their homelands, bringing with them crime, anarchism, disease, filth, and most of all competing with real Anglo-Saxon American workers. With anxieties over race suicide and dispossession on multiple levels, the Klan nativists' backlash augmented due to the competition of Blacks and the prominence of Jews who apparently benefited from the switch to extensive capitalism. To withstand the dispossessed American sense of victimization, the Ku Klux Klan attempted to restrain their loss by setting protective boundaries around White native-born Protestants. This nativist group, according to Lipset Seymour and Earl Raab, attempts to curtail the influx of new immigrants and to keep strict racial boundaries between the real American and the unreal American outsider. In this regard, they stated that:

The fluidity of the American social structure – the fact that no group has enjoyed a status tenure in the style of European social classes – has meant that the problem of status displacement has been an enduring characteristic of American life. New areas, new industries, new migrant groups, new ethnic groups, have continually

encroached upon the old as important and influential. On these occasions, various formerly entrenched American groups have felt disinherited. (Lipset and Raab, 1970, p. 24)

The authors demonstrate that White middle class Protestants have been reactionary conservatives who oppose all types of change and would instead long to be free of past traditions through which they were powerful in their hegemonic and unchallenged society. What is remarkable that the Ku Klux Klan's political clout was rather meagre as they never really succeeded in interpreting their agenda to a tangible policy proposals. With the legislation of Johnson-Reed Act in 1924, imposing quotas to cut off the country's growing diversification along the triumph of Herbert Hoover in the 1928 election, the Klan came to halt quickly with its final demise from the political scene in a very brief time span. Beginning just after the turn of the 19th century, as theories about the new eugenic science virtually bolstered the idea of new immigrants' inferiority, the gate keeping ideology began as safeguard to the American borders. As with other different minority groups, native resentments against Chinese and Asians arose proportionately from the perception that they were unassimilable to the Anglo-Saxon mold, even disruptive minority whose inferior race, customs and habits were a social menace to the American hegemony (Jones, 1960).

Chinese were regarded as unassimilable as their culture was labeled not only as primitive and backward, but also as a constant challenge to the American democratic institutions. Throughout the parlance of that time, Chinese were cast as 'Yellow Peril' and they represented a fierce competitors to White natives for jobs in gold mines and railroad industry, and often with low payments (Fuchs and Forbes, 2003). All such upheavals of both economic competition and nativist resentment had pervasively fueled retaliation against Chinese, all culminating in a series of more successful laws that both restricted the Chinese rights and even humiliated them in the U.S.A. Most notably, the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, banning Chinese immigrants from entry to the country, was reenacted periodically until 1943. The significant success of the anti-Chinese exclusion prompted the support of a stranger nativist framework and subsequent akin restrictionist operations against Japanese, Koreans, Filipinos, and Indians in the West. White nativists targeted them harshly as they were inherently inferior, and; hence, unassimilable (Jones, 1960, p.264).

Due to the Japanese population increase and their great success, White Californians rallied to lead anti-Japanese campaigns and mobilizations, depicting them as Oriental invasion. Vehement nativism against Japanese led to the official legalization of the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1907 until they were excluded almost completely from entry to the U.S.A. in 1924. The same destiny awaited for Filipinos who were also blamed by nativists as criminal, immoral, and unassimilable, and; therefore, only 50 Filipino immigrants were allowed to enter the U.S.A. under the Philippine Independence Act of 1934. Accordingly, by the end of 1930, the U.S.A. witnessed a dramatic decrease of Asian immigration due to the successive exclusive act. As with Chinese and Asian immigrants, Southern and Eastern Europeans immigrants were undesirable to native populations and they were stereotypically portrayed with racial and cultural prejudices. Slavics, Russians, Poles, Czechs' differences in language, religion, and economic background made them encounter fierce hostility and discrimination by White Anglo-Americans. By the end of WWII, the nativist drumbeat grew impossible to ignore, particularly the passage of the Civil Right Act of 1965 that marked a watershed moment in the American history. Indeed, the 1965 Act influenced the liberal view of immigration since the it put an end to the national origin quota system, and it replaced it instead with an annual quotas on the basis of the principles of family relationships and professional skills. Though the ultimate objective behind the passage of the 1965 Immigration Act was to restrain the influx of the of Southern and Eastern European immigrants, the unexpected outcome of the new law was the sleepy rise in immigration from Asia and the Americas, eclipsing European immigration and changing the ethnic makeup of the U.S.A. (Chishti, Hipsman, & Ball, 2015).

As exclusions on national origins and race were eliminated, 1965 has contributed to a sleep growth in illegal immigration until 2005. The usher number of Latinos, particularly Mexicans, inflamed harsh anti-immigration sentiments around the 1980s and 1990s, along another great wave of nationalism that briskly erupted to target Central America. Mexicans have been essentially prone to extreme nativist suspicions, narrowly stemming from their threat and non-assimilation to the Anglo-Saxon culture again. In this vein, political professor Samuel Huntington, regarded the first to mount alarmist worries about the question of Mexican immigration in contemporary America, advanced ungrounded theoretical speculation about the Mexican challenge and hispanization of the U.S.A.. He predicted a breakup of the American nation because Mexicans haven't assimilated into the American

mainstream culture, forming instead their own political and linguistic enclaves”, and refusing the “Anglo-Protestant values that built the American dream” (Huntington, 2004, p.30).

Tracing back history, it is obvious that previous racial minorities such as the Southern and Eastern Europeans pursued the historical path of socio-cultural, economic and political assimilation, and that the controversies between Anglo-Protestantism and Catholicism were vanished by the process of assimilation. Hence, why Huntington has such a pessimistic vision regarding Mexican non-incorporation to the U.S., and why he asserts that their linguistic, cultural, and religious backgrounds are hindering their full fusion to the American mainstream. In the face of Huntington’s exaggerated speculations and in reworking ideas about assimilation, one can assert that the American mainstream, despite fears about non-assimilation and split, is larger to embrace more newcomers than before. Despite ungrounded nativist alarms about Hispanic immigration in general, Mexicans are sharing the American dream with a desire to blend politically, socially, and culturally. Their assimilation is always regarded as an incontrovertible fact in a nation of immigrants. It seems that contributory factors to the resurgence of nativism, anger, and xenophobia is almost endless. Last century exclusions and the sweeps of early newcomers were not terribly different from the heavy-handed nativism of recent year to deport and assault racial groups along with them.

What really makes the American mainstream a historical magnet is that the newcomers who were already demeaned by one generation were the grandparents of the successes of coming generation. Possibly, most of them or their offspring later assimilated with those who despised and abased the new arrivals with similar intense violence that had been acted against them or their predecessors. Nowadays, it is up for discussion whether nowadays nativism is a new phenomenon, or it is simply a persistent trend that has been existent through the course of the last century. Even though there has been nationwide appeal that espoused particular nativist agenda, the essence of nativist ideology has largely remained the same while the threatening outsider’s scope and considerations have often changed throughout time. Indeed, the 2009 was delineated as a different scope of threatening other with the same nativist ideology to the previous decades, particularly when Barack Obama’s ascendancy instigated a new lurid flare-up of nativism under the banner of the Tea

Party. In essence, the Tea Party is concerned with the questions of inclusion and exclusion. Thus, tea partiers are ideologically very conservatives, dreading the threat of President Obama's progressive agenda. The contemporaneous phenomenon of the Tea Party materialized a nativist opposition to Barack Obama's elevation to the White House, focusing on what constitutes a real American by excluding African American, Hispanics, illegal immigrants and gay community from the American society. As the first African American president, all the worries seemed to coalesce around the figure of Obama who would promote the increasing influence of minorities and democratic liberalism, and; thus, leading the country to a decline (Parker & Barreto, 2013).

Tea partiers' flagrant antipathy toward Obama's elevation to office can be cast as Obamophobia since they think that Obama's agenda will destroy their country due to the increasing assertiveness of various minorities, the influx of illegal immigration and progressive politics that have become known as Obamacare. All these policies seem to contradict the general nativist agenda that truly sought the U.S.A. to turn back to an age when Protestant middle-class Americans still were hegemonic in America. By objecting Obama's and attacking every republican politician who didn't serve them, the Tea Party has been too effective in intensifying anti-establishment policies and creating a sense of dissatisfaction with politics as usual.

As the 8 years of Obama tenure symbolized the collapse of White native-born clout, the 2016 was viewed as a perfect time to reset a clock and attempt to expunge all Obama's accomplishments. While the Tea Party was increasingly the Republican Party's liability, the Republican play field for the 2016 nomination was extremely made up of favorite and former adherent Donald Trump who emerged victorious only 6 years after. Ultimately, Trump symbolizes a mere maturation of the Tea Party ideas and his ascendancy to office has come to represent the real platform of nativism revival. By raising the salience of American national identity controversies and the setting of worries and dispossession to shape his messages (Bloom, 1998, p.100), he openly promised to bring back the working class and White Protestant culture, and even provide them with a voice, which they were denied for long. In Trump's view, uncontrolled immigration considerably caused the decay of all White working class. These claims certainly became the corner stone of his electoral campaign in which Mexicans and Muslims stood out as the central threat to be fought. As nativism

significantly undergirded Trump's platform agenda, he focused on two tangible plans: constructing the Mexican wall as crackdown to the endless influx of immigrants pouring the southern borders, and implementing the Muslim Ban form that was regarded as the backbone of his broader nativist program.

By targeting several Arab and Muslim countries, Trumps obviously marks his doctrine that immigrants of Muslim and Arab backgrounds are deemed inherent threat to the American nation. Surely, anti-Muslim nativism has spiked following 9/11, when Muslims have become inextricably associated to threat of terrorism in the American public discourse. With such an emphasis on difference and danger, nativists identify all Muslims together, failing to differentiate between the bunch of individuals that commit the terrorist acts and the majority that do not. Seemingly, the changing demographic landscape and the growing economic inequalities helped Trump skillfully to capitalize this unsteady cocktail to serve his nativist agenda. At that standpoint, it is still ambiguous what the future could bring. Hence, it is clear that the nativist rhetoric never ends, suggesting that future outbreak are assumed to occur.

4-Immigrants' Assimilation Patterns

The controversy over assimilation has basically been a subject of intensive debates during the post-Civil Right movement era, particularly when migratory patterns have peaked a scale and complexity that were unprecedented in American history. Politicians and sociologists have long strived to understand the delicate balance between the immigrant receiving countries, like the U.S.A., and the diverse forms of incorporation. Nevertheless, no precise framework has offered the social science field with a profound corpus of cumulative findings regarding the process of assimilation for immigrants and their offspring. A deep discussion of the divergent manifestations of assimilation would have to involve a wide variety of forms and dimensions that interpret the ongoing social realities of the U.S.A. In recent time, scholars consider the term assimilation as unpopular and suggest that it is a mere wishful ideology. In other words, newcomers, arriving to the shores of the U.S.A., would become like the overwhelming majority in the mainstream through the acquisition of the English language, the Anglo-Saxon customs and traditions in their new land. For the traditional sociological school, assimilation requires a one-sided process through which

immigrants inevitably substitute all their own cultural patterns with an exclusive Anglo-American culture (Alba & Nee, 2003).

