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**REVISITING U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN AFRICA AND
THE MIDDLE EAST
CASE STUDIES: APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA AND THE
PALESTINIAN/ISRAELI CONFLICT**

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the substance of this dissertation is entirely the result of my investigation and that due reference or acknowledgement is made, whenever necessary, to the work of other researchers.

I am duly informed that any person practicing plagiarism will be subject to disciplinary sanctions issued by the university authorities under the rules and regulations in force.

Date: 28 January 2025

Signature

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my dear parents who made the most precious sacrifices for me to witness this day. You stood by my side in my hard times and made me blaze my flames to chase my dreams. You are my support in life, and your prayers for me in the cover of darkness mean the world to me.

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation revisits U.S. public diplomacy as a foreign policy tool within the framework of post-Second World War international relations. It addresses the issue of diverging U.S. diplomatic attitudes and behaviours vis-à-vis two analogous cases of apartheid practiced by South Africa and Israel. The study unearths the key U.S. foreign policy objectives by comparing and contrasting the case studies of the South African apartheid era and the Palestinian/Israeli conflict. The U.S. foreign policy decision-makers attain these objectives by working in concert with the U.S. media, which sculpture narratives to shape public opinion. Therefore, the present work aims principally to weigh how far U.S. diplomacy is impartial, and thereby illuminate the implicit unspoken reasons accounting for the differences in U.S. policy towards two comparable apartheid scenarios. Second, it seeks to investigate how the American media collaborate and show complicity with the American government to produce stereotypical representations of Arabs and Blacks as well as deceptive discursive claims. To achieve these research objectives, the study's theoretical framework is incarnated in a couple of cultural theories—namely Edward Said's theory of Orientalism and Bell Hooks' Critical Race, Gender and Class Theory—and a single political theory known as Putnam's Two-Level Game Theory. The present research is conducted using a Comparative Case Study approach (CCS), which is primarily a qualitative approach, following a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) methodology. The research findings reveal that the U.S. mediatory role in the course of its public diplomacy practiced vis-à-vis apartheid South Africa and Israel have not been impartial and have failed to meet the requirements of fair public diplomacy. Besides, the underlying and unspoken reasons behind have been tightly linked to national interest considerations, which have repercussions on geopolitical, geostrategic, geo-economic and cultural calculations. Likewise, the U.S. media have, to a far extent, proved to be responsible for cementing and spreading stereotypical images about Arabs, Palestinians, and Blacks to serve the U.S. hegemonic culture; once the political landscape witnesses alterations, so do the representations of the American media.

Key Words: public diplomacy, the United States of America, South Africa, Israel, Palestine, apartheid

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIPAC: American Israel Public Affairs Committee
ABC: American Broadcasting Company
ANC: African National Congress
ARAMCO: Arabian American Oil Company
CAAA: Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act
CBS: Columbia Broadcasting System
CCS: Comparative Case Study approach
CENTCOM: United States Central Command
CENTO: Central Treaty Organization
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency
CNBC: Consumer News and Business Channel
CNN: Cable News Network
FMF: Foreign Military Financing
FY: Fiscal Year
QCA: Qualitative Comparative Analysis
METO: Middle East Treaty Organization
MOU: Memorandum of Understanding
NAACP: National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC: National Broadcasting Company
NGO: Non-Governmental Organization
OPEC: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PA: Palestinian Authority
PLO: Palestine Liberation Organization
SACP: South African Communist Party
SAF: South Africa Foundation
SAFUNDI: Journal of South African and American Comparative Studies
SASP: Southern Africa Support Project
SOCONY: Standard Oil Company of New York
TNCs: American Transnational Corporations
TWA: Trans World Airlines
UK: United Kingdom
UN: United Nations
UNRWA: United Nations Relief and Works Agency
U.S.A.: United States of America

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INTRODUCTION

Military intervention was the most prevalent means used by powerful countries during the twentieth century's major conflicts, including the First World War, the Second World War, and subsequently, the Cold War. In the latter period, the Soviet Union and the United States invested every effort to back failing regimes to protect their own interests, driven by the apprehension and conflicts between the two superpowers and their fear of leaving a power gap that the other side might exploit. On the Cold War chessboard, nations like Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Somalia were all considered crucial pieces at one point or another. However, following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, one superpower suffered the loss of its ability to support such regimes, while the other seized the opportunity to do so.

Several fragile nations, like the ones mentioned above, broke up or fell apart completely in the 1990s and needed 'humanitarian' assistance. This has offered international politics a new means known as 'humanitarian' intervention, which intertwined with its predecessor military intervention, to make an eccentric combination. Stated differently, one of the most significant aspects of the international environment of the 1990s was the emergence of a new pattern of intervention, referred to as military intervention for humanitarian objectives. In the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001, a "New World Order" centered on American dominance has evolved as the primary premise of American foreign policy, conducting a primarily unilateral "Global War on Terrorism," marking yet another fundamental transition.

Throughout history, another efficient means has been diplomacy. From a government-centric view of international relations, diplomacy is linked to

developing and executing foreign policy as well as offering counsel. Accordingly, when determining their foreign policy, countries must assess both their own and other countries' goals; they must determine whether these goals are compatible with one another and what strategies, such as compromise, persuasion, and the threat of force, they are willing to employ to achieve them (Morgenthau, 1993, pp.361-362).

However, since 1965, an expanded definition to diplomacy appeared, using the phrase “public diplomacy.” The latter, which is one of foreign policy’s tools, examines how public opinions affect the development and application of foreign policy. It covers features of international relations that transcend traditional diplomacy. These include how governments shape public opinion in other nations, how private groups in nations interact based on their interests, how foreign affairs are reported and how this affects policy, how people who work in communication—like diplomats and foreign correspondents—communicate with one another, and how intercultural communications work (Clifton, 2012, p.10). Worth noting is the fact that credibility and impartiality are among the main characteristics of a good diplomat.

In the last few decades, public diplomacy has been applied by the U.S. with regard to Middle Eastern and African politics. The Palestinian question, on the one hand, is undoubtedly the most contentious Middle Eastern question in international politics in the contemporary world, and is of prime importance to America in particular.

Much ink has been spilled over this question. A number of studies that have looked at U. S. foreign policy behaviours vis-à-vis the Palestinian question in the last few decades have argued that the U.S. has been the main mediatory that strived to pull both Palestinians and Israelis out of their deepening conflict and endless hatred.

However, a different opinion is held among other scholars and politicians regarding the real unstated reason generating such a choice of diplomatic policy, which the present work tries to elucidate.

It is necessary to make analogies between the situation of the Black community in South Africa during apartheid and the situation of Palestinians under Israeli occupation. The comparison between both cases, which underpins the analysis undertaken by the present study, is legitimate. The white supremacy's practice of apartheid in South Africa for the most part of the second half of the twentieth century had a bitter flavour to the Black community forming the majority of the population. In its most basic form, apartheid is a system of laws and practices that discriminate against people based on their race or ethnicity, while also excluding them from politics and social interactions (Greenstein, 2020, p.74).

In addition to the institutionalisation of racial discrimination in South Africa, millions of Black South Africans were indirectly denied citizenship through the establishment of an ethnic government based on African reserves, called "homelands." The apartheid policy was unquestionably incredibly unjust, and politically incorrect, and the foreign policy of the United States of America, in its turn, caused significant harm to Blacks in apartheid South Africa.

The impetus or motive for investigating this topic stemmed from the significant shifts in U.S. foreign policy since the Second World War. These developments have had notable ramifications for the rest of the world, uppermost Africa and the Middle East, due to the overwhelming might and influence of the sole remaining world superpower. Additionally, the purpose and significance of this study stem from the need to make a

scholarly contribution to clarify the U.S. different foreign policy tendencies and dig deeply into the nature of the U. S. diplomatic tendency vis-à-vis two similar cases of apartheid. The first concerns South Africa and the second concerns one of the most complex questions nowadays—namely the Palestinian question.

Based on the above analogy, a major issue surfaces. Contrary to the U.S. unwavering support for Israel for several decades up to contemporary times, one of the core issues addressed in this work is the sudden shift in Washington DC's policies in relation to Pretoria's practice of apartheid by the late 1980s and early 1990s.

This work, then, attempts to reconstruct and revisit American diplomacy in both Africa and the Middle East as it unfolded in the second half of the twentieth century, with an emphasis on the Apartheid era in South Africa and the Arab-Palestinian/Israeli conflict. It also compares and contrasts both case studies in the process, to unravel the underlying U.S. foreign policy objectives. In other words, this work is an examination of this glossed-over analogy by explaining the many similarities and differences between the U.S. bewildering diplomacy vis-à-vis apartheid in South Africa and the apartheid practised by Israel on the Palestinians. In doing so, it broaches several related topics including the U.S. media's behaviour vis-à-vis these two similar cases of apartheid.

Hence, given the nature of the topic discussed, and the comparative study undertaken, the research objectives of this dissertation are multidimensional. First, the present work aims primarily to weigh how far U.S. diplomacy is impartial, and thereby unravel the tacit unspoken reasons behind U.S. policy's divergent actions vis-à-vis two similar cases of apartheid. Second, it seeks to show that the U.S. media and its fictional

arts' wing are complicit with the U.S. government in the production of accepted—originally unaccepted and misleading—discursive claims and stereotypical representations of Arabs and Blacks. That is to say, the U.S. media are in the service of the hegemonic culture whenever needed to attain a political aim based on the self-interest game. Once the political picture is altered, the U.S. media's behaviour is altered in turn.

Simultaneously, this work will involve pivotal shifts between the cultural and geopolitical spheres. To put it another way, the study will combine both the geopolitical and cultural aspects of America's "special relationship" with Israel, since the latter aspect serves as the foundation for the former. It will explore the long-running cultural background that moulded American perceptions of the "Holy Land" and Israel's necessity. The purpose would be to document the ideological connection between Zionist and American national distinctiveness claims and their creation of exceptional races and people.

In light of the requirement for a clearly expressed outlook, the study's research questions are of considerable significance. Hence, three major questions have been developed:

*First, to what extent has the U.S. public diplomacy been 'impartial' in its foreign policy tendency and behaviours vis-à-vis Pretoria's practice of apartheid in South Africa and Israel's same practice in the Occupied Palestinian Territories?

*Second, what are the implicit undeclared reasons behind the disparities in U.S. conduct between these two comparable apartheid scenarios?

*Third, how far are the U.S. media conglomerates complicit with the U.S. government's goals in the process of its diplomatic mediation efforts in Africa and the Middle East?

Secondary questions that this study aims to answer include: Why does the United States remain devoted and determined to closely monitor a distant Middle Eastern issue called the Palestinian question and ensure Israel's survival and supremacy in the face of the myriad of intricate and significant regional challenges confronting the global hegemon today? And above all, does the U.S. really yearn for a final settlement to the Palestinian issue?

The present study suggests three hypotheses:

*First, the U.S. mediation efforts in the course of its public diplomacy practiced vis-à-vis apartheid South Africa and Israel have not been impartial and even-handed and did not fulfill the requirements of public diplomacy as they have been biased to a party at the expense of the other.

*Second, the U. S. diplomatic foreign policy pursued vis-à-vis apartheid South Africa and the Palestinian question has been solely motivated by national interest considerations. The latter has repercussions on geopolitical, geostrategic, geo-economic and cultural calculations.

*Third, the U.S. media have, to a far extent, been used by the U.S. government as a powerful tool to cement and spread stereotypical images about Arabs, Palestinians, and Blacks to serve the hegemonic culture. Once the political picture is altered, the U.S. media's images are altered in turn.

The U.S. media's three major types, namely newspapers, TV channels, and the fictional arts' wing Hollywood, are subject to a great deal of analysis in the present study. This is due to the power they own in inventing well-planned for narratives and shaping public opinion. Both theoreticians Bell Hooks and Edward Said consider them as partners in the sculpture of U.S. diplomacy and foreign policy in Africa and the Middle East. This is attributed to their role in the endorsement of U.S. diplomatic efforts and the attainment of its goals.

Because of this, the present work's analysis is grounded upon Edward Said's theory of Orientalism and Bell Hooks' Critical Race, Class, and Gender Theory; both of which are cultural theories. Another equally important political theory that the present study utilizes is Robert D. Putnam's Two-Level Game Theory. This latter theory shows how statesmen's negotiations at both international and national levels affect the distinct foreign policy behaviours towards similar cases based on the "win sets" logic. The three theories are thoroughly spelt out in the first and third chapters of this dissertation.

Based on the overview that has been provided about the content and the scope of analysis expected to take place in the present work, it is incumbent to spotlight the originality of this study by showing its distinct contribution in comparison to previous studies.

Amidst the multitude of research papers available online that bear similarity to varying degrees to the sub-topics that the present work discusses, four main studies have been selected based on their tight relationship with one of the aspects covered in the present study; a task which was not easy.

The first study is titled “*United States Foreign Policy Towards South Africa: From Constructive Engagement to Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986*”; a 2024 doctoral dissertation written by Jennifer J. Squires for The City University of New York. This work, which investigates the main reasons behind U.S. shift in policy towards the apartheid practiced by Pretoria, contends that lobbying Congress has long been a strategy used by domestic American pressure groups to direct the legislative branch toward particular foreign policy decisions. Its research findings reveal that six different U.S. domestic anti-apartheid economic sanctions and divestment organizations, over a period totaling approximately four decades, employed their different protest actions to underscore and caution Congress that apartheid is a manifestation of racism. This was initially prompted by African American human rights leaders and organizations undertaking sporadic anti-apartheid protest actions in South Africa. Therefore, it was necessary to abolish apartheid. Among the key domestic anti-apartheid activists in question were African American civil rights and human rights advocates who led the struggle for economic sanctions.

With a firm belief in racial justice, these domestic anti-apartheid organizations and their allies successfully pushed the U.S. Congress in October 1986 to enact a new U.S./South African foreign policy. In the final phase, evidence backed by several factors covered in this dissertation, including American polls conducted during the relevant period, indicates that most members of the U.S. Congress, Republicans as well as Democrats, felt compelled to enact a new U.S./South Africa foreign policy in order to satisfy the passionate demands of their anti-apartheid, racial justice supporters (Squires, 2024). This study bears similarity to the present work for they both unravel the

true reasons pushing such a shift in policy. However, contrary to the aforementioned study, which delved for these reasons as an end goal, the present dissertation identifies them at a wider scope when compared to the U.S. foreign policy towards Israel as a means to dig deeply into the unspoken agendas.

The second study is Elizabeth Stephens' 2003 doctoral dissertation titled "*United States Policy Toward Israel: The Politics, Sociology, Economics & Strategy of Commitment*" at the London School of Economics and Political Science. It primarily highlights the Zionist Lobby and the U.S./Israeli 'special relationship' as the prime reasons behind Washington's unwavering and frequently patient dedication to Israel. It explains that Israel was considered an appropriate ally during the Cold War since it was a "bastion of democracy" in a world full of semi-authoritarian and pro-Soviet nations. However, the United States' commitment to Israel, a tiny nation that is mostly devoid of oil and offers little real economic advantages, persisted after the end of the Cold War. A relevant explanation, according to Elizabeth Stephens, is that the Zionist lobby, which has an excessive amount of influence over American politics, is responsible for this U.S. commitment. Although there are only about six million Jews in a population of almost 300 million, governmental devotion to Israel is largely consistent across Republican and Democratic presidential transitions, suggesting that endorsement of Israel is not a byproduct of party affiliation but rather a given that is deeply embedded in the political agenda and discourse.

This dissertation suggests to articulate the U.S. commitment to Israel using the concept of political culture, which is hazy but nonetheless useful. The idea best addresses the problem of an American commitment that is frequently expensive in terms

of both financial aid and diplomacy, for factors that are explained in this dissertation. Although political culture is not the only explanation for how U.S. policy toward Israel has developed, it has been crucial in defining and forming the country's foreign policy, which has led to decisions and actions that are difficult to explain in terms of geopolitics, economy, or the military alone. Americans have been influenced by this concept to feel that they have a duty to support societies that share their political beliefs and that they are related to those societies. This concept distinguishes Israel from other countries and serves as the cornerstone of the 'special relationship' between the United States and Israel (Stephens, 2003). The same reasons that this dissertation has put forward are outlined too in the present work in addition to other reasons. However, my work makes clear that the concept of political culture is nothing but an unfounded justification to justify the undeclared national interest bargaining.

The third study is a 2015 book titled *Israel and South Africa: The Many Faces of Apartheid* edited by Ilan Pappé. As the title denotes, the book compares between the many similarities between both types of apartheid practiced by Israel and South Africa. The book asserts that several well-known academics and political analysts, such as former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and UN Special Rapporteur John Dugard, have maintained that Israel's mistreatment of its Arab-Israeli citizens and the occupied territories' inhabitants equates an oppressive system that is similar in cruelty and barbarism to South Africa's white supremacists. The 'apartheid question' has gained prominence in this debate, but there has not been much real academic examination of the parallels between the apartheid and Zionist regimes. Ilan Pappé, a renowned professor in Israel and a prominent critic of the current government, gathers historians,

journalists, attorneys, and policymakers from both nations in this book to evaluate the consequences of the apartheid comparison for political action, international law, and legislation. This analogy between Israel and South Africa, which features contributions from notable anti-apartheid campaigner Ronnie Kasrils, provides a daring and perceptive viewpoint on one of the most significant moral dilemmas of the contemporary age (Pappé, 2015).

The fourth study is a 2020 article written by Ran Greenstein, who is an associate professor of sociology at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. This article titled “*Israel, Palestine, And Apartheid*” examines the parallels and discrepancies between the currently-abandoned apartheid system in South Africa and Israel's present apartheid policies, emphasizing the necessity of distinguishing between Israel within its post-1967 borders, Israel within its pre-1967 borders, and Palestine. He contends that although Israel asserts that all of its residents are entitled to democratic rights, it is evident that all seven pillars of apartheid are in place in the territories that it has occupied, where the Palestinian Authority is powerless and Israeli dominance is the only recognised authority. The article describes how the Palestinians have been evicted from their land due to the entry of various immigrant communities into Israel. It offers a fresh definition of “apartheid of a special type” for the policies in place and the various ways that Israel controls Palestinian life. It ends with a recommendation in favour of the binationalism strategy outlined in the 2007 Haifa Declaration (Greenstein, 2020).

The above mentioned literature review can be categorized into two categories. The first of which discusses U.S. foreign policy towards either South Africa or the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, but not both; and the second draws an analogy between the

practice of apartheid by white supremacists in South Africa and by Israel, without linking them to U.S. foreign policy behaviours. My work's contribution stems from its act of coupling both categories by the discussion of U.S. diverging public diplomacy, being a prominent foreign policy tool, in regard to two analogous cases of apartheid in South Africa and the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

Another major contribution is the selection of the theoretical framework, which utilizes two cultural theories next to a single political theory. The usefulness of both cultural theories lies in their analysis of the major role media play in the purposeful dissemination of stereotypical images about specific races. This serious issue was brought to the fore by a number of theoreticians and academics as a focal aspect of their research such as Jack Shaheen, but either in relation to Arabs and Palestinians or Blacks in a separate manner. The present research, however, couples and compares between the U.S. media portrayal of Arabs and Palestinians on the one hand and Blacks on the other to excavate for undeclared geopolitical, geostrategic, geo-economic, and cultural agendas. Overall, the present research is multidimensional and multipurpose.

My research will be conducted primarily using a Comparative Case Study approach (CCS) following a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). The CCS approach is defined as “the systematic comparison of two or more data points or cases obtained through the use of the case study method” (Kaarbo & Beasley, 1999, p.372). A participant, an intervention location, a program, or a policy can all be represented by a case. Its methodological development was greatly aided by the adoption of case study research in political sciences starting in the early 1980s, which resulted in the integration of formal, statistical, and narrative methodologies in addition to the utilization of

empirical selection of cases and causal inference (George & Bennett, 2005). Comparative case studies have become more sophisticated in recent years and are now considered an appropriate form of investigation to examine a wide range of intricate problems, especially when social interactions and human behaviour are essential to comprehending subjects of interest (Harrison, Birks, Franklin, & Mills, 2017). The present dissertation embraces the CCS approach for it compares two case studies related to the U.S. foreign policy tendency and behaviour vis-à-vis them. Both the case study of South Africa and that of the Palestinian/Israeli question are systematically and empirically compared to come up with causal inferences.

Besides, the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is a methodology that makes it possible to analyze several cases in intricate circumstances. It can assist in explaining why some situations result in change while others do not. QCA is made to handle complexity and context-related influences. It is predicated on two tenets: first, that change frequently results from various combinations of factors rather than from a single one; and second, that identical changes can be produced through different combinations of factors (Ragin, 1984). QCA is intended to be applied as an exacting process. As a result, the various procedures are implemented uniformly throughout all QCA investigations and are quite clearly described. The first step requires the development or use of a detailed theory of change, and the second step identifies cases of interest. The third step requires the development of a set of factors, followed by the scoring of factors in step four. Thereafter, the fifth step analyzes the dataset and finally, the last step interprets the findings and revises the theory of change (Simister & Scholz, n.d., p.1). As far as the present work is concerned, the analysis undertaken perfectly fits

the QCA methodology as the prime investigative mission is to explain why change happened in U.S. foreign policy assumptions towards the practice of apartheid in South Africa favouring democracy, and it did not happen in a similar case of apartheid practiced by Israel on the Palestinians. The tacit unstated reasons behind require a combination of factors including geopolitical, geostrategic, geo-economic, as well as cultural considerations. In relation to them, the notion of American national interests will recurrently be referred to. All the aforementioned steps will be applied in the present research.

Accordingly, this dissertation is divided into four chapters. The first chapter charts the theoretical and conceptual frameworks and historical background of the apartheid crisis in South Africa and the Arab/Israeli conflict. All of them serve as the foundation for the current work's investigation. It opens with the explanation of the study's theoretical framework. It, then, highlights the post-Second World War new realities and conflicts focusing on the prevalence of white supremacy in South Africa accompanied with the institutionalisation of apartheid, the origins and dimensions of the Israeli/Arab conflict, and the U. S. foreign policy behaviours vis-à-vis Africa and the Middle East prior to and following 1948. This same chapter has, additionally, crucial transitions between the cultural and geopolitical, identifying the institutional and ideational sources of American foreign policy. The concluding section explains how the imperial culture of the United States has influenced early Zionists' feeling of exceptionality and, more significantly, their belief in and acceptance of white supremacy. It will be demonstrated that this idea has played an active role in the racism

of both white people and Jews toward their ‘backward’ Black and Palestinian counterparts.

The second chapter compares and contrasts U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East and South Africa to assess how ‘unbiased’ it has been over the past few decades. In order to achieve this, this chapter identifies the main U.S. aims in the Middle East—which has unabatedly continued to garner the country's foreign policy's primary attention since World War II—alongside the U.S. interest in apartheid South Africa. It also identifies the nature of the government's covert national interest-based agenda in both regions. The definition of diplomacy, emphasizing its incongruity with partiality, is then provided, with particular attention to public diplomacy. This would establish the stage for the next sections, which would analyze in detail key facts and events in the course of the United States' convoluted diplomacy with the apartheid issue in South Africa as well as its ‘partial’ diplomacy regarding the Palestinian/Israeli conflict.

The third chapter aims to examine the relationship between the United States and Israel and its effects on Palestine using Robert D. Putnam's “two-level-game” theory as a framework. With the use of this latter theory to analyse U.S./Israeli relations, the study will demonstrate how statesmen must negotiate at both the national and international levels to balance both domestic and foreign interests, and how this interaction can impact public opinion. To effectively achieve the objectives of the study, it is vital to outline the change in U.S. policy assumptions on its seemingly unwavering support for Pretoria. This is followed by an analysis based on Putnam's theory perspective. Later in this chapter, it will be argued that the political influence of the Israel Lobby was largely responsible for the unique relationship between the United States and Israel. It

will, therefore, highlight the lobby's power sources and success strategies. It will then highlight Israel's role as America's watchdog in the Middle East in order to identify its various facets. Afterwards, the implications of the two-level game on the relationship between the United States and Israel, and consequently the Palestinian issue, will be examined.

The fourth chapter aims to unravel the veiled agendas behind U.S. media's discrepant portrayal of crises in the Middle East and South Africa. This chapter is, therefore, principally analytical and exploratory to generate some intriguing results. It opens with an analysis of the U.S. mass media's portrayal of Arabs and Palestinians on the one hand, and Israelis on the other in late twentieth century. In this regard, it brings to the fore both Arabs and Palestinians' stereotyped image and contrasts it with the Israelis' positive image. It, more importantly, unfolds the implications of Edward Said's Theory of Orientalism on such a portrayal. Ensuingly, the second part of the chapter sketches the U.S. mass media's positive portrayal of apartheid Pretoria from 1948 to the mid-1980s, having an inverse relationship with their portrayal of Black Americans and Black South Africans under apartheid rule. The chapter comes to a close by analysing the implications of Bell Hooks' Critical Race, Gender and Class Theory on such a portrayal.

Chapter One:

Theoretical and Conceptual Frameworks and Historical Background of the Arab/Israeli Conflict and Apartheid South Africa

This chapter will set forth the theoretical and conceptual frameworks and historical background of the apartheid crisis in South Africa and the Arab/Israeli conflict—all of which form the platform on which the present study stands. It commences by putting forward the theoretical framework of the study. To the end of achieving the work's intended objectives, both Edward Said's Theory of Orientalism and Bell Hooks' Critical Race, Gender and Class Theory have been selected. More specifically, this chapter begins with an overview of orientalist theory tenets, which will in turn be followed by a survey of Critical Race Theory dogma. These bodies of knowledge consist of an array of ideologies; however, for the purpose of this work, only the fundamentals of each will be discussed. Thereafter, an integration of these two contemporary theories will attempt to demonstrate their constructive linkage with the U.S. imperial culture. The second section will introduce both South Africa and the Middle East, making clear significant events that formed the origin of both conflicts. It also sheds light on two intertwined dimensions, namely history and culture, focusing on the latter. The next section will discuss the institutional and ideational sources of American foreign policy, discerning the link between the Puritan line of thought and American exceptionalism. The closing section will elucidate how the U.S. imperial culture has contributed to the conviction and acceptance of white supremacy and more importantly to early Zionists' sense of exceptionality. This belief, as will be shown, has contributed to both the Jews and whites' racism towards their 'backward' Palestinian and Black counterparts respectively.

1-1-Theoretical Framework

In spite of the availability of a multitude of theories tackling and discussing issues of knowledge and power, for the end goal of the present study two main theoretical frameworks have been chosen, namely Edward Said's Theory of Orientalism and Bell Hooks' Critical Race, Gender and Class Theory. While the former, in the words of Leela Gandhi, "diagnoses Orientalism as a discourse which invents or orientalises the Orient for the purposes of imperial consumption" (Shabanirad & Marandi, 2015, p.23), the latter reveals the discursive representation of Black identity. Equally important is the fact that both theories give considerable attention to the philological analysis of discourse, using different devices, seen as the main vehicle to assert Western hegemony and standards over Oriental and Black races. This will thoroughly be elucidated in what follows.

1-1-1- Edward Said's Theory of Orientalism

Edward Said's pioneering text *Orientalism* polyphonically reads the imperial discourse constructed about the non-Western "Other". It points out that the hegemonic culture puts the Western intellectual under its service. Said, in this groundbreaking work, shows how "imperial and colonial hegemony is implicated in discursive and textual production" (Shabanirad & Marandi, 2015, p.22). Orientalism forms, then, a critique of Western texts' misrepresentation of the East as an alien strange spot inhabited by inferior others, resulting thereby in the construction of a number of reiterated persistent clichéd images on the Orient.

Indeed, the work of Edward Said provides an entry gate into a cultural approach to questions of discourse, racialization and power. In *Orientalism*, Foucauldian notions

of discourse and power/knowledge are utilised by Said to produce a genealogy of Orientalism as an academic discipline (Stoddart, 2007, p.216). The latter refers to systems of constructing knowledge about—and producing—the Orient as a discursive object of colonialism and governance. Those systems constitute a “style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between the Orient and most of the time the Occident” (Said, 1979, p.2). The end result was epitomized in the fact that a very large number of writers, including novelists, poets, philosophers, political theorists, economists and imperial administrators have falsely presupposed as true “the basic distinction between East and West as the starting point for elaborate theories, epics, novels, social descriptions, and political accounts concerning the Orient, its people, customs, ‘mind,’ destiny, and so on” (Said, 1979, p.3).

Hence, for Edward Said (1979), Orientalism, roughly beginning in the late eighteenth century, can be studied and put under analysis as “the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorising views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it” (p.3). Orientalism is, in brief, a Western style for controlling, reframing, and having command over the Orient.

