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**U. S. Post-Cold War ‘Humanitarian’ Military
Interventions in Africa and the Middle East
Case Study: Somalia (1992) and Iraq (2003)**

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Declaration

I hereby declare that the substance of this dissertation is entirely the result of my own investigation and that references to other authors' works are made whenever is necessary.

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“I object to violence because when it appears to do good, the good is only temporary; the evil it does is permanent.”

Mahatma Gandhi

To my dearest parents...

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Abstract

This dissertation is a study of U.S. foreign policy in the context of international relations in the post-Cold War era, an era in which the U.S. assumed the role of the world hegemon. It deals with the issue of U.S. ‘humanitarian’ military interventions in Africa and the Middle East. To this end, U.S. interventions in both Somalia (1992) and Iraq (2003), incarnating Africa and the Middle East respectively, have been chosen as cases in point. More specifically, the study examines the extent to which a ‘humanitarian’ concern shaped U.S. foreign policy decisions during its military interventions in both countries, as opposed to calculations of national interests.

The intent of this dissertation is, then, to prove that U.S. ‘humanitarian’ military interventions in Somalia and Iraq were driven in the first place by realistic geostrategic and geopolitical considerations of primacy, economic interests as well as cultural motivations, not idealistic ‘humanitarian’ concerns.

For this reason, this work strives to argue within its different chapters that the United States calculations of national interests explain better why the nation pursued distinct policies and approaches in both Somalia and Iraq, and that the ‘humanitarian’ concern was of marginal relevance. In clearer terms, the shift of the U. S. ‘humanitarian’ military intervention from a multilateral realistic profile in the case of Somalia to a more unilateral idealistic profile in the case of Iraq was a national interest act—for Iraq was, unlike Somalia, a worthy terrain.

Besides, this study elucidates that the main reasons leading Presidents George Bush the father to delay action and then opt for intervention in Somalia and Bill Clinton to urge for withdrawal from it, as well as the reasons pushing George W. Bush the son to wage war on Iraq are all based on the realistic national interests’ game. The latter has its implications politically, economically and geostrategically.

Not only does this work unfold American foreign policy twists and underlying calculations in the course of its ‘humanitarian’ interventions, but it shows how the giant media conglomerates are U.S. foreign policy decision makers’ unhumanitarian partners as well. The argumentation and analysis set forth in this dissertation are based on the hegemony theories formulated by Antonio Gramsci and Robert Cox.

List of Abbreviations

- ABC: American Broadcasting Company
- BBC: British Broadcasting Corporation
- CBS: Columbia Broadcasting System
- CIA: Central Intelligence Agency
- CNN: Cable News Network
- CPO: the Coalition Provisional Authority
- ICP: Iraqi Communist Party
- MSNBC: MicroSoft National Broadcasting Company
- NBC: National Broadcasting Company
- OIF: Operation Iraqi Freedom
- OPEC: the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
- SCO: Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
- SNM: Somali National Movement
- SPM: Somali Patriotic Movement
- SYL: Somali Youth League
- UK: United Kingdom
- UN: United Nations
- UNITAF: Unified Task Force
- UNOSOM I: the first United Nations Operation in Somalia
- UNOSOM II: the second United Nations Operation in Somalia
- UNSC: United Nations Security Council
- UNSCOM: United Nations Special Commission
- USA: United States of America
- USC: United Somali Congress
- USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- WMD: weapons of mass destruction
- WSLF: Western Somali Liberation Front

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Introduction

“The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing”¹, Edmund Burke declared as early as the eighteenth century. From a western perspective, this was a pioneer statement defending and promoting the policy of intervention for the sake of containing the ‘evil’ failed states. Throughout the course of the twentieth century, military intervention has proved to be the most prominent form of intervention characterising the First and Second World Wars. Nonetheless, Wilsonian idealism featuring the early twentieth century bore the seeds of ‘humanitarian’ intervention for self-interested reasons, assigning America the task of a world ‘liberator’, thus inevitably a world hegemon. This process, however, was to take more time than many Americans had believed, due to the emergence of Germany, Japan and the USSR as rising powers. Consequently, a convergence between both realism and idealism was necessary. The collapse of great-power cooperation after World War II helped establish realism as the dominant approach to the theory and practice of international politics in the United States, even during the Cold War. Simultaneously, American leaders’ exaggerated description of external dangers—specifically the Soviet threat—sent the impression that the nation was about to launch an idealistic crusade, not a realistic policy.

One of the main Cold War mechanisms was the Marshall Plan (1948-1952). Secretary of State George Marshall demanded that the European states devise a plan for their economic recovery and the United States would supply their funds. Many European nations, however, realised that such an American measure was meant to establish U.S. hegemony over Europe. As a result, European leaders—yearning for a united Europe free from American domination and pressure—established the European Economic Community in 1957. Having the same fears from the Soviet Union, Western Europe felt the necessity to sideline with the U.S., which was seen unquestionably as the leader of the Western bloc.

As a result, tension between the two hostile power blocs became the dominant atmosphere. Inseparable from this tension was the fear to let any vacuum of power open that the other side might fill. Thus, both the Soviet Union and the United States attempted by all means to bolster weak regimes and hold together divided societies. Such states as Somalia, Afghanistan, and Yugoslavia were each regarded, at one time or another, as important pieces on the Cold War chessboard. With the demise of the Soviet Union, however, one superpower

¹ Makalena Y. Shibata, “*A Case Study on the U.S. Policy in Humanitarian Intervention: Somalia, Rwanda, and Liberia.*” Alabama: Maxwell Air Force Base, 2006. pp. 01.

lost its capacity to prop up such regimes, and the other lost its most obvious incentive to do so—now deserving the label of the world hegemon.

In the post-Cold War era, specifically in the 1990s, a number of weak states fragmented or collapsed entirely and required a ‘humanitarian’ aid. This has added to the world politics’ repertoire the term ‘humanitarian’ intervention, merging with its predecessor military intervention, together forming an odd couple. In other words, the development of a new pattern of intervention, known as military intervention for humanitarian purposes, has been a crucial feature of the 1990s international environment up to the present day. It has become apparent now that this new ostensibly idealistic pattern of intervention serves as an adequate way to assert U.S. hegemony and achieve the typically realistic self-interest’s game. Thus, unsurprisingly during this period, the intensity and frequency of the U. S. ‘humanitarian missions’ in accordance with the United Nations authorisation have increased in pace to once every 30 months.¹ Chief among which are the 1992 intervention in Somalia, 1994 intervention in Rwanda, 1995 intervention in Bosnia and the 1999 intervention in Kosovo, all along multilateral lines. Once again, both realism and idealism have been used interchangeably.

A further significant shift has followed the events of September 11, 2001, after which a “New World Order” based on American leadership has emerged as the guiding doctrine of American foreign policy, waging a basically unilateral idealistic “War on Terrorism”. The central justification was that allowing distant and trouble lands like Afghanistan and Iraq to collapse into anarchy threatens the U.S. safety and welfare.

Amidst all these post- Cold War foreign policy calculations and world dilemmas, news media, especially television, appear to be assuming an ever larger role in the United States’ vital affairs. CNN’s live coverage of the Gulf War, for example, led some diplomats to declare that the lifeblood of the diplomatic trade—the cable traffic between embassies and foreign ministries—was mostly dead. “It’s useless for us to report what is happening,” a European diplomat remarked, “when everyone in our capital sees it all on television. By the time you’ve coded your cable, they know as much as you do.”² I do believe, however, that this is not the case all the time, for there were some news—humanitarian catastrophes—that deserved media portrayal towards which TV

¹ Francis Fukuyama, ed. *Nation Building Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*. Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006. pp. 229-30-31.

² McNamara, Kevin J. “International Media and U.S. Foreign Policy”, *Science Direct* (1996)pp.664.
<<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00304387/40>>

channels had followed a policy of denial long before considering them breaking news. Somalia, for instance, is a typical case of such a policy. The latter was pursued before President Bush's decision to launch a realistic multilateral intervention in Somalia.

Much ink has been spilled over this intervention. For instance, a number of studies that have illuminated the U. S. foreign policy behaviours in the post-Cold War era have reached the conclusion that the shift from multilateralism to unilateralism was the central lesson following the 1994 shameful withdrawal from Somalia—for which the finger of blame was put entirely on the United Nations.¹ However, a different opinion is held among some scholars and politicians—with whom I do agree—regarding the real unstated reason generating such a shift in policy, which the present dissertation tries to elucidate and demonstrate.

Other studies claimed that following the Cold War closure, Americans have become involved as 'humanitarian' outsiders in ethnic conflicts for one chief reason, 'humanitarian' concerns. Yet, ethnic conflict had and still has more to do with the vital concerns of interested nation-states. In such an environment, problems inside some weak states, previously of secondary regional concern, grew in significance. When the international community gets involved in these conflicts, it is normally with limited objectives and the commitment of limited resources. Such was the case for the U.S. interventions in Somalia and Bosnia at the wake of the 1990s. However, its recent interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have proved to be totally different in terms of objectives, means and ideology for some underlying reasons.

The aim of this study is, then, to explain how the U. S. military intervention in Africa and the Middle East has evolved since the end of the Cold War, in terms of theory, practice and how it unfolded upon the whole region. Uppermost, the aim is to examine the extent to which it deserves the label 'humanitarian'. This will be achieved by focusing purposefully on a couple of cases of U. S. 'humanitarian' military interventions. The first case is the 1992 intervention in Somalia, and the second is the 2003 intervention in Iraq.

A plenty of important studies about U.S. interventions in both Somalia and Iraq are available. Those that analyse U.S. 'humanitarian' military intervention in Somalia include, among others, Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst's *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*, Haji Abdiwahid Osman's *The Legality of the UN Humanitarian Intervention under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: Somalia and Beyond*, and

¹ See for example: Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*. 15 July 2011
<www.dodccrp.org/files/Allard_Somalia.pdf>

Peter Woodward's *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa*. Regarding the U.S. war on Iraq, Debra Miller wrote an important book entitled *The War against Iraq*, and so did Alejandro Colás and Richard Saull when they published *The War on Terrorism and the American 'Empire' After the Cold War*. On his part, Thomas E. Ricks has put into question the U.S. ability to achieve any 'humanitarian' or military success in his *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*. The quality of my work, however, lies in its capacity to merge both topics together. Out of this comparative study, I aim at bringing to the surface unstated realities about U.S. 'humanitarian' military ventures in Africa and the Middle East.

Interestingly, the objective of this study is twofold. First, it seeks to examine the theoretical developments underpinning the U. S. 'humanitarian' military intervention after the end of the Cold War. Secondly, to describe the shift of the U. S. 'humanitarian' military intervention from a multilateral realistic profile in the case of Somalia to a more unilateral idealistic profile in the case of Iraq. Albeit both countries are said to be failed states requiring American sympathy, the present work unravels the underlying reasons and agendas behind. In view of the aforesaid, given the altered nature of the practice and incentive influencing the U. S. 'humanitarian' military intervention in Africa and the Middle East, it is of great importance to scrutinise the strategies presented by such a change.

This work, additionally, provides a multidimensional overview of U.S. 'humanitarian' military interventions in both Somalia and Iraq. The first concerns American foreign policy twists as expounded above. Whereas the second makes clear the U.S. media policy twists, that go hand in hand with the executive's decisions, vis-à-vis those interventions. My goal is to paint with broad brush strokes to outline how the giant media conglomerates are complicit with U.S. foreign policy decision-makers' calculations in war aims and shifts.

Such an intermingling between the society's elite and the media based on self-interest had been referred to by Antonio Gramsci at the wake of the twentieth century. By developing a whole theory about hegemony at the national level, he could explain thoroughly the dynamics of this link. Thereafter, Robert Cox developed an extended version of Gramsci's hegemony theory that elucidated the dynamics of hegemonic states' use of international institutions to maximise their self-interest. The U.S. exploitation of the United Nations during Somalia's debacle fits in this pattern. This would render both Gramscian and Coxian hegemony theories of prime importance to this work. Hopefully, the linkage between both theories and the subject of humanitarian intervention would be a motivating factor that raises readers' curiosity to explore this relationship within the folds of this dissertation.

As for my motives for exploring this topic, they are many. Chief among which arose from the fact that the subject of humanitarian intervention and international law has proven to be a challenging one to write about. Not only because of its inherent complexity, and the ethical dilemmas that it poses, but also because world events either prompting actual intervention on humanitarian grounds, or at least provoking a discussion of the possibility of such intervention, are becoming more and more frequent. Furthermore, human rights can become a pretext for policies that undermine democracy and the rule of law. Respect for human rights is one thing, promoting human rights is another. Human rights can be promoted by methods that themselves violate human rights. Like national security, human rights often end up providing a justification for foreign intervention. The question of when—under what circumstances—it is morally permissible to intervene abroad in order to protect national security or to enforce respect for human rights remains crucial to the present study. I have accordingly found it necessary to focus on the aforementioned couple of case studies of U.S. ‘humanitarian’ interventions initiated before and after 09/11, for numerous events relevant to ‘humanitarian’ intervention have occurred before and after this date.

Equally significant is the fact that U.S. foreign policy ever since the end of the Cold War has undergone important changes. Given the overwhelming power and influence of the world’s only superpower, these changes have important implications for the rest of the world, uppermost Africa and the Middle East. Besides, the purpose and significance of this study stem from the need to make a scholarly contribution to clarify the new interventionist tendencies and dig deeply into the nature of the U. S. changing tendencies and different policy behaviours, with the help of its media, vis-à-vis two ‘failed’ states.

Accordingly, given the need for a clearly-stated purpose, the research questions of the study are of paramount importance and formulated as follows:

- Why did the U.S. prefer to shield under the United Nations umbrella during its ‘humanitarian’ military intervention in Somalia, whereas in Iraq neglecting the total opposition of the UN, it did act unilaterally accepting to take responsibility over what the war may generate?
- Why was media coverage in both ‘humanitarian’ military interventions so different? For, as my study will show, in Iraq there was an amplification and magnification of events, whereas in Somalia it was after a year of the debacle that people heard of it for the first time.
- Why was there in Somalia an immediate withdrawal once feeling that the mission was driving towards failure? And why was there in Iraq, in spite of the difficulty of the

mission, a “transportation of an enormous army, navy and air force 7000 miles away to destroy a country scarcely known even to the educated American, all in the name of freedom”¹?

- To what extent were Gramsci and Cox right when they claimed in their hegemony theories that hegemonic states make use of national and international institutions respectively in order to extend the reach of their hegemony and wealth?

Secondary questions that this study hopes to answer regarding the Somali case include:

- Why was Somalia's outcry so great in spite of the fact that with the end of the Cold War it became no longer a necessary addition to American concerns in the Gulf and Indian Ocean?
- President Bush argued that his decision for intervention was motivated by a ‘humanitarian’ concern. But why did his acknowledgement that Somalia was a major human tragedy come almost a year after the outbreak of the civil war? This must cast doubt on the extent to which a ‘humanitarian’ concern for the Somalis had influenced Bush's decision.
- Knowing that there was no perceived material or strategic interests at stake in Somalia, why did the constituted identity and interests of the U.S. as perceived by the Bush administration prescribe a preference for intervention and a military action was taken in the name of humanitarianism?

Likewise, the Iraqi case raises a number of secondary questions among which:

- In comparison to Somalia, what was more striking in Iraq that caught American attention at the wake of the twenty-first century and even before?
- And was it really a ‘humanitarian’ intervention in Iraq as it is repeatedly claimed by U.S. officials and politicians? If not, what was the real intention?

In the journey of answering these questions, this dissertation suggests a couple of hypotheses:

- First, the main reasons leading Presidents George Bush the father to delay action and then opt for intervention in Somalia and Bill Clinton to urge for withdrawal from it, as

¹ Said, Edward W. preface. *Orientalism*, 3rd ed. London: the Penguin Group, 2003.pp. xv.

well as the reasons pushing George W. Bush the son to wage war on Iraq are very close in nature.

- Second, the U. S. foreign policy shifts and twists in the course of its ‘humanitarian’ missions were motivated in the first place by realistic geostrategic and geopolitical considerations of primacy, economic interests as well as cultural motivations, not idealistic ‘humanitarian’ concerns. The U.S. media, as well, are no exception.

In order to achieve the aims of this study and examine the rightness of the above hypotheses, the study will be pursued principally from a historicist analytical approach following a chronological order. The latter is not an innocent chronological or narrative exercise. It is rather very helpful for an understanding of particular interpretations and conceptions of power. For a clear understanding of the overall international climate in the post-Cold War era and the U. S. role and interventionist tendencies within it, the different patterns of intervention in the period preceding the end of the Cold War will be outlined in order to provide a basis for understanding its historical evolution. Then, an analytical approach is indispensable and required to unfold the U. S incentives and finalities pushing it to pursue distinct policies in Somalia and Iraq. To this end, the notion of American national interests will recurrently be referred to.

Accordingly, the study will be divided into three chapters. The first chapter covers both the theoretical and historical backgrounds of the post-Cold War new realities and tendencies focusing first on two relevant hegemony theories set forth by Gramsci and Cox. The relevance of those theories to this dissertation stem from the fact that the U.S. has emerged after the Cold War closure as the world’s hegemon, exercising hegemony over national and international institutions. The establishment of this hegemony did lead to the demise of the notion of sovereignty, established earlier by the United Nations Charter. In this regard, this Charter is given considerable attention in this chapter.

This same chapter will also be devoted to defining the term humanitarianism, for a clear understanding of its meaning is a necessary precursor to examine the relevance of military enforcement in humanitarian interventions in the post-Cold War era. This would be very helpful to evaluate U. S. actions in Somalia and Iraq. Then, the foreign policy approaches pursued by the U.S—influencing the nation’s behaviours during its interventions—prior to, during and following the Cold War will be outlined. Undeniable as well is the role media performs in making those foreign policy agendas applicable. Therefore,

this chapter will be entitled: “New Post-Cold War ‘Humanitarian’ Interventionism and the Foreign Policy of the U.S.—the World Hegemon”.

The second chapter of the study will be mainly analytical and deal exclusively with the American ‘humanitarian’ intervention in Somalia and the role of media in it—unveiling the hidden reality from its various angles and examining the ‘humanitarian’ aspect of the ‘mission’. Within the various sections of this chapter, I will back my argumentation by facts in an attempt to answer the above questions. Hence, it will first explain Somalia’s recent history which laid out the foundations of Somalia’s post-Cold War nightmare. Then, it will expound the circumstances surrounding President Bush’s Intervention’s decision, compare media coverage prior to and after the President’s intervention decision, delve into the nature of President’s Clinton deep military involvement and sudden withdrawal and bring to the surface the catastrophic aftermaths of intervention. Thus, this chapter will be entitled: “The 1992 U. S. ‘Humanitarian’ Military Intervention in Somalia: Hidden Agendas or Humanitarian Concerns?”

Following the same analytical approach, the third chapter entitled: “The 2003 War on Iraq: a U. S. ‘humanitarian’ War on Terrorism” will necessarily commence by a glimpse of Iraq’s riches and recent history. Obviously, the former was the determining factor that led Iraq to be so tempting for the U.S., whereas the latter gifted America such a ‘moment’. Then, it will explain and analyse thoroughly the circumstances under which the war against Iraq was declared faced by an overwhelming United Nations negativity and unprecedented media propaganda. The president's declared as well as undeclared objectives will also be unveiled focusing on the ‘humanitarian’ aspect of the war. Finally, the work will be rounded off by a conclusion, that constitutes a summary of the entire study’s findings, based upon the research questions and secondary questions posed at the outset.

Chapter One:
**New Post-Cold War ‘Humanitarian’ Interventionism and
the Foreign Policy of the U.S.—the World Hegemon**

This chapter will commence by setting forth the theoretical framework on which the present study stands. It sheds light on Gramsci's and Cox's hegemony theories and their implications on U.S. hegemony and power. The next section will discuss the extent to which the principle of non-intervention was applicable in the pre and post-Cold War eras, focusing on the latter when matters of sovereignty seem to have taken a backseat and been replaced by human rights. That is, how the balance of power politics since the end of the Cold War has shaped the new interventionist tendencies. Then, the term humanitarian intervention will be defined, highlighting the contradiction of military intervention and humanitarian intervention. The next section will consist of a set of arguments against the use of force. This would set the tone for the subsequent chapters. It will be followed by a glimpse at U. S. foreign policy in the twentieth century, especially in the post-Cold War era, making clear the different approaches adopted by successive presidents influencing their interventionist tendencies. The closing section will discuss the role that the media perform in shaping any interventionist policy.

I-Gramscian and Coxian Hegemony Theories and their Implications on U.S. Power

Students of politics and international relations often engage with the concept of hegemony as somehow related to the revolutionary and co-founder of the Italian Communist Party, Antonio Gramsci. Despite the different meanings given to hegemony, Gramsci has always been identified as the thinker to have developed the concept.¹

Hegemony is not static and U.S. hegemony has evolved overtime since the Second World War. The immediate post-World War II order laid the foundation of a highly institutionalised multilateral system that provided key benefits for a number of countries whilst simultaneously enhancing American power. A historical reading of American hegemony suggests that its recent unilateralism is undermining the foundations of its power and influence.

A key argument of this section is that the development of American hegemony generally, and the distinctive boost that has occurred after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, can best be understood by placing recent events in a theoretical framework. In clearer terms, this section assumes that the key concepts of Gramsci's and Cox's political analysis

¹ Fusaro, Lorenzo. "*Gramsci's concept of hegemony at the national and international level.*" London: King's College, 2010. pp. 02.

can serve as a useful guide to the changing dynamics of international relations with respect to the U.S. hegemonic role in international politics.

I-1-Gramsci's Concept of Hegemony

The Gramscian definition of power is similar to that employed by Machiavelli. Machiavelli, who describes power as a centaur where the centaur is half man, half beast, sees power as half coercion, half consent. In other words, no matter how much force you make use of, if people don't accept your power it is all for naught.¹ In regards to society, Gramsci argues that coercion will always be latent and only used in marginal cases. Rather, it is the consent that gives the upper class power.²

The hegemony that the upper classes hold over culture and values is usually enough to legitimise their power over the people of the nation by means of acceptance. This power is purveyed by the upper classes through civil society constituted by the churches, educational institutions, and media among others. Together, they are called the "historic bloc". This concept is of paramount importance to my study for in this and the subsequent chapters it will be demonstrated that the media—in our case the U.S. media—are at U.S. government's disposal as a propagandist tool in pursuit of power and influence. A thorough discussion of this will be provided in the last section of this chapter.

For a better understanding of this concept, historic bloc refers to "the structure of the society, the economic base of the society, the cultural flows that are current and the political system that exists within it."³ Besides, the historic bloc itself is indeed in a state of constant change because of the dialectic relationship that exists in all of society. The factors that affect the historic bloc are numerous, and include for instance class relations and the structure of the economy.⁴ In addition to this, the historic bloc is the system of society and not the state itself. It should be noted, though, that it is entirely possible for the society to change without affecting the historic bloc in what is known as "passive revolution".⁵

Additionally, while social institutions produce and reproduce the values and ideals of the upper class, they also have another tool at their disposal. In what Gramsci calls

¹ Rytter Sørensen, Jesper. *Cambodian Institutions in Change – A Study in Hegemonic Influence*, diss. Denmark: Aalborg University Press, 2010.pp.16.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Cox, Robert. *Production Power and World Order*. Guildford: Columbia University Press, 1987.pp. 389.

⁵ Cox, Robert. *Approaches to World Order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.pp. 137.

Transformismo, hegemonic institutions will incorporate critics into their structure.¹ Transformismo is defined as the act of incorporating leaders of opposing organisations or parties into the hegemonic system, thus neutralising their revolutionary potential. This mechanism ensures the resilience and longevity of the hegemony since it allows itself to incorporate opposing leaders who might otherwise threaten its dominance. By incorporating the outside opponents into the hegemonic structure, their revolutionary potential is essentially nullified because they are allowed to integrate some of their ideals into the hegemonic structure in a more docile fashion.²

Because of its importance in the field of politics, numerous authors have taken Gramsci's definition of hegemony as a starting point that deserves elaboration. At the most general level there is much merit in 1992 Adam Watson's distinction between empire and hegemony. According to him, the former is the "direct administration of different communities from an imperial centre", whereas the latter is the ability of some power or authority in a system to "lay down the law" about external relations between states in the international system, while leaving them domestically independent.³

Giovanni Arrighi is another author who takes Gramsci seriously when cogitating on the concept of hegemony and reflecting upon ways in which this concept could be applied to the international. Central to Arrighi's analysis is the claim that hegemony does not equal domination. The power of a hegemonic group—or a state—is "more" and "different" from pure and simple domination.⁴

For Arrighi, power can also be understood in Machiavellian terms and hence it can take the form of a "combination of consent and coercion". Consent is associated with moral leadership, while domination implies "the use of force, or a credible threat of force".⁵ Arrighi claims that a dominant group's power, then, can be based on domination, "pure and simple" one might say, which rests on coercion and force—or it can be based on domination and hegemony. Arrighi in fact understands hegemony eventually as addendum or "additional power" to domination which "accrues to a dominant group by virtue of its

¹ Cox, *Approaches to World Order*, pp.139.

² Rytter Sørensen, op.cit., pp.16.

³ Beeson, Mark, Richard Higgott. "*Hegemony, Institutionalism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice in Comparative Historical Perspective*", *Third World Quarterly* Vol 26 Issue 07(2005)pp.1174.

⁴ Fusaro, op.cit., pp. 02.

⁵ Ibid.

capacity to place all the issues around which conflict rages on a ‘universal’ plane”.¹ These characteristics can be best understood when projected at American hegemony. For instance, U. S. ostensible ‘humanitarian’ intervention in Iraq was justified in part upon universal security grounds—for Saddam’s possession of weapons of mass destruction could result in a third world war.

This idea is based on Gramsci’s statement that “it is true that the State is seen as the organ of one particular group, destined to create favourable conditions for the latter’s maximum expansion”. But, he continues showing that the interests of the particular group need to be conceived and presented as the interests of all and hence to be ‘universal’. In Gramsci’s words: “the development and expansion of the particular group are conceived of, and presented, as being the motor force of a universal expansion, a development of all the national energies”.²

In an influential article called “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method”, Robert Cox also analyses Gramsci’s concept of “hegemony” and gives some guidelines on how it could be applied to the field of international relations.

I-2-Robert Cox’s Hegemony Theory and the International

The aim of Robert Cox is to raise Antonio Gramsci's theory to the international level. To this purpose he shares Gramsci's views of hegemony. He simply states that hegemony on the international sphere is the dominant system at the time. The primary difference between Gramsci and Cox is as such that where Gramsci points to national institutions as the purveyors of hegemonic ideals, Cox points to international institutions as the ones that perform this operation on an international level.³

Cox posits that the strongest states in the international sphere maintain the status-quo, benefiting themselves, through hegemonic systems. This means, Cox argues, that the hegemonic ideals are transferred from the core countries—those that are strongest and have already adopted the hegemonic ideals—to the periphery, the developing countries that have to adopt these ideals. For this purpose, Robert Cox uses the Gramscian term “passive revolution” to describe the process. In other words, Coxian passive revolution is basically

¹ Fusaro, op.cit., pp. 03.

² Ibid.

³ Cox, op.cit., pp.135.

where “periphery countries gradually adapt to the economic, social and political conditions of core countries or in some cases have them thrust upon them”.¹

Moreover, in order for an international hegemony to be established, there must be a state strong enough to have global reach in order to create a set of international institutions. The latter must have sufficient power to impose the hegemony of the core states upon the periphery countries. Thus, Cox asserts that “the international hegemony is effectively the international expression of the national hegemony of the core states”.²

As specified earlier, Cox mainly deals with a system of international organisations which he describes as the “process through which the institutions and [the hegemony’s] ideology are developed”.³ Cox describes five features of the organisation:

The institutions embody the rules which facilitate the expansion of hegemonic world orders. They are themselves the product of a hegemonic world order. They ideologically legitimise the norms of the world order. They also co-opt the elite of the peripheral countries. And finally, they absorb counter hegemonic ideas.⁴

When the international organisation is established, it will only be at the initiative of core countries, or at least with their consent. The core country will then ensure the peripheral countries consent. This is done in a hierarchical manner. The semi-peripheral countries will be consulted first and more peripheral countries second.⁵ There is furthermore an informal structure reflecting the different levels of real political and economic power. It is these informal power structures which underlie the formal procedures for decisions.

As on a national level, furthermore, transformismo exists in the international sphere. Robert Cox describes it as the way in which international organisations co-opt talents from the peripheral countries who come with the intent to change the organisation from within, but end up working within the structures of the passive revolution. They are at best able to transfer elements of modernisation to the periphery countries, though within the interests of the local powers. Thus, they ensure the stability of the hegemonic system.⁶

This theory proves to be right, to a large extent, when applied to the real world. According to Babones and Alvarez-Rivadulla, the current core countries include: Great

¹ Cox, op.cit., pp.129.

² Ibid.,pp.137.

³ Ibid

⁴ Ibid.,pp.138.

⁵ Ibid

⁶ Ibid.,pp.139.

Britain, Germany, France, Japan, Canada, to mention only a few, with the U.S. at the forefront.¹ Semi-periphery countries include Chile, South Africa, Turkey, Brazil and Uruguay, among many others.² Examples of periphery countries include most of African countries together with Pakistan, the Philippines, India, Indonesia and so on.³

Besides, the economic and political system that has grown out of this globalised climate is commonly known as the Bretton Woods system and includes such institutions as the UN system, the IMF and the World Bank. The U.S. plays a significant role in all these institutions, and as in the case of the IMF commands a veto vote.⁴

For instance, under the leadership of the U.S., core countries control and benefit from the global market via the World Trade Organisation. This latter was known previously as the GATT—General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—and was signed into effect in Geneva, Switzerland. The main purpose of this organisation was to further the liberalisation of world trade. The GATT conducted eight rounds of talks dedicated to addressing various trade issues and resolving international trade disputes. After seven years of negotiations in the 1980s and 1990s, the Uruguay Round was held. The result of this round was an agreement to reduce trade barriers and to create more comprehensive and enforceable world trade rules. The final result of these negotiations was the creation of the WTO which was formed as a result of this agreement on January 1, 1995.⁵ Since its inception, the WTO has served as a forum for promoting multilateral economic cooperation.

A further example of American command and hegemony over the world system is the Washington Consensus (WC) formed in 1989 by the U.S. government along with the World Bank and IMF. This agreement has formed a guideline for developing countries pointing in the direction of privatisation of industries and institutions, financial deregulation and reductions of trade barriers as a method of development.⁶

Significantly, since the 1990s the WC has dominated the creation of policies in global governance institutions such as the IMF and World Bank. It can be argued that because of the

¹ Babones, Salvatore, J., M. Alvarez-Rivadulla. “*Standardized Income Inequality Data for Use in Cross-National Research*”, *Sociological Inquiry*, Vol. 77, No. 1 (February 2007)pp.14.

² Ibid., pp.13.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Wallerstein, Immanuel. “*The Three Instances of Hegemony in the History of the Capitalist World Economy*”, *International Political Economy Volume II*, London: Sage Publications, 2008.pp. 213.

⁵ Rytter Sørensen, op.cit.,pp.21.

⁶ Wittkopf, Eugene R. et al. *American foreign policy: Pattern and Process*. Basing stoke Thomson Wadsworth, 2008. pp.567.

WC, U.S. hegemony has been bolstered in that a set of principles on global governance, preferable to U.S. interests, have been utilised within international institutions.

Of significance and importance to my work is the United States' relation with the UN. Throughout the history of American hegemony, it has used the United Nations as a weapon to contain counter hegemonic ideas. The U.S.A.'s first war following the Second World War—the Korean War—was fought between the U.S. and the Republic of Korea on one side, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the other side—later joined by the Peoples Republic of China. It began on 25 June 1950 when North Korea crossed the 38th parallel. Following this aggression from North Korea, the UN Security Council both condemned the aggression and called for “police action” against North Korea. This is the first example of the UN system being used to suppress the spread of counter hegemonic ideas.

In this instance, the U.S. found that the spread of communism in East Asia beyond China and the Soviet Union was against their interest. Following the failure to defeat North Korea, South Korea became a buffer state and thus an integral part of the American containment strategy against communism in the region. This conflict, while not a military victory—because the American led UN alliance failed to effectively defeat North Korea—was a political victory for Americans because they managed to demonstrate their dominance over the UN system.

Likewise, in the post-Cold War era U.S. hegemony has been bolstered in that a set of principles on global governance, preferable to U.S. interests, have been utilised within the UN. This is only to say that the current hegemonic system of international institutions continues to be under the dominance of American ideals and values. In this respect, Esther Brimmer Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of International Organisation Affairs asserts: “U.S. engagement at the United Nations is an essential means of achieving our foreign policy goals and advancing our values. It is an important forum for burden-sharing in tough financial times. And it clearly benefits Americans”.¹ On her part, Condoleezza Rice in her article “Promoting the National Interest” assures: “U.S. interests are served by having strong alliances and can be promoted within the U.N. and other multilateral organisations.”²

This reality, epitomised in my work in the United Nations Charter, would be explained thoroughly in the subsequent section of this chapter. The second and third chapters

¹ Brimmer, Esther. “*How Engagement at the United Nations Benefits the United States*”. (2011) 18 Aug 2013 <<http://www.state.gov/p/io/rm/2011/171889.htm>>

² Rice, Condoleezza. “*Promoting the National Interest*”, *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 2000) 47.

would further confirm this argument. The former delves into the real causes lying behind the U.S. 1992 multilateral intervention in Somalia, being primarily under UN auspices, to show that it was obviously in U.S. interest. On the contrary, the latter proves that U.S. interest was to be realised by a unilateral intervention in Iraq in 2003, without a UN approval.

It is clearly noticeable today that the privileging of unilateralism over multilateralism may ultimately weaken the basis of the U.S. hegemonic position. As events in Iraq demonstrate, and as the rise of anti-Americanism around the world suggests more generally, there are limits to American power.

As one may perceive, this can be induced from the Coxian theory which claims that as long as a hegemon is shielding under the international institutions' umbrella, it is under no harm, and vice versa. In spite of its relative relevance in the real world, a number of critics have criticised this theory, showing some limitations of it.

I-3-Critique of Coxian Hegemony

I will in this part introduce the reader to the critique that other academics have levelled at this theory. The purpose of this critique is to give the reader a better understanding of the limitations of the theory, and thereby also a better grasp of the purpose and direction of this study.

One of the most common critiques directed at Robert Cox's theory of hegemony is that the roots of his understanding of hegemony stem from Antonio Gramsci's world view. The argument is that Gramsci's theory of hegemony is historically grounded in Gramsci's own era and that it therefore cannot be generalised beyond fascist Italy in which Gramsci lived.¹ John Bellamy argues that Gramsci did not comment on the world system as a whole, but rather focused on the internal situation in Italy at the time. By this logic he argues that, since the original Gramscian hegemony theory does not directly address globalisation, Coxian hegemony theory which is based on Gramscian methodology is therefore not valid and not a universal theory.² The claim that Coxian hegemony theory is not universally applicable is a serious claim since the validity of a social scientific theory rests in whether or not it is universally applicable.

¹ Berry, Craig. "*Rediscovering Robert Cox: Agency and Ideational in Critical IPE*", *Political Perspectives Graduate Journal* (2007):pp.5, 29 Aug 2013

<<http://www.politicalperspectives.org.uk/General/Issues/CIP-2007-1/CIP-2007-01-08.pdf>>

² Rytter Sørensen, op.cit., pp.19.

Another critique of Coxian hegemony theory views that the strength in the world order should not be found in a complex interaction of cultural values and ideological ideas, but rather in the inherent economic strength of the market capitalistic system.¹ Furthermore, the critique argues that by looking for historic blocs constructed by ideas and values, you run the risk of building up an idealistic account of economic policy and thus undermining the principle of economic materialism which forms the core of Marxist teachings.