The sociologist Smith Robert Park provided one of the earliest definitions of assimilation process in the United States of America, and he defines it as “the name given to the process or processes by which people of diverse racial origins and different cultural heritages, occupying a common territory, achieve a cultural solidarity sufficient at least to sustain a national existence” (Gordon, 1964, quoting Parker, 1930, p. 63). It is worthy to mention that in Park’s definition focuses on culture as a component of the assimilation process, asserting that:

In the United States, an immigrant is ordinarily considered assimilated as soon as he has acquired the language and the social rituals of the native community and can participate, without encountering prejudice, in the common life, economic, and political. The common sense view of the matter is that an immigrant is assimilated as soon as he has shown that he can “get on in the country.” This implies among other things that in all the ordinary affairs of life he is able to find a place in the community on the basis of his individualism without invidious or qualifying reference to his racial origin or to his cultural inheritance (Gordon, 1964, quoting Park, 1930, p.63).

Basically, Park’s quotation clarifies that assimilation is the progressive change from a more diverse cultural background to a less diverse behavior; in the sense that assimilation occurs when the changes of cultural behavior and pattern will become over time similar to that of the natives. Thus, assimilation equates the integration of the subordinate groups into the prevailing host society along the manifestation of the dominant group’s cultural values by the subordinate group individuals. In other words, minorities’ cultural distinctions are absorbed in the homogeneous host culture as being similar to it.

Immigrants usually give up their native cultural traits and adopt the characteristics of the dominant culture. Yet, the idea of adopting the homogeneous culture of the host country is limited by both the predisposition of the welcoming group that may set racial boundaries and exclusive lines to social life participation and by the desire of new immigrants to embrace such social participation. As assimilation is prone to discordant arguments, many sociologists and anthropologists have attempted to attribute assimilation to acculturation and

specified its understanding to the idea of a furthest form of acculturation. In fact, Alba and Nee keep to assert that assimilation still has a vital core and emphasize on the earliest classical discussions, suggested first by Robert E. Park. As reactionary tendency against the implicit ethnocentricity of the old explanation of the term, assimilation has more lately come to indicate the reduction of boundaries between racial and ethnic groups. Thus, most of nowadays sociologists primarily explain assimilation, despite its multivalence and without Eurocentrism, as a process of homogenization that eliminates gradually the social and structural differentiation based on ethnicity (Feagin, J. R. & Feagin, C. B., 2003).

What is remarkable is that the most dominant ideology of American assimilation was the Anglo-conformity that compelled minorities to adjust the WASP cultural norms. In spite of the proliferation of literature to identify more alternatives to assimilation, many sociologists agree on the traditional form of assimilation as the basic ideology of incorporation in the U.S.A., and that while they may not explicitly uphold it, they still foresee the adoption of the Anglo-American core culture by minorities (Glazer,1997). In recent America, and because of the globalization processes and ethnic cultural patterns, the U.S.A. has assimilated newcomers and approached ethnocultural plurality through different approaches along the balance tipping strongly in support of its pluralist nature. Accordingly, the essential key for a better understanding of assimilation in the American experience is closely linked to the enduring fact that America is a multicultural nation.

Recent social pundits have acknowledged the ongoing significant ethnic diversity in the U.S.A., and they gradually realized that the real representation of the American social landscape comprised elements of both assimilation and cultural pluralism. Hence, do the implications of multiculturalism, as a strong undeniable fact upheld by pluralist, jeopardize the path of assimilation? The fact that, the present day America provides satisfactory answers that are plain to accept since multiculturalists are primarily assimilationist by force of social realities with the American community. The illusion of non-assimilation, due to cultural pluralism, is created only for immigrants who have not had time yet to fully blend. Thus, today's American assimilation implies the belief of ethnic cultural distinctiveness with the participation in the broader mainstream. According to the multiculturalist view, the present assimilation process corresponds with cultural differences as if they all share multi-racial unity whose actual and present strength depends on the myth of American pluralism.

4-1-American Dominant Models of Assimilation

Immigrant assimilate into the host countries in a very diverse ways, in conformity with the various historical, demographic, political, and social specificities that mark any country, and to a further extent, how concepts of belonging and assimilation to a nation have historically been viewed. For the United States' case, patterns of assimilation are tightly linked to colonial history, the nation building, as well as exclusion and inclusion policies. Broadly speaking, the experience of America, as a nation of perpetual immigration change, has long dictated different meanings of assimilation, generating the rise of divergent sociological theories of assimilation. In the field of sociological literature of assimilation, the most reliable and notable contribution is attributed to the outstanding works of both scholars: Robert Ezra Park and William Isaac Thomas who endeavored to examine the earliest assimilation process among immigrant groups. Nevertheless, they left greater ambiguities without solutions. What is worthy to note that all such ambiguities were not clarified until the American sociologist Milton Gordon introduced his distinguished research on American incorporation. In his study, *Assimilation in American Life*, he distinguished three possible outcomes of assimilation in the United States: Anglo-conformity, the melting pot, and cultural pluralism (Gordon, 1964).

Precisely, the assimilation models seem to fall into three major models: the Americanization movement, the straight-line model, and the segmented assimilation one. Though the ideal of newcomers' assimilation into the American mainstream is as old as the nation itself, what existed was the ideal of Americanization or the Anglo-conformity that required new immigrants to fully blend themselves into the culture of the American community. Such a full blending occurs, according to Gordon, through seven successive sub-processes: acculturation, structural assimilation, marital assimilation, identificational assimilation, behavioral and perceptual assimilation, and civic assimilation (Gordon, 1964, p.228). Even though Gordon's seven dimensions contributed to explain the American assimilation process, his analysis received much criticism, emanating particularly from the fact that he only tackled the mutual relation between immigrants and the community, and neglected the relations between immigration and other ethnic groups or relations between individuals of different ethnic minorities in the community (Alba & Nee, 2003, p.27).

4-1-1-The Anglo-conformity Model of Assimilation

Arguably, the best experiment of the Anglo-conformity model or the Americanization movement was the Crèvecoeurian idealized portrayal that came to imagine the United States, in his 1782 *Letters from an American Farmer*, as a greater melting pot amalgamating all different Old World immigrants into one new race, new man; the American (Gleason, 1980, p.33). The Anglo-conformity model was viewed the typical movement of assimilation at that time and it was interpreted through Zangwill Israel's appealing symbol of the melting pot that sought to compel immigrants to adhere themselves to the English language, customs, and traditions. However, the realization of the Anglo-conformity model of assimilation or the melting pot metaphor had come to a paradoxical end. The confusion surrounding them never becomes a reality, but rather a deception because the Americanization movement or the melting pot did not accrue the visible presence of non-White groups. Thus, the Anglo-conformity model was largely refuted by multiculturalists who still argue that it is a flagrant denunciation of minority group, native minorities and their heritage. Furthermore, the socioeconomic attainment of new immigrants can only be achieved throughout time, and the Americanization tendency objection may drag us to understand Herbert Gran's straight-line of assimilation.

4-1-2-The Straight-line Model of Assimilation

The second model of assimilation is the "straight-line" and it is ascribed to the sociologists W. Lloyd Warner and Leo Strole and later Milton Gordon who persisted to analyze assimilation as a core concept in their approach to better theorizing ethnic and racial relations in the American society. The straight line suggests that the longer a minority group has lived in the United States and the bigger the generational gap among individuals of that community becomes, the easier the assimilation process, as described by Gordon, will occur. Therefore, the offspring of immigrants will more likely incorporate into the broader mainstream society, particularly when they have been more exposed to the country's culture that of the immigrants themselves, and ultimately they will be neither ethnics anymore nor distinguishable from the natives. In this regard, the straight-line assimilation implies a monotonic process through which immigrants or ethnic groups, as time passes and the succeeding generations substitute the former ones, more and more attain full assimilation. Even till the end of the 20th century, most social scientists assert that the better understanding

of the continuous significance of ethnic and racial relations can be achieved through a long-term, and; thus, a better comprehensive analysis of acculturation can get along with a slower, disparate-or as Gans states-bumpy-line assimilation.

Gans denounced the idea of an ethnic revival and the importance of ethnic retention among the American Whites, suggesting instead the death of ethnicity and the emergence of a highly notable acculturation along a slower and uneven bumpy-line of assimilation (Gans, 1992). The bumpy-line envisions a generational process that unfolds in successive way; a process of substantial successes that occur across sequential generations with each new generation attaining a new stage of adaptation to the host community as a stride closer to full assimilation. Straight-line model of assimilation does not stand without criticism and its drawbacks lies on its failure to overcome the experiences of European immigrants and African Americans, and to better characterize their assimilation pathways. Straight-line shortcomings do not revolve exclusively around the quantitative feature of linearity, but on its deficiency to explain one out of several possible paths that the immigrant can encounter and pursue. Since the United States has waned to master the controversies surrounding racial and ethnic problems, one can assert that the straight-line model can never provide accurate solutions to the incorporation ambiguities of the new American tides of immigration, including Asians, Hispanics, Arabs, and Muslims.

4-1-3-Segmented Model of Assimilation

As criticism to the straight-line model during the early 1990s, the Cuban American sociologists Alejandro Portes and professor of sociology Min Zhou have developed theories of segment assimilation, pointing out that ethnic communities can be a powerful engine of social integration than indirectional assimilation as they can offer more opportunities for new arrivals than the open market system. In essence, segmented assimilation theory is based on the fact that the American community is now more diverse and segmented. As the model of linear assimilation is too simple and insufficient, the popularity of the segmented theory lies upon its success to characterize the diverse experiences of assimilation paths that immigrants and their offspring may encounter in the host country. Accordingly, through highlighting the shortcoming of the earliest notions of assimilation, sociologists have recently realized that the integration experiences of recent immigrant groups are varied and diverse. In this perspective, immigrants can assimilate in different strata in the host

community, and their upward mobility depends on multidimensional factors. The immigrants' assimilation can be either the result of an individual social promotion or the consequence of an effective action from self-supporting communities and networks that uphold the influence of deprived groups. The main theme of segmented assimilation theory is the acculturation paradigms and the interactional relation between parents and child, parent's economic and educational successes, financial resources of the family and ethnic group context of reception upon arrival to the U.S.A., and immigration status that primarily steers the direction of the assimilation for the second-generation offspring (Portes & Zhou, 1993).

The kernel of segmented theory is that the United States is unequal and stratified society to an extent that multiple and segregated segments, at divergent degrees and in divergent places, are existent to which immigrants can take multiplicity of incorporation pathways. According to this model, second generation immigrants are likely to pursue true possible pathways with three corresponding outcomes: upward assimilation associated with persistent biculturalism, downward assimilation and poverty because of the acculturation into urban underclass, and economic assimilation combined with the deliberate retention of the immigrants' cultural values. The first pathway of incorporation implies that immigrants might pursue a traditional way of incorporating, gradually framing a new Americanized identity and increasingly embracing the practices of the dominant culture. The second pathway explains that when children are subject to racialization and blocked entry into the common civic life because of discrimination, they might withdraw from communal participation and end up incorporated into an impoverished minority subculture. The last pathway occurs when immigrant' parents might aim to keep their ethnic culture, they might seek to protect the child from downward mobility by limiting the children's relation with poor native-born immigrants of colors such as African Americans and Hispanics.