In order to achieve this, the western society needs to be restructured. In this regard, Said takes Antonio Gramsci’s innovative analytic distinction for granted. The latter makes the distinction between both civil and political society. According to Gramsci, while the former consists of voluntary—or at least rational and noncoercive—affiliations like schools, families, the media and unions, the latter encompasses state institutions like the police, the central bureaucracy, and the army who directly dominate

the polity. Culture effectively functions within civil society, where “the influence of ideas, of institutions, and of other persons works not through domination but by what Gramsci names consent” (Said, 1979, p.6).

In any untotalitarian society, then, some cultural forms operate predominantly over others. Likewise, some ideas are more powerful than others. This cultural exercise is what Gramsci has named hegemony, which is a key concept for any attempt to understand the industrial West’s cultural life (Said, 1979, p.7). In this regard, it is this hegemony, or more precisely the outcome of the operating cultural hegemony, that gives Orientalism its endurance and power.

As referred to earlier, Edward Said found it of great usefulness here to make use of Michel Foucault's notion of a discourse, which he outlined in his *The Archaeology of Knowledge* and in *Discipline and Punish*, to delineate Orientalism. For him, without analysing Orientalism as a discourse it will be quite hard to understand “the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage, and even produce, the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period” (Said, 1979, p.23).

Unlike Michel Foucault, however, Edward Said (1979) believes in the crucial role individual writers have played to the end of creating “this anonymous collective body of texts that constitute a discursive formation like Orientalism” (p.23). The unity of the large ensemble of texts he analyses is due in part to the fact that they are thematically interlinked.

Therefore, while Said cautiously explains that the power-effects produced by Orientalist discourse should be understood as working in conjunction with the political institutions of colonialism, the core of his analysis provides deep readings of Orientalist texts. The objective of which is the study of the work of countless devoted scholars “who edited texts and translated them, codified grammars, wrote dictionaries, reconstructed dead epochs, produced positivistically verifiable learning to produce truths, like any truths delivered by language, that are embodied in language” (Stoddart, 2007, p.216). What is the truth of language, Nietzsche once said, but “a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms” (Said, 1979, p.203); in brief, it is a body of human relations, that have been enhanced, interchanged, and embellished rhetorically and poetically, and which began to seem solid, canonical, and compulsory to a people as a result of long use (p.203).

Given all these elements, what makes Orientalism of paramount importance to the present work is that it is not merely a political field or subject matter that is passively echoed by culture, institutions, or scholarly works; nor is it only a wide and scattered collection of texts about the Orient; nor does it represent and express only some villainous Western imperialist plot to take hold of the Oriental world. It is rather, and more importantly, a set of scholarly, aesthetic, sociological, historical, economic and philological texts bearing a shared geopolitical awareness (Said, 1979, p.12).

In explaining this awareness—echoing Frantz Fanon—Said notes that Orientalist discourse produces an essentially divided social reality, split between the Occidental self and the Oriental other. In other words, hegemonic discourses of Orientalism work to legitimate Western cultural, political and economic dominance over the Middle East and

North Africa. Therefore, in the present study Said's work is useful for highlighting how cultural discourse manufactures an Orient that is liable to Western economic and political subjection.

Moreover, "so authoritative a position did Orientalism have that I believe", says Said, "no one writing, thinking, or acting on the Orient could do so without taking account of the limitations on thought and action imposed by Orientalism" (p.3). In brief, due to Orientalism the Orient was, and is still, a bound subject of action and thought. Reaching this conclusion required a systematic study of texts. Said (1979) explains his methodology as follows:

My principal methodological devices for studying authority here are what can be called strategic location, which is a way of describing the author's position in a text with regard to the Oriental material he writes about, and strategic formation, which is a way of analyzing the relationship between texts and the way in which groups of texts, types of texts, even textual genres, acquire mass, density, and referential power among themselves and thereafter in the culture at large. I use the notion of strategy simply to identify the problem every writer on the Orient has faced: how to get hold of it, how to approach it, how not to be defeated or overwhelmed by its sublimity, its scope, its awful dimensions. (p.20)

In the above statement, Said shows that his study to authority does not necessitate analysis of hidden elements in the Orientalist text, but analysis rather of the text's surface and what it describes. Orientalism, he argues, is "premised upon exteriority, that is, on the fact that the Orientalist, poet or scholar, makes the Orient speak, describes the Orient, renders its mysteries plain for and to the West" (p.20).

A prime reason behind Said's focus on exteriority lies in his conviction that it is indispensable to unveil the fact that what is ordinarily circulated by cultural discourse

and exchange within a culture is not truth but representations (p.21). The Orient that is shown in Orientalism, then, is a whole system of representations moulded by a network of forces that placed the Orient into Western consciousness, Western learning, and subsequently, Western empire. This definition of Orientalism appears mostly to be political for the simple reason that Edward Said believes Orientalism itself to be the crop of a set of political forces and activities.

The range of the Orient representations following the last third of the eighteenth century—those belonging to what Edward Said calls modern Orientalism—expanded immensely. It is true that after Anquetil-Duperron and William Jones¹, and following Napoleon's Egyptian expedition, “Europe came to know the Orient more scientifically, to live in it with greater authority and discipline than ever before” (Said, 1979, p.22).

More precisely, it has been estimated that between 1800 and 1950 about 60,000 books depicting the Near Orient were written; “there is no remotely comparable figure for Oriental books about the West” (Said, 1979, p.204). As one may perceive, this large number is quite significant in this regard.

For the purpose of this study, therefore, Orientalism’s methodological devices stated above will be utilised to analyse and unearth the obscure agendas behind U.S. mass media’s and fictional arts’ disproportionate portrayal of crises in the Middle East and South Africa.

¹ **Abraham Hyacinthe Anquetil-Duperron** (1731-1805) was the first French Indologist to work professionally. He studied oriental languages, especially Arabic. He came up with the new profession’s institutional framework. A century following his death, he served as an inspiration to the founding of the *École française d'Extrême-Orient*. **Sir William Jones** (1746-1794) was a British Orientalist and jurist who did much to encourage interest in Oriental studies in the West. He had several writings about Arabs’ culture and religion, and translated many books from Arabic to English.

Indeed, at the dawn of the nineteenth century, theses of Oriental primitiveness, decadence, and inferiority to the West coupled themselves easily with ideas about racial inequality's biological bases. Hence, Gobineau's *Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines*, Cuvier's *Le Règne animal*, and Robert Knox's *The Races of Man*, which contained racial classifications, found a willing echo in latent Orientalism. Second-order Darwinism was added to these widespread ideas, in order to accentuate "the scientific validity of the division of races into advanced and backward, or European Aryan and Oriental-African" (Said, 1979, p.206).

For these reasons, the whole question of imperialism, constituting the bone of contention in the late nineteenth century between pro-imperialists and anti-imperialists, promoted the paired typology of backward—or subject—and advanced races, cultures, and societies. For instance, John Westlake's *Chapters on the Principles of International Law* contends that "regions of the earth designated as 'uncivilized' ought to be annexed or occupied by advanced powers" (Said, 1979, p.206).

Another important point is that Orientalism derives from Britain's and France's unprecedented closeness with the Orient. The latter until the early nineteenth century had really meant only India and the Bible lands. The Orient and Orientalism were dominated by both France and Britain during the period that stretched from the early nineteenth century until the World War II closure. Since the latter's termination, America has taken hold of the Orient, and came into contact with it as its predecessors once did. A single prime transformation occurred during this time epitomized in the act of associating it to philology and then to social science (Said, 1979, p.4). It can safely

be said then that almost all orientalists' aim behind studying the orientals was to aid their government to find convenient policies for handling the orient countries.

Out of this nearness, whose dynamic is highly yielding albeit it always shows the Occident—British, French, or American—as more powerful, springs the wide-ranging body of texts Edward Said labels Orientalist. In this regard, Said (1979) states:

So far as the United States seems to be concerned, it is only a slight overstatement to say that Moslems and the Arabs are essentially seen as either oil suppliers or potential terrorists. Very little of the detail, the human density, the passion of Arab-Moslem life has entered, the awareness of even those people whose profession is to report the Arab world. What we have, instead, is a series of crude, essentialized caricatures of the Islamic world presented in such a way as to make that world vulnerable to military aggression. (p.4)

Part and parcel of Said's analysis of Orientalism is the explanation of native women's unfavourable images or stereotypes as well. This is especially overtly shown in the writing of novelists and travellers in which women are usually portrayed as “the creatures of a male power-fantasy, expressing excessive sensuality and being more or less stupid” (Said, 1979, p.207). Flaubert's *Kuchuk Hanem*¹, for instance, is one of the early examples of such caricatures that were quite common in pornographic novels that distorted the Orient to serve the West.

Photography's role was important as well. A vivid example is the one of the Algerian case. French entrepreneurs during the French colonisation of Algeria made Algerian women's postcards and circulated them in France. Although those Algerian

¹ **Gustave Flaubert** (1821-1880) was a French novelist. In his Orientalist depictions of the East, **Kuchuk Hanem** emerged as a significant character and symbol. During his trip to the East in 1849–1851, Flaubert paid her a visit while he was in Egypt. His experiences there and his probable sexual relationship with Kuchuk Hanem were major influences on the orientalist themes that run throughout his writing.

women in these photographs were meant to appear as if the camera were capturing a real moment in their everyday lives, the whole scenes were fabricated in the photographer's studio. As Malek Alloula argues in his book *The Colonial Harem*, the circulation of these photographs aimed at providing evidence of the backward, exotic and strange customs of Algerians—they in fact echo the French colonial perspective not the actual Algerian life (Ranjan, 2015, p.85). This is an example of how Arab women have been exoticised and eroticised.

Moreover, Orientalists' conceptualized image about oriental males, and the Orient in general, is frozen and negatively eternally static. This is to say that the very possibility of progress, change, and human transformation is denied to both the Orient and the Oriental (Said, 1979, p.208).

In sum, it can be said that Said's work is significant for its precise description and analysis of Orientalism as being the focal reason behind the misleading racial gender and cultural representations that form the heart of Western thought, and thereby claimed superiority, towards the Middle East; of how the West/East divide is taken for granted based on the West's representation of the East. The essence of Orientalism is, therefore, the existence of a carefully crafted and incessant Eurocentric preconception against Arabo-Islamic people along with their culture. The resultant cultural representations of such prejudices have served, and continue to serve as will be demonstrated in the subsequent chapters, as covert pretexts for the colonial and imperialist culture and plans of the European powers along with the United States.

On her part, Bell Hooks does an excellent job in her *Yearning*, by exploring the intersections of race, class and gender in social inequality and counter-hegemonic

politics not only in the Middle East and North Africa but in Black African countries as well.

1-1-2- Bell Hooks' Critical Race, Gender and Class Theory

Through a series of essays, Bell Hooks initiates a widely inclusive discussion of postmodernity, the discursive representation of Black identity, and strategies for resistance to racialised systems of power. Though she is principally interested in the production of Blackness and gender in books and film, she—like Edward Said—also engages in a critical reading of cultural texts (Stoddart, 2007, p.218).

For Hooks (1990), the vision of difference incarnated in post-structuralism, which subverts the notion of a unitary historical class actor, is problematic when it dismisses notions of “oppression, exploitation, and domination” from its analysis (pp.51-52). For her, racialised and gendered structures of privilege and oppression—being both material and cultural—should not be obliterated. Therefore, “counter-hegemonic politics that takes up the challenge of post-structuralism requires constructing linkages across multiple sites of subalternity” (Stoddart, 2007, p.218). In her view, the notion of “yearning” forms the platform on which counter-hegemonic political perspectives stand. This notion incorporates race, gender and class as social power’s main dimensions (Hooks, 1990, p.27).

Furthermore, “marginality” for Hooks is seen with different lenses as a major site for, on the one hand, the production of knowledge and, on the other, for engaging in political resistance to power (Hooks, 1990, p.149). About this she writes:

Understanding marginality as position and place of resistance is crucial for oppressed, exploited, colonized people. If we only view

the margin as sign marking the despair, a deep nihilism penetrates in a destructive way the very ground of our being. . . . I am not trying to romantically re-inscribe the notion of that space of marginality where the oppressed live apart from their oppressors as ‘pure.’ I want to say that these margins have been both sites of repression and sites of resistance. (pp.150, 151)

As for women, Hooks exhorts a politics that is grounded in the experience of subalternity and marginality. This experience alleviates the construction of a counterhegemonic knowledge. The aim of which is to weaken the master narratives of class, race, and gender without renouncing the ability to make truth claims. Theorists like Hooks tend to manage the churning between the post-Marxist and post-structuralist interest in discourse and critical theories of ideology (Stoddart, 2007, p.218).

Here, consent to systems of domination comes forth as people take the discourses of class, race and gender that circulate throughout the media, the state and the educational system for granted (Stoddart, 2007, p.218). This idea resonates quite well with the Gramscian hegemony theory adopted by Edward Said. These discourses make our ongoing participation in existing systems of political and economic inequality seem more feasible than political action directed at radical social change. As one may perceive, both Bell Hooks and Edward Said share common conviction that the media are of paramount importance to the production of accepted—originally unaccepted and misleading—claims. This idea will recurrently be referred to in the coming chapters.

More compelling to the present study is the act of Hooks’ description of yearning as “a common psychological state shared by many of us . . . Specifically, in relation to the post-modernist deconstruction of ‘master’ narratives”. She adds: “The yearning that

wells in the hearts and minds of those whom such narratives have silenced is the longing for critical voice” (Hooks, 1990, p.27).

Hooks integration of post-modernist thought, that will exhaustively be explained in what follows, emphasizes how a collaboration of critical race, gender and class theory tenets and post-modern thought can produce a successful analysis of the historical events that have been taking place in both the Middle East and South Africa.

It is imperative, therefore, to explain what post-modernism is. The term postmodernism encompasses many divergent points of view, generally referring to a “decisive break with modernity in which cultural symbols, media-driven images, and other forces of symbolic signification have changed the nature of social organisation and the relation of individuals to the social worlds” (Schneider, 2003, p.94).

Postmodern thought takes the discrepancy that there is such a thing as an objective truth as its most cardinal ideology. Rather, postmodernists argue that subjectivity characterises all knowledge, which is always influenced by personal, cultural, and political views (Schneider, 2003, p.95). Besides, postmodernists view knowledge as socially constructed and made up simply of “claims to knowledge”; hence, “no independent reality other than in the minds and practices of those who create them and recreate them exists” (Stuart & Milovanovic, 1999, p.5).

In other words, all knowledge is seen as a social artificial construction which then becomes a resultant of individuals judging one distinction superior to another. Postmodernist theorists generally agree that “these distinctions are conceptual and

constructed through communication,” (Stuart & Milovanovic, 1999, p.5) which was first set forth by Lacan, one of the pillars of postmodern thought.

Indeed, Lacan constructed the platform for what came to be identified as the postmodern theoretical body of knowledge thanks to his generation of psychoanalytic semiotics. The focus of the following lines is upon Lacan’s four discourses, which were published in French as *L’Envers de la Psychanalyse* as part of his 1969–1970 seminar presentation. The four discourses presented by Lacan focus on “the inter- and intra-subjective dimensions of human development” (Milovanovic, 1994, p.176). Studying the relation between the subject and discourse formed his prime concern. This perspective couples the subject with language and desire, which in Lacan’s viewpoint are pertinent (Milovanovic, 1994, p.176).

The four discourses are the discourse of the master, university, hysteric, and analyst, all of which were offered as the main forms of discourse in existence. Four main terms in the aforementioned discourses are identified by Lacan. These terms include S1, S2, \$, and *a* (Milovanovic, 1994, p.177). *S1* represents master signifiers, which in Lacan’s words are defined as “key signifiers that derive from early childhood experiences.” *S2* represents knowledge, which is socially constructed and always exists within any chain of signifiers. \$ represents the particular desire of a subject. Finally, the *a* which Lacan defines as “*le-plus-de-jouir*: the excess of enjoyment, and what is left out” (Milovanovic, 1994, p.177).

In addition, Lacan also identified four structural locations in which these terms position themselves. These include: agent, other, truth, and production. These structural positions can be “visualised in a linear fashion with the agent and the other residing in

the conscious level of the subject, and truth and production in the unconscious” (Schneider, 2003, p.96).

Critical race theorists have overtly criticised postmodernism because they believe it harms the advancement of critical race theory tenets. However, this collaboration is imperative to Bell Hooks theory, as postmodernism actually serves to advance the critical race theory vision.

More specifically, her theory demonstrates the intersectionality—i.e. the conviction that individuals and classes generally have common overlapping interests or traits—of race, class, and gender within the four discourses of Lacan (Schneider, 2003, p.96). These bodies of knowledge can form together an intellectual discourse giving birth to a framework that illustrates perfectly how cultural hegemonic tools operate. Having said this, each of the four discourses needs to be formulated whilst incorporating critical race theory tenets, starting with the discourse of the master. Initially, the discourse is mapped, as shown below, with the four structural positions (Nail, 2013, p.13):

agent → other

truth // product

The place of the agent of the discourse is positioned in the top left-hand corner; the position from which the discourse would seem to spring. This can be thought of as the speaker or the author. Yet, it can perhaps more precisely and more effectively be perceived as the ideology, tradition or convention from which the discourse can be derived. In other words, one must not postulate the speaker only as the chief responsible behind moving their ‘own’ discourse, for other forces are in action as well. This agent

addresses another—addresses someone or something or some place outside itself. The agent, however, does not begin from nothing, does not speak from nowhere. The agent’s discourse is nurtured, motivated and stimulated by a certain truth. Clearly put, “Something occupies the position of truth for every discourse produced” (Nail, 2013, p.13).

The product of the discourse lies at the other end of what can be likened to a track. A discourse is not carried in the transmission from agent to other. There is always a remainder, an excess. There is always that which escapes or is produced as a result of the discourse—the notion of imaginary identification. A discourse is encountered but the resultant meaning is extended beyond what could strictly be contained in the discourse. The speech or text produced by the agent of the discourse, therefore, is tightly related to a certain conception of truth. Interestingly enough, however, the product of the discourse, which encompasses the meaning, the understanding, and the effect, is never adequate to this truth. Here lies the significance of the double bar (//) on the bottom line of the schema which stands for impotence. The arrow on the top indicates impossibility for Lacan. Hence, “discourse always fails; the circle is not complete” (Nail, 2013, p.13). In this regard, Lacan argues that:

These spaces, the markers of these spaces, remain the same for every discourse, they describe the structure of discoursing. There are, of course, different forms of discourse and these emerge by populating the spaces of the schema to form different social or discursive relations. (Nail, 2013, p.14)

As the quote denotes, these spaces’ markers do not change in the different forms of discourse to establish various discursive and social relationships. Lacan determines four potential elements that are able to fill the four spaces in different permutations,

invariably keeping the same sequence, hence producing four different models of discourse (Nail, 2013, p.14). The interpretation provided below for each Lacanian model represents Bell Hooks' conception of how these models have had implications on a Black African context.

The discourse of the master is as follows: S1 (agent) is positioned in the top left hand corner, S2 (other) is placed in the top right hand corner, \$ (truth) is found in the bottom left hand corner, and a (production) is located in the bottom right hand corner (Milovanovic, 1994, p.178).

Here, agent (S1) can stand for prevalent white males who tend to deliver messages of racial and gender supremacy through presenting master signifiers (S1), like masculinity and white skin privilege. The other (S2)—for example an African American female—then interprets these signifiers as knowledge; thus for the particular individual in this example, racial minority and gender minority disadvantages have now become compounded by yet another disadvantage which is separate systems of subordination, which in turn is internalised and produced in the unconscious *le-plus-de-jouir* (a). This process returns back as the desire of the other (S2) forms and takes for granted a truth (\$) that fortifies the position of the white male (agent, S1) (Milovanovic, 1994, p.178). This integration can illustrate how privileged white males—due to their subject position—can actually form and keep a superior holding in society.

The discourse of the university is as follows: S2 (agent) is positioned in the top left hand corner, a (other) is placed in the top right hand corner, S1 (truth) is found in the bottom left hand corner, and \$ (production) is located in the bottom right hand corner (Milovanovic, 1994, p.178).

Here agent can represent racism (knowledge), which is a taught and learned behaviour. This body of knowledge, which is basically socially constructed, is enacted by the a (other) who thereby results in the production of *le-plus-de-jouir*. The latter becomes the \$ (production) desire of the subject which in turn constructs the master signifiers that give birth to race based differences as S1 (truth). Thereafter, the other elements tied to race, class, and gender intertwine, quite often resulting in structurally oppositional and contradictory positions or intersectionality. The ensuing political implications spring from claims that factual (truth) inequalities exist between groups due to the fact that they are naturally given (Schneider, 2003, p.98).

In the context of the aforementioned integration in particular, the subject which is minority is denied full place in society. This integration may provide an explanation as to how the dominant ideology (racism) is continuously reproduced even by the individual subjects who find their own conditions exploitive. The prevalent knowledge here introduces itself as a master signifier (truth), that is produced and reproduced by the subject's discursive position(s) (Schneider, 2003, p.98). This integration definitely epitomizes the formulation of the present conditions of hegemony in the United States. Thus the current dominant ideology that America is a race neutral country is, in fact, misrepresentative.

The discourse of the hysteric is as follows : \$ (agent) is positioned in the top left hand corner, S1 (other) is placed in the top right hand corner, a (truth) is found in the bottom left hand corner, and S2 (production) is located in the bottom right hand corner (Milovanovic, 1994, p.179). The hysteric (subordinated) \$ here tries to offer his or her suffering (inferior status) to the other (S1) whose only response or answer takes the form

of master signifiers' presentation like stereotypes or deviant categories—namely race based differences.

The above creates the knowledge presented by the hysteric in the information receiver, which then forms *le-plus-de-jouir* (a) as truth. Therefore truth, as a result, is not acknowledged, for the subject is unable to construct discourse that embodies her or his desire. This despair is then reflected and perpetuated via dominant discourse as the subject (subordinated) has no other means for presenting such suffering (Milovanovic, 1994, p.179).

The hysteric in light of this view would constitute the subject in a subordinate position who might convey her/or his suffering to a member of the dominant stature by presenting everyday experiences which create unique and specific narratives (storytelling). The prevalent group usually tends to advance prejudices. The former enjoys power, voice, and representation, and defends discriminations aiming at imprisoning the minority groups in the cage of disadvantaged position (Schneider, 2003, p.99).

The hysteric's suffering can be presented in a substitute narrative other than prevalent discourse, hence the subject now performs the job of an alternative truth conveyer. This amalgamation that studies the individual perspective may provide some help in comprehending intersectional individuals' predicament (Schneider, 2003, p.99).

Indeed, many races are split among a variety of conditions, such as socioeconomic, political, religious, sexual orientation, national origin, etc., all of which contribute to the intersectionality of individuals. This particular integration's emphasis is upon alternative perspectives and viewpoints of stories in hopes that subjected views

might be recognised and shared by others who may reside in an intersectional position. However, the presented stories go quite often unaccepted from political, structural, and legal perspectives when the subject tries to construct narratives (Schneider, 2003, p.99). For the reason of the unacceptability of these stories, this amalgamation can put into question both the acceptability and unquestionability of white people's stories. The effort of analysing storytelling and counter-storytelling is a focal aspect of this dissertation to frame conclusions that will prove the suffering of deprived individuals in both Palestine and South Africa.

The discourse of the analyst is as follows: a (agent) is positioned in the top left hand corner, \$ (other) is placed in the top right hand corner, S2 (truth) is found in the bottom left hand corner, and S1 (production) is located in the bottom right hand corner (Milovanovic, 1994, p.179). Here, the best representation of the analyst is found within the critical race theory concept of "petit or petty apartheid"¹. This theoretical ideology (a) is presented to the \$ other (hysteric) who, taking into consideration this novel information, starts to construct alternative master signifiers (the petit apartheid linear continuum) that describe numerous discrimination forms.

Thereafter, these forms of discrimination are presented as knowledge that transcends suppressive language restraints where the production of a conception of truth starts to take place. The latter reverts subsequently to *le-plus-de-jour* (a). This process supports the body of knowledge developing in the analyst and builds a foundation of truth that supports the information presented to the hysteric (Milovanovic, 1994, p.179).

¹ In general, apartheid was divided into two categories: **petty or petit apartheid**, which involved the segregation of public facilities and social gatherings, and **grand apartheid**, which tightly segregated housing and employment opportunities by race.

The usefulness of this integration lies in the subordinated individual(s)' ability to identify the many aggressions—along the constructed petit apartheid continuum—they suffer from. If the subject's place is found within an intersection of recognised sites of oppression, each factor can be considered apart in an individual manner. The subject, or the exploited individual, becomes “a revolutionary subject” thanks to this discourse, for usually the individual initially deconstructs the racial oppression and later on he consciously reconstructs labels through the petit apartheid ideology. Hence, he “provides a formal way of deconstructing repressive language barriers and recognising these aggressions as they are so rarely ever acknowledged or addressed by the dominant members in society” (Schneider, 2003, p.100). Black South Africans and Afro-Americans alike, for instance, witnessed such a development in terms of collective Black consciousness. A self-worth Black awakening was the main characteristic of the 1960s and subsequent decades in South Africa, America, and other spots around the world.

The petit apartheid continuum or alternative signifiers can apply “a social policy that consists of, not only deconstruction of racial oppression and language barriers, but also reconstruction in that petit apartheid recognises informal micro and macro aggressions and provides labels to levels of harmful aggressions” (Schneider, 2003, p.100). In summary, one must note that the different integrations or amalgamations elucidated above do not necessarily provide answers to all the questions that arise regarding the complexities of race, class, and gender. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this study, injecting critical race theory tenets into Lacan's four discourses is of paramount usefulness in that it provides a conceptual framework from which the

intersections of race, class, and gender can be consciously analysed in regard to the case studies at hand.

Equally compelling to the present study is the act of Bell Hooks'—by merging both critical race theories and post-modern thought—description of her theoretical premise using the metaphor of a circle. Within this circle, the powerful social locations are positioned in the centre and the others somewhere on the margins. She argues that the view is clearer from the outer rings. People who have been subject to abuse not only by gender but by race and class as well have to “recognise the special vantage point our marginality gives us and make use of this perspective to criticise the dominant racist, classist, sexist hegemony” (Ken, 2007, p.5). One “privilege” attached to social locations in the centre, according to Hooks, is inhabitants’ ability to organise their lives with fairly severe disregard for the ways their advantages impinge on the lives of those located at the margins. Her model particularly “criticises the obliviousness and carelessness that characterise the powerful centre locations, and highlights the keen perspectives of those who have little choice but to be aware” (p.5).

All in all, this section has discussed the fundamentals of both Edward Said’s Theory of Orientalism— which is significant for the description and analysis of Orientalism as the cause of the misleading cultural racial and gender representations that form the bedrock of Western thought, and thereby claimed superiority, towards the Middle East—and Bell Hooks’ Critical Race, Gender and Class Theory— which reveals Black identity’s discursive representation in psychoanalytic lenses. Thereafter, an integration of these two contemporary theories will demonstrate their constructive linkage with the U.S. imperial culture, which will be discerned in the second part of this

chapter. Both the conceptual framework and the historical backgrounds of the case studies at hand are necessary precursors to bridge the gap created by the U.S. diplomacy's inconsistent behaviours vis-à-vis both conflicts, namely the Arab-Palestinian/Israeli conflict and apartheid South Africa. Hence, in what follows both the conceptual and historical backgrounds of conflicts in South Africa and the Middle East will be highlighted, making clear significant events that formed the origin of both crises.

1-2- Conceptual Framework and Historical Background

It is quite clear to the observer's eye that both Africa and the Middle East had passed through hard times in the previous century. The latter witnessed the rise of new powers affecting the politics' calculus, two bloody World Wars which put the whole world's interest at stake, followed by another Cold War whose closure signaled the waning of the traditional world and the waxing of another that is globalised—with the full meaning of the word. South Africa was no exception to the aforesaid, and what comes next sketches the country's bitter experience with white supremacy's exercise of apartheid.

1-2-1- Historical Background to Apartheid South Africa

Rich in natural resources, South Africa is recognised for its abundant farmlands and unique mineral riches. Well known is the fact that South African mines rank among the top producers of gold and diamonds worldwide, in addition to key metals like platinum.

South Africa was invaded and colonised in the seventeenth century by both the Dutch and the English. The Dutch planned to use the Cape as a stopover for ships sailing to India when they settled there in 1652 as part of the Dutch East India Company, which was led by Jan van Riebeeck. However, Van Riebeeck required more since the ships needed meat from animals. This led to an inevitable conflict with the San and the Khoi—

the principal, though not exclusive, peoples of southern Africa from the first century A.D. forward, who had a large number of cow herds and opposed Dutch encroachment on their territory (Anti Apartheid Movement, 1974, p.16). In a few of years only, the land issue had visibly surfaced as a problem that would plague white-black relations for many generations to come.

Many Khoi were enslaved as a result of the failure of their resistance. Due to Dutch-Khoi marriages and links, a generation was born that was either assimilated into the Afrikaner culture or with the progeny of East Indies slaves. They both made up the vast majority of the two million Coloureds who reside in South Africa today. While some Khoi built new villages, many others died from new diseases (Anti Apartheid Movement, 1974, p.16).