Leo Panitch, on his part, also criticises the Coxian hegemony theory. His criticism is based on his argument that the theory creates a view that is too top down. He argues that Coxian theory views globalisation as an outside-in process—that globalisation goes from the global to the national. His criticism is that the theory, thus, misses the level that goes between the global and the local.²

While I recognise that the above mentioned scholars bring entirely valid criticism to bear against Coxian hegemony theory, I nevertheless consider this theory, together with the Gramscian theory, to be the most valid theories for the problem at hand. Since the aim of this study is to assess the extent to which U. S. military interventions in both Somalia and Iraq are ‘humanitarian’, I find that both theories provide the optimal framework for analysing both interventions. Because the Gramscian hegemonic theory demonstrates that a hegemonic state has command over its media, which is an integral part of the “historic block” at the national level, it is relevant to my argumentation. Likewise, the Coxian hegemonic theory, which provides an extension of the Gramscian approach to the international level, asserts that a hegemonic state makes use of international institutions only to advances its foreign policy goals. In my work, this could have implications on the U.S. policy behaviours vis-à-vis the UN. Thus, both theories have been chosen as the theories of this study.

Inseparable from the domination of the concept of hegemony in its modern sense, in the post-Cold War era, is the erosion of another concept called sovereignty. Albeit the latter was established by the United Nations Charter after the Second World War closure, it constituted the main hindrance to the expansion of the U.S., the world hegemon.

¹ Rytter Sørensen, *op.cit.*, pp.19.

² *Ibid.*

II-The Responsibility to Protect and the Decline of Sovereignty since the Cold War

International law pays great attention to the territorial integrity of states and non-interference in their domestic affairs. This was codified after the Second World War by the United Nations Charter, which went into effect on October 24, 1945, and was seen as one of the international community's decisive factors in choosing between action and non-intervention. Nonetheless, since the end of the Cold War matters of sovereignty and non-interference have been challenged by the emergent globalisation, U.S. hegemony and human rights discourse amidst genocide and war crimes.

II-1-Content of the Charter

The Charter is a treaty binding on all states party to it. It tends, to a large extent, to prohibit unilateral uses of force by states because of the terrible experiences which that liberty to go to war had imposed on international society, particularly in the two devastating world wars.¹ The main provisions of the Charter concerning the jus ad bellum² are Article 2(4), Article 39 and Article 51. Article 2(4), which sets out one of the principles of the United Nations, states:

All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.³

It is apparent that this provision contains a strict prohibition on any unilateral use of force by single states or by coalitions of states. This provision is today considered to be part and parcel of customary international law and hence binds all states of the world without exception. The use of force is prohibited mainly in the relations between states. This means that civil war is not covered. Thus, insurrection is not prohibited by the Charter, and neither is it prohibited for a government to use force in order to put down a rebellion taking place on its territory.

Additionally, this Article covers all uses of military 'force' which is larger than the concept of 'war'. It rules out any use of force, whatever its legal qualification, and not only prohibiting the formal resort to war.

¹ Kolb, Robert, Richard Hyde. *An Introduction to the International Law of Armed Conflicts*. Portland, USA: Hart Publishing, 2008.pp. 10.

² Jus ad bellum (Latin for "right to wage war") is a set of criteria that are to be consulted *before* engaging in war, in order to determine whether entering into war is justifiable. <http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Jus+ad+bellum>

³ Kolb, *ibid.*, pp. 11.

Article 51 of the Charter creates an exception to the prohibitive rule found in Article 2(4). It is concerned with self-defence of states. It reads as follows:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.¹

As one may perceive, this Article allows a state that is attacked to defend itself by way of military force and to call upon other states to come to its defence. This right of self-defence continues at least up until the time that the collective security machinery of the Security Council begins to function and collective security measures are adopted. It may even continue indefinitely in time if the Security Council fails to take appropriate measures. The interpretation of Article 51 has been fraught with problems. These problems have mainly arisen when some states have constantly and abusively attempted to extend the reach of the exception. Thus, the whole question of pre-emptive self-defence, which is much discussed today, is located, as far as the law is concerned, within Article 51 of the Charter.

Finally, there are the powers of the Security Council of the United Nations, which go in fact in accordance with U.S. interests and expansionist goals. Under the Charter law, the Security Council functions as a sort of guardian of international peace and security. The Charter, in Chapter VII, endows the Security Council with the power to take binding measures in order to safeguard international peace and security, or to restore it if it has already been broken. In Chapter VII, we find an organ representing the international community that is granted an extraordinary array of powers to employ in order to suppress any uses of force and to repel any aggression. The Council may also act in cases of threat to the peace, and thus pre-emptively.

Hence, the scope of its allowed action is not limited to collective security in the narrow sense and may therefore extend beyond a reaction by all members against an aggressor.² The role of the Council extends to a collective responsibility for world peace in the broad sense and has recently been broadened to encompass what are today often called

¹ Kolb, *op.cit.*, pp. 11.

² *Ibid.*

'human security' issues. It can be argued that the Council's powers listed in the Charter broaden whenever the U.S. feels it necessary to do so according to the requirements of each age. Hence, because the human rights discourse has gained momentum in the post-Cold War era, being a suitable justification for the achievement of foreign policy goals, it has become the modern rhetoric of the Charter. Consequently, during the 1990s, the Security Council with U.S. leadership undertook many actions in order, for example, to halt civil wars and the humanitarian catastrophes linked with them, such as in Somalia and Liberia; to restore democratically elected regimes, such as in Haiti; or to build up new national structures, for example in East Timor. The key provision that governs the action of the Council is Article 39 of the Charter, which states:

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.¹

Articles 41 and 42 set out the types of measures the Council may take in order to maintain or restore the peace namely peaceful coercive means, such as embargoes, which are dealt with in Article 41, or military coercive means, such as enforcement by a military force set up under the auspices of the Security Council, which are dealt with by Article 42. We can thus see that the Security Council has a right to use force in the cases contemplated in Article 39, namely threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression. The Council may resort to force in these cases, but, obviously, it is under no obligation to do so. Instead, it can either refrain from acting at all, for example because of an exercise of the veto, or decide to use only peaceful sanctions.

In all this, the formerly respected doctrine of sovereignty started to take a backseat, specifically at the onset of the 1990s, only to be replaced by another form of sovereignty that is extremely different from the concept of sovereignty itself.

II-2-The Charter and the Doctrine of Sovereignty

As one may perceive, this charter seems to establish the doctrine of sovereignty following the Second World War closure. This doctrine has constituted the main hindrance to the adoption of military intervention after the War. However, the post-Cold War realities have

¹ Kolb, op.cit., pp. 11.

demonstrated the erosion of this non-intervention norm in the 1990s and a new form of sovereignty, suitable to U.S. interests, emerged.

Since the collapse of the Cold War world order in 1989, a unipolar power structure has replaced the bipolar balance. It can be said that, under such a global configuration, only one superpower sets the world agenda and dominates in almost all fields including the international geostrategic, economic, political and ideological discourses. The mutual control that existed as a basic element of the Cold War's power structure became no longer in place. This is not to say that during the Cold War both superpowers complied with the non-interventionary norm, which they also ignored. Rather, interventionary policy was based on the policy of containment, the prism through which most foreign policy decisions were measured.

By early 1992, the Security Council asked the new UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to prepare a report on the future of UN peacekeeping in light of the Gulf War experience.¹ Boutros-Ghali did so and submitted his *Agenda for Peace* to the Security Council that summer. Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* evoked a model of world order that did not concern itself solely with maintaining inter-state borders and guaranteeing state sovereignty, but rather focused as much on intra-state affairs as on inter-state affairs. In his words:

In these past months a conviction has grown, among nations large and small, that an opportunity has been regained to achieve the great objectives of the Charter – a United Nations capable of maintaining international peace and security, of securing justice and human rights and of promoting, in the words of the Charter, 'social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom'. This opportunity must not be squandered. The Organisation must never again be crippled as it was in the era that has now passed.²

Aiming at assigning this new order some credibility, Boutros-Ghali suggested new conceptions of peace and security. He stated that "peace" could be threatened by terrorism or by "brutal ethnic, religious, social, cultural or linguistic strife",³ and described a "new dimension of insecurity", for which "efforts of the UN to build peace, stability and security must encompass matters beyond military threats in order to break the fetters of strife and warfare that have characterised the past".⁴ In an attempt to effect the reading of Articles 2, 24(1) and 42 of the UN Charter, it can be argued that the *Agenda* used this new conception of

¹ Burgess, Stephen Franklin. *The United Nations under Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992-1997*. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2001. pp. 08.

² Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. *An Agenda for Peace, 1995: With the new supplement and related UN Documents*, 3 Jan. 1995: para.3., United Nations, New York, 16 Jul 2011 <<http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agsupp.html>>

³ *Ibid.*, para.11.

⁴ *Ibid.*, para.13.

‘peace and security’ to interpret the Charter as establishing that even situations entirely internal to states could be conceived of as threats to peace and security and be addressed by the Security Council with force in a ‘humanitarian’ cloth. This would further confirm the Coxian hegemony theory mentioned before.

In his *Agenda*, Boutros Boutros-Ghali defended the then emerging doctrine of “contingent sovereignty,” which holds that sovereign rights are not fully protected. The contingent sovereignty doctrine maintains that states that fail to protect or prevent atrocities against their citizens, like Somalia, Rwanda, and Liberia, forfeit their claim to non-intervention. In such circumstances, the responsibility to protect the citizens devolves to the international community especially if this failure poses a threat to international peace and security.¹ In the Somali case study presented in the subsequent chapter, the UN Security Council authorised ‘humanitarian’ military intervention and, therefore, the U.S. as a member state had the legitimacy to intervene along multilateral lines.

Contemporary security challenges following the events of 9/11 have marked a further shift. As a result of today’s power relations, the U. S. and its allies have become gradually more tempted to make use of the United Nations structures—in particular the Security Council—for the promotion of their own strategic interests. So-called “collective enforcement actions” on the basis of Chapter VII of the Charter—that are de facto unilateral military actions exclusively directed by the United States—have become the preferred tool of global hegemony in the contemporary “New World Order”, as labelled by former U. S. neo-conservative President George W. Bush. In clearer terms, multilateral action in the legal framework of the United Nations Charter widely welcomed in the 1990s has been dissolving into “coalition wars” and unilateral actions against those who challenge the “multi-unipolar power system”.² Under such circumstances, it is apparent that the notion of sovereignty, especially in the nations forming the so-called “axis of evil” among which Iraq, has further lost ground in favour of a forced legitimisation of military interventionism, ‘humanitarian’ most of the time, under the banner of the “War on Terrorism”. A definition to humanitarian intervention in its modern sense would further confirm the demise of the notion of sovereignty.

¹ Patrick, Stewart. “*The Role of the U.S. Government in Humanitarian Intervention.*” Remarks to the 43rd Annual International Affairs Symposium, “*The Suffering of Strangers: Global Humanitarian Intervention in a Turbulent World,*” Lewis and Clark College, Portland, Oregon. 5 April 2004 cited in: Shibata, op.cit., pp. 27.

² Huntington, Samuel P. “*The Lonely Superpower*”, *Journal of Foreign Affairs* (2011), 21 Jul 2011 <<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/54797/samuel-p-huntington/the-lonely-superpower>>

III-Humanitarian Intervention and Military Intervention Defined

Before focusing on the changing behaviours in U. S. ‘humanitarian’ military actions, it is incumbent that the concepts humanitarian intervention and military intervention, though so distinct they are, be defined. Military intervention can be defined as “military operations undertaken openly by a state’s regular military forces within a specific foreign land, in such a manner to risk immediate combat”.¹ On the other hand, the term humanitarian intervention is frequently employed to denote a wide array of international actions, from the distribution of humanitarian aid to virtually any form of military intervention, regardless of whether it is in response to a serious humanitarian crisis.² The recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have further muddied the waters, as there has been a tendency for these wars to be viewed wrongly as ‘humanitarian’ interventions, even by those who believe that they lacked any ‘humanitarian’ rationale. It is therefore necessary to define thoroughly what I mean by ‘humanitarian’ intervention to help set the scope of what follows.

As a starting point, humanitarianism is a concept derived from a range of intellectual, religious and cultural traditions. Humanitarian intervention as a doctrine was developed during the 19th century. Orthodox humanitarian action, for instance, which emerged at that time, has aimed at alleviating human suffering caused by abrupt catastrophic occurrences. It is a tangible set of practices targeting the victims in the disaster region, and delivering medical aid or food to them. This comprises limited and neutral operations which are directed by a particular set of objectives.³ Of significance to my work are the elements of impartiality and neutrality which are central in this kind of intervention.

For the purpose of this study, humanitarian intervention in its modern sense, in the post-Cold War era, can be defined as “forcible action by states to prevent or to end gross violations of human rights on behalf of people other than their own nationals, through the use of armed force without the consent of the target government and with or without UN authorisation”.⁴ In this respect, John Charvet argues in his “The Idea of State Sovereignty and the Right of Humanitarian Intervention” that humanitarian intervention, as the most assertive form of promoting human rights at a global level, was clearly incompatible with norms such

¹ Tillema, Herbert K. “*Foreign Overt Military Intervention in the Nuclear Age: A Clarification*”. Journal of Peace Research (1989): pp.419, 26 Jul 2011

<http://jpr.sagepub.com/search/results?fulltext=Foreign+Overt+Military+Intervention+in+the+Nuclear+Age%3A+A+Clarification&x=0&y=0&submit=yes&journal_set=spjpr&src=selected&andorexactfulltext=and>

² Pattison, James. *Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should Intervene?* New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2010, pp. 24.

³ Reichberg, G. M. et al., eds.. *The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary Readings*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2006, pp. 690.

⁴ Kardas, Şaban. “*Humanitarian Intervention: The Evolution of the Idea and Practice*”, Journal of International Affairs (2001): pp. 2, 3 Aug 2011 <<http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume6/June-July2001/kardas09.PDF>>

as non-intervention and state sovereignty. Hence, humanitarian interventions were rarely exercised before and during the Cold War. The end of the Cold War has brought about a substantial change in the concept of humanitarian intervention as well as in the practice as the aftermath of the war has resulted in a suitable political atmosphere for initiating such kind of interventions.

III-1- Humanitarian Intervention: a Discussion

III-1-a-Consequentialism and the Good

Before granting an intervention the label ‘humanitarian’, it is worthwhile considering what consequentialism as an approach is in general and then relating this to the effectiveness of a humanitarian intervener. Putting it in its most simple form, consequentialism judges things by their consequences. If something—such as an action, rule, institution, or practice—promotes, or is expected to promote, a good outcome, then that makes it morally right. What consequentialism is concerned with, therefore, is the intrinsic value of certain ‘states of affairs’. Actions, rules, and institutions are instrumentally valuable to the extent that they have, or are expected to have, the consequence of achieving the intrinsically valuable state of affairs.¹As Philippa Foot puts it:

[a] consequentialist theory of ethics is one which identifies certain states of affairs as good states of affairs and says that the rightness or goodness of actions (or of other subjects of moral judgement) consists in their positive productive relationship to these states of affairs .²

Hence, those who are sceptical of ‘humanitarian’ intervention can cite the failure of the 1992 UN and U.S. interventions in Somalia and UN action in Bosnia as examples of the ineffectiveness of intervening to save lives.³

In clearer terms, this theory takes the effectiveness of a humanitarian intervener seriously. Accordingly, it can be said that the consequences that U.S. so-called ‘humanitarian’ interventions in Somalia and Iraq led to were totally negative and destructive. This will be unveiled in the coming chapters which will elucidate thoroughly these consequences.

¹ Pattison, op.cit., pp. 71.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.,pp. 74.

III-1-b-Illegal Humanitarian Intervention

A large number of contemporary political experts and theorists agree that any humanitarian intervention initiated without a UN authorisation, such as that undertaken by the U.S. in Iraq, is illegal. For them, there are two quite distinct objections to illegal humanitarian intervention.

The first objection is that illegal humanitarian intervention is itself abusive. States use humanitarian intervention as a cover to engage in abusive humanitarian intervention.¹ It is meant to imply imperialistic or neo-colonial intervention, where the intervener's primary intention is to gain territorial, economic, or strategic advantage. Another version of this objection uses 'abusive' to mean motivated by self-interest: illegal humanitarian intervention is abusive because those undertaking such interventions do so with self-interested motivations. Ian Brownlie who served as an advisor to President Jimmy Carter, for instance, asserts that when humanitarian justifications have been made by interveners, "circumstances frequently indicated the presence of selfish motives".² Hence, self-interested reasons are inappropriate motives to conduct war in defence of human rights.

Let us now consider the second claim often made about illegal humanitarian intervention and abuse. It is called the 'Bad Precedent Objection'. The allegation is that illegal humanitarian intervention leads to abusive intervention, which is discussed earlier. This objection has become more popular since 2003 with some theorists³ suggesting that the illegal intervention in Kosovo set a precedent for the war on Iraq.

III-2-Military Enforcement in Humanitarian Interventions: a Discussion

Many states and observers have argued that military force is either an illegal, immoral, or simply politically ineffective means for achieving the objectives of humanitarian intervention.⁴ Moreover, even those otherwise believing in the intrinsic desirability of using force in certain situations frequently emphasise the negative consequences of the threat or use of force when employed in inauspicious circumstances. And some observers question the way force has been employed in recent UN 'humanitarian' intervention operations, and emphasise accordingly respect for international humanitarian law and international human rights law.

¹ Pattison, op.cit., pp. 57.

² Ibid, pp. 58.

³ See for e.g. Wheeler 2005b: pp.240

⁴ Leppard, Brian D. *Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention*. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002.pp. 232.

Examples of all of these positions may be found in the United Nations Council's debates on humanitarian intervention. For example, after the 1992 disastrous events in Somalia, the representative of Brazil affirmed that "time has proved right those delegations in the Council which, like my own, have consistently maintained that this body should, to the fullest extent possible, seek to avoid the application of the extraordinary powers for enforcement action conferred upon it in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter."¹

Besides, during the Council's debate on Resolution 940 on Haiti, the Mexican representative argued that economic sanctions should have been given more time to work. Moreover, he stated that

the use of force in this case gives rise to grave legal and practical doubts, and we must not forget that history—from which we still have much to learn—has shown that military intervention in our hemisphere has invariably been traumatic; it has desolated cities, harmed and demoralized civilians, aroused historical resentment and, despite its high cost, not necessarily obtained its objective².

The Chinese delegate asserted, furthermore, that China advocated peaceful solutions to disputes or conflicts through "patient negotiations" and that it did "not agree with the adoption of any means of solution based on the resort to pressure at will or even the use of force."³

Likewise, during those debates, the Namibian delegate affirmed that in "numerous cases of conflict situations it has been the view of the Security Council—and rightly so—that military action is not the solution, but rather that peaceful means should be resorted to."⁴

Many states have emphasised that force ought to be employed sparingly, and that political negotiations are the key to long-term success in resolving civil conflicts and putting an end to human rights violations. For example, during the debate on Resolution 794 authorising the UNITAF mission in Somalia, the representative of Cape Verde stressed the need for "eliminating the underlying causes of the conflict" by promoting political negotiations.⁵

¹ U.N. Doc. S/PV.3385 (1994), pp.9, qtd. in Lepard, *op.cit.*

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, pp.233.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp182.

As I have just shown, some governments have questioned whether the threat or use of force, even if in principle legal and ethical, ought to be used in particular circumstances when the moral consequences of attempting to do so are likely to be unhappy ones, given the UN's meagre capabilities and the current political climate. UN secretaries-general have expressed similar doubts. For instance, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, in his 1995 *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*, discouragingly concluded that "in the contemporary political environment enforcement simply was not an option for the UN".¹ He also noted the dangers of mixing peace enforcement with peacekeeping, stating that the dynamics of peace enforcement "are incompatible with the political process that peace-keeping is intended to facilitate" and that peacekeeping "and the use of force—other than in self-defence—should be seen as alternative techniques and not as adjacent points on a continuum, permitting easy transition from one to the other."²

Secretary-General Annan expressed very similar views in his July 1997 reform proposals, pointing out that the "United Nations does not have, at this point in its history, the institutional capacity to conduct military enforcement measures under Chapter VII."³ And in his 1999 Srebrenica report, he affirmed that

peacekeepers must never again be told that they must use their peacekeeping tools—lightly armed soldiers in scattered positions—to impose the ill-defined wishes of the international community on one or another of the belligerents by military means. If the necessary resources are not provided—and the necessary political, military and moral judgments are not made—the job simply cannot be done.⁴

A further reason for which the use of force for humanitarian purposes is widely criticised is that when the Council did explicitly authorise the use of force, its action often appeared to be hasty and militarily ill-conceived.⁵ For example, the Council's direction to the secretary-general to apprehend the persons suspected of being responsible for the June 5, 1993, massacre in Mogadishu, Somalia—a direction necessarily implying the arrest of General Aideed—involved extreme military risks. It also threatened, as actually occurred, to place UNOSOM II contingents in a direct state of combat with local forces. The Commission of Inquiry established to investigate the lessons to be learned from the UN's experiences in Somalia recommended that the UN refrain from undertaking future enforcement actions in

¹ Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*, ¶ 77.

² *Ibid.*, ¶¶ 35–36.

³ Annan, *Renewing the United Nations*, ¶ 107, qtd. in Lepard, *op.cit.*, pp.234.

⁴ Annan, *The Fall of Srebrenica*, ¶ 498, qtd. in Lepard, *ibid.*

⁵ Lepard, *ibid.*

internal conflicts. The Commission concluded that if the UN does engage in enforcement, “the mandate should be limited to specific objectives and the use of force would be applied as the ultimate means after all peaceful remedies have been exhausted.”¹

Besides, one particular consequence of the UN-approved use of force in the eyes of many observers is that it has a very damaging effect on the UN’s perceived impartiality. Another consequence, of course, is the risk of severe casualties, a risk that has prompted many commentators to endorse less violent means of persuasion, including the imposition of economic sanctions.

As we saw earlier, however, many observers with a consequentialist orientation are now re-evaluating whether economic sanctions in fact save more lives in the long run. Some commentators, too, insist that the Security Council is subject to legal limits on its ability to authorise the use of force, even if it is properly seized of a matter constituting a threat to or breach of the peace under Article 39. While it is generally acknowledged that the Charter grants the Council authority to permit or call for the use of force, it has been argued that the Council is still subject under the Charter and customary international law to existing *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*² rules requiring the observance, at a minimum, of the legal principle of necessity.

Given the above definitions and arguments against the use of force, America’s act of fusing both forms of intervention, military intervention and ‘humanitarian’ intervention for the former is an integral part of the new version of the latter, casts doubts over the real intentions of the U. S.—the world hegemon—in the course of its foreign policy interventionist ‘missions’. It also leads to question the extent to which these ‘missions’ are really ‘humanitarian’. Bombs are never humanitarian. Rather, they kill people and the mass killings in Somalia and Iraq are but some examples. Albeit the U. S. ‘humanitarian’ crimes committed in both countries were similar in kind, the approaches driving American foreign policy leading to intervention were totally different. Therefore, for more significance and clarity of argument, an understanding of both realism and idealism is of prime importance.

¹ United Nations, Report of the Commission of Inquiry, ¶ 270, qtd. in Lepard, *op.cit.*, 234.

² *Jus in bello* is a Latin term which means “the law in waging war.” It is an aspect of the international law of war which addresses the practices forbidden to belligerents *during* a war. *Jus in bello* defines standards by which a country can conduct war and the actions during the war should be just and fair.

IV- U. S. Foreign Policy throughout the Twentieth Century: Between Idealism and Realism

IV-1-Realism and Idealism: Rival Theories

During the twentieth century, political realism and political idealism vied as conceptual rivals for understanding international relations, for qualifying what policies should or should not see the light of day, and for justifying or criticising the kinds of policies that went forward.¹

Philosophically, realism and idealism comprise opposing approaches to the definition and pursuit of national objectives abroad.² Realists tend to accept conditions as they are and to define the ends and means of policy by the measures of anticipated gains, costs, necessities, and chances of success. Idealists, on the other hand, tend to define goals in ideal forms, and presume that the means for their achievement lie less in measured policies, relying on diplomacy or force, than in the attractiveness of the goals themselves.³ A more detailed overview of what both realism and idealism mean would better clarify these differences.

IV-1-a-Political Realism

Realism is the dominant school of international relations theory. Its definitions vary considerably in their details but “reveal a striking family resemblance.”⁴ Realists tend to converge around six central propositions, which in this and the following chapters we will take as providing a working definition of the tradition of realism.

At the core of realism is the idea that politics takes place within and between groups. Group solidarity is essential to domestic politics and conflict, and cooperation between polities is the essence of international politics. To survive, people need the cohesion provided by group solidarity. Yet, cohesion between members of the same group generates the potential for conflict with other groups. Today, the most important human groups are nation states and the most important source of in-group cohesion is nationalism. For convenience, I shall use the term “states” henceforth.

¹ Strohmer, Charles. *“Realism and Idealism in International Relations”*, 2011. pp.02. <www.ProfProjects.com>

² While the American clash between realism and idealism owes an intellectual debt to antecedent European thought, it was in the United States that both doctrines were fully established, in theory and in practice. Whereas in continental Europe, utopian idealism remained excluded from the realm of practice, in the United States it became a recurrent, contrapuntal theme of statesmen and politicians, commentators and theorists.

³ Graebner, Norman A. *“Realism and Idealism”*. *An Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy*. Ed. DeConde et al. Vol.1 2nd Ed. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2002. pp.311.

⁴ Reus-Smit, Christian, Duncan Snidal, eds. *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*. New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2008. pp. 132.

Another important assumption is that relations between nations exist fundamentally in a state of nature described as anarchy, a condition in which war between nations is assumed to be permanent and expected.¹ The absence of government dramatically shapes the nature of international politics. Consequently, anarchic political systems of self-help both impose distinctive constraints on the ability of international actors to achieve their purposes and exacerbate group egoism.² Realism's bottom line, then, structural anarchy, combined with the absence of a central authority to settle disputes, gives rise to what has been called the state security dilemma.

If war is permanent in the world, then nothing can ever change that fundamentally. Wars will continue, despite attempts to prevent them. That is a core position held by political realists, and behind it lies the moral assumption that human nature is inherently not benevolent or kind, but self-centred and competitive. If so, then states must always be prepared for war, and, indeed, history reveals that increasing military strength, if not superiority, is basic to political realists. They believe that military might alone win wars. However, Robert Jervis, the Professor of International Affairs at Columbia University, points out that this is not to say that realists like war, "for many realists study the causes of war in the hope of reducing the chances of future conflict".³

Additionally, since a state must look first and last to itself for its security when arranging its relations with other states, this gives primacy of importance to a state's national interest. For this reason, the interests of other nations, or of international institutions, such as the UN, or of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with transnational interests become secondary or tertiary.⁴ This egoism is rooted in human nature. National interests, then, are central to realistic theory and usually rooted in whatever a state considers necessary for maintaining its survival. In other words, a state is thought to act according to the logic of its national interests, and especially in defence of them, when its survival is at stake. For the purposes of the present work, this cardinal realistic assumption will continuously be referred to as it is cardinal as well to any U.S. interventionist behaviour.

¹ Strohmer, op.cit.

² Reus-Smit, op.cit.,pp. 134.

³ Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner, eds. *Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics*. USA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1999.pp.334

⁴ Strohmer, *ibid.*, pp.04.

Besides, Hans Morgenthau, the European philosophical father of twentieth-century political realism, saw interests defined in terms of power. Morgenthau, whose book *Politics Among Nations* is considered the definitive text of political realism in the twentieth century, went so far as to say that “without such a concept a theory of politics ... would be altogether impossible.”¹ For realists, then, a state’s “goals have to be trimmed to fit within the possibilities created by the configuration of power.”² Hence, the intersection of groupism and egoism in an environment of anarchy makes international relations, regrettably, largely a politics of power and security.³

Another non-negotiable principle of political realism is balance of power, which has been the most relied on arrangement for ordering relations between states to put the brakes on forms of anarchy. Typically, two or more states or groups of states will act in concert—politically, economically, or militarily—to try to hold in check a powerful state or a group of states from gaining predominance and dictating to the others.⁴ The idea is to create a form of international stability through balance of power arrangements, which arise and change through shifting alliances, partnerships, friendships, or even secret diplomacy and adversarial relations. Morgenthau insists that balance of power politics must not be thought of as merely one kind of foreign policy among many, but the only kind possible. The “balance of power and policies aiming at its preservation,” he wrote, “are not only inevitable but are an essential stabilising factor in a society of sovereign nations; and the instability of the international balance of power is not due to the faultiness of the principle but to the particular conditions under which the principle must operate in a society of sovereign nations.”⁵

War is the agency through which balance of power arrangements often change dramatically in the aftermath. Political analysts have argued, for instance, that the ousting of Saddam Hussein’s army from Kuwait in 1991 was needed to restore the balance of power in the Middle East. Conversely, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 disrupted and changed the balance of power in the Middle East, though it did not have the desired outcome expected by the George W. Bush administration.⁶

Finally, within political realism diplomacy is crucial. For the realist, diplomacy is controlled by the aforementioned concepts namely the anarchical state of nature, the

¹ Morgenthau, Hans.J. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 1993, pp. 5, qtd. in Strohmer, op.cit.

² Katzenstein, op.cit.

³ Reus-Smit, op.cit.

⁴ Strohmer, *ibid.*

⁵ Morgenthau, *ibid.*

⁶ Strohmer, *ibid.*

sovereign state, balance of power and national interests.¹ In practice, this usually means that realist-oriented presidents, Ronald Reagan for example, would rely on their ambassadors and diplomats to advance only the nation's interests when they are engaging with their counterparts in other nations. Diplomacy then directs work among states functioning as a concert of power.² Realistic leaders, however, are not prevented from seeking relations with ideological adversaries when it is in the interest of the state to do so, as they were between the United States and Russia during the Cold War. Political idealism, on the contrary, has very different convictions from those of political realism. Below are some of its principles.

IV-1-b-Political idealism

Like political realism, idealism, since at least the time of English philosopher John Locke (1632-1704), has also profoundly shaped the way many politicians and theorists in the West think about international relations and world politics. Perhaps the chief difference between the two ideologies is ontological. Whereas realism emphasises the tragic side of human nature, political idealism is more optimistic. There are many versions of idealism and some tend toward utopianism³, but they are united around the assumption that human nature is basically good. This in turn determines what idealists posit as possible for collective expressions of human nature, such as in international relations.

Many political idealists assume forms of an anarchical state of nature, and thus war remains an accepted means of settling international disputes for them. But as the American scholar and former policymaker Joseph Nye points out, realists hold a harsher view of the anarchical system for “anarchy [is] less threatening to idealistic views of international politics”⁴. This gives idealists a more optimistic view than realists.

Ole Holsti, a professor of international affairs, writes that whereas realists see war as a natural state of affairs, idealists tend to view conflict “as a consequence that can be attributed to historical circumstances, evil leaders, flawed socio-political systems, or inadequate international understanding and education.”⁵ Or, as a leading constructivist thinker, Alexander Wendt summed it up in the title of his often cited 1992 article: “Anarchy is what states make of it.”

¹ Ibid., pp.05.

² Strohmer, *ibid.*

³ see Carr, Edward. *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939* (chapters 2-6)

⁴ Nye, J.R., Joseph S. *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*. 7th ed. New York: Longman, 2008. pp.4.

⁵ Holsti, Ole R. “*Theories of International Relations*”, qtd. in Strohmer, *ibid.*, pp.06.

So for realists, a state's position in the international system determines its national interests and predicts its foreign policies. Idealists, in contrast, have a richer account of how state preferences and national interests are formed.¹ Idealistic policymakers thus tend to circumscribe the state and think outside of balance-of-power arrangements. This rattles realists. For instance, idealists emphasise international institutions, multinational corporations, and international law much more than many realists would be happy with. International norms, as well as cultural, economic, and ecological considerations between nations, also play emphasised roles in idealistic world politics at the expense of, realists might argue, military clout.²

For the political idealist, then, diplomacy is not as rigidly controlled by the concepts of anarchy, the sovereign state, balance of power, and national interests as it is for realists. Perhaps a better way to say this is that the diplomatic initiatives of an idealistic administration are controlled differently than realistic initiatives because idealists understand the concepts somewhat differently and place different emphases on them.

We see this today in the approach to international relations of the Barack Obama White House, as we did in recent history with the Clinton and Carter administrations. Certainly ambassadors and diplomats serving idealistic administrations would seek to advance their nations' interests, but they would in many periods of history have the blessing of their presidents to work with their counterparts overseas in other areas as well.

Under the rubric "liberal foreign policy", also in contrast to realism, Dennis Ross notes other central idealistic principles and these, too, help us to image the different castes of mind between idealistic and realistic diplomacy:

They promote dialogue; restrain aggression through collective security mechanisms rather than through balance-of-power maneuvering; strengthen international institutions to manage international relations and mediate conflicts; foster human rights and support humanitarian interventions militarily; and enlarge nation-building and the export of democratic values.³

¹ The definition of national interests depends in large part on the type of domestic society and culture a state has. For example, a domestic society that values economic welfare and places heavy emphasis on trade, or that views wars against other democracies as illegitimate, defines its national interests very differently from a despotic state that is similarly placed in the international system. Liberals argue that this is particularly true if the international system is moderate, that is, not purely anarchic.

² Strohmer, *op.cit.*, pp.07.

³ *Ibid.*

In short, it can be said that America has a split personality when it comes to foreign policy.¹ The pragmatic or realistic side pushes the U. S. to respond to the facts of the situation and apply a rational decision-making process to problems. It is based on the logic that in order to be successful America must balance its resources and capabilities with its objectives and liabilities. The other side of this personality grows out of the myth of American exceptionalism, believing in the nation's ability and duty to remake the world along the U. S. national image.² In this regard, Americans become missionaries who feel that they are fulfilling the job when the nation, being the “moral exemplar”³, undergoes an interventionist policy.

In my view, realism and idealism, as they are discussed in academic debates about the political character of American foreign policy, have been complementary rather than opposed approaches to furthering American interests in the world. As realists, American leaders have shown themselves to be practitioners of the balance of power, mindful to fend off the expansion of powers that might threaten American security. Yet, rather than annex foreign territories to its own imperial control, the United States—for reasons peculiar to its own national identity⁴—has favoured measures to reinforce the independence of states whose incorporation under the control of another great power might threaten American national security.

Put differently, liberal democratic internationalism has been the American way of practicing balance-of-power politics in world affairs. Wilsonianism has been an “operational code”⁵ giving continuity to American policy. This is not only because it expresses American interests, but also because in an era of nationalism and mass government, America’s traditional goal of a plural world political order met with a relatively sympathetic reaction on the part of other major forces in world affairs.⁶

Both realism and idealism have manifested themselves in the U.S. political arena throughout the twentieth century. What follows, here, is a short historical description to both approaches and the underlying policies pushing their implementation.

¹ Staten, Cliff. “*U. S. Foreign Policy Since World War II*”, *American Diplomacy* (2005):pp.01, 5 Aug 2011 <http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2005/0709/stat/staten_reality.html>

² Such a belief is deeply rooted in American minds and traces its roots back to the notion of Manifest Destiny.

³ Mataress, Susan M. *American Foreign Policy and the Utopian Imagination*. Massachusetts: Univ of Massachusetts Press, 2001.pp. 47.

⁴ These include its geostrategic reasoning, its culture and ideology, and especially its economic and political structure.

⁵ Smith, Tony. *America’s Mission : The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century*. New Jersey: Princetown University Press, 1994.pp. 144.

⁶ Ibid.

IV-2-Twentieth Century U.S. Foreign Policy Twists between Realism and Idealism

The issue of how important it is for the United States—the world hegemon—to promote democracy abroad has been one of the major questions of twentieth century American foreign policy.¹ From debates over Cuba and the Philippines in the late nineteenth century through the debates over the democratisation of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union one hundred years later, Americans have argued the relevance of encouraging democracy for others in relation to their own national interest. They thought also about the proper means for doing so where it has seemed appropriate. To this end, realism and idealism were given prominence interchangeably.

IV-2-a- Wilsonian Idealism

The repeated willingness of the United States to permit its foreign policy to be driven by moral considerations culminated in Woodrow Wilson's crusade in Europe. Theodore Roosevelt, like other realists, feared that a German victory would endanger U.S. interests by undermining the historic European balance of power—a balance that had provided the United States almost perfect security through much of its history. Wilson, however, quickly turned the war into another moral crusade. For him, the breakdown of the peace revealed serious flaws in the international system that required correction. Determined to exert a powerful voice in world affairs at the war's end, he favoured a policy of strict neutrality to hold America above the fray. When German submarine warfare brought the United States into the war, Wilson would seek to reform the world through his dominant voice in erecting the postwar peace structure.