As an alternative to the different trajectories of assimilation to the incredible straightforward assimilation process, these different trajectories of assimilation correlate with the three processes that explains the relations between immigrant children, their parents, and the larger ethnic group. Those three possible types of second generation immigrant's incorporation are constant, dissonant, and selective. Constant acculturation takes place when both parents and their children pursue the classical assimilation to the

White middle class by learning the language and adopt the American culture at the same pace, while they gradually abandon their mother tongue and their native culture at roughly the same time. This upward assimilation tends to happen when parents possess enough human capital to support their children and to advance at the same rate as them in their cultural change so they can supervise them. For example, when parents acquire English, they can understand and help their children with their homework. In contrast to the constant acculturation, the dissonant acculturation occurs when children learn English, embrace the American culture, and abandon the native culture one faster than their parents. This situation takes place particularly when parents have limited human capital that does not allow them to supervise their children's cultural advancement. The dissonant occurs when immigrants tend to assimilate into the vulnerable minority underclass because of the lack of parental and society backup. Finally, the selective acculturation happens when the learning of English language and the adoption of host American culture of both children and parents take place within the frame of an ethnic community of enough size and resources. Hence, immigrants and their children partially maintain the parents' native language and culture and become fluent bilingual, providing by that new resources of upward mobility (Portes, Rumbaut, 2001).

Segmented assimilation has been largely accepted as a credible model to explain the real trajectory of incorporation of different minority groups. For instance, its process has been identified as being at work in different immigrant societies across the United States. Good examples of upward assimilation are the experiences of some well-educated and wealthy Asians who have settled in the middle class as well as upper- middle class in many regions of Los Angeles. Those immigrants indicate fast economic progress as they create successful business and entrepreneurship along the establishment of enclaves and the maintenance of native cultural values. Korean of New York city and Cuban in Miami provide another great example of upward assimilation through becoming prosperous entrepreneurs. However, others fall mainly within the downward assimilation such as Haitians in New York City and Mexicans in Los Angeles and California. Those immigrants fall within the category and they serve mainly as source of cheap underclass labour because they are exposed to bad counterculture that is characterized by poverty and undesirable neighbourhood. Therefore, they suffer many problems, including high rates of school dropout, gangs joining, and drug consumption. Within the assimilation field, segmented

assimilation theory offers indispensable perspective on the divergent experiences of contemporary ethnic group immigrants for almost two decades, but it has too come under attack (Rogers, 2001).

The main criticism of segmented assimilation, as Alba and Nee argue, is that it posits much more focus on the underclass and downward mobility, overlooking the fact that the working class Blacks and Latinos have jobs, a household, and desire to ambitious future. Furthermore, they assert that the incorporation experiences of recent immigrants and their progenitors are very similar to the earliest waves of European and their offspring who simultaneously did not fully incorporate within the third and fourth generations. Hence, expectations of limited and uncontinuous incorporation with the newest immigrants is quite possible. Similarly, they state that assimilation is a real pivotal phenomenon to achieve success in America; thus, it is important to blend as social boundaries are blurred and crossed. Concerning Arab and Muslim threat and non-assimilation to the broader American mainstream, more empirical researches demonstrate that Muslim and Arab immigrants embrace the path of selective acculturation that push them gradually to full sociopolitical upward mobility in terms of culture, politics, economy, and language. Muslims and Arabs, similar to different tides that set sail to the American shores from the early American inception, aspire to greater American dream that drag them enthusiastically to espouse assimilation at fore.

5-Arab Americans' Assimilation into the American Mainstream

5-1-Arab Americans' Political Assimilation

Surprisingly, little has been written about the participation of Arab and Muslim Americans in the American politic and civic life. Research on immigrant's economic and cultural adaptation has increasingly come to the fore of immigration discussion, yet relatively meager studies remain known about their engagement in the political arena. Arab Americans have been thrust into the spotlight following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 whose hurdles have persisted to yield deep fear and suspicion about their loyalty and political integration in the American society.

Wrapping under the rising fears of non-assimilation, Arab American ability to face such an increasing tide of misunderstandings and skepticism has been impeded, curbing the

efforts of many Arab Americans who ardently attempt to carve a constructive place within the American stream. Questions about their current political involvement and participation in the American political life prevailed media coverage as well as public discourse, effectively scratching the wealth evidence that existed previously on their successful incorporation (Suleiman, 1999; Haddad & Smith, 1996).


Against the native-born Americans' claims that Arab and Muslim immigrant groups are making the process of political involvement more arduous and incomplete, many scholars with deeper knowledge in Arab Americans responded with a renewed strain to reconsider their political experiences in comparison to multiple U.S.A. ethnic groups. Newly available investigations have confirmed that they have nonetheless been active since their early days of migration, creating vibrant national institution of civil society and becoming intensively involved in the American political process. It is crucial to raise questions over whether and how Arab and Muslim Americans shape the American politics, and how politically active they are. As an initial attempt to provide an answer to their path of political participation, it is important to understand that there remains a relative dearth of knowledge of their political involvement in the earliest historical period as they aspired no serious involvement. However, there is no doubt that millions of Arab Americans, from the mid-1960s, pursued the path of political incorporation, demonstrating repeatedly remarkable integrative capacities for both the American nation and republicanism.

Since the 1960s, the Arab American populations witnessed a rapid increase as result of changing American immigration policies and politics along the economic crisis that exacerbated large flow of refugees and labour market since 1967. Like other Post-1965 immigrants, once allowed to settle largely in the U.S.A., Arab Americans have been able to secure formal citizenship with relative ease. Indeed, they have demonstrated higher rates of naturalization in comparison to other immigrant groups; for instance 67.2 % of Egyptian immigrants naturalize in the U.S.A., ranking the 9th highest percentage of any nationality. In particular, the process of political incorporation entails immigrants to become citizens of the United States and; therefore, acquiring the right to vote, holding elective office and sitting on juries. Even though American citizenship for immigrants has been relatively out of search, most post 1965 immigrants have been real contributors in the broader American political mainstream.

Despite stereotypes that often distort the Arab Americans as politically detached from the American society, several empirical researches have empirically demonstrated high levels of political engagement and activism than commonly believed. Motivation for involvement has varied within historical periods. For the pioneer Arab immigrants who arrived to the U.S.A. as Ottoman subjects, the citizenship itself agitated and traumatized the Arab community on the basis that early Arab Syrians were Asians and; therefore, not eligible for the American citizenship. Though they were treated as Whites for more than thirty years, they found themselves again struggling for their right of Americanness until their Whiteness recognition in 1924. There is no question; however, that early Arabs place great emphasis on American citizenship as an ongoing political struggle and challenge for fitting in the American society (Haney-Lopez, 1996).

Social reports show additional evidence that Arab Americans and their offspring appeared to have more desire to become American citizens. By examining the following figure 3 of nativity and citizenship status of Arab Americans in 2000, one might draw clear evidence that Arab American have been more politically involved.

Figure 3. Nativity and Citizenship Status: 2000
 (Percent distribution. Data based on sample. For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/doc/sf4.pdf)



Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 special tabulation.


As indicated in figure 3, 46 % percent of Arab Americans were native U.S. citizens, who were born in the U.S.A. or born abroad to U.S. citizen parents, in comparison with 89 percent

of the whole population. At the same level, it shows that foreign born Arabs represent higher rates of naturalization with more than half percent of naturalized citizens in comparison to 54 percent of overall foreign born Arabs in the U.S.A. Furthermore, all foreign born Arabs have clearly promoted a sense of political belonging through formal naturalization; around 41 percent for Egyptians, 37 percent for both Palestinians and Jordanians and 23 percent for Lebanese.

As Another reliable and straightforward indicator of political incorporation, voter turnout data are frequently used to measure political participation. Research on Arab and Muslim American voting has flourished over past two decade to contradict speculations predicting low levels of their voting turnout among in regard to the relative success of other minority groups. Instead, the ensuring years have seen rapid changes in political participation accompanied unprecedented shifts in Arab American voting support. Despite the seeming withdrawal from the public spotlight and the fallacy of their political disengagement, there is more much proofs that Arab Americans are deeply engaged in civic and political processes (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000).

As shown in the 2011 Pew study, 55 percent of Muslim Americans aged 18-29 are registered to vote (Figure 4), which is basically in line with the overall population. Voter registration among American Muslims is in continuous increases with age and registration for those aged 55 and over being the highest (80 percent).

Figure 4: American Muslims Registered to Vote by Age



Source: Pew Research Center 2011

A 2005 Zogby International Project MAPS survey reveals that political participation is endorsed by 95 percent of Arab and Muslim Americans. Similarly, the 2007 Pew Survey found out that the total registration level reached 63 percent for Arab Americans comparing to 72 percent for the whole U.S. population in 2004; and 2000 figures of 63 percent for Mexican Americans, and 57 percent for Native Americans (MAPS Project & Zogby International, 2004). More recent accounts have reported higher voting turnout in 2016 presidential elections and 2018 mid-term primary elections appear to confirm that political involvement is not accidental, but a convincing evidence of a genuine progress of political participation with Arab American minority.

Apart from citizenship and voter turnout, another relevant factor that can contribute to refute the multivariate arguments of political consciousness lack among Arab Americans is holding offices. Though stereotyping of Arab and Muslim Americans has ostracized them politically and making it hard for them to hold political office, they have positively struggled to be politically active and contributed to the United States. In fact, Arab Americans exhibit telltale signs of political involvement through becoming active in the American political process in all its forms, including elections and running for political office. In their paper presented to the Michigan Conference of political science: *'The Aftermath of the 9/11 Attacks among Arab Americans: Detroit Exceptionalism and the Limits of Political Participation'*, Sally Howells and Amaney Jamal demonstrate heightened political consciousness among Arab Americans who run for prominent public position. In this regard, they stated that:

The City of Detroit...is...home to the Ambassador Bridge and the Detroit-Windsor Tunnel ...owned by an immigrant from Lebanon, Manuel Maroun. ...former Wayne County Road Commissioner Michael (Mohammed) Berry. Flight schedules and ground traffic at the airport are managed by Hassan Makled ... These men are among more than 60 deputized Arab Americans in Wayne County alone.... Elder is one of at least 34 Arab Americans in Michigan to hold a political appointment, while the state is home to at least 21 Arab American elected officials. This list...does not include the much larger number of Arab Americans who sit on the boards of local hospitals and the United Way, serve as Regents of state universities, or are active participants (Howells & Jamal, 2005).

Whether or not Arab Americans vote and participate in politics, a strong sentiment dominates that Arab Americans and their Islamic faith are compatible with the ideology and attitudes consistent with American standards. Despite the gathering climate of suspicion and mistrust, execrated by the politization of Arab Americans as radicals and inconsistent with American ideal, they have attempted to include themselves within the nation's civic and political life, especially to gain political voices and secure governmental and media access. While there is no doubt that Arab Americans would offer viable option of full political assimilation, as other minority groups have, the need to accelerate the process and to bring Arab Americans into the fold by American life is urgent, especially cementing the suppression that Arab political contribution would add new aspiration to the existing ones.

5-2-Arab Americans' Economic Assimilation


Arab economic participation, indisputably the cornerstone of integration process, is another promising sign of the American mainstream capacity to shape successful trajectory of Arab American assimilation. With economic integration, there would be a course of obtaining membership status in the central institutions of the American mainstream, which would include making productive contribution to the American society indistinguishable in aggregate from the achievement of Native Americans in terms of income, employment, educational, and housing levels. Most notably, recent analysis of Arab American's economic assimilation patterns suggest that they cluster a higher ranks on economic ladder and that their skill are to a further extent matched with those of Native workers.