Likewise, the Dutch severely threatened the culture of the San. The Dutch ruthlessly wiped out thousands of them when they rebelled, retaining only the children as slaves who subsequently married into the Coloured servant community. The fortunate few San escaped into the deserts to the north.

Many Dutch settlers felt belittled by the British stereotypical treatment of Africans and Coloureds, the imposition of strangers' authority, and the forced use of English as the official language when the British, in 1806, finally took over Cape Colony. For example, they were horrified when the British established the "Black Circuit" court in 1812 to hear complaints from slaves and servants against their white owners (Anti Apartheid Movement, 1974, p.16). The last straw was the act of freeing slaves in southern Africa, as well as those throughout the British Empire, in 1834. This statute smelt like an attempt to undermine the life the Dutch settlers had created for

themselves, as slavery was a fundamental part of their society. In addition, it was customary for them to travel or trek in pursuit of fresh territories. Hence, they responded to this law by embarking on what is known as the Great Trek in 1837.

The industrialisation that accompanied the discovery of gold and diamonds was what distinguished South Africa's condition from that of any other African colony. As a result, waves of new European immigrants flocked to South Africa with hopes to grow wealthy. While some became millionaires, most of them became part of the new, strong white labour force. Consequently, many Africans became landless people looking for employment after Europeans claimed large portions of southern Africa. This time of instability is the origin of many aspects of the twentieth century South African life, such as passes and employment reservations (Anti Apartheid Movement, 1974, p.21).

Furthermore, the foundation of the new Transvaal and Orange Free State colonies was a direct result of English control over the Dutch descendants, also referred to as Boers or Afrikaners. As previously mentioned, the discovery of diamonds in these areas in about 1900 led to an English domination that resulted in the Second Boer War. It must be acknowledged that the Treaty of Vereeniging signed on May 31, 1902, ending the war between the South African Republic and the Orange Free State on the one side, and the United Kingdom on the other, directly led to the creation of the Union of South Africa.

Indeed, the South Africa Act of 1910 gave the white minority in Britain authority over the native (African), Asian (primarily Indian), coloured, and other mixed races. The colonies and republics of Cape Colony, Natal, Transvaal, and Orange Free State were all united as the Union of South Africa by this Act. The creation of the Union led

to the political unrest and chaos that would engulf the nation for the ensuing eight decades by disregarding the desires of the vast majority of its citizens. In order to solidify White privilege and power at the expense of the Black South Africans, the British and the Boers (Afrikaners) set aside the resentment of war (Conservatives in Action-CIASA, n.d.). Hence, the foundations of apartheid were established by the South African Party, which was established in November 1911 by a number of groups following the Union of South Africa in 1910.

The different groups' tortuous power-sharing dominated politics until the Afrikaner National Party was able to secure a sizable majority in the 1940s. Apartheid was further developed by the strategists of this party as a tool to consolidate their hold over the social and economic systems. Apartheid was essentially implemented to uphold white authority and deepen racial segregation. The Grand Apartheid plan, which prioritised police repression and territorial separateness, was put into effect beginning in the 1960s (The History of Apartheid in South Africa, 2017, p.1).

1-2-1-1- White Supremacy: The Prelude to Bedlam

Racial discrimination became institutionalised in 1948 with the adoption of apartheid legislation, as previously pointed out. Both the phase of Blacks' intimidation accompanied by its succeeding phase exemplified in laws pertaining to racial inequity have perfectly been explained by Bell Hooks in her theory, illustrated in the previous section. Every aspect of social life was impacted by unfair racial policies, such as the promotion of white-only employment and the ban on non-white-white marriage. For example, the Population Registration Act of 1950 established three racial classifications for all South Africans: whites, Black Africans, and coloured of mixed

origin. The last of which included main subgroups of Asians, whereas a Black person was anyone who formed part of an African tribe or race. Social acceptance, appearance, and descent were the main parameters upon which the classification into one of these categories was based. For example, “a white person was defined as in appearance obviously a white person or generally accepted as a white person” (The History of Apartheid in South Africa, 2017, p.1).

It is interesting to note that having a non-white parent made it difficult for a person to be considered white. In order to confirm that a person was unmistakably white, it was necessary to analyse his speech, mannerisms, habits, education, and behaviour. Black people were required to carry “a pass book,” which contained their fingerprints and photo, along with information on their permission to enter non-Black areas. The Department of Home Affairs, a government agency, was tasked with classifying the populace. There were severe repercussions for breaking the race laws, including arrest, beatings, and occasionally wrongful death (The History of Apartheid in South Africa, 2017, p.1).

Based on the Bantu Authorities Act, an ethnic government base in African reserves—also referred to as “homelands”—was created in 1951. Relying on the sometimes ambiguous record of origin, the government used to rule over all Africans in those homelands, which were regarded as autonomous states. Voting and other political rights were restricted only to the designated homeland for every African. The primary premise was that once they are declared as the homeland's citizens, they would lose their South African citizenship and any right to connect with the South African Parliament, which had complete authority over the homelands (The History of Apartheid in South

Africa, 2017, p.1). The years 1976 to 1981 witnessed the creation of four of these homelands, signalling the denationalisation of nine million South Africans. The homeland administrations, who rejected the ostensible independence, were enraged by this and pushed for political rights across the nation. However, in order for the Africans residing in their homelands to enter South Africa, they needed a passport. To put it another way, they were simply viewed as foreigners in their own country.

Subsequently, in 1953, the Public Safety Act and the Criminal Law Amendment Act were passed, extending penalties for opposing the repeal of a law or complaining about it, and granting the government the authority to declare emergency states. The punishments included beatings, fines, and incarceration. In the year 1960, there occurred an infamous incident at Sharpeville where a sizable contingent of Black people refused to present their passes. The government, consequently, proclaimed a state of emergency. After 156 days of the emergency, 69 individuals had been killed and 187 more had been injured. Maintaining both the Criminal Law Amendment Act and the Public Safety Act sent a strong message that the white regime had no intention of halting the unjust apartheid laws (The History of Apartheid in South Africa, 2017, p.2).

Table 1 below illustrates how incredibly unfair the apartheid regime was. It is evident that although white people only made up around 25% of the population, they received three-quarters of the nation's income. The inevitable result was political protests. However, even non-violent political complaints were subject to harsh penalties. Under the emergency conditions, which continued sporadically until 1989, anyone could be imprisoned for no less than six months without having their case heard by an ordinary police official. As a result, thousands of people were murdered in detention, often

following horrific torture (The History of Apartheid in South Africa, 2017, p.3). Every person who was tried received a life sentence in prison, a death sentence, or exile. Nelson Mandela's fate was the first one.

Apartheid and the People of South Africa		
	<i>Blacks</i>	<i>Whites</i>
Population	19 million	4.5 million
Land Allocation	13 percent	87 percent
Share of National Income	< 20 percent	75 percent
Ratio of average earnings	1	14
Minimum taxable income	360 rands	750 rands
Doctors/population	1/44,000	1/400
Infant mortality rate	20% (urban) 40% (rural)	2.7%
Annual expenditure on education per pupil	\$45	\$696
Teacher/pupil ratio	1/60	1/22

Figure 1: Disproportionate Treatment circa 1978. Source: [Leo80]

Table 1: Disproportionate Treatment of the People of South Africa 1978 (The History of Apartheid in South Africa, 2017, p.3)

Blacks in apartheid South Africa suffered greatly as a result of the United States of America’s foreign policy. In fact, the efficacy of American assertive rhetoric was purposefully undermined by inaction over the 46 years of apartheid (1948-1994), added to the early years of its existence starting from the 1910 establishment of the Union of South Africa. A thorough examination of U.S. policy toward Pretoria shows that it was insufficiently engaged and too often sidetracked from its human rights concerns in favour of strategic and financial goals. In an effort to strike a compromise between these three interest groups, Washington, D.C., was severely exposed to accusations that its

rhetoric was only performing lip service to the fight against apartheid. Exhaustive analysis to Washington, D.C.'s both diverging rhetoric and converging actions is set about in the second chapter.

The situation in the Middle East was by no means better than that in its South African counterpart, for the colonised countries changed hands, the thing that threw them in an obscure hole of mysterious destiny. The following lines will shed light on the twentieth century darkness in the Middle East.

1-2-2-The Middle East in Chaos

Indeed, an unprecedented era of cultural decline the Middle East witnessed in the twentieth century. Ironically, it had been the same place known for centuries as “the cradle of civilisation.” Therefore, it is incumbent to begin the journey with an introduction to the crisis in the Middle East, to have a clear image of how chaos has trespassed on the Palestinian scene throwing it into the lion’s den.

1-2-2-1- An Introduction to the Crisis in the Middle East

The Middle East—a name used interchangeably with the Fertile Crescent as coined by the archaeologist James Henry Breasted—refers to a crescent-shaped area stretching from the Nile Valley through the eastern shore of the Mediterranean to Mesopotamia (Jones, n.d.). The area has commonly been seen an important land bridging both Africa and Asia. Its rivers had historically watered early settlements. The crescent contained a large number of plant and animal species. It was where people first learned to herd animals and grow crops. Later it became the place where people first organised into complex societies, complete with civil servants and official records. And as far as spirituality is concerned, it is the home of three of the world’s major religions— Islam,

Christianity, and Judaism. Therefore, no wonder the Middle East is known as “the cradle of civilisation” (Jones, n.d.).

On the other hand, the way Americans view the Middle East is quite distinct. In fact, “few parts of the world have become as deeply embedded in the U.S. popular imagination as the Middle East” (Little, 2008, p.9). The Puritans who established “God’s American Israel”, roughly four centuries ago, on Massachusetts Bay came with “a passionate fascination with the Holy Land and a profound ambivalence about the infidels”—primarily Muslims and to a lesser extent Jews—who inhabited the land (p.9). Both religious parables and Bible stories drew a special perception in the citizens of one of the New World’s newest nations’ minds about some of the Old World’s oldest civilisations. The former has long held tightly a romanticised and stereotypic vision of the latter. Sailing from America during the nineteenth century to the Eastern Mediterranean, missionaries, tourists and uppermost merchants brought two contradictory attitudes about that corner of the world. While they were impressed by the Christian relics and biblical landscapes on the one hand, they on the other were horrified by the tyrannical governments and degraded societies that they came across from Constantinople to Cairo (p.9).

During the twentieth century, the oil men, diplomats, and soldiers who advanced and safeguarded U.S. interests in the Middle East “converted these earlier cultural assumptions and racial stereotypes into an irresistible intellectual shorthand for handling the backward Muslims and the headstrong Jews whose objectives frequently clashed with America’s” (Little, 2008, p.10).

Best-selling novels, political cartoons, feature films along with popular magazines all mirrored this intellectual shorthand. The latter, therefore, has resulted in an unshakable impact on the nation's capital and on Main Street. Both U.S. policymakers and the American public have repeatedly utilised over the years what historian Michael Hunt has termed a "hierarchy of race" in dealing with what the West called the Third World. As early as 1900, Hunt argues:

Anglo-Saxon racism and Social Darwinism had fused in the collective mind of America to generate a powerful mental map in which, predictably, the "civilized" powers—the United States and Western Europe—controlled a descending array of underdeveloped, even "primitive" Asians, Latinos, American Indians, and Africans. (Little, 2008, p.10)

Although Hunt discusses the Middle East only in brief, his short remarks, as the above quotation makes clear, suggest that U.S. policymakers tended to deliberately place Arabs at the bottom than the top of the race hierarchy.

It is common truth that at the dawn of the twentieth century, the world was not as neatly divided into independent countries as it is today. Empires were dismantled; territories possession hands changed due to war, and European powers aimed at controlling some of the unstable lands as they were witnessing transitions. Nowhere was all this truer than in the Middle East. Significant events during this period bore the seeds of the Arab/Israeli conflict.

1-2-2-2- Origins and Dimensions of the Arab/Israeli Conflict

The Arab/Israeli conflict is the product of an intermingling of two intertwined inseparable dimensions, history and culture. While history provides the historical data

required to comprehend fully the origins and dimensions of the conflict at hand, existential theories would delve into the abstract nature of this struggle for existence.

Historians argue that during World War I, precisely in 1916, a series of secret talks were held between Britain and France to define each power's spheres of influence and dominance in the eventual fall and partition of the Ottoman Empire. The outcome of which was the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which indeed carved up the Middle East into zones of influence. It was agreed that France would administer Lebanon and Syria, while Britain would supervise Iraq and Transjordan—today's Jordan. Palestine, however, would become under dual control as the French let the British rule there, too.

Meanwhile, Zionism—a movement to establish a home in Palestine for the world's Jews—was on the rise. Its leader was Theodore Herzl (C.Kelman, 2007, p.288). It was around this time that the Balfour Declaration took place on November 2, 1917. This letter written by the British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour to Baron Lionel Walter Rothschild, the Zionist British banker and politician, expressed British endorsement of “the establishment in Palestine of a national home for Jewish people” (Balfour, 1917). This declaration was to determine the plight of the Palestinian indigenous population for more than a century up to contemporary times. Hence, when the British were given formal control of Palestine in a 1922 mandate of the League of Nations, waves of Jewish immigrants flooded into Palestine, resulting in an increased violence between Arabs and the Jews. The British seemingly attempted to restrict Jewish immigration, only to be met with an international support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine. In other words, as the Nazi Germans had the intention to eradicate European Jews, the world believed a Jewish homeland to be an urgent need.

Under such circumstances, the then recently formed United Nations prepared a plan to partition Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states in 1947, known as the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine. Jerusalem—a holy city for Muslims, Jews, and Christians—was given a special international status as the plan recommended that it would fall under UN administration (C.Kelman, 2007, p.288). The following year, the British abandoned control of Palestine and quit. Soon after, on May 14, the State of Israel was announced. Neighbouring Arab states bitterly refused the partition plan, however, and their armies soon afterwards invaded their new neighbour. The resulting war is known as the War of 1948. Cease-fires with Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon ensued, with fifty percent more territory taken by the fledgling state. Thenceforth, the Arab/Israeli conflict has lived to this day.

Simultaneously, the Palestinian/Israeli conflict can be described from a cultural perspective as an existential conflict between two peoples—or two identity groups—each of which claims the same right for territory ownership and thereby political state. In such a conflict, the very existence of the other torments and threatens each group's own existence. Additionally, “the other's identity and its associated narrative challenge the group's claims to ownership—at least to exclusive ownership—of the land and its resources” (C.Kelman, 2007, p.289). These dynamics have resulted in a hostile view of the conflict in regard to issues of territory, national identity and existence, wherefore the act of acknowledging the other's identity has been regarded as a serious danger to one's own identity and existence. “Each side has espoused the view that only one can be a nation: Either we are a nation or they are. They can acquire national identity and rights only at the expense of our identity and rights” (p.289).

Hence, over the course of the conflict, each side has endeavoured to erode the other's identity as a national group, put the truthfulness of its links to the land into question, and raise doubts over the validity of its claims to national rights. Indeed, each has utilised negation techniques in its own national narrative. For instance, Israel's Prime Minister Golda Meir made in 1969 an ill-famed observation during a newspaper interview:

There were no such thing as Palestinians. When was there an independent Palestinian people with a Palestinian state? It was either southern Syria before the First World War, and then it was a Palestine including Jordan. It was not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself as a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them. They did not exist. (Cook, 2008, p.18)

As one may perceive, Meir's analysis deliberately ignored the existence and long-standing history of Palestinians tracing their roots back to Canaanites, as the Zionists' claim was based on their search for "a land without a people for a people without a land." Besides, Meir overlooked too the recent miserable history and colonial experience of the Middle East, next to falsifying commonly perceived political realities. De facto, the idea of the nation-state—which assigns a group that owns a particular piece of territory the quality of sovereignty—has recently been invented as a new political concept in Europe, acting as the platform upon which relations between peoples have been regulated. This development has existed for little more than two centuries.

In spite of this, nationalists claim that some groups have a hereditary or basic right to own a nation in a state of their own as they share a common lineage, ethnicity or fate. Most modern scholars, however, view nationalism in a different light. They argue that it is no more than an effort to call forth an illusion of an imagined community

grounded on myths, culture and language—by exploiting the means of mass communication made possible by industrialisation—to frame a national identity and thereby consciousness. For this reason, the whole idea of nationhood claim is often disputed given its unstable changing nature. Examples of which include the Scots in Britain and the Basques in Spain who have been claiming at a time or another a right to separate nationhood (Cook, 2008, p.19).

The case of the Middle Eastern political governance is quite distinct, however, as it was long part of the Ottoman Empire. The whole region was divided into a series of separate provinces on the basis of some geographical features and the culture and language of the inhabitants. Just like Europeans were before the intrusion of nationalism, peoples within the Ottoman empire believed themselves to be principally interlaced to a religious or ethnic community rather than framing an identity tight-knit to a particular area or state. Following the early twentieth century downfall of the Ottoman Empire, European imperial powers, uppermost Britain and France, quickly stepped in to install the nation-state model into the region.

More importantly, they did so in ways that suited their interests. They intentionally formed fragile and fractious nation-states by placing potentially unfriendly communities within the same borders —neglecting the informal territorial boundaries set up by the region's ethnic or religious communities. Iraq, an amalgam of Sunni, Shia and Kurdish groups, was a typical example. “This ensured”, Jonathan Cook (2008) asserts, “that the newly independent regimes would still need the support of their colonial patron to survive” (p.19).

Britain at that time—committed as referred to earlier to founding a Jewish homeland in Palestine—was determined to beat down any attempt to awaken Arab or Palestinian nationalism. Nonetheless, in the face of an aggressive Jewish nationalism being advanced by the Zionists in the UK, U.S.A., and Palestine, an emergent Palestinian nationalism was apparent from the early 1930s. This resulted in the very first Palestinian intifada or uprising—usually referred to as the Arab Revolt that stretched from 1936 to 1939—against Britain's rule and its support for the Zionists. The revolt at the beginning took the form of a six-month general strike and ban of the British- and Zionist-commanded parts of the economy, in what Rashid Khalidi, the noted historian, considers as “the longest anticolonial strike of its kind until that point in history, and perhaps the longest ever” (Cook, 2008, p.20).

According to Khalidi, the strength of Palestinian resistance required brutal force from the British to quell, with more than 10 per cent of the Palestinian population killed, wounded, imprisoned or exiled as a result. Meanwhile, Britain had to counter the aggressive ambitions of Germany and Italy for control of the Mediterranean; therefore, it was obliged to dispatch a huge number of soldiers into Palestine during this period (Cook, 2008, p.20).

The revolt's forced subjugation had a damaging effect on both Palestinians and their ability to fight thereafter, and on the already weak abilities of their national leadership. This was attributed to the fact that a considerable number of the Arab casualties included the most experienced military cadres next to some of the best fighters. Contrary to its treatment of the Jewish community in Palestine, Britain stood

aggressively against the development of any national institutions for the Palestinians.

As Khalidi notes,

Successive British governments simply were not prepared to countenance any progress toward Palestinian self-determination, or toward the linked principle of representative government, that would enable the country's overwhelming Arab majority to place meaningful obstacles in the way of the Zionist project. They were committed to holding fast to such position at least until Jewish immigration brought about a Jewish majority, at which stage it would become a moot point and perhaps democracy could be admitted. (Cook, 2008, p.20)

In other terms, in contrast to the situation in the other Mandates of the Middle East—where power was steadily being transferred to Arab leaders—Palestinians were disallowed to experience neither self-rule nor any outlook of eventual statehood. Ironically, power was put at the hands of the Jews instead. Therefore, unlike Palestinians, “the Jews were given communal autonomy within British rule and the chance to build national institutions, one of the reasons they were in a position to declare statehood the moment Britain departed Palestine” (Cook, 2008, p.21).

Benny Morris, an Israeli historian and a professor of history in the Middle East Studies department of Ben-Gurion University, is one of a multitude of Israelis embracing this extremist expulsion policy or what is more commonly known as the transfer—which is supposed to be more adequately termed ethnic cleansing. Opinion polls frequently show that up to 60 per cent of Israeli Jews advocate schemes to urge or oblige Arabs to leave both the occupied territories and Israel (Cook, 2008, p.141).

It is worth pausing to reflect on what might have brought a man of Morris's stature to the point where he becomes a high-profile recruit to the cause of transfer. And why are so many Israelis convinced that there is only one way to ease the “existential fear”

they are experiencing, and that is by committing the crime of ethnic cleansing? To explain this phenomenon, one needs to understand the overriding but inferred role of Zionism in shaping Israelis' worldview.

Zionism is a frame of ideological reference, as specified earlier, that prefaces every argument, every thought, and every action. It completely dictates public opinion and state policy (Cook, 2008, p.141). For an ideology that has triggered such agony, both to Arabs and Israelis in the Middle East, it is worth noting that its goals are so rarely verbalised beyond oversimplified slogans. Few who have studied the history and development of the ideology have looked beyond the intentions of its nineteenth-century prophet, Theodor Herzl, and its pre-state ideologues, men like Ben-Gurion, Vladimir Jabotinsky and Martin Buber. Hence, “the practical expression of Zionism in statehood, a project of more than five decades' duration, is barely mentioned” (p.142).

Jonathan Cook, an award-winning British writer and journalist who writes about the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, expounds quite perfectly in his *Disappearing Palestine: Israel's Experiments in Human Despair* some common assumptions held by Zionists. They base their ideology on the idea that the Jews deserve, as a political and moral right, a homeland. From this thesis flows another less spoken assumption that no other people's claim to this land is comparative to the Jewish claim (p.142). Others must accordingly be required to make sacrifices to guarantee the lasting survival of the Jewish state. Zionism is, in essence, a reinvention of the idea that the Jews are God's elect people for the secular modern era. Yet the practice as well as the preaching must be analysed. How did Zionism as a nation-building ideology develop from its earliest days to the foundation of Israel and beyond?

Zionism's initial aim is regarded by them as honourable enough to found a sanctuary for the much oppressed Jewish people. Herzl, in particular, was not very much concerned about where this sanctuary would be. In fact, there was a time when it might have been established in Argentina or Uganda, but over time, the Zionists' focus shifted to the Holy Land.

Zionist organisations such as the Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Fund aided early immigrants to Palestine—including chiefly East Europeans who fled the pogroms—to settle on land bought from the indigenous population, the Palestinians (Cook, 2008, p.142). But the migration to Palestine only began with the rise of Hitler who was compelled to expel the Jews from most of Europe, combined with the United States declination—the preferred destination of European Jews—to allow many of these refugees into its land. “With the horror of the Holocaust, Zionism's arguments about the need for a sanctuary for the Jews grew more urgent” (p.142).

The truth about the war of 1948, in which some 750,000 Palestinians were expelled or obliged to flee their homes, has been illuminated only over the past four decades, after academics like Benny Morris trawled the Israeli archives. They revealed that Israelis' traditional account of their War of Independence—one presenting it as a battle for survival—were far from credible. In fact, according to Morris and others, the Jewish militias and the army often met little or no resistance from the local population—mainly rural, peasant farmers—but nonetheless drove Palestinians from their homes and land (Cook, 2008, p.143).

Both Zionism's end-goal and the sanctuary that was left to Israelis after 1948 did not match, however. From a Zionist standpoint, the project of erecting a safe Jewish

homeland in the Promised Land was incomplete because some 150,000 Palestinians remained in pockets across the country. Cook states that during the period of the military government imposed on these unwelcome citizens until 1966, there was much dark plotting about how to expel the Israeli Arabs, as they are now called (Cook, 2008, p.143). None of the schemes, however, could be completely carried out without risking the international community's wrath.

The Zionists hoped another strategy—namely encouraging waves of Jewish immigrants to Israel—might eventually swamp the indigenous population. After the slaughter of European Jewry in the Holocaust, Israel's founders feared there were no longer enough Ashkenazi Jews¹ to ensure the success of their project and so reluctantly also brought to the new state Jews from the Arab countries—a group that would come to be known as the Mizrahim.² However, the Palestinian minority's higher birth rate meant that over many decades they will constitute about a fifth of the population, in spite of the waves of Jewish immigration.

The state's failure to weaken the Palestinian presence in Israel resulted in an ever-greater concern that one day the Jewish state would be devastated from within by this “demographic time bomb” (Cook, 2008, p.143). The sanctuary idea remained an unfulfilled dream. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians remained within the borders of the Jewish state with ties to millions more in the region.

Zionism, however, had a chance to revive itself after the 1967 war, when the movement split into two camps with very different conceptions of the Jewish state's

¹ As one of the two main ancestral groups of Jews, **Ashkenazi Jews** had forebears in France as well as Central and Eastern Europe, comprising Germany, Poland, and Russia, among others.

² **Mizrahi Jews**, also known as **Mizrahim** in plural, is a term used to describe the descendants of Jewish communities from North Africa, Central Asia, West Asia, and parts of the North Caucasus.

role. Some, including Ben-Gurion, adhered to the idea of sanctuary and called for urgent withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza. However, others, either excited by the ostensibly providential nature of Israel's victory or tempted by the prospect of further colonial expansion, set a different objective.

They argued that Israel had been presented with an opportunity to reclaim a biblical birthright, namely the Jewish people return to all of its homeland. It was a strange argument for a supposedly secular state but it had several advantages over the discredited sanctuary idea (Cook, 2008, p.144).

First, and as a starting point, whereas the goal of a sanctuary brought to the surface the internal flaws in the idea of a Jewish state, the goal of a biblical return was a centripetal project. It fortified the Jews' sense of themselves as an ethnic and religious nation. For this reason, Cook (2008) explains that “one of the driving forces—at least publicly—for territorial expansion in Palestinian areas was the reclaiming of Jewish holy sites, from Joseph's tomb near Nablus and Rachel's near Bethlehem to the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron” (p.144).

Second, unlike the goal of sanctuary which could only be achieved by openly using unethical means—namely ethnic cleansing—the goal of return could be realised through silent but aggressive settlement beyond Israel's recognised borders. At first, small groups of zealots, backed by the government and army, set up encampments on hilltops overlooking Palestinian towns and villages. They looked to the world like mavericks, people who were happy to live in caravans without water or services. Soon, as the 1948 Zionists lost the argument in government, the national-religious extremists

were joined by construction companies that bulldozed vast tracts of land and laid foundation stones for high-rise blocks of flats (Cook, 2008, p.144).

East Jerusalem, which is the Palestinian half of the city before the war of 1967, was encircled within two decades by big housing estates, all illegally built on occupied land. The Jordan Valley too was surrounded with small Israeli settlements along a main highway that made Jerusalem and Israel a quick drive away (Cook, 2008, p.144). All this happened in an implicit way intended not to beware the West until the facts on the ground made reversing the settlement programme all but impossible.

And third, and most importantly, the new territorial acquisitiveness could successfully serve as an efficient justification for demanding ever greater subsidies from Israel's chief sponsor, the United States (Cook, 2008, p.144). This last point is quite significant in this respect, for the United States' foreign policy, I dare argue, has exacerbated the existential conflict between the two races by being institutionally biased to one race at the expense of the other. This is itself, I believe, due to the imperial culture inherited by Americans from their Puritan ancestors, constituting the ideational source of their nation's foreign policy vis-à-vis the conflict.

1-2-3- The Institutional and Ideational Sources of American Foreign Policy

At the dawn of the nineteenth century, the newly formed nation of the United States of America commenced its expansionist movement. Since then up today, Americans have always regarded their expansionist journey as their God's given right. The assumption that America has been the chosen nation drove Americans to transcend their borders. This belief has become a prime justification for expansion, in order to export the American model of civilisation abroad, to secure and preserve democracy all over the

world, or rather to rule the whole world. In this respect, Senator Beveridge boasts: “....The power that rules the Pacific is, therefore, the power that rules the world. And...that power is and will forever be the American Republic” (Tindall & Shi, 2012, p.368).

This American tendency is based on the beliefs and principles that characterised the early society formed in North America. Since the Puritans had been a striking force in the foundation of that hard-line society, their influence on the future American policies was quite prominent. It was they who laid down the American conception of an elect people, who were deemed to expand and rule everywhere. The Puritans' belief in being God's chosen people destined to fulfill God's divine mission fuelled their desire to depart England, expanding to the New World. They crossed the Atlantic Ocean only to feed their aspiration of erecting a new Garden, a City that would be a perfect model. In this context, John Winthrop states:

For we must consider that we shall be as a city upon a hill. The eyes of all people are upon us, so that if we shall deal falsely with our God in this work we have undertaken, and so cause Him to withdraw His present help from us, we shall be made a story and by-word throughout the world. (Winthrop, 1630)

Winthrop's statement openly expresses the missionary nature of his Puritan fellowmen's commonwealth established in the New World. It also warns them from deceiving their God so that they will be stripped off this Divine help. Puritanism is, in essence, a religious movement which sailed on English ships across the Atlantic Ocean towards the New World early in the seventeenth century. Calvinism, the creed of Calvin, was the most puritanical reformational movement. This latter is often summarised by the

Five Points, which defined Calvinist orthodoxy. Among them, three points were strongly held by the Puritans.