Wilson's program for avoiding another catastrophic crisis, such as that of 1914, required both changes in the quality of national behaviour and an international mechanism for settling international disputes peacefully.² To that end, he believed it essential that the world relieve itself of the balance of power and the pursuit of national interests. His solution lay in the principle of collective security, in which all peace-loving nations would pledge themselves to joint action in behalf of peace. The necessary multilateral institutions, through which the protectors of the peace would function, took the form of the League of Nations and the World Court, both enforcing the rule of law. Wilson found additional hope for a peaceful future in the expansion of world commerce, operating under a body of nation treaties that would assure

¹ Smith, op.cit.,pp.60.

² Graebner, op.cit.,pp.322.

equal access to world markets. The result would be both a more prosperous and a more peaceful international system.

For Wilson, finally, the new world order would require the active leadership of the United States. This was an early step in establishing American post-Cold War hegemony. Wilson's vision of enduring peace required, as well, a democratic foundation that would assure the necessary fusion of policy and moral purpose. In his war message to Congress in April 1917, Wilson declared:

A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants. It must be a league of honour, a partnership of opinion. . . . Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honour steady to a common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own.¹

The result of Wilson's idealistic framework for world order following the First World War, based on the promotion of human rights and democracy, was an apparent failure. The U.S. inability to join the League of Nations, as well as the emergence of Japan and Germany as rising powers during the 1930s were some reasons behind. Consequently, the inter war years witnessed the abandonment of idealism, while realism started to be seen as a more appropriate approach to the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.

IV-2-b-A Return Back to Realism

It became clear that Wilson's policies laid the foundation for a pervading post-war isolationism. For countless Americans, nothing in the country's recent experience dictated the necessity of a permanent, continuous American involvement in European politics.

Isolationism insisted that the nation had no external interests that merited the use of force, and that events outside the hemisphere were inconsequential. In apparent contrast, internationalism declared that U.S. interests existed wherever governments challenged peace or human rights.

At the eve of the Second World War, there was an almost universal national acceptance of U.S. involvement in it. Realists presumed that the war, like the Great War of 1914, would, with the defeat of the Axis, reaffirm Europe's traditional balance of power and

¹ Graebner, op.cit.,pp.323.

re-establish the essential elements of the Versailles settlement of 1919.¹ To that end, Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt, in the Atlantic Charter of August 1941, advocated the return of East-Central Europe to its pre-war status.

American idealism, however, assigned the war a deeper, largely ‘humanitarian’ purpose. In his lend-lease proposal of January 1941, Roosevelt adopted the goal of the Four Freedoms—freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear—in his crusade against the Axis powers.² In his 1942 book Price of a Free World, Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace proposed, as the war’s true purpose, not only the elimination of fascism from the world, but also “the establishment of freedom for all peoples, the final triumph of democracy, and the elimination of poverty and hunger everywhere.”³

Modern realism began as a reaction to the breakdown of the post-World War I international order in the 1930s. The collapse of great-power cooperation after World War II helped establish it as the dominant approach to the theory and practice of international politics in the United States. During the Cold War, efforts to displace realism from its dominant position were repeatedly opposed by the continued salience of the U.S./Soviet antagonism.⁴ Although indirect, the connection between events and theory was undeniable.

IV-2-c- Realism and U.S. Containment Policy during the Cold War

What follows is a short note about a well-known modern realistic approach to international relations that was implemented in the doctrine of containment, a U.S.-led post-World War II effort of Western nations to limit the spread of Soviet Communism. First endorsed by President Harry Truman, containment was adopted in varying ways by successive presidents of both parties.

It required no more than the post-war Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe, in defiance of the Western principle of self-determination, to create doubts regarding the Kremlin’s ultimate intentions. As early as 1946, anti-Soviet officials and members of Congress predicted further Soviet expansion into war torn Europe and elsewhere. Clark Clifford’s September 1946 report to President Truman, reflecting the views of top U.S. officials, described a deeply

¹ Graebner, op.cit.,pp.324.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Wohlfarth, William c. “*Realism and the End of the Cold war*”. The MIT Press, 2009.pp.91.
<<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539080>>

threatened world. When suspected Soviet ambitions, in early 1947, seemed to focus on Greece and Turkey, the Truman administration framed the Truman Doctrine, with its corresponding rhetorical predictions of falling dominoes across Europe, Africa, or Asia.

Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan accepted the administration's dire predictions uncritically. "Greece," he wrote on 12 March, "must be helped or Greece sinks permanently into the communist order. Turkey inevitably follows. Then comes the chain reaction which might sweep from the Dardanelles to the China Seas."¹ Never before, critics noted, had U.S. leaders described external dangers in such limitless, imprecise terms. Secretary of State George C. Marshall, Soviet expert George Kennan, and columnist Walter Lippmann objected to the language. Lippmann accused the administration of launching an idealistic crusade, not defining a realistic policy.²

At this time, it became clear that the U.S. was trying by all means to prevent the expansion of the Soviet Union. In this regard, American policymakers felt the need for a resolution that would help Western Europe recover economically. For this reason, Secretary of State George C. Marshall proposed the European Recovery Program, later known as the Marshall Plan. The latter was in operation for four years beginning in April 1948. As one may perceive, this measure was an attempt by the U.S. to assert its hegemony over Europe. As time went by, European leaders realised that and urged for the creation of a united Europe free from American domination. As a result, the European Economic Community was established in 1957.

Not only was the Marshall Plan presented to war-torn nations in Western Europe, but it was also open to all European countries, including the Soviet Union. However, Stalin rejected the plan and refused to participate. His denunciation of the Marshall Plan resulted in the division of Europe into two blocs; one dependent on the United States, the other dependent on the Soviet Union.

After the implementation of the Marshall Plan, the U.S. and its allies came to the conviction that military security as well was indispensable to Europe's recovery. Consequently, ten European countries together with the United States and Canada created the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in 1949. The organisation constituted a system of collective defence whereby its member states agreed to mutual defence in response to any

¹ Graebner, op.cit.

² Ibid.

attack by the Eastern bloc. This reflects a U.S. realistic foreign policy based on the assumptions of maintaining balance of power through economic as well as military strength.

Events in East Asia, where the United States faced two unwanted, powerfully led communist revolutions in China and Indochina, seemed to confirm the fears of Soviet expansionism. The reason is clear. Washington officials presumed, logically, that both revolutions were under Soviet control. Thus, a return back to the human rights rhetoric seemed an adequate option.

IV-2-d-A Renewed U.S. Commitment to Human Rights

By the 1960s, much of America's predominant realism had become soft, emphasising less the requirements of security and defence than the need of accommodation with the realities of coexistence.¹ Convinced that previous administrations had exaggerated the Soviet threat, President Jimmy Carter set out in 1977 to establish a more relaxed, flexible, non-ideological relationship with the Soviet Union and China. With the U.S. failure in Vietnam, the country could no longer maintain the illusion of global power. Carter recognised that reality by lessening the strategic importance of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In dismissing the Cold War commitment to global containment, the Carter administration accepted Soviet activity in the Afro-Asian world with profound indifference.

It is widely believed that the administration of Jimmy Carter was characterised by a foreign policy that placed the defence of human rights at its centre, at least rhetorically.² "As president", Carter wrote in his memoirs, "I hoped and believed that the expansion of human rights might be the wave of the future throughout the world, and I wanted the United States to be on the crest of this movement".³ Thus, historian Douglas Brinkley writes that "human rights considerations became paramount in deciding which governments...received American aid and political support."⁴

Unquestionably, Carter intended to give more prominence to human rights than any recent previous administration. For instance, he cut aid to the brutal military junta in Argentina and by some accounts saved thousands of lives in the process. However, in the case of the murderous Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia, headed by the notorious Pol Pot,

¹ Graebner, op.cit.

² Clymer, Kenton. "*Jimmy Carter, Human Rights and Cambodia*". USA: Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2003. pp.245
<http://migs.concordia.ca/documents/ClymerarticleCarterandCambodia.pdf>

³ Carter, Jimmy. *Keeping Faith :Memoirs of a President*,qtd. in Clymer, ibid.

⁴ Clymer, ibid.

human rights considerations hardly entered into the administration's foreign policy calculus—despite the fact that Carter himself characterised the Khmer Rouge as the “worst violator of human rights in the world.”¹ Not surprisingly, Carter scarcely mentions Cambodia in his memoirs.

The administration's failure to elevate human rights concerns in its policy towards Cambodia can be attributed to several factors. Chief among which are geopolitical considerations—in particular, the desire to oppose the perceived expansion of Soviet influence in Southeast Asia at the expense of America's new friend, China.² In clearer terms, the self-interest realistic principle won out over human rights in Carter's Cambodia policy.

Already facing open challenges to its alleged loss of will, the Carter administration reacted to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in late December 1979, with bewilderment and rage. National security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski warned the country that the Soviet Union now threatened American interests from the Mediterranean to the Sea of Japan. Additionally, On 4 January, the president revealed his fears to the nation. “A Soviet-occupied Afghanistan,” he declared, “threatens both Iran and Pakistan and is a stepping stone to possible control over much of the world's oil supplies.”³ Consequently, national interest considerations surfaced back on the U.S. political scene, throwing all moral concerns into the heart of the ocean.

Ronald Reagan caught the country's post-Afghan alarms at full tide, embellished them, and rode them to victory in the presidential campaign of 1980. He and the Republican Party pilloried the Carter administration for leading the country into the posture of “weakness, inconsistency, vacillation, and bluff”⁴ that enabled the Soviet Union to surpass the United States in military power.

The Reagan team was determined to counter the global Soviet threat by aiding Nicaragua and El Salvador, thereby preventing the rhetorical dominoes from falling across both South America and North America.

Another U.S. intervention, which raised some ethical issues, was the 1983 armed ‘humanitarian’ intervention in Grenada. An early argument for the Reagan's administration ‘humanitarian’ intervention in Grenada was that it was intended to promote democracy and

¹ Clymer, op.cit.,pp246.

² Ibid.

³ Graebner, op.cit.

⁴ Ibid.,pp.325.

oust a government made up of “a brutal group of leftist thugs,”¹ as President Reagan put it. Critics of the legality of intervention have challenged the argument that the latter was a lawful act of ‘humanitarian’ intervention. They argue that the island of 120 square miles was previously considered too insignificant to command the attention of senior government officials in Washington until October 25, 1983.² Besides, a careful analysis to the statements delivered by all those who defended this intervention, including the President himself and his ambassador J. William Middendorf, reveals that their emphasis was less on the rescue mission aspect and more on describing the intervention as a legitimate action intended to put an end to the “reign of terror” in Grenada.³

In 1984, Ronald Reagan’s secretary of defence, Caspar Weinberger, suggested that six tests ought to be passed before dispatching U.S. troops. Chief among which is that “the United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest”.⁴ This statement proves that national interests are put at the forefront when the U.S. follows a certain policy, be it realistic or idealistic.

By the end of the 1980s, American fears from the Soviet expansion started to vanish because of the apparent disintegration of the Soviet Union. The process of Soviet disintegration culminated in the collapse of the Soviet satellite empire in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the demise of the Cold War during the following year. Reagan supporters attributed the Soviet collapse to the toughness of the U.S. realistic foreign policy and military build-up of the Reagan years. For Soviet experts, the communist regime’s crash flowed naturally from its internal flaws, its political erosion, and its ideological rejection.⁵ Following the Cold War closure, U.S. foreign policy has twisted between realism and idealism.

IV-2-e-The Post-Cold War Era

With the termination of the Cold War and collapse of the USSR in 1990–1991, the United States quickly emerged as the world’s hegemon and lone superpower. President George H. W. Bush, who learned his realistic foreign policy under the détente of Nixon, presided over the end of the Cold War, the demise of the Soviet Union, and an effort by the

¹ Nardin, Terry, Kathleen D. Pritchard. *“Ethics and Intervention: The United States in Grenada, 1983”*. Washington, D.C: Georgetown University, 1990.pp.14

² Ibid.,pp.01.

³ Ibid.,pp.06.

⁴ Melanson, Richard A. *“Post-Cold War Policy”*. *An Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy* .Ed. DeConde et al. Vol.1 2nd Ed.New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2002. pp.160

⁵ Graebner, op.cit.,pp.326.

Congress to balance the budget. He directed a realistic foreign policy in the Gulf by working together with other forces forming a war coalition. Financially speaking, the Gulf War cost the United States very little and Bush refused to expand the war beyond the limits set by United Nations resolutions and the U.S. Congress.

Behind the debate over American global responsibility and proper role in world affairs was President George H. W. Bush's refusal, in 1992, to confront the well-publicised genocide in Bosnia and his tardy, reluctant involvement in feeding the starving people of Somalia. For his critics, the end of the Cold War gave the United States, with all its power, an unprecedented opportunity to embrace the country's historic mission to humanity.¹

President Bill Clinton, who was elected primarily on a domestic policy platform, was under continuous Congressional and public pressure to balance the budget and to reap the major benefit of the end of the Cold War. Shielding under the United Nations umbrella during the then emergent 'humanitarian' interventions proves that the U. S. foreign policy under President Clinton was realistic.

Until September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush, who was openly critical of nation-building efforts and open-ended broad foreign policy commitments, promised an even more limited role for the United States in world affairs.² The horrific events of 9/11 and the declaration of a war against global terrorism, however, provided the initial public support for President George W. Bush to embark on a renewed idealistic foreign policy. As a neoconservative, he wanted to exercise a more assertive, pre-emptive, and unilateral foreign policy that drew upon the hegemonic power and military capabilities of the United States, to reshape the global political system.

Since the end of the first Gulf War, many in the neoconservative group had already made clear their desire to topple Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The events of 9/11 led to Bush's declaration of a global war against terrorism and the struggle against Al Qaeda, Bin Laden, and the Taliban led to broad and open-ended nation-building goals in Iraq. On the surface, the U. S. declared goal was that of bringing democracy to the entire Middle East and much of the developing world. The spread of such claims, and the neglect of others, has most of the time been guaranteed by the U. S.-based media.

¹ Graebner, op.cit.

² Staten, op.cit.

V-Agenda Setting or Denial: The Role of the Media in Shaping Intervention Policies

Under the cover of darkness on December 9, 1992, U.S. forces went ashore at Mogadishu, Somalia, and got an unexpected reception. The night suddenly turned bright, as television lights illuminated the landing area and temporarily blinded marines and navy SEALs equipped with night vision goggles. At the water's edge were hundreds of journalists who had been waiting to film the beginning of Operation Restore Hope, a 'humanitarian' mission to distribute food and other vital supplies to starving Somalis. The news media had turned the beach into a kind of outdoor television studio, much to the distress of the troops.¹

The advance guard of Operation Restore Hope did not know that television journalists would complicate their landing. Yet, reporters were there because Pentagon officials had alerted them. Military officials hoped for favourable publicity from news stories about the beginning of "a mission that they thought would win widespread approbation."² But while they notified reporters, Pentagon authorities forgot to tell marine and navy commanders to expect a reception of lights and cameras.

This incident illustrates the complex relationship between the news media—and particularly television journalists—and those who plan and implement U.S. foreign policy. Journalists depend on government officials for information and access—to conferences, briefings, crisis areas, and war zones. Yet they often chafe under the restrictions that policymakers or military commanders impose. Those who formulate or carry out foreign policy depend on TV news to provide them with favourable publicity as well as information about international affairs or channels for building public support. Yet these officials also worry about the power of cameras and reporters to transform events as well as to frame issues, expose secrets, or challenge official policies. In clearer terms, cooperation and mutual dependence is "the flip side of tension and conflicting interests."³

Among other forms of media, my focus in this section will be mainly on television, for since the middle of the twentieth century, television has been closely connected to U.S. foreign policy. What makes TV important is that it is a visual medium that commands large audiences. Continuing technological improvements, including live broadcasting of international events as they take place, have made television a powerful instrument for

¹ Chester, Pach. "*Television*". *An Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy*. Ed. DeConde et al. Vol.1 2nd Ed. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2002. pp.547

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

conveying information, moulding public attitudes, and influencing government policies. Yet it is easy to exaggerate or misunderstand the power of television to shape foreign policy. Even when the networks consisted of a handful of stations, government officials showed keen interest in using television to build public support for U.S. foreign and military policies. Public affairs officers in the State Department said they favoured television because it did “a better job than any other medium at depicting foreign policy in action.”¹

Beginning in the late twentieth century, the U.S. government had to deal with twenty-four-hour news cycles, “real-time” reporting of “breaking” news, and extensive coverage of international events with large significance. For example, the first major international crisis following the Cold War saw endless rivalry by Washington and Baghdad to score propaganda points during the months leading up to Operation Desert Storm. The latter led *Newsweek* to declare that “TV has once again become the water in which world events swim.”² Television has affected the ways that the U.S. government has made foreign policy and built public support for it. Yet presidents and other high officials with clear objectives and sophisticated strategies for dealing with the news media have maintained control of foreign policy and commanded public backing for their international agenda.³

But even before it had such immediacy or reach, television played a significant, and sometimes controversial, role in shaping government actions and popular understanding of international affairs. The Vietnam War was a critical event. It began, at least, as an American war, just when television had become the principal source of news for a majority of the U.S. public. It offered lessons about the role of TV in shaping public attitudes toward international affairs. And it occurred at a time of significant changes in journalism. Despite their devotion to objectivity, balance, and fairness, TV reporters would no longer insist, as before, on a contract provision that limited their right to express opinion in their stories.⁴ Vietnam, in short, marked a major transition in the relationship between television and foreign policy.

The new millennium began with televised celebrations on every continent, hopeful events that suggested that modern communications were bringing closer the creation of Marshall McLuhan’s global village. Yet the twenty-first century also brought almost unimaginable scenes of horror and disasters. Enormous audiences in the United States and

¹ Chester, op.cit., pp.548.

² McNamara, op.cit.pp.664.

³ Chester, ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

around the world relied on television for news about these disasters. Even government officials watched television because it provided more information more quickly than other available sources.¹ Round-the-clock coverage on the broadcast as well as the cable news channels quickly spread the disbelief, outrage, grief, and uncertainty about the future that were immediate products of these startling events.

Just as a picture is worth a thousand words, several pictures of the World Trade Centre falling on the 11 September 2001 nightly news have increased “the vulnerability that citizens feel from outside threats and increased their approval of hawkish foreign policy.”² In other words, watching TV news in late 2001 heightened emotional responses to the terrorist events of September 11 and perception of future risk. In turn, increasing appraisal of risk led to greater support for U.S. overseas involvement in general, and U.S. military intervention in Iraq in particular.³

By and large, the media have an effect on policy and can similarly be affected by it, but this is perhaps stating the obvious. Schattsneider, Cobb and Elder in Parsons (1995), have pointed out that the media policy process may not be as open as we believe, because not all problems are brought to the public attention.⁴ The same applies to the international activities of U. S. political actors. The media, because of their vested interests or setting in society, frequently have their own agenda or may serve other vested interests. This means that they can choose to influence the public debate, in accordance with government most of the time, through what Parsons refers to as “agenda-setting”.⁵

Discerning media coverage reveals that it is sometimes illogical in some emergency relief cases, simply because coverage is determined by factors other than humanitarian needs and its policy can in some cases be dictated upon it. This would confirm Gramsci’s hegemony theory, illustrated at the onset of this chapter, asserting that the media is part of the hegemonic society’s “historic bloc”. Sometimes, the tortuous media impact on conflict management is far greater than the direct impact of intervention and withdrawal decisions.⁶ The media, therefore,

¹ Ibid., pp.559.

² Kushner, Shana A. “*Threat, media, and foreign policy opinion*”. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005.pp.08
<<http://www8.georgetown.edu/cct/apsa/papers/shanakushner.pdf>>

³ Ibid.

⁴ Parsons, William. *Public Policy: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis*. Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc, 1995.pp. 86.

⁵ Ibid.,pp. 112. The agenda-setting thesis is credited to Bernard Cohen, who argued that the press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about.

⁶ Jakobsen, Peter Viggo. “*Focus on the CNN Effect Misses the Point: The Real Media Impact on Conflict Management is Invisible and Indirect*”, *Journal of Peace Research* (2000): pp.131–143, 15 Aug 2011
<<http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/rdenever/PPA-730-27/Jakobsen.pdf>>

by being in the business of ‘manufacturing’ news are also involved in the production of problems. They select what is ‘newsworthy’ and in doing so, include and exclude issues, events and ideas following the executive's policy, as was exactly the case in Iraq. In clearer terms, in the process of pursuing their own interest, the news media sometimes obediently go along with U.S. foreign-policy initiatives.

On the other hand, the media can choose to “submerge” some issues—not to talk about them or remain silent about them—with what Parsons (1995) refers to as “agenda-denial”. For instance, the setting of pro-U.S. and Western agendas in the 1991 Gulf War, were followed by denialist media policy and non-reporting of Iraqi deaths frequently by means of “embedded journalism”.¹ Similarly, the U. S. intervention in Somalia debacle was preceded by a denialist policy for almost a year for some significant unstated agendas. The media effectively have the power today to decide whether or not it is ‘scandalous’ that thousands of people are dying from famine and who, if anyone, should answer for this.² This is accompanied by the often selective determination by news agencies of which kinds of humanitarian problems become ‘issues’. Consequently, some serious humanitarian crises become seen as peripheral by means of what Mark Bradbury terms the “normalisation of crisis”³, only to please U.S. government. This fact was referred to by Gramsci several decades earlier.

In order for U. S.-based media conglomerates to continue to be profitable and to extend their reach, they rely on the government to protect their interests domestically and internationally. Domestically, policies like the Telecommunication Act of 1996 have allowed for unprecedented media concentration. Internationally, the U. S. government, through institutions like the World Trade Organisation, pries open foreign governments for U. S. media investments. The cases explored in this study will shed some light regarding the role of the media in shaping the agenda for intervention, if not how lack of media coverage has accompanied non-intervention policies. If one compares the role of media highlighting human suffering and oppression in Iraq, thus prompting intervention, while the plight of people in Somalia was initially largely ignored, and intervention delayed, one may recognise the paramount important space media occupy in the field of international—and the U. S. in our case—political game.

¹ Fisk, Robert. *The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle East*. Toronto: Harper Perennial, 2006. pp. 761-763.

² Hendrickson, Dylan. “*Humanitarian Action in Protracted Crises: The New Relief Agenda and its limits*”, Relief and Rehabilitation Network (1998): pp.9, 19 Nov 2011 <www.oneworld.org/odi/rnn/>

³ Ibid.

What comes next in the subsequent chapter would confirm my argumentation in regard to media, for it delves into the nature of the 1992 U.S. so-called 'humanitarian' military intervention in Somalia. Somalia which had been bleeding for several years before U.S. foreign policy decision makers and the U.S. media could recognise the humanitarian necessity to offer it a helping hand. This is to say that the coming chapter puts into question the intermingling between the U.S. administration's late decision to take Somalis out of their deepening despair and the launch of an extensive coverage about the tragic situation in Somalia by the U.S. media. This important aspect of this 'humanitarian' military intervention, next to a number of other equally important aspects, will be analysed thoroughly within the folds of the second chapter in the quest for the untold reality.

Chapter Two:

The 1992 U. S. 'Humanitarian' Military Intervention in Somalia: Hidden Agendas or Humanitarian Concerns?

In view of the research questions posed in the introduction, the second chapter will examine the extent to which the U. S. post-Cold War interventions in Africa have been 'humanitarian'. It will, additionally, delve into the nature of the executive's hidden national interests-based agenda, exploring a selected African case of 'humanitarian' military intervention after the Cold War. The case under discussion concerns the 1992 United States-led intervention in Somalia that spanned the G. H. W. Bush and Clinton administrations. This chapter deviates from a historical exposition of the case under question, but focuses on the circumstances surrounding this intervention based on a realistic multilateral policy. The superimposition of the hegemony theories set forth by Gramsci and Cox on those circumstances will further give weight to my argumentation. The aim of this chapter is, then, to discuss this intervention, focusing on who authorised it, why the U. S. chose a specific timing to intervene and withdraw, and what was the aftermath of the intervention.

I-Somalia: A Brief History

One of the most important local circumstances that must always be taken into account while trying to understand the causes for the emergence of Somalia as one of the main battlefields—requiring international attention and a U. S. 'humanitarian' aid—is the nation's clan-based system as well as its strategic location. It is also imperative to understand Somali history, society, and culture in order to evaluate U.S./Somali relations during and after the Cold War.

Somalia, officially the Somali Republic and formerly known as the Somali Democratic Republic, is Africa's easternmost Muslim country. It occupies the tip of the Horn of Africa with an overall land area of 637,000 square kilometres and a coastline of 2,960 kilometres¹ that borders the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Historically, it was similar to numerous cultures in and around the region. For example, in ancient times, the Egyptians glorified Somalia as "God's Land"². German scholars observed that the Samaal people, who give Somalia its name, inhabited and occupied the whole Horn of Africa as early as 100 A.D. This theory diverges from the popular myth that the Somali people originated from Arab roots. Indeed, historians and archeologists have revealed that Somalis share language, traditions, and culture with Eastern Cushitic genealogical groups.³ The Eastern Cushitic ethnic sub-family

¹ Haji, Abdiwahid Osman. *The Legality of the UN Humanitarian Intervention under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: Somalia and Beyond*, diss. Canada: Ottawa, 1997. pp. 73.

² Mohamed.A, Mohamed. *U. S. Strategic Interest in Somalia: From Cold War Era to War on Terror*, diss. Buffalo: the Graduate School of the State University, 2009. pp.1.

³ Ibid., pp.02.

includes the Oromo the most populated ethnic group in Ethiopia, the Afar people who inhabited between Ethiopia and Djibouti, the Beja tribes of Eastern Sudan and the Boni tribes of Northeastern Kenya. In other words, modern Somalis are richly embedded in African culture. For this reason, clanship is an important ingredient of Somali society.²

I-1- Dynamics of Clanship in Somali Society

Although the Somali people have a common language and ethnic origin, they are deeply divided along clan lines. Somalis belong to six major clans namely the Darod, Dir, Issaq, Hawiye—who are pastoral and form 70 percent of the population— Digil and Rahawein—who are agricultural clans and represent 20 percent of the population.¹ Clans are indispensable to Somali life, and each clan is divided into a big number of sub-clans.

It is incumbent to understand the role and history of clan politics and how it developed over the centuries to shape the modern government in Somalia. Traditionally, nomadic society mastered the art of forming alliances to protect the interests of kingship and ensure water and grazing land. Rainfall, in particular, is very critical to the life of pastoral communities. It is the main factor that forces them to compete with other tribes and to move from one inhospitable place to another. Although they expect two rainy seasons, some localities never see one drop of rain and experience severe droughts, costing nomads most of their livestock. In the twentieth century and up to the 1980s, there were six harsh droughts across several regions of Somalia that produced famine.²

Tribal elders play an important role in the process of securing water. They make the final decisions in waging war and making peace with other neighbouring tribes and relocating clan-families to new territories.³ Tribal elders sit on the council of leadership that administers most clan affairs, down to relatively small matters, like marriage arrangements within the clan-family. The relationship between different tribes always depends on how tribal elders manage conflicts and enforce previous agreements.

However, Allegiances among various clans shift frequently because of complicated inter-clan rivalries. Therefore, it is the role of elders to find some sort of resolution to crises before things get out of hand and an endless cycle of revenge ensues. It must be said that these conflicts are positive in that they cement together clan-families against the threat presented by other tribes. This is necessary. As with political circumstances shifting

¹ Haji, op.cit.

² Mohamed.A, op.cit.

³ While anthropologists might use tribe and clan in different terms, in Somali language, both (clan-family and tribe) mean the same.

continuously, it is hard to predict when another war might take place. Yet, insecurity and suspicion within the clan remains high where negotiation and conflict resolution are not possible. In his book *The Shaping of Somali Society*, Lee V. Cassanelli summarises Somali clan politics by translating a Somali proverb:

I and my clan against the world

I and my brother against the clan

I against my brother.¹

I-2- European Colonial Rule

Over the centuries, the Somali people have demonstrated, as part of their tradition, “a vigorous independence and unwillingness to surrender to a single political authority”². Clan leaders never had the authority to enforce rules on all people. Rather, their role was to remind people of the importance of strong clan consciousness, stressing ancestral pride, as the clan has been the integral part to their survival and existence since ancient times. On the other hand, Europeans see the state as responsible for individual rights and inherently do not recognise the nomadic system of justice, based on collective responsibility.³ For this reason, there was a clash of cultures when the Somali Peninsula and East Africa were dragged out of their relative isolation into world politics, marking the start of the imperial epoch.

During the past two centuries, Somalia has experienced colonisation by many different countries. In 1886, the British Empire declared a protectorate over northern Somalia, with the aim of safeguarding the trade links of its colony, Aden. In 1881, France set presence in part of the Somali peninsula which they called Somali-France, now Djibouti. Italy established a colony in southern Somalia by 1889. Somalia was also the target of African expansionism, for in the 1880s Ethiopia claimed the Ogaden area. Somalia was then divided into five jurisdictions: British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, French Somaliland, Ethiopian Somaliland and Northern Frontier District of Kenya which was formerly claimed by the British.⁴ (see Figures 1 & 2)

The British and Italians had different strategies and interests in Somalia. Britain was interested in Northern Somalia, mainly as a source of livestock for its colony in Aden⁵—its principal supply route to Indian Ocean through the Suez Canal. Italians, on the other hand, wanted crops in the form of plantation agriculture: bananas, sugarcane, and citrus fruits.

¹ Cassanelli, Lee. *The Shaping of Somali Society: Reconstructing the History of a Pastoral People*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1982. pp. 21.

² Mohamed.A, op.cit.,pp. 03.

³ Peterson, Scott. *Me Against my Brother: At War in Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda*. London: Routledge, 2000. pp. 11.

⁴ Haji, op.cit.

⁵ Cassanelli, ibid.,pp. 148.



FIGURE 1: Political map of Africa.¹

¹ World Atlas. Retrieved: April 20 2013, from <<http://www.world-atlas.us/africa-map.gif>>



FIGURE 2: Map of Somalia and Neighbouring Countries.¹

¹ U.S. Politics. Retrieved: April 21 2013, from <<http://www.uspolitics.about.com>>

As soon as the British colonial government started asserting its authority over Somalia at the turn of the century, resistance took shape under the leadership of Somali nationalist Sayyid Mohammed Abdille Hasan, known to the British as “the Mad Mullah”¹. His Islamic resistance movement sought to end European rule and Ethiopian incursion in Somali territories. He used both religion and nationalism to advance his cause and successfully united Northern Somali tribes against the foreigners until his death in 1920. The use of force by the British never produced a better outcome, but Sayyid Mohammed won many followers, especially among his own clan. He dared to suggest the possibility of a free and united Somalia.

While British and Italian colonies were vying for control of the Somali Peninsula during the World War II, Somalis continued to mistrust and undermine the authority of their colonial rulers. As a result, the first modern Somali political group was formed in 1943. The Somali Youth League (SYL) articulated the need for national unity and discouraged division between clan-families. This new ideology worked, for the SYL helped Somalis realise that the only way to succeed and overcome colonial occupation was to unite against it. Against a common rival, national consciousness was beginning to form. The SYL’s main focus, of course, was to end colonial rule and liberate the nation from foreign influence and domination. This did not happen overnight. What was necessary first was resolving all problems between tribes and compromising the clan system. The creation of a Somali state in 1960 could not have happened without this foundation.² This young state will become very important to the U.S. during its Cold War calculations.

I-3- U.S. Strategic Interest in Somalia during the Cold War Era

U.S. involvement in Africa was limited before World War II, with the exception of a few commercial treaties signed with selected countries in West Africa. Generally speaking, Washington was not interested in African affairs and voiced no real objection to European domination of the continent. However, there was some attention to Africa when, on January 18, 1918, President Woodrow Wilson offered his famous Fourteen Points declaration to a Joint Session of Congress in which he spoke about the principle of self-determination and governance.³

At that time, President Wilson wanted to counter the German threat which had changed the American attitude toward European Colonies. His stance had obvious implications for the millions of Africans subjected to foreign rule. The Atlantic Charter,

¹ Mohamed.A, op.cit.,pp.05.

² Ibid.,pp.06.

³ Johnson, Paul. *Modern Times: The World from the Twenties to the Nineties*. New York: HarperCollins, 1991.pp. 429.

signed in 1941 by President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill, was another initiative to promote world peace by compromising imperialism. Both leaders recognised the importance of colonial people's rights to self-determination and self-governance.¹

After World War II, the Soviet Union entered the world political affairs opposing Western domination and imperialism. As a result, the Western bloc became more proactive in promoting democracy in the former colonial countries.² The Second World War's end marked the beginning of de-colonisation in Somalia. Yet, the process was not always perfect.

In 1960, both the southern part of Somalia under Italian rule, and the northern part under British rule became independent. Although these smaller areas voluntarily agreed to join together, the other areas—French Somaliland, Ogaden and the Northern Frontier District of Kenya—forming part of Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya were excluded.³ With the formation of the Somali Republic, Somali political leaders continued to follow a policy of a greater Somalia in which the boundaries of the new state were to be extended to include all the missing territories. However, these attempts at unification failed.

Due to its strategic location in one of the world's main maritime arteries and trade routes, connecting the Middle East and Europe with the Far East, and its location on the shores of the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean—just across the Gulf of Aden from the Arabian Peninsula—the U. S. and the Soviet Union struggled over expanding their influence zones over Somalia during the Cold War. As a result, While Ethiopia, Kenya and France remained allies of the United States, this latter did not want to sever relations with Somalia because of the Soviet threat and strategic importance of Africa's Horn region. Besides, the U.S. promised financial and military aid to Somalia. However, the Soviet-led Eastern bloc also offered a similar deal in pursuit of its own geographic advantages. Thus, Somalia became a prize during the Cold War. Even President Kennedy recognised this development and met with Somali Prime Minister Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke in 1962. However, the Soviet Union ultimately offered what Somalia wanted most: more military hardware —under the Russian military aid agreement of 1963—to protect the Somali population in Kenya and Ethiopia.⁴ Things went well between the two allies for more than a decade. Yet, Siad Barre's expansionist ambitions changed the balance of power in the whole region.

¹ Johnson, op.cit.,pp. 421.

² Mohamed.A, op.cit.,pp.07.

³ Haji, op.cit.,pp.74.

⁴ Mohamed.A, ibid.,pp.08.

I-4- Siad Barre's Years and the Prelude to Chaos

On October 21, 1969, the civilian administration was overthrown in a military coup led by Major-General Mohamed Siad Barre.¹ Quickly, Barre made major changes to Somali government system when he took over. On November 1, 1969, he suspended the 1960 constitution, dissolved the National Assembly and replaced it with a 25-member committee called the Supreme Revolutionary Council which consisted of army and police officers. Additionally, the regime adopted scientific socialism, abolished and prohibited the multi-party system, trade unions and free speech.² U.S. influence in Somalia apparently ended as Somalia and the Soviets signed a prestigious treaty of friendship.

Albeit the Supreme Revolutionary Council announced its intention to fight and abolish tribalism, nepotism and major obstacles to progress and growth in the nine years of civilian democratic government³, the nation was in perpetual financial crisis and overly dependent on foreign assistance to meet its operating budget. The majority of Somali people welcomed the new military regime's promise to clean up the sort of corruption that had been tolerated in the previous administration. Popular acceptance to Barre's promise to clean up corruption, helped facilitate his battle against tribalism, thought to be the true cancer of Somali society. Indeed, an official government slogan stated, "Tribalism divides where Socialism unites."⁴

Barre's regime was in need of economic assistance to develop Somalia's infrastructure.⁵ Both the United States and the former USSR saw an opportunity to help. The Somali government first turned to the USSR for protection during the period from 1970 to 1977. During this period, "Barre received millions of dollars worth of tanks, AK47 assault rifles, anti-tank guns, mortars, military vehicles and ammunition from the Soviet Union."⁶ From the early 1960s to the late 1970s, Somalia received about \$300 million in fresh military aid from the Soviet Union. In return, the Soviets were allowed a base at the port of Berbara, near the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. From this strategic location, they could counter the United States military movement in the Middle East and North Africa and control trade.⁷ "A more sinister aspect of the agreement saw the Soviet Union's KGB training Somalia's own secret police organisation, the National Security Services"⁸.

¹ Former democratically elected leader Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke was assassinated by one of his own security guards during his visit in the drought-stricken area of the Las-Anod District, in the northern part of Somalia.