Throughout the previous few decades, Arab Americans have shifted from a mere small minority group of immigrants to a more encouraging and a mightily productive segment of the U.S. economy. Nevertheless, tenuous interests have been paid to the economic achievement as well as contributions of Arab Americans to the broader American stream. This happens because of the fact that Arab Americans are relatively unstudied and numerically a limited presence in American life. As an opposition to the paradoxical suspicions of those who have not fully and readily acknowledged the potential of Arab Americans in the economic sphere, ample instances still support the prospect of Arab American's upward mobility. In fact, considerable skepticism over whether Arab economic assimilation would occur in ways reminiscent to the European immigrants upward mobility

is still alive. Thus, it quite crucial to raise facts about the recent Arab Americans' economic mobility against the following grumbly questions: Is there really a heightened economic mobility among Arab American? Is the U.S.A. really a magnet for economic assimilation? With a variety of data and investigation, such frequent questions are essential to prove that suspicions about their failure to assimilate economically are unduly doubtful since Arab American generations are still imagining the American economy as a path for strong political recognition. Considering different generational cohort, contemporary studies show that Arab Americans share similar socioeconomic characteristics with American population. According to the U.S. Census, they excel in the arena of educational attainment when compared to average U.S. population.

As the following figure 5 shows, the 2000 Census report demonstrates that over 84 percent of Arab American attain high level school diploma in comparison with 80 percent of all Americans aged 25 and older.

Figure 5. Educational Attainment: 2000 (Percent of population 25 and older. Data based on sample. For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see: www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/doc/sf4.pdf)



Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 special tabulation.

Besides, 41 percent of Arab Americans have a bachelor degree compared with 24 percent of all Americans aged 25 and older. Egyptians represented the highest level of educational achievement; 94 percent of them were holders of a high school diploma or more and 64 percent had a bachelor's degree or more education. The Iraqis presented the lowest percentage among Arab groups with 73 percent had at least a high school diploma, only 36 percent of them had at least a bachelor's degree in comparison to the overall population.


Concerning higher education, while the total number of Arab Americans who have post graduate degree is just 9 percent, Arab Americans of 25 years old and more approximately double such rate with 17 percent possessing post-graduate degrees (Brittingham, & De La Cruz, 2005). Such educational success of Arab Americans, with higher rates of graduate and post-graduate degrees, is manifested through heightened socio-economic achievements. Though Arab Americans can be found across different working sectors, their advanced educational achievements allow them to compete Native Americans in higher professional fields such as engineering, law, and medicine.

As one would expect, having more jobs in such higher professional fields would basically generate increasing income for Arab Americans. Indeed, the 2000 U.S. Census provides a rational reality that Arab Americans can well continue achieving economic uphill climbs in comparison to their American native counterparts.

The following figure 6 demonstrates that economic success appears to be making well. Arab Americans of 16 and older were more likely, and Arab American women less likely, to have jobs in comparison to total population of Native Americans. Precisely, employed Arab Americans aged 16 and older represent a higher percentage of 42 percent compared with 34 percent of their counterparts in the total population.

Figure 6: Occupation: 2000

(Percent distribution of employed civilian population 16 and older. Data based on sample. For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/doc/sf4.pdf)




Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 special tabulation

That is to say that Arab Americans witnessed an increase of employment in different occupations, including management professional and related occupation. Another encouraging sign is that a major proportion of 30 percent of Arab Americans worked in sales and office occupations compared with 27 percent of the total population. It is worthy to note that the Egyptian immigrants represented more than half of workers in management, professional while 23 percent of Moroccans workers were in service occupation, roughly twice as high as any other Arab group.

In the same vein, as Arab Americans generally have higher professions, they tend to exceed the U.S. averages regarding household income. In fact, the 2000 Census indicates that they exhibit higher earnings than their comparable workers in different sectors. The average income of Arab men working year-round and full time was \$41,700, compared with national average of \$37,100. This obviously reveals that Arab Americans are successful, a further argument to prove their economic assimilation. Even the median level of earning for Arab women exceeded the total earning of female population in 1999, Arab women earned \$31,800, compared with \$27,200 among the total female population, with \$35,200 yearly for Egyptian women and \$27,100 yearly for Moroccan women.

Figure 7. Median Earnings by Sex: 1999


(For employed, full-time, year-round workers 16 and older. Data based on sample. For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/doc/sf4.pdf)



Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 special tabulation.

For a better understanding of Arab Americans' economic assimilation, the following figure 8 demonstrates that Arab females had an increasing median income than all Arab American females. In 1999, the average family income among Arab Americans was 52.300, which is considered higher than the total national median of 50.000.

Figure 8. Median Family Income: 1999 (Families classified by ancestry of householder. Data based on sample. For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/doc/sf4.pdf




Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 special tabulation.

Still for all suspicion over Arab American non-assimilation, a 2019 report entitled: *“Power of Purse: Middle Easterns and North Africans in America”* went deeper to assure economic intergenerational mobility among Arab Americans who are still enriching the American labor market with new energies, picturing similar pattern of earlier immigrant waves to the U.S.A.

According to data from 2015 American Community Survey, the earnings of MENA immigrant household allow them to contribute significantly to pay huge revenue to federal state and local tax offers. Nationwide, MENA immigrant household contributed more than \$12.2 billion in federal tax revenue, and more than \$4.7 billion in state and local tax payments. For states and cities with large MENA communities such as California, New York and Michigan, MENA immigrants frequently contribute significantly as taxpayers. For instance, in New York, MENA immigrants paid more than \$633 billion taxes in 2015. This means that they contributed with a considerable percent of all state and local tax revenues collected in 2015. Figure 9 reveals significant contribution of MENA immigrants in many other top five states.

Figure 9: TOP 10 STATES WHERE MENA IMMIGRANTS CONTRIBUTED THE MOST IN STATE AND LOCAL TAX REVENUES, 2015.




Source: Power of the Purse: Middle-Easterners and North Africans in America, New American Economy, January 2019. <https://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/MENA-Report.pdf>

For instance, in California, MENA Arab Americans’ economic incorporation is evidenced by their high level of entrepreneurship.

As an outstanding characteristic, entrepreneurship is represented by an estimated 135,000 MENA entrepreneurs in broad range of industries, including dentistry and construction. Nearly 18 percent of MENA immigrants and North Africans, or nearly one in every five, were self-employed entrepreneurs as shown in figure 10.

Figure 10: ENTREPRENEURSHIP RATES FOR VARIOUS POPULATION SUBGROUPS, 2015




Source: Power of the Purse: Middle-Easterners and North Africans in America, New American Economy, January 2019. <https://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/MENA-Report.pdf>.

With the exclusion of Israeli Immigrants, the entrepreneurship proportion represented 16.9 percent, still more than the percentage of the whole U.S.A. population. One of the most significant indicator of how minority groups contribute to the well-being of the country’s economy is the spending power as consumers yearly. As most MENA immigrants have the highest levels of educational attainment, it was estimated that their spending power topped \$ 41.5 in 2015.

Similar to federal, state, and local tax contribution, MENA immigrants have large amounts of disposable income in many key states. As a top, MENA immigrants in California had nearly \$13.5 billion spending power in 2015. New York is classified second with \$3.9 billion. As shown in the following figure 11, the spending power of MENA immigrants in Texas, New Jersey, and Michigan reached \$2 billion in 2015.

Figure 11: SPENDING POWER OF MENA IMMIGRANTS IN SELECTED STATES, 2015



Source: Power of the Purse: Middle-Easterners and North Africans in America, New American Economy, January 2019. <https://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/MENA-Report.pdf>

Highlighting particular indispensable occupation, it is noticed that MENA immigrants often play exceptional role in the fields where employers much more struggle to find enough workers. Their relative youth allows MENA immigrants to fill critical gaps in the American labor force. In this regard, the report clarifies the fact that:

MENA immigrants, however, are not just filling today's STEM jobs. They are also playing a valuable role educating the next generation of American workers. Our research shows that in 2015 more than 23,000 post-secondary teachers in the United States were MENA immigrants. Foreign-born MENA residents, with at least a bachelor degree were strikingly more likely to be employed in postsecondary education roles than the high-skilled population overall (newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/MENA-Report.pdf, January, 2019)

In contrast to recent mounting fallacies regarding Arab immigrants' non-assimilation to the broader mainstream, such higher rates of 2015 surely indicate that Arab Americans are in fact becoming economically incorporated, offering remarkable constitution and creating opportunities to the American economy.

5-3-Arab American's Cultural Assimilation

Despite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary, popular perceptions, particularly among political elites, persist to reckon that Arab and Muslim Americans oppose the American cultural traditions and values. The underlying drivers of their integration are fueled by widespread assumptions that have continued to feed into the thinking that their shared cultural ethnic affiliation and rituals are dissonant with the American cultural values. Though ungrounded concerns over Arab and Muslim peculiarity and non-cultural assimilation resonate with reality, they still remain a consequential theoretical puzzle. The latter has framed an apprehension that they are antithetical to American democratic ideals, unable to incorporate and beholden to religious and cultural standards that are inferior to the American ones.

As a response to all such paralogism, there is a large rich literature on cultural assimilation of Arab immigrants, offering a spectacular intergenerational progress in adopting their host country way of life. As Arab Americans are witnessing a vivid images about their political and economic integration, one can expect mechanically a feasible trajectory of acculturation through generations because assimilation along cultural, economic and political outcomes are interdependent. As a highly distinctive cultural, traditional, linguistic and religious group, Arab Americans are predictably fraught with the erosion of traditional and conservative features through time. In this regard, Arab Americans

stains have been found to be linked with the adoption of the American culture and retention of the heritage culture. In other words, second generation Arab Americans exhibit decreasing levels of engagement in Arab customs and language and heightened levels of adoption of American mainstream culture (Amer, 2014). Thus, they are expected to assure better cultural mobility and abundance of their ethnic culture as long as they expose to the driving cultural forces of the mainstream (Amer, 2014).

Longer length of residence in the U.S., according to sociologists Faragallah, Schuman and Webb, is a pivotal factor for greater adjustment and identification with the American culture (Faragallah, Schuman, and Webb, 1997). It is also worthy to mention that country of origin as well as religion are linked with acculturation and assimilation to the American mainstream. In 2007, an empirical study of sociologists Ajrouche and Jamal showed that Lebanese and Syrian Christian Arab Americans with long history of immigration to the U.S. reported higher levels of acculturation and life satisfaction, as compared with more recent Muslim immigrants (Ajrouch & Jamal, 2007).

Basically, Christian Arabs have offered easy and optimistic prospect of immersion in the dominant culture due to the same religious backgrounds. Hence, there is nothing to fear regarding Arab cultural assimilation since their process of adopting the host culture has been similar to different earlier minority groups whose adaptive trajectory has been determined by both age and length of immigration. Like other immigrants who were initially viewed as incapable to espousing the norms, responsibilities, and values of the American ideal, Arab American activists argued that they would be perceived as belonging, as Americans, and as full members of the polity since their assimilability is just a matter of time.


As Islam is of a substantive stature for understanding Arab and Muslim culture, more existing specialization tends to politicize Islam as radical and extreme and; thus, constructive to the common American democratic ideals. Despite such a proclivity of Islam's incompatibility with assimilation patterns, many current scholars and pundits have focused on multiple dimensions to empirically demonstrate that Islam, like other faiths in the United States, is positively associated with civic acculturation and a lower likelihood of hindering Arab American path toward cultural mobilization (Read, 2015). Moreover, most scholarship has demonstrated that Arab and Muslim Americans, with increasing level of

religiosity, are more likely to believe that Islamic religious system and teaching are consistent with American democratic values and culture.

