

Prisoners in the Western Mediterranean Basin through the book *Africa in the Hafsid Era* by Robert Brunschvig – A Study and Analysis.

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Abstract:

Roberto Brunschvig's book titled *Africa in the Hafsid Period* deals with the issue of prisoners in the Western Mediterranean during the Middle Ages. This study will look at the way they lived and the way they were treated as well as the importance of this phenomenon in the context of political and economic relations between the Hafsid dynasty and its neighbours. The approach is historical-analytical, focusing on the treaties and diplomatic missions mentioned by Brunschvig. In conclusion, prisoners were not simply the result of war, but a diplomatic and economic tool to reflect an evolving relationship between states and the way such states develop their exchange with each other.

Keywords: Prisoners, Robert Brunschvig, Africa, Hafsid era, Western Mediterranean basin, embassies.

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الملخص:

تناول هذه الدراسة ظاهرة الأسرى في الحوض الغربي للبحر المتوسط خلال العصر الوسيط من خلال كتاب إفريقيّا في العهد الحفصي لروبار برنشفيك. وتهدف إلى تحليل أوضاع الأسرى وآليات التعامل معهم، وفهم دلالات هذه الظاهرة في العلاقات السياسية والاقتصادية بين الحفصيين والدول المجاورة. اعتمد البحث على المنهج التحليلي التاريخي باستقراء المعاهدات والسفارات الواردة في الكتاب. وأظهرت النتائج أن الأسرى لم يكونوا مجرد نتاج للحروب، بل عنصرًا دبلوماسيًا واقتصاديًا مهمًا، ارتبط بتطور العلاقات الدولية وتنظيمها عبر المعاهدات، مما يعكس تعقّد التفاعلات بين الصراع والتعاون في المتوسط الغربي خلال العصر الحفصي.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الأسرى، روبرار برنشفيك، إفريقيّا، العهد الحفصي، الحوض الغربي، السفارات.

1. INTRODUCTION

Prisoners were an essential factor in the history of the west Mediterranean during the Middle Ages due to ongoing war. They were connected with naval war and piracy, and they impacted

political and economic relations in the region.

Robert Brunschvig's book, *Africa in the Hafsid Era*, is presently one of the best recent works dealing with the history of Ifriqiya during the Hafsid period. He uses many sources and provides a complete analysis of several historical phenomena related to the concept of prisoners, and also identifies key treaties and agreements between the Hafsids and their neighbours.

Based on this, the present research seeks to examine the phenomenon of prisoners in the western Mediterranean through this work, with the aim of uncovering the conditions of captives, the mechanisms of their treatment, and understanding what this phenomenon reveals about the nature of relations among the different powers in the region.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction to the Book

The author examines all aspects of the history of the Hafsid state, from the beginning of the 13th century to the end of the 15th century. It is worth noting that the author followed a distinctive approach in writing this book, unlike those before him, as he presented the history of this state from its political, economic, social, and cultural perspectives.

The Hafsids, also known as Banu Hafs, were a Masmuda Amazigh dynasty that governed Ifriqiya from 1229 to 1574. The dynasty traced its origins to Abu Hafs Umar (1174–1195), an ancestor of the ruling family and a

devoted supporter of Ibn Tumart. His descendant, Abu Zakariya al-Hafsi (1228–1249), consolidated authority in the region, proclaimed independence, and founded a new state that replaced Almohad control in Ifriqiya. Under the reign of his son, al-Mustansir (1249–1277), the Hafsid state achieved a major victory by repelling Eighth Crusade in 1270, after which he assumed the title of Commander of the Faithful. Following his death, disputes among his sons over succession triggered prolonged internal struggles and political instability.

At the end of the 13th century, the ruling dynasty split into two branches, one governing Béjaïa and the other Constantine. In the mid-14th century, the Marinids took control of the country. After their withdrawal, the Hafsid state regained its strength under the rule of Abu al-Abbas Ahmad (1370–1394), Abu Faris Abd al-Aziz (1394–1434), and Abu Umar Yahya (1435–1488). This period was marked by stability and widespread security across the state. The capital, Tunis, became an important commercial center.

Starting from 1494, a phase of rapid decline began, as many cities and regions gained independence. From 1505, the Ottomans, through their commanders Aruj and Hayreddin Barbarossa, took control of the region. In 1535, the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V and King of Spain Charles I besieged Tunis. The last Hafsid rulers found themselves under increasing pressure from the Ottoman leaders established in Algeria on one side and the Spanish on the other.