² Haji, op.cit.

³ Mohamed.A, op.cit.,pp.09.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Metz, Helen Chapin, ed. *Somalia: A Country Study*. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division Library of Congress, 1993.pp.176.

⁶ Haji, ibid.,pp.75.

⁷ Mohamed.A, ibid.,pp. 10.

⁸ Metz, ibid., pp.188.

While Somalia was gaining military strength, Ethiopia grew weaker. In September 1974, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia had been overthrown by the Derg—the military council—under the leadership of General Teferi Benti, marking a period of turmoil. The Derg quickly fell into internal conflict to determine who would have primacy. Meanwhile, various anti-Derg as well as separatist movements began throughout the country. One of the separatist groups seeking to take advantage of the chaos was the pro-Somalia Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) operating in the Somali-inhabited Ogaden area. From 1976 to 1977, Somalia supplied arms and other aid to the WSLF. The regional balance of power now favoured Somalia.

Benti was killed in 1977 as the Derg thought mistakenly that this would restore order in the country. The announcement of Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam as head of state on 11 February 1977 quickly ensued. However, the country remained in chaos as the military attempted to suppress its civilian opponents. Despite the violence, the Soviet Union, which had been closely observing developments, came to believe that Ethiopia was developing into a genuine Marxist–Leninist state and that it was in Soviet interests to aid the new regime.¹ They thus secretly approached Mengistu with offers of aid—instead of those provided by the U.S.— that he accepted.

For this reason, when Barre wanted to unite the Somali Ogaden—which was located in the South-eastern part of Ethiopia—with the rest of the country, Moscow refused. As a result, the Somali/Soviet relationship came to an end and Barre invaded southern Ethiopia in 1977. In less than a year, the Somali National Army lost the war for a full Eastern bloc —comprised of Cuba, East Germany, Libya, South Yemen, the Soviet Union army—attached themselves to the Ethiopian cause. This war, which is often referred to as the start of the collapse of the Somali State, caused the massive displacement of “more than one million forced migrants”². Barre then turned to the United States for assistance. In his article “The Somali Crisis”, Ayittey states that

On August 22, 1980, Somalia and the United States signed an agreement that permitted the United States to use military facilities at the port of Berbera. In exchange, Washington agreed to provide Barre with \$20 million in credits for the purchase of military equipments, \$5 million in budgetary support and \$20 million in general credits that year.³

¹ Haji, op.cit.

² Ahmad, Ismail I., Reginald H. Green, “*The Heritage of War and State Collapse in Somalia and Somaliland*”, 1999: pp.121, Sussex Univ Press, Brighton, 27 July 2011 <http://www.cja.org/downloads/Heritage_of_war__state_collapse.pdf>.

³ Ayittey, George B.A. “*The Somali Crisis: Time for an African Solution*”, *Policy Analysis* (March 28, 1994)pp.205, 28 July 2012 <<http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-205.html> >.

Under the banner of democracy and humanity, the United States has always claimed its bitter opposition to ruthless dictators, who commit atrocities and violate the fundamental human rights of their own citizens. This policy has long compromised key principles of the Constitution including due process of law, respect for individual freedom and human rights, free and fair democratic elections, and a free market economy.¹ However, the U. S. profile during the Cold War, I dare argue, demonstrates that reality is completely different. It was only required that these dictators somehow suit American interests to provide them with a hand of help. Somalia fits the trend. In this respect, Metz asserts:

Although the United States had made a strong point of speaking out against human rights violations in other parts of the world, it kept quiet about the suspension of political parties and the violation of human rights in Somalia, while at the same time continuing to provide support to the repressive regime in the form of weapons and military aid.²

Ironically, much of the American aid to Somalia was used to suppress the Somali people and to commit human rights violations against them, something the U. S. has condemned in other countries. Barre benefited a lot from America's support and blind eye. His regime survived the 1980s, receiving grants and flexible loans from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, and food aid through the United States Agency for International Development. This aid was distributed amongst camps and displaced communities, as a result of a refugee flood from war-torn Ogeden region of Eastern Ethiopia. In return, the United States received its strategic naval base at Berbera.³ Strategically speaking, this was a win-win situation between the two allies. The termination of the Cold War did not only mark the demise of the Soviet Union, but the end of the U.S. aid to Siad Barre as well. Consequently, it helped exacerbate the situation in Somalia from bad to worse.

I-5- The Descent into Anarchy

In May 1988, Barre's regime declared war on its own people, dropping bombs on Somali citizens in northern Somalia.⁴ In central Somalia in particular, his military forces committed unnecessary atrocities where they burnt villages, slaughtered thousands of innocent people, and raped women.⁵ Barre was highly antithetical to what the United States was supposedly pursuing. Hence, it is no wonder that, in the mid 1980s, a rising opposition

¹ Mohamed.A, op.cit.,pp.11.

² Metz, op.cit.,pp.177.

³ Mohamed.A, ibid.

⁴ Haji, op.cit.,pp. 75.

⁵ Samatar, Ahmed I. *The Somali Challenge: From Catastrophe to Renewal?* London: Lynne Rienner , 1994.pp. 118.

movement demanded fair representation in the government. Having this demand ignored, the opposition armed itself as the Somali National Movement (SNM), aiming at overthrowing the autocratic regime.

Soon afterwards, the SNM's guerrilla army seized two major cities in Northern Somalia—Hargeisa and Buro—in 1988. Barre and his superior American weapons reacted by crushing the SNM movement. Many civilians died in the crossfire, thousands more fled their homes for the countryside where water and shelter were short. The Africa Watch Magazine estimates that during war between the Barre's regime and the opposition movements 50,000 to 60,000 civilians were put to death.¹

The end of the Cold War, marked by the disintegration of the Soviet Union at the wake of the 1990s, unveiled once more the U. S. self interest-based foreign policy. The planet's lone superpower no longer had any real need for Somalia. It was now convenient to withdraw the support that had long enabled Barre's rule and the corrupt machinery that characterised it. When the United States suspended all financial aid to the Barre's regime, it left him with no leg to stand on. Consequently, his security apparatus swiftly collapsed. At this time, the nation found itself engulfed in civil war.² In this traditional clan-based society, the civil war was fought among three major clan opposition movements, namely the United Somali Congress (USC), the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) and the Somali National Movement (SNM).

On January 28, 1991, after months of fighting in the capital city of Mogadishu, the USC faction took over the capital and Barre fled to the south of the country.³ With the shared enemy eliminated, so too did any reason for the resistance movement to be unified. The same warlords who brought down the dictator continued to fight among themselves for power and control. Thus regional, clan politics returned to Somalia at the worst possible time. In other words, the collapse of the government of President Mohamed Siad Barre resulted in fighting between rival political movements, including those led respectively by Ali Mahdi and General Mohamed Farah Aideed. Civil war tore the country apart and left it without any effective government whatsoever. "Marauding soldiers from the various factions seized food supplies from an already-starving civilian population, contributing to a famine crisis of tremendous

¹ Africa Watch, Somalia. "*Government at War with its Own People*". New York: Africa Watch, 1990.pp. 265, qtd in Haji, op.cit.,pp.91.

² Haji, op.cit.,pp. 76.

³ Ibid.

proportions”¹, which in turn precipitated large-scale population movements into neighbouring Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti.

For a year the power struggle afflicted the Somali people with loss of lives and property. The two men’s quarrel became everyone’s problem. The combatants recruited fighters from their own clan-families and committed themselves to clan, rather than Somali national interests. Aideed and Mahdi were vying for presidency of the entire nation. Interestingly, the two “candidates” were members of the same Hawiye tribe of Mogadishu and central Somalia.² Thus, General Aideed and Mr. Mahdi subdivided Hawiye tribe into two sub clans over which they presided as warlords. This development marked a “slippery slope”³ which was incompatible with the modern nation-state. Hence, “Warlordism” became an accepted part of Somali political culture. With so much threat from other clans, every major clan-family had to grow its military leaders and militias in order to protect itself.

In sum, while clan elders and chiefs were still responsible for clan family affairs in villages, warlords were the players upon the national stage. They kept themselves away from clan business which might create conflicts with traditional elders and chiefs. Rather, the warlords concerned themselves with warfare, for they knew no other way of getting things done. In effect, they were “Somalia’s nightmare, an unending plague”⁴. The resulting dual catastrophes of famine and merciless civil war made humanitarian intervention essential and inevitable. The next section of this chapter puts into question the role, policies as well as hidden agendas of the U. S. in this ‘humanitarian’ military intervention.

II-The Reign of Terror in Somalia: an Analysis of the U. S. ‘Humanitarian’ Military Involvement

The severe insecurity of the early 1990s, combined with exceptional drought, led to an extreme humanitarian crisis where up to 500,000 people are estimated to have died and up to two million people forcibly displaced. A full quarter of Somalia’s nine-million people experienced malnourishment.⁵ It was in this environment that by March 1991 Somalia again emerged central to post-Cold War interventions. One year and a half before the 1992 intervention, assistant Secretary of State, Herman Cohen, pronounced Somalia a civil strife disaster, at which point the United States Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance began to fund

¹ Lepard, op.cit.pp.11.

² Aideed belonged to Habar-Gidir sub-clan family, while Mr. Mahdi was a member of the Abgal sub-clan.

³ Mohamed.A, op.cit.,pp.15.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.,pp.16.

relief efforts. Nonetheless, it was not until the spring of 1992 that Somalia became a major issue in Washington. As a result, the United Nations Security Council, in April 1992, authorised the use of military force so as to be able to “use all necessary means to establish [. . .] a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia”¹ and the first United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was deployed with the consent of the respective leaders of the two leading Somali factions, General Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed.

An admixture of a set of certain circumstances coupled with increased media attention raised the profile of Somalia during this period. In the first six months of 1992, however, the crisis in Somalia failed to generate significant interest in the Bush administration. While Andrew Natsios, Director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, declared in January 1992 that Somalia was the greatest humanitarian emergency in the world, the violence and starvation remained “a third tier issue”² for the administration.

II-1-The Circumstances Surrounding President Bush's Intervention Decision

A sudden shift in policy occurred by August 14, 1992 when the Bush administration had ordered a major airlift of relief supplies – Operation Provide Relief to Somalia. The airlift represented a major intensification in U.S. involvement with the Somali crisis. On the surface, it epitomised George Bush’s ostensible political commitment to the country. After a series of interagency meetings, which were called in order to develop policy options for President Bush, three options had been developed. The first was continuing with aid operations and seeking to enhance the UN presence in Somalia. The second involved organising an international coalition of forces under UN command in which U. S. military airlift, sealift and logistical and communications support would be offered but not ground troops. The third option was sending in a division of U.S. troops under U.S. command and control.³ On November 25 Bush agreed on the third option and proceeded to offer the UN up to 28 000 troops to spearhead an intervention. This suggests that the U. S. participation was not purely built on ‘humanitarian’ grounds taking into account the original definition of humanitarianism cited in the previous chapter, which conforms more to the first option, and confirms that of importance for America was the military commitment.

¹ UN Security Council, “*Resolution 794: Somalia*”, 3 Dec. 1992: para. 10, UN, New York 4 Aug 2011 <<http://www.javier-leon-diaz.com/humanitarianIssues/Resolution794.pdf>>

² Woods, James L. “*U.S. Government Decision-making Processes During Humanitarian Operations in Somalia*”, qtd. in Clarke, Walter and Herbst, Jeffrey, eds. *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1997.pp.153.

³ Cusimano, Maryann K. *Operation Restore Hope: the Bush Administration’s Decision to Intervene in Somalia, Pew Case Studies in International Affairs*. Washington DC: Georgetown Univ, 1995.pp.10.

Meaningful action was to take more time. It was on December 4 that the UN Security Council voted to support intervention, and an announcement was made by Bush that U.S. troops would be sent to Somalia. Meanwhile, famine threatened 1.5 million people in Somalia.¹ So, while the humanitarian crisis was rapidly unfolding in Somalia, the U.S. was trying to operate in an international environment and taking its full time. This delay to take action is very significant in this context. It can be argued that because the bargains intervention in Somalia would entail were almost insignificant, adopting a realistic multilateral approach under the UN auspices was to save America from gambling alone in an unworthy game. Thus, an overwhelming 85 per cent of poll participants in PIPA's April 1995 survey agreed that "the only way for the U.S. to not always be the 'world policeman' was to allow the UN the means to perform some policing functions. UN peacekeeping is a way we can share the burden with other countries."² At the same time, the newly adopted burden-sharing policy of the UN allowed the U.S. to lead this 'humanitarian' military intervention in Somalia. Once more, taking into account Cox's hegemonic theory, it is apparent that the U.S. has attempted to use the UN as the umbrella that would protect it from gambling alone in an unworthy terrain.

In Resolution 794, adopted on December 3, 1992, the Council determined "that the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to international peace and security."³ Acting under Chapter VII, the Council authorised a multinational coalition led by the United States, known as the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), "to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia."⁴ In other words, the first U.S. troops were joined by other forces to create UNITAF, which was charged with restoring security in limited geographic areas to allow the distribution of aid.

Two views tend to dominate the conventional understanding as to why the United States intervened in Somalia, namely the CNN-effect and President Bush's moral indignation

¹ Department of Public Information, "*United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I)*", UN, New York, 1992, 7 Aug 2011 <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unosomi.htm>

² PIPA, April 1995, qtd. in Leonie G. Murray, *Clinton, Peacekeeping, and Human Interventionism*. Oxon: Routledge, 2008, pp.11

³ Leopard, op.cit.,pp.12.

⁴ Ibid.

and the do-ability of the mission.¹ Bush outlined this ostensible motivation when he addressed the nation the day after Resolution 794 was passed: “The people of Somalia, especially the children of Somalia, need our help. We’re able to ease their suffering. We must help them live. We must give them hope. America must act.”² Neither of these views, however, stands up to analytical scrutiny.

Paradoxically, it is worth noting that the conflict in Somalia had been ongoing for several years by the time which military intervention began in 1992. This, of course, is indicative of the fact that it was not so much the presence of violence that prompted action, but something else. Instead of intervening in the moment of instability, the United States tried not to get involved and virtually ignored the political crisis. This was a typical realistic policy based on the pursuit of America’s national interests, in spite of the fact that the situation in Somalia was tragic. When action was taken, the initial efforts were, to a large extent, driven by an ostensibly ‘humanitarian’ agenda as the speech above suggests.

However, states do not intervene to prevent human rights violations simply because they are allowed to. Only by considering when and where humanitarian action is prescribed and by examining the interplay of this prescription with the material self-interests of states can we begin to understand why the U. S. did respond to the grave violations of human rights in Somalia and not in other spots. This confirms Caspar Weinberger’s view explained in the previous chapter. Without doubt, Somalia presented a case where the scope of the tragedy together with other unpopular often unstated stimuli created pressure on America to act militarily under the cover of ‘humanitarian’ interests. Some of these stimuli, to mention only a few, will be outlined.

Firstly, I dare argue that the U. S. initiative to provide humanitarian relief was partly based on the premise that doing so would be easy and not costly. In a way, this case does correspond to explanations of why a country like the United States intervenes ‘humanely’ in a weak country like Somalia, and does not offer a departure from the rule of American national interests. Bush’s ‘humanitarian’ impulses prevailed in the absence of a material interest for intervention in Somalia partly because the operation was predicted to be relatively risk-free and short-term. At a National Security Council meeting in late November, Lawrence

¹ Western, Jon. “*Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information, and Advocacy in the U.S. Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia*,” *International Security*, Vol. 27, no. 1 (July/August 1999)pp.03.

² W.Bush, George “*Address to the Nation on the Situation in Somalia*,” December 4, 1992, qtd. in: Luke Glanville, “*Somalia Reconsidered: An Examination of the Norm of Humanitarian Intervention*”, 2005.pp.05,Macquarie Univ, Australia, 23 June 2011 <<http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/files/2011/04/a178.pdf>>

Eagleburger argued that “we could do this...at not too great a cost and, certainly, without any great danger of body bags coming home.”¹ It was around this time that Colin Powell agreed to support military intervention. James L. Woods describes this support of the Joint Chiefs as “the clinching factor”² which gave Bush the opportunity to choose to pursue a maximalist course of action, shielding intentionally under a UN umbrella. Hence, advocates of a UN-based collective security system say that “with an armed United Nations Americans can promote democracy, protect human rights, and maintain stability, without paying the full costs or looking like bullies”³.

Here is another key to understanding American intervention in Somalia in December 1992. Faced with a loss in momentum for his new world order, Bush secured United Nations authorisation to occupy that country for ‘humanitarian’ relief. However, it was unclear how the American initiative amounted to more than an isolated instance of humanitarian assistance, to military involvement. To many historians, it appeared that precisely because Bush did not know how to act in a Wilsonian manner toward Haiti or the former Yugoslavia, toward China or Panama, toward the former Soviet Union or in the aftermath of the victory over Iraq, that he had looked for a low-cost, high profile action in the Horn of Africa. “Yes, Somalia should be saved; but where was the new world order?”⁴, states Tony Smith.

Furthermore, one may question the U. S. act of launching UNITAF as an act of aiding Somalia or de facto America. The distinction is delicate, yet significant. As a matter of fact, intervening in Somalia was important for another important reason, as U.S. policy-makers felt that they faced a choice between joining an intervention in Bosnia to stop the slaughter of Bosnian Muslims or lead an effort in Somalia. Despite the fact that intervention in Somalia would not yield any benefits, they certainly preferred its problems and location to the violence in Bosnia. In other words, it can be argued that intervening in Somalia satisfied Bush’s desire to deflect attention away from calls for the use of force in the Bosnian conflict. To quote Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger who defended Bush's decision to intervene in Somalia and not Bosnia in a discussion about American national interests:

...this debate is around this issue of our national interest and that’s a legitimate issue, but the fact of the matter is that a thousand people are starving to death every day,

¹ Wheeler, Nicholas J. *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2002. pp.181.

² Woods, op.cit., pp. 158.

³ Gerlach, Jeffrey R. “A U. N. Army for the New World Order”. *Orbis* (spring 1993): pp.226, 20 April 2013 <<http://www.sciencedirect.com/www.snd11.arn.dz/science/article/pii/0030438793902263>>

⁴ Smith, op.cit.pp., 321.

that this is not going to get better if we don't do something about it, and it is in an area where we can, in fact, affect events. There are other parts of the world where things are equally tragic, but where the cost of trying to change things would be monumental – in my view, Bosnia is one of those.¹

For this reason, it is argued that throughout the fall of 1992 liberal humanitarianists² escalated their advocacy efforts and mobilised political pressure on the Bush administration to do something in both Somalia and Bosnia. As this political pressure intensified, Bill Clinton won the presidential election on November 8. President Bush and General Powell concluded that liberal humanitarianism would dominate the new Administration. They also believed that liberal humanitarianists, in control of the White House bully pulpit, would campaign heavily for American intervention in Bosnia. Given the shift in power in Washington and the intensity of mobilised political pressure to respond to humanitarian emergencies, Bush and Powell concluded that if the United States was going to intervene in response to a humanitarian crisis, it would be in Somalia and not Bosnia. Somalia was easier.³

Another factor which also impacted Bush's humanitarian impulse was that he was coming to the end of his term as President. It is widely accepted that concern for his presidential legacy contributed to Bush's decision to intervene. An insight into this concern is provided by a Defence Department official who said at the time, "I had the feeling that no matter what was said (by his advisors), he would not want to leave office with 50,000 people starving that he could have saved."⁴ This is to say that self-interested reasons are inappropriate motives to conduct war in defence of human rights.

Besides, understanding the U.S. mission under the UN auspices from the Somali viewpoint is crucial in assessing the effectiveness of Bush's intervention decision to assist the humanitarian disaster in the country. For this study, fifty Somalis were interviewed during the three months following the departure of UNOSOM troops in March, 1995.⁵ As to their opinion about Bush's real intentions, the vast majority, precisely 36 out of the 50

¹ Eagleburger Lawrence interview, "*This Week with David Brinkley*", *ABC News*, (1992), qtd. in Glanville, op.cit., pp. 07.

² They filled the ranks of humanitarian and human rights non-governmental organisations and supported military intervention to provide humanitarian relief to aggrieved populations and to stop or prevent atrocities perpetrated against civilians.

³ Western, op.cit.pp.07.

⁴ Oberdorfer, Don. "*The Path to Intervention*" qtd. in: Glanville, ibid., pp.0 6.

⁵ Haji, op.cit., pp. 120.

interviewees, believed that the U.S. mission was meant to undermine Aideed politically and eventually install an anti Somali National Alliance (SNA) puppet government.¹

Moreover, a comparison of the different ambiguous objectives stated by the U. S. government at the onset of the mission would be of paramount importance. For example, in resolution 794 of December 2, 1992, it was stated that the primary objective of the U.S. /UN mission was “to create a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid”². In less than three months, in resolution 814 of March 26, 1993, the U. S. embarked on an ambitious nation-building mandate and to a large extent abandoned the humanitarian aspect of the mission. Also, the role of the UNOSOM military changed from peacekeeping to peacemaking covering the whole country.³ Not only does the administration’s behaviour vis-à-vis the Somali crisis alone put into question the U.S. real objectives, but the media coverage is very significant as well.

II-2-Media Coverage Prior to and after President Bush's intervention Decision

Likewise, an analysis of the timing of media coverage calling for intervention in Somalia remains crucial and casts doubt on the extent to which a U. S. ‘humanitarian’ concern was the only stimulus. In fact, a thorough analysis of the media behaviour reveals that the latter had followed an agenda-denial policy following that of the U. S. executive—neglecting the plight of the Somalis for almost a year after the outbreak of the civil war, and exposing Somalia to public debate afterwards. This coincided with President Bush's decision to deploy troops in Somalia, thus shaping the agenda-setting for intervention. What all this amounts to is that Antonio Gramsci was extremely right when he asserted in his hegemony theory that the media are at their hegemonic state’s disposal as a powerful weapon whenever necessary.

By the early 1990s, many people had thought that television news possessed formidable powers to influence the U.S. government’s foreign policy. The “CNN effect,” as it is usually called, actually has several dimensions. The first is providing a new channel of diplomatic communication, one that allows governments to transmit proposals or engage in dialogue, sometimes with extraordinary speed.⁴ The second dimension of the “CNN effect” is setting the foreign policy agenda—giving certain issues urgency or importance through news reports that capture the interest of millions of viewers and elicit a strong response. The third dimension is accelerating official action. The final and most controversial dimension of the

¹ Haji, *op.cit.*,pp.121.

² *Ibid.*,pp.122.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Officials in the Bush administration, for example, sometimes used TV to send messages to Saddam Hussein after the invasion of Kuwait, hoping that a public channel might increase the pressure on the Iraqi leader to accede to U.S. demands.

“CNN effect” is forcing government action.¹ George F. Kennan, the foreign-service officer who was an architect of containment during the early Cold War, summarised this perspective in a diary entry about U.S. intervention in Somalia in December 1992. Kennan maintained that television pictures of starving Somali children had produced “an emotional reaction, not a thoughtful or deliberate one,”² but one strong enough to take control of foreign policy decisions from “the responsible deliberative organs of our government.”³

A closer look at U.S. involvement in Somalia, however, suggests different conclusions than Kennan’s about the effects of televised images on government policy decisions. Quantitative studies show that extensive coverage of the famine and fighting in Somalia followed the policy initiatives of the Bush administration in 1992 rather than preceded them. “Television coverage surely affected the views of administration officials and gave them confidence that what they thought would be a limited, low-risk humanitarian intervention would have considerable public support”, argues Chester Pach, “but television pictures of suffering Somalis did not determine the president’s decision to dispatch troops”⁴.

A review of the coverage of the news stories from Somalia would confirm this stand. Jonathan Mermin’s analysis of television coverage of ABC, CBS, and NBC points to very low coverage of Somalia from January through June, an increase in July, and extensive coverage in August and September, a sharp drop off in October, and a recovery in November.⁵ Only three full stories occurred on the first six months of 1992—January 5th, February 27th, and March 2nd—with scary predictions of numbers who would starve without relief. In July and August, however, three full stories ran on the networks—July 22 by ABC, July 31 by CBS, and August 13 by ABC— all containing videos of starving children.⁶

By superimposing events in Washington onto the timetable of stories, it can be demonstrated that it was Washington which set the context in which the media responded. In late June, U.S. Ambassador to Kenya Smith Hempstone Jr. travelled to refugee camps on the Somali-Kenyan border for the first time. He reported his trip in a cable entitled “A Day in Hell,” which presented a vivid report of the humanitarian suffering. The cable resonated with many liberal humanitarianists in the State Department who believed that the Bush

¹ Chester, *op.cit.*, pp.558-9.

² *Ibid.*, pp.559.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Mermin, Jonathan. “*Television News and American Intervention in Somalia: The Myth of a Media-Driven Foreign Policy*”, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 112, No. 3 (1997)pp.391.

⁶ *Ibid.*

administration needed to do more in Somalia, and the cable was immediately leaked to the press.¹ Afterwards, on July 22nd, the day the ABC story aired, the House Select Committee on Hunger held hearings on Somalia. Senator Nancy Kassebaum, the senior Republican of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's sub-committee on Africa, who had just returned from a fact-finding mission, declared: "I strongly support sending a United Nation security force to Somalia".² Senator Paul Simon, chair of the subcommittee on Africa, also urged the administration to act after witnessing the horrific conditions in Somalia, saying: "I don't want to wait to have a Democratic administration before we respond more adequately. I want to do it now".³ The timing suggests the importance of both Kassebaum and Simon and the House Committee on Hunger in getting Somalia on the media's agenda. In this regard, Strobel notes, "Television did not lead but followed policy action or proposals".⁴

The CBS story on July 31st also followed this pattern. Senator Edward Kennedy in a hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee wondered: "Why we're not moving in Somalia as we are in Yugoslavia".⁵ On his part, White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater in a press conference on July 27th stated: "The tragedy in Somalia...requires the urgent attention of the international community".⁶ According to Mermin, CBS covered Somalia on July 31st only after actors in Washington defined it as a significant concern: "Instead of being out ahead of Washington, television appears to have acted in concert with Congress and the White House in illuminating events in Somalia".⁷

Additionally, the August 13 story on ABC followed two weeks of debate and action in Washington. Chief among which, the Senate Resolution on Somalia urging deployment of UN forces on August 3rd; Senator Rockefeller's criticism of Bush's inaction on Somalia on August 9th; the House resolution on Somalia On August 10th; the UN's announcement to send 500 troops to guard relief supplies on August 12th; and candidate Clinton's citation of Somalia as an important foreign policy issue on August 13th.⁸ On the same day, Bush decided—before ABC framed a story—in meetings with James Baker, Secretary of Defence Richard Cheney,

¹ Western, op.cit.,pp.14.

² Mermin, op.cit.,pp.392.

³ Ibid.,pp.393.

⁴ Strobel, Warren P. *Late-Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media's Influence on Peace Operations*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997.pp.136.

⁵ Graybill, Lyn S. "*CNN Made Me Do (Not Do) It: Assessing Media Influence on U.S. Interventions in Somalia and Rwanda*", *Sarai Reader* (2004): pp.172, 17 April 2013 <<http://www.sarai.net/publications/readers/04-crisis-media/22lyn.pdf>>

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Mermin, ibid.,pp.394.

⁸ Graybill, ibid.

and National Security Advisor Brent Snowcroft to authorise the airlift.¹ The day following the ABC story, the White House announced it would airlift emergency aid in what it called “Operation Provide Relief”.²

Interestingly, the media framed the Somalia story as actors in Washington were framing it – that Somalia was a situation that the U.S. should and could do something about. Mermin argues: “It is noteworthy that the framing of the crisis in Somalia as a humanitarian disaster that the United States could do something about does not appear on television until it has appeared in Washington first”.³

From mid-August to mid-September, the networks devoted fifty-five minutes to the preparations for the airlift and the operation. From mid-September to November 8th—presidential election season—only 250 seconds of coverage was broadcast on Somalia.⁴ Interestingly, from November 9th to November 24th, the three networks broadcast four full stories. On November 26th, the White House announced the decision to send ground troops to secure relief delivery routes.⁵ During this period, precisely on November 9th, Senators Simon, Kassebaum, and Wofford in a press conference called for further action. On November 18th, a six-member Congressional delegation to Somalia held a press conference describing Somalia as “an affront to humanity” and urged further action.⁶ Thus, television coverage and actions of politicians are correlated, with official actions preceding Somalia’s becoming a news story.

Between November 26th—when the decision to launch “Operation Restore Hope” was announced—until December 9th—the day the U.S. troops landed near Mogadishu—there were ninety-five news reports, and coverage remained relatively high through year’s end.⁷ The images broadcast on CNN and the three networks helped Bush explain why the mission was necessary. Thus, the media, being part of the government’s “historic bloc”, became an instrument of policy. Former State Department spokesman Richard Boucher explained: “We didn’t have to spend as much time postulating an argument for [intervention]”.⁸

When Navy Seals and Marines landed on the beach of Mogadishu on December 9th, the networks and CNN were already there, having sent in their journalists, Ted Koppel of

¹ Graybill, op.cit.

² Mermin, op.cit.,pp.396.

³ Ibid.,pp.397.

⁴ Graybill, ibid.,pp173.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Mermin, op.cit.,pp.401.

⁷ Strobel, op.cit.pp.136-7.

⁸ Graybill, ibid.

ABC, Tom Brokaw of NBC, and Dan Rather of CBS. In addition to the journalists waiting on the beach, more than twenty journalists accompanied the Marines as they prepared for the beach landing.¹

By and large, coverage empathised with the people of Somalia and focused upon the positive humanitarian aspects of the intervention decision. In doing so, coverage helped build support for Bush's policy of intervention whilst marginalising those who opposed the operation. In short, in the intervention of Somalia the news media actually tended to follow the self interests-based agenda of the executive, and moreover, helped to build support for that agenda, contrary to what was 'humanely' presented on TV channels.

Even more importantly, it was not until six weeks into the U.S. intervention that a journalist for a major media did unusually outlet report on the close relationship between oil and the U.S. intervention. This was Mark Fineman of the *Los Angeles Times*, who wrote:

Far beneath the surface of the tragic drama of Somalia, four major U.S. oil companies are quietly sitting on a prospective fortune in exclusive concessions to explore and exploit tens of millions of acres of the Somali countryside... That land, in the opinion of geologists and industry sources, could yield significant amounts of oil and natural gas if the U.S.-led military mission can restore peace to the impoverished East African nation.²

So, unusually Fineman was courageous enough to confess that prior to the collapse of the Somali government in 1991, four major oil petroleum giants had agreements with Somalia, giving companies the rights to the most promising concessions. Companies such as Conoco, Amoco, Chevron and Phillips were hoping that Bush would make the decision to send troops to Somalia, as it will help protect their investments. Thus, it has been theorised that the former Texan-oil man, President George Bush, had personal reasons for wanting intervention in Somalia. When in the mid-1980s it was disclosed that there was large amount of oil in northern Somalia, Bush urged American oil companies to exploit those reserves. After the enactment of Operation Restore Hope, Conoco played an intimate part in U.S government's role in 'humanitarian' efforts. And questions began to raise on if Bush's efforts were to restore hope, or to restore oil.

The subsequent U. S. President, Bill Clinton, has proved to be no exception to the rule of American national interests, and both the deepening involvement of U. S. forces in combat

¹ Strobel, op.cit.,pp.96.

² Fineman, Mark. "*The oil factor in Somalia* ", *Los Angeles Times*(2003), 23 Aug 2011 <<http://michaelmaren.com/somalia-archive/the-oil-factor-in-somalia/>>

operations during UNOSOM II, as well as the timing of his decision to withdraw his troops from Somalia early in 1994 deserve particular mention.

II-3- President Clinton: a Deep Military Involvement and a Sudden Withdrawal

When Bill Clinton replaced George H.W. Bush in office in 1993, he continued, and in fact expanded, his predecessor's involvement in Somalia. Although both UNITAF and UNOSOM were authorised as peace-enforcement missions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UNOSOM II mandate reflected a considerably deeper military commitment of 'humanitarian' assistance. In fact, American forces were supposed to play a role in logistical support to the operation only. However, in pursuit of the best government, UN and U.S. officials actually helped to exacerbate strife by pitting one warlord against another. One prime example was when Belgian peacekeepers enabled warlord Mohamed Said Morgan to capture the southern Somali town of Kismayo from General Mohamed Farah Aideed's ally, Mohamed Omar Jess.¹ This action infuriated Aideed and his followers.

Many violent protests ensued against U.S. 'humanitarian' efforts, involving road bombs and skirmishes with Pakistani peacekeepers.² In the aftermath of the June 5, 1993 ambush that killed 24 Pakistani peacekeepers, the United States played a prominent role in drafting UN Security Council Resolution 837, which called for the apprehension of those parties responsible. That resolution constituted a real change in the mission, because its terms were rapidly translated into a manhunt for Mohammed Aideed. Because those operations clearly outran the capabilities of other UNOSOM II forces, there was an immediate expansion in the use of the Quick Reaction Force. Here, U.S. policy completed its transformation from a 'humanitarian' to military mission.

The mistake of ordering the arrest of General Mohamed Farah Aideed shows the extent to which the United States failed to understand the culture and the clan politics of this nomadic nation. Admittedly, Aideed was "a ruthless thug"³ and a poor model for humanity. Yet when U.S. and UN coalition started to hunt him down, he became an automatic hero for Somalis because of his courage to stand up to the world's remaining superpower. Thus, Aideed succeeded in mobilising Somalia's clans including rivals against the foreigners. In response, the United States and United Nations escalated the conflict, culminating in what amounted to a state of war.

¹ Mohamed.A, op.cit.,pp. 17.

² Ibid.,pp.18.

³ Ibid.

Numerous Somali civilians were killed, apparently, at least in many cases, as a result of fire by UNOSOM II forces. Moreover, there were confirmed reports of the torture and murder of civilians by certain contingents.¹ On October 3-4, 1993, U.S. special operations forces that were not under the command of UNOSOM II attacked the Olympic Hotel in search of Aideed and were ambushed. This led to eighteen American servicemen losing their lives and the infamous shooting down of two Black Hawk helicopters.² Consequently, UNOSOM II operation has been criticised as “mission creep”³ since the requirements of the supposedly U. S. ‘humanitarian’ aid did not necessitate so deep an involvement militarily.

For this reason, it is widely believed that the overall ‘humanitarian’ operation in Somalia was not cost effective. Drysdale, for instance, who is a senator advisor to three envoys to Somalia, noted that only 0.7 percent of \$1.5 billion of the 1993 budget was spent on humanitarian aid.⁴ On his part, the Under Secretary of Humanitarian Affairs Jan Eliasson told the UN Economic and Social Council that the UN is spending ten dollars on military and only one dollar on humanitarian operations.⁵ The clear implication, as one may perceive, is that the U.S./UN mission lost the humanitarian priority as it began to focus on the capture of the warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed.

Besides, it has become virtually impossible for competing Somali forces to view the United States, under the UN auspices, as an impartial mediator. The fact that America soon made the capture of Aideed its highest priority eliminated any pretence that the U. S. could impose a political settlement without taking sides. It thereby transgressed the principles of impartiality and neutrality central to any humanitarian mission as the previous chapter makes clear. In this respect, Brian D. Lepard assures: “UNOSOM II ceased to be concerned about maintaining any perception on the part of the factions of its ‘impartiality’.”⁶ This would further prove that the use of force and impartiality, which is an integral part of humanitarian intervention, are but odd couples and incompatible with each other. Hence, it came as no surprise that many Somalis responded with hostility to the United States' involvement and expressed their hostility toward the U.S. presence on numerous occasions bearing in mind its real intentions, culminating in the death of the 18 U.S. soldiers. For Somalis, in the words of

¹ Lepard, op.cit.,pp.14.

² Mohamed.A, ibid.,pp. 19.

³ It is the expansion of a project or mission beyond its original goals. The phrase first appeared in articles concerning the United Nations peacekeeping mission during the Somali Civil War in the *Washington Post* on April 15, 1993 and in the *New York Times* on October 10, 1993.