In 2011, the researchers Dana Karam, Matt Bareto, and Oskooii Kassra found out a strong link between mosque attendance, political engagement and Arab Americans' assimilation into the U.S. mainstream. Similarly, they confirmed that Arab and Muslim Americans who are subject to political discrimination, owing of their Islamic religion, tend to be more politically involved in the American society (Karam, Kassra, and Matt, 2015). While most of the complaints are based on Islamic religion and its different values from the American culture, it is fundamental to demonstrate that Arab Americans are not uniformly religious and devout. The idea that they favor their Arab or Muslim identity over other affiliations and interests has been envisaged on the outgroup rather than engaged from the practices and the beliefs of the group itself. In general, Arab and Muslim Americans have never presented a monolithic group as they are more diverse and distinct in their religiosity.

The data of the following pie of figure 12 shows that being a Muslim is less important for Arab American than how Muslim you are. Accordingly, some Muslim American are religiously devout, some are moderate in their religion, and some are non-practicing and secular, primarily designated as Muslims in name only, similar to a large rate of U.S. Christians and Jews . As Islam is not an influential religion on most of the Arab and Muslim Americans, some of them attend a mosque on a weekly basis and pray every day, and 34 percent who seldom or never attend a mosque, and 26 others who are secular and non-practical.

Figure 12: American Muslim Mosque Attendance




Source: PEW RESEARCH CENTER 2011 Muslim American Survey. Religious commitment is an index based on self-reported mosque attendance, prayer and the importance of religion. Figures may not add to 100% because of rounding. <https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2011/08/Survey-Report-Muslim-Americans-No-Signs-of-Growth-in-Alienation-or-Support-for-Extremism.pdf>

Such a weak adherence to Islam explains that Arab and Muslim Americans are not strongly conservatives in terms of religion because small proportion is considered religiously devout. Thus, worries of Arab and Muslim American threat, particularly their religion, have nothing to do with the empirical realities. More evidence asserts that they adhere to a religion that is not monolithic, but instead diverse.

Although Arab and Muslim Americans have long been criticized of their inability to adopt the American life and to be productive citizens, they have demonstrated strong cultural assimilation as they have embraced the American life (figure13). They felt that there is no conflict between being an Arab or Muslim and living in the American society. They believed that they should incorporate into the American cultural standards and to be indistinguishable from their counterpart Anglo-Americans.

Figure 13: Should American Muslim adopt American culture or remain distinct?



Source: Pew Research Center 2007

Given the ongoing skepticism that Arab and Muslim Americans fail to adopt the Anglo-Protestant ethnic and culture due to their different values and norms, one can assume that such skepticism is overstated because the influence of American culture over them has been practically stronger. Thus, suspicions over the fragmentation of American cultural values, due to the threat of Arab American culture, is apparently a refutation to the feature of cultural dynamism. Considering both cultural dynamism and segmented assimilation, several studies have suggested that Arab American immigrants have not migrated to the U.S.A. with rigidly fixed cultural attitudes; instead, they have gradually embraced much of host culture. As a matter of fact, Arab American native culture has imperatively changed

due to intergenerational mobility, including prominent traditions that have become malleable within the broader American mainstream.

Generally, Arab families are tightly knit well beyond the nuclear family. They may keep a fairly oriented way of conducting their lives while adjusting to the U.S. dominant culture. Nevertheless, there has been a slow, but predictable attrition of certain traditional and somewhat conservative features. Such erosion of significant traditions would gradually manifest itself in gender roles and dynamic relation between men and women, which are influenced by the compelling standards of the American culture as well as the exigency of economic struggle for success. Hence, the requirement of integration prompts Arab Americans to adapt, quite differently from their homeland traditions, new American cultural attitudes. In addition, the most attributable change is the support of nuclear family, providing more distance and separating them from ancestral homeland along heightened degree of acculturation in the American way of life.

Further promising signs that Arab Americans are really pursuing the cultural assimilation pattern of European immigrants is their increasing number of intermarriage. It is quite clear that intermarriage is a significant indicator of cultural assimilation and identification since it is considered as a force of integration (Gordon, 1964). Outmarriages between members of different ethnic group mirror frequent social interaction mobility and acceptance between distinct social groups. Hence, intermarriage engenders a multidirectional adaptation process through which each spouse embraces the partner's culture within the broader mainstream.

Despite the contemporary attention in scholarship about Arab and Muslim American groups, the little strides of their intermarriage have been conducted as most researches have focused on the ongoing patterns of intermarriage among Hispanics, Asians, and Africans. Most prevailing studies tend to suggest that individuals demand more potential spouses who are attractive in terms of socio-economic status, including prestigious jobs, higher income and education. Accordingly, the strong standing and success of Arab Americans would lead up to hypothesize and predict high overall rates of outmarriage among them (Qian & Lichter, 2007). In fact, the 1990 U.S. Census shows that rates of Arab Americans outmarriages have increased substantially as group boundaries have weakened and ingroup social distance has declined. More than 80 percent of U.S. born Arabs had non-

Arab spouses, pointing to a diminishing ethnic identification. Furthermore, four Arab American men out of five and nearly three Arab American women out of four got married with non-Arab spouses after they migrated to the U.S.A. For both sexes, high educational attainment, the decline of language and residential barriers have played a pivotal role to make interethnic marriage among Arab Americans commonplace (Kulczycki & Lobo A, 2002).

In the light of cultural assimilation trends, Arab Americans' rapid demographic changes, educational upgrading and strong language proficiency have facilitated marital assimilation with strong signs of acculturation. Such increasing rates of Arab intermarriage would be expected to continue into the present time because the offspring of those Arab immigrants, through successive generation, will more likely to follow the same upward mobility pattern of their forefathers.

As Arab Americans have intermarried with non-Arabs, high rates of intermarriage among children and grandchildren would weaken the identification with minority group across generations, particularly those born by Arab American intermarriage. Accordingly, they would produce an ethnic leakage in the larger mainstream with more economic, political, and linguistic assimilation.

5-4-Arab American's Linguistic Assimilation

No aspect is more fundamental to assure a safe trajectory toward a full immersion into the wider American mainstream than the proficiency of English language. The acquisition of the core competencies of the host culture is a compulsory factor that involves adhering to knowledge of the receiving country's language and its cultural standards. Thus, the linguistic acculturation is significant to the extent that it allows the immigrant to get involved with the country's political and economic process. In the face of the common assertion that Arab Americans are unable to sustain social and economic life in English due their lack of language assimilation, several studies have demonstrated that the U.S. has aptly been strong to extinguish immigrants' mother tongue within fewer generations.


In fact current evidence shows that Arabic appears to offer no threat as Arab Americans make the transition from Arabic language to English. Though they retain greater ability to speak their native language throughout successive generations, such ability drops

sharply and converges toward the successful patterns observed for earlier White Europeans. Arab Americans' linguistic assimilation may be important at the level of social interaction in the American society. In other words, levels of English language proficiency are found to be critical factors in determining socioeconomic status and earning.

Though there is a clear gap in literature that focuses separately on the linguistic acculturation of Arab immigrants, there exist at the same time a proliferation of studies that expound the striking effect of English language proficiency on their economic and political assimilation. As the death of previous immigrant's mother tongue was an enduring fact in the U.S.A, recent Arab Americans will strip of their mother tongue within the larger process of ethnic language erosion. As the 2000 Census shows (figure 14), the rate of linguistic assimilation among Arab Americans seems to be high; 69 percent of Arabs aged 5 and other spoke a language other than English at home, compared with 18 percent of the whole population. Nevertheless, within those Arab Americans who spoke a non-English language at home, a high percentage of 65 percent spoke English "very well", representing 44 percent of Arabs aged 5 and other. Jordanians represented an increasing proportion of 89 percent of those who spoke a language other than English at home in comparison with other Arab groups. A heightened percentage of 66 percent of these Jordanians spoke English "very well", representing 59 percent of the overall Jordanians aged 5 and older. Though most Arab groups were more likely to have problems speaking English, the Lebanese aged 5 and older were the least likely to have difficulty speaking English, presenting just 14 percent of those who spoke English less than "very well". Indeed, the pace of proficiency of English among Arab Americans, as shown in 2000 Census (figure 14), seem to be high.

Figure 14. Language Spoken at Home and English-Speaking Ability: 2000

(Percent distribution of population 5 and older. Data based on sample. For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/doc/sf4.pdf)



Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 special tabulation

Such an evidence indicates that Arab Americans' linguistic assimilation has been quite optimistic. Henceforth, it is expected that the newly arrived Arab Americans to the U.S.A. may exhibit more pretty images of language proficiency similar to the patterns of earlier Europeans.

Another additional evidence comes from data of the researcher Ayat Jebril Nashwan who conducted a research on Arab American middle and high schools students aged 11 to 17 years old in East Tennessee. The research respondents were balanced in terms of gender and over half of them were born in Arab countries mainly Iraq, Egypt, and Syria. They had lived in the U.S. with a mean of 9.4 years, and most of them had lived in the state of Tennessee for 1 to 2 years. Using a non-experimental and cross-sectional design, the investigators' results revealed high levels of English proficiency among those youth Arab American immigrants; 67.4 percent of respondents reported that they speak excellent English, and almost 24 percent speak English very good. Only 7 percent said that their command of English was fair, and 7 percent reported they speak poor English. When asked what language they speak most of the time at home, outside home, and in school. The majority (37.4 percent) reported that they speak both English and Arabic languages. However, the overwhelming majority 90 percent speak English outside home, and only a

slight percentage of 1.7 percent speak Arabic most of the time outside home. The research also indicates that the majority of respondents speak English “very well”, in comparison to a mere slight rate who speak their mother tongue (Ayat , Jebul Nashuwan, 2014). These results are a clear indicator that Arabic fluency concurrently decreases over longer residence in the U.S.A. All in all, Arab Americans are steadily tracing their trajectory of immersion to the broader American mainstream with pretty images of cultural, linguistic, economic, and political assimilation.

Conclusion

Despite anti-immigration hysteria, banning laws and historical amnesia, the belief in American exceptionalism has not vanished. As the traditional thought of American exceptionalism denotes, in its original core essence, superiority over other nations, many socialists disparage it as a broader idea, contending that it is in fact an aberration for purported aims. In other words, it seems that it renders the United States incapable to curb the limits of its powers, implicating the nation into both a military and economic troubles. In fact, exceptionalism can reflect the American hypocrisy as it could stimulate the idea that the ends justify the means. To romanticize the U.S.A. as a democratic plan, all those brutal facts have been overridden and ignored as a retrospective illusion in America’s exceptional experience. Henceforth, the emphasis on culture and race, and the disregard of nativism and racial prejudice can be interpreted as an endless historical amnesia in the American anti-immigration history. Unlike the past patterns of racism, recent anti-Muslim and anti-Arab attitudes are viewed to plainly exaggerate the designations of inferiority and incompatibility with the American cultural values as they are grounded on Islamic religion and Arab cultural divergence. Despite suspicion over Arab and Muslim Americans’ non-assimilation, they are offering vivid images and viable option of full integration to the broader American mainstream. Accordingly, President Trump’s pessimism about Arab and Muslim immigration, as interpreted in his shutdown Muslim bans, is totally groundless. Barring Arabs and Muslims from migrating to the U.S.A. is a violation to its inherent ideals as a nation knitted out of the divergent experiences of immigrants from different arrays of the world. Instead of halting immigration and focusing on Eurocentric nativism, Trump should reconsider immigration policies to keep open the doors of opportunities for Arab and Muslim Americans.