In 1574, the ruler of Algiers succeeded in entering Tunis; the last Hafsid sultan was deposed, and Tunisia came under Ottoman rule ¹.

In the second part of the book, Robert addresses the political and administrative system of the state. He discusses the sultan and his court, the army, its composition and weaponry. He also examines the components of society, the land system, the crafts and industries practiced by the population, as well as intellectual and artistic production and centers of learning. Furthermore, he highlights the scholarly contributions produced during the Hafsid era ².

2.2 Introduction to the Author

Robert Brunschvig is considered one of the most prominent French historians specializing in the history of the Islamic world in general and the Maghreb in particular. He was appointed in the late second decade of the 20th century as a teacher in Tunisian secondary schools. He took advantage of his stay in Tunisia to initially improve his command of the Arabic language and then to specialize in Islamic history. He was greatly assisted in achieving this dual objective by the renowned French Orientalist Professor William Marçais, who had deep expertise in Islamic civilization and Arabic philology. Brunschvig soon mastered the Arabic language and trained in research methods related to Islamic history, which directed his scholarly interest toward studying a period of Tunisian history³.

The Hafsids' relations with neighboring states were

shaped largely by political and economic considerations. Following the decline of Almohad authority, the Italian republics and other Christian powers recognized the importance of establishing diplomatic and cooperative ties with the rulers of the Hafsid state in order to protect their commercial interests and ensure the continuity of their trade networks and economic activities across the cities of the Islamic Maghreb.

In recognizing the newly developed economic strength and political influence of the Hafsids, the Italian Republic sent numerous embassies as an attempt to overcome difficulties in establishing good relations with the Hafsid State ⁴.

As Tunis was the most important center of Pisan trade in North Africa⁵, the consul of Pisa, “Comes de Sconti,”⁶ sent in the year 607 AH / 1210 CE an envoy to the Hafsid Sultan Abu Muhammad Abd al-Wahid ibn Abi Hafs, carrying a letter expressing the Republic of Pisa’s desire to maintain relations as they had been during the Almohad period ⁷. The Hafsid sultan responded positively and sent them a letter clarifying his position, which was delivered by the Pisan envoy known as “Gerardo.” The letter stated:

“Your treaty with the Almohads is appreciated, and your loyalty is acknowledged; accordingly, dealings have been conducted with all those who come from your side or belong to your sphere of influence, facilitating their affairs and ensuring their protection and security in the most appropriate manner. Know that this reflects goodwill toward you and favorable

consideration for all who come to your lands, God willing.”⁸

Venice⁹ was also among the first to establish relations with the Hafids, sending an embassy in 629 AH / 1231 CE and succeeding in concluding a peace and trade treaty with them. Likewise, the Pisan embassy to the court of Sultan Abu Zakariya managed to conclude a peace and trade agreement in 632 AH / 1231 CE, through which a commercial treaty was established between the two sides for a period of thirty years¹⁰.

This was followed by Genoa, which succeeded in concluding its first agreement with Abu Zakariya Yahya on 10 June 1236 CE. Through this treaty, its city obtained significant privileges, including the guarantee of security and protection for merchants during their stay in Tunis, as well as a commitment not to attack Hafsid ships through piracy for a period of ten years¹¹.

Thanks to the policies of Abu Zakariya, the Christian kingdoms were able to establish several permanent commercial institutions in Ifriqiya, supervised by consuls who were responsible not only for protecting their interests but also for managing their various affairs¹².

They carried out many embassies, including the following:

In 668–669 AH / 1270 CE, King Louis IX of France led the Eighth Crusade, which this time targeted the Hafsid state¹³. This led to a deterioration of commercial relations between the Italian republics and the Hafids, and the suspension of all existing treaties between them¹⁴.

After Louis IX's campaign against Tunis failed, the Italian

republics—Pisa, Genoa, and Venice—moved to restore relations to their previous state. Genoa and Venice sent two embassies to the Hafsid Sultan Abu Abdullah al-Mustansir in early June 669 AH / 1271 CE, and concluded a commercial treaty with him ¹⁵

The second embassy was led by the envoy Opizon Adalard in 671 AH / 1272 CE, with the aim of concluding a commercial treaty. The agreement stipulated that it would remain in force for ten years and that the terms of the 649 AH / 1251 CE treaty would be applied, including the exemption of Genoese goods and those of other Christians from taxes ¹⁶ .