First among which is the point of Predestination—also called Unconditional Election. In believing in this point, the Puritans claim that God has divided humanity into two very distinct groups. While the first is the ‘elect’ encompassing all those whom God has espoused to have knowledge about Himself, the rest are all ignored, known as the ‘neglect’, and doomed to spend eternity in hell without any hope of mercy. In their view, this divine selection had been arranged before the universe was created, and hence before any humans existed. Yet, the ground utilised by God to select the lucky few is unknown; certainly not through any good works on the part of the individual (Tindall & Shi, 2012, p.372).

The second point is Irresistible Grace, also known as the Effectual Call. It asserts that God’s call is sovereign; it is eternal God’s will to offer His grace to the elect. This grace will grant them the ability to trust the Christ, to the end of being saved. Therefore, every human whom God has elected will be drawn to his right action for which God has called him, and thus he by no means can resist this call. For that reason, the puritans would expand for the sake of answering the Call of God (Tindall & Shi, 2012, p.372).

The third and last Puritans’ strikingly held point is Perseverance of the Saints—used interchangeably with “Once Saved, Always Saved” belief. The latter maintains that everyone who has already been saved will eternally remain in that state. None are lost, and it is quite impossible for them to lose salvation (Tindall & Shi, 2012, p.372). These

ideas were deeply ingrained in the Puritan mind, only to be transferred in a few decades' time to their American grandchildren who assigned them different terms.

Along decades of tough struggles with the Anglican Church, the Puritans realised at the dawn of the seventeenth century that their model was not likely to see the light of the day in England. There, they could neither display their religious principles, nor accept any power to restrict and repudiate them. As they believed they are God's elect people, they hence became steadfastly determined to seek out new lands where they could fulfill their dreams, avoid persecution and build a community of their own.

This, in fact, ushered in the first phase of Puritan expansion, for they believed that they could not resist the call of God.¹ This expansion took place in 1620, when a Separatist Puritan congregation called the Pilgrims, through Leiden, Holland, set sail for the New World, aboard the Mayflower ship, under the leadership of William Bradford. This latter held the conviction that America might be their Promised Land. This is because the Pilgrims identified themselves with the ancient Hebrews. They believed they were God's preferential people chosen for the Promised Land. Besides, those Puritans who disembarked in Plymouth, Massachusetts in 1620 believed they were establishing the New Israel guided by God. A decade afterwards, the second wave of Puritan ships, led by John Winthrop, docked in Boston. While their dreams were fading in England, they were on the rise for a new life on American soil.

Unsatisfied yet, the Puritans did not only settle in the New World, but expanded as well. Cracks that began to appear in Massachusetts Bay Colony forged new ways to

¹ Due to their belief in one of John Calvin's points, Irresistible Grace.

resolve problems, namely moving away, setting up new colonies in new lands. Consequently, they expanded to Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Haven, New Hampshire, among others. Such lands were possessed by the Indians who vainly confronted the Puritans. Large numbers of innocent Indian lives were lost as a result (Tindall & Shi, 2012, p.372).

The Puritans ruthlessly put the Natives to death because they believed in Predestination. Moreover, their belief in the Calvinistic doctrine of Irresistible Grace made them unreluctant to kill those Indians. Hence, they exterminated both the Pequot and the Wampanoag Indians.

These Puritan ideals and spirit had their echo on the newly formed American mind. At the wake of the nineteenth century, the notion of the U.S. providential mission to secure democracy and liberty was renewed in the Monroe Doctrine and Manifest Destiny. While the former assigned America the task of the Western Hemisphere's guardian, the latter revived the Puritans' strongly held point of Predestination. Both of them, indeed, served as torches which have been lightening the way for any expansionist movement.

The Monroe Doctrine expressed in President James Monroe's speech in 1823 warned the main European empires back then—namely Russia, Prussia, and Austria—from grabbing on the newly independent Latin American countries following the fall of the Spanish Empire. Monroe assigned his country the job of protecting what he named “the Western Hemisphere” from any foreign aggression, which could harm the American national security, ostensibly declaring the American Isolationist foreign

policy. This was, de facto, the first hidden step towards establishing U.S. hegemony, only to be followed in a few decades with several other steps.

As the Americans expanded, the inevitability of their growth was assumed to be a natural companion (Pouvelle, 2003, 142). They felt that the country has been preordained by God to extend over the entire continent. To the newspaper editor John L.O'Sullivan goes the credit for attaching the term Manifest Destiny to this idea. In 1845, in his article titled “Annexation”, he wrote of America's “manifest destiny to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions.” In his view, the then annexation of Texas as well as the trespassing on other countries’ lands (Mexico) was justified by God’s providence (L.O’Sullivan, 1845). This justification, since then up to now, has been serving as a powerful tool, alongside the Monroe Doctrine, to justify American expansionist ambitions.

In sum, both notions of Manifest Destiny and that of America’s world position as peace and security champion are originated from the Puritan vision for the New World to be a city set upon a hill. This imperial culture served as a justification for both the westward expansion during the second half of the nineteenth century, as well as the subsequent continental and overseas expansion. Because the Puritans considered themselves as the “New Israelites” founding their land of milk and honey under God’s providence, Americans subsequently attached themselves to Israelis. Hence, part and parcel of the contemporary version of this imperial culture has been the representation of the ‘elect’ Israelis as opposed to the ‘backward’ Palestinians, giving Israelis the incentive that pushed them to indiscriminately hate and deny Palestinian identity.

1-2-4- American/Zionist Exceptionalism and States of Exception: U.S. Imperial Culture and Israel/Palestine Racial Dichotomy

This section explores how representations of Israel/Palestine have become firmly lodged in contemporary United States imperial culture. From the figure of the “city upon a hill” onward, these representations gave rise to a variety of settler-colonial and messianic narratives (Feldman, 2008, p.2).

As cultural critic, literary theorist and Palestinian activist Edward W. Said simply put it, “lurking near Palestine has always been the problem of representation” (Said, 1980, p.39). In his own late 1970s trilogy, *Orientalism*, *The Question of Palestine*, and *Covering Islam*, Said exhaustively expounded the procedures through which the West has represented and thereby shaped knowledge about the Orient in general and Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims in particular.

For Said, as has thoroughly been elucidated in the first section of this same chapter, Zionism and the broader Orientalist discourse of which it was part put into service a “blocking operation” whereby certain “experts” in the West frequently wrote for and about Palestinians in ways that impeded what Said called “their presence”. Indeed, Palestinians were depicted as subjects with respect to history, culture, affect, and political will. Therefore, making a Palestinian presence lucid to face such blockages also needed representation. Such forms of knowledge were deemed disqualified, naive, local, regional, insufficiently elaborated and hence in need of displacement by expertise and propriety—what French philosopher Michel Foucault once called “subjugated forms of knowledge” (Foucault, 2003, p.8). However, in spite of that, Edward Said has undertaken the mission of defending the Palestinian cause and creating a counter-

hegemonic Palestinian voice that can be heard via much of his public and scholarly work.

All American narratives about the Orient, stretching from the English Puritan John Winthrop on the deck of the *Arbella* in 1630 forward to California Governor Ronald Reagan's own recasting of America as a “light unto nations” and a “city on a hill” in the 1970s, have been peppered with divine promises, biblical injunctions, and territories destined for settlement (Feldman, 2008, p.6). Both the U.S. and Israel are believed to exist outside history, holding divine commitments to the democratic values of freedom and liberty, “with morally righteous pioneering spirits and melting-pot immigrant cultures, with uniquely benevolent roles in a hostile world of barbarism, backwardness, and tyranny” (Feldman, 2008, p.6). Indeed, these narratives have represented a common and ostensibly endless time of crisis for both nations. Their very “ways of life” have been regarded as menaced from “dangerous” racialised subjects, shifting over time and space between American Indians, African Americans, Filipinos, Arab Palestinians, Muslims and terrorists.

Put differently, popular American representations of Palestine, Israel, and the Holy or Promised Land, have had an unshaken presence, starting with the foundational document of the American myth—later on known as American Exceptionalism—in John Winthrop's 1630 sermon *A Model of Christian Charity* as stated earlier. It gave rise to what is named an ideology of “destinarian exceptionalism”, which stands for founding a settlement or a commonwealth and ‘civilising’ the North American continent in terms of a purified “unique Protestant covenant secured by a divinely inspired mission akin to, or as a mirror of, the biblical promise of the land of Canaan to the Jews” (Feldman,

2008, p.28). Two centuries later, as westward continental expansion coincided with large-scale travel by American Protestant missionaries, tourists, U.S. consular agents, and Zionist and proto-Zionist settlers to Palestine, such visions were fuelled by the settlement of a resembling remote territory, one that also operated along a covenantal narrative of an elect people, frontier lands, and hostile natives.

Indeed, theories of racism's historical and transnational relation to empire were being remarkably adhered to for the sake of thinking through and representing the linkages between the U.S. domestic scene and its connections to Israel/Palestine. For instance, thinkers such as Horace Kallen, Nathan Glazer, and Daniel Patrick Moynihan theorised cultural pluralism through an “immigrant analogy” authorising Jewish and Zionist assimilation in the U.S., while underestimating African Americans and Palestinians in the process (Feldman, 2008, p.9).

To make these analogous images clearer, it is of paramount importance first to shed light on some Zionist thinkers’ violent narrative—predominantly inspired by the American model—about Palestine’s indigenous population. In early 2004, for instance, the Israeli newspaper *Ha'aret* published an ill-famed interview with the well-known Israeli historian Benny Morris on the occasion of his new book release. In this interview, headlined “*Survival of the Fittest*,” Morris remembered the cruel establishment of the Israeli state in the late 1940s, giving more details to justify a narrative of native dispossession, massacre, and rape that Morris and some of his colleagues in the Israeli academy had been assembling over the course of several decades:

The need to establish this state in this place overcame the injustice that was done to the Palestinians by uprooting them. Even the great American democracy could not have been created without the annihilation of the Indians. There are cases in which the overall,

final good justifies harsh and cruel acts that are committed in the course of history. (Feldman, 2008, p.21)

Morris' statements, as the above comment denotes, emphasize on justifying the military, tactical, and philosophical commitment of Israel's early founders to the "cleansing" of the space of Palestine from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River. According to Morris, leaders like David Ben-Gurion committed a serious "historical mistake" for not completing the Palestinian "cleansing" in 1948. "It was necessary," Morris plainly asserts, "to cleanse the hinterland and cleanse the border areas and cleanse the main roads. It was necessary to cleanse the villages from which our convoys and our settlements were fired on" (Feldman, 2008, p.22). Since such practices were left incomplete in the past, a possible future cleansing "in five or ten years" would be made permissible by two indisputable facts: "a demographic reserve" of Arab Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are a "time bomb" capable of crippling the state's Jewish national character; and "Islam and Arab culture" come from a "barbarian" world of tribalism and revenge, with "no moral inhibitions". While displacement is an adequate future for the region's Arabs, he adds, the present needs "healing the Palestinians.... Until the medicine is found, they have to be contained so that they will not succeed in murdering us". "There is a wild animal there," Morris states, "that has to be locked up in one way or another" (Feldman, 2008, p.23).

Morris's comments embrace of rhetoric anathema to the peace movement—to which he had pretended to adhere— were intentionally shocking and frustrating. These comments, in fact, unveil the deep-rooted colonial/racial structure of the Israeli state project, which was sustained by America. Morris' justification for present-day

Palestinian “caging” and a future of ethnic cleansing gives credit to a narrative with profound historical antecedents that arise not only out of the canon of Zionist literature, but draws on imaginative and symbolic histories coupling Israel/Palestine and the U.S. through figures of analogy, metaphor, and comparison as shown earlier.

In his turn, in retrospect, the founder of modern political Zionism, Theodor Herzl, explained the role of a Jewish national home in Palestine as “the portion of the rampart of Europe against Asia, an outpost of civilisation as opposed to barbarism” (Feldman, 2008, p.24). Similarly, Chaim Weizmann, the prominent lobbyist on behalf of the Zionist project and Israel's first president, described in the 1930s the double-edged logic of imperial benevolence and absolute force. “We wish to spare the Arabs as much as we can of the sufferings which every backward race has gone through on the coming of another, more advanced nation.” Yet, in his view, the Palestinians’ resistance to settlement revealed “the old war of the desert against civilisation, but we will not be stopped.” David Ben-Gurion, the state's principle architect and first prime minister, agreed: “We are not Arabs, and others measure us by a different standard ... our instruments of war are different from those of the Arabs, and only our instruments can guarantee our victory” (Feldman, 2008, p.24).

That a native population existed at all was itself a contested topic, as shown previously in Golda Meir’s observation.¹ The traditional Zionist slogan that Palestine was “a land without a people for a people without a land” was drawn from the journalism of British colonisationist² and author of *The Melting-Pot* Israel Zangwill. He wrote in

¹ Go to page 51.

² He is given this label based on his proclamation of the virtues of Jewish colonisation in Mesopotamia; he maintained that none of the inadequacies the Zionists had discovered in East Africa existed in the region between the Tigris and the Euphrates.

1920: “Scrap Zionism and build Palestine. This is the language which the Arabs will understand. Only after Zionism has been honourably interred will the two races work together” (Feldman, 2008, p.25).

Indeed, Zionism's effort to root the Jews in the ‘Land of Israel’ has always needed a companion: the uprooting of the indigenous population. Whether utilising the settlers' messianic language of returning to the Promised Land, the pioneer rhetoric of redeeming the land, or the discredited jargon of ‘Judaizing’ land, Zionists have been pushed to intimately attach their national identity to control over territory and the expulsion of non-Jews who claim rival equal ownership (Cook, 2008, p.6).

In sum, this irrefutable claim to Palestine resounds with Zionists in several tight-knit ways, including in the security, imaginary and religious-mythical realms. It promises a personal and collective safety seemingly unrealisable for populations that are stateless. It reinvents the supposedly weak Diaspora Jew who is now set free, “casting off his wandering and compromised nature to toil the land and become a muscular Sabra Jew¹” (Cook, 2008, p.6). And inevitably it feeds on ideas of chosenness and return, the Jewish people's armour against the twin dangers of modernity—secularism and assimilation. It is crucial here to highlight the Bible’s narrative of the Jews’ claimed ‘Promised Land’—a land that caters both Jewish and American spices’ sense of exceptionality.

1-2-4-1- Zionism and the Bible: A History Re-enactment or Denial?

Soon after the founding of Israel in May 1948, and on a larger-scale following the astounding Israeli victory in the June 1967 Six Day War, both the U.S. public and

¹ The **Diaspora Jews** are the Jewish people scattered in all over the world far from their ‘ancestral’ homeland. The **Sabra Jew** is a term often used to describe Jews born in Israel to symbolize resilience and strength.

policymakers steadily came to regard the small Jewish state's challenge to its much larger Arab rivals as a re-enactment of the biblical story of David and Goliath (Alessandrini, 2017, p.3). Broadcasted by much of the American media as a geopolitical underdog whose occidental values were anathema to its oriental neighbours, Israel relied on fearlessness, cleverness, and predominantly, Western weapons to beat down people whose Muslim faith and tribal culture seemed to magazines such as *National Geographic* more and more outdated for twentieth-century realities.

“Sailing with Sindbad’s Sons,” for instance, was published in the November 1948 issue of *National Geographic*. It narrates the voyage of the Bayan, a square-rigged “winged galleon of Araby” that followed the route of the old slave and spice trade from Aden at the mouth of the Red Sea to Zanzibar off the East African coast. The Bayan’s crew description backed up the classic orientalist myth of the archaic but happy native. “Like monkeys in treetops, Arabs climb a 130-foot yard,” reads one caption. “Their pay is a pittance and their food poor, yet they are cheerful” (Alessandrini, 2017, p.3). Hence, Israel and Palestine entered and became firmly implanted in debates about supposedly domestic U.S. concerns both through imaginative and material links to Israel and Zionism that strengthened U.S. hegemony.

For the sake of advertising their claim to the Promised Land, the Zionists, including the secular ones, looked for historical rationalization in the Bible. In this context, the Haifa University’s professor of psychology Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi expounds:

The historisation of the Bible is a national enterprise in Israel, carried out by hundreds of scholars at all universities. ... The Israel Defence Ministry has even published a complete chronology of

Biblical events, giving exact dates for the creation of the world, the killing of Abel and the exodus from Egypt. (Cook, 2008, p.15)

Or, as peace activist and former Knesset member Uri Avnery observes, the Bible was soon being treated “as if it were a history book. . . . That is the history that all of us [Israelis] learned in school, the foundation upon which Zionism was built” (Cook, 2008, p.15). Unsurprising, then, is the fact that many leaders of Labour Zionism, in spite of its avowed socialist and progressive outlook, fervently followed biblical archeology. Yitzhak Ben Tzvi, Israel's first president, along with some generals like Yigael Yadin and Moshe Dayan were deeply interested in unveiling ancient artefacts they strongly held as the Jewish people's righteous passport to Israel. Hence, Dayan's reply to a question about the reason behind his numerous digs was: “The ancient land of Israel. Everything that ancient Israel was. Those who lived there then. ... I sometimes feel I can literally enter their presence” (p.15).

Another question can be brought to the fore in this context: Even if it were possible to consider the Bible as “documented history”, why would the fact that, two thousand years ago, the Jews formation of a nation in an ancient Israel necessarily attain their descendants the right to dismiss, detach, and expel the Palestinians now? Jeff Halper, the Israeli peace activist and sociologist argues for the Zionist narrative as follows:

Although the ancient Israelites and Judeans had sovereignty over the country for only 1,300 of its 10,000 years of recorded history—and a third of which was under Babylonian, Greek or Roman suzerainty—in Zionist thought our claims trump any others, including the 1,300 years of Muslim rule. (Cook, 2008, p.16)

De facto, however, the joint attempts of Israeli historians and archaeologists to lay hands on the physical evidence indispensable to ascertain that the Bible is a genuine record of the Jewish people's history have been met with rigid refuting claims by an increasing number of other Israeli academic counterparts. Ze'ev Herzog, the Tel Aviv University's professor of archaeology, for instance, caused an uproar in 1999 when he shockingly confessed that archaeology's efforts to grab on concrete evidence that an ancient Jewish nation had ever taken place had been unsuccessful. "This is what archaeologists have learned from their excavations in the Land of Israel", he said. "The Israelites were never in Egypt, did not wander in the desert, did not conquer the land in a military campaign and did not pass it on to the 12 tribes of Israel," (Cook, 2008, p.16) he added. More difficult to admit for Ze'ev Herzog is the idea that "the united monarchy of David and Solomon, which is described by the Bible as a regional power, was at most a small tribal kingdom" (p.16).

In other terms, Herzog's research—and that of other archeologists—suggests that, when a historical unit named Israel came to exist for a short period of time, "it was pagan and Jerusalem was not its spiritual centre." The reaction in Israel to these findings was undeniably fierce. This was due to the fact that any attempt to raise doubts over the reliability of the biblical descriptions is seen as an attempt to subvert the Jews' historic right to the land and thereby discrediting the myth of the ancient Kingdom of Israel's renewal. For instance, in response to Herzog's findings, Tommy Lapid who was at the time a member of the Israeli parliament asserted that "the attempt to prove that the Bible is wrong is really an attempt to prove that Zionism is wrong and Israel is wrong" (Cook, 2008, p.16).

Besides, in contradiction to the Zionists' claim that the ancient Israelites had rivalry with two other ethnic nations, namely the Canaanites and the Philistines inhabiting Palestine, Israel Finkelstein, another professor of archeology at Tel Aviv University asserts that the Israelites were in reality Canaanites and not a separate ethnic group. They possibly broke free due to religious reasons. According to Niels Peter Lemche, a biblical scholar at the University of Copenhagen, the real difference between the Canaanites and the Israelites would be "a religious one and not the difference between two distinct nationals" (Cook, 2008, p.17).

Another disputation blew in early 2008 when Shlomo Sand, a history professor at Tel Aviv University, published a book in Hebrew called *When and How Was the Jewish People Invented?* In this book, Sand ridiculously exposes Israel's official history that today's Jews are the posterity of the 2,000 years ago Jewish community in Palestine; a community that was purportedly expelled by the Romans in 70 AD. He contends instead that most of the Jews and Christians in the region converted to Islam several hundred years later, when the Arabs conquered Palestine (Cook, 2008, p.17).

Interestingly enough, no less than a couple of Israel's founding fathers, David Ben-Gurion and Yitzhak Ben Tzvi promoted this view as they argued that an interesting number of nowadays Palestinians were the region's Jews descendants. In the 1920s, the pair even worked on a plan to convert the native Palestinians back to Judaism, only relinquishing the idea when faced with an increase of Palestinian resistance to Zionism a decade later during the Arab Revolt of 1936-39.

How, then, does Sand explain today's widely scattered Jewish Diaspora if there was no exile? These Jews, he contends, have in fact descended from non-Jews who

converted to Judaism, thereby explaining the great ethnic diversity to be found among the modern Jewish population. In his viewpoint, “Judaism was a proselytizing religion that competed for converts with the new upstart faiths of Christianity and Islam.” He adds that “it had most success among pagan populations, particularly the Berber tribes located in North Africa, the Arabs of southern Arabia, and Turks in south Russia, who converted from the fourth century AD onwards.” As a result, Sand observed in an interview: “The people did not spread, but the Jewish religion spread” (Cook, 2008, p.17).

Most ruinous to the Zionist assumption of a Jewish return, Sand states that the pioneering immigrants to Palestine following the massacres in eastern Europe called Ashkenazi Jews—who form the elite in Israel in contemporary times—bore no historical roots in Palestine. Sand and other scholars assert that they trace their roots back to the Khazars, who are a Turkic people that established a kingdom 1,000 years ago in what is now southern Russia. The Khazar king, states Sand, converted himself and his subjects to Judaism (Cook, 2008, p.18).

In partial support of this theory, Paul Wexler of Tel Aviv University contends that Yiddish—generally said to be a Germanic tongue—is, in fact, a Slavic language. Sand, additionally, revealed that his research would probably ruin his academic career in Israel, adding: “The revelation that the Jews are not from Judea [ancient Israel] would ostensibly knock the legitimacy for our being here out from under us. . . . There is a very deep fear that doubt will be cast on our right to exist” (Cook, 2008, p.18).

Amid all these conflicting views over the essence of Israel’s existence, the United States of America keeps performing its ‘noble’ role, namely assuring Israel’s security

and thereby survival. The means is to make the American public convinced of American/ Zionist exceptionalism, which itself makes representations of Palestine/ Israel deeply lodged in American imperial culture.

In July 2014, for instance, at the height of a recent Israeli military assault upon Gaza, a major rally was held in New York City in defence of Israel. “United We Stand with Israel” attracted major figures in city, state, and national politics; the large majority of them progressive Democrats, who delivered ardent speeches supporting Israel’s right to self-defence and insisting on the sacredness of the “Special Relationship” coupling both the United States and Israel (Alessandrini, 2017, p.1).

One of the most resonant rhetorical assertions came from Brooklyn Congressman Hakeem Jeffries. “We know that Israel lives in a very tough neighbourhood,” Jeffries addressed the crowd, adding: “There are certain realities to that...because the only thing that neighbours respect in a tough neighbourhood is strength.” In his conclusion to the speech, Jeffries declared: “Israel is here to stay and it will remain...Israel today, Israel tomorrow, Israel forever” (Alessandrini, 2017, p.1).

Jeffries’ last sentence in his speech reflects the well-known exhortation of Alabama Governor George Wallace, amidst the U.S. civil rights movement’s struggle to put an end to legal segregation, in the summer of 1963: “In the name of the greatest people that have ever trod this earth, I draw the line in the dust and toss the gauntlet before the feet of tyranny, and I say segregation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever” (Alessandrini, 2017, p.1).

Thanks in part to this eccentric echo, Jeffries’ speech brings forth a revealing snapshot of the much-disputed relationship between U.S. racial politics and the

representation of Israel/Palestine in the U.S. context. Questions arise here over the forces and contexts leading a progressive African-American politician to parrot the rhetoric of one of the most openly racist figures of twentieth-century American history in order to promote a military assault on an occupied and imprisoned population. On a larger scale, questions arise also over the circumstances by which the general public in the United States has come to consider issues related to Israel/Palestine as “local, not foreign policy, matters,” as Edward Said put it in 2000 (Alessandrini, 2017, p.2).

In sum, as one may perceive, this imperial culture is firmly lodged in both American and Jewish minds, for early Zionist thinkers had been unwaveringly inspired by Winthrop’s idea of destinarian exceptionalism. Thus, the representation of the ‘elect’ Israelis as opposed to the ‘neglect’ backward Palestinians has given Israelis the incentive that pushed them to indiscriminately hate and deny Palestinian identity. In the process of resolving this complex existential and political conflict between the two races, the U.S. has used the tool of diplomacy to attain its goals in the Middle East. The same tool was used in apartheid South Africa backing. As Noam Chomsky reminds us, one thing apartheid South Africa and Israel have in common is the U.S. connection (Trabulsi & Kfoury, 2015, p.2).

As long as apartheid South Africa could bank on U.S. backing, it could endure external pressures and ignore the rest of the world. As shown previously, once American support was withdrawn—along with other factors—white-minority rule in South Africa fell apart. And the same applies to Israel; “Israeli aggression,” Glenn Greenwald wrote after the 2014 assault on Gaza, “would be impossible without the

constant, lavish support and protection of the U.S. government, which is anything but a neutral, peace-brokering party in these attacks” (Trabulsi & Kfoury, 2015, p.2).

These comparisons with South Africa stand on a realistic background. Indeed, the last phase of apartheid’s disassembling occurred in the years 1990–94, which definitely lifted hopes for similar steps elsewhere and inspired some people with a liberation prototype that could be repeated in Palestine. Yet, it accidentally clashed with the post-Nasser period of rising Arab division and the Sadat government’s separate bilateral Arab-Israeli agreements, which began in the 1970s under American mediation and help. These agreements detached “the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from the wider Arab/Israeli conflict and set the two on different tracks—increasingly diverging over time and more so since the Oslo Accords of 1993-95” (Trabulsi & Kfoury, 2015, p.3). Therefore, the extent to which the U.S. has respected the requirements of public diplomacy in both cases along with the covert agendas behind will exhaustively and thoughtfully be analysed in the subsequent chapter.

Chapter Two:

**U.S. Diplomacy in the Middle East and South Africa: Conflicted
Behaviours**

Building on the research questions propounded in the introduction, the second chapter will examine how far U. S. diplomacy in both the Middle East and South Africa in the last few decades has been ‘unbiased’, comparing and contradicting both cases in the process, to delve for buried realities. To this end, this chapter will untangle U.S. foreign policy’s furtive aims in the Middle East—as this region has unstoppably continued to amass the U.S. foreign policy’s prime attention since World War II—in addition to key U.S. interest in apartheid South Africa, pinpointing the nature of the government's veiled national interest-based agenda in both regions. Then, the term diplomacy—with special emphasis on public diplomacy—will be defined, highlighting its contradiction with partiality. This would set the tone for the subsequent sections in which both pivotal events and facts in the process of U.S. bewildering diplomacy vis-à-vis the apartheid crisis in South Africa, as well as U.S. ‘partial’ diplomacy vis-à-vis the Palestinian/Israeli question will exhaustively be analysed, bringing some unstated realities to the surface.

2-1-Covert Aims of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East

It is common truth that any given country’s foreign policy aims at attaining, or contributing to the attainment of, national objectives or national interests. Undeniably, an indispensable role has been played by U.S. foreign policy in shaping the course of events in several world corners. No corner is more exemplary of the aforesaid than the Middle East, a region of immense importance and unceasing change.

Indeed, the Middle East has been a primary attention pivot of U.S. foreign policy. Therefore, the present section begins with shedding light on the political and economic presence of the United States in the Middle East region prior to and following World War I, and following World War II to comprehend both the development of this presence

and the motives behind. This will be achieved by probing into the geo-economic, geostrategic, and geopolitical motives of the United States.

Owing predominantly to some geo-economic, geostrategic, and geopolitical factors, The Middle East area's significance has promptly risen since World War II. Culturally, several similarities exist between this region and the West, stemming from the Crusades time in the Middle Ages and lasting through modern history. This was due to the Western missionaries' efforts and their educational schemes (Al Sarhan, 2017, p.454). As previously mentioned in the first chapter, the Middle East comprises parts of three continents: Africa, Europe, and Asia. The region also owns essential resources, chiefly waterways and oil.

The name "Middle East" is almost new. The term came into existence in 1902 in a series of articles published by *The Times*— the British daily newspaper. Following the closure of World War II, the term "Middle East" became considerably utilised, mainly in government agencies and academic institutions (Al Sarhan, 2017, p.455).