Limitations of the Study

Although the research has attained its objective, it has some inescapable limitations that should be conceded. The scope of my research is limited because the topic has been approached only from historical, political and sociological angles; the psychological perspective has been rather neglected. The relations between Arab Americans and their group and culture have been referred to in general theoretical terms, or in common-sense language. Thus, the study of the psychological functions of ethnicity, nativism, and Islamophobia at a personal and group level in different cultural groups seems to provide fertile ground for the exploration of those links.

In the present study, most data focused predominantly on first and second generation Americans of Arab descent; this lack of variability may have masked the power of generational status to predict assimilation process as well as ethnic identity retention among the third and the fourth generations. It is argued that over generations, integration into the broader American mainstream is more likely to occur through time as long as immigrants are further removed from the immigration experience and stripped from their ethnic affiliation and belonging. As such, it is important to examine the fluctuation of ethnic identity through a generational lens.

A further limitation is that of gender, and whether the patterns of links between gender, ethnic identity and assimilation would be different in a female sample. From the results of the study, that pointed to significant gender differences in ethnic behaviors and other-group orientation, the relationships between gender, Islamophobia, and ethnic identity could be different in women. Another important limitation is what types of nativism and discrimination Arab Americans are experiencing, and if such attitudes decrease in the upper socioeconomic strata or no. Generally nativism and Islamophobia take on different forms in different socio-economic strata; thus, it may become subtler. Are these experiences of marginalization and exclusion the same regardless of Arab American socio-economic status? Hence, the examination of Arab American's ethnic identity in different socio-economic setting is warranted as it yields to a better understanding of their upward and downward mobility.

Suggestions for Future Research

The research on ethnicity and assimilation among Arab Americans is still in its infancy stage and merits further study. In fact, there are several relevant implications for future research on the topic of Arab immigration to the U.S.A. and their ethnic identity within the heated debates over nativism and multiculturalism. First, and most importantly, a future study may include the combination of both qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection for a better understanding of the factors underlying the different experiences among the Arab American group. The researcher can take a large sample size for the quantitative part of the study, and later extract a subset of the initial pool of participants to conduct the qualitative portion. While the current study examined the possible link between ethnic identity, nativism and multiculturalism to understand the divergent pathways of assimilation among young adults, it is also possible to understand to what extent our results can be generalized to adolescents. As Gender was not a distinctive factor in this study, future research may focus on how gender can play a role in providing different results. Thus, another second possible extension of this study is to examine a sample of women or males separately to understand the relationship between gender, ethnic identity and assimilation, particularly within islamophobic and discriminatory attitudes.

A possible extension would also be replicating this study, but with a comparative study of Arab Americans of different ethnic origins through focusing on two or three ethnics only to sort out the main differences and similarities of their assimilation process. For example, there are huge Yemini, Iraqi, Palestinian, and Syrian communities in American states and their suburbs. Comparing all of these ethnic communities in one study on assimilation and ethnicity will give readers a bigger picture of the experiences of Arabs in the U.S. Therefore, such a study would probably be of significance to those who work with ethnic minority groups, mainly those interested in comparing the experiences of Arab Americans in the U.S.A. with others ethnic in diaspora.

Furthermore, an important consideration for future studies is the examination of the geographical locations in which Arab Americans live, particularly communities of ethnic concentration. Given that Arab immigrants experience dissimilar challenges in terms of discrimination and stereotyping in different American states, they may; thus, exhibit diverse educational attainment, upward economic assimilation and political participation.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

Herman Melville overstated more than one century ago when he wrote, “you cannot spill a drop of American blood without spilling the blood of the world.” Nevertheless, contemporary American’s facts evince that his words flawlessly describe the United States today. To a degree hors concours anywhere else, the United States has knitted disparate ethnic backgrounds into one nation. Such a salient exception is visible not just in America’s tremendous mosaic, but also in its success in commingling immigrants, regardless of their skin color, ancestral homeland, or place of worship into one homogeneous fabric. The American mosaic-that has always been complex-is becoming even more intricate. Indeed, centuries of massive immigration swiftly refashioned the racial and ethnic mix. Thus, immigration in the twenty-first century will still revolve around race and culture, but it will also encompass a palette with more hues. Such more complex American mosaic spells enduring controversies that will no longer be only, or perhaps even basically, about Whites and Blacks. Instead, it will also progressively be about Arab and Muslim immigrants and their progeny, many of whom are regarded as neatly discordant with American cultural norms.

American nativists’ heightened fear and skepticism of threat is not a recent phenomenon in the American political history, but rather old attitudes that are reminiscent to those perpetrated nearly century ago. In fact, multiple paradigms of anti-German and anti-Jewish predated anti-Hispanic and anti-Muslim in the contemporary America. By the same token, substitute “Italian” and “Pole” for “Asian” and “Latino,” and current alarms would sound commonplace to Americans living one hundred years ago. As interwoven to Whiteness, eurocentrism and phobia were requisite exigency to advance the categorization of immigrants in hierarchical and moral order through the mystification of priority, the idea of global development, homogeneity, and democracy. Immigrants’ detentions during the early history of the U.S. immigration were not relatively dissimilar from the heavy-handed attitudes of contemporary nativism. But, it is worthy to grasp that nativism and exclusion are barely an exclusive American phenomenon. What makes them significant is that they generally raise skepticism over the American ideals.

Overwhelmingly, the Anglo-Saxon myth fails to acknowledge that it could never visualize a harmonious national identity without stigmatizing the inherent racial minorities

as an inseparable part of the overall American history. Blacks, Latinos, Arabs, and Muslims, despite their noticeable involvement and success, are primarily labeled as aliens from the overall realm of the American mainstream. Such patterns of condemnation and dismissal provide much impetus for the Anglo-Americans to define themselves as true Americans in opposition to inferior outsiders. The fallacious belief, featuring the American society by White and Anglo-Protestant core culture solely, overcasts the deep-rooted fact that the American culture is a meld of cultural pluralism throughout the American experience. As corollary of the prevailing White Protestant culture, into which newcomers were incorporating, nowadays American diverse cultures have debunked the old-fashioned WASP character. Currently, in order to encompass the perpetual ethnic diversity, it is compulsory to understand the United States as staunchly pluralist and also as a liberal recipient of miscellaneous cultural entities.

It is still widely conceded that the divergent ethnic groups, with non-Anglo or non-Protestant backgrounds, have shaped prototypically a motor for cultural democracy. Hence, the increasing worries about the menaces of ethnic cultures, particularly recent Trump's overt assaults against Arab and Muslim Americans, are extremely overblown. Through romanticizing America as a nation of immigrants, allegations over their non-assimilation to the superior Anglo-Protestant culture clash with the democratic ideals of the forefathers. In this regard, it has become requisite for the U.S.A. to keep a way a monolithic factor for this divergent turmoil that holds diversity near its heart through outstripping a bit the perplexing contestation over multicultural. As a recantation and along convincing arguments against anti-multiculturalism, abundant proofs show that the U.S.A. has undergone, despite its relatively short history, further transformations in response to its continuous dynamism and inconstant milieu. In fact, Multiculturalism is always interpreted as a pervasive notion that the U.S.A. has long stood for harmony and acceptance.

Similarly, the resonant of the American mosaic continues to haunt the contours of American national identity. Apparently, the American national portrait is no longer featured only with Black and White races, but in cultural diversity. Indeed, the exceptional fortune of the United States is that its common culture has been whittled by the interaction of its subsidiary cultures. Paradoxical through it may seem, the U.S. has a common culture that is marked by cultural kaleidoscope of diverse ethnic groups with a variety of origins. In this

fashion, diversity enriches the American society, but it also sows the seeds of social conflict. As Fears of immigrants' non-assimilation predated the American Constitution, the potential friction between natives and immigrants is not new. Americans often imagine that their ancestors made a smooth transition from mere immigrants to full American citizens. Practically, the long lineage over fears of immigration highlights an often-overlooked fact that such a transition has always been tied in with challenges. Certainly, vims to smooth interactions between new and established communities will not cancel social conflict. Nonetheless, they can substantially constrict it; thus, augmenting the chances that American growing diversity will be far less wrenching than it otherwise could be. Nodaway's offspring of Irish, Italian, Greek, and Polish immigrants are often romanticized as full-fledged members of a common American Anglo culture. But, when those immigrants first rushed to the American shores, the native-born viewed them as physically distinct, culturally alien foreigners who hailed from lower races.

Through blurring the line of reality over inferior races, the American nation's continuous forgetfulness of its brutal history serves initially as retrospective illusion, burdened strikingly by the undeniable facts of the legacy of African slavery, and grooved in the genocide against American Indians and the colonists' wrestling of their land. Such peculiar penchant of forgetfulness was firmly bound to a deliberate disavowal that prompted them to provide amnesiac representations of sediment normality. To idealize the U.S.A. as democratic plan, all those barbaric episodes have been disregarded and denied as an aberration in America's exceptional experience. Obliterating all what was shameful is a focal augmentation that is deeply instilled in the rhetoric of official history. Accordingly, it cannot be renounced or eliminated, but instead stripped of its entanglement for the creation of the American nation. As forgetfulness of the past is intrinsic in the foundation of the nation and the construction of a sense of national belonging, such illusionary vision supersedes brutality and discrimination in favor of freedom and equality as fundamental principles of the nation foundation. The retrospective illusion does not fall on either trust or skepticism of its prevalence or dismissal, but on how its potential impact could be magnified when beholding the presence of minorities in the U.S.A. Thus, the focus on culture and the overlooking of racial prejudice in American identity issues mirror a ceaseless historical amnesia through the past eras of anti-immigrant sentiments.

Dissimilar to the foregone patterns of racism, current anti-Muslim and anti-Arab Americans attitudes are viewed to overstate explicitly the designations of difference as they are grounded on Islamic religion and Arab cultural divergence. The signs of difference are not only founded to bolster flagrant prejudice and hatred, but to plainly generalize direct threats to the American way of life. In fact, such distinctions are rigorously created to an extent that Arab and Muslim Americans have to be viewed as unsuitable others with deeply rooted norms. As bigotry and animus against them are also framed on the basis of clash of civilization and enemy creation, they have been long prone to ideological funnel that aims to fabricate a model of an idealized 'us' against the menacing 'other'.

Wrapping under the mounting worries of non-assimilation, Arab and Muslim Americans' ability to encounter such an increasing tide of misunderstandings and skepticism has been impeded, curtailing the efforts of many who ardently attempt to carve a constructive place within the American stream. Debates about their involvement and participation in the American life have long prevailed media coverage as well as public discourse, scratching effectively the ample evidence that existed before on their successful incorporation. Comparable to other different minority groups, resentments against Arab and Muslim Americans have proportionately grown from the perception of non-assimilation to the Anglo-Saxon mold. Thus, they are regarded as a disruptive minority whose Islamic religion, inferior race, customs and habits are a social threat to the American hegemony. Instead of labeling newcomers, particularly Muslims and Arabs in current political discourse, they should be viewed as a solution to stagnation and social decay and as energetic participants in the American society. Most who augmented skepticism about their inability to adopt the Anglo-Saxon cultural norms, frequently overlook the incontrovertible reality that American mainstream, despite fears about non-assimilation and fragmentation, is broader to embrace more newcomers than before.