However, this treaty was put to a severe test only a few months later, when the King of Sicily, who had declared war on Genoa, demanded in March 672 AH / 1273 CE that the Hafsid sultan expel them from his territory in accordance with the provisions of the treaty concluded during the Crusade. The following year, in May, he also requested that the sultan provide assistance to a pirate from Marseille in order to attack Genoa. There is, however, no evidence that the sultan complied with these demands, as the relevant clause in the treaty concerned armed men and not peaceful merchants ¹⁷.

As for the Republic of Pisa, there is no record of an embassy dating to this period following the end of the Crusade. However, it is clear that it resumed its commercial activities with Ifriqiya. Evidence of this is that the people of Pisa who had left Béjaïa out of fear of the inhabitants' anger returned there in 669 AH / 1271 CE ¹⁸.

3. RESULTS

3.1 Embassies between the Hafsid and Christian Kingdoms:

Some Christian states sought to free themselves from the directives of the Church and focus on their commercial interests in dealings with the Islamic world, as was the case with Aragon¹⁹ and the Italian republics. Meanwhile, other states remained under ecclesiastical influence, such as Castile and France, which led the failed crusade of Louis IX against Tunis in late 667 AH / 1268 CE, under the pretext of collecting debts owed to some of their merchants by certain Hafsids subjects^{20 21}. Thus, the campaign was launched in response to Church incitement and the interests of French merchants, including some state officials²².

News of Louis IX's planned campaign against Ifriqiya reached the Hafsids Sultan from the Mamluk ruler. In response, the Hafsids sultan al-Mustansir resorted to diplomacy, sending an embassy accompanied by gifts. Coincidentally, the Hafsids envoy met the envoy of al-Zahir Baybars, who had arrived for the same purpose, namely to persuade Louis IX to abandon his decision to launch the campaign. The embassy adopted a policy of negotiation and conciliation; however, Louis IX did not respond positively. Ibn al-Shamma' reports regarding this embassy that he rejected reconciliation, treated the envoy harshly, and declared his determination to proceed with the campaign²³.

The French king did not merely refuse peace²⁴; he addressed the envoys in harsh terms and insisted on war, even offending their religious sensibilities and insulting their sovereign by expressing his desire for their conversion to

Christianity. He took advantage of a ceremony held on 9 October 1269 CE during the presence of the Hafsid embassy at his court, where he witnessed the baptism of a Jewish convert. During the event, he told the envoys that he wished to convert their ruler himself and baptize him in the same manner as that Jew²⁵. Upon their return, the envoys reported the failure of their peaceful mission, which led al-Mustansir to prepare for military resistance against the invasion ²⁶

A combination of factors enabled al-Mustansir to defeat the army of Louis IX . Following the latter's death during the same period, his brother Charles arrived from Sicily to Carthage and attempted to continue the war. However, he soon realized that the conditions were not favorable for success, particularly due to the depletion of supplies and the spread of disease. He therefore initiated a request for peace.

It appears that the acceptance of peace was initially rejected by both sides. On the Islamic side, al-Mustansir faced opposition from leading figures, including scholars, religious figures, and jurists who insisted on the necessity of jihad against the Christians²⁷. Regarding this scholarly opposition, it is reported that the jurist Abu al-Abbas Ahmad ibn Uthman ibn Ajlan al-Qaysi was asked for his legal opinion on the peace agreement. However, he avoided giving a clear response during the sultan's council, stating: "I have no knowledge of the situation." He was repeatedly pressed by members of the court to express his opinion, which indicates strong opposition that others sought to neutralize through his statement. He remained firm in his position until the council was dismissed by al-Mustansir²⁸ .

3.2 Captives in the work of Robert Brunschvig

The book is considered one of the most important works addressing the relationship between the Hafids and neighboring powers, in which Brunschvig highlights several treaties that included provisions for the release of captives. Among the key examples:

When the Hafids firmly established their rule in Tunis, Abu Zakariya advanced toward the capital with the support of local leaders in the south and southeast. Abu Muhammad attempted resistance unsuccessfully; he was deposed by the Almohad troops in Kairouan, taken captive, and exiled by his brother who entered Tunis in 1228, while his unfortunate secretary was executed²⁹.

This event shows that captivity was not limited to conflicts with Christians but also resulted from internal political struggles among Muslim powers.