The Middle East, which is also named Southwest Asia or the Near East, has varied geographical boundaries. In academia, for instance, the Middle East stands for the Arab states of North Africa; the Arab states of Asia; Occupied Palestine; and the non-Arab states of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey, and Iran (Surratt, 2000, p.4). Three distinct periods marked the presence of the U.S. in the Middle East: the first came to an end in 1914; the second started after 1919, while the third set about after 1945.

Prior to World War I, a long history coupled both the Middle East and American trade, a relationship that traces its roots back more than two centuries ago. In fact, commercial contacts between Boston and the Turkish ancient city Smyrna started as

early as 1767. Smyrna products—most particularly figs— at that time were transported to America, and subsequently—specifically in 1811— an American trading house was founded in Smyrna, setting the stage for the first Ottoman American treaty signed on May 7, 1831 (Howard, 1974, pp. 117-118).

Numerous religious, medical, and charitable missions in the Middle East were conducted by American religious groups, chiefly Presbyterians. As far as the Middle East is concerned, the first appearance of American missionaries was in 1820, for this year coincided with the launch of an introductory American mission wearing a religious cloth by the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. Thenceforth, the Middle East became a prime destination to the American philanthropic organisations as well as missionaries to offer their services to the populace.

Unexpectedly, however, a minimal number of Muslims and Jews could be converted to Christianity. Rather, the trace they left in the region was the considerable influence on education marked by the foundation of some key institutions. These included the 1866 establishment of the Syrian Protestant College known nowadays as the American University of Beirut, the 1919 foundation of the American University of Cairo, the 1863 opening of Robert College in Turkey, and the 1871 establishment of Istanbul Women's College (Howard, 1974, p.118).

The American University of Beirut “became—at least in some fields—the most outstanding institution of higher learning in the Middle East.” When the nineteenth century came to a close, “AUB was a highly influential centre for the emergence and promotion of Arab nationalism” (Crabb, 1983, p.399).

Thanks to its subsidies to higher education, next to the absence of American political agendas in the region in this era, America and its model of democracy were viewed in positive lenses by the local population (Al Sarhan, 2017, p.455). In light of this, it can be said that prior to World War I, the relationship between the United States and the Middle East was epitomized only in educational, evangelist, and trading activities. Thereafter, during the closing phase of World War I, the Ottoman Empire's dismantling put the whole region of the Middle East under European authority.

For instance, the British mandate encompassed Iraq, Transjordan, Egypt, Palestine, and Sudan while the French mandate included Syria, Lebanon, and the North African states. The British influence was extended to the Gulf region as well. It is worth noting in this regard that after World War I and before World War II, the Middle East region witnessed the nominal independence of some states with the perpetuation of some influences only up to World War II closure.

Contrary to this European colonialism, which notably retarded Arab aspirations to breathe free under one unified independent nation-state, the isolationist foreign policy was dominating the United States' political scene. Hence, the latter's interest in the Eastern Hemisphere in general, and the Middle East in particular, was ostensibly—at least to the common observer's eye— marginal and too little.¹ This isolationism was interrupted by the infamous Japanese Pearl Harbour attack on December 7, 1941 (Al Sarhan, 2017, p.456).

¹ Worth mentioning is the fact that America was facing some social upheavals and a serious ethical crisis resulting from the nation's participation in WWI ; the thing that made it a priority to devote careful concentration to domestic issues during the Roaring Twenties and the New Deal Thirties.

As indicated previously, the American political trend, principles, and ideas had a positive echo in the Middle East in the course of World War I and following it. This was due in part to President Woodrow Wilson's idealism through which he promoted the concept of "the self-determination" of nations after World War I. His idealistic view supported people's full rights to choose their own political destiny. Highly appealing were these concepts to the Arabs and their aspirations to gain independence.

President Wilson's ideas, furthermore, "...provided a stimulus to Arab nationalism in the years ahead. Prior to the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, the United States enjoyed widespread prestige and admiration in the Arab world" (Crabb, 1983, p.400). The year 1917 witnessed the Wilsonian administration's endorsement of a letter aiming at setting up, in Palestine, a "national home" for Jewish people. The letter was known as the Balfour Declaration as highlighted in the first chapter. Five years later, in July 1922, "a joint resolution of Congress voted unopposed for this Mandate for Palestine" (p.400). Afterwards, Jewish claims to inhabit Palestine from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea were legitimized.

Nearly two months later, on September 21, 1922, the joint resolution that affirmed the foundation of a Jewish national homeland in Palestine was signed by President Warren G. Harding. In the ensuing period, in spite of the fact that the Middle East was subject to European dominance, American economic relations with the Middle East, uppermost petroleum companies, remarkably increased. Those companies obtained full rights in businesses in both Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, and attained a partial interest in Kuwait and Iran (Al Sarhan, 2017, p.456). The same period saw a low U.S. political involvement in the Middle Eastern affairs.

With the outbreak of World War II, the United States' contact with the Middle East rose. Besides, the U.S. government kept a close eye on the region's huge oil reserves and started to reconsider their significant importance to American and Allied security interests. Nevertheless, "it was not until the end of the [Second World] war that the area came to assume any real significance in U.S. foreign policy" (Ismael, 1986, pp.135-136).

Indeed, the intensification of the U.S. political presence in the Middle East occurred at the end of World War II. In the preceding years, three loose events took place in this regard. First, as part of the Lend-Lease Act, the United States made use of Iran from 1941-1945 as a transit route to provide the Soviet Union with its supplies. Second, in 1938, *Aramco*, the Arabian-American Oil Company, was founded in Saudi Arabia. Third, early in the 1920s, Wilsonian idealism had some effect on the Arab nationalist movement (Al Sarhan, 2017, p.457). Thereafter, an intermingling of power shifts, oil considerations, and the Palestinian question pushed the United States to direct its attention to the Middle East.

Following World War II, the international arena became dominated by a new balance of power in which both the United States and the Soviet Union were competing as the only two rival world superpowers. Both France and Britain, the chief European powers, encountered serious economic hardships, which rendered them unable to keep their traditional prime roles in the Middle East. President Roosevelt's expectations in the first half of the 1940s that Britain would persist as the security keeper in the region failed.

This was true as in 1944 observers revealed, “Soviet policy in the Arab world appears to be aimed at the reduction of British influence in that area and the acquisition of the balance of power.” A single year later, on May 8, 1945, State Department personnel declared that Britain was no longer capable to counter the Soviet Union and was cognizant of the fact that the United States might have to be responsible for “fostering the economic advancement of the Middle East people” next to “facilitating freedom from external interference and exploitation” (Little, 2008, pp.119-120).

The Kremlin’s aim, following World War II, was to diffuse its clout along the southern border of Russia. It started in 1941, when Josef Stalin ordered Soviet troops into Iran and heightened diplomatic compression on Turkey, which had formerly disallowed the “Red Navy” to cross the channels between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea called the Dardanelles. Thereafter, in the fall of 1945, the United States’ policymakers had worse expectations. “The British publicly admit that they are no longer able to keep the Middle East in order without ... [US] help.” The President received warnings from the State Department that “Soviet Russia is showing a marked interest in the area.” Hence, if the United States did not react “firmly and adequately,” a third world war might emanate (Little, 2008, pp.119-120).

American response to this came in 1947 by the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, which articulated the United States’ intention to acquire Britain’s commitment to both Greece and Turkey. A feeling of discomfort dominated the American political scene, particularly in the mid-1950s, due to possible Soviet expansion in the Middle East. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles expressed the urgent need to find allies in the states nearest to the Soviet Union. As a result of the United States’ endeavours, the

Baghdad Pact Organisation was formed in February 1955—also known as the Middle East Treaty Organisation METO (Al Sarhan, 2017, p.458).

METO encompassed countries like Britain, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey. This organization aimed at containing probable Soviet Union expansion in the Middle East region. In the aftermath of the 1956 Suez War, the Soviet Union's penetration into the Arab states, and President Nasser's far-reaching plan of pan-Arabism, the U.S. foreign policy makers introduced the Eisenhower Doctrine. The latter allowed Middle Eastern countries to request U.S. economic aid to face armed aggression; it also gave Washington a high-ranking status of the Anglo-American Association membership in 1957 (Little, 2008, pp.119-120).

Following the 1958 Lebanon crisis, Baghdad Pact members, except Iraq, advocated U.S. intervention in Lebanon. This resulted the following year in Iraq's withdrawal from METO, which in its turn was renamed as the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) besides its headquarters, which were shifted from Baghdad to Ankara. Before its total disintegration in 1979, American backing to CENTO took the form of a non-signatory associate. Due to the many financial hardships it was facing during the 1960s, Britain felt the unescapable need to abandon all its remaining imperial bases in the Gulf region and the Arabian Peninsula.

This period witnessed American officials' shift toward what will be known later as the Nixon Doctrine. The latter formed allies in the Middle East—including Saudi Arabia and Iran—against the Soviet Union. Afterwards, President Jimmy Carter forged his own doctrine, in January 1980, when those countries failed to properly serve the U.S., telling the world that “the United States had vital security interests in the Middle

East for which it was willing to fight, whether it had dependable partners or not” (Little, 2008, pp.119-120).

Worth noting is the fact that after World War II closure, which witnessed the start of the Cold War, the United States had sculptured a number of policies, tactics, and strategies to contain probable Soviet expansion in the world in general, and in the Middle East region in particular. These policies encompassed notably the containment, détente, and deterrence implemented during the Cold War. The closure of the Cold War era in the opening years of the 1990s was obviously accompanied by the disappearance of the Soviet Union threat, namely communism, to the region.

This has left the United States as the sole preeminent superpower in the post-Cold War era. It enjoyed hegemony, authority, and military power as far as international affairs were concerned. Two prime reasons in the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century formed the incentive behind the United States’ active role in the region. These have been namely the goal of holding guaranteed access to Middle Eastern oil resources, and the Palestinian question. Additionally, undeniable is the fact that, due to security concerns, U.S. involvement in the region has been much deeper than it might seem, starting from the fall of the Soviet Union to the present (Al Sarhan, 2017, p.458).

In a nutshell, the Middle East has never ceased to receive U.S. foreign policy’s prime concern since World War II. The three above-mentioned incentives were notably interrelated as an unshakably stable Middle East could securely ensure both a safe road of oil to North America, Japan, and Europe, and a protection to Israel’s sovereignty. In this regard, consecutive U.S. administrations, over several decades, have tightly identified their nation’s national security interests in the Middle East as guaranteeing an

open door access to its oil, taking control of any aspirant regional powers longing for leadership, and narrowing the propagation of weapons of mass destruction. Since 1948, intrinsically perpetual have been three chief objectives, namely holding guaranteed access to oil, providing the safety of Israel, and ensuring that the Middle East, as a region, is not controlled by any antagonistic power (Hadar & Preble, 2008, p.539).

For this reason, it is hard to avoid the suspicion that a determined group at and near the centre of the U.S. administration saw the war on Iraq as fulfilling their ambition to begin remoulding the Middle East into a new political map, to better suit their perception of American and global interests. The upcoming paragraphs offer an amalgamation of geo-economic, geopolitical, and geostrategic aims.

2-1-1- Geo-economic Aim of the U.S.: The Oil Factor

To start with the geo-economic aim, it is widely agreed that the prime goal of the United States in the Middle East region revolves around the nation's access to oil. It is worth noting that this latter became highly significant at the end of the nineteenth century. This period coincided with the Second Industrial Revolution. Contrary to the First Industrial Revolution, which took place at the end of the eighteenth century and was supplied by waterpower and then by coal, the Second Industrial Revolution was fuelled by the drift of inexpensive oil ready for use. This viscous liquid became vital to the swiftly growing petroleum-based economies. This ignited, in its turn, a rush for the attainment of both fresh supplies of oil and more markets in which to extend (Al Sarhan, 2017, p.459).

Hence, the increasing demand in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century was the inevitable outcome as far as the petroleum industry and the consumption of oil-based products are concerned. Both of which grew speedily across the world, with Europe and North America at the forefront, as the main oil suppliers were chiefly Russia, the United States, Mexico, and Romania (Al Sarhan, 2017, p.459).

In the United States, oil and commerce were of paramount importance. Therefore, an atmosphere of anxiety began to exist in the American political scene in the summer of 1899, when America's economic adversaries were planning to divide East Asia into absolute spheres of influence. With President William McKinley's approval, U.S. secretary of state John Hay was pushed by State Department officials to announce the United States' intention "to maintain the open door for ordinary commerce in China." He, thereafter, sent diplomatic notes to Britain, Russia, and the other great powers informing them that his country would act severely against any discrimination practised upon U.S. commerce or investment in the Celestial Kingdom. Wrapped after the turn of the century in the cloth of "the Open Door policy," Hay's initiative turned into a beacon for consecutive generations of U.S. diplomats and businessmen who aimed to mingle both economic opportunity abroad and affluence at home (Little, 2008, p.45).

Standard Oil Company was one of the most important U.S. firms doing business in China at that time. The credit goes to this company for providing both Shanghai and Beijing with much of the kerosene necessary to their lamps. The shifty entrepreneur John D. Rockefeller, who utilised vicious tactics against his adversaries, established this company in 1870. The latter began to enjoy a sole monopoly, "controlling every aspect

of the petroleum industry from securing concessions and drilling wells to building refineries and developing marketing networks” (Little, 2008, p.45).

In reaction to the excessive affluence and power of *Standard Oil*, the U.S. Supreme Court, in 1911, released an important ruling dismantling Rockefeller’s gigantic trust and substituting it with a number of separate corporations. The largest of these corporations—called *Standard Oil of New Jersey*—was deprived of the lion’s share of its domestic crude reserves and was forcibly obliged to look for fresh supplies overseas. Chances in Latin America seemed promising; however, the firm’s top executives quickly knew that the oil fields’ fortune resided in the Persian Gulf (Little, 2008, p.43).

Hence, in the early years of the twentieth century, a number of business chiefs and government agents were anticipating that the black gold overflowing to the surface from east Texas to western Pennsylvania would ultimately impel the United States to matchless military and industrial superiority. The detection of immense oil pools in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran during the early decades of the twentieth century provoked America's biggest petroleum firms to acquire concessions in the Middle East and, more importantly, to grow into colossal international companies.

Established and run by businessmen who preferred to amplify benefits by limiting taxes and expenses, these international oil corporations as a rule stayed standoffish from American foreign policy and, rather, practised corporate diplomacy in their own way until the outbreak of the Second World War (Little, 2008, p.43). In May 1908, the first main gusher that had been penetrated by the *Anglo-Persian Oil Company* was in southwestern Iran at Masjid-I-Suleiman. Soon after learning that the Royal Navy chose to

substitute its warships' coal-fired boilers with diesel engines, the British government gained a 51 percent interest in *Anglo-Persian*. The aim was to permit Whitehall to gain monopoly over Iranian oil for the following four decades.

Significantly larger oil stocks were said to lie nearby in Mosul—the far Ottoman Empire's portion that would subsequently be fused into northern Iraq. Anxious to get oil for their nation's growing military machine, German entrepreneurs were the first to found the *Turkish Petroleum Company* (TPC). The latter's initial explorations in Mosul were cut by the guns of August 1914. The eventual German loss after four years led the *Anglo-Persian* and *Royal Dutch Shell* to acquire a predominant interest in the TPC, transfer the German stake to the French, and strive to place the TPC under the shield of Britain's economic sphere of influence (Little, 2008, p.46).

In sum, it can be said that in the very early twentieth century, the oil markets thrived rapidly throughout the globe, specifically in Europe, the United States, and Canada. After the outbreak of World War I, the main world powers started to give priority to oil as an essential military resource, as this modern war triggered a continuous demand for oil and its auxiliary petroleum-based items which were highly required for ships, tanks, aircrafts, submarines, as well as the greasing of the then modern rifles. This hefty use of oil at that time produced a serious scarcity in both 1917 and 1918 (Al Sarhan, 2017, p.459).

Willing to prevent being attracted into both imperial competitions and political tiffs in the Persian Gulf area, Woodrow Wilson and the presidents that followed him were happy to let the gate wide open to companies that were interested in Middle East

petroleum— like *Standard Oil of New Jersey* and *Texaco*—and then enjoying it swing shut behind them. As a result, two decades later, American oil executives possessed much more clout in Riyadh and Baghdad than did American diplomats (Little, 2008, p.44).

After the end of World War I, numerous Western firms acquired shared concessions in the Middle East region, most particularly in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, and Bahrain. The reason that lay behind these shared concessions was to discuss remedies to conflicting business and political agendas and to end up having more secure entrepreneurial expeditions.

Even though *Jersey Standard* and many other significant American oil companies thought that their supplies in the Western Hemisphere were most likely enough to satisfy America's oil requirements for the near future, the Wilson administration expected a post-war crude oil scarcity and pushed Britain to allow U.S. engagement in the TPC consortium, as part of the U.S. Open Door policy. Neglecting Uncle Sam's dissatisfaction, British and French governments met in April 1920 on the Italian Riviera at San Remo where they signed an accord officially expelling the U.S. from Iraqi oil. Furious by the San Remo contract, Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby admonished British authorities seven months later that the U.S. continued to be dedicated to the standard "that opportunity to explore and develop the petroleum resources of the world wherever found should without discrimination be freely extended." Frightened that its U.K. competitors would certainly utilise their monopoly stand in Iraq and Iran to begin a price war by disposing low-priced Middle East crude onto world outlets, *Jersey*

Standard resembled Colby's call for the open door and started looking for oil concessions in the Persian Gulf area (Little, 2008, p.46).

The U.S. firm that pushed the most for the open door in the Middle East, nevertheless, was the *Standard Oil Company of New York* (SOCONY)—one more crude-short stepchild of the Supreme Court's separation of Rockefeller's oil trust. Its opportunities for securing oil in the Middle East were hastened by the San Remo contract; SOCONY convinced the State Department to boost its pressure on the British to allow American multinationals to buy into the TPC consortium (Little, 2008, p.46).

Concerned that discrimination against American oil interests could prompt retaliation against British business, in late 1922 Whitehall granted American companies a considerable stake in Iraqi oil. Five years later, by the time that a British drilling group generated the very first gusher 200 miles north of Baghdad, the TPC consortium had actually been renamed the *Iraq Petroleum Company* (IPC), and its possession had actually been reconfigured. SOCONY and *Jersey Standard* coupled to regulate 23.75 percent of IPC's stock; *Royal Dutch Shell*, 23.75 percent; *Anglo-Persian*, 23.75 percent; and the state-owned *Compagnie Française des Pétroles* (CFP), 23.75 percent. The 5 percent left was taken by *Calouste Gulbenkian*, an Armenian deal-maker that had actually assisted win the initial deal from the Turks (Little, 2008, p.47).

At the end of the Second World War, the U.S. federal government ended up being cautious regarding lowering in oil production and the potential economic missteps that would certainly come from a fuel scarcity. To avoid this, the U.S. made financial requests for concessions with several Middle Eastern nations as pointed out previously.

This demand began in the pre-war years with concessions that were shared by numerous oil firms in Bahrain, Kuwait, as well as Saudi Arabia in the years 1929, 1934, and 1947 respectively (Rustow, 1982, pp.92-93).

In response to American demands, in 1948, numerous firms were established to make use of these concessions. The *Arabian American Oil Company* (ARAMCO) was joined by *Esso* (currently *ExxonMobil*), *Texaco*, and *Mobil*, next to *Standard Oil of California* (SoCal) which had already signed a concession agreement with Saudi Arabia in 1938; they all began to invest in the Saudi concessions. These firms quickly examined and established huge production fields that enabled them to accumulate large benefits from inexpensive oil that would certainly be utilised to reconstruct the economies of Europe and Japan that had been damaged during the course of the Second World War. The boost ultimately brought this inexpensive oil to American coasts and boosted the development of the post-war American economy, which restated the aspiration of even more American firms to look for concessions in Iran, Kuwait, and other spots in the region. Concurrently, as the growth of the Middle Eastern concessions raised, the U.S. oil manufacturing started to shrink in proportion due to its intensified consumption. The latter increased to as high as 30% of the globe's total consumption of petroleum with just an approximated 6% of the globe's reserves (Iskandar, 1974, p.55).

After the close of The Second World War, the U.S.A. started seeking different sources of oil overseas to satisfy its very own future needs. The Middle East was extremely eye-catching to both the U.S. federal government and American oil firms as a result of its tried and tested long-term oil reserves. Arab crude oil reserves were revealed to possibly have far more than the initially approximated 60% of the globe oil

reserves. Actually, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, and also Abu Dhabi owned greater than 50% of the identified reserves among themselves alone (Iskandar, 1974, p.55).

To vouch for this top quality, Middle Eastern oil was identified to flow unhampered of its very own pressure. This situation enabled more affordable production expenses; the Middle East per production barrel varied in between \$0.10 and \$0.22 cents, in contrast to \$0.39 cents in Venezuela, and as much as \$1.51 per barrel in the United States (Rustow, 1982, pp.92-93). This is a substantial unlikeness in terms of prices when it involves the bottom line. This is what made U.S. policymakers acknowledge how precious and beneficial was Middle Eastern oil.

Hence, based on this advantage, a couple of wars— one hot and one cold— manifested the value of Middle East oil for U.S. national safety and security and changed the connection between business owners and policymakers drastically. Persian Gulf oil certainly encouraged the Allied armies and navies to overpower and eventually defeat the Axis; it certainly sustained the Marshall Plan that assisted revitalize the financial healing of Western Europe, and it would ultimately flow right into the vehicles of countless travelers from Long Island to Los Angeles whose need for gasoline was steadily overtaking America's supply.

Due to the fact that both security abroad and welfare at home appeared to depend upon safe accessibility to Middle East crude, the United States' federal government quickly cleared the way for brand-new pipes, subsidised the building and construction of a fleet of supertankers, and spared American multinationals from the antitrust legislations. In the course of the Suez crisis and the Six Day War, Washington

functioned very closely with Wall Street to protect its oil concessions from assaults by Arab radicals and to stop the producing nations from interrupting the circulation of oil to customers in Europe and Asia (Little, 2008, p.44).

Increasing rivalry inside the global oil industry and the expanding development of the Arab oil states, nonetheless, swiftly deteriorated this informal collaboration between U.S. multinationals and policymakers right after 1970. For a long time controlled by the “Seven Sisters,” a crew of strong American and British-controlled giants that consisted of *Jersey Standard* and *Royal Dutch Shell*, Middle East crude was challenged and aimed at all along the late 1950s by smaller sized rivals that are more hostile (Little, 2008, p.44). By being provided terms much more generous than their bigger competitors, independent firms such as *Occidental Petroleum* won the right to manipulate prolific new oil fields such as those in Libya. As supplies increased, prices and profits dropped, dramatically decreasing the revenues to which the producing states had actually come to be familiar and triggering them to create the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960 (Little, 2008, p.44).

Afterwards, throughout the 1973 Arab/Israeli War, Arab registered members of the OPEC led a trade embargo against the United States in reaction to the move to re-supply the Israeli armed forces. The trade embargo, additionally, was applicable on various other nations that supported Israel encompassing Portugal, the Netherlands, and South Africa. Oil exports were disallowed, and production decreases were made, disturbing the U.S. economy that was incredibly dependent on external oil (Al Sarhan, 2017, p.461).

After ten years of economic wrangling among themselves, OPEC's Middle Eastern members succeeded to take control of production, pricing, as well as distribution from the large multinationals after 1973. By 1980, nearly all of the area's oil operations had actually been nationalised owing to the initiatives of OPEC (Little, 2008, p.44).

As they disposed their capacity to regulate both price and supply, the oil firms distanced themselves from the U.S. federal government. When many of the oil giants struck financially rewarding refining and circulation contracts with the producing nations in the very early 1980s, critics pointed out that large oil was placing business profits ahead of American national security. Yet if what was ideal for *Standard Oil* was not necessarily ideal for America throughout the Reagan years, corporate and national interests once more assembled in late 1990. At that time, American multinationals functioned carefully with American policymakers to boycott Iraqi crude after Saddam Hussein attacked Kuwait in a careless bid to dominate Persian Gulf oil. Seventy years earlier, because of the first Great War (WWI), the Wilson government had actually opened the gate for U.S. oil firms in the Middle East. In 1991, George Bush declared the century's last "great war" to help prevent this gate from slumming closed (Little, 2008, p.45).

Given the aforesaid, the oil variable is largely an essential geo-economic element in American foreign policy in the Middle East. In this regard, the American reporter Thomas Friedman published an article, which was released in *Herald Tribune* in mid-April 2003, in which he asserted: "Oil is one of the reasons for preparing for war against Iraq and if anyone tries to convince us otherwise, he certainly does not respect our minds" (Mansour, 2004, p.72). Thus, the oil factor has actually received the attention of

a variety of academics addressing the question of U.S. foreign policy from different angles.

Although space constraints make a comprehensive overview of these viewpoints not feasible, one might keep in mind, to name a few, that Michael Klare has actually highlighted in various publications the expanding worldwide rivalry for the decreasing energy resources and the enhanced role of countries as well as their armed forces apparatuses in safeguarding those diminishing resources (Mercille, 2010, p.331). Andrew Bacevich, on his part, has justified that the primary factor to control the region's oil reserves is to ensure an ever-increasing American affluence, which needs “access to cheap oil and lots of it” (Bacevich, 2005, p.182).

Besides, James L. Gelvin (2005), in his book *The Modern Middle East: A History* reveals that among one of the most remarkable goals of the U.S. in the Middle East region is to guarantee Western easy access to oil (p.260). The factors for this are twofold: initially, financial factors are basic, and second, the strategic plan is determined by the simple fact that the U.S. should supplement its home output of oil from the Middle Eastern resources. He proved this by the truth that in 1973 as much as a third of American oil imports arrived from the Middle East just before the oil trade embargo dilemma. And even today, the quantity of oil continues to be at one-fifth of American imports.

From a strategic point of view, the post-war financial healings of Europe and Japan were fuelled by inexpensive Middle Eastern oil. Since the Oil Embargo Crisis, American plan has actually treated oil as a strategic resource, as does considerably much of the globe. Actually, more than five decades later, even Europe obtains greater than a

third of its petroleum from the Middle East, and Japan obtains almost 80% of its petroleum from Middle Eastern business principle partners (Gelvin, 2005, pp.214-215).

Hence, one might say, three oil-related geo-economic motives for American intervention in the Middle East might be identified— particularly to help make profit from oil, to consume the oil, as well as to develop control over oil. Some critics, under the motto “No Blood for Oil,” describe profit and access as the major motives.¹ Alternatively, the present research suggests that, historically, control of oil has been clearly the most vital variable stimulating the United States’ intervention in the Middle East.

Simply put, command of the Gulf oil does not just provide the United States with the opportunity of using the oil tool. It, likewise, ensures the global dominance of the dollar as the globe’s unit of account, given the substantial overall size of oil business. Furthermore, guiding oil profits via American economic operators forms similarly a crucially essential lift for the country’s economic power.

Therefore, a prime motivation for American interventions in the Middle East, as indicated by Klare, was to keep “a stranglehold on the global economy” (Klare, 2003, p.4). One distinction in a post-Cold War geopolitical setting is that Middle Eastern oil currently requires to be assured for the Western community but revoked to Russia and China. Certainly, their control over Middle East power resources would definitely go a long way in the direction of consolidating the rising “Asian power grid,” (Mercille, 2010, p.332) an organization of Eurasian nations to regulate the continent's power resources. This power grid is significant due to the fact that, next to other things, it assists

¹ See Rutledge (2005) for this view.

Eurasian armed forces and political collaboration by means of bodies such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) established in 2001, involving Russia, China as well as various other main Asian countries. In brief, Eurasia would most likely be reinforced relative to the West, and the idea that Iran is currently an SCO member is a threatening sign for the West. The events of 9/11 obviously offered a political possibility to combine all these agendas.

2-1-2- Geopolitical Aims of the U.S.: The Hegemony Game

The geopolitical variable with its many dimensions has played a notable role in American foreign policy in the Middle East. The first dimension of which is keeping American military bases, specifically those in the Arab oil-rich nations along trade routes and high pressure spots that will certainly permit American policy to, overtly and covertly, affect the whole region.

The U.S. military bases can be identified as “military places that are used for training purposes, preparation, and stocking of military equipment for American military assistance or operations throughout the world” (Al Sarhan, 2017, p.463). Those military bases are closed to the general public and generally take various forms according to the military objective for which they were developed. They can be categorized into four key categories: Flying force; Military or Land; Navy; and Communication and/or Spy (p.463).