Ultimately, the derogatory perception against Arab and Muslim Americans' non-assimilation is a ramification of America's improvident and biased knowledge about Islam and Arab culture since Islam is mistakenly treated as monolithic cultural code for all Muslims and Arabs without subtle nuances of its diversity, inner dynamism and huge historical complexities. Accordingly, such tight views are the result of traditional Western ignorance and unconsciousness. Endorsing the credibility of both cultural dynamism and

segmented assimilation, ample proofs confirm that Arab and Muslim American immigrants have not migrated to the U.S.A. with rigorously fixed cultural attitudes; instead, they have gradually adopted much of host culture. Actually, Arab American native culture has conclusively changed due to intergenerational mobility, including notable cultural traditions that have become malleable within the larger American mainstream.

As biased ideology, nativists choose the worst stand in Islamic and Arab culture and the best of their own to idealize a plausible dualism. The traditional Western view implicitly reveals disdainful portrayals and a fanatical vision. Indeed, such a vision does not match the recent global issues, and; thus, overrides the divergent aspects of Islam for the sake of escalating the unchangeable superiority of the Christian West and championing capitalists and imperialists' ambitions. In spite of the proclivity of Islam's incompatibility with the American incorporative trends, many pundits have focused on multiple angles to empirically show that Islam, like other existing faiths in the United States, is positively tied with civic acculturation and a lower likelihood of cumbering Arab American path toward cultural assimilation.

As Islam has come at height after 9/11, many American Presidents have contrived a deceptive and a misleading depiction to represent Islamic states and their Arab culture as a serious threat to the American values through advocating evil cultural language. Judgmental statements such as "Islamic Terror", "Muslim Jihad", or "Crusade" are fundamental cornerstones of cultural talk that lacks rational ability to examine issues from a de facto standpoint by its assertive tendency to attribute criminal activities to religion or culture. Those miscreants have undoubtedly bent in nihilism, but they are in no way representatives of Islam, Muslims, or Arabs. With such a focus on difference and danger, nativists generalize all Muslims together, failing to differentiate between the bunch of individuals that commit the terrorist acts and the majority that do not. Noteworthy, one can argue that the enduring War on Terror seems to neglect a pivotal point that not all Muslims are terrorists, but all terrorists are Muslims. The claim of course is exaggerated to an extent of being faulty. Apparently, the changing demographic landscape and the growing economic inequalities have helped skillfully to galvanize this unsteady cocktail of nativist agenda. At that standpoint, it is still obscure what the future could bring. Therefore, it is clear that the nativist discourses never end, suggesting that future outbreaks are supposed to occur. While most

governments' definitions have categorized Arab Americans as White, the U.S.A. discourses have classified them as different and inferior to White. Exemplifying this perspective of categorization, Arab American pundits highlight the metaphorical term of invisibility to refer to the Arab Americans' situation within the American discourses on ethnicity and race. In this perspective, the invisible citizens have become visible in the aftermath of 9/11.

The hysteria about Arab and Muslim menace has given a powerful impulse to the recognition of prejudice as an emergent echo to the historical and archetypal Muslim enemy. 9/11 and its legacy have created the ghost of Islamophobia that has been interpreted in more stringent policies as the backbone of contemporary rhetoric of the U.S. terrorism and counterterrorism. Regardless of whether countering violence extremism is called Countering radical Islam or not, such initiatives of banning entry and deportation, while couched in neutral terms, have particularly targeted almost exclusively the Arab communities. Although the American government's purported objectives appear laudable in strengthening communities against violence, the initiatives unjustifiably and unfairly aimed at Muslims and Arabs as they infringe upon constitutional rights.

Countering violence extremism policing desperately focuses on Muslim and Arab subjects, renewing the embedded tropes that Islam is violent and extremist. Countering violence extremism theory stands as the most prominent and perhaps the most heinous form of Islamophobia, lulling the ability of Arab and Muslim Americans to practice freely their religion, curbing their civil liberties, jeopardizing their political participation and free speech. Henceforth, their surveillance and monitoring are flagrant transgression of constitutional guarantees of religious equality.

The fact that a proliferation of research has demonstrated that the countering violence extremism policies are baseless, unscientific, and discredited as they advance discriminatory and unconstitutional practices. Similar to the Patriot Act and other policy legislations, countering violence extremism emboldened a growing discrimination against Muslims and Arabs through wide range forms of harassment, attacks, distrust, and assault. Therefore, these initiatives are dangerous as they harm American public safety, disrupts attempts to reinforce the American community, and create a gateway for unwarranted racial surveillance while promising a safe atmosphere to combat violence and discrimination. While these initiatives appear to be applicable on worldwide immigrants, the intensification on ideological matters

that are predominantly associated to Islam means that it is quite proven to be incommensurately aimed at Muslims and Arabs. There is; nevertheless, little doubt that targeting them carries serious costs. Such restrictive travel policies and increasing American hurdles, practically discrimination on the basis of religion, ideology or national origin, would likely to undermine the American values. In this regard, Islamophobic stances generate strong religious identity and challenging sentiments among Arabs and Muslims in diaspora. Accordingly, they have constructed their identity subsequent to the tragic terrorist events of 9/11 and the intensity of Islamophobia.

What emerged from an in-depth is that Islamophobia induces a strong adherence to Islamic Arab identities as Arabs and Muslims' lives have been tremendously impacted by stringent surveillance. Arab American youth are living under a strong societal pressures, and they feel saddled with the shared responsibility and vexation when responding for atrocities committed by Muslim perpetrators in the name of Islam. Most of them feel that it is absurd to generalize on all Muslims on few extremists. Thus, they are compelled into defensive positions, expressing regret and frequently wider skepticism. Such a recurrent defense of one's faith places serious stress and torturous emotion among Arab and American youth who don't remain silent in the face of Islamophobia rhetoric and persistent condemnation of others' actions. In this vein, it catalyzes an engagement in counter-strategy, particularly a re-definition of the parameter of social dynamism.

The unthoughtful or ill-mannered actions, abiding the groundless and irrational phobia of Arab and Muslim, bred from Donald Trump's crystal clear Islamophobic trend as a new benchmark in America's nativist history. Unprecedented anti-Muslim statements, such as 'Muslim ban' "Islam hates us", 'how to make America safe again' once again blossomed out across his proliferation of official declarations, statements, and speeches. To sway the American and international opinion toward waging a war against Islam, Muslims, and Arabs, he enacted Muslim bans 1, 2, 3, and 4, widely known as the Muslim shutdowns. In fact, Trump's Muslim bans stirred a rampage of traumatic news in the world since they were unexpected. The American and international press found it an engrossing bone of contention and began to shore up the President initiatives and to tag his political policies as trumpism. Whatsoever the denouements and interpretations of trumpism, he is regarded as the pioneer self-declared anti-Muslim American President throughout American history.

Apart from the instantaneous impacts of Arab and Muslim bans on either halting or hindering Muslims and Arabs from entering the U.S.A., their straightforward effects have domestically taken boundless tragic forms. Anti-Muslim and anti-Arab bigotry and animus, coming from the highest levels of Trump's government, are echoed and manifested on the group. The swelling rates of xenophobia during Trump's tenure, along the well-reported increase in hate crimes and violence against Muslim and Arab Americans or those perceived as Muslims, are not only alarming and disconcerting, but jointly an underlying threat to multicultural landscape as well as an infringement to both the American constitutional values and immigration. In fact, reasons of Muslim bans and extreme vetting are not clearly open to public so it is intractable to determine these policies' goals, leaving much room of anxiety due to its vagueness and uncertainty. Owing to a short one-year period of the extreme vetting policy, there have been tangible impacts on visitors, international students and scholar population. Because of to the implementation of Muslim bans and extreme vetting, Muslim and Arab Americans have not been able to travel comfortably to the U.S.A. due to the fear of inability to return to their homelands. In fact, the application of the Muslim bans were without notice or previous notifications that resulted in turmoil at the American airports, culminating in the annulment of medical appointments and marriage plans, job loss, and university program setback.

As the United States cherishes equality and the separation of religion from state as fundamental essence of its creed, Trump's fervent Muslim barrings of entry to the U.S. are unlikely to secure borders and protect the nation from foreign terrorists, but will assuredly dampen the inherent cultural norms that characterize the pluralistic nature of the U.S.A as nation of immigration. The most startling is that the Department of Homeland Security officials view that Trump's ideological screening would interrogate travelers about the role of women in the society, honor killing and legitimate military targets. One can see no link between an immigrant's view of women's role in the society and terrorism; however, the relation between such queries and the heated criticism upon the rights of women in the Muslim and Arab societies is actually evident. Precisely, Arab and Muslim travelers have found themselves obliged to deal with encroaching questions about their personal beliefs while others have even been subject to more strange and peculiar inquiries related to Sunni or Shiite denominations and whether they are carrying Quran in their baggage or no. Indeed, all such discriminatory and racist investigations would erode the nation's strength to

promote mutual contact, economic cooperation with other world countries, particularly the Arab world. In other words, though trumpism might particularly impact Muslims and Arabs in the U.S.A., its reductionist bans and zealous vetting would simultaneously lessen the temporary visitors coming to America for business and tourism. They would; therefore, lead to less foreign investments, less business, little talent immigration, and fewer scientific and cultural exchanges.

A thorough scrutiny of Trump's goal demonstrates its clear flaws. On the one hand, the Muslim ban and executive order would supposedly determine to evaluate an individual as a positive contributor to the American national interests. Apparently, such a migratory criteria of individual's evaluation proved to be invalid by which to judge visitor businessmen and students who visit the U.S.A. for just limited periods. Accordingly, such rigorous standards of evaluation are cloaked under the objective to maintain the Muslims and Arabs in the speculation of being a perpetual threat to the American values. As part and parcel of his larger anti-immigrant policies, Trump's skepticism about their threat is ungrounded. Subsequently, for the sake of ensuring safety, equality, and justice for all the Americans, Trump should reconsider his anti-Muslim agenda, and his policy makers have to keep a keen eye to voice strongly their objection to laws and practices aroused by prejudice against Muslims. In fact, Trump's anti-Muslim steps emanate from his religious animus that is hostile to American economic interests and values.

The incessant anti-immigration campaigns under the banner of religion, unfolding American Islamophobia, should be viewed as a violation of American axiomatic tradition as a land of opportunity. Thus, perpetuating anti-Arab and anti-Muslim rhetoric, which the world has well grasped from Trump's presidential administration, has caused the U.S.A. to be unwittingly seen as unwelcoming to immigrants from different backgrounds. Pondering the future of the U.S.A. as a promoter of globalization and democracy, it is evident that the general outlook of immigration would bear the brunt of the perpetual changes, especially with Trump's withstanding policies. However, it is also crucial to realize that skepticism over Muslim and Arab immigration and their non-assimilation needs to be counteracted through championing the welcome and admission of immigrants of whatever origin. Given the inimical aspect of all Muslim bans to Americans' interests and fundamental values, the broader anti-immigrant agenda should be reconsidered and canceled to prevent future administrations from legislating new and similar bans.