⁴ Elmi Abdullahi, Elmi. *Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia: Challenges and Lessons*, diss.Washington, D.C.: The American University, 1995.pp. 131.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Lepard, op.cit.pp.13.

columnist George F. Will, the U.S. intervention in Somalia could be aptly termed “colonialism of compassion.”¹

Furthermore, when the 18 U.S. soldiers were killed during the aforementioned Somali-U.S. confrontation, it became apparent to U.S. policymakers that establishing a functioning society in Somalia was more complex, and uppermost more costly, than they had thought and this fell into contradiction with their perceived self-interests. Because there was no ‘perceived success’ to counter the lack of ‘perceived interest’, and to create a sense that fatalities had been ‘worth it’, President Clinton eventually recognised the necessity to give up this ‘unworthy’ game² and pledged to leave the country by March 31, 1994. This further confirms the argument that the U. S. materialistic national interests are put at the forefront when the country undergoes an intervention be it direct or ‘humanitarian’, even when the stated ‘noble’ objectives of the mission remain unfulfilled after withdrawal. This egoism epitomises the realistic policy pursued by the United States of America.

Due to these strange U. S. foreign policy behaviours, many UN member states have become cynical and suspicious of mandates authorising then suddenly putting an end to ‘humanitarian’ interventions. They argue that the major powers dominate the Security Council, and that they are simply using it as a basis to surreptitiously pursue their own ambitions and their own national interest.³ This conforms to the aforementioned Coxian hegemony theory. Consequently, in my view, the Security Council would find “a threat to international peace and security” legalising humanitarian intervention only where it is in the Five Permanent Members’ interest to do so. Ruth Wedgewood further confirms this when he declares:

The United Nations is a deeply political place. Members consider national self-interest. To a realist, Security Council action can be explained as the resolution of political vectors. Each country calculates its national self-interest, and the interests of allied cooperative states, while speaking a universalistic vocabulary.⁴

Indeed, this fundamental criticism that the council intervenes only in cases in the national interests of the Permanent Five has become apparent throughout the above investigation of events during the U. S. intervention in Somalia. Equally important, if the U.S. assistance missions during the 1990s were really ‘humanitarian’, one may question its total neglect to a myriad of humanitarian disasters throughout the world. These include Sudan,

¹ George F. Will, . . . *When to Fold*, qtd in: Ayittey, pp.15.

² Murray, op.cit.,pp.110.

³ Haji, op.cit.,pp. 98.

⁴ Ibid.,pp.99.

Zaire, Burundi, Algeria, Sierra Leone, Guatemala, East Timor and the former Soviet republic of Georgia in which thousands of innocents were dying in internal conflicts. Such inconsistencies help undermine the U. S. credibility in the course of its ‘humanitarian’, or more adequately military, missions.

On a practical basis, moreover, any intervention costs time and money. If the intervention faces resistance, then it will also cost blood. These prices lead many to believe that America, as being a permanent member in the UN, will only commit forces if its own interests are involved. Thus, taking this into account would turn Clinton’s sudden withdrawal decision from Somalia to an unsurprising act. As a diplomatic correspondent for Reuters has said:

Analysts and diplomats say that problems with peacekeeping missions in Somalia and Bosnia have made the most powerful states—the United States, Russia, France and Britain—wary of involvement in missions where they do not have a clear stake.¹

In 1994, the U. S. published a statement that seems to support this conclusion. Essentially, it said that the United States must have an interest in internal political or ethnic conflicts before it allows its forces to participate in a UN operation.² Consequently, the American forces left Somalia to meet its own destiny alone reaping the fool costs and catastrophes of the U. S. ‘humanitarian’ military intervention.

II-4-Aftermaths of Intervention: Anarchy and Humanitarian Catastrophe

Knowing that any humanitarian aid is supposed to pull the target country out of its deepening despair to some extent, a careful analysis of the consequences of the U. S. ‘humanitarian’ aid provided to the Somalis reveals that the latter was more negative than it was positive. Success indicators may be expressed in terms of the numbers of children being fed or gallons of potable water being pumped. The extent to which the U. S. has realised these indicators remains questionable, as this ‘humanitarian’ aid has failed to arrest Somalia's economic decline and, instead, has helped produce numerous human, economic and political disasters. For instance, to mention only a few, Walter S. Poole has insisted that: “in Somalia humanitarian relief was not followed by nation-building because the underlying political and security problems were never solved”.³ For his part, Peter Woodward has asserted that:

At the time of the UNOSOM II pull out in 1995, Somalia was similar to conditions before UNOSOM in 1992. The two major faction rivals for control of the largely

¹ Op.cit.,pp. 100.

² Ibid.,pp. 101.

³ Poole, Walter S. *The Effort to Save Somalia: August 1992-March 1994*, (2005): pp.4, Joint History Office, Washington, DC, 28 Aug 2011 <<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/history/somalia.pdf>>.

destroyed capital of Mogadishu were still those of Aideed and Ali Mahdi. There was still a UN presence. And its civilian personnel, as well as those of the remaining NGOs, were as constrained in their activities as they had been for much of the time since Barre's downfall in 1991, with or without foreign troops...and deadly clashes occurred from time to time.¹

So, America has left Somalia in a much worse situation than it was before. When the United States and the UN withdrew their forces from Somalia in 1994 and 1995 respectively, order still had not been restored and the security situation remained fragile. The UN assisted Somalia somewhat with food aid, but could not restrain the ongoing famine in the country killing at least 200 citizens per day.²

Furthermore, conflict between rival warlords and their factions continued throughout the 1990s and no stable government emerged to take control of the country.³ It was apparent that the only beneficiary from this military intervention was General Mohammed Farah Aideed.⁴ He added to his symbolism through opposing the U.S. forces that were considered by the majority of Somalis as being imperialist forces. Consequently, following the U. S. withdrawal from Somalia, his influence increased to the extent that he was appointed as president by many factions in 1995. For this reason, animosity between him and his enemy Ali Mahdi Mohamed reached its highest peak and deadly clashes took place. Chief among which was the 1996 battle in which General Aideed was seriously wounded and died afterwards.⁵

Besides, it is worth noting that following the U. S. intervention, Somalia began to split up into various parts.⁶ 'The Republic of Somaliland was the first area to declare its independence. Because it enjoyed relative stability in comparison to the remaining areas, they were tempted to follow suit. As a result, Puntland, which is located in the eastern north of Somalia, was formed in May 15, 1998. (see Figure 3)

¹ Woodward, Peter. *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa*. UK: University of Reading, 2006.pp.71.

² Alkarhdaghi, Ali.M, ed. "*The Issue of Somalia : from Civil War to Direct Occupation*", *Albassaer* (2007): pp.22, 02 May 2013 <www.midadulqalam.info/midad/uploads/File/Samalien_Albasar_Magazin.pdf>

³ "*Somalia Civil War*" <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/somalia.htm>>

⁴ Alkarhdaghi, *ibid.*,pp.23.

⁵ This battle was fought against a former officer of Aideed followers named Otman Ali Otto. He rebelled against him after Aideed's son Hussein, who was a former soldier in American navy, was installed as Otto's successor.

⁶ Alkarhdaghi, *ibid.*




Figure 3: Map of Somalia after division.¹

¹ This map was retrieved from: <www.somalinet.com>

Moreover, what is worse was hinted at by Noam Chomsky who has reported the body count from U.S. fire in Somalia in 1993 declaring: “The official estimate was 610,000 Somali casualties in the summer of 1993 alone, two-thirds women and children.”¹ This has led Chomsky to question the nobility of America's ‘humanitarian’ invasion to Somalia having generated an endless pool of the blood of innocent children and women. Thus, it is no surprise to say that military enforcement in the U. S. ostensible ‘humanitarian’ intervention in Somalia is simply an immoral and politically ineffective means for achieving the objectives of a typical humanitarian intervention. To be more precise, it is even disastrous and traumatic.

This is to say that policies must be judged by their consequences, not only by their intentions, if they are to be qualified as noble and humanitarian. No matter how magnanimous the objectives or noble the motives, the ‘mission’ in Somalia was in all aspects catastrophic and doomed to failure. For this reason, from a consequentialist viewpoint, which was discerned in the previous chapter, because the U. S. intervention in Somalia produced a myriad of negative outcomes, then this makes it morally wrong or unhumanitarian.

Besides, its impact on American foreign policy was great and so was its outcry. It is widely argued that the doctrines of the United States were clearly affected. President Clinton issued a policy directive in April 1994, shortly after U.S. forces left Somalia, that implied a sharp curtailment of American involvement in future armed humanitarian interventions and that marked a retreat from his administration's earlier rhetoric of assertive multilateralism. Hence, its substitution with unilateralism seemed to be an adequate option.

However, I believe, this was not the case as this was another justification serving the rule of self- interests. Put differently, it was not so much the aftermath of Somalia’s debacle which led the U.S. to substitute multilateralism with unilateralism in interventions like that in Iraq. It was rather the new requirements of America’s national interest—as being the world hegemon—which dictated upon the nation such a shift in policy. The proof is to be found in the subsequent chapter which analyses the 2003 U.S. unilateral idealistic war on Iraq from its different angles and it is to discussion and examination of this shift epitomised in the war on Iraq that my study now turns.

¹ Chomsky, Noam. *The New Military Humanism - Lessons from Kosovo*. London: Pluto Press, 1999. pp. 68.

Chapter Three:
**The 2003 War on Iraq: a U. S. ‘humanitarian’ War
on Terrorism**

The third chapter departs from Africa and lands in the Middle East to further delve for unstated realities into American ‘humanitarian’ military interventions in the region in the post-Cold War era—specifically in the post-September 11, 2001 era. In the quest for the U. S. real aim, this chapter expounds the case of Iraq. Within the space of this chapter, I will not explain the different phases through which America has taken control of Iraq in 2003. My emphasis is rather to explore the circumstances under which a declaration of unilateral war against Iraq based on an idealistic approach and media propaganda became possible, illuminate the significant events and examine the extent to which a ‘humanitarian’ concern was one of its major incentives, comparing it to Somalia and building my argumentation on facts. Coxian and Gramscian hegemony theories will find their implications in the case under discussion in this chapter.

I-Iraq the Tempting Country

To get a better picture of the current political situation in Iraq, an understanding of its natural resources and strategic position as well as its recent history is a necessary precursor. Iraq is an Arab Muslim country that is situated in the land that the ancient Greeks called Mesopotamia, meaning land between the rivers. In fact, two internal factors have shaped Iraq's modern state of affairs, namely oil and Saddam Hussein. The former supplies the country with its life blood and wealth, for Iraqi oil reserves are the second largest in the world and constitute a significant portion of U.S. oil imports. Whereas the latter had failed to use the country’s great natural and historical resources to forge a prosperous, free, and peaceful nation. Instead, he employed violence and terror against his own people and sought to increase his power by building up Iraq’s military, using terror and torture against anyone who dared criticise or threaten his regime. And by attacking Iraq’s neighbours, namely Iran and Kuwait, paving the way for an American ‘moment’ in his country. Iraq’s recent history, therefore, became marked by repression, war, and struggles with the international community, with America at the forefront, over oil and weapons of mass destruction. The struggle has intensified after the 9/11 events, which is the external factor, culminating in a U. S.-led brutal and costly war against Iraq. A nation that is, unlike Somalia, worth the sacrifice.

I-1- Iraq: An Introduction to the Country

For many Americans, the Republic of Iraq is a nation seeped in mystery and shadows. In the past few years, the United States has fought two wars in Iraq. Thus, Iraq has been a

fixture in the media of the United States and, by extension, the world. However, few American adults know or understand the rich cultural history or the political forces that have shaped modern Iraq. Hence, a clear understanding of the country's recent history is crucial in discerning the U.S. foreign policy behaviours vis-à-vis Iraq in the past couple of decades.

The current boundaries of Iraq are an artificial creation of the British and French after World War I. Prior to that time, what we now call Iraq was roughly equivalent to Mesopotamia. The term “Mesopotamia” means the land between the rivers. The name refers to the Tigris and the Euphrates, two large rivers in Iraq. This location became what many have called the “cradle of civilisation.” Indeed, modern-day Iraq was where civilisation began. Legends hold that modern-day Iraq is the site of the biblical Garden of Eden.¹ Some 50 miles outside Basra, an ancient tree is allegedly the Tree of Adam and Eve and is a popular tourist site.

Whether or not Eden actually existed in Iraq, Mesopotamia was indeed the cradle of civilisation. In the fertile crescent of Mesopotamia, writing, mathematics, and the world's first codified legal system began. The Sumerians invented agriculture and irrigation and put the wheel to use in manufacturing pottery and for transportation.² Unfortunately, modern Iraq has suffered such war and strife as to make archaeological excavation difficult to impossible.

Iraq is approximately 168,000 square miles. In comparison with its near neighbours, Iraq is smaller than Iran but larger than Syria. The Tigris and Euphrates rivers flow southeast through Iraq, toward the Persian Gulf, and join at Shatt al-Arab, just north of Basra. The rich banks and tributaries of the two great rivers created a highly fertile, arable plain and set the stage for civilisation to develop. Iraq's richest natural resource is the black gold found beneath the surface where gallons of petroleum that make up more than 95 percent of contemporary Iraq's economy. As of 2000, it is estimated that Iraq contains more than 310 billion barrels of oil reserves, the second-largest reserves in the world.³

Iraq's only seacoast is a small 58 kilometres strip of land on the Persian Gulf, so named during the Persians occupation of Mesopotamia starting in 539 B.C.E.⁴ Iraq's major ports are Basra, at the confluence of the two rivers, and at Umm Qasr. Iraq's tiny coastline barely provides enough access to export oil, and the ports are relatively shallow. At least, part

¹ Hunt, Courtney. *The History of Iraq*. U.S.A: Greenwood Publishing Group Inc, 2005.pp.01.

² Ibid.,pp.11.

³ Ibid.,pp. 02.

⁴ Before that, it was commonly called the Chaldean Sea or the Sea of the Rising Sun.

of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1989 was based on the desire to have access to Kuwait's lucrative seaports.¹

Iraq is home to approximately 25.5 million people, with a population growth rate of 2.84 percent.² The vast majority of Iraqis identify themselves as Arab—75 to 80 percent. The Kurds make up 15 to 20 percent of the population. The remaining 5 percent is comprised of Turkomans, Assyrians, and other ethnic groups. (see figure 4)

Harmonious coexistence between several tribes, languages, and religions is part and parcel of Iraqi society. Loyalty to family and tribe is a significant factor throughout Middle Eastern society. Just like the Somali society, tribalism remains a significant force in Iraqi life, especially in the rural countryside.

As for language, most Iraqis speak Arabic, while the Kurds speak Kurdish, creating a language barrier. It is impossible to speak of an Iraqi identity without also mentioning the religious sects that constitute Iraq: Arab Shiite Muslims, Arab Sunni Muslims, Kurds, and Christians. Many Kurds are also Sunni Muslims. All these segmentations have contributed to the dynamic heritage, rich history, and vibrant cultural tapestry of Iraq today.

Because Iraq is located on the historical trade routes connecting East and West, this gave it “access to the wealth, culture, and splendour of the world”³. Of course, it also made Iraq a valuable conquest. Over the six millennia of recorded history, Iraq was frequently invaded and conquered.

For example, the Ottomans conquered Baghdad in 1534 and ruled Mesopotamia until World War I. However, Ottoman control did not extend to the Mesopotamian countryside, which was ruled by native tribesman. After repelling an attack by the Safavids of Persia, Mesopotamia became known as the Province of Baghdad. The 1908 revolution of the Young Turks brought a constitution and a parliament to Baghdad.⁴

Allied with Germany and Austria-Hungary as the Central Powers during World War I, the Ottoman Turks were defeated, and as a result, the empire was overthrown internally.⁵ Then, Iraq came under British occupation. The occupation was later modified to a British

¹ Hunt, op.cit.,pp. 03.

² Ibid.,pp. 05.

³ Ibid.,pp. 01.

⁴ Ibid.,pp. 47.

⁵ Fattah, Hala.Caso, Frank. *A Brief History of Iraq*. New York: Facts on File Inc., 2009. pp.154.



FIGURE 4: Political Map of Iraq.¹

¹ This photo was retrieved from: <<http://www.ezilon.com/maps/asia/iraq-maps.html>>

Mandate, and Britain was tasked by the League of Nations to guide Iraq's transition to independence. Iraq attained full independence in 1932 and joined the League of Nations as a sovereign state, even though Britain retained a proprietary interest in Iraq's development. From 1932 to 1958, the country was ruled by a monarchy originally from the Hashemite family in the Hijaz. In 1958, a bloody coup overthrew the monarchy and installed the first of many republican regimes.

Iraq endured a decade of revolutions, rebellions, and power shifts between the Revolution of 1958 and the rise of the Ba'athists in 1968 to power. The Ba'athists and the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) grappled for power over the next 10 years, setting the stage for the 1968 revolution. In July 1968, the Ba'ath Party wrested control of Iraq in the so-called Bloodless Revolution.¹ Al-Bakr was installed as president of Iraq and carried out the consolidation of power with one of his chief deputies, Saddam Hussein. Iraq now controlled its own oil resources, and the oil boom of the early 1970s brought great wealth as well as problems to Iraq. Therefore, a discussion of Iraq's oil resources, which constitute an eminent ingredient in U.S. policy calculations in regard to Iraq, is necessary.

I-2- Iraq's Black Gold: God's Grace or a Dark Curse?

While this is necessarily a narrow overview of Iraq's oil, its strategic importance renders it vital to any study about Iraq's state of affairs. Accordingly, what follows will provide a brief history of Iraq's involvement with oil and examine the security threats to the nation's oil terminals in an oil-thirsty world, with the United States at the forefront.

The oil industry is at the centre of Iraq's economy and accounts for more than 95 percent of Iraq's revenues.² Iraq has long been a major oil exporting power, and had produced about 22 billion barrels of oil at the time the Gulf War began.³ For this reason, Iraq is a member of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The Iraq Petroleum Company was nationalised in 1972 and produces most of the oil in Iraq. The main customers of Iraqi oil are Iraq's Middle Eastern neighbours. Iraq oil export revenues have allowed it to be a major trading partner, although they have varied sharply according to world oil prices and the impact of Iraq's wars.

¹ Hunt, op.cit.pp.79.

² Ibid.,pp. 75.

³ Cordesman, Anthony H, Hashim, Ahmes S. *Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond*. U.S.A: Westview Press, 1997.pp.161.

Oil accounts for 70 per cent of Iraq's Gross Domestic Product.¹ It is quite literally the country's life blood. Estimates vary, but oil valued at up to \$18 billion a year is thought to flow through two terminals off Iraq's coast.² For all of Iraq's crude oil production comes from on-shore fields, about two-thirds of which from the two large fields Kirkuk and Rumaila. These fields, are in decline, despite water injection, but Iraq has a total of 73 known oil fields and only 15 have been put into production.³

Six of these fields are considered “super giant” with recoverable reserves of over 6 billion barrels, three are “big giants” with up to 6 billion barrels of reserves, and 20 are “giant” fields with less than 5 billion barrels. Iraq has roughly 1,500 oil wells, of which 820 were actively producing before the Gulf War. Iraq also has a share of the Saudi-Iraqi neutral zone, with another 5 billion barrels of proven reserves.⁴ (see Figure 5)

Oil has long been central to military power and to modern industrial society since the early twentieth century. And “possession of ample domestic oil supplies and control over access to foreign oil reserves was, and continues to be, a significant element in the power position of the United States relative to its rivals”⁵. Randall demonstrates that as early as the 1920s, U.S. policy makers identified petroleum security as a “major foreign policy objective”⁶, and that they worked consistently to help U.S. oil companies obtain and maintain control of foreign oil reserves.

The United States remains the world's largest consumer and importer of oil. Hence, among other factors, oil is a critical dimension of any U.S. strategy towards Iraq. “In the grand scheme of things”, Captain Kurt Tidd of the U.S. Fifth Fleet deployed in the Northern Gulf in July 2004 confesses, “there may be no other place where our armed forces are deployed that has a greater strategic importance”.⁷

It is no surprise, thus, that after World War II, American influence took on increasing significance in Iraq, much to the resentment of the Iraqi populace and the Arab nationalists. Iraq, with its massive oil deposits and reserves, was attractive economically and was

¹ Keble, Wayne. “*Keeping Iraq's Life Blood Flowing: Protecting the Offshore Oil Terminals*”, RUSI Journal. London Vol. 152, Iss. 6 (Dec 2007) pp.36.

² Ibid.

³ Cordesman, op.cit.,pp. 162.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Painter, David S. “*United States Foreign Oil Policy Since World War I: For Profits and Security*”. Canadian Journal of History. Vol. 41, Iss. 1 (Saskatoon: Spring 2006)pp.161.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Keble, ibid.




FIGURE 5: Iraq's Oil Infrastructure.¹

¹ This photo was retrieved from : <http://images.nationmaster.com/images/motw/middle_east_and_asia/iraq_oil_2003.jpg>

strategically located in relationship to the main Cold War enemy of the West, the Soviet Union.¹

Because Iraq is one of the cheapest places to produce oil, it is estimated that, since the early 1980s, the U.S. military has spent an average of \$4 to \$5 per barrel to protect the Gulf's oil.² With the oil exporting infrastructure of the region representing such a strategically important and sensitive target, protecting them for America's national interest has been an enduring commitment, and these hidden costs are likely to rise continuously.

All this wealth lying beneath Iraq's surface has generated a number of wars. The Iran-Iraq War, Gulf War I, and the subsequent United Nations embargoes severely crippled oil exports. Severely restricted exports and imports have caused significant inflation estimated at 27.3 percent in 2003. After the UN lifted the embargoes imposed after Gulf War I and prior to Gulf War II, oil exports reached about one-third of the pre-1980 amount.³

Since the invasion of 2003, Iraq's oil exports have reduced from 3.5 million barrels per day to just over 2 million.⁴ The oil industry, which many believed would be the engine of reconstruction, is barely generating sufficient revenues for its own rehabilitation, let alone the country as whole.

Not only is Iraq's oil infrastructure creaking from the effects of years of sanctions and underinvestment in repairs and maintenance, but simultaneously insurgents have attacked the northern pipelines into Turkey, so that the only steady flow of exports is through the Shi'a-dominated south of the country.⁵

Nonetheless, the Gulf region is still providing more than a quarter of the world's oil. With global demand expected to increase by more than 50 per cent over the next twenty five years, the region, which holds almost two-thirds of known reserves, will need to export more. Meanwhile, the U.S. will need to import more. Currently, Iraq alone controls approximately 10 percent of the world's oil reserves.⁶ Hence, conveniently, for Americans Iraq is still, in Paul Wolfowitz's words, "swimming in oil".⁷ It was this oil—God's grace to Iraq—which

¹ Hunt, *op.cit.*, pp.04.

² Keble, *op.cit.*, pp.37.

³ Hunt, *ibid.*.

⁴ Keble, *ibid.*, pp.38.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Hunt, *ibid.*

⁷ Keble, *ibid.*

helped Saddam Hussein's greed develop, resulting in a curse that took the country to the brink of abyss.

I-3-Saddam Hussein's Tyrannical Rule and the U.S. 'Moment' in Iraq

Saddam Hussein was another critical dimension of U.S. strategies towards Iraq. Historically, Saddam played a major role in the 1968 coup that finally secured Ba'athist power in Iraq. Officially, Saddam served as vice president of the Revolutionary Command Council in al-Bakr's government. It is important to note that prominent men from Tikrit held most of the top positions in the Ba'ath Party and the al-Bakr government. Those holding the three top positions—Saddam, al-Bakr, and Hammad Shihab—were blood relatives. This loyalty to Tikrit natives would become a distinguishing characteristic of Saddam's reign and helped him hold power for so long.

Behind the scenes, he was viewed as a political asset to the Ba'ath Party.¹ Initially at least, his rural and tribal background helped the more urban, elite, intellectual Ba'athists appeal to the Iraqi tribes. He negotiated the 1970 peace treaty with the Kurds and worked to improve relations with the Soviet Union. Out of public view, Saddam was in charge of the feared secret police and security force, funded by the vast oil profits of the early 1970s, and did much to secure al-Bakr's power in Iraq.² Saddam and al-Bakr formed an effective government team. Al-Bakr possessed significant military experience and prestige. Saddam was considerably younger than al-Bakr and did not have any military experience, and this was a disadvantage in a military-based government. Saddam became al-Bakr's power behind the throne who executed secret plots on his behalf.³ Throughout his political career, he relied on kinship ties and clan loyalty rather than devotion to any one political concept or theory.

Al-Bakr and Saddam were able to foil a Nasser-backed coup in September 1968 and launched a series of massive purges to help consolidate their power. Anyone who was perceived as challenging their authority was stripped of all possessions and tossed out of the Ba'ath Party. Many were imprisoned, tortured, and eventually murdered. Entire families were wiped out so that no remaining family members would be able to exact revenge for those killed. These bloody purges gave rise to a reign of terror throughout Iraq. Saddam also established a Ba'ath militia that later would become his loyal Republican Guard. By the time

¹ Hunt, *op.cit.*, pp. 86.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 87.

³ *Ibid.*

Saddam took power in 1979, the Republican Guard had swelled to more than 50,000 members.¹

By the early 1970s, the treaty that Saddam had managed to negotiate with the Kurds was collapsing. In the treaty, the Kurds were allowed to develop a militia called the Pesh Merga. The 1970 treaty did not specify land boundaries of Kurdish autonomy, and this frustrated the Kurds. By 1973, the Kurds were seriously challenging Ba'ath authority and control. Saddam and the Ba'athists attempted to assassinate the Kurdish leader and his son. When the plot failed, Saddam was able to align with the Soviet Union for assistance to keep the rebellious Kurds in line.² In turn, the Kurds sought aid from the Iranians. In a way, because the Kurds' ethnic heritage is much more akin to the Iranians, who are of Persian descent, than the Iraqis, who are of Arab descent. The Kurds also allied with the United States, which was still interested in containing communism during the height of the Cold War. They received aid from Syria and Israel as well.

When President Anwar Sadat of Egypt signed the Camp David Accords in 1978, the Arab world denounced Egypt because it formally recognised Israel and the right of the Zionist state to exist. “Egypt”, for so long the leader of the Arab world, “was now a pariah”.³ Saddam Hussein led an Arab summit in Baghdad and joined in denouncing Egypt and the Camp David Accords. Iraq started to recognise itself as a leader in the Arab world, and Saddam was ready to take the leadership role.

On July 16, 1979, al-Bakr was in poor health and resigned from politics. Some stories hold that Saddam arrested him. Al-Bakr named Saddam as his successor and vested him with executive power.⁴ Regardless of how al-Bakr's resignation took place, Saddam stood ready to step into the power vacuum. Saddam would rule Iraq through the Iran-Iraq War, two Gulf wars, and 10 years of UN sanctions before the United States would oust him from power in 2003.

Oil was a key factor in the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq stretching from 1980 to 1988. It was used as a weapon both financially and environmentally. For Saddam Hussein, the initial targets were Iranian ports and oil complexes, but this soon expanded into what became known as the 'tanker war', with both sides attacking the oil carrying vessels of the

¹ Op.cit.

² Ibid.,pp. 88.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

other. In 1984 alone, seventy-one ships were damaged.¹ These sustained attacks cut Iranian oil exports in half, reduced shipping in the Gulf by 25 per cent, and slowed Gulf oil supplies to the rest of the world.² It is worth noting also that Iraq's power was weakened and frustrated. On the other hand, this war did improve Iraq's relationship with the West, most notably and perhaps ironically the United States, which sought to contain a common enemy in Iran.

Oil was also to feature in 1989, with Iraq accusing Kuwait of illegally slant-drilling³ into the Iraqi part of the Rumaila Oil Field—which lies under both countries—and launching an invasion. In fact, after the Iran-Iraq War ended, Iraq needed to keep oil prices high to rebuild its war-torn country. Kuwait increased its oil production, thereby driving prices lower. In retaliation, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990.⁴ In January 1991, the United States bombarded Iraq and Kuwait.

On February 27, President Bush declared a cease-fire. Saddam Hussein was driven from Kuwait, but not from power. The UN resolutions were intended only to remove Saddam from Kuwait and were silent on removing him from power. Why did U.S. officials wait until 2003 to remove Saddam? The answer involves a combination of factors. In 1991, he was left in power and U.S. officials allowed him to crush Kurdish and Shiite rebellions that could have led to regime change because revolutionary change would have been unpredictable and could have hurt American interests.⁵ For instance, if Shiites had come to power, this could have led to an increase in Iranian influence in Iraq. The new regime could have acted independently from Washington, but what the latter wanted was an obedient Saddam. As the *New York Times*' Thomas Friedman explained at the time, “the best of all worlds” for Washington would be “an iron-fisted junta without Saddam Hussein”.⁶

Moreover, while the Arab nations participating in the coalition did indeed want Saddam removed from Kuwait, they would not have supported an attempt to remove him from Iraq. Thus, Bush did not want to take the risk of the Western-Arab coalition, which was

¹ Keble, op.cit.,pp. 39.

² Ibid.

³ It is a method of drilling for oil in which the well is not drilled vertically, as when a number of wells are to be drilled from a single platform to reach different areas of an oil field. <<http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Slant+drilling>>

⁴ Hunt, op.cit.,pp. 89.

⁵ Mercille, Julien. “*The Radical Geopolitics of U.S. Foreign Policy: The 2003 Iraq War*”, *GeoJournal* (2010);pp. 333.

⁶ Ibid.

already fragile, fracturing.¹ Instead, he settled on an isolationist policy to try to drive Saddam out of power more than a decade later.

The expulsion of the Iraqis from Kuwait by coalition forces in 1991 was followed by 13 years of UN sanctions against Iraq leading to an economic disaster that impoverished the country. These UN sanctions forbade member states, companies and individuals from undertaking any economic intercourse with the Iraqi government or with private Iraqi firms, except in regard to goods deemed by the UN Sanctions Committee to be of a humanitarian nature. While accurate data are not available, it is estimated that Iraq's per capita income dropped from \$2,108 in 1989 to well under \$1,000 a year in 1992-1995. Additionally, consumer prices have doubled annually since 1993.²

Besides, instead of rebuilding its wealth, Iraq suffered massive wartime damage and punishing sanctions, and lost virtually all of its capability to export. According to the Iraqi Oil Minister, Lieutenant General Amir Muhammad Rashid, Iraq lost \$85 billion in revenue as a result of the ban on the export of its oil between August 6, 1990 and July 1995.³ At the same time, Saddam Hussein and the ruling elite wasted resources on luxuries for themselves, and dealt with the growing economic crisis through repression and gross incompetence in managing the domestic economy. Consequently, oil smuggling became a way of life with Saddam accused of selling petroleum products worth some \$5.7 billion on the black market over six years.⁴

Coupled with the damage caused by Gulf War bombing, sanctions helped spur a severe humanitarian crisis that resulted in hundreds of thousands of preventable deaths among children during the 1990s. The aim was to cut Saddam down to size, combined with CIA-backed covert operations to remove him from power. Those efforts did not succeed in changing Iraq's leadership, but nevertheless, the harsh sanctions and periodic bombing contributed to "contain" Saddam and "shame" him, sending a clear message to the world about the likely consequences of challenging American hegemony.⁵ This contributed to the devastation of Iraqi society. It was to this end, I dare argue, that the U.S. made use of Article 41 of the UN Charter—that concerns the imposition of sanctions—referred to in the first

¹ Hunt, *op.cit.*, pp. 99.

² Cordesman, *op.cit.*, pp. 127.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 136.

⁴ Keble, *op.cit.*, pp. 39.

⁵ Mercille, *op.cit.*

chapter. This instance serves as an adequate example of a hegemon using an international institution's law in pursuit of its self interest, as put forward by Cox.

Following the September 11, 2001 attack “how the administration appealed to fear and faith was by calling upon Americans to believe in a mission of liberation in the strategically vital Persian Gulf.”¹ As one may perceive, such an idealistic approach of U. S. foreign policy conduct always given a humanitarian flavour seems very suitable when the national interest's rule—based mainly on materialism—waves in the horizon. To explain to Americans why they fight, government leaders translate war aims into official narratives and propaganda which is the deliberate manipulation of facts and ideas. The official current narrative has presented conflict as a mighty clash between civilisation and terrorism in Iraq.² In other words, the 1990s multitude of U. S. interventions in various crises along ‘humanitarian’ multilateral lines became no longer a suitable narrative at the wake of the twenty-first century, in favour of a more beneficial declared “War on Terrorism”.

However, in spite of the fact that the ‘humanitarian’ narrative has lost prominence, it has not been totally removed from the list of justifications forming the official narrative, for the war against Iraq in 2003 was made legitimate, among other reasons, on ‘humanitarian’ grounds. The only difference is that experiments in ‘humanitarian’ intervention before 9/11 were rarely associated to an American empire or labelled as imperialist. George W. Bush's arrival in the White House, the atrocities of 9/11 and the war on terror which ensued, however, have painted a remarkably different picture and it is part of the aim of this chapter to explore the value of the linkage between humanitarianism, terrorism, war and empire in the U. S. foreign policy.

II-Stating the Unstated in the U. S. ‘Humanitarian’ War on Iraq

Unlike the 1992 multilateral intervention in Somalia, American intervention in Iraq was initially unilateral and solely a U. S. responsibility, to quote Francis Fukuyama: “The American occupation of Iraq—for all the British and other international participation— was in its leadership and design an American occupation.”³ It was not multilateral for it was not authorised by the UN—which prohibits any unilateral use of force—and was faced by an overwhelming negativity by most countries including the Arab nations. Ironically, the U.S. had disparaged UN authority and then claimed it must attack Iraq to uphold UN resolutions.

¹ Brewer, Susan A. *Why America Fights*. Oxford: Oxford Univ Press, 2009, pp. 11.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 04.

³ Fukuyama, *op.cit.*, pp.174.

In this case, because the UN sought to impede the process of a U.S. control over Iraqi oil, America quickly transgressed UN resolutions and articles—article 2(4) in particular—which it formerly claimed it respects. This was but an abusive and self-interested attempt to quench the nation’s imperialist thirst under the name of idealism. This would render the U.S. so-called ‘humanitarian’ intervention in Iraq basically illegal, taking into account the definition of illegal humanitarian intervention elucidated in the first chapter.

To justify the U. S. military intervention, Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld announced the objectives of the war: to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, end the regime of Saddam Hussein, “search for, capture, drive out terrorists who have found safe harbour in Iraq,” deliver humanitarian relief, “secure Iraq’s oil fields and resources, which belong to the Iraqi people, and which they will need to develop their country,” and the need to enforce UN Security Council resolutions, or the need to begin the democratic transformation of the Middle East.¹ Hoping that the occupation of Iraq could be paid for by Iraqi oil², on March 17, 2003, President Bush issued an ultimatum demanding that Saddam Hussein and his sons depart from Iraq within 48 hours. On March 19, offensive operations began with air strikes against Iraqi leadership positions. By April 15, after 27 days of operations, coalition forces were in relative control of all major Iraqi cities and Iraqi political and military leadership had disintegrated. On May 1, 2003, President Bush declared an end to major combat operations. The analysis provided below will examine the extent to which the stated war aims are valid.

II-1-‘Fake’ Objectives for the War Justification

Facts and events prior to, during and following the war have proved that reality was quite different and does not meet the stated objectives. The real objective rather, the unstated, lies in conformity with the rule of American national interests. Firstly, many opponents of Bush’s proposed war on Iraq pointed out that there was no link between Iraq and terrorists. Indeed, in the days after the September 11 terrorist attack, even the U.S. secretary of state, Colin Powell, admitted that he could find “no clear link”³ between Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein, albeit President Bush and his backers kept on claiming that there was such a connection. Their claims centred around an alleged meeting in Prague, Czechoslovakia, in April 2001 between the leader of the September 11 hijackers, Mohamed Atta, and an Iraqi

¹ Shanker, Thom, Schmitt, Eric. “*A Nation at War: The Pentagon; Rumsfeld Says Iraq is Collapsing, Lists 8 Objectives of War*,” qtd. in Brewer, op.cit.,pp. 250.

² Colás, Alejandro, Saull Richard,eds.*The War on Terrorism and the American 'Empire' After the Cold War*. Oxon: Routledge, 2006.pp.189

³ Qtd. in: Safire, William. “Clear Ties of Terror,” *New York Times* (2003):pp. 25 Aug 2011
<<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/27/opinion/clear-ties-of-terror.html>>

intelligence agent. After an investigation, however, the Czechs concluded that the report could not be substantiated.