Prior to the Second World War, the number of America’s military bases overseas was comparatively small. However, with the start of the Cold War, the number of military bases as well as military installations rose quickly worldwide. According to

Alexander Cooley's representation of the U.S. Department of Defence's 2006 Base Structure Report:

The United States officially maintains 766 military installations overseas and another 77 in non-continental U.S. territories. Fifteen of these facilities were estimated to be worth more than \$1.6 billion each, whereas an additional 19 were valued at between \$862 million and \$1.6 billion. (Cooley, 2008, p.5)

Before 1980, the U.S. kept very little military presence in the Middle East. At the beginning of the 1970s, the U.S. signed an agreement with Bahrain for periodic utilisation of its naval facilities by the American Navy for a fee of four million dollars a year. Yet, after the 1973 Arab/Israeli War, Bahrain—no more welcoming of the American military presence—ended the lease (Sandars, 2000, p.293).

Afterwards, both the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan represented a considerable peril to America's crucial interest in the region, mainly taking into consideration the strategic location of an approximated 40% - 70% of the globe's petroleum reserves. In his 1980 State of the Union address, President Jimmy Carter declared that the U.S. would undoubtedly protect its interests in the Gulf area from external pressure doing whatsoever required, even involving military action (Carter, 2001). Carter, in March 1980, asked for the foundation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) (Al Sarhan, 2017, p.463).

In order to stimulate a long-lasting solution to the region, President Ronald Reagan brought together the command framework of the RDJTF and came to be much more associated with its connexion with the region. This act, merged with the formation of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) on January 1, 1983, developed

and improved the command structure to better fit its task in the region (Al Sarhan, 2017, p.464).

The United States CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) wraps the main area of the globe, the Middle East. It consists of nations in Central Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa—most remarkably, Bahrain, Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Kyrgyzstan, Egypt, Oman, Syria, Iran, Tajikistan, Jordan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Turkmenistan, Qatar, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, United Arab Emirates, and Tajikistan (Al Sarhan, 2017, p.464).

The prime goal of the United States CENTCOM is to provide conditions for the region's stability, safety, and affluence by promoting collaboration among countries, reacting to turmoil, restricting as well as avoiding hostilities, and promoting growth and reformation. By means of joined military operations, education and learning, and human support service, CENTCOM¹ offers to keep accessibility to facilities in the Middle East in addition to establishing partnerships with regional leaders (Al Sarhan, 2017, p.464).

After the Soviet Union's decline in the early 1990s, the Saddam Hussein government started to present a fresh and serious danger to the U.S. national security interests in the Middle East region. In 1990, following the Iraqi attack on Kuwait, America started to set up a coalition of higher than 30 countries to drive out the Iraqi army from Kuwait that took place in January 1991.

The United States CENTCOM sent approximately about 532,000 U.S. military personnel that comprised the coalition's military—the totality of which was about

¹ The United States CENTCOM is formed by four service components and one subordinate unified command. These include the United States Naval Forces, Middle East located in Bahrain; the United States Army Forces, Middle East based in Kuwait; the United States Air Forces, Middle East in Qatar; the United States Marine Forces, Middle East established in Bahrain; and the United States Special Operations Command, Middle East based in Qatar.

737,000—forming the pinnacle of the U.S. deployment in this Middle Eastern region. In 1991, there was a Gulf War armistice, yet there were relentless Iraqi frictions over the ensuing decade (Al Sarhan, 2017, p.464). In the outcome of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States CENTCOM's area of responsibility (AOR) was key to the Global War on Terrorism and participated in ventures in the Horn of Africa, Iraq, Afghanistan, as well as in other places in the AOR (*Military: US Central Command (USCENTCOM)*, 2016).

George W. Bush government claimed that the Iraqi government did not join efforts with the United Nations' arms inspectors to affirm that any type of WMD were destroyed and that Saddam Hussein was sustaining terrorism. As a consequence to these claims, America attacked Iraq in 2003. In the first phase, 150,000 American military personnel were sent to team up with personnel from coalition forces. This number rose by 30,000 in 2007, but the United States' forces in Iraq have generally ranged between 100,000 and 150,000. It was not until December 2011 that the U.S. formally withdrew its soldiers, keeping behind just 150 personnel staying at the American embassy in Iraq. Ever since this period, the deployed soldiers in the Middle East—approximately 35,000 U.S. military personnel—are largely placed in the Gulf States (*2015 Index of U.S. Military Strength*, 2016).

Besides, as part of the second dimension of the U.S. geopolitical aim in the Middle East, America strives to stop any aggressive power from attaining hegemony over the region, as difficult or as simple as that might be (Garfinkle, 2018, p.6). In their attempts to stop the appearance of competing hegemonies in the region, Americans search out the second geopolitical logic of preserving American credibility worldwide

(Mercille, 2010, p.333). A straightforward message requires to be transmitted to prospective challengers that seeking growth autonomous of American hegemony, or objecting to Washington's standards, will certainly not be consented to.

Put differently, more recent American policies in the Middle East were developed to indicate to potential challengers of American hegemony that disrupting American international plans holds serious punishments. This was acknowledged by American officials, as George Bush proclaimed during the course of the Gulf War:

And when we win—and we will—we will have caught a dangerous dictator and any tyrant tempted to follow in his footsteps that the U.S. has a new credibility, and that what we say goes, and that there is no place for lawless aggression in the Persian Gulf and in this new world order that we seek to create. (Bush, 1991)

A more overt declaration by George Bush came later on September 11, 1990 when he revealed U.S. real intentions behind intimidating Saddam's efforts to take Kuwait over. He asserts:

Vital issues of principle are at stake. Saddam Hussein is trying to wipe a country off the face of the Earth. . . . Vital economic interests are at stake as well. Iraq itself controls some 10 percent of the world's proven oil reserves. Iraq plus Kuwait control twice that. An Iraq permitted to swallow Kuwait would have the economic and military power, as well as the arrogance, to intimidate and coerce its neighbours—neighbours who control the lion's share of the world's remaining oil reserves. We cannot permit a resource so vital to be dominated by one so ruthless. And we won't. (Little, 2008, p.43)

Moreover, the third geopolitical dimension of the U.S. interest in the Middle East area is upholding a tight relationship with its "client-states" and unthreatening regimes. *The Dictionary of Government and Politics* identifies a client-state as a "country which

depends on another country for such things as defence, trade, etc” (Collin, 1998, p.50).

The Guide to International Relations and Diplomacy provides a more thorough definition to client-state as:

A country that is economically, politically, and/or militarily dependent upon another state.... The relationship is bilateral, and normally beneficial one, with mutual, although different, obligations. The client state... is often militarily powerful but economically weak.... client states during the Cold War were Israel and South Korea for the United States, and Syria, Iraq... for the Soviet Union. (Fry et al., 2002, p.9)

As the above statement explains, numerous Middle Eastern nations were split into a couple of corresponding camps at the outset of the Cold War. In one of the two camps, nations such as Syria and Egypt promoted the Soviet Union and embraced global communist beliefs. In the second camp, nations like Turkey, Greece, added to Israel, supported the U.S. and embraced capitalist tenets and style. Both parties, nevertheless, were obtaining financial, military, and diplomatic assistance from either Washington or Moscow. Additionally, a handful of countries had the ability to utilise their diplomatic capacities to get assistance from each of the two parties.

In clearer terms, after the collapse of the globe’s traditional powers—chiefly British, French, and Ottoman—in the Middle East, most freshly sovereign states in the region encountered considerable financial hardships and were intensely reliant on foreign economic support. Amidst the Cold War struggle, the United States and the Soviet Union became the principal suppliers of foreign help. Each of the two world powers acknowledged the value of the region for their national security interests and, therefore, looked for the strengthening of their partnerships with the region’s nations and developed “client-states” (Al Sarhan, 2017, p.466). Particularly, the nations

mentioned below came to be “client-states” of the U.S. since the mid-1940s: “Saudi Arabia (1945), Greece and Turkey (1947), Israel (1948), Iran (1953 and ended in 1979), Pakistan (1954), Lebanon (1957 and ends in 1975), Jordan (1963), Tunisia (1974), Egypt (1976), Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman (in 1991-1992)” (p.466). The patron-client relation with the Middle Eastern nations has attained favourable results in protecting both Allies’ and American security interests in the region.

Because the U.S. acknowledged its rival’s interests in the Middle East region, it aimed at preventing its quite possible proliferation through various policies. These encompassed the containment, deterrence, and détente; founding protective organisations and alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1949, Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1954; METO in 1955, and CENTO in 1959 as previously highlighted; and boldly chasing several agreements, alliances, and accords of common collaboration and friendly relationship.

Easily noticeable is the fact that throughout the duration of this experience, an unequal relationship between the U.S. and the Middle Eastern nations was designed. This unequal patron-client relation has made it possible for the U.S. to obtain total access to tested energy supplies. Besides, this partnership opened the gate for founding more military bases and installations, which have, as a result, augmented American personnel’s presence in the Gulf region. Precisely, in 2014, as formerly highlighted, as many as 35,000 American armed forces’ personnel worked in the Middle East, yet exact numbers are not readily obtainable due to the hypersensitive politics of the Middle East region (*2015 Index of U.S. Military Strength*, 2016). Eventually, financial, military, and diplomatic assistance has been ultimately broadened to friendly Middle Eastern regimes.

With the advent of the 2010-2011 Arab Spring, however, the American foreign policy toward those regimes altered completely, for the U.S. chose to assist people in revolution rather than backing their regimes. This preference contradicts the U.S. past strategy in Libya, Bahrain, Tunisia, Syria, Yemen, and Egypt. In my view, this strategic preference has proved so far to be a double-edged sword that could have generated lengthier complications and disorder to the local populace than maintaining the former regimes in power could have produced.

In sum, safeguarding client-states has been vital to American foreign policy for several decades. Nevertheless, since the U.S. has extended its interests globally, it has made use of a system of rotating preservation of specific regimes and has required to occasionally handle extra clients from time to time to preserve its interests.

Warding off terrorist groups as well as the Islamic resistance movements is the last American foreign policy's geopolitical interest in the Middle East region. Afghanistan, a country situated in South-Central Asia, not too far from the Middle East, initially captured U.S. concern. After the 1979 Soviet Union attack on this country, the U.S. and its allies denounced this aggressive action. Various measures, subsequently, were taken by the American government to push the Soviets to pull out their forces. Hence, Arab states, the U.S., as well as China overtly and covertly provided the Mujaheddin with both military and financial aid.

In 1998, however, Al-Qaeda was declared having responsibility over the bombing of U.S. embassies located in East Africa. America, consequently, put the finger of blame on the Taliban¹ regime for ensuring a secure asylum for Al-Qaeda and its chief

¹ Islamic forces that opposed Afghanistan's occupation by the Soviet Union from 1979 to 1989. They ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001.

leader, Osama bin Laden (Laub, 2014). Then, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, generated an American declaration of a global “War on Terrorism.” Both Al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime were accused by the George W. Bush administration of sheltering Al-Qaeda forces.

As part of this “War on Terrorism”, the U.S. aimed at fighting a number of Islamic groups, a large segment of whom were Sunni Muslim—namely Al-Shabaab in Somalia, Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Taliban in Afghanistan, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. The immediate reason behind this was the defence of American national security interests worldwide (Al Sarhan, 2017, p.469).

Therefore, a number of Middle Eastern countries, including Syria, Iraq, and Iran were accused by the Bush administration of funding as well as sustaining terrorists. In this respect, President Bush declared: “... Syria and Iran continue to harbour and assist terrorists.... The United States lists both countries as state sponsors of terrorism because of their support for Palestinian militant groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad” (*Bush: Syria, Iran Harboring Terrorists*, 2003).

As for Iraq, President Bush accused it of backing terrorism. Bush alleged that a tight relationship existed between Iraq, Saddam Hussein, and Al-Qaeda. He claimed also that Iraqi intelligence personnel met Osama bin Laden in Sudan. Then, in February 2003, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism was introduced by the Bush government for the sake of resisting terrorism around the globe. This program encompassed plans to eliminate terrorists as well as their organisations, to revoke sponsorship, assistance, and shelter to terrorists, to reduce the financial and social

facilities that terrorists use, and to protect American residents and their welfare inside and outside their country (Al Sarhan, 2017, p.469).

Officially, on March 19, 2003, Iraq was invaded by the U.S., which brought down the Saddam Hussein regime. The list of President Bush's accusations included primarily the Iraqi regime's violation of human rights, its ownership of WMD, added to its act of shielding terrorist leaders. Furthermore, the U.S. officials contended that the Iraqi regime was shaking both the stability and safety of the whole Middle East region.

Until now, the U.S. holds the conviction that due to their extremist perception of Islam, these Islamic groups deeply oppose the West. Besides, the United States considers those terrorist groups as presenting considerable danger to America, its allied security interests, and the whole Middle East region's safety and stability. During August-September 2014, the United States formed an international coalition against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). On September 23, 2014, the United States and other countries, among which a number of Arab countries—namely Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar—started air attacks on ISIS spots in Syria “to take out the militant group's ability to command, train and resupply its fighters” (Al Sarhan, 2017, p.469).

Based on this, it is crystal clear to the observer's eye that the United States has been in the last couple of decades highly concerned that if radical Islamic combatant groups take hold of WMD with their many types—biological, nuclear, chemical radiological—there would result a serious peril to American national security interests. More particularly, any threat to those interests related to the Middle East would generate a quick destabilisation of the whole area.

In sum, as shown in this section, prior to World War II American presence in the Middle East region was minimal. However, in the course of World War II and following it, the U.S. kept little military presence in Bahrain, Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. After the 1990 Iraqi attack on Kuwait, the U.S. escalated its military presence and increased the impact of its military ground in the Gulf States. This could allow the U.S. to assure secure access to and command over oil, not only for America but for its allies as well. Additionally, the U.S. strived to attract some “client-states” and guarantee the safety and security of friendly regimes. This was vital to respond immediately to external and internal crises, to resist extremist forces and Islamic radical factions that might shake the stability of American interests in the region, and, ultimately, to sustain the short and long-term geostrategic U.S. foreign policy agendas that will be highlighted below.

2-1-3- Geostrategic Aim of the U.S.: The Watchdog Guardian

More importantly, the Americans’ aims in the Middle East go beyond the geopolitical and geo-economic variables to meet the geostrategic variable as well. De facto, Americans aim to help Israel and deflect attention away from its colonisation of Palestine and the killing of people there (Sorabji & Rodin, 2006, p.90). The best evidence of this was their keenness to devastate Iraq, the most powerful adjoining Arab country in early twenty-first century, next to their current ceaseless effort to disintegrate all the countries of the region such as Syria, Lybia, Lebanon, Yemen and Iran into small statelets, and through their division and fragility to ensure Israel’s durability and the perpetuation of its cruel colonisation of the Peninsula. Considered as the main parts of the game, these countries would not only end up being the U.S. primary partners, but they would sustain the initiatives to settle the Palestinian/Israeli conflict as well.

Hence, an important geostrategic U.S. interest in the Middle East region is Israel's protection and the assurance of its stability in the frequently skittish region. At a deeper level, the preservation of a powerful Israel in the Middle East region strengthens American national security interests there. This foreign policy tendency has prevailed in American political scene since the mid-twentieth century and carries on to sculpture the present policy (Al Sarhan, 2017, p.461).

It would be incorrect to believe that Israel embodies the main American interest in the Middle East, despite the striking degree of American support for Israel. Instead, the region's energy reserves, particularly those in the Arabian Peninsula, are of primary significance. The idea that the United States should maintain control over these energy reserves has been essentially a tenet of American foreign policy since World War II. The idea that petrodollars should be primarily directed towards the United States through military acquisitions, building projects, bank deposits, and Treasury securities investments, is another twist upon the same topic. It was required to defend this primary interest against numerous threats in the twentieth century (Chomsky, 1999, p.61).

The first threat, in Professor Noam Chomsky's view, was exemplified in the USSR and the spread of communism as explained previously. The second threat was related to Europe, which presented a more plausible challenge to American hegemony in the area. The United States was able to drive out France and, to a greater extent, Britain in the 1940s. 40% of Iranian oil was transferred from British to American ownership as a result of the 1953 coup supported by the CIA that reinstalled the Shah (Chomsky, 1999, p.65).

Later on, there was an ongoing concern about European engagement in the area. The United States vehemently opposed Britain and France's attempt to regain their influence in the region with the 1956 Suez invasion in cooperation with Israel. It had a key role in driving all three nations out of Egyptian territory; however, Soviet threats may have also had some influence. In his 1973 “Year of Europe” speech, Henry Kissinger spoke about the risks of a commercial bloc controlled by Europe that would exclude the United States and include the Middle East and North Africa (Chomsky, 1999, p.65).

The threat of radical nationalism was the third indigenous threat that the area needed to be “defended” against. The Israeli argument that a strong Israel was a “strategic asset” for the U.S., acting as a deterrent to domestic extreme nationalist threats to U.S. interests that could receive backing from the USSR, began to gain traction in the late 1950s. Israel's actions to thwart Syrian attempts to aid Palestinians being targeted by Jordan in September 1970, when the United States was unable to directly intervene against what was seen as a threat to American clients in the Arab world, further supported this Israeli argument (Chomsky, 1999, p.67). As a result of this commitment, U.S. aid increased significantly. U.S. analysts contended in the 1970s that the Shah's Iran and Israel were used to safeguard American dominance over the Gulf's oil-producing regions. Since the overthrow of the Shah, the United States has become more supportive of Israel's role as a Middle East watchdog serving American interests.

Simultaneously, Israel helped the United States bypass the prohibition on aid to Rhodesia and South Africa, support Haile Selassie in Ethiopia, Idi Amin in Uganda, Mobutu in Zaire, Bokassa in the Central African Republic, and others at different points

in time, and provide significant covert CIA subsidies to help the U.S. penetrate Black Africa. Later, Israel provided military and technological assistance, along with numerous advisors, for U.S. clients in Central America (Chomsky, 1999, p.67-68).

In the twenty-first century context, the U.S. has been having several reasons for needing to preserve Israel's safety and supremacy in the Middle East. First, since their control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, the Sunni Islamist group Hamas—which the U.S. has classified as a 'terrorist' organization—has engaged Israel in multiple conflicts from that location. Second, Hezbollah's missile arsenal and Iran-supported attempts to exploit Syrian bases and territory to support Hezbollah continue to pose a threat along the northern border of Israel. Nonetheless, the 2021 Abraham Accords, which were discussed earlier in chapter one, were the result of Israel's expanding collaboration with a number of other Arab and Muslim-majority nations. In addition, U.S. officials frequently discuss their worries about China and Russia—including Russia's invasion of Ukraine—with Israeli interlocutors. Israel aims to alleviate these worries while fostering closer commercial ties with China and preventing Russian interference in Israeli military operations in Syria (Zanotti, n.d. p.1). As previously illustrated in the preceding chapter, this dedication to preserve Israel's existence is based on a religious ground. Many members of the religious right composed of the Pentecostals and Fundamentalists adopt a seceding form of Protestant millennialism. The latter was transferred to the U.S. in 1859 by the English theologian John Nelson Darby (Judis, 2005, p.6). This perspective of history is profoundly bleak and has quite often stimulated a discrete view of American role worldwide. Darby argued that the time span from Christ's crucifixion to the "end times" that preceded the millennium was a "parenthesis."

The end times would start with the sudden arrival of Jesus to “rapture the true believers to heaven.” Those model Christians would be protected and saved for seven years of “bloody tribulation,” which would happen in Israel to which the Jews would have come back and laid claim. At the seven years’ termination, Jesus would arrive to overthrow Satan in the battle of Armageddon, leading the millennium to start (p.6).

Christians who complied with this theory strongly considered that their principal duty on earth was to design exemplary lives so that they could be “raptured before the tribulation”. For the most part of the previous century, a large number of them stayed away from politics and, as a result, lacked any perspective about foreign policy. The only exception was their unshakable interest in the Jewish return to Israel. However, even in contemporary times when many of them became engaged in politics chiefly for the sake of fighting what they consider as a secular threat to their beliefs, they continue to carry a short-sighted view of American foreign policy goals concentrated on Israel. For this reason, a large number of the religious right members were in favour of and sustained the war on Iraq. Obviously, their objective was not to democratise the Middle East, but specifically to counter Saddam Hussein’s regime which posed a serious threat to Israel, a country that “they are determined to protect in preparation for the end times” (Judis, 2005, p.6).

In short, the geopolitical, geo-economic as well as geostrategic variables are cardinal to elucidating the U.S. foreign policy objectives behind its interest in Middle Eastern affairs; and missing out one of them would make the view incomplete. Likewise, South Africa had been an important player in the U.S. self-interest chessboard during

the reign of Apartheid for some key factors. The most important of which will be highlighted in what follows.

2-2-Key U.S. interests in Apartheid South Africa

With the aim of contextualising the subsequent chapters of this work, the present section covers the entire 1948 to 1994 apartheid era. It pinpoints major sets of interests that consecutive United States' governments needed to mangle as far as South Africa was concerned. In this regard, three key foreign policy motives are analysed in turn: economic prospects, strategic considerations, and human rights apprehensions. Stretching from President Truman to Bush, the above motives were the major contending calculations that every single administration was incessantly obliged to match. As will be revealed, shifts in conditions and perspectives over the years made the interconnectedness between the three motives compelling and changeable, with their relative importance shrinking and increasing. What is fixed is the fact that none of those motives came to be entirely void of appropriateness to the U.S. Certainly, each continued to be extremely pertinent all the way through the entire apartheid era. The factors behind the maintenance of this significance are expounded hereinafter.

2-2-1-U.S. Strategic Interests in South Africa: The Communist Ghost

The Second World War played a decisive role in altering the United States' approach to foreign affairs. The threats encountered on the eve of the war, which were not properly met by convenient measures, changed American policymakers' perception about national security plans. Shortly before the outbreak of the war, the U.S. troops were stationed nowhere abroad, the country lacked military alliances, added to a defence

budget which did not exceed \$500 million per annum. After forty years, America adopted a new strategy of foreign policy—as part of it 50 alliances were made globally, in addition to the creation of a huge army of remarkable capacity funded by about \$300 billion per annum (Thomson, 2008, p.6). This is what enabled Washington, D.C., to meet the then modern threats to American sovereignty, chiefly communism.

Indeed, at the heart of American foreign policy objectives in the post-World War II era was its inclination to contain communism. The steps made forward included the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, American troops' participation in the Korean War, next to the declaration of a long revenge war in South East Asia. All these steps provided protection to the U.S. security interests globally. The strategy of this time was identified by Secretary of State Dean Acheson as having the “central aim and purpose” to “maintain as spacious an environment as possible in which free states might exist and flourish.” For him, the adequate “method was common action with like-minded states to secure and enrich the environment and to protect one another from predators through mutual aid and joint effort” (Acheson, 1969, p.727). It is clear that the U.S. now aimed to preserve its security by means of active relationships with nations it had formerly considered as too distant for such interest.

At the height of the Cold War era, South Africa—which had previously been receiving marginal considerations as far as U.S. global strategic calculations were concerned—became seen as a beneficial ally. Firstly, starting from the Second World War closure up to the 1980s, the government in Pretoria was forming a safe platform of animosity toward communism. Secondly, while Africa was regarded as the continent of uncertainty, South Africa appeared as a relatively stable country. On the whole, Africa

was transforming itself into a nonaligned area—through the process of decolonisation—after formerly being a Western sphere of influence. After taking independence, numerous were the former colonies that started to embrace ideologies incompatible with the political ideals adopted by the U.S.

Contrary to them, South Africa continued to have a resolute support to the capitalist system. For this reason, the government in Pretoria was America's perfect partner. This partnership epitomised in the U.S. economic and military hegemony over southern Africa could assist in stopping Marxist-Leninism from getting prominence within this region (Thomson, 2008, p.7).

Indeed, U.S. strategists found it quite valuable to have a white government in Pretoria. During this time, and specifically in the 1960s, the South African liberation movements began their armed struggle against the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) in reaction to their outlawing. To help them win the struggle, they received material assistance from the Soviet Union and its allies. This alliance along with the ANC's socialist tendency threatened U.S. interests in the region if the majority rule would come to be an imposed reality substituting the pro-Western government in Pretoria (Thomson, 2008, p.7).

Another dimension of American concerns were related to the matter of the ANC's strong ties with the South African Communist Party (SACP), which was the ANC's principal ally in its struggle for liberation. If looked at closely, both organisations' structures were considerably intertwined. Hence, at the height of the Cold War, it was hard to avoid the suspicion that there were relations coupling both the ANC and the

SACP on the one hand, and the Soviet Union's Communist Party on the other. This issue was brought to the fore by the American political scientist Michael Radu, who wrote in the State Department's journal *Problems of Communism* and asserted that, because of these connections with Moscow, the African National Congress had been transfigured from a "nationalist organisation dedicated to the pursuit of civil and political rights to a vanguard socialist movement with strong Marxist-Leninist elements" (Radu, 1987, p.59). His end conclusion was that the ANC has become a merely communist movement "in its political goals, and an ally of the USSR in its geopolitical aims" (p.64). Given these facts, for the U.S., Pretoria's dedication to halt "communists" from gaining power in the Republic and the whole region overweighed the South African government's racial policies.

Besides, Pretoria's geographical location was another incentive that boosted this state's value in Washington, D.C.'s eyes. "A plain question deserves a plain answer: South Africa is of great strategic importance, whatever one's point of view," noted Richard Bissell (1980) in response to a former question posed by him in a paper titled *How Strategic is South Africa?* (p.209). He knew quite clearly that Pretoria strategically supplied essential minerals to the Western world, next to this Republic's closeness to the active sea-lane off the Cape of Good Hope.

Following World War II, the route's relevance changed into an accessibility passage to the Middle Eastern oil reserves. This importance was boosted in the aftermath of the Suez Canal closure between 1967 and 1975. The expanding flow was for super tankers to ship the largest quantities of Western oil imports through this sea rapid route around the Cape of Good Hope. These tankers, by the year 1980, provided supplies to

65 percent of Western Europe's, and 28 percent of U.S. oil consumption (Hanks, 1981, p.19). The Cape, being close to the African coast, became, therefore, "a congestion area", or "choke point", with roughly about 2,300 vessels crossing its sea every month (Thomson, 2008, p.7). These reasons pushed strategic analysts to suggest that this Cape traffic was prone to Soviet intrusion, indicating that South Africa was the natural policeman to defend Western shipping from this danger. For instance, Robert J. Hanks, the former U.S. naval officer, affirmed in his 1981 book *The Cape Route: Imperiled Western Lifeline* that "the importance of the Cape Route to the industrialised nations of the Free World must be taken as a given. There is little room for argument with this thesis" (p.xi).

The strategic calculus was taken more seriously in 1968 when the Soviet navy began to severely guard the Indian Ocean. U.S. strategists and politicians became highly interested in the long-term deployment of between 15 to 30 warships and auxiliary craft. To mention a few, for instance, S.W.B. Menaul (1972), the Air Vice-Marshal, alluded to the ports of Durban and Simonstown and said: "NATO members must, in the near future, take advantage of these facilities so in co-operation with South African maritime forces they may jointly provide the security which these vital sea lanes demand" (p.44). Menaul's assessment received wide applause from Senior U.S. Navy staff. Admiral John McCain, a former commander in chief for the Pacific, felt that "we absolutely need access to the South African facilities at Simonstown and Durban." The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), on their turn, were worried about the "increasing Soviet naval capability" in this (Thomson, 2008, p.7).

As a result, the conviction that Washington, D.C., needed to cultivate deeper connections with Pretoria, for the sake of the Cape Route defence, made it to as high as the Secretary-General of NATO Joseph Luns who, in the early 1970s, strongly promoted South Africa's incorporation within the NATO alliance's defence outline (Coker, 1982, p.36). Pretoria's outstanding ports, its strong anti-communist stance, added to the fact that it was alone in charge of supervising traffic rounding the Cape of Good Hope had generated a positive impact among U.S. foreign policy officials.

Besides, of paramount importance to the U.S. were the massive mineral resources under the South African government's custody. In spite of covering only one percent of the globe's surface area, South Africa was the fourth biggest nonfuel minerals' exporter during this time (The [Rockefeller] Study Commission, 1981, p.310). For instance, Pretoria was in 1975 the chief provider of gold, vanadium, antimony, and platinum group metals worldwide. It, additionally, ranked second in both manganese and chrome ore supply, and third in uranium, asbestos, and diamonds' output. Rutile, andalusite, and cobalt were likewise striking in the supply of this global minerals' store (Van Rensburg & Pretorius, 1977, p.21). The U.S. viewed the dependable supply of these products as a crucial and intrinsic element of its industrial machine. As a result, South Africa gained the name the "Persian Gulf of non-fuel minerals" (Thomson, 2008, p.7).

Chief among those minerals, four types were of significant strategic worth: vanadium, manganese, chromium, as well as the platinum group metals—particularly, iridium, rhodium, palladium, osmium, and ruthenium. For example, the lack of chromium could have prevented the U.S. steel making industry from the production of corrosion resistant alloys of substantial strength, properties required by the weaponries'

business. Moreover, manganese, having likewise utility in the steel industry, had no “known satisfactory substitute to defuse and deoxidise iron”. Similarly, lightweight vanadium was largely utilised in the aircrafts’ manufacturing—basically in the production of airframes and jet engines. On their turn, the platinum group metals were essential for electrical items and as stimulants in the petrochemical industry (The [Rockefeller] Study Commission, 1981, p.318).