Furthermore, Islamophobia should be opposed and challenged across broad spectrum, and the marginalization of Muslim and Arab Americans should not be accepted to reinforce the fundamental American principles of equality before lawful institutions and to adherence to the assimilation process as the magnet of the American society. In order to guarantee security, equality and liberty, prompt measures should be anticipated in order to keep a keen watch and stand ready to withstand laws animated by hatred against Muslims and Arabs. For instance, Arab and Muslim governments ought to adopt boosterish strategies to backup political involvement in their own societies and in the United States as a protection from further abusive legislations. Espousing the interaction of the no-Muslim ban campaign will be an encouraging initiative that will focus on abrogating all bans through legal and legislative strategies, including more visibility over the opacity of the bans. It has become compulsory for the United States to welcome a new congress, with new members and new majority in the House of Representatives, which will concentrate on the new legislative session. At least, it will offer an opportunity to prompt legislative efforts to annul or at minimum restrain Trump's detrimental policies and start laying the long-term foundation for restricting any future enforcement of discriminatory bans.

Islamophobia has impelled Arab and Muslim Americans to consolidate themselves through a collective sense of affiliation rather than adhere themselves to ethnic identity that has more implications with culture, traditions, and a sense of belonging. The recent revival of Muslim and Arab consciousness, particularly in the current American socio-political context, has aroused as a defensive force for the collective Muslim brotherhood. The sense of Muslim and Arab brotherhood allows them to feel that they are integrative part of the worldwide trend against racial attacks. Unsurprisingly, Islamic and Arab identities serve, in a wake of Islamophobia, to create new group demarcations to strengthen ties and solidarity within the Arab community in the United States.

Against the fallacy that Arab and Muslim Americans are making the American process of assimilation more arduous and deficient, several pundits with deeper knowledge of them have empirically shown that they are exhibiting telltale signs of successful assimilation. Though Arab and Muslim Americans stereotypes have ostracized them politically, they have positively strived to be active and contributed to be integrative capacities to the United States with new strains in comparison to the experiences of their

counterpart ethnic groups. In fact, they are deeply engaged in civic and political processes with unprecedented shifts of involvement. There is no doubt that Arab Americans and their progeny, from the mid-2001 onward, have steadily pursued the path of political incorporation. They have endeavored to gain political voices within the nation's civic life, especially to participate in election, voting, to secure governmental and media access, and to run for political office.

Despite the predominant evidence to the contrary, an ongoing perceptions persist to reckon that Arab and Muslim Americans are not pursuing the same economic trajectory of incorporation as early European immigrants. Instead, the ensuing years have demonstrated that they and their offspring are deeply engaged economically. Most remarkably, current investigations on Arab American's economic assimilation patterns have proven that they cluster higher ranks on economic ladder in terms of prestigious jobs, higher income and education. As their skills are to a further extent matching with those of native workers, one can predict that such economic integration would automatically lead up to heightened rates in outmarriage. In fact, the strong standing of educational attainment and the decline of residential barriers have played a fundamental role to make outmarriage among Arab American prevalent. Since they are experiencing quite pretty trends of their political and economic integration, one can foresee mechanically a convenient trajectory of acculturation among successive generations because assimilation along cultural, economic and political outcomes are interdependent.

Against the pessimist irony of immigrant's otherness, one reason for optimism is that America has triumphed many times in melding different groups into one nation. The American creed of liberty, justice, and equality for all under law adds a powerful force for assimilation. It is obvious that many immigrants discovered on arriving that the native born dismissed them as inferiors, too culturally alien, and never to become Americans. Yet, if the American society has often fallen short of its ideals, it has not abandoned them. Instead, it has struggled to translate them into reality. Through bad luck, ill will, or incompetent public policy, growing diversity could produce more social and political calamities that pessimists fear. However, disaster is neither preordained nor likely to occur. Indeed, what may be most surprising about the pessimists' arguments is their lack of confidence in the resiliency of the American society they trumpet.

The American governmental and societal institutions should hold on that the American democratic values should reach out to all immigrants, hearten them to become citizens, and welcome them into the American knit. Government and civil society should proactively mobilize to institute policies designed to minimize the discord that arises when newcomers meet natives; thereby, helping to lessen the political conflicts that can surge from diversity. The American ideals alone; however, are not accountable for the success of American diversity. Equal opportunities has been indispensable reality of economic upward mobility. Newcomers have historically realized that they could perch the ladder of economic success no matter how humble their descent. This upward mobility averts racial, ethnic, and religious divisions from coinciding with class clashes as it diminishes the potential for conflict. Conversely, there may be no surer way to guarantee that any ethnic, racial, or religious group, most notably Arab and Muslim Americans, will rebuff integration into American society than to deny its members the appropriate mechanism and opportunities they need to bear the torch of the incontrovertible verity of the American dream.

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Résumé

L'histoire enchevêtrée de l'immigration américaine a longtemps été contournée par les ambivalences de l'ethnicité, du nativisme et de l'assimilation. Depuis son berceau primitif, le portrait national américain a été peint en diverses nuances d'immigrants de différents horizons du monde avec un sentiment paradoxal qui chérit parfois et d'autres fois condamne leurs expériences dans la société américaine. La présente étude examine ses nuances et les cris croissants suscités par l'immigration arabe aux États-Unis dans un climat d'anti-immigration, de discrimination, d'islamophobie et de multiculturalisme. En tant que groupe très visible à la suite des attentats du 11 septembre, les sentiments islamophobes et anti-immigrés, en particulier sous le mandat actuel du président Donald Trump, ont sans cesse fait des boucs émissaires des immigrants arabes d'une myriade de maux sociaux qui nuisent l'unité nationale et l'hégémonie américaines. Ils ont subi les plus hostiles assauts au motif que la culture anglo-protestante et les valeurs démocratiques, profondément enracinée dans la société américaine, subissent des changements minants avec des implications menaçantes en raison de leur immigration. Étant donné qu'ils ont été une menace perpétuelle à travers les diffamations stéréotypées des médias, la dualité «bonne Amérique» ou «nous» contre «ennemi maléfique» ou «eux» a été sédimentée et institutionnalisée avec succès dans un contexte de terrorisme et de guerre contre le terrorisme. La plupart des nativistes pessimistes ont augmenté de façon flagrante les craintes et le scepticisme concernant la non-assimilation des Arabes américains au motif que leur foi islamique monolithique et leur culture arabe sont contradictoires avec les valeurs et les libertés américaines. En romantisant le fait incontestable des États-Unis comme un aimant et une lueur d'espoir pour les immigrants, l'étude démontre que les fervents soupçons et les interdictions d'entrée des musulmans aux États-Unis proposées par Donald Trump sont injustifiés puisqu'ils constituent en fait une violation de la constitution américaine et de la tradition axiomatique des États-Unis comme terre d'opportunités. La croyance illusoire que la société américaine se caractérise exclusivement par la culture WASP est une dénonciation plaintive de la diversité raciale qui a profondément marqué la réalité exceptionnelle du multiculturalisme aux États-Unis. En reconsidérant les trajectoires de l'assimilation complète des immigrants antérieurs, les allégations fallacieuses sur la non-assimilation des Arabes américains sont exagérées puisque le courant dominant américain est maintenant plus large pour accueillir de nouveaux immigrants qu'auparavant. En effet, ils partagent le rêve américain avec plus de désir d'enseignement supérieur, d'intégration économique ascendante, d'implication politique et d'acculturation. Ainsi, au lieu de les ternir en tant qu'immigrants, il est crucial d'être considéré comme une présence énergique qui enrichit pas appauvrit, renforce pas sape, nourrit pas épuise, une nation dont le caractère national a longtemps reflété un kaléidoscope culturel de groupes ethniques.

Mots clés : Arabe américains, assimilation, ethnicité, immigration, islamophobie, nativisme, menace.

ملخص

لطالما كان التاريخ المتشابك للهجرة الأمريكية مرتبطا بالانتماء العرقي، والوطنية، والاستيعاب. فمنذ النشأة الاولى للولايات المتحدة الامريكية تم رسم لوحتها القومية بظلال متنوعة من المهاجرين الوافدين من مختلف مناحي العالم مع تنامي مشاعر متناقضة تتمثل في الاعتراز بالمهاجرين تارة ونبذ تجاربهم في التيار الأمريكي السائد تارة اخرى. تبحث هذه الدراسة في أشكال التدايعات المتزايدة التي أثرت حول الهجرة العربية إلى الولايات المتحدة في ظل مناخ مراهض للهجرة، والتميز العنصري، وراهاب المهاجرين والتعدد الثقافي. كمجموعة بارزة للغاية في أعقاب أحداث 11 سبتمبر، فإن مشاعر العدا للمسلمين، و العرب، و المهاجرين بصفة عامة، لا سيما في عهد الرئيس الحالي دونالد ترامب ، جعلت المهاجرين العرب كبا ش فداء بلا هودة لعدد لا يحصى من العلل الاجتماعية التي تعيق الوحدة الوطنية والهيمنة الأمريكية. لقد عانوا من أكثر الاعتداءات عنفا على أساس أن الثقافة الأنجلوبروتستانتية والقيم الديمقراطية، المتجذرة بعمق في المجتمع الأمريكي، تشهد تغيرات كاسحة مع تداعيات تهديدية بسبب هجرتهم. نظرًا لأنهم يمثلون تهديدًا دائمًا من خلال افتراء وتضليل وسائل الإعلام النمطية، فقد تم ترسيخ ثنائية "أمريكا الطيبة" أو "نحن" مقابل "العدو الشرير" أو "هم" بنجاح في سياق الإرهاب والحرب على الإرهاب. كما ان معظم المتشائمين زادوا من مخاوفهم وشكوكهم حول عدم استيعاب الأمريكيين العرب على أساس أن عقيدتهم الإسلامية المتجانسة وثقافتهم العربية تتعارض مع القيم والحريات الأمريكية. ان حقيقة الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية كمغناطيس جذب ومنازة أمل للمهاجرين لا جدال ولا غبار عليها مما تجعل شكوك دونالد ترامب المتشددة وخاصة حظر المسلمين دخول امريكا لا يمرر ولا اساس لها من الصحة لأنها في الاساس انتهاك صارخ لجوهر الدستور الأمريكي وكذا التقاليد السائدة للولايات المتحدة كأرض للفرص. الاعتقاد الزائف بأن المجتمع الأمريكي يتسم حصريًا بالثقافة الانجلوساكسونية هو إدانة شائنة للمزيج العرقي الذي ميز بعمق واقع التعددية الثقافية في الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية. تعد فكرة عدم اندماج العرب أمرًا مبالغًا فيه نظرًا لأن التيار الأمريكي السائد أصبح الآن أكثر اتساعًا لاحتضان القادمين الجدد عن ذي قبل. في الواقع ، ينشرك العرب الأمريكيون الحلم الأمريكي برغبة أكبر في التعليم العالي والتسريع من عجلة الاقتصاد الصاعد والمشاركة السياسية والتناقص. وبالتالي، بدلاً من تشويه سمعتهم كمهاجرين، فانه من الأهمية بمكان أن يُنظر إلي ان تواجههم يثري و لا يفقر ، ويقوي ولا يقوض ، ويغذي ولا ينضب المجتمع الامريكي الذي لطالما عكس طابعاً قومياً يتسم بالتعدد الثقافي.

الكلمات المفتاحية: العرب الأمريكيون ، الاندماج ، العرق ، الهجرة ، الإسلاموفوبيا ، النزعة القومية ، التهديد.