Next, the Bush administration pointed to an al-Qaeda terrorist camp in northern Iraq that was providing a haven for a terrorist known as Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi, allegedly a senior al-Qaeda leader who escaped from Afghanistan into Iraq and was treated at a Baghdad hospital. Although there was no proof, Bush and his team claimed that Hussein's secret police most certainly knew of al-Zarqawi's presence, thus establishing that Iraq was harbouring terrorists. Bush himself made this claim in an October 7, 2002, speech to the nation. However, there were credible reports that al-Zarqawi had left Iraq; that he was not part of al-Qaeda at the time; and that Iraq had no control over or relationship with him. Critics, therefore, concluded that this evidence, at best, established a very weak connection between Iraq and terrorism.¹ For that reason, the United Nations next to many of America's European and Arab allies were not on board with the United States for any sort of military action against Iraq. What all this amounts to is that, I dare argue, the link established by Bush's cabinet between Iraq and terrorism was a mere justification to curb Iraq's wealth.

As soon as the war began, the rule of national interests manifested itself very quickly when the Iraqi oil fields were immediately secured and this task was seen as a priority. This is because some studies at the time noted that the last drop of oil will be in Iraq, which owns 112 billion barrels of oil reserves, constituting 11 per cent of the world oil reserves.² Thus, in northern Iraq, for instance, Kurdish fighters, under the command of American Special Forces, soon took control of the oil town of Kirkuk. Additionally, Iraq's southern fields, which account for 95 per cent of Iraq's oil income and are at the very heart of its economy, were among the first areas secured by U.S. forces when the war began. This act was the result of American experts' predictions that the southern Rumeila oil field alone could produce up to 1.1 million barrels a day within weeks after the end of the war.³ This obviously conforms to the aforementioned rule.

In March 2003, the two giant offshore oil Terminals, Khor Al-Amaya and Al-Basra, formerly operated by the Iraqi owned South Oil Company, were one of the first objectives of coalition forces. U.S. and Polish Special Forces secured them in the opening hours of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). They were decisive points in the maritime campaign as they represented not only the future prosperity of Iraq, but a potential environmental disaster if

¹ Miller, Debra. *The War Against Iraq*. USA: Lucent, 2003. pp.33.

² Mansour, Ahmed. *The Story of Baghdad's Fall*. Lebanon: Ibn Hazm Publishing Press, 2004. pp.72.

³ Miller, ibid., pp.80.

damaged.¹ While the Al-Basra terminal reopened in July 2003, and the Khor Al-Amaya terminal opened in February 2004, America's dismantling of the Ba'athist system, including the Iraqi Navy, created a security vacuum that many were quick to spot and keen to exploit.

Meanwhile, despite the fact that Article 54 of the Geneva Convention prohibits any attack on potable water and irrigation systems in wars, the U.S. forces and their allies destroyed the eight multipurpose Iraqi dams. They also destroyed Iraq's flood control systems, irrigation systems, power plants and sewage treatment plants.² All this has led to serious health problems from which Iraqis currently suffer and will continue to suffer for decades to come.

Moreover, the sudden defeat of the regime of Saddam Hussein, expectedly, left a gaping power vacuum in the country and did not end the Iraqis' suffering. This led to an unprecedented wave of crime and looting that destroyed much of what the war had left standing. The looting decimated government buildings, hospitals, museums, universities, banks, businesses, and power and water facilities, proving that American troops were unable to and uninterested in providing security in the face of anarchy and looting. In this respect, Roth argues:

If invading forces had been determined to maximise the humanitarian impact of an intervention, they would have been better prepared to fill the security vacuum that predictably was created by the toppling of the Iraqi government. It was entirely foreseeable that Saddam Hussein's downfall would lead to civil disorder.³

The worst example of looting was the theft of precious heirlooms and artefacts from Iraq's National Museum in Baghdad. The museum housed some of the world's oldest pieces from ancient Mesopotamia, and experts claimed that major irreplaceable treasures were stolen—including items such as a lyre from the Sumerian city of Ur dated 2400 B.C. Such a loss of many important cultural objects was blamed on the United States. This is very significant. The fact that the United States moved quickly to protect the Iraqi Oil Ministry, but did not station troops to protect the museum sent a message that the United States valued oil more than Iraq's cultural heritage, which they claimed are there to protect. To quote Frank Rich, a columnist for the *New York Times*, who said, "By protecting Iraq's oil but not its cultural mother lode, we echo the values of no one more than Saddam, who in 1995 cut off funds to the Baghdad museum, pleading the impact of sanctions, yet nonetheless found plenty of money to pour into his own palaces."⁴

¹ Keble, op.cit.,pp. 40.

² Mansour, op.cit.pp.46.

³ Pattison, op.cit.,pp. 174.

⁴ Rich, Frank. "And Now: 'Operation Iraqi Looting,'" *New York Times* (2003) qtd. in Miller, op.cit.,pp. 68.

As the war ended, the focus of the military turned to searching for Iraq's supposedly hidden cache of weapons of mass destruction. This goal became a high priority for the United States, because finding and destroying illegal weapons was the main justification given by President Bush in his push for war against Iraq. Despite expectations that troops would quickly stumble upon illegal weapons left behind by Iraqi forces, however, initial coalition efforts to search for such weapons proved unsuccessful.¹ As a result of the lack of success in finding prohibited weapons, President Bush came under growing international pressure and his real materialistic aim related to American national interests began to unravel. An editorial in the *New York Times*, for example, said, "With every passing day, American credibility is called into question. . . . The chief justification for invading Iraq was to get rid of Baghdad's stores of chemical and biological agents and dismantle its effort to produce a nuclear bomb."²

When such a misleading justification to wage war on Iraq started to fade, a number of embarrassing facts began to uncover as well. For instance, Christian Westermann, who served as an intelligence officer in U.S. Foreign Affairs Ministry, confessed that he was subjected to intense pressure by the undersecretary of state for arms control and international security John R. Bolton to maximise the risk of Iraq's arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. He was obliged to modify his reports to comply with the administration's perception of the Iraqi threat before the war.³ Moreover, on June 17, 2003, the democratic Senator Carl Levin accused the Director of the United States Central Intelligence Agency George Tenet that he had lied in his testimony before Congress on weapons of mass destruction. He pointed to the existence of documents proving that Washington withheld essential information from UN inspectors.⁴

The United Nations sanctions that began in August 1990 can be taken as a proof that Iraq was void of weapons of mass destruction when American feet trampled Iraq. In fact, sanctions blocked the import of vital materials and technologies for producing weapons of mass destruction, as elucidated earlier. Especially after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the achievements of UN disarmament were ignored, and Saddam's defiance was taken as confirmation that deadly stockpiles remained. Despite these suspicions, however, progress

¹ Miller, op.cit.,pp. 56.

² "*The Quest for Illicit Weapons*," *New York Times* (April 18, 2003) qtd. in Miller, ibid.,pp. 57.

³ Mansour, op.cit.,pp.105.

⁴ Ibid.

was being made. As former chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix wrote in his book, “the UN and the world had succeeded in disarming Iraq without knowing it.”¹

The UN Special Commission achieved similar success in eliminating Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programs. After the Gulf War, inspectors discovered stockpiles of chemical weapons. They disposed of 480,000 litres of live chemical agent and more than 3,000 tons of precursor chemicals. As a panel of Security Council experts reported, “the prime [chemical weapons] development and production complex in Iraq was dismantled and closed under UNSCOM supervision and other identified facilities have been put under monitoring.”² Inspectors also supervised the destruction of Iraq's biological weapons program, especially after Saddam's son-in-law General Hussein Kamel defected and confirmed the large-scale production and weaponisation of anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin. Consequently, UNSCOM demolished the main biological production facility at Al Hakam in 1996. When the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission inspectors entered Iraq in 2002, they found no evidence of renewed chemical or biological weapons programs.³

So, once the intelligence about WMD proved to be wrong, and the connection between Saddam and Al-Qaeda nonexistent, the president turned to the idea of creating a democratic Iraq as the central focus of the occupation.⁴ Put differently, with two out of the list of chief reasons for war discredited, the administration talked up the ‘humanitarian’ spread of democracy, using an idealistic rhetoric. And the Bush administration claimed that the war was a great military victory for America because it resulted in the quick removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime and freedom for the Iraqi people. In this context, Sorabji asserts

America’s wars against Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 were ostensibly part of a ‘war on terrorism’, and, in the case of Iraq, an attempt to eliminate that country’s supposed weapons of mass destruction, but when those attempted justifications looked too thin, the human rights of Afghans and Iraqis were also invoked.⁵

For Iraqis, however, the reality of the war’s aftermath was death and destruction, a power vacuum, and chaos in the streets, not a ‘humanitarian’ relief. Thousands of Iraqis were

¹ Lopez, George A, Cortright, David. “*Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked*”, *Foreign Affairs*. New York Vol. 83, Iss. 4 (Jul/Aug 2004) 01.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Fischel, Jack, R. “*The War in Iraq*”, *The Virginia Quarterly Review* (Spring 2006):pp.300.

⁵ Sorabji, R.Rodin,D. *The Ethics of War: Shared Problems in Different Traditions*. UK: Oxford University, 2006.pp.191.

killed or injured by American bombs, and the cut-off of essential services such as water, food, and electricity created humanitarian disasters in the making. Without a police force to maintain order, looting and crime became widespread, depriving Iraqis of many items essential for recovery and rebuilding. In order to downplay the information, U.S. reports did not mention that unknown thousands of Iraqi troops were killed and wounded, many of them forced to fight against their will. Despite the variance in estimates, it is clear that the war on Iraq has exacted a large human cost. Average deaths per day ranged from 48 to 759. The cause-specific mortality rates attributable to violence ranged from 0.64 to 10.25 per 1,000 per year.¹ As for civilians, reports varied but a survey by the *Associated Press*, based on records from 60 of Iraq's 124 hospitals and reported in June 2003, said that "at least 3,240 civilians died . . . between March 20, when the war began, and April 20, when the fighting was dying down."²

Interestingly, the disorder opened Iraq's borders to infiltration by al-Qaeda, suicide bombers, Iranian intelligence agents, and the general insurgency—which continues to threaten the emergence of a stable Iraq. Diamond cites a speech in October 2004 in which Ambassador Bremer admitted: "We paid a big price for not stopping the looting because it established an atmosphere of lawlessness."³ All these devastating consequences not only undermined Iraqis' confidence in the United States, but fanned the suspicion that the United States did not want a strong, independent Iraq.

Teson makes perhaps the strongest case that can be made in favour of the war being a humanitarian intervention. . This is because it meets the defining conditions listed in the first chapter—it was military and forcible, it occurred in circumstances of grievous suffering, and it was by an external party. However, it is very doubtful whether the U. S. intention was 'humanitarian'. Rather, as Weiss rightly asserts, "the primary purpose of the war in Iraq was not to halt human suffering"⁴.

Teson's argument relies on the humanitarian credentials of regime change, of ending Saddam Hussein's tyrannical rule. But, although it may have humanitarian side-effects, removing a tyrannical dictator is not, in itself, humanitarian. Teson himself concurs that

¹ Tapp, Christine et al. "*Iraq War Mortality Estimates: A Systematic Review*". (2008): pp.01. <<http://www.conflictandhealth.com/content/2/1/1>>

² "*Partial Count Finds Many Civilians Killed*," *Associated Press* (June 11, 2003)qtd. in Miller, op.cit.,pp.61.

³ Fischel, op.cit.,pp.303.

⁴ Pattison, op.cit.,pp. 173.

regime change, by itself, may not be enough to ensure an intervention's humanitarian intention.¹

Additionally, regime change, however desirable, is not permitted by the Charter — Article 2(4). If it were, the powerful nations could go round the world picking off the weak states thought to be hostile to their own ambitions. The Charter specifically does not authorise pre-emptive nor preventative action on the basis of a perceived future threat.

The only way around this predicament was for the Bush-Blair axis to fabricate a case of threat. This is why they focused on the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq — which were never found—and on the bogus claim that Saddam Hussein could deploy such WMD within a 45-minute window. Kofi Annan, then the UN Secretary General, informed the BBC in 2004 that the Charter had been breached and that the invasion was not sanctioned by the Security Council.²

Although the U.S. employed the quasi-‘humanitarian’ rhetoric of promoting freedom and democracy, such justifications have largely been post-hoc rationalisations and played a significant role only after the failure to find weapons of mass destruction as mentioned before. For example, Bush made no mention of liberating the Iraqi people in his letter to Congress in March 2003, which presented his official grounds for the use of force.³

Moreover, the coalition forces under U. S. leadership have violated all jus in bello rules—outlined in the first chapter—and made use of internationally prohibited weapons, that it was clear would result—and did result—in a large number of casualties as elucidated earlier. For example, U.S. military forces used stun grenades that do not destroy, but cause loud noises. It was discovered through some reports that these were new electromagnetic bombs that hit small circles and lead to the disabling of the five senses, and all forms of life and then the rapid death of all those who are in their circle.⁴

Another instance is the use of hellfire missiles which are being continuously condemned by humanitarian groups. According to Iraqi doctors in Alfallujah hospital, these missiles turned the corpses they had received at hospital to the blue colour, and led to the

¹ Op.cit..

² Mansfield, Michael. “*Why Bush, Blair should be charged with war crimes over Iraq invasion*”, 19 March 2013, CNN, 22 March 2013 <<http://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/19/opinion/iraq-war-bush-blair/index.html?sr=fbmainintl>>.

³ Sorabji, op.cit.,pp.202.

⁴ Mansour, op.cit.,pp.93.

bleeding of their noses, eyes and ears.¹ U.S. Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld admitted that these missiles had been used during the war on Iraq . He said in a session held by the U.S. Congress on May 14, 2003 whose details were reported by the French news agency: “These missiles are characterised by their enormous destructive ability and cause the outbreak of a firewall that consumes oxygen in the targeted place so that the victims die of suffocation.”²

Other sources have indicated that some bombs thrown at Iraqi military sectors led to the liquefaction of the soldiers’ bodies so that only skeletons remain. And Iraqis have talked about other bombs that led to the fossilisation of the bodies of the targeted soldiers.³ Therefore, the behaviour of American forces reinforced the suspicion about the intervention’s real intentions.

Given all these casualties, the numbers of civilians actually killed in military operations in Iraq, running into thousands, raise serious questions about whether the requirement of impartiality has been met. Thousands more were injured by the attacks. This confirms the incompatibility of the use of force and impartiality in humanitarian interventions—explained in the first chapter—and places the ‘humanitarian’ aspect of the war in an embarrassing position.

Besides, the 1990s behaviour of the American and British governments in imposing economic sanctions against Iraq fits in with this pattern of unhumanitarian behaviour. These sanctions exacted a terrible humanitarian toll on Iraq. They have led to the deterioration of what was an extremely good national health service. It is estimated that as many as 500,000 Iraqi children died of thirst, malnutrition, and preventable diseases as a result.⁴ It was this which led Denis Halliday, who had served as the head of the United Nations Humanitarian Program in Iraq, to resign in 1998 in protest against what was being done to Iraqi people.⁵ He characterised them as “genocide”. He subsequently gave the following explanation of his decision to resign:

I was driven to resignation because I refused to continue to take Security Council orders, the same Security Council that had imposed and sustained genocidal sanctions on the innocents of Iraq. I did not want to be complicit. I wanted to be free to speak out publicly about this crime. And above all, my innate sense of justice was and still is outraged by the violence that UN sanctions have brought upon, and

¹ Op.cit.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.,pp.94.

⁴ Pattison, op.cit.,pp. 174.

⁵ Mansour, ibid.,pp.37.

continues to bring upon, the lives of children, families – the extended families, the loved ones of Iraq. There is no justification for killing the young people of Iraq, not the aged, not the sick, not the rich, not the poor.¹

On July 5, 2000, he presented a lecture in the Egyptian Journalists' Syndicate in order to make clear the dimensions of what was happening in Iraq. He asserted: "These sanctions destroy the humanitarian foundation and basic human rights on which the UN Charter was built".² As a result, it was estimated that the turnout at school, which reached 80% before the imposition of sanctions, dropped to 3% only in 2001.³ Yet, the U.S. continued to support sanctions against Iraq, despite fierce opposition from many other governments.

Thus, the U. S. lacked a humanitarian intention. For this reason, it can be said that the 2003 war on Iraq was not a case of 'humanitarian' intervention, nor was it a case of 'justifiable' humanitarian intervention. Some arguments against the justifiability of this 'humanitarian' intervention, to mention only a few, are mentioned below.

To start with, as discussed earlier, it has been widely acknowledged that there was not a well-thought-out strategy for managing the situation after Saddam's forces had been defeated. Furthermore, this intervention lacked just cause. As Roth argues: "there was not the same degree of the violation of human rights in March 2003 as in previous years —such as during the Anfal genocide".⁴ This led him to question the real objectives lying behind this specific timing of intervention. Although the tyranny and oppression of Saddam's rule were objectionable, it is questionable whether these were sufficiently egregious to render 'humanitarian' military intervention by the U.S. justifiable.

Besides, the humanitarian crisis was not serious enough to justify 'humanitarian' intervention. This is because the likely costs of any intervention must outweigh the potential benefits. If an intervener is to have just cause, the intervener needs to be responding to a situation—typically the mass violation of basic human rights—in which it has the opportunity to do enough good to outweigh the harm that it will cause.⁵ In the case of Iraq, it is severely doubtful that the improvements in the enjoyment of human rights by the removal of Saddam's tyranny was sufficient to outweigh the foreseeable harms in terms of civilian and soldier casualties, as well as other more diffuse negative effects on the international system.

¹ Mansour, op.cit.,pp.37.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.,pp.47.

⁴ Pattison, op.cit.,pp. 175.

⁵ Ibid.

Moreover, the violation of the principles of *jus in bello* outlined earlier can be taken as a strong argument against the justifiability of this mission. Teson, however, asserts that civilian losses have been well within the boundaries permitted by the doctrine of double effect, since they are in proportion to the ‘remarkable improvement’ in the quality of life and prospects of the Iraqi population and their descendants.¹ It is patent, I dare argue, that this is mistaken. Any beneficial effects from the war such as the potential establishment of democratic institutions are massively disproportionate to deaths amongst the Iraqi population—widely cited estimates vary from 91,000 to 654,000²—and the destabilising effects of the war for the international system. For these reasons, according to the consequentialist approach outlined in the first chapter, the U.S. intervention in Iraq was far from being justifiable and morally right.

In all this, the post-war anarchy and humanitarian catastrophe have revealed that the U.S. focus was not only on terrorism or on humanitarianism, but rather on war, materialism and imperialism. They have also unveiled the stark inadequacy of a United States holding the banner of a moral exemplar trying to spread democracy and peace throughout the world and providing a ‘humanitarian’ aid to all people in need, among whom Somalis and Iraqis. In what follows, the real unstated aims of this war, to mention only a few, will be outlined.

II-2-The Underlying Unhumanitarian Aims of the War

Thorough commentary on how the U. S. intervention in Iraq should be rated in the materialistic calculus would need more space than this section can command. But, the following paragraphs suggest some aspects that have relevance beyond the event itself.

The most important aspect concerns motivations. It is hard to avoid the suspicion that a determined group at and near the centre of the U.S. administration saw the war as fulfilling their ambition to begin remoulding the Middle East into a political form, better suiting their perception of U.S. and global interests.

In clearer terms, underneath the hype for the war on Iraq was the conviction held by high administration officials that Saddam’s removal represented an opportunity to reshape the Middle East.³ Once his regime had been replaced, Saddam would no longer be a threat to American dominance in the Persian Gulf. A pro-American democratic Iraq would also allow

¹ Op.cit.,pp.176.

² Ibid.

³ Fischel, op.cit.,pp.298.

the United States to establish a base in the area, thus replacing American troops from an increasingly unstable Saudi Arabia, and create stability for the flow of oil to the West. There was also the additional benefit that a democratic Iraq would become the catalyst for transforming the Middle East into a model of Arab democracy, which, in the words of then National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, “is the only guarantee that it will no longer produce ideologies of hatred that lead men to fly airplanes into buildings in New York and Washington.”¹

Thus, I do agree with Peter Gowan assuring that the U.S. aim of occupying Iraq was to use it as a base both for reorganising the politics of the Arab world and for gaining military-political control over the Gulf, the crucial centre of world oil supplies. From there it could exert pressure on Iran from both Iraq and Afghanistan in preparation for regime change there and a drive for U.S. ascendancy in the Caspian region. Through these bold moves, it could hope indirectly to make all the great powers dependent upon U.S. services and support.² This was further confirmed by Former U.S. diplomat Joseph Wilson. “The underlying objective of this war,” he asserted, “is the imposition of a Pax Americana on the region and the installation of vassal regimes that will control restive populations.”³ This would confirm also Arab suspicions that regime change is merely cover for an oil grab. The following paragraphs suggest an intermingling of geoeconomic, geopolitical, and geostrategic motivations.

The oil factor is primarily an important geoeconomic factor in U.S. foreign policy and in the 2003 War on Iraq in particular. In this respect, the American journalist Thomas Friedman wrote an article, that was published in Herald Tribune in mid April 2003, in which he assures: “Oil is one of the reasons for preparing for war against Iraq and if anyone tries to convince us otherwise, he certainly does not respect our minds”.⁴ Thus, the oil factor has received attention from a number of scholars approaching the question from various perspectives. Although space limitations make an extensive review of these perspectives not possible, one may note among others that Michael Klare has underlined in numerous publications the growing global competition for diminishing energy resources and the increased role of states and their military apparatuses in securing those vanishing resources.⁵ Andrew Bacevich on his part argues that the main reason to dominate the region’s oil reserves

¹ Op.cit.

² Gowan, Peter. “*The Bush turn and the drive for primacy*”, qtd.in: Colás,op.cit.,pp.148.

³ Ricks,Thomas E. *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*. New York:Penguin, 2006.pp.96.

⁴ Mansour, op.cit.,pp.72.

⁵ Mercille, op.cit.,pp. 331.

is to guarantee an ever-increasing American affluence, which requires “access to cheap oil and lots of it.”¹

For the purposes of this work, three oil-related geoeconomic motivations for U.S. intervention in the Middle East may be identified—namely to make profits from oil, to consume the oil, and to establish control over oil. The first refers to claims that Iraq was invaded to generate profits for American oil companies, which are close to the Bush administration. The second refers to claims that the invasion occurred so that the U.S. could use Iraq’s oil for its own consumption, increasingly dependent on foreign oil. The last refers to claims that the invasion’s objective was to regulate the amount, price and geographical allocation of Iraq’s oil to the world economy. This is in addition to the American economy receiving a large proportion of the generated petro-dollars, in the form of weapons purchases and financial investments in the United States by Middle Eastern governments.² Numerous analysts³ have touched upon some of those three aspects, but rarely on all three.

Some critics of the invasion, under the slogan “No Blood for Oil,” refer to profits and access as the main motivations.⁴ However, the present study argues that, historically and in 2003, control of oil has been by far the most important factor motivating U.S. intervention in the Middle East. It must be kept in mind that the Middle East only accounted for about 13% of total American consumption—about 24% of imports, the bulk of which comes from Saudi Arabia—on the eve of the invasion.⁵ In short, the U.S. could live without Iraqi oil and it must be seen as a secondary motivation behind the invasion. Indeed, as long as the world runs on oil, one could speculate that the United States will seek to control the region containing two-thirds of energy resources in order to exert leverage over industrial rivals and regulate the smooth functioning of the world economy, even if it only consumes modest amounts from the region.

In other words, control of Gulf oil does not only offer the U.S. the possibility of using the oil weapon. It also assures the international dominance of the dollar as the world unit of account, given the enormous size of oil finance. And steering oil revenues through U.S. financial operators is also a crucially important boost for U.S. financial strength. Therefore, “Iraq as the target, in the reasoning of the Federal Reserve and Wall Street, would serve

¹ Bacevich, A. *The New American Militarism*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.pp.182.

² Mercille, op.cit.,pp.331.

³ See for eg : Harvey (2003), Jhaveri (2004), Billon et al. (2004), Peters (2004) and Smith (2003, 2005).

⁴ See Rutledge (2005) for this view.

⁵ Mercille, ibid.,pp.332.

reflation through the implicit agenda of gaining leverage in controlling oil prices, and keeping prices high if necessary.”¹

So, a prime motivation for the U.S. invasion, as noted by Klare, was to maintain “a stranglehold on the global economy.”² One difference in a post-Cold War geopolitical environment is that Middle Eastern oil now needs to be preserved for the Western world and denied to Russia and China. Indeed, their control over Middle East energy resources would go a long way towards consolidating the emergent “Asian energy grid,”³ an association of Eurasian countries to manage the continent’s energy resources. This energy grid is significant because, among other things, it sustains Eurasian military and political cooperation through bodies such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) founded in 2001 between Russia, China and other central Asian states. In short, Eurasia would be strengthened relative to the West, and the fact that Iran is now in the process of becoming an SCO member is an ominous sign for the West. The events of 9/11 of course provided a political opportunity to merge all these agendas.

Likewise, the geopolitical factor has played a significant role in the U.S. war on Iraq. To understand its significance, the 2003 invasion needs to be interpreted as the latest phase in a war on Iraq begun with the first Gulf War. As elucidated earlier, Saddam Hussein was an American ally until his August 1990 move into Kuwait. His incursion led to a quick shift in the U.S. position—Iraq became labelled as a rogue regime and Saddam was demonised by pointing to atrocities he had committed earlier. By exerting its hegemony over Kuwait, Iraq would have controlled about 20% of world oil reserves and would have been able to finance pan-Arab ambitions, independent of Washington’s plans for the region.⁴ The U.S. intervened not so much to preserve its consumption of Kuwaiti oil—at the time and still today, the U.S. imports little of it—but rather to keep it in friendly hands and maintain its strategy of “divide and conquer”. By dividing the control of the Gulf’s oil among several rulers, it could prevent the emergence of rival hegemonies in the region.

After the Gulf War, which quickly pushed Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, extremely harsh sanctions were imposed on Iraq. Such policies have much to do with the geopolitical logics of maintaining American credibility in the world.⁵ A clear message needs to be sent to potential challengers that pursuing development independent of American hegemony or

¹ Nederveen Pieterse, Jan. “*Scenarios of power*”, qtd.in: Colás,op.cit.,pp.189.

² Klare, M. “*The coming war with Iraq: deciphering the Bush administration’s motives*”, *Foreign Policy in Focus*,(16 January 2003):pp.04.

³ Mercille, op.cit.,pp.332.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.,pp.333.

disobeying Washington's guidelines will not be tolerated. This often has little to do with direct American economic interests in the defiant country. For instance, the U.S. did not have large economic interests in Vietnam but it was nevertheless very important to keep on fighting to maintain U.S. prestige and credibility in the world.¹

Therefore, one reason why Iraq was harshly punished after the Gulf War, culminating in the 2003 invasion, was to maintain American credibility. Put differently, such policies came to signal to would-be challengers of U.S. hegemony that interfering with American global plans carries real penalties. This was recognised by American officials, as George Bush declared during the Gulf War:

And when we win—and we will—we will have aught a dangerous dictator and any tyrant tempted to follow in his footsteps that the U.S. has a new credibility, and that what we say goes, and that there is no place for lawless aggression in the Persian Gulf and in this new world order that we seek to create.²

Furthermore, the Americans' aims behind this war are not only geopolitical and geo-economic, but geo-strategic as well. Americans wanted to serve the Jews' petty state and divert attention from its occupation of Palestine and murder of Muslims there.³ The best proof of this is their eagerness to destroy Iraq, the strongest neighbouring Arab state, and their endeavour to fragment all the states of the region such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan into paper statelets. And through their disunion and weakness to guarantee Israel's survival and the continuation of the brutal crusade occupation of the Peninsula. In fact, Iraq not only would become the United States' main ally in the region, but would support efforts to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In short, the geopolitical, geo-economic and geo-strategic logics are central to explaining the American motivations behind the war on Iraq and considering only one of them misses some important factors of the invasion.

An equally significant and important aspect of this war is unilateralism as a policy adopted by America to wage war on Iraq. The latter can be interpreted as a self-interest act, when compared to the multilateral policy pursued in Somalia. While in the case of Somalia there was a delay of action until a United Nations authorisation was passed, in the case of Iraq action was quickly taken in spite of the fierce UN warning and opposition to the war. Iraq was undoubtedly the winning ticket that would give America access to what Peter Gowan has

¹ Op.cit.

² Bush, G. H. W. "*Remarks to community members at Fort Stewart, Georgia*" (February 1, 1991), Sep,13 2012, <<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19269>>.

³ Sorabji, op.cit.,pp.90.

called a “global primacy”¹. Somalia, on the contrary, in regard to its humble resources constitutes an insignificant addition to U. S. primacy and thereby has been seen as a burden. Hence, Cheney has stated in the run-up to the attack on Iraq that “the world is in our hands”² in spite of the fact that the war was going to be very costly, given the immense costs and risks of war and reconstruction in Iraq— up to \$70 billion for the war itself; \$50 to \$70 billion to restore oil production facilities; and up to \$250 billion more for security, reconstruction, and humanitarian needs.³ Statistics have shown also that \$4 billion per month were devoted by the U. S. to keep troops stationed in Iraq.

It can be argued, therefore, that there are very powerful long-term hidden reasons for the U.S. to have what Cheney has aptly termed “a permanent footprint in the sands of a key region like the Middle East.”⁴ For that reason, in the months following the war Iraqis and many others throughout the world remained sceptical that U.S. intentions were based on Iraq’s best interests. This scepticism was based on a widely held recognition that the United States sought to occupy Iraq for its own geoeconomic, geopolitical and geostrategic purposes. Even before the military operation had ended, some European nations began calling for a UN control over the rebuilding of Iraq. The United States also was criticised, even in Britain, when initial rebuilding contracts were swiftly awarded to big American firms that had close connections with President Bush’s administration. Hence, Iraqi demonstrators called the United States an ‘occupier’ instead of a ‘liberator’ and demanded that the U.S. forces leave Iraq immediately. Their reasoning was that they did not feel any U. S. ‘humanitarian’ contribution. Yet, on the contrary, it was all destructive.

Indeed, Americans behaved as occupiers, not liberators and the Abu Ghraib scandal is the best proof. In the spring of 2004, the world was shocked by the publication of graphic photographs of Iraqi prisoners being tortured by American soldiers in Baghdad’s Abu Ghraib prison. It is worth noting, as Danner assures, that these were not isolated events, nor were they the work of a few “bad apples”⁵. Rather, Danner cites documents that reveal that American officers, under enormous pressure as the insurgency increased, felt the need to extract more information from prisoners. He also states that from his knowledge of the interrogation methods of the American military and intelligence agencies, what happened at Abu Ghraib was not due to the ingenuity of the prison interrogators. He notes:

¹ Colàs, op.cit.,pp. 147.

² Qtd. in: ibid.,pp. 133.

³ Gordon, Philip H. Jeremy Shapiro, *Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis over Iraq*. USA: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2004.pp.81.

⁴ Colàs, ibid.,pp. 127.

⁵ Fischel, op.cit.,pp.308.

Different soldiers, different unit, different base; and yet it is obvious that much of what might be called the thematic content of the abuse is very similar: the hooding, the loud noises, the stress positions, the sexual humiliations, the threatened assaults, and the forced violations—all seem to emerge from the same script...All of this...suggests a clear program that had been purposely devised.¹

Equally important, Danner cites a report from military intelligence that in their estimation between 70 percent and 90 percent of the persons deprived of their liberty in Iraq, and exposed to interrogation, had been arrested by mistake. As a result, Iraqis pointed to the Abu Ghraib images as symbols of the degradation inflicted on Muslims by the American occupiers.

In his *Squandered Victory*, Larry Diamond is equally suspicious and critical of the Bush administration's decision-making process in Iraq. Diamond, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, served as a senior advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad from January to April 2004. In particular, Diamond is disparaging of Bremer's tenure as administrator to the CPA. He notes that if Bremer was sincere about bringing democracy to Iraq, it was to be achieved at his own pace and in his own way.²

Diamond cites an early example of Bremer's snobbishness when he recounts the ambassador's response to Massoud Barzani, the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party. On Bremer's arrival in Baghdad, the latter suggested that he appoints a strong mayor to run Baghdad. It was expected, Diamond writes, that Bremer would meet with Iraqi leaders to discuss the formation of an Iraqi interim government. Instead Bremer, implementing a decision made in the White House before his departure, responded to Iraqi leaders that the idea of an interim government with real sovereign authority had been indefinitely postponed.³ Bremer informed them that the Americans and their allies would remain in control under the newly formed Coalition Provisional Authority, led by himself, exercising all executive, legislative and judicial authority. Incidents such as the above fuelled the fears held by many Iraqis that the liberators would become occupiers. Indeed, Diamond notes, "the longer-term American occupation had begun"⁴.

In order to make such foreign policy behaviours justifiable, there are specific ways in which war is packaged and sold to the public by means of the media. The subsequent section will explain thoroughly these hidden agendas and mutual benefits.

¹ Op.cit.,pp.309.

² Ibid.,pp.302.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

II-3-A Significant Unprecedented Media Propaganda

With all these agendas in play, an analysis of the media news coverage which followed an agenda-setting policy in the build up to the war on Iraq is of paramount importance. In this section, I will discuss how the war on Iraq was covered—before and during the war. In particular, I will show how the propaganda efforts of the pro-war side were able to find an echo—and even amplification—in the mainstream media, while dissenting views were muffled. This would further argue that the American-based media does not deviate from the rule of self-interests. For, I believe, there is a convergence of media and government interests in war propaganda deriving from shared economic and political interests. In the case of Iraq, the conquest of that country and the strengthening of U.S. control in the region allow U.S.-based media conglomerates and telecommunications giants to be better positioned to dominate Middle East markets.¹ The situation in Somalia was very distinct for the latter had neither a strategic nor an economic significance to the main intervener during the 1991 humanitarian crisis and thereby an agenda-denial policy was the most suitable option for the media.

II-3-a- Media Coverage in the Lead-Up to the War

In the run-up to the War on Iraq, controversy has swirled around the performance of American mass media. News content, in Bennett's language, was "indexed to the positions articulated in elite debate, and only when institutional political actors vigorously challenge one another will coverage contain a diversity of viewpoints".²

In order to demonstrate that, Hayes and Guardino have conducted a systematic content analysis of network TV coverage in the months before the start of the Iraq War. They chose to analyse coverage on the ABC, CBS, and NBC evening news programs from August 1, 2002, through March 19, 2003, the day the invasion began. This left them with 1,434 stories from ABC World News Tonight (411), the CBS Evening News (498), and NBC Nightly News (525).³ In clearer terms, they have analysed the entire plausible universe of stories on Iraq that appeared on these three programs for a period of approximately 7.5 months. While reports on a possible war with Iraq certainly appeared in the mass media before August 2002, they chose to begin their study at this point because it coincides roughly with the start of the Bush administration's concerted strategic communications campaign promoting the war. In this

¹ Kumar, Deepa. "*Media, War, and Propaganda: Strategies of Information Management During the 2003 Iraq War*", 2006: pp.04, Routledge, UK, 9 Aug 2011 <<http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/3039/iraqwar.pdf>>.

² Hayes, Danny. Guardino, Matt. "*Whose Views Made the News? Media Coverage and the March to War in Iraq*", *Political Communication* (2010):pp.60.

³ *Ibid.*,pp.66.

month, the Bush administration began its public push for a confrontation with Saddam Hussein over his alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction.

Before presenting their data on the focus of Iraq coverage and the direction of that coverage, it is useful first to document the increase in the amount of news the American public had at its disposal over the course of the debate over military action. Figure 6 displays the number of stories aired on the three networks during each of the 8 months in the lead-up to the war. It is obvious that the media were increasingly giving importance to the situation in Iraq in order to mould public opinion in favour of the war.

What is more important to the present work is the content of those news reports. Figure 7 displays the distribution of the focus of stories, presented as the proportion of all Iraq coverage on the three networks ABC, CBS, and NBC—for their attention to Iraq-related themes showed considerable homogeneity.