Therefore, South Africa provided supply to a sizable percentage of U.S. demand to these four minerals. For instance, South African suppliers supplied 57 percent of U.S. vanadium requirements, 30 percent of U.S. chrome ore, 36 percent of U.S. ferromanganese, 19 percent of U.S. platinum group metals, and 35 percent of U.S. ferrochrome needs in 1974. Washington, D.C., had to take into consideration the well-being of its allies as well. Western Europe and Japan, contrary to the U.S., which could reach a certain level of self-sufficiency relative to these materials, needed to import the largest portion of their mineral needs (Van Rensberg & Pretorius, 1977, p.112).

The United States and its allies’ reliance on this one country for these four minerals had strategic ramifications. What if the supply of South African materials was cut off? The accessibility to alternate sources of supply added to policymakers’ concerns in the United States. Indeed, the Soviet Union owned the majority of the world's remaining manganese, chromium, platinum, and vanadium group metal reserves (see table 2).

<i>Mineral</i>	<i>United States</i>	<i>South Africa</i>	<i>Soviet Union</i>	<i>Soviet Union plus South Africa</i>
Chromium:				
production	0.00	33.0	24.5	57.5
reserves	0.00	66.4	2.90	69.3
Manganese:				
production	0.00	20.9	45.8	66.7
reserves	0.00	37.2	50.7	87.9
Platinum Group:				
production	0.10	47.5	47.5	95.0
reserves	0.10	73.2	25.1	98.3
Vanadium:				
production	17.6	42.3	27.9	70.2
reserves	0.70	49.4	45.9	95.3

Table 2: Percentage Share of World Chromium, Manganese, Platinum Group Metals, and Vanadium Production and Reserves by Country 1979 (U.S. Department of the Interior, 1980, p.34)

Brett Silvers and Scott Thompson noted in 1979 that, “Russia’s African policy is not driven by its own resource needs, but rather those of NATO . . .” (Thomson, 2008, p.9). After all, A.N. Lagovsky, a Soviet major-general was the one who coined the “weak link principle” in the 1950s. Lagovsky had theorised that the Western economies could

be seriously disrupted by denying them minerals mined in southern Africa (p.9). Such concerns led Anthony Harrigan (1976), the vice president of the U.S. Industrial Council, to declare that “If the Soviets are successful in detaching these resources [from the Western economies] they will have struck a massive, possibly devastating blow to the West, [giving] the Soviet totalitarian order a bigger boost than any other it has enjoyed in its history” (p.496).

This line of thinking prompted the United States Congress in 1971 to enact a legislation that violated UN sanctions against Rhodesia. As an alternative to depending on Soviet supplies, the Byrd Amendment allowed the United States to import chrome from this territory, despite the fact that Rhodesia had unilaterally declared itself independent from the UK and was governed by an unlawful white minority-rule government. Senator Robert Byrd had convinced his colleagues that strategic objectives superseded human rights concerns when the matter was related to securing supplies of these minerals (Thomson, 2008, p.9).

On the whole, during the apartheid era, South Africa was a willing participant in the fight against communism. It was also a country with access to one of the world's busiest shipping channels and had the ability to supply the West with relatively rare materials for their industrial economies. Given the international political context of the Cold War, these strategic issues remained at the forefront of foreign policy leaders' minds as they examined their strategy toward South Africa. As one may perceive, if the U.S. pursued a more aggressive policy of confronting the South African government's racial policies, these strategic advantages could have been jeopardised, and the economic interests, as will be discussed below, could have been put at stake.

2-2-2-U.S. Economic Interests in South Africa: Supremacy's Winning Ticket

During the second half of the twentieth century, the United States' economy exploded into the global market. Between 1945 and 1980, the value of exports as a percentage of the U.S. gross domestic product doubled, and imports quadrupled. Foreign investment in the United States skyrocketed. In 1950, total American direct investment abroad was valued at US\$11,788 million; by 1980, it had nearly grown to US\$215,375 million (Seidman, 1978, p.81). The reality of American transnational corporations (TNCs) flying the country's flag in nearly every corner of the globe had arrived. The actions of American corporations in South Africa were no exception.

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the United States made significant Transnational Corporation investments in South Africa. The automotive and petroleum sectors in the United States were at the forefront of this new economic invasion. By 1920, the Union of South Africa was the United States' fifth-largest export market for automobiles. To reach this market, *Ford* of South Africa— with its assembly plant in Port Elizabeth—was founded in 1923, with its own assembly plant in Port Elizabeth. In 1926, *General Motors* followed *Ford's* lead, and in the 1930s, the *Firestone Tire Company* came. “There are splendid openings here...for energetic men with sufficient capital to finance the undertaking and employ the large forces of cheap native labour found in most parts...American capital could be put to splendid use here in the interests of American trade,” as the United States consulate in Cape Town noted formerly in the 1920s (Thomson, 2008, p.11). By 1940, corporations like *Johnson & Johnson*, *Coca-Cola*, *Colgate-Palmolive*, *Metro Goldwyn Mayer*, and *Colombia Records* all had South African subsidiaries. Likewise, during the post-Second World War years in South

Africa, U.S. commercial interests were well serviced (see table 3). South Africa was significantly a good environment for multinational firms to work in, reaping the benefits of the South African government's pro-capitalist liberal leanings toward overseas investment.

<i>Year</i>	<i>Total U.S. exports to South Africa (US\$ millions)</i>	<i>Total U.S. imports from South Africa (US\$ millions)</i>	<i>U.S. total direct investment in South Africa (US\$ millions)</i>	<i>Return on U.S. total direct investment in South Africa (percentage)</i>
1950	126	142	140	9.29
1955	268	96	257	14.79
1960	288	108	286	11.89
1965	438	226	528	14.58
1970	536	290	868	16.60
1975	1,302	840	1,582	4.49
1980	2,463	3,321	2,350	28.30
1985	1,205	2,071	1,394	2.51
1990	1,732	1,698	775	21.03

Table 3: U.S. Economic Relations with South Africa (Exports, Imports, and Direct Investment), 1950–1990.¹

¹ U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. *Historical statistics of the United States colonial times to 1957*. Washington DC: U.S. GPO, 1960; U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. *Statistical Abstract of the United States*. Annual editions: 1963, 1974, 1985, 1990, 1993. Washington DC: U.S. GPO, 1963,

Despite the fact that South Africa's percentage of total U.S. international exports stayed relatively stable over these years, at between 1 and 2% of total U.S. exports, the Republic had little trouble digesting its share of the quickly rising production from the U.S. economy. South African imports from the U.S. increased from US\$131 million in 1945 to US\$2,463 million in 1980. South African exports to the U.S. similarly increased, totalling US\$104 million at World War II closure and US\$3,321 million by 1980. The investment sector, nevertheless, reaped the greatest fruits of this free access to the market in South Africa. The book value of U.S. private capital investment in the Union of South Africa in 1950 was US\$140 million; by 1980, it had climbed to US\$2,350 million (Thomson, 2008, p.11).

For U.S. transnational businesses, the chief appeal of the South African market was the profits on their investments. For example, from 1950 and 1990, these profits yielded an average of 13.72 percent, while global U.S. investment yielded only 11.2 percent on average (Thomson, 2008, p.12). South Africa's mining industry was an especially powerful sector of its economy. This country, as one American corporate director described, "makes U.S. mining companies' mouth water" (Falconbridge, 1975, p.155). Profits on investment in this area routinely surpassed analogous investments around the world. Between 1950 and 1980, money invested in the Republic yielded a 30 percent average return, double that of U.S. mining corporations in Latin America and the Caribbean, and quadruple that of Canada. Thanks to these profits, by 1980, 57 percent of *Fortune's* wealthiest 500 U.S. industrial corporations were proved to

1974, 1984, 1990, 1993; and U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of Economic Analysis. *Survey of Current Business*. 1956, 36(8), 19 and 23; 1961, 41(8), 22–23; 1966, 46(9), 34–35; 1972, 52(11), 30; 1977, 57(8), 44 and 50; 1984, 64(11), 24–25; 1986, 66(8), 70; and 1994, 74(8), 134.

invest directly in the South African economy, including the mining sector and other sectors (Thomson, 2008, p.12).

The revenues that American businesses could harvest from the South African economy, as well as the number of major American enterprises that thrived in this climate, became key considerations for presidents developing foreign policy toward this country. Any punitive actions aimed at pressuring Pretoria over its apartheid policy entailed jeopardising U.S. economic interests in the country, as well as incurring political costs among corporate executives at home. The following lines discuss how the United States' strategic and economic objectives in South Africa conflicted with the country's human rights challenges.

2-2-3-U.S. Interests and Human Rights in South Africa: Overlapping Priorities

The desire of succeeding administrations to propagate American principles overseas was a core consideration of American foreign policy in the post-war years. "There are those who will say that the liberation of humanity, the freedom of man and mind, is nothing but a dream. They are right. It is the American dream" (Vogelgesang, 1980, p.15). This statement by Archibald MacLeish seeks to emphasize the liberal tradition that runs through American society. This tradition traces its roots back to the United States' founding document, which was written by the Puritan founding fathers. "All men are created equal," according to the Declaration of Independence of 1776, with "certain unalienable rights," and the "right" and "duty" to overthrow "destructive" governments. To codify these ideas in law, the United States created a constitution followed by the Bill of Rights.

With such a solid ostensible home political heritage of liberty and equality, it is not astonishing that these ideas have made their way into American foreign policy. In his research of the American Approach to Foreign Policy, Dexter Perkins (1962) concluded that it is “fair to say that there is a highly moralistic favour to our diplomacy as compared with other nations” (p.76). He cites President Woodrow Wilson's idea that “the world must be made safe for democracy,” as expressed in his Fourteen Points and the Versailles Treaty (p.84).

Throughout the twentieth century, an identical rhetoric was, indeed, frequently reiterated. President Franklin D. Roosevelt spoke of “four freedoms”, namely freedom of expression, freedom of religion, freedom from economic hardship, and freedom from fear of aggression. During World War II, the United States alongside the United Kingdom drafted the Atlantic Charter, which espoused for self-determination; and during the Cold War, Washington, D.C., repeatedly voiced support for the expansion of freedom and democracy around the globe while denouncing the Soviet Union's authoritarianism.

It is true that proponents of “realism” mitigated the direct implementation of those beliefs in post-war U.S. foreign policy, yet undeniable is the fact that, as expressed by Richard Cooper and Joseph Nye, “Neither politics nor morality really stops at the water’s edge. They just become more complicated . . . Given the nature of American political culture, there will always be a demand for moral expression in foreign policy” (Huntington, 1985, p.41).

Considering this requirement, the U.S./South African relationship could never be merely a friendship between two nations dedicated to the containment of communism and the promotion of capitalist business. Apartheid made this quite hard. Pretoria's bold attempt at social engineering could not be ignored by any measure of realist logic. The fact that Black South Africans were deprived of fundamental human rights worsened the bilateral ties between the two nations as the post-World War II era evolved.

In 1948, when South Africa's National Party was voted into office, its administration endeavoured to segregate the lives of Black and white South Africans through parliamentary legislation and forceful policing during the following 40 years, exercising explicit and institutionalized racism, as detailed in the preceding chapter. Before 1948, and starting from 1910 when the seeds of apartheid were being formed, laws had already constrained the amount of territory that Africans could buy and confined them to particular kinds of jobs. Apartheid after 1948 was about solidifying this status and completely segregating the demographic groups.

Marriage and sexual interactions between people of different ethnicities, as shown earlier, were criminalised by a massive wave of laws in the late 1940s and early 1950s—for example, the 1949 Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, succeeded by the 1950 Immorality Act. Apart from that, the 1950 Population Registration Act gave everyone in South Africa an official racial identification. The 1950 Group Areas Act restricted the settlement of certain population groups to specific geographical zones. Furthermore, under the bizarrely worded 1952 Abolition of Permits and Consolidation of Documents Act, Black “citizens” were compelled to carry passes declaring their official racial classification and defining where they were allowed to be. Additionally,

the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1952 kept races separate in public venues and on public transportation. The school system was also stratified, according to the Bantu Education Act of 1953. Besides, the 1950 Suppression of Communism Act established a security structure to implement this social engineering. The Afrikaner government's goal was to make it illegal to have any significant contact between Black and white people (Thomson, 2008, p.13).

This “separate development” grew even more extensive later, as highlighted in the first chapter, with “petit or petty apartheid” giving way to “grand apartheid.” The next goal was to solidify the racial separation on a territorial level. Grand apartheid's inevitable consequence was that all Africans would dwell in their own distinct states, governed by their own governments. Such people were allowed to reside and find a job in “white” South Africa only if they assisted the white economy, but then again, they were treated as transitory visitors with no voting rights within the country. To this goal, the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970 gave all Africans a hometown. Unless they were advantageously engaged in the white commerce, each of these individuals was compelled to live in a government-defined region based on their ethnic background. This legislation was coupled by mass “removals” of entire villages (Thomson, 2008, p.13).

Apartheid theory aimed to harmonise Afrikaner nationalist dominance with a sense of fairness. Apartheid was supposed to provide Black South Africans with what the Afrikaner had fought for: self-determination and the ability to build their own culture. Yet, apartheid, in essence, was nothing more than widespread profiteering, misery, and human rights violations. Apartheid was rendered untenable by simple math.

When 75 percent of the population was crammed into the homelands, which accounted for only 13 percent of the Republic's total land area, equitable prosperity was impossible. The Black consciousness pioneer Steve Biko (1988) dubbed these homelands “sophisticated concentration camps” (p.101).

Statistics back up his point of view. The health parallels are rather shocking. Black Africans survived 23 years shorter than their white South African counterparts in 1950. On the other hand, white new-born mortality was 3.6 percent, while African children had a mortality rate of 20%. There was also the issue of obtaining jobs. Most jobs were available on rich white South Africa's excellent agricultural land and urban industrial zones, driving most African employees to leave from their homes for extended periods of time. Even back then, there existed a colour bar that assured that Africans were paid up to twenty times less than whites were.¹

As the whole depth of apartheid's repercussions became apparent to the rest of the world, it became exceedingly challenging for the global community to overlook the South African government's legislative agenda. The continuous mistreatment and oppression of the majority population by its own government, particularly by the glaring disparity between Black and white levels of income and suffering, put apartheid forcefully on the agenda of global politics.

Apartheid had a special relevance for the U.S. because of racial tensions in its own country. In a place where slavery was a major component in the nineteenth-century Civil War, and where African Americans were now uniting to demand civil rights,

¹ See Table 1 (Chapter 1, p.45)

U.S. authorities were obliged to be mindful of the domestic repercussions of their actions towards South Africa. It is worth noting that, around the same period as the National Party was putting through its petit apartheid legislation, African Americans were still barred from voting in certain southern states in the United States. The Ku Klux Klan maintained their harassment to the Black population, and southern Dixiecrats were just as committed as whites in South Africa to preserve “their way of life.” During the 1950s and 1960s, hate crimes and racial intolerance were common in the United States (Thomson, 2008, p.14).

The Civil Rights Movement achieved advances throughout the time period under study in response to this injustice. The famous *Brown vs. Board of Education* case, the 1954 Supreme Court ruling in *Topeka*, and the Montgomery bus boycott all made lawmakers more aware of the subject of race in their own nation. Likewise, the federal government started to advocate civil rights, albeit tentatively, as evidenced by the deployment of troops in Little Rock in 1957, as well as the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act (Thomson, 2008, p.14). Considering these settings, the foreign policy agenda was meant to pursue this direction, and South Africa became associated with the domestic racial conflict in the United States on the times when it did attract the public's attention in the United States.

Well beyond this local resonance, the United Nations also accentuated the subject of apartheid's discussion during the second half of the twentieth century, as the U.S. needed notice on its human rights interests in South Africa. A strong group of developing nations, arising from the decolonisation process and carrying the wounds of racism and colonialism, constantly argued in this forum that the whole world should

intervene to end apartheid. These states consistently pressed the U.S. to take a public stance on the matter through resolutions. Although only three Asian, three African, and seven Middle Eastern states were in 1945 among the United Nations' pioneering founders, the speed of decolonisation in the 1950s and 1960s led membership of these newly independent nations to grow dramatically and eventually hold a majority in the General Assembly. This majority was already striving to draw attention to the anti-apartheid movement (Thomson, 2008, p.14). As a result, from the 1950s onwards, South Africa's race issues came to be a persistent element of the United Nations agenda, in the form of resolutions demanding severe penalties.

Furthermore, a majority of the United Nations General Assembly wanted to impose sanctions for reasons other than apartheid. Namibia, in South West Africa, also enraged this UN nonaligned group. Namibia's colonial history is difficult. South West Africa was formerly a German protectorate, but after the South African Defence Force defeated German troops in the colony during World War I, it was handed up to the League of Nations.

In line with the Versailles Treaty, South Africa was given the responsibility of administering the area on behalf of the British government. The dispute between the UN and South Africa over this mandate started in 1946, when the UN sought that South West Africa be designated as a UN Trust Territory. Pretoria turned down the offer to hand up control, stating that the United Nations lacked the authority to change a League of Nations mandate (Thomson, 2008, p.14).

A long sequence of legal and political confrontations ensued in order to establish South West Africa's international standing. The United Nations did not take action jointly until the second half of the 1960s. In October 1966, the United Nations General Assembly immediately ended South Africa's mandate, establishing a Council for South West Africa with executive authority to govern the territory. The Security Council supported the 1966 resolution in August 1969, and the International Court of Justice approved it in 1971 (Thomson, 2008, p.14).

Between 1971 and 1990, the United Nations funded a number of negotiating attempts with Pretoria in an effort to transfer Namibia's formal independence into genuine self-determination from South African authority. Pretoria proceeded with its management to the territory while experimenting with its own internal settlement for Namibia (Thomson, 2008, p.14).

Despite the international community's disagreement with South Africa over South West Africa/Namibia, the United States sought to downplay the issue and avoid taking a public stance on it throughout the period under discussion. Washington, D.C., was obliged to strike a compromise between displaying its commitment to international law and human rights while also protecting its strategic and economic interests in southern Africa. Administrations worked to safeguard their South African ally on this issue to varied degrees over time, as will be shown.

In sum, the United States' economic and strategic interest should have culminated into a tight partnership between the two countries in the second half of the twentieth century. Pretoria's anti-communist stand, its dedication to a liberal commercial

and investment atmosphere, South Africa's proximity from the Cape sea route, and its deposits of vital minerals valuable to the U.S. economy were all significant distinguishing aspects in Washington, D.C.'s relations with this nation.

Nonetheless, the United States' adherence to democracy and human rights around the world necessitated a firm reaction against apartheid. The latter resulted in an embarrassing situation for the U.S. This necessity arose not only from a moral, abstract detestation of systemic racism, but also because of the United States' own internal inheritance of racial inequality and the civil rights movement. Besides, as a superpower, the United States' policymakers had to be aware of the creation of an African Asian nonaligned bloc following the end of European colonialism. A later section of this same chapter will investigate how every single U.S. administration attempted to conduct the self-interest play in South Africa by harmonising these opposing strategic, economic, and human rights interests.

The above stated reconciliatory policy is significant in this regard. All these policies form part of a vital tool for attaining U.S. foreign policy objectives called diplomacy. Therefore, a definition to diplomacy in its modern sense would further confirm the above statement.

2-3-Diplomacy: A Definition

Since the Cold War's termination, an increasing number of academics have focused their studies on diplomacy. However, in contrast to other fields, the concept of diplomacy has received relatively less attention. "The study of diplomacy remains marginal to and almost disconnected from the rest of the field," writes Paul Sharp. Even tougher is Barry

H. Steiner, who claims that “no area of world politics has reflected a greater gap between experience and theory than diplomatic statecraft” (Klavins, 2011, p.1). Despite the fact that scholars continue to examine the concept of diplomacy and the diplomat's function, few scholars can deny that diplomacy has become vague and shapeless in today's world.

To have a better grasp of the evolution and shift of diplomacy in the twentieth and twenty-first century, it is incumbent to provide a brief definition to this term. According to *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, diplomacy “is a system of communication between strangers.” It is the formal medium by which a sovereign nation forms and expresses its self-identity via its external relationships with other nations. As does the discourse from which it is produced, “diplomacy requires and seeks to mediate otherness through the use of persuasion and force, promises and threats, codes and symbols” (Berry, 2002, p.2).

Diplomacy recognises the need of governments to communicate with the leaders and people of other lands. The centrality of communication to the conduct of diplomacy has long been evident, but only in recent years has an emphasis on “public diplomacy” been seen (Berry, 2002, p.2). This section defines and distinguishes traditional diplomacy from public diplomacy and provides a rationale for the use of public diplomacy in international relations.

Traditional diplomacy is commonly defined as the art and practice of conducting relations among sovereign states, which derives from Sir Harold Nicolson’s classic definition of diplomacy as “the management of international relations by negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of the diplomatist” (Klavins, 2011, p.1). The word diplomacy

itself comes from the Greek verb *diploun*, which means “to fold.” In the era of the Roman times, all passports, or passes across imperial roadways, were imprinted on double metal plates, pleated, and stitched together in a specific way. *Diplomas* were the name for these passes (Berry, 2002, p.3). Later on, the term *diploma* was widened to include various official documents, particularly those that conferred privileges or embodied agreements with other communities. As these treaties accumulated, it became necessary to employ trained clerics to index, decipher, and preserve these documents.

It was not until late into the eighteenth century that the meaning of *res diplomatic*—or diplomatic affairs—was broadened to include anything from archive administration to international relations’ management (Berry, 2002, p.4). Prior to 1796, diplomacy was termed as “negotiation” or “*négociation continuelle*,” as Cardinal Richelieu phrased it. Edmund Burke coined the term “diplomacy” in English in 1796, derived from the French word “*diplomate*” (p.2). Diplomacy is associated with designing and implementing foreign policy, as well as providing advice, from a government-centric perspective of international relations. Such a definition of diplomacy aligns with Geoffrey R. Berridge's view that diplomacy is a critical tool for developing foreign policy. According to political scientist Hans J. Morgenthau (1993), the task of diplomacy is fourfold:

Taken in its widest meaning, comprising the whole range of foreign policy, the task of diplomacy is fourfold: (1) Diplomacy must determine its objectives in the light of the power actually and potentially available for the pursuit of these objectives. (2) Diplomacy must assess the objectives of other nations and the power actually and potentially available for the pursuit of these objectives. (3) Diplomacy must determine to what extent these different objectives are compatible with each other. (4) Diplomacy must employ the means suited to the pursuit of its objectives. Failure in

any one of these tasks may jeopardize the success of foreign policy and with it the peace of the world. (pp.361-362)

In other words, Morgenthau believed nations had to evaluate their objectives, as well as the objectives of other nations when deciding foreign policy; they had to decide whether those objectives were mutually compatible and what means they were willing to use to pursue them. Morgenthau described three tools nations could wield while pursuing their objectives: persuasion, compromise, and threat of force. Yet, as Morgenthau observed, no diplomacy that relies solely on the threat of force could be called peaceful, just as no diplomacy could be described as smart if it relied solely on persuasion and compromise.

Rather, to be able to satisfy both his country's interests and the interests of peace, a major power's diplomatic agent has to simultaneously be persuasive, willing to compromise, and impress the foreign power with his country's military strength. Diplomacy is the art of putting the correct focus on each of the tools at one's disposal at any given time (Berry, 2002, p.5).

In contemporary times, nonetheless, this concept of traditional diplomacy does not encompass all diplomatic processes. As a result, a broader definition is required. In fact, examining public diplomacy is muddy territory that requires substantial contextual investigation. According to Gifford D. Malone, the term public diplomacy was coined in 1965 by the dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University Edmund A. Gullion, in the occasion of the foundation of its Edward R. Murrow Centre for Public Diplomacy. He asserts:

Public diplomacy... deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of intercultural communications. (Clifton, 2012, p.10)

Gullion's description demonstrates a broad public diplomacy concept ready to be explored. Since the Cold War, international relations scholars have attempted to piece together a coherent public diplomacy theory. More descriptive than definite, some scholars focus on the many approaches to public diplomacy including exchange diplomacy or political advocacy. Others discuss contemporary innovations in public diplomacy programming such as religious dialogue and social media. Consideration of the current political context leads to more active descriptions such as coercive diplomacy. In 2008 public diplomacy expert Eytan Gilboa came to the conclusion that a multidisciplinary endeavour and tight cooperation between practitioners would result in a sound public diplomacy theory (Clifton, 2012, p.10).

Besides, the phrase "public diplomacy" has to be restructured to reflect twenty-first-century characteristics. In the public eye, the term diplomacy is frequently used interchangeably with the term foreign policy, which is inaccurate. Public diplomacy, however, is one of foreign policy's tools.

At a United States Information Agency commemorative symposium held in 1994, former USIA Alumni Association President Hans N. Tuch said : "Our role in the world, our international relationships, and our national goals have changed drastically, forcing us to focus anew on the way we communicate with foreign publics and on what

we communicate to them” (Berry, 2002, p.13). Indeed, traditional diplomacy is no longer sufficient to regulate the affairs of nations, and public diplomacy “[has come] into its own as an indispensable component of international relations” (p.14).

One important change that has forever altered the nature of diplomacy is the communications revolution, which makes possible the instant transmission of all kinds of information across national boundaries and even into the “tightest fortress of thought control” (Berry, 2002, p.14). Public opinion is exerting a strong influence on the actions of democratic governments and totalitarian regimes alike and has become an increasingly important factor in foreign affairs. “The exploding communications revolution, the broadcast satellite, the shortwave radio signal, the ease of international travel, and the swift global flow of information” (p.14) rendered both democracies and even the most rigid dictatorships unable to ignore public attitudes and concerns.

Inseparable from the notion of public diplomacy are the qualities of a good diplomat. Traditional diplomats are remiss if they fail to acquire the media skills and temperament needed to handle the pressures of today’s instantaneous communication environment. Media skills are essential to the contemporary diplomat, because the transparency and openness of the mass media have contributed to the disintegration of “cabinet diplomacy” in favour of “the reign of lobbies and anonymous corporations” (Berry, 2002, p.15). As far as U.S. public diplomacy is concerned, the subsequent chapter—which illuminates the tremendous role the Zionist lobby plays in shaping American politics—would confirm this fact.

Given their importance, and in order to have well-trained diplomats, the U.S. government founded in 1947 the Foreign Service Institute community, equipping

American diplomats as well as other professionals to achieve U.S. foreign policy interests both domestically and abroad. In its “Protocol for the Modern Diplomat”, the U.S. Foreign Service Institute (2011) states:

At gatherings that include representatives from the host country as well as from other countries, the timeless formality of international diplomatic culture remains in place. It ensures that each country will be respected uniformly and without bias. The necessary respect is expressed most visibly through spoken courtesies. (p.2)

As one may perceive, the above quotation makes mention of the notion of impartiality as an important characteristic of a good American diplomat. This idea is of paramount relevance to the present study that will recurrently be referred to in this chapter’s closing section.

Indeed, public diplomacy is in practice not merely the conveyance of truthful information. It is a long-term process requiring credibility, impartiality, and deep understanding as solid foundations for the message one wishes the target audience to accept. A 1985 report by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy read, “It is not one-shot dramatic efforts that make public diplomacy succeed. Rather, it is the steady, wise use of all of the resources of public diplomacy over time” (Berry, 2002, p.11).

In summary, while traditional diplomacy essentially concentrates on government-to-government relations, public diplomacy seeks to communicate a message to government officials, business executives, public opinion leaders, political activists, community volunteers, and foreign populations. An outer look to American public diplomacy reveals that the latter is conducted openly, in plain view and with the full knowledge of any target government that might be interested. However, the

messages do, in most times, reflect overt or subtle points of view, for American practitioners prefer to employ techniques that make them appear as having noble intentions.

Additionally, Giandomenico Picco, an Italian diplomat and former United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, stresses that “diplomacy, one of the last monopolies of a government, is now accessible to and performed by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as well as individuals who have one main characteristic: credibility”. It would be a huge fallacy to believe that governmental diplomacy’s role has become less important. In other words, “although the entry of these new players has ended the effective monopoly diplomats once enjoyed over international relations, governmental diplomacy continues to have an important role” (Berry, 2002, p.3). However, it is worth noting that both state and non-state actors collaborate to advance their country's national interest and goals. The following section would reaffirm this by concentrating on American diplomacy vis-à-vis the apartheid crisis in South Africa.