In 618 AH, a treaty was concluded in Tunis between the envoy Fibaldi and Sheikh Abu Ishaq Ibrahim, acting governor, stipulating the release of all captives and ensuring safe maritime navigation between Africa and Egypt. This reflects an early awareness of the need to regulate the issue of captives through formal agreements³⁰.

Regarding relations between the Hafids and Italian maritime republics, Brunschvig notes that in 1265 a ship anchored in the port of Tunis when a Venetian fleet of ten ships suddenly arrived under the command of Jacopo Dandolo. The

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Venetians burned the southern ship after plundering it and took its crew captive³¹.

When the Crusaders withdrew from Tunis, Brunschvig reports that on 5 November, al-Mustansir swore, in the presence of the Sicilian advisor Geoffrey de Beaumont, to the following terms: reconciliation with all princes and knights who participated in the crusade, the release of captives, and the guarantee of security and exchange for travelers and merchants. This testimony is significant as it represents a direct source and shows that the release of captives resulted from negotiations, involving also commercial actors³².

During the conflict between Pisa, Genoa, and Venice, Brunschvig notes the frequency of attacks in the western Mediterranean basin. The Genoese seized a Pisan warship in the Gulf of Tunis, while the Tunisians retained the sailors who managed to escape. These prisoners were not handed over to the victors, and Sultan Abu Hafs decided not to release the captive sailors until the end of the war between the rival republics³³.

When Djerba was occupied by Roger de Lauria in 1284, the island was seized and subjected to a brutal campaign of plunder and killing, sparing neither men nor women. Several thousand captives were taken and sent to Sicily to be used as slaves, while others remained on the island³⁴. This reinforces the idea that captivity was not an exceptional phenomenon but a widespread practice affecting men, women, and children alike, transforming human beings into a movable and exploitable resource³⁵.

Regarding Aragon's support against Abu Hafs, Brunschvig

notes that an agreement was reached whereby Aragon would provide several ships equipped with soldiers and supplies, with costs to be reimbursed later. It was also agreed to return the Bedouin leader Marjam ibn Sabir to his people in exchange for a fine, as well as to support the Almohad prince against Abu Hafs³⁶.

Ibn al-Hakim succeeded in 1338 in retaking Mahdia, then recovered Ceuta and captured its ruler. In 1335, Abu Bakr besieged Gafsa, recaptured it, and brought its leader to Tunis as a prisoner. These cases show that captivity also included elites and rulers, not only common people, and that prisoners were used as instruments of political pressure.

In 1388, the Italian maritime states carried out a joint action with Venice against the Tunisian kingdom. In the following year, they separately sent an envoy to Tunis tasked with redeeming their captives, who were reportedly being treated poorly³⁷.

In 1391, King Charles VI of France requested John, King of Aragon, to intervene in order to secure the release of a large number of knights who remained in captivity in Africa after the Mahdia campaign³⁸. This shows that the issue of captives had become an international matter, involving major powers such as France, which demanded the liberation of Christian prisoners.

Also in 1391, an agreement was concluded between the Genoese and Sultan al-Mustansir of Tunis, whereby the treaty of 1383 was renewed for ten years. The republic paid a high price to redeem several hundred of its citizens captured in Africa before the latest negotiations. Earlier, in 1317, some Venetian

captives held in Africa and Annaba³⁹ had already been released. This illustrates the continuity of negotiations over captives and the emergence of gradual, partial solutions.

In 1397 (800 AH), Genoa considered renewing its agreements with Tunis. Shortly after seeking assistance from France, and in order to secure the release of captives and recover seized goods, Charles Grillo received instructions in 1397 first from the Doge Antonio Adorno and then from the governor Valeran of Luxembourg, Count of Saint-Pol. In the same year, three Genoese warships led by George Granello attacked four Tunisian vessels near the coast of Sicily and freed Sicilian men, women, and children who had previously been captured⁴⁰. This reflects the dual nature of Mediterranean relations, characterized by both conflict and negotiation.

Martin later sent a letter to Abu Faris on 28 July 1397 requesting the release of several monks. Two months later, his ships attacked the village of Torriquenca in Valencia and took about one hundred captives, both men and women⁴¹.

In 1399, the King of Aragon sent a message to Abu Faris expressing regret over acts of plunder and politely requesting that he not oppose the release of certain captives⁴².

Regarding negotiations with Sicily, Brunschvig notes that Martin the Younger, while suppressing internal rebellions, accepted preliminary peace proposals sent by Abu Faris through two Jews from Trapani on 10 May 1409. However, he conditioned final approval on his father, the King of Aragon, and demanded 30,000 gold ducats in advance to redeem Muslim captives and establish a truce⁴³.