As shown in the figure, it is quite clear that over the 8 months of coverage, stories about the UN arms inspection efforts and Iraq's alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction were the most prominent themes. According to Hayes and Guardino, more than one in five stories (22%) focused on weapons inspections or WMD. Stories about the level of support from the international community and the prospects and planning for the war—the likelihood of an American victory for example—grew more common after the end of 2002, and made those topics the second, third, and fourth most common themes.¹ The explicit congressional, international, and political debate over the invasion itself was certainly part of the coverage. But the stories that focused on the arguments for and against an invasion were much less common than stories about military planning or the allegations about weapons in Iraq. To be more accurate, about 12% of the stories that focused primarily on WMD included a secondary focus on the debate.²

¹ Hayes, *op.cit.*, pp.69.

² *Ibid.*, pp.70.




FIGURE 6: The increasing amount of pre-Iraq’s war network news coverage. Figure presents the number of stories about Iraq aired on the ABC, CBS, and NBC nightly news programs from August 1, 2002, through March 19, 2003.¹€

¹ Op.cit.,pp.67.




FIGURE 7: Focus of pre-Iraq's war network news stories. Figure presents the percentage of stories with a primary or secondary focus on each topic on the ABC, CBS, and NBC nightly news programs from August 1, 2002, through March 19, 2003.¹

¹ Hayes, op.cit.,pp.69.

Additionally, as Figure 7 denotes, the media also ignored the historical connections between the U.S. and Iraq. It is well known that Saddam Hussein was an ally of the U.S., and that the U.S. supplied Iraq with chemical and biological weapons during the 1980s. But with few exceptions, “the media developed collective historical amnesia on this question”.¹ One of the exceptions was a Washington Post story that stated clearly that U.S. involvement with Iraq “included large-scale intelligence sharing, supply of cluster bombs through a Chilean front company, and facilitating Iraq’s acquisition of chemical and biological precursors.” The article went on to add that the “administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush authorised the sale to Iraq of numerous items that had both military and civilian applications, including poisonous chemicals and deadly biological viruses, such as anthrax and bubonic plague,”² and that this practice continued even after Iraq used chemical and biological weapons against the Kurds. At the very least, the article threw into question the sincerity of the Bush administration’s denunciation of Hussein’s use of chemical weapons against his own people—the Kurdish population. But this history was largely downplayed by TV channels.³

The sources of news in the pre-war coverage are of prime importance as well, because they confirm Gramsci’s hegemony theory asserting that the mass-media—in our case television news—had the intention to follow the executive’s opinion about the wisdom of an invasion. Thus, one of the most common criticisms of media coverage in the months before the war is that reporters were overly willing to accept the Bush administration’s rationale for the invasion. Before the start of the Iraq war, CNN set up a system of “script approval”⁴ where reporters had to send their stories to unnamed officials in Atlanta before they could be run. This would ensure that if the military made any errors, CNN monitors would act as the second layer of filtering. Rupert Murdoch of News Corporation took an active role in setting the tone of his news media outlets, so that, not coincidentally, all 175 editors of Murdoch’s worldwide newspaper empire took a position in support of the war.⁵ Fox, also owned by News Corporation, took this support to the extreme, going so far as to ridicule antiwar protesters.

So, not only were journalists rarely sceptical of claims about WMD and Iraq’s terrorist connections, but they simply gave more attention to pro-war than anti-war perspectives. “In the period before the war, U.S. journalists were far too reliant on sources sympathetic to the

¹ Kumar, op.cit.,pp.59.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.,pp.60.

⁴ Ibid.,pp.51.

⁵ Ibid.

administration,” Michael Massing wrote in the *New York Review of Books* in 2004. “Those with dissenting views—and there were more than a few—were shut out.”¹ As a result, the critics’ argument goes, the American public was repeatedly told why an invasion was needed or why Saddam Hussein was a threat but was much more rarely exposed to anti-war arguments.

Hayes and Guardino’s data allow us to examine the rightness of these key claims systematically. To this end, they coded every quote from every source on the network news during the pre-war period. In all, they analysed 6,089 “source quotes.”² Nearly every story included at least one source quote— just 1% had none—and 20% included as many as seven. They placed each source into one of 23 different categories, and coded each quote as supportive of the Bush administration’s policy, opposed to it, or neutral.

Figure 8 demonstrates that George W. Bush and his underlings, while not holding full sway over the news, garnered twice as much attention as any competing source. Administration officials comprised 28% of the networks’ source quotes—a total of 1,718 in all. Bush himself was the source of more than half (53%) of all the quotes in the category, meaning that the president accounted for 15% of all statements in the pre-war period, more than any other single source. Not surprisingly, as shown by the shading of the bars, the vast majority of the quotes attributed to Bush and other administration officials—78%—were supportive of military action. Twenty-one percent were coded as neutral, and 1% as opposed.³ This confirms that actors across the entire political spectrum were not given equal opportunity to air their divergent views about the war.

These findings reveal that the argument set forth in the present work, that goes in accordance with Gramsci’s view in his theory in regard to the media, is justified. News coverage, at least as exemplified by the network broadcasts, was more favourable toward the Bush administration’s rationale for war than its opponents’ arguments against. A plurality of news stories focused on Iraq’s alleged weapons programs and administration officials were quoted more frequently than any other source. In sum, these findings support the view that the

¹ *Op.cit.*,pp.70.

² *Ibid.*,pp.72.

³ *Ibid.*




FIGURE 8: Distribution and direction of source quotes in pre-Iraq's war network news stories. The figure presents the number of quotes attributed to each source category in Iraq stories on the ABC, CBS, and NBC nightly news programs from August 1, 2002, through March 19, 2003. The shading of the bars represents the number of each source category's quotes coded as supportive of, neutral toward, or opposed to the Bush administration's Iraq policy.¹

¹ Op.cit.,pp.73.

media's performance did not live up to the democratic standards most journalists hold themselves to, and that they were no more than the government's "watchdogs"¹.

As the war began, following the Bush administration and Pentagon slogan of "shock and awe", the media presented the war against Iraq as a great military spectacle, showing the U.S. bombing and invasion of Iraq as an unprecedented triumph. Entire networks like Fox and the NBC cable networks provided little but propaganda and one-sided reporting, as did, for the most part CNN.²

II-3-b- Media Coverage during the War

In order to achieve the goals of a pre-emptive U.S. strategy in the war, it was very important for the Bush administration to engage in psychological warfare through the mass media. The "Fox effect"³ shows how this works. The Fox news channel emerged, over the course of the war on Iraq, as the most watched source of news on cable. Fox's approach to the war was self-consciously biased in favour of war. Reporters openly chided antiwar voices and abandoned any pretence of neutrality and objectivity. Despite the obvious violations of journalistic integrity, Fox received high ratings, and disturbingly other channels took steps to emulate Fox.⁴

At the height of war, while official sources were treated deferentially, those who did fall outside the accepted gamut of legitimate sources were dismissed. This logic served to limit diversity. For instance, when the Chicago-based pacifist group "Voices in the Wilderness" invited the American news media to cover a visit by American antiwar teachers to an Iraqi school, the media declined. Norman Solomon, who was present when this took place, explained this incident as follows:

I was there when Kysia [a member of Voices in the Wilderness] handed the press release to a TV crew. As soon as he left, the crew didn't even bother to read the entire press release before declaring that it was propaganda. They considered Voices to be outside the reign of legitimate sources, and therefore it could be safely ignored.⁵

This is not to say that there are not journalists who want to report on wars in ways that are more inclusive of diverse opinions. However, they are restricted by in-built systems of

¹ Kumar, op.cit.,pp.58.

² Kellner, Douglas. "*Spectacle and Media Propaganda in the War on Iraq: A Critique of U.S. Broadcasting Networks*", 2004:pp.04, Univ of California, Los Angeles, 30 Aug 2011 <<http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/>>

³ Kumar, ibid.,pp.52.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.,pp.53.

discipline and rewards. During the war on Iraq, even celebrity journalists like Peter Arnett would be disciplined for crossing the line. Arnett was fired by NBC and National Geographic for stating on Iraqi TV that U.S. war aims had failed to proceed as planned.¹

For this reason, network and cable television channels incorporated logos that prominently featured the American flag. They also adopted names for their war coverage that bore a strong resemblance to the Pentagon's language. Fox and MSNBC went with "Operation Iraqi Freedom," the Pentagon's name for the Iraq operation, CBS opted for "America at War," and CNN used "Strike on Iraq."² With titles and logos that established "us" and "them" in news coverage, it was almost a foregone conclusion which side would receive favourable coverage and which would not.

It is worth noting that the United States military "embedded" 500 journalists within its front line forces in 2003 to provide immediate coverage of the crisis in Iraq. While reporting from the scene of battle is not new, what was new about this war was the live footage from the actual battles. Far from making the war more realistic, it positioned viewers, quite literally, to witness the skirmishes from the point of view of the military. Far from objective reporting, the embedded reporters were telling the story both physically and ideologically from the vantage point of the U.S. and British troops.³ Ideologically, the journalists seemed to identify with the soldiers. This would seem natural. After all, they ate with them, they slept together, and they even wore the same clothes. As Pamela Hess, a United Press International reporter, would state, "Reporters love troops. Put us with these 18-year-old kids ... we just turn to jelly"⁴. When setting this system up, argues Deepa Kumar, it must have been clear to the war planners that this situation would create identification with the soldiers and lead to voluntary self-censorship by the journalists.

Miskin and his colleagues questioned the American media's one-sided coverage of the conflict in Iraq, arguing that it overemphasised the U.S. military's involvement and underreported the humanitarian crisis for Iraqi citizens. The journalistic language of the

¹ Op.cit.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.,pp.61.

⁴ Ibid.

coverage, such as “quick, surgical intervention” and “precision-guided bombs” seemed to them to trivialise the human cost of war.¹

To this end, ten Iraqi participants—eight male and two female—living in the Greater Vancouver Area, British Columbia, Canada were interviewed individually between February and March, 2006. The average age of participants was 44. Nine participants were born in Iraq, and one outside Iraq. All settled in Canada between 1974 and 2000. Of the sample, eight identified as Arabs; two as Kurds. Seven belonged to the Sunni sect, while the remaining three identified as Shia. All participants reported having immediate or extended families living in Iraq.²

Participants expressed a sense of frustration and anger with the North American media’s negative portrayal of Iraqis. They felt that they were misrepresented, demonised, or belittled in the media. They reported hearing specific terms such as extremists, peasants, inferior to Westerners, a bunch of criminals, dangerous, not capable of running their country, terrorists, uneducated, behind, needing to get liberated, as well as other negative labels.³ No positive interpretations were made.

Consequently, participants experienced the American media in particular as biased, military focused, and lacking social, cultural, or political context in reporting. Almost all participants felt that the severity of the situation in Iraq, and the resulting humanitarian crisis, was not communicated to the public. In addition, they felt that the media engaged in sensationalisation, magnification and exaggeration of the war in Iraq. Some participants compared the coverage of war to an “infomercial”, “play-by-play update of a game like football,” or a “commercial.”⁴ They felt this reflected insensitivity on the part of the journalists and led to the trivialisation of the crisis. Hadia, one of the participants, asserts: “There is no real sense, no real portrayal of what it is actually like to be living there ...and how terrifying it must be for all those people who are actually there”.⁵

¹ Rostam, H.Haverkamp, B. “*Iraqi Expatriates’ Experience of North American Media Coverage of the Iraq War*”, *International Journal for the Advancement of Counselling*,(2009):pp.100.

² Op.cit.,pp.102.

³ Ibid.,pp.105.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

When they were asked about images of the war, participants recalled and reported approximately 30 different images and stories from various American media sources with CNN at the forefront. They can be described as falling into three clusters: U.S. military, Iraqi civilians, and Iraqi society and culture. However, according to them, the vast majority of images recalled fell in the the first cluster. These images focused on the presence of the U.S. army in Iraq, explosions and missiles. Some interpreted them as surreal, resembling “fireworks,” that minimised the severity of the crisis in Iraq.¹ Recalling the images of American troops and their tanks entering Baghdad brought feelings of doubt as to whether the U.S. government would ensure security and stability in the region.

What all this amounts to is that all these 24/7 cable networks, as well as the big three U.S. broadcasting networks, were rarely showing Iraqi casualties while constantly claiming the success of their ‘humanitarian mission’. Thus, they produced a view of the war totally different from that shown in other parts of the world. To quote Henry Jenkins who asserts in his book *Media Tonic for War Fever*:

The U.S. news media covered the war in Iraq the same way they cover the Olympics—with red, white, and blue trappings, human interest stories, bombastic theme music, and an almost total focus on American accomplishments at the expense of any international context. Around the clock coverage gave the illusion of telling and showing everything and made us forget how little we actually knew.²

Indeed, the American public knew very little about the war's undeclared aims as well as its unstated realities. Chief among those to be blamed, as unravelled above, are the media. It can be said, therefore, that the media, always abiding by the self-interests rule, are American foreign-policy decision makers' inhumane partners in generating humanitarian catastrophes in the process of their so-called ‘humanitarian’ military interventions. The humanitarian catastrophes generated in Somalia and Iraq—unfolded in this study—are but some examples of this ‘humanitarian’ intervener’s inhumanity.

¹ Op.cit.

² Qtd. in “*At War with Iraq: the Propaganda Battles*” (May 17, 2009) <http://www.classroomtools.com/iraq_war.htm>.

Conclusion

This work has been carefully crafted to assist readers in weighing the extent to which the United States intentions in its ‘humanitarian’ military interventions—in the regions of Africa and the Middle East in the post-Cold War era—have been primarily based on the rule of American national interests. The latter has its implications politically, economically and geostrategically, merged with its cultural motivations incarnated in the notion of America “the moral exemplar”. The first chapter has illustrated the theoretical and historical backgrounds of the post-Cold War era. The former, represented in my work by Gramscian and Coxian hegemony theories, constituted the theoretical basis on which the argumentation of this study stands. Meanwhile, the latter made clear the nature and development of new military interventionism in the 1990s as held by the United States of America, shrouded in a ‘humanitarian’ cloth. Simultaneously, it was coupled with the sidelining of any sense of sovereignty and the discarding of the previously respected principle of non-intervention, now disturbing America's national interests. The second and third chapters have explored the extent to which Africa and the Middle East respectively have entered this new interventionist paradigm, taking the cases of Somalia and Iraq.

Somalia, which had been bleeding a severe humanitarian crisis for almost a decade prior to the U. S. ‘humanitarian’ intervention, did not capture an American attention until the spring of 1992. At that time, U.S. ground troops landed in Somalia to help end a famine only to be withdrawn the next year, as a result of casualties that were incurred after the mission had grown. Undeniable is the fact that this intervention did contribute some humanitarian relief to the country. But the U. S. decision-makers' intentions were not as noble as it was widely believed, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the late intervention and the quick withdrawal decisions as well as the multilateral realistic policy undertaken.

Without doubt, Somalia presented a case where the scope of the tragedy together with other unpopular often unstated stimuli created pressure on America to act militarily under the cover of ‘humanitarian’ interests. For instance, while Bush was willing to intervene in Somalia where no national interest existed, it was considered at the time to be low risk, and had strong public support. When it turned out not to be risk-free—with the deaths of eighteen Army rangers—President Clinton rushed to enact the presidential directive which limits humanitarian intervention only to places where a vital national interest exists. For that reason, the suspicion that Americans were acting on their own behalf or in national self-interest, instead of on behalf of the victims themselves, lingers on, given the fact that the Somali terrain for Americans was void of worth.

Iraq's wealth, on the contrary, was worth the sacrifice and an invasion of Iraq couched in 'humanitarian' terms would add prominence to American primacy. Ironically, the U. S. practice there has displayed Orwellian features where war against Iraq was for peace; the occupation of Iraq was its liberation; destroying its food and water supplies would enable 'humanitarian' action; and where the murder of countless Iraqis and destruction of the country will produce 'freedom' and 'democracy.' "I wish I could have some real answers to why we're here, but I don't think I'll ever have them."¹ This was the answer of a U.S. soldier in Iraq in 2005. This confession of an American confirms the fact that the objectives stated by the U. S. policy-makers in the run-up to the War on Iraq were unpersuasive. My study was an attempt to unravel the real unstated objectives based on American national interest rule: Iraqi oil and wealth, added to considerations of keeping both U.S. credibility and Israel's power in the region, attained through a unilateral idealistic policy, as a step towards the goal of asserting U.S. disciplinary power at the global level.

Given that terrible human rights violation in Somalia and Iraq, one may assume that the United States required much more compelling interests than the protection of human rights. Therefore, a chief inference from an analysis of both narratives in Somalia and Iraq suggests that the so-called U.S. 'humanitarian' military interventions in both countries were classic acts of power politics, not an act of idealism in the case of Iraq. Hence, these interventions can conveniently be termed U.S. military imperialistic interventions, that are falsely claimed to be 'humanitarian'.

A bunch of other inferences—that would provide answers to the research question and secondary questions posed in the introduction—can be induced. The first concerns U.S. impartiality. For instance, the deep involvement of UNOSOM II in Somalia militarily and the transformation of the mission into a manhunt for Aideed has stripped it of its impartiality and thereby its 'humanitarian' aspect. Likewise, in the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration continued to focus on Iraq's possession of WMD as its prime justification for war. By November 2002, the White House was reported to have settled on a war plan for Iraq. The White House gave many reasons for launching this war. It pointed out, among other reasons, that because Saddam's regime had demonstrated its capability and willingness to use WMD against other nations as well as its own people, coupled with its continuing hostility towards—and willingness to attack—the U.S., the toppling of Saddam's regime was in the best interests of Iraqis and the world at large. In clearer terms, the U.S. insisted that Iraq posed

¹ Brewer, op.cit.,pp. 230.

both a continuing threat to the national security of the U.S., as well as to international peace and security in the Persian Gulf region.

However, as this study has illustrated, a major criticism directed towards national security justifications to launch ‘humanitarian’ military interventions is that they lack impartiality. The reason is that the appeal to national security to justify armed attacks or covered action against other countries arbitrarily favours the interests of one’s own nation. Put differently, an argument for intervention that purports to be moral—as was claimed in Somalia and Iraq—cannot simply dismiss considerations of impartiality, and military enforcement in ‘humanitarian’ interventions has a very damaging effect on their impartiality. Consequently, their ‘humanitarian’ spirit vanishes rendering them no more than military interventions.

Furthermore, of course, the clash of interests is a constant in international politics, and the United States and Iraq are certainly not exceptional in this regard. Although Saddam may indeed have wanted to dominate the region, he was hardly alone in this ambition. Despite the reasons given by the U.S., the truth of the matter was probably more honestly expressed by U.S. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice when she claimed that the ambitions of Saddam Hussein and the interests of the United States were going to clash.¹

For this reason, after the 9/11 attacks on America, the U.S. announced a strategic policy of fighting terrorism and countries or organisations that harbour terrorists. In a televised speech on 20 September 2001, Bush had made it clear that he would use all means possible in the “war on terror” and had placed the war preparations against Iraq in the context of “either you are with us or with the terrorists”.² In this regard, this dissertation has tried to prove that the term “war on terrorism” was merely a propagandistic and rhetorical device for establishing U.S. military power while destroying the power of daring leaders— both of which would advance U.S. interests and hegemony.

Therefore, a prime inference suggests that Americans intervene ‘humanitarianly’ for their interests in the first place. Their ideals are introduced to give these interventions, sometimes invasions, a sense of legitimacy. Accordingly, the main reasons leading Presidents George Bush the father to delay action and then opt for intervention in Somalia and Bill

¹ Eid, Mahmoud. “*The 2003 War on Iraq: A Global Media-Politics Convergence*”, *The Journal of International Communication* 14:1 (2008):pp.158.

² Ibid.

Clinton to urge for withdrawal from it, as well as the reasons pushing George W. Bush the son to wage war on Iraq are very close in nature for they all serve the national interests game.

Simply put, because no vital interest existed in the Horn of Africa albeit the situation in Somalia was tragic, President George Bush the father preferred to remain disengaged for one year and a half. However in the spring of 1992, due to the liberal humanitarianists' mobilised political pressure, he faced a choice between joining an intervention in Bosnia to stop the slaughter of Bosnian Muslims or lead an effort in Somalia. In order to deflect attention away from calls for the use of force in the Bosnian conflict—which was expected to be costly— he certainly preferred Somali terrain and problems. Unexpectedly, the subsequent president realised that establishing a functioning society in Somalia was more complex, and uppermost more costly, than he had thought and this fell into contradiction with his nation's perceived self-interests. Consequently, he gave up this 'unworthy' intervention and pledged to leave the country by March 31, 1994.

Likewise, as argued in the third chapter, the 'humanitarian' rhetoric used by President George W. Bush the son in the lead-up to the war on Iraq was another failed attempt by an American president to mislead the public regarding his real underlying aim. This time, the aim was Iraq's black gold—which made it more striking in comparison to Somalia—that would guarantee the survival of U.S. hegemony and prominence. This would confirm the rightness of the first hypothesis suggested in the introduction.

Thus, in spite of the various analyses arguing the substitution of the 1990s multilateral intervention by the unilateral one at the wake of the 21st century as a result of a set of lessons learned from Somalia, it can be said that reality is quite different and the typically realistic national interest's notion is the primary determinant factor. In this respect, the former American National Security Advisor Anthony Lake made his contribution to the debate of whether unilateral or multilateral action was preferable in the post-Cold War world. For him, the country should not give a principled answer on this question. Rather, America had to act exclusively according to its interest, putting it explicitly: "We should act multilaterally where doing so advances our interests, and we should act unilaterally when that will serve our purpose."¹ However, self-interested reasons are inappropriate motives to conduct war in defence of human rights.

Hence, it can be concluded that the shift in U.S. foreign policy from realism to idealism during its war on Iraq stemmed from four main motivating factors: to affirm

¹ Glanville, op.cit.pp.11.

America's hegemony over Europe and its position as the world's sole superpower; to restore the credibility of America as its leader especially after 09/11; to protect its national security; and to secure its economic interests in the Middle East. This would prove that the second hypothesis suggested in the introduction is right.

In this regard, another important inference unfolds. It can be said that realism and idealism, as they are discussed in academic debates about the political character of American foreign policy, have been complementary rather than opposed approaches to furthering American interests in the world. As realists, American leaders have shown themselves as practitioners of the balance of power, mindful to fend off the expansion of powers that might threaten American security. Yet rather than annex foreign territories to its own imperial control, the United States, for reasons peculiar to its own national identity¹, has favoured idealistic measures to reinforce the independence of states whose incorporation under the control of another great power might threaten American national security. In the post-Cold War world, realism has been the American way of practicing balance-of-power politics in world affairs and protecting U.S. interest. Wilsonianism, in the form of 'humanitarian' concerns, has been an "operational code"² giving continuity to American hegemony and power, for the realistic approach alone has become unconvincing.

Added to them, another inference suggests that in the course of U. S. foreign policy military interventions, unilateralism and idealism have proved to be to a large extent compatible, for the latter is the cultural and religious justification of the former whenever the idea of national interests is smelt. Likewise, the approach of realism tends to save America from gambling in unworthy terrains and thereby it pursues a multilateral policy under the UN auspices.

Taking this into consideration, it can be concluded also that the U.S. shields under the United Nations umbrella only when it assures that doing so would save the nation from dispatching its troops alone—thereby risking casualties—to help unworthy inhabitants of areas of little significance to the U.S. As a result, Robert Cox was to a large extent right when he asserted in his hegemony theory that hegemonic states make use of international institutions in order to preserve their national interest, to the end of extending the reach of their hegemony and wealth.

¹ These include its geostrategic reasoning, its culture and ideology, and especially its economic and political structure.

² Smith, op.cit.pp.144.

Likewise, the significance of the media—being a U.S. national institution— to this study emerged where it concerned human suffering and shaping opinions in coherence with the executive's decisions about intervention or delay of action. The different behaviours of U.S. media in both narratives in Somalia and Iraq have proved to be no more than practical examples of Antonio Gramsci's hegemony theory—elucidated thoroughly in the first chapter—and hence unquestionably confirming its rightness. In the case of Somalia, for instance, it took the media more than one year to recognise at last that Somalia's debacle was worth coverage and intervention. Obviously, this act was not done arbitrarily coinciding intentionally with the executive's decision to supply Somalia with 'humanitarian' aid.

In the run up to the war on Iraq, however, with few exceptions, the mainstream media coverage—in TV channels in particular—was huge and simply parroted the administration's line. They presented certain facts and ignored others in spite of the fact that anti-war arguments providing evidence that the whole scenario was fraught with contradictions were very strong. Thus, in this dissertation, I have argued that the propagandistic coverage during the build-up to the war on Iraq in comparison to the little coverage Somalia had received earlier reveals the extent to which the media are complicit with the aims of U. S. foreign policy decision-makers. In clearer terms, media coverage to both interventions has resulted from a self-interests' based cooperation between media and political elites. Hence, the decision to intervene or remain disengaged is a function of both the president's calculations of stakes and risks coupled with the perceived public support for these operations attained via media—especially TV channels—portrayal. The superimposition of Gramsci's theory on this statement reveals that TV channels are an audio-visual weapon in the hands of American political elites, used at the right time and in the right spot.

By and large, the U. S. military interventions in Somalia and Iraq, representing in my work Africa and the Middle East respectively, are widely believed to have been driven by the impulse of providing 'humanitarian' aid, among other reasons in the case of Iraq, to those affected by internal strife. However, military intervention in response to consummated atrocities benefits no one. The costs and dangers of 'humanitarian' military intervention heap further misery on a population that has already suffered major atrocities. Such costs can be justified only when the potential benefits outweigh them—when there are people to save and rights violations to halt. From both interventions in the case studies discussed in this work, the mass-killings in Somalia and Iraq have proved that bombs are never humanitarian. Additionally, military intervention launched to punish leaders, even if it succeeds, is more than likely to punish the population as well.

In short, the U.S. ostensibly laudable goal did not set its 'humanitarian' military interventions in Africa and the Middle East free from doubt over the real unpopular intentions. Thereby, a thorough examination of them has been required, a task this dissertation has to some extent attempted to delve into.

Glossary

Balance of power: This concept of international relations originated in Europe in mid-1600s. It asserted that hegemonic ambitions of nations will lead inevitably to war in the absence of power balancing, whereby weaker powers either strive to increase their own military power or to counter the superior military capacity of neighbouring nations. In other words, balance of power expresses the doctrine intended to prevent any nation from becoming sufficiently strong so as to enable it to enforce its will upon the rest. It is the capacity of the members of the world community to hold each other in check.

Hegemony: The structure of power relations in which one nation, a hegemon, assumes leadership and responsibility over the world or regional systems primarily by virtue of its superior financial, commercial, and productive power and secondarily by its military power.

Human rights: The rights people have simply because they are human beings, regardless of their ability, citizenship, ethnicity, danger, language, nationality, race, or sexuality.

Intervention: Interference usually by force or threat of force in another nation to compel or prevent an action. It is also the deliberate act of a nation to introduce its military forces into the course of an existing controversy.

Peacekeeping mission: A mission that involves military efforts to maintain peace that has just been established. It entails the deployment of military force into the zone of war.

Power politics: International diplomacy in which each nation uses or threatens to use military or economic power in order to further its own national interests.

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A Summary in Arabic

ملخص

هذه الأطروحة تحمل عنوان: "التدخلات الإنسانية العسكرية للولايات المتحدة الأمريكية في أفريقيا والشرق الأوسط. أنموذجي الدراسة: الصومال (1992) والعراق (2003)". كما هو جلي، فإن هذه الأطروحة هي دراسة للسياسة الخارجية للولايات المتحدة في سياق العلاقات الدولية في عصر ما بعد الحرب الباردة، وهي الحقبة التي تولت الولايات المتحدة فيها دور المهيمن العالمي دائما تحت غطاء ما يسمى بالتدخلات الإنسانية. هذا العمل يتعامل مع مسألة التدخلات العسكرية للولايات المتحدة تحت غطاء 'الإنسانية' في أفريقيا والشرق الأوسط. و تحقيقا لهذه الغاية، قد تم اختيار التدخلات الأمريكية في كل من الصومال (1992) والعراق (2003)، اللتان تجسدان أفريقيا والشرق الأوسط على التوالي، كحالتين تجسدان السياسة الأمريكية. وبشكل أكثر تحديدا، فإن هذه الدراسة تبحث الى اي مدى أثر الجانب 'الإنساني' على قرارات السياسة الخارجية للولايات المتحدة خلال تدخلاتها العسكرية في كلا البلدين، مقابل حسابات المصالح الوطنية.

غاية هذه الأطروحة ، إذن، هي إثبات أن التدخلات العسكرية للجيش الأمريكي تحت غطاء 'الإنسانية' في الصومال والعراق لم تكن نتيجة لاهتمامات 'إنسانية' مبنية على النهج المثالي، بل كانت في المقام الأول وفقا لاعتبارات واقعية جيوسياسية و جيوسياسية، و مصالح اقتصادية فضلا عن دوافع ثقافية.

لهذا السبب، فإن هذا العمل يسعى جاهدا ليثبت ضمن فصوله المختلفة أن حسابات المصالح الوطنية للولايات المتحدة من شأنها ان تقدم شرحا أفضل لسبب اتباع امريكا سياسات ونهج مختلفة في كل من الصومال والعراق، و ان الاهتمامات 'الإنسانية' كانت لها أهمية هامشية. بعبارة أكثر وضوحا، فإن تحول التدخلات 'الإنسانية' العسكرية للجيش الأمريكي من المنهج الواقعي المعتمد على التحالفات في حالة الصومال إلى منهج مثالي أمريكي بحثت في حالة العراق كان عملا يخدم المصلحة الوطنية الأمريكية. ذلك لأن العراق كانت، على عكس الصومال، جديرة بالاهتمام و التضحية.

الى جانب ذلك، هذه الدراسة تبين أن الأسباب الرئيسية التي ادت الرئيسين جورج بوش الأب إلى تأخير تقديم المساعدة ومن ثم تبني سياسة التدخل العسكري الإنساني في الصومال وبييل كلينتون لحث الانسحاب منها، وكذلك الأسباب التي جعلت جورج بوش الابن يشن حربا على العراق تستند جميعها إلى لعبة المصالح الوطنية المبنية على النهج الواقعي. هذه الأخيرة لديها اسقاطاتها السياسية، الاقتصادية و الاستراتيجية.

لا يكشف هذا العمل التقلبات السياسية الخارجية الأمريكية والحسابات الكامنة في سياق تدخلاته 'الإنسانية' فقط، لكنه يبين كذلك كيف أن التكتلات العملاقة لوسائل الإعلام هي بمثابة الشريك اللا انساني لصانعي القرارات السياسية الخارجية للولايات المتحدة. لهذا السبب، تستند الحجج المنصوص عليها في هذه الأطروحة إلى نظريات الهيمنة التي صاغها أنطونيو غرامشي وروبرت كوكس.

بكلام أوضح هذا التعاون بين نخبة المجتمع والإعلام المبني اساسا على المصلحة الذاتية كان قد اشير اليه من قبل أنطونيو غرامشي في أعقاب القرن العشرين. من خلال تطوير نظرية كاملة حول الهيمنة على الصعيد الوطني، استطاع أن يفسر بدقة ديناميكيات هذا الترابط. بعد ذلك، وضع روبرت كوكس صيغة موسعة لنظرية غرامشي حول الهيمنة. هذه الأخيرة وضحت دورها ديناميكيات استخدام الدول المهيمنة للمؤسسات الدولية لتوسيع مصالحهم الشخصية.

استغلال الولايات المتحدة للأمم المتحدة خلال كارثة الصومال يناسب في هذا النمط. هذا من شأنه أن يجعل كلا النظريتين حول الهيمنة ذات أهمية قصوى لهذا العمل.

الكثير من الدراسات النوعية حول التدخلات الأمريكية في الصومال والعراق متاحة. تلك التي تحلل التدخل الأمريكي 'الإنساني' العسكري في الصومال تشمل: كتاب والتر كلارك و جيفري هربست تحت عنوان: "التعلم من الصومال: دروس التدخل الإنساني العسكري"، أطروحة حاجي عبد الواحد عثمان التي تحمل عنوان: "مشروعية التدخل الإنساني للأمم المتحدة بموجب الفصل السابع من ميثاق الأمم المتحدة: الصومال وما بعدها"، وكتاب بيتر وودارد: "السياسة الخارجية الأميركية و القرن الأفريقي". فيما يتعلق بحرب الولايات المتحدة على العراق، كتب ديبرا ميلر كتابا مهما بعنوان "الحرب على العراق"، وكذلك فعل اليخاندرو الكولا و ريتشارد سول عندما كتبا: "الحرب على الإرهاب و الإمبراطورية الأمريكية بعد الحرب الباردة". من جانبه، فقد عمد توماس أريكس إلى التشكيك في قدرة الولايات المتحدة على تحقيق أي نجاح 'إنساني' أو عسكري في كتابه: "الفشل التام: المغامرة العسكرية الأمريكية في العراق". ميزة هذه الاطروحة، خلافا للأعمال المذكورة، تكمن في قدرتها على دمج الموضوعين معا. الهدف من هذه الدراسة المقارنة هو توضيح الحقائق غير المعلنة حول المغامرات العسكرية 'الإنسانية' للولايات المتحدة في أفريقيا والشرق الأوسط.

وفقا لذلك، و نظرا للحاجة الماسة لهدف واضح، أسئلة البحث لهذه الدراسة لها أهمية قصوى ووضعت على النحو التالي:

- لماذا فضلت الولايات المتحدة الحماية تحت مظلة الأمم المتحدة خلال تدخلها 'الإنساني' العسكري في الصومال، في حين أنها في العراق تجاهلت المعارضة التامة للأمم المتحدة، و تحركت بشكل منفرد متحملة مسؤولية ما قد يتولد عن الحرب؟
- لماذا كانت التغطية الإعلامية في كلا التدخلين العسكريين 'الإنسانيين' مختلفة جدا؟ لأنه، كما تظهر دراستي، كان هناك تضخيم و تكبير في الأحداث في العراق، بينما في الصومال لم يسمع الناس عن الكارثة الإنسانية الا بعد عام من بدايتها؟
- لماذا كان هناك انسحابا فوريا من الصومال بمجرد الشعور بأن البعثة سيكون مصيرها الفشل؟ ولماذا كان هناك في العراق، على الرغم من صعوبة المهمة، نقل جيش هائل لمسافة 7000 كيلومتر لتدمير بلد بالكاد تعرفه الشريحة المتعلمة من الأميركيين، كل ذلك باسم الحرية؟
- إلى أي مدى كان غرامشي و كوكس محقين عندما اكدا في نظريتهما حول الهيمنة أن الدول المهيمنة تستفيد من المؤسسات الوطنية والدولية على التوالي من أجل توسيع نطاق هيمنتها وثروتها؟

الأسئلة الثانوية التي تعمد هذه الدراسة للإجابة عنها بشأن القضية الصومالية تشمل ما يلي:

- لماذا كان التورط الأمريكي في الصومال عميقا جدا على الرغم من حقيقة أنه مع نهاية الحرب الباردة لم تعد الصومال تشكل إضافة ضرورية للاهتمامات الأميركية في الخليج والمحيط الهندي؟
- برر الرئيس بوش بأن قراره للتدخل في الصومال كان بدافع اغراض 'إنسانية'. ولكن لماذا اتى اعترافه أن الصومال باتت مأساة إنسانية كبيرة تقريبا بعد عام من اندلاع حرب أهلية؟ هذا يجب أن يلقي ظللا من الشك على مدى قوة المبرر 'الإنساني' الذي أثر على قرار بوش.

• مع العلم أنه لا يوجد أي مصالح استراتيجية على المحك في الصومال، لماذا قررت الولايات المتحدة تحت إدارة بوش تفضيل التدخل، وعمدت إلى العمل العسكري باسم 'الإنسانية'؟

على نفس النحو، فإن حالة التدخل الأمريكي في العراق تثير عددا من الأسئلة الثانوية من بينها:

• بالمقارنة مع الصومال، ما هو الشيء الذي جعل العراق أكثر إثارة للانتباه و أدى إلى اهتمام أميركي في أعقاب القرن الحادي والعشرين وحتى من قبل؟

• وهل كان التدخل في العراق حقا 'إنسانيا' كما يدعي مرارا وتكرارا المسؤولون الأمريكيون والسياسيون؟ إذا لم يكن كذلك، ما هو القصد الحقيقي؟

في رحلة الإجابة عن هذه الأسئلة، تقترح هذه الأطروحة فرضيتين. أولا، الأسباب الرئيسية التي ادت الرئيسين جورج بوش الأب إلى تأخير تقديم المساعدة ومن ثم تبني سياسة التدخل العسكري الإنساني في الصومال وبيل كلينتون لحث الانسحاب منها، وكذلك الأسباب التي جعلت جورج بوش الابن يشن حربا على العراق هي ذات طبيعة واحدة. ثانيا، التحولات والتقلبات في السياسة الخارجية للولايات المتحدة خلال تدخلاتها 'الإنسانية' العسكرية في الصومال والعراق لم تكن نتيجة لاهتمامات 'إنسانية' مبنيّة على المثالية، بل كانت في المقام الأول وفقا لاعتبارات واقعية جيوسياسية وجيوسياسية، مصالح اقتصادية فضلا عن دوافع ثقافية. وسائل الإعلام الأمريكية، كذلك، تولي اهتماما لنفس الاعتبارات.