- Brunschvig also reports that during the raid on the Kerkennah Islands on 19 September, the population resisted strongly but was overwhelmed. Several hundred were killed and more than 3,000 men, women, and children were taken captive⁴⁴.
- In 1431, Genoa sought reconciliation with Tunis and sent the physician Pietro de Fernaza, who had previously visited Tunis twice to free captives. Genoa offered compensation for the detention of Ibn Skari in exchange for 7,000 gold ducats⁴⁵.
- After a treaty between Tunis and Genoa, pirates later captured Genoese merchants near Mallorca and took them to Annaba, but De Mari succeeded in securing their release⁴⁶.
- Overall, these cases show the existence of continuous diplomatic exchanges between the Hafsid state and Italian maritime cities such as Genoa and Venice. Their missions often focused on negotiating the release of captives, determining ransom amounts and conditions, ensuring the safety of subjects, and resolving disputes arising from acts of captivity.

4. CONCLUSION

Through this study, it becomes clear that Africa in the Hafsid Era is one of the most important works documenting Hafsid history, providing valuable information on the issue of captives that is rarely found in other sources. Brunschvig

addresses the main treaties and agreements concluded for the release of captives, as well as mentioning some individuals held in prisons in Africa and Annaba.

To summarize; Data obtained from embassies and treaties has shown many advancements in the manner of how Captives are handled, from an individual to institutional and official. Embassies are a major part of negotiating while treaties are used to formally and regularly allow the release of Captives. These trends illustrate the development of Diplomatic exchanges through negotiations and interest exchange, while tensions and conflicts still exist.

Also, this study shows that Captives and economy are connected in relation to trade. As such, Captivity, embassies and treaties represent key and important elements in understanding the history of International Relations throughout the Medieval period.

Ultimately, Captivity during the Hafsid Age was not solely created due to hostilities but resulted from a number of Social, Economic and Political components. The analysis of Brunschvig demonstrates the multi-faceted nature of this issue.

5. Citations:

¹ - Robert Brunschvig, *History of Africa during the Hafsid Period from the 13th to the End of the 15th Century*, translated into Arabic by Hammadi Sahli, vol. 2, Dar al-Gharb al-Islami, 1st edition (1988), Beirut, Lebanon.

² - Ibid, pp 8- 461

³ - Robert Brunschvig, op. cit., *introduction to the critical edition*.

⁴ - Rachid Baqqa : *The Crusading and Commercial Activities of Genoa on the Coasts of the Maghreb from the 12th to the 15th Century*, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Emir Abdelkader, p. 244.

⁵ - Ships loaded with spices and silk would depart from the Levant toward Cyprus, then Alexandria, before reaching Ifriqiya. From Tunis, ships from the Maghreb and the Christian West engaged in a form of reciprocal trade, stopping at several coastal cities before reaching Ceuta. Another route was also used by ships departing from Genoa toward Tunis, then moving westward along the coast, passing through Bône (Annaba), Béjaïa, Algiers, Oran, and Honein, before heading north toward Almería. They would then return to the southern shore, stopping at La Calle (Ghazasa), and again cross back to the northern shore. Venetian ships would depart from their port toward Sicily, then proceed to Tripoli in Libya, before stopping at the island of Djerba, Tunis, Béjaïa, Algiers, and Honein. After this route, some ships returned to Venice, while others continued toward Badis and La Calle, then changed direction northward to Tortosa, before returning directly to Tunis, then to Sicily and Venice. One researcher notes that three Venetian ships used to travel to Tunis, from where they transported pilgrims from the Maghreb and al-Andalus to Alexandria (Mohamed Omrani Zerifi).

⁶ - Bacha (Najat), “*Trade in the Islamic Maghreb from the 4th to the 8th Hijri Century*”, Publications of the University of Tunis, Tunis, pp. 72–73.

⁷ - Jaboudah (Abdallah) , Maryam (Muhammad): *Trade in Ifriqiya and Tripolitania during the Almohad and Hafsid Periods*, unpublished PhD dissertation, Zagazig University, Egypt, 2008, p. 133.

⁸ - Azzawi Ahmad : *Almohad Letters*, vol. 1, p. 256.

⁹ - **Venice**: Venice, also known as *Venezia*, is located in northeastern Italy and consists of several closely situated islands. Ibn al-Wardi described it as follows:

“The land of the Venetians is a vast region, and their major city is called Venice. It lies on a gulf that extends from the Mediterranean Sea for about seven hundred miles toward the north. It is close to Genoa; the distance between them by land is eight days, while by sea it is much farther, more than two months. Venice is the seat of their ruler, whose name is the Pope—so it is said. It is located north of al-Andalus—so it is described. All their cities lie along both sides of the Venetian Gulf, and they are thriving cities and villages.”

¹⁰ - Mas (Latrie): *Traité de paix et de commerce*, les relations des chrétiens, les arabes de l’Afrique septentrionale, paris, 1872 , Ibid, p 83.

¹¹ - Ibid, p83-84.

¹² - Abdallah Jaboudah, Maryam Muhammad, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

¹³ - Jacques Le Goff , saint Louis , Maury imprimeur, France, 2014, p 150-210.

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- ¹⁴ - Abdallah Jaboudah, Maryam Muhammad, op. cit., p. 136.
- ¹⁵ - Mas latrie, les rellions , Ibid ,p129-130
- ¹⁶ - Mas latrie: **les rellions** , Ibid, p140.
- ¹⁷ - Robert Brunschvig, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 97..
- ¹⁸ - Ibid., p. 96.
- ¹⁹ - With the beginning of the 7th Hijri century / 13th century CE, the Kingdom of Aragon became a maritime power in the Mediterranean basin. This dominance created new shipping routes between the ports of Barcelona, the Maghreb, and al-Andalus. (Mohamed Omrani (Zerifi): ***The Main Maritime Routes during the Marinid Period***, p. 66).
- ²⁰ - The reason for the Eighth Crusade was the claim made by French merchants for money they had loaned to the Tunisian trader al-Liyani, one of the officials of Sultan al-Mustansir. After the merchant was killed, the French traders demanded repayment of his debts. When they saw that their claims were not being fulfilled, they appealed to Louis IX to intervene regarding what had happened. In response, Sultan al-Mustansir sent an embassy to negotiate the issue, accompanied by a gift valued at eighty thousand pieces of gold; however, the Hafsid attempt failed. (Ahmad Azzawi, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 102).
- ²¹ - Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-'Ibar, vol. 6, p. 462.
- ²² - Ahmad Azzawi, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 102.
- ²³ - Mamdouh (Hussein): ***The Crusades in North Africa and Their Civilizational Impact***, Dar Ammar for Publishing, Jordan, 1st ed., 1998, p. 257.

- ²⁴ - Ibn Abi (Dinar): *Al-Mu'nis fi Akhbar Ifriqiya wa* Tunis, Tunisian Printing Press, Tunis, 1st ed., 1869, p. 136.
- ²⁵ - Mamdouh Hussein, op. cit., p. 259.
- ²⁶ - Ibn Abi Dinar, op. cit., p. 136.
- ²⁷ - Mamdouh Hussein, op. cit., p. 320.
- ²⁸ - Abu al-‘Abbas al-Qaysi: one of the major jurists of Béjaïa, he taught many students and was among the witnesses to the reconciliation between al-Mustansir and the French. (Mamdouh Hussein, op. cit., p. 320).
- ²⁹ - Robert Brunschvig, vol. 1, p. 49.
- ³⁰ - Robert Brunschvig, op. cit., p. 55.
- ³¹ - Robert Brunschvig, op. cit., p. 83
- ³² - Robert Brunschvig, op. cit., p. 93
- ³³ - Robert Brunschvig, op. cit., p. 123
- ³⁴ - Robert Brunschvig, op. cit., p. 125
- ³⁵ - Robert Brunschvig, op. cit., p. 130
- ³⁶ - Robert Brunschvig, op. cit., p. 188
- ³⁷ - Robert Brunschvig, op. cit., p. 229
- ³⁸ - Robert Brunschvig, op. cit., p. 234
- ³⁹ - Robert Brunschvig, op. cit., p. 234-235
- ⁴⁰ - Robert Brunschvig, op. cit., p. 249
- ⁴¹ - Robert Brunschvig, op. cit., p. 150-151
- ⁴² - Robert Brunschvig, op. cit., p. 255
- ⁴³ - Robert Brunschvig, op. cit., p. 255
- ⁴⁴ - Robert Brunschvig, op. cit., p. 260
- ⁴⁵ - Robert Brunschvig, op. cit., p. 266
- ⁴⁶ - Robert Brunschvig, op. cit., p. 267

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