تحقيقا لذلك، قسمت هذه الدراسة إلى ثلاثة فصول يغطي الفصل الأول كلا من الخلفيات النظرية و التاريخية للحقائق والنزاعات الجديدة لما بعد الحرب الباردة بالتركيز أولا على نظريتي الهيمنة المنصوص عليها من قبل غرامشي و كوكس . ارتباط تلك النظريات بهذه الأطروحة يتولد من حقيقة أن الولايات المتحدة قد ظهرت بعد اختتام الحرب الباردة القوة المهيمنة في العالم ، ومارست الهيمنة على المؤسسات الوطنية والدولية . إنشاء هذه الهيمنة أدى إلى زوال فكرة السيادة ، التي أنشئت في وقت سابق في ميثاق الأمم المتحدة . في هذا الصدد ، تم إعطاء هذا الميثاق اهتماما كبيرا في هذا الفصل.

كما تم تكريس هذا الفصل أيضا لتعريف مصطلح الإنسانية ، لان فهم معناها هو مقدمة ضرورية لدراسة علاقة التصعيد العسكري بالتدخلات الإنسانية في عصر ما بعد الحرب الباردة ، وبالتالي تقييم تصرفات الولايات المتحدة في الصومال و العراق . بعد ذلك ، قامت هذه الأطروحة برسم الخطوط العريضة لنهج السياسة الخارجية المتبعة من طرف الولايات المتحدة التي أثرت على سلوكياتها أثناء تدخلاتها—قبل وأثناء و بعد الحرب الباردة. هذا الجزء مهم للغاية، لذا فهو يحتاج تفصيلا أكثر.

كان التدخل العسكري طوال القرن العشرين النوع الأبرز للتدخل مميزا الحربين العالميتين الأولى والثانية. ومع ذلك ، مثالية ويلسون في أوائل القرن العشرين حملت بذور التدخل 'الإنساني' لأغراض و مصالح ذاتية. في هذه الفترة كلفت أمريكا بمهمة 'محرر' العالم ، وبالتالي حتما مهيمن العالم . هذه العملية كانت لتستغرق مزيدا من الوقت بسبب ظهور ألمانيا واليابان و الاتحاد السوفياتي كقوى صاعدة . نتيجة لذلك ، كان التقارب بين كل من النهج الواقعي والمثالي شيئا ضروريا . ساعد انهيار التعاون بين القوى العظمى بعد الحرب العالمية الثانية على إنشاء الواقعية كنهج سائد لنظرية و ممارسة السياسة الدولية في الولايات المتحدة ، حتى خلال الحرب الباردة . في نفس الوقت ، وصف قادة أمريكا للمخاطر الخارجية—على وجه التحديد الاتحاد السوفياتي—المبالغ فيه بعث الانطباع أن أمريكا كانت على وشك شن حرب صليبية

مثالية، بعيدة عن الواقعية.

خطة مارشال (1948- 1952) كانت واحدة من الآليات الرئيسية للحرب الباردة .من خلال هذه الخطة، طالب وزير الخارجية جورج مارشال الدول الأوروبية بوضع خطة لانتعاشها الاقتصادي بينما الولايات المتحدة تزودها بالأموال . لكن العديد من الدول الأوروبية أدركت أن هذا الإجراء الأمريكي يهدف لإقامة الهيمنة الأمريكية على أوروبا . نتيجة لذلك ، قام قادة أوروبا بتأسيس المجموعة الاقتصادية الأوروبية في عام 1957 . نظرا لنفس المخاوف من الاتحاد السوفياتي ، شعرت أوروبا الغربية بضرورة تأييد الولايات المتحدة ، زعيمة الكتلة الغربية . لهذا السبب ، أصبح التوتر بين الكتلتين هو الجو السائد . جزء لا يتجزأ من هذا التوتر كان التخوف من ترك أي فراغ للسلطة مفتوح يمكن للجانب الآخر قد يشغله . وبالتالي ، فإن كلا من الاتحاد السوفياتي والولايات المتحدة حاولت بكل الوسائل لدعم الأنظمة الضعيفة و المجتمعات المنقسمة . وقد اعتبرت بعض الدول مثل الصومال وأفغانستان و يوغوسلافيا ، في بعض الأوقات كقطع هامة على رقعة شطرنج الحرب الباردة . لكن مع زوال الاتحاد السوفياتي، الذي فقد قوته و قدرته على دعم هذه الأنظمة ، فقدت الولايات المتحدة هي الاخرى الحافز للقيام بذلك ، الآن اصبحت تستحق تسمية مهيمن العالم .

في عصر ما بعد الحرب الباردة ، وتحديدًا في التسعينيات، أصبحت بعض الدول الضعيفة مجزأة و انهارت تماما . لذلك، تطلبت مساعدات ' إنسانية ' . وقد أضاف هذا إلى قاموس السياسة العالمية مصطلح 'التدخل الإنساني ' الذي اندمج مع مصطلح التدخل العسكري ، ليشكلا ثنائيا غريبا . بعبارة أخرى ، تطوير نمط جديد من التدخل ، معروف باسم التدخل العسكري لأغراض 'إنسانية'، كان السمة الحاسمة في البيئة الدولية بدءًا من التسعينيات و حتى يومنا الحاضر . أصبح من الواضح الآن أن هذا النمط المثالي ظاهريا هو بمثابة وسيلة كافية لتأكيد الهيمنة الأمريكية وتحقيق المصالح الذاتية المبنية أساسا على الواقعية . وبالتالي ، خلال هذه الفترة ، ازدادت كثافة و وتيرة ' البعثات الإنسانية ' المتعددة الاطراف للولايات المتحدة وفقا لتفويض من الأمم المتحدة لمرة واحدة كل 30 شهرا . أهمها التدخل في الصومال عام 1992 . مرة أخرى ، استخدمت كل من الواقعية و المثالية بالتبادل . ثم أعقب ذلك تحولا كبيرا نظرا لأحداث 11 سبتمبر 2001 ، فبرز "نظام عالمي جديد " يقوم على الزعامة الأمريكية كمذهب توجيهي للسياسة الخارجية الأمريكية . قام هذا النظام الجديد بشن "حرب على الإرهاب" بمبادرة امريكية بحجة على اسس مثالية . وقد كان المبرر الرئيسي يرتكز على عدم السماح لبلدان بعيدة ومتعبة مثل أفغانستان والعراق بالانهيار والوقوع في حالة من الفوضى لان هذا من شأنه ان يهدد سلامة ورفاهية الولايات المتحدة .

ما لا يمكن إنكاره كذلك هو دور وسائل الإعلام في صنع و تنفيذ تلك الأجنداث السياسة الخارجية المعمول بها . ولذلك، كانت لها اهمية معتبرة في الفصل الاول الذي حمل عنوان : " سياسة التدخل ' الإنساني ' الجديدة في فترة ما بعد الحرب الباردة و السياسة الخارجية للولايات المتحدة— القوة المهيمنة في العالم . "

بعد اخذ كل هذه المعلومات بعين الاعتبار، يتعامل الفصل الثاني من هذه الدراسة التحليلية أساسا مع التدخل الأمريكي ' الإنساني ' العسكري في الصومال ودور وسائل الإعلام فيه بكشف الحقيقة المخفية من زواياها المختلفة، و مناقشة الجانب ' الإنساني ' للمهمة لذلك ، فإنه يشرح ملابسات قرار الرئيس بوش بالتدخل ، يقارن بين التغطية الإعلامية قبل وبعد قرار الرئيس ، يخوض في طبيعة التدخل العسكري العميق للرئيس كلينتون و انسحابه المفاجئ و يفسر التدايعات الكارثية للتدخل . وبالتالي ، هذا الفصل يحمل عنوان : " التدخل 'الإنساني' العسكري للولايات المتحدة في الصومال عام 1992 : أجنداث خفية أو أغراض إنسانية؟" . فيما يلي شرح تفصيلي لأبعاد القضية الصومالية .

حين هبطت قوات المارينز الأمريكية إلى أرض ميناء مقديشيو فى التاسع من ديسمبر 1992 لتقود قوات التحالف الدولى تحت مظلة الأمم المتحدة فى عملية سميت "باستعادة الأمل فى الصومال" ساد لدى الرأى العام العالمى الاعتقاد بسرعة وسهولة تحقيق هذه العملية لأهدافها المتمثلة فى تأمين وصول المساعدات الإنسانية الدولية لشعب أنهكته المجاعة والجفاف والحروب الأهلية الدموية. وقد توقع الكثيرون أن تكون استعادة الأمل نسخة مكررة من عملية عاصفة الصحراء التى أنهت بها القوات الأمريكية أزمة الخليج فى يناير 1991، وبذلك تتحقق ريادة الولايات المتحدة لما يسمى بالنظام العالمى الجديد ويتجسد جوهر هذا النظام الأحادى القطب بعد انتهاء الحرب الباردة وزوال ما كان يسمى بالاتحاد السوفياتى. ومن ناحية أخرى، فقد بدا واضحا للعيان تحول أجهزة الأمم المتحدة ومجالسها من مجرد ساحات للشجب والإدانة، أو التأييد والمناصرة، إلى ممارسة الدور الفعال فى حل الأزمات الدولية الطارئة. ومع استخدام الفصل السابع من ميثاق المنظمة الدولية، استعادت تلك المنظمة روح التفاؤل التى حفت بميلادها فى أعقاب الحرب العالمية الثانية. ولكن رغم بزوغ هذه التوجهات والتوقعات فى سماء العلاقات الدولية فى أطرها الجديدة، إلا أن عملية استعادة الأمل، التى تحولت فى الرابع من ماي 1993 إلى يونوصوم (2)، قد بدت بعد اقل من عام أشبه بالسير على الرمال المتحركة. وهو الأمر الذى حدا بالولايات المتحدة إلى إعلان سحب قواتها من الصومال فى موعد أقصاه 31 مارس 1994، وما تلا ذلك من إعلان كل من فرنسا وإيطاليا عزمهما على اختفاء اثر الإدارة الأمريكية فى هذا الشأن، وذلك بسحب قواتهما فى مواعيد مختلفة.

وبين الأقدام المتحمسة للتدخل الدولى فى الصومال، والانسحاب المتسارع منه، مر عام حافل بالعديد من الأحداث والمواقف والقرارات الدولية المتضاربة ويمكن رصد التحولات الحادثة خلال ذلك العام على عدد من المحاور المحلية والعالمية نجملها فيما يلى :

الاولى تخص القوى المحلية الفاعلة فى الصومال. بعد سقوط نظام سياد برى وفراره فى يناير 1991 إلى خارج البلاد، بدأ النزاع يدب بين رفاق السلاح—زعماء حركات المعارضة التى أزاحت هذا النظام—وذلك سعيا إلى انفراد كل منهم بالسلطة، دون الاكتراث بالمصالح القومية للصومال. وهو الأمر الذى ترتب عليه انهيار الدولة بكل مؤسساتها وأبنيتها ورموزها، بالإضافة إلى تكريس اعتماد كل من الأطراف المتصارعة على الانتماء القبلى كأساس للقوة وكوسيلة لفرض سيطرته على الساحة المحلية. وإذا كان الإقليم الشمالى قد أعلن انفصاله تحت حكم الحركة القومية الصومالية، معبرا عن رفضه لكافة أشكال الاستغلال والاضطهاد الإقليمى خلال الحكم الوطنى ، فإن الإقليم الجنوبى تنازعت فصائل المعارضة لنظام سياد برى. وتجسد الصراع بين تلك الفصائل فى أبشع صورة فى العاصمة مقديشيو، التى انقسمت إلى جزئين يتصارعهما جناحا حركة المؤتمر الصومالى الموحد، بعد تعيين المؤتمر علي مهدي محمد رئيسا مؤقتا للصومال فى أعقاب طرد سياد برى واحتجاج الجنرال محمد فارح عيديد على ذلك مطالباً بأحقية فى الرئاسة لدوره فى تعقب قوات سياد برى إلى خارج البلاد. وقد كانت دموية هذا الصراع ووحشيته وما أدت إليه من تفاقم آثار الجفاف والمجاعة، هى التى شكلت الدافع المعلن من عملية استعادة الأمل فى الصومال. وخلال عام من التدخل الدولى تحت مظلة الأمم المتحدة، وقعت بعض التغييرات فى خريطة القوى الداخلية المتصارعة فى الصومال نتيجة لهذا التدخل. فمن ناحية، أدى تجاهل القوى الدولية لانفصال الإقليم الشمالى تحت اسم جمهورية أرض الصومال إلى اكتسابه فرصة لتدعيم هذا الانفصال وإقامة نوع من الحكم المركزى باتفاق العشائر والقبائل المكونة للإقليم واقتسام السلطة فيما بينها ورغم عدم الاعتراف الدولى بالجمهورية الجديدة وما يعنيه ذلك من الانتقاص من شرعيتها، إلا أن صمت الأمم المتحدة والقوى العالمية المتدخلة تحت لوائها تجاه ما يحدث فى الإقليم الشمالى يشير إلى الاتجاه الدولى غير الراض لانفصال. كذلك فإن استقرار الأوضاع فى هذا الإقليم وتشكيل حكومة له ووجود رئيس للجمهورية ومجلس للشيوخ يعكس

جدية القوى الشمالية في الانفصال والمضى فيه لآخر الشوط، كما أنه لا يمنح القوات الدولية الذريعة اللازمة لتدخلها العسكري وان كانت بعض الأنباء قد تواترت عن وجود بعض الصراعات المسلحة حول استغلال الأراضي الزراعية بين بعض قبائل الشمال .

ومن ناحية أخرى، فإن التدخل الأجنبي في جنوب الصومال قد أحدث بعض التأثيرات على القوى المتصارعة فيه، حيث انتقص عدم اعتراف القوى الدولية المتدخلة برئاسة على مهدي محمد للصومال من شرعية وجوده، وأضعف ذلك من موقفه في مواجهة الجنرال عيديد وفي المقابل، فإن الأسلوب الذي تعاملت به القوات الإدارية الأمريكية وقوات التحالف الدولي قد أدى إلى تحول الجنرال عيديد من شخصية مرفوضة قومياً كأحد أمراء الحرب والمسؤولين عن انهيار الصومال، إلى بطل ورمز قومي. ما اكسبه وقواته بعض الشرعية اللازمة للاستمرار في المطالبة بالاستئثار بالحكم ومكاسبه. ففي خلال عام واحد، استطاع عيديد أن يستثمر كافة سلبيات التدخل الأجنبي في الصومال في تعزيز موقفه كأقوى زعيم محلي. فقد استطاع عيديد أن يلعب على أوتار الروح الوطنية في مواجهة الممارسات الخاطئة لقوات التحالف الدولي، واستفاد من جنوح هذه القوات إلى العمل العسكري وتبنى سياسة فرض السلام بالقوة، مستثيراً لمشاعر القومية للصوماليين، ومحفزاً إياهم لمقاومة هذه السياسة. وهو الأمر الذي أدى إلى اكتسابه للمزيد من الشعبية كذلك فإن تسرع الولايات المتحدة بإدانة عيديد والمطالبة بملاحقته والقبض عليه دون تحقيق في مدى مسؤوليته عن مقتل الجنود الباكستانيين في يونيو من العام 1993 قد أدى إلى إظهاره في ثوب الشهداء المضطهدين من قوات التدخل الأجنبي. كما أفضى إلى المزيد من العنف في مواجهة تلك القوات، وما ترتب على ذلك من سقوط عشرات القتلى من القوات الأمريكية. وقد أضاف تراجع مجلس الأمن عن قراره بملاحقة عيديد المزيد من الرصيد الوطني والشعبية لهذا الجنرال، بحيث أصبح من المحتم على أية قوى تتعامل في الصومال أن تعترف بوجوده كمركز للقوى.

أما المحور الثاني فيخص بالذكر الأسباب الحقيقية للتدخل الأمريكي. عند بداية التدخل، تحالفت عدة عوامل خارجية وداخلية من أجل دفع الولايات المتحدة إلى التحرك العسكري في القرن الإفريقي، مع العلم أن التدخل العسكري الأمريكي في الصومال في ديسمبر 1992 مثل تحولاً جذرياً في الموقف الأمريكي من هذه الأزمة، وفي الاستراتيجية الأمريكية العازفة عن التورط في النزاعات الأفريقية بصفة عامة. فمن ناحية، خلت الساحة الدولية للولايات المتحدة مما مكنها القيام بدور اللاعب الأوحده في السيطرة على مقاليد الأمور بعد انهيار الاتحاد السوفياتي. وقد جربت أمريكا إمكانات آلياتها العسكرية وردود الفعل الدولية والإقليمية في عملية عاصفة الصحراء في حرب الخليج، وأحرزت فيها نجاحاً دعم من هذه المكانة الدولية ولم يكلفها خسارة تذكر. ومن ثم، فإن تكرار الموقف في القرن الإفريقي كانت لا تقاوم خاصة مع الانهيار الداخلي في الصومال، والعلاقات الأمريكية الوطيدة والإيجابية مع دول الجوار الإقليمي، والمناخ العالمي المواتي لهذا التدخل بعد تقاعس المنظمات الدولية والإقليمية عنه. ومن ناحية أخرى، فإن الاعتبارات الخاصة بالمعركة الانتخابية على الرئاسة الأمريكية قد ألقت بعض النثر على الاهتمام الأمريكي بالأزمة الصومالية في النصف الثاني من 1992. ويرى بعض المراقبين قرار الرئيس السابق جورج بوش بالتدخل العسكري في الصومال في إطار السعي إلى اكتساب المزيد من الأضواء على دوره الشخصي في توطيد مكانة الولايات المتحدة الدولية قبل أن تغيب عنه هذه الأضواء بعد ظهور نتيجة الانتخابات بفوز منافسه بيل كلينتون. كما يرى البعض أيضاً هذا القرار كنوع من الضغط على الرئيس الجديد كي يستمر في تنفيذ توجهات الرئيس السابق من حيث أهمية التركيز على السياسة الخارجية خاصة وأن كلينتون قد طرح شعار الاهتمام بالشؤون الداخلية أثناء الحملة الانتخابية .

وإذا كان الهدف المعلن من عملية استعادة الأمل في الصومال هو التحرك لأغراض إنسانية بحثاً على حد قول

جورج بوش نفسه، إلا أن هذه العملية تمت بهدف تحقيق نصر عسكري أمريكي سهل وميسور في عملية سريعة تشبه ما تم في عاصفة الصحراء. وقد استفادت الولايات المتحدة من العمل تحت مظلة الأمم المتحدة من أجل إكساب عملياتها الشرعية الدولية اللازمة. إلا أن التدخل العسكري الأمريكي قد أثار بعض التحفظات من الدول الاستعمارية السابقة في منطقة القرن الإفريقي، وعلى الأخص إيطاليا وفرنسا اللتين أثارتا الحديث عن المصالح الحقيقية للولايات المتحدة في الصومال، ورغبتها في إقامة حكومة صومالية موالية تدور في فلكها وتسمح لها بالوجود في هذه البقعة الاستراتيجية. كما تسمح لها أيضا بالتوغل نحو السودان ومنطقة حوض النيل. بالإضافة إلى نشر تقارير حول تواجد شركات البترول الأمريكية تحسبا لاحتمالات تدفقه في الأرض الصومالية.

وقد وضعت هذه التحفظات والتقارير علامات استفهام حول الهدف 'الإنساني' للمهمة العسكرية الأمريكية. ففي النهاية، تسعى كل دولة لتحقيق مصالحها القومية بحسابات المكسب والخسارة. وتندعم وجهة النظر هذه من خلال حقيقة أرقام الإنفاق الأمريكي في الصومال، التي قدرت تكلفة الوجود العسكري الأمريكي هناك خلال الشهور الأولى بـ 15 مليار دولار أمريكي، طبقا لما أعلن رسميا في مناقشات الكونجرس الأمريكي وذلك بخلاف نفقات الإغاثة الإنسانية. كذلك فقد أوردت بعض التقارير أن تسعة أعشار المبالغ المخصصة للمهام الإنسانية في العملية الدولية في الصومال كانت تصرف لمهام وأغراض عسكرية وليست إغاثية. الأمر الذي يعكس غلبة الهدف العسكري للعملية على أهدافها الإنسانية، والتحول في مسارها من مهمة لإنقاذ ضحايا الجفاف والمجاعة وتأمين وصول المساعدات إليهم، إلى حرب اقرب إلى حرب العصابات التي عانى منها الاستعماريون السابقون في الجزائر وعدن، وعانت منها الولايات المتحدة في فيتنام ولبنان.

ورغم محاولات الإدارة الأمريكية إلقاء اللوم على الأمم المتحدة وأجهزتها في مسؤوليتها عن هذا التحول إلى الحل العسكري، إلا أنه من الصعب تصديق أن تكون الولايات المتحدة أداة في يد المنظمة الدولية، بقدر ما أثبتت الأحداث في الساحة الصومالية أن العكس هو الصحيح وهذا يتوافق مع نظرية روبرت كوكس. فبرغم انسحاب الولايات المتحدة من قيادة العملية الدولية في الصومال في 4 مايو 1993، وبدء ما عرف باسم عملية يونوصوم(2). بقيادة الأمم المتحدة، وتخفيض عدد القوات الأمريكية في هذه العملية إلى 1400 جندي، إلا أنه لم يمض شهر واحد على هذه الخطوة إلا وعادت الولايات المتحدة إلى تدعيم وجودها العسكري بإرسال فرقة من القوات الخاصة الرانجرز وذلك للمساهمة في إلقاء القبض على الجنرال عبيد تنفيذا لقرار مجلس الأمن حول مسؤوليته عن مقتل الجنود الباكستانيين في القوات الدولية. وجسد هذا القرار وما تبعه من تحركات عسكرية استحوذ الهدف العسكري على التدخل الأمريكي في الصومال كما أدى إلى تصاعد العمليات العسكرية في حرب العصابات، والتي أسفرت عن مقتل العشرات من الجنود الأمريكيين في بداية أكتوبر 1993، والتمثيل بجث بعضهم امتهانا للكرامة الأمريكية ولمكانتها العالمية.

وقد مثلت أحداث أكتوبر هذه نقطة تحول أخرى في الموقف الأمريكي من الأزمة الصومالية فقد أظهرت ردود الفعل داخل الولايات المتحدة ان عقدة فيتنام لم تمت تماما في وجدان الرأي العام الأمريكي الذي فزع مما تناقلته وكالات الأنباء ومحطات التلفزيون العالمية عن الأحوال والمخاطر التي يتعرض لها الجنود الأمريكيون في مقديشيو، فتحررت آلياته للضغط على صانع القرار بانسحاب القوات الأمريكية من الصومال. ومن ناحية أخرى فقد أظهرت هذه الأحداث أن العملية الأمريكية في الصومال لن تكون مغامرة استعراضية قصيرة المدى، وإنما استشعرت الحكومة الأمريكية مدى عمق المستنقع الصومالي، وإمكان تحول المواجهة إلى حرب عصابات حضرية، أو صراع اجتماعي ممتد لا ترغب هي في التورط فيه.

بطريقة مماثلة، تحليل توقيت التغطية الإعلامية المطالبة بالتدخل في الصومال يبقى حاسماً، ويزيد من الشك حول مدى اهتمام الولايات المتحدة بالجانب 'الإنساني' للقضية الصومالية. في الواقع، التحليل الدقيق لسلوك وسائل الاعلام يكشف أن هذه الأخيرة قد اتبعت سياسة إنكار وإهمال للكارثة الإنسانية في الصومال منتهجة نفس السياسة المتبعة للسلطة التنفيذية الأميركية اتجاه المحنة الصومالية لمدة سنة تقريباً بعد اندلاع الحرب الأهلية. بعد ذلك، أولت اهتماماً مفاجئاً بهذه القضية. تزامن ذلك مع قرار الرئيس بوش لنشر قواته في الصومال بهدف تحويل الانتباه عن مطالبات التدخل في البوسنة. هذا يدل على أن أنطونيو غرامشي كان محقاً تماماً عندما أكد في نظريته حول الهيمنة أن وسائل الإعلام تعتبر سلاحاً قوياً في يد صانعي القرار في الدولة كلما كان ذلك ضرورياً.

يعكس موقف الإعلام الأمريكي و كذا موقف الحكومة الأمريكية المتردد في الصومال محاولات امريكا الدؤوبة لتحقيق مصالحها و اغراضها الشخصية تحت مظلة الاهداف 'الإنسانية' النبيلة، تارة عن طريق النهج الواقعي، و تارة اخرى عن طريق النهج المثالي مثلما كان الحال في العراق.

باتباع نفس المنهج التحليلي ، الفصل الثالث من هذه الاطروحة هو تحت عنوان: " الحرب على العراق في عام 2003 : الحرب الامريكية 'الإنسانية' على الإرهاب " . بالضرورة بدأ هذا الفصل بلمحة عن ثروات العراق وتاريخها الحديث . من الواضح ان ثروات العراق كانت العامل الحاسم الذي قاد العراق ليكون مغرباً جداً بالنسبة للولايات المتحدة، في حين أن صدام حسين منح امريكا الفرصة للانقضاض على هذه الثروات بعد ذلك، تم شرح وتحليل دقيق للظروف التي من خلالها أعلنت امريكا الحرب ضد العراق مواجهة رفضاً تاماً من قبل الأمم المتحدة و دعاية إعلامية غير مسبوقه. كما تم كشف النقاب عن الأهداف غير المعلنة للرئيس جورج بوش الابن مع التركيز على الجانب 'الإنساني' للحرب . تفاصيل هذه الحرب نشرها فيما يلي:

ان تلك الحرب ليست مفاجئة ولا على غير المتوقعة ، بل هي حرب يعد لها منذ سنوات بعيدة من خلال العديد من الاحتمالات المتوقعة في نظر مخططي تلك الحرب.

ما فتئت أمريكا تعلن صباحاً مساءً أن هدفها من الحرب هو نزع أسلحة الدمار الشامل في العراق حتى لا يشكل خطراً على جيرانه ، وكذا تخليص الشعب العراقي من حاكم ظالم لأسباب 'إنسانية' بحتة. لكن، كل عاقل في العالم يعلم أن هذه مجرد شماعة تعلق عليها المقاصد الأمريكية الحقيقية ، فالعراق دمرت قواته العسكرية في حرب الخليج ، ثم استباحته فرق التفتيش والتجسس الدولية كل شبر فيه طوال عشر سنوات ، بالإضافة للقصف شبه اليومي الأمريكي والبريطاني لشماله وجنوبه والحصار المفروض عليه ، والتصوير بالأقمار الصناعية والطائرات التجسس . وقد اعترف بذلك مسؤولو فرق التفتيش السابقين ، ولقد رأينا عجباً في بحث فرق التفتيش عن الأسلحة النووية وغيرها في المساجد ومصانع حليب الأطفال والكليات التي يدرس فيها آلاف الطلاب . وكأنه لم يكف العراق أنه ابتلي بحاكم مجرم فعل فيه الأفاعيل حتى ابتلي بهذه الحرب الصليبية الحاقدة الظالمة التي مات بسببها ملايين الأطفال والنساء والشيوخ ، وأذل بها شعب كامل كان لزمناً طويلاً غرة في جبين الحضارة وحامل مشعل التقدم والمدنية. فأعداد المدنيين الذين قتلوا في العمليات العسكرية في العراق، التي تصل إلى الآلاف، تشير تساؤلات خطيرة حول ما إذا كان قد تم استيفاء شرط النزاهة و عدم الانحياز في تدخلات أمريكا 'الإنسانية'. آلاف آخرون أصيبوا و شردوا بسبب الهجمات . هذا يضع الجانب 'الإنساني' للحرب في موقف حرج.

اضافة الى ذلك، تجاهلت قوات التحالف تحت قيادة الولايات المتحدة جميع القواعد التي يجب احترامها أثناء الحروب وتعمدت استخدام الأسلحة المحرمة دولياً، رغم أنه كان واضحاً أن هذه الأسلحة من شأنها أن تؤدي بحياة عدد كبير من الضحايا. على سبيل المثال، استخدمت قوات الجيش الأمريكي قنابل صوتية لا تدمر، ولكنها تسبب ضوضاء صاخبة. وما تم اكتشافه من خلال بعض التقارير أنها قنابل جديدة كهرومغناطيسية تضرب دوائر صغيرة وتؤدي إلى تعطيل الحواس الخمس، وجميع أشكال الحياة ومن ثم الموت السريع لجميع أولئك الذين هم في دائرتها.

وإذا لم تكن هذه الدعوى 'الإنسانية' الكاذبة المعلنة هي السبب الحقيقي، فما هي الأسباب يا ترى؟

لهذه الحرب دوافع وأهداف للاعب الرئيسي فيها " أمريكا " ، أما اللأعبون الصغار فإنما هم أدوات يُضرب بعضها ببعض ويُجعل بعضهم طعماً للبعض الآخر. الدافع الأول اقتصادي. لا شك أن القرن الواحد والعشرين هو قرن الصراع على الطاقة البترولية حيث أن الغرب منذ عام 1973 م وهو يسعى سعياً حثيثاً لإيجاد بديل للبترول . لكن هذه المساعي لم تحقق نجاحاً يذكر ، والقرن الواحد والعشرون حسب الإحصاءات القائمة الآن هو القرن الأخير للبترول تقريباً فمن سيتحكم في هذه الطاقة سيتحكم في العالم ، وهيمنة أمريكا على العالم الآن في أوج عظمتها. فهي إذن فرصتها للسيطرة المباشرة على مصادر الطاقة قبل أن تنشأ قوى أخرى تنافسها على ذلك أو لا تسمح لها بالتفرد بالسيطرة مثل أوروبا الموحدة تقودها فرنسا وألمانيا أو الصين في المستقبل ، وبالذات لو تم شيء من التفاهم أو التحالف بينها وبين روسيا أو اليابان . خصوصاً انه قد ثبت أن خزان الوقود البترولي الأكبر في العالم يمتد من بحر قزوين عبر أذربيجان وإيران والعراق إلى الخليج .

أما الدافع الثاني فهو جيواستراتيجي. من خلال النفوذ الصهيوني في الإدارة الأمريكية ينظر للحرب على العراق بأنها إنقاذ لإسرائيل من مأزق تعيشه في مواجهة الشعب الفلسطيني. بعبارة أخرى، أراد الأمريكان خدمة دولة اليهود الصغيرة وصرف الأنظار عن احتلالها لفلسطين وقتل المسلمين هناك. وخير دليل على ذلك هو حرصهم على تدمير العراق، أقوى دولة عربية مجاورة، وسعيهم لتفتيت جميع دول المنطقة مثل المملكة العربية السعودية، ومصر، والسودان إلى دويلات صغيرة. ومن خلال انشقاقها وضعفها، تضمن بقاء إسرائيل واستمرار الاحتلال الصليبي الوحشي لشبه الجزيرة. في الواقع، العراق لن يصبح فقط الحليف الرئيسي للولايات المتحدة في المنطقة، لكنه سيدعم الجهود الرامية إلى حل الصراع الفلسطيني الإسرائيلي.

اضافة الى ذلك، يقوم الدافع الثالث على الحسابات الجيوسياسية الرامية الى الحفاظ على مكانة و هيبة الولايات المتحدة في العالم. بعد حرب الخليج الاولى، سرعان ما اخرج صدام حسين من الكويت، وفرضت عقوبات قاسية للغاية على العراق. مثل هذه السياسات مرتبطة بالمنطق الجيوسياسي للحفاظ على مكانة الولايات المتحدة في العالم. هي تحمل رسالة واضحة إلى المنافسين المحتملين لأمريكا مفادها أن السعي إلى تحقيق تنمية مستقلة عن الهيمنة الأمريكية أو عصيان المبادئ التوجيهية لواشنطن لن يتم التسامح معه. لذلك، أحد الأسباب التي جعلت أمريكا تعاقب العراق بقسوة بعد حرب الخليج الاولى، التي بلغت ذروتها في غزو العراق عام 2003، كان للحفاظ على هيبة الولايات المتحدة.

بطبيعة الحال، فإن صراع المصالح هو ثابت في السياسة الدولية، والولايات المتحدة والعراق هما بالتأكيد لا يشكلان حالة استثنائية في هذا الصدد. على الرغم من أن صدام حسين كان يريد في الحقيقة الهيمنة على منطقة الشرق الأوسط، هو لم يكن وحده في هذا الطموح. وعلى الرغم من الأسباب الواهية التي أعطيت من قبل الولايات المتحدة، أعربت

مستشارة الأمن القومي الأميركي كوندوليزا رايس عن حقيقة الأمر بصراحة أكثر عندما صرحت أن طموحات صدام حسين ومصالح الولايات المتحدة كانت في طريقها للاشتباك، هذا من شأنه أن يزعزع هيبة و مكانة الولايات المتحدة.

بهدف ترسيخ الهيمنة الأمريكية في الفترة التي سبقت الحرب على العراق، كانت تغطية وسائل الإعلام الرئيسية خصوصا القنوات التلفزيونية، على عكس الصومال، ضخمة ورددت ببساطة آراء الإدارة الامريكية. قدمت بعض القنوات مثل ABC، CBS و NBC بعض الحقائق وتجاهلت غيرها على الرغم من حقيقة أن الحجج المناهضة للحرب التي توفر دليلا على أن السيناريو كله كان محفوا بالتناقضات كانت قوية جدا. وهكذا، كما تبين هذه الأطروحة، فإن التغطية الدعائية قبيل الحرب على العراق مقارنة بالتغطية شبه المدومة التي كانت قد تلقتها الصومال في وقت سابق تكشف ان وسائل الإعلام كانت متواطئة مع أهداف وقرارات صناع السياسة الخارجية للولايات المتحدة.

وبالنظر إلى الانتهاك الرهيب لحقوق الإنسان في الصومال والعراق، يمكننا أن نستنتج أن هدف الولايات المتحدة هو تحقيق مصالحها القومية، بعيدا عن حماية حقوق الإنسان. ولذلك، فإن الاستدلال الرئيسي من تحليل التدخلين في الصومال والعراق يشير إلى أنه ما يسمى التدخلات العسكرية 'الإنسانية' للولايات المتحدة في كلا البلدين كانت أعمالا كلاسيكية لسياسة القوة، وليست أعمالا مبنية على المثالية في حالة العراق. وبالتالي، يمكن بسهولة وصف هذه التدخلات بأنها تدخلات امريكية إمبريالية عسكرية، وصفت خطأ بأنها 'إنسانية'!

هذا يقودنا الى الاستنتاج التالي: إن الأميركيين يتدخلون 'انسانيا' لتحقيق مصالحهم بالدرجة الاولى. يتم استعمال اللهجة المثالية لإعطاء هذه التدخلات، وأحيانا الغزوات، نوعا من الشرعية. ولذلك، فإن هذه الدراسة تبين أن الأسباب الرئيسية التي ادت الرئيسين جورج بوش الأب إلى تأخير تقديم المساعدة ومن ثم تبني سياسة التدخل العسكري الإنساني في الصومال وبييل كلينتون لحث الانسحاب منها، وكذلك الأسباب التي جعلت جورج بوش الابن يشن حربا على العراق تستند جميعها على لعبة المصالح الوطنية الواقعية.

باختصار، الهدف 'المثالي' للولايات المتحدة الجدير بالثناء ظاهريا اثناء تدخلاتها 'الإنسانية' العسكرية في أفريقيا ومنطقة الشرق الاوسط لم يمنعنا من التشكيك حول النوايا الحقيقية غير المعلنة لهذه التدخلات. وبالتالي، كان من الضروري إجراء فحص دقيق لها، مهمة حاولت هذه الأطروحة إلى حد ما الخوض فيها.