2-4- U.S. Bewildering Diplomacy vis-à-vis the Apartheid Crisis in South Africa: An Analysis of Diverging Rhetoric, Converging Actions

As previously noted, America's foreign policy did not prioritise Africa throughout the second part of the twentieth century. The government redirected senior Cold War strategists to other assignments. Former presidents' and secretary of states' memoirs usually discuss the Soviet Union, the Middle East, Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, and East-West relations in general, but they hardly ever address African issues. Relationships between the U.S. and this corner of the world have a history of being handled at the

bottom of the foreign policy hierarchy. The continent was the domain of specialised executive officials, who were monitored by junior congressional subcommittees (Thomson, 2008, p.1). Overall, the United States' estimates during the Cold War gave very little weight to African nations.

African concerns did occasionally appear within the executive's higher institutional levels. The Algerian war, Congolese secessionist conflicts, Ethiopia's revolution, the Biafran conflict, Zimbabwe's independence, and Angola's civil war all aroused key governmental interest in the U.S. However, this piqued interest was just fleeting. Due to Cold War concerns, these officials quickly averted their focus from the continent once the fire in question had been extinguished or had burned itself out.

As the second section of this same chapter has made clear, one significant exception to this pattern was South Africa. Out of all the African nations, this particular country received the most consistent attention from the United States during the Cold War. Although senior U.S. politicians were not very concerned with the Union of South Africa or the Republic of South Africa at this time, low- to medium-level executive branch power holders were always paying attention to it. As a result, over the entire 46-year Cold War, apartheid continued to be a topic of discussion in the international community.

In real terms, apartheid presented challenges for the U.S. government. Washington, D.C., had several concerns about South Africa that appeared to be largely unavoidable. In many respects, including helping the United States protect its interests on the African continent, the South African government appeared to be a great partner as highlighted earlier. Throughout the bipolar Cold War, South Africa was militarily

and economically significant, in addition to Pretoria's strong historical and cultural ties to the West. The government of Pretoria presented itself as an inhibitor on the spread of communism. Along with having unique mineral riches and a strategic location on the vital Cape Sea route, it was also home to numerous American international companies that viewed the South African market as an attractive one (Thomson, 2008, p.2).

However, the U.S. foreign policy towards South Africa was not solely based on these favourable characteristics. There was still no resolution to the apartheid problem. The two governments could not develop a natural partnership based on common interests as long as this social control exertion was in operation. Paradoxically, the fundamental idea of apartheid exacerbated the nation's responsiveness to racial concerns while simultaneously undermining the ideal of freedom promoted by Washington, D.C. In this way, the aforementioned strategic and economic advantages were at odds with Pretoria's systemic violations of the human rights of a large portion of its citizens.

This section examines the foreign policy that emerged from efforts to address these strategic, economic, and human rights concerns. It uses each of these goals as a way to track the various phases of highs and lows of the U.S. response to apartheid. In fact, despite maintaining mutually beneficial strategic and economic ties, successive U.S. administrations worked to publicly express American opposition to apartheid. In this regard, every U.S. administration's policy vis-à-vis South Africa throughout almost the five decades of apartheid is analysed. The diverse techniques used by successive executives, as well as the consistencies that remained, are discussed as well.

The general trend was for the United States to strengthen its human rights position by gradually reducing its strategic connections with Pretoria. While Truman and

Eisenhower vigorously maintained Cold War cooperation with Pretoria, subsequent presidents avoided close ties with it. Their rhetoric was very explicit about this.

Despite the fact that human rights became more prominent, no government had been able to develop a long-term solution to balance the interests of all three groups. Nixon, Ford, and Reagan all used positive sanctions to gain influence in Pretoria, whilst Carter used a more confrontational approach. Neither strategy resulted in meaningful apartheid reforms. In the end, the United States' South Africa strategy was always constrained by this group of interests. Throughout the apartheid era, successive administrations maintained a consistent pattern of pursuing all three objectives at the same time.

In retrospect, one can note that the story started in 1948, when the pursuit of the Cold War was the major most significant focus of American foreign policy. The Truman Doctrine had revealed the United States' intention. The Marshall Plan was created to help Western Europe's economies, the Berlin airlift was completed, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was formed. When the U.S. got itself engaged militarily in the Korean War in 1950, the resolve to a broader containment policy was made. The Cold War became genuinely worldwide from this moment forward (Thomson, 2008, p.17).

In comparison to this containment priority, the general election in South Africa in 1948 had little significance for Washington, D.C. Only those immediately entrusted with monitoring the Union of South Africa were aware of the poll that brought the National Party to power. Only a few other Americans were aware of the election. Analysts were unable to foresee that the National Party's rise to power, together with its

apartheid policies, would come to be one of the most divisive and difficult diplomatic issues of the last five decades of the twentieth century (Thomson, 2008, p.17).

Both the Truman (1945-1953) and Eisenhower (1953-1961) administrations were favourable toward Pretoria, recalling that South African forces fought alongside American troops in World War II. Hence, diplomacy based on amicable cooperation took place. As President Eisenhower proclaimed, “As there is no weapon too small, no arena too remote to be ignored, there is no free nation too humble to be forgotten,” South Africa was considered as a beneficial, if not crucial, collaborate for the United States in the early years of the Cold War (Thomson, 2008, p.18).

As a result, both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations worked to “maintain and develop” South Africa's intended “friendly relations.” A State Department strategy paper from 1951 stated that, “It is in our interests to maintain friendly relations with South Africa because of strategic considerations and also because South Africa represents a good market for our products.” Nonetheless, this paper also agreed that the racial policies of the National Party “periodically produce a strain” between the two countries, “which unfortunately is likely to continue” (Thomson, 2008, p.22). In spite of the fact that, at the beginning, U.S. authorities looked at the “apartheid experiment” with “tolerance,” “wishing the Prime Minister’s plans well,” the atmosphere shifted because of the “racial tension” caused by the execution of “heavy-handed policies” (p.22). The American embassy staff started to send increasingly frequent warnings home.

Despite their fears about the consequences of apartheid, U.S. policymakers believed they had little influence over Pretoria. South Africa's commitment to advance its apartheid policies, against world opposition, became clear as the 1950s advanced. The government of the National Party did not want to make concessions. "To do what world opinion demands would mean suicide by white South Africa," Prime Minister Malan said (Thomson, 2008, p.23). On this subject, the Truman and Eisenhower administrations believed they had little incentives and sticks to use. In any case, the chargé in Johannesburg, William Maddox, considered that "quiet diplomacy" was the way to go. For much of the apartheid era, this private "gentle persuasion" tactic became the default U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa.

However, it was the Sharpeville and Langa massacres on March 21, 1960, that set the tone for future U.S. administrations' discourse on apartheid. When 76 unarmed anti-pass law protestors were killed and 178 others were injured by South African police in these two townships, international attention was drawn to the country's racial policies. The shootings "caused shock and distress beyond the borders of South Africa," according to Henry Cabot Lodge, who represented the United States in the United Nations Security Council (Thomson, 2008, p.28). As a result, the U.S. delegation favoured moving the debate on this subject from the General Assembly to the Security Council. The Sharpeville shootings resulted in a considerable shift in discourse in 1960, but beyond that, little had changed in practice.

John F. Kennedy was no better to his predecessors. When it comes to interpreting the Kennedy years (1961-1963), researchers of U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa have a favourable view of this period. In the early 1960s, there was a harsh shift in

rhetoric toward Pretoria, next to the imposition of an arms embargo. If any objections are made, academics claim that senior decision-makers paid too little heed to the Republic. The term “benign neglect” is sometimes employed. Despite being a proponent of universal human rights, the Kennedy administration was too preoccupied with the Cold War to risk, or dedicate the time to, confronting Pretoria over apartheid. The outcome was a “holding operation” that made the United States' objection to the Republic's racial practices obvious, but offered nothing in the way of fresh actual action.¹

The lines that follow give a rebuttal to this theory of benign neglect. It is argued that the Kennedy administration did use a holding operation, but that it had nothing to do with negligence. Instead, Washington, D.C., was pursuing a two-pronged strategy. Wherever possible, the administration continued to work closely with the South African government, but shunned policy areas that were too directly linked to apartheid. Overall, the goal was to provide reciprocal cooperation and support in possible political and economic areas.

An examination of the reasoning underlying the imposition of the 1963 arms embargo, Kennedy's most visible act of defiance, uncovers a confused, pragmatic approach to apartheid. At the time, the United States did not take a clear stance. Instead, an impromptu combination of confrontation and cooperation emerged (Thomson, 2008,

¹ For such an interpretation of Kennedy's South Africa policy, see, for example, Gavshon, Arthur (1981), *Crisis in Africa: battleground of East and West*. Harmondsworth: Penguin. p.153; James N. Giglio, James N. (1991). *The presidency of John F. Kennedy*. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. p.230; and Purkitt, Helen E (2000). A Problem-Centered Approach for Understanding Foreign Policy: Some Examples from U.S. Foreign Policy toward Southern Africa. In Stuart S. Nagel, (ed.) *Handbook of Global International Policy*. New York: Marcel Dekker.

p.31). The administration's anti-apartheid rhetoric and the arms embargo were overshadowed by strategic and economic considerations, weakening the impact of the former measures.

The Kennedy administration was under increasing pressure to embrace a comprehensive package of punitive sanctions after the 1963 arms embargo was enacted. Indeed, the United Nations General Assembly voted in 1962 to recommend that all member states withdraw their diplomatic presence in the Republic, embargo the country's ports and airspace, prohibit the sale of South African commodities on their soil, and prohibit exports to the Republic. The United States voted against the resolution, stating that rather than being isolated, South Africa should be exposed to international opinion (Thomson, 2008, p.39). Because of the U.S. negative stance, as well as France's and the United Kingdom's, such sanctions were never made mandatory or extensively imposed. The 1963 arms embargo was, in fact, an ineffective attempt of enforceable economic restrictions imposed by the United Nations on South Africa during the apartheid era, due to the veto power of those permanent members.

After a US\$30 million loan from a group of U.S. institutional investors to Anglo-American *Rand Selection Corporation*, the First National City Bank of New York extended a US\$5 million revolving credit to the government's *Industrial Development Corporation*. At the same time, 12 of the country's major banks, including Chase, First National, and Dillon, Read & Co., supplied an additional US\$40 million in credit (Thomson, 2008, pp.41-42).

Strategically speaking, cooperating with an apartheid-implementing government did not sit well with Kennedy's domestic political agenda, and strong relations with South Africa jeopardised the administration's Cold War strategy of courting existing and growing Third World powers. By renouncing the Eisenhower administration's opposition to nonalignment, Kennedy hoped to gain favour with these new governments, limiting communist spread.

The manoeuvring space for the twin approach, on the other hand, was shrinking. As will be shown below, it would be difficult for Kennedy's successors to tread this fine line between cooperation and confrontation while pretending to be the free world's leader on the subject of apartheid.

Scholars such as David Dickson and Arthur Gavshon argued that after Kennedy's assassination, Johnson (1963-1969) followed in Kennedy's footsteps by speaking out against apartheid. However, due to competing priorities, neither administration was able to devote more time to the Republic's racial policies. Johnson's South Africa strategy was reduced to a state of benign neglect as a result of civil rights at home and the Vietnam War overseas (Thomson, 2008, p.47).

This work takes a distinct approach to the subject. It argues that Kennedy and Johnson's policies on South Africa were not coordinated. Whereas Kennedy strove to achieve the best of both worlds by executing an unstructured mixture of condemnation and cooperation as circumstances and chances arose, the Johnson administration's commitment to human rights was more consistent, possibly even more principled. While there was ambivalence when President John F. Kennedy was compelled to balance U.S.

interests in South Africa, it often resulted in strategic and economic concerns being prioritized—or at the very least, these interests were not jeopardised. This occurred less frequently under President Johnson's watch (Thomson, 2008, p.47). There was still a lot of uncertainty in Johnson's balancing act, but when a decision had to be made, human rights issues usually won out and a firm stance was taken. Consequently, the Johnson administration's approach toward South Africa became more consistent.

However, that is not to suggest that Johnson's foreign policy toward this portion of the world was completely revised. Despite the deterioration of relations, Washington, D.C., still saw South Africa as an ally. As a result, under the Johnson administration, the punishing economic penalties desired by African and Asian countries were not implemented. The administration was only willing to go so far in defying the Republic's historical support of U.S. economic and geopolitical interests (Thomson, 2008, p.48).

The Nixon (1969-1974) and Ford (1974-1979) administrations' subsequent South Africa policies sparked debate. Since a 1972 *New York Times* article, this strategy received a lot of attention, almost all of it unfavourable. Most academics equate the Nixon and Ford administrations with a “tilt” toward white power in southern Africa at the very least. According to more radical readings, this tactic culminated in the minority rule administrations' “full embrace.” Many critics base their conclusions on a single word from a secret 1969 National Security Council study. They concentrate on Policy option two of the Interdepartmental Group for Africa's response to National Security Study Memorandum number 39 (NSSM39). This option implied that “the whites are here to stay . . .” in southern Africa (Thomson, 2008, p.48). These comments were interpreted by campaigners as embodying the West's moral intransigence. Despite the

strength of the anti-apartheid movement at home, the U.S. and its allies were accused of cooperating with human rights abuses in order to preserve strategic and economic interests.¹ (See Tables 4 & 5)

	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
Short term	4,434	6,978	11,204	22,772	25,525	59,606
Medium term	10,609	13,136	21,054	19,674	15,870	25,952
Long term	18,770	40,858	53,919	66,977	138,464	174,034
Total	33,813	60,972	86,177	109,423	179,859	259,682

Table 4: U.S. Export-Import Bank Exposure in South Africa (US\$ millions), June 1971– June 1976 (U.S. Congress, 1976, p.254)

	Year	Number
Johnson Administration	1967	333
	1968	300
Nixon Administration	1969	284
	1970	180
	1971	135
	1972	144

Table 5: U.S. Aircraft Exports to South Africa, 1967–1972 (U.S. Congress, 1973, p.47)

In this regard, option two of NSSM39 should not be disregarded out of hand. Despite claims to the contrary, the NSC response to NSSM39 did not advocate for a simple acceptance of the status quo in this case. Option two was a little more subtle. It aimed a mix of positive and negative sanctions in an attempt to improve dialogue between the

¹ See, for example, Fraser, C. Gerald (1972, November 5). Nixon Denounced on Africa Policy. *New York Times*. p.51.

parties, which may lead to further apartheid reforms. Option two, at least on paper, offered a comprehensive strategy for fighting minority control while also safeguarding U.S. material interests in the region (Thomson, 2008, p.48).

It is argued in the present dissertation that both Nixon and Ford were responsible for failing to sufficiently safeguard U.S. human rights interests in South Africa. This is due to the fact that option two was never actively considered. The recommendations of the Interdepartmental Group for Africa were not put to the test. The strategy was never substantively implemented by the bureaucracy; the policy's objectives were never satisfactorily expressed to the policy's target audience in southern Africa—or to the bureaucracy back home; the range of positive and negative sanctions fully implemented was weak, stimulating no one in Africa to change their position; and there was a lack of leadership from senior members of the administrations, suffocating any source of authority's strategy (Thomson, 2008, p.64). As a result, NSSM39 did eventually default to maintain the status quo in southern Africa, yet through neglect rather than design.

Of all previous administrations, President Jimmy Carter's administration (1977-1981) was the one that battled Pretoria the most. After the Kissinger effort of 1976, the new White House maintained a high-level focus on southern Africa. Interest was preserved and resources were provided. The United States condemned apartheid publicly, issued warnings, made symbolic acts, and backed a UN-mandated arms embargo (Thomson, 2008, p.89). However, as will be seen below, the outcomes of this South African policy never lived up to its lofty goals. Any progress made toward the abolition of apartheid fell far short of the goals set by Washington, D.C. Pretoria was defiant in its response to requests for more swift reforms.

The result was a deadlock. While the Carter administration was unwilling to elevate the level of confrontation, South African officials deftly evaded Washington, D.C.'s rhetoric and ultimatums. Economic sanctions were not implemented in a significant way. As a result, the United States officials had to be content with advances made elsewhere in the region. Namibia's future had been advanced in negotiations, and Zimbabwe attained independence in 1980. During Carter's presidency, however, the abolition of apartheid remained out of reach for the United States (Thomson, 2008, p.89).

However, the most methodical U.S. foreign policy towards South Africa was formed under the Ronald Reagan administration (1981-1989). The United States' strategy against apartheid was characterised by unmatched consistency from Reagan's inauguration in 1981 until the summer of 1984. This was largely due to the plan developed by the Africa Bureau of the State Department. Chester Crocker, Reagan's assistant secretary of state for African affairs, instituted a "Constructive Engagement" program (Thomson, 2008, p.111). In an effort to boost the ambition of reforms already taking place in South Africa, Washington, D.C., silently offered the South African authorities positive sanctions.

As a result, neither positive nor punitive punishments were carried out to completion. For the sake of advancing human rights in the region, comprehensive economic sanctions were not applied. For the very same human rights concerns, strategic and economic ties were not considerably strengthened as a form of positive sanctions. In this regard, all administrations did not succeed to break free from the shackles of incompatible but important interests.

However, these efforts at nonviolent involvement were undermined by events in the mid-1980s, particularly a new wave of unrest in the Republic's townships. The situation had deteriorated to the point where the American Congress felt compelled to take action by 1986. Despite a presidential veto, the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) was passed in October 1986 after the federal legislature enacted a set of harsh economic sanctions (Thomson, 2008, p.111). They dramatically limited U.S. commercial contacts with South Africa for the first time. With the United States' strategic and economic interests in the Republic having dwindled, executive authorities had far greater leeway in responding to F.W. de Klerk's more liberal regime from 1989 onwards. More details about this decade's events are provided in the third chapter.

Despite being a turning point in American anti-apartheid activity, the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act did not encompass all of American policies towards South Africa following October 1986. The sanctions created by this legislation and the conditions for their removal characterised the last phase of Washington, D.C.'s action against apartheid. However, the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations all bolstered the CAAA with complementary policy actions for various covert motives. Each government gradually succeeded in establishing connections between the Republic's Black community and the United States. The Bush (1989-1993) and Clinton (1993-2001) administrations benefited greatly from this when it came to communicating with all parties during the constitutional negotiations that were initiated by the advent of President F.W. de Klerk. Officials in the United States then had to decide when the sanctions would be lifted and how best to support the talks (Thomson, 2008, p.149).

As a result, U.S. policy had finished its transformation from the 1940s and the 1950s' strategic priorities, to an unwavering commitment to the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s' economic and trade cooperation, to a position where U.S. officials could then aid in the negotiations that would bring about the end of apartheid and the formation of a new South Africa in 1994. Overall, when the world community grasped the effects of apartheid in the early 1950s, Washington, D.C., began to disassociate itself publicly from the Republic's leadership. This rhetoric was later changed to a harsher tone near the end of the 1950s, echoing the evolution of Pretoria's policy. All of the U.S. presidents regularly denounced apartheid after the 1960 Sharpeville massacre. This discourse was strengthened by the ongoing oversight of U.S.-funded development and "empowerment" initiatives among the Black population of the Republic. To be effective, a state's commitment to human rights in the international arena must go beyond words. As with everything else in foreign policy, words must be supported by deeds.

It is clearly noticeable that the absence of action deliberately undermined the impact of U.S. resentful rhetoric. A closer examination of the U.S. approach to handling Pretoria finds that it was not adequately involved and that its geopolitical and economic commitments too often diverted it from its human rights concerns. Attempts to achieve equilibrium among these three interest groups left Washington, D.C., exposed to accusations that its rhetoric was merely a token gesture to provide lip service to the anti-apartheid movement. These charges of expediency were not significantly refuted by the small but expanding empowerment initiatives in the U.S. Many opponents, therefore, argued that because of their ongoing strategic and economic

collaboration, Washington, D.C., was delighted to keep the same situation's persistence in South Africa.

A key question posed in this work, however, is the sudden shift in Washington, D.C.'s policies in relation to apartheid in Pretoria by the late 1980s and early 1990s, which is one of the primary focus areas of this dissertation. Why did the United States abruptly abandon its strategic and economic connections with Pretoria, reverse its prior disregard for human rights concerns, and take Black rights into consideration? This study contends that the United States' leaning to the Black community in South Africa, which signalled the end of the apartheid era in that nation, resulted from the very same national interest game that had pushed it to maintain tight relations with Pretoria decades earlier. In fact, it was closely linked to the end of the Cold War, which left the U.S. as the only superpower in the world. Pretoria's contribution to preventing the spread of communism on the continent, thus, lost its significance. However, the major role the anti-apartheid movement played in the U.S. to pose significant pressure on the Reagan administration cannot be downplayed. Consequently, the latter decade of the twentieth century appeared to be a better time for U.S. policymakers to adopt a humanitarian foreign policy.

Contrary to the South African case, U.S. ineffective rhetoric in the process of its partial mediation efforts in the Palestinian/Israeli conflict was not, and has not been, followed by any effective action to resolve the conflict. Nor did the U.S. over decades show any intention to put an end to its close ties with an oppressive nation named Israel for some unstated reasons. This would cast doubt over the credibility of this so-called "honest broker". Indeed, the apartheid practiced by the Zionists in Palestine, as will be

shown below, has been met by no objections on the part of American politicians under a ‘Special Relationship’s ’ cloth.

2-5- U.S. Diplomacy in the Middle East and U.S. ‘Special Relationship’ with Israel: An Odd Couple

Throughout the second half of the twentieth century and early twenty-first century, U.S. mediation efforts in the Middle East have spilled much ink. This is due to American ‘Special Relationship’ with Israel merged with its attempt to perform the role of an honest broker in the Palestinian/Israeli conflict; both forming an odd couple. Arabs consider that by making an alliance with the Zionist invaders, the U.S. has deserted its values and betrayed them. It is worth noting that the United States' support for the Jews in Palestine in the second half of the twentieth century did not take place at the expense of oil concessions or strategic advantages. It also did not make the Middle East any more prone to Soviet influence. On the contrary, the United States program of rebuilding Europe proceeded unhindered by Middle East issues, and the Arab world never served as a Cold War battlefield. Yet, Washington's backing to Zionists and its role in Israel's foundation tainted U.S-Arab relations and caused the unrest of the whole region. The following lines spotlight key events and facts in the process of U.S. ‘partial’ diplomacy vis-à-vis the Palestinian/Israeli question.

2-5-1- U.S. ‘Partial’ Diplomacy vis-à-vis the Palestinian/Israeli Question: Key Events and Facts

As the first chapter made clear, it is widely accepted that Americans inherited a set of ideals from their Puritan ancestors. Thus, Throughout American history, there has been

widespread support for liberal, democratic, individualistic, and egalitarian values among the American people. Since the seventeenth century, these political values and ideals have constituted the foundation of American national identity, as Gunnar Myrdal dubbed them “the American Creed.”

Political institutions as well have reflected, throughout American history, these values, yet have never been successful in bringing them to fruition in a suitable manner. There has always been a disconnect between the ideas that Americans held and the institutions that expressed them. This disconnect between ideals and institutional practice has resulted in a state of discord between the theoretical and practical aspects of American politics. The same applies to American diplomacy, for, as will be shown below, both American diplomatic behaviour vis-à-vis the Palestinian/Israeli question and the aforementioned theory have worked increasingly at cross lines.

The peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians have been ongoing for the past thirty years, since the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991. By no means has the task of reaching a peace agreement been easy. It has been marked by violence, failure to compromise, and violation with prior agreements. The United States' role as a biased third-party mediator in the Palestinian/Israeli peace process stalled attempts to reach a comprehensive agreement between the two parties. Scholars and political analysts have identified a number of reasons why the 1993 Oslo Accords and the 2000 Camp David Accords failed as peace agreements.

As far as the 1993 Oslo Accords are concerned, Edward Said (1993) described the deal as “more flawed” and unfavourable to the majority of Palestinians than many initially believed. In his words:

The fashion-show vulgarities of the White House ceremony, the degrading spectacle of Yasser Arafat thanking everyone for the suspension of most of his people's rights, and the fatuous solemnity of Bill Clinton's performance, like a 20th-century Roman emperor shepherding two vassal kings through rituals of reconciliation and obeisance: all these only temporarily obscure the truly astonishing proportions of the Palestinian capitulation.

As the statement denotes, the peace agreement was annoying not only because it was dissatisfactory, but because Arafat showed a dishonourable applause to it. Therefore, Said (1993) named the agreement "an instrument of Palestinian surrender, a Palestinian Versailles." James Baker, a former U.S. Secretary of State, declared in a TV interview that no concessions were made on the part of Israel except simply the recognition of the PLO's existence as the Palestinians' representative. Conversely, in Said's viewpoint, Arafat's agreement to recognise Israel's right to exist implied a number of "renunciations of the PLO Charter; of violence and terrorism; of all relevant UN resolutions, except 242 and 338, which do not have one word in them about the Palestinians, their rights or aspirations" (Said, 1993).

The document's main focus, as approved by the U.S., was the protection of Israel's security; it made no mention of the Palestinians' protection against Israeli incursions. Rabin stated unequivocally in his news conference on September 13, 1993, that Israel would maintain sovereignty and that it would also control the Jordan River, the borders with Egypt and Jordan, the sea, the territory between Gaza and Jericho, Jerusalem, the settlements, and the roadways. The statement contained little indication that Israel would cease its brutality against Palestinians or compensate those who had been harmed by its policies over the previous forty-five years, as Iraq had been obliged

to do after withdrawing from Kuwait (Said, 1993). No witness is required to deduce that the United States' efforts were directed towards helping Israel to gain bargains rather than pushing it into concessions.

Seven years later, a number of fundamental concerns plagued the 2000 Camp David Accords, including the clash of topics that had previously been reserved for later discussions, specifically Jerusalem, the refugee crisis, the construction of Jewish settlements, and borders. The Palestinians were thought to be unyielding and reluctant to participate effectively in diplomatic initiatives. News organisations and political media outlets released remarks pointing to the United States' allegedly biased involvement in peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians. In his capacity as a third-party mediator, Clinton proposed a plan known as “parameters.” It “allowed Israel to annex 4 to 6 percent of the West Bank in exchange for a land swap of 1 to 3 percent of pre-1967 territory; it divided Jerusalem giving control of the Wailing Wall to Israel and the rest of the Temple Mount to the Palestinians while dividing the rest of the city based on ethnic lines; it called on Palestinians to waive on their request for the right of return; and situated an Israeli military presence in the Jordan Valley for security reasons” (Hammouri, 2022, p.5).

The parameters proposed by Clinton was a clear proof that the U.S. was by no means willing to be a fair impartial mediator and respond to the PLO's demands, chiefly the Palestinian right of return and self-determination. It also did not address the Palestinians' key concerns such the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Therefore, the parameters were categorically rejected by Yassir Arafat. It is significant to consider that the Clinton parameters' failure may had been caused by the fact that they

were pushed forward as a final attempt before he left the U.S. presidency. Clinton and the Israelis seemed to be under more time pressure, which may have contributed to their unwillingness to think again about the Palestinians' complaints and objections (Hammouri, 2022, p.5). In sum, the United States did not pressure Israel to make concessions; instead, it supported Israel and safeguarded its interests, which caused the Palestinians to become increasingly wary of the proposed plan and ultimately led to its total failure.

Furthermore, foreign aid has been a key diplomatic tool in the United States' search for Arab-Israeli peace for more than three decades. During this time, the United States has spent tens of billions of dollars to execute Arab-Israeli peace agreements, generate regional public support, and promote ongoing negotiations. American assistance to both belligerents, however, looked inequitable and partial—throwing the element of impartiality into the heart of the ocean.

Since the October War in 1973, the United States has given Israel a degree of assistance that exceeds that given to any other country. Since 1976, Israel has been the greatest annual receiver of direct U.S. economic and military aid, and the largest overall recipient since World War II (see Table 6).

current, or noninflation-adjusted, dollars in millions

Fiscal Year	Military	Economic	Missile Defense	Total
1946-2016	91,617.786	34,265.675	5,104.874	130,988.340
2017	3,175.000	-	600.735	3,775.740
2018	-	-	-	-
2019 Request	3,300.000		500.000	3,800.000
Total	94,792.790	34,265.675	5,705.61	134,764.080

Table 6: Total U.S. Foreign Aid Obligations to Israel: 1946-2017 (Sharp, 2018, p.1)

In 2003, the United States provided more than \$140 billion in direct aid to Israel. Each year, Israel gets nearly \$3 billion in direct foreign aid, approximately one-fifth of America's total foreign aid expenditure. The U.S. provides each Israeli with a direct subsidy of around \$500 per year on a per capita basis (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, p.31). When one realises that Israel is today a prosperous industrial state with a per capita GDP roughly comparable to that of South Korea or Spain, the generosity becomes particularly striking.

Israel also receives special privileges from the United States. Other aid recipients get their funds in quarterly installments, however Israel receives its whole appropriation at the start of each fiscal year (FY), earning additional interest. Most beneficiaries of American military help have to spend all of their funds in the United States, but Israel can spend about a quarter of its aid budget to support its own defence sector (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, p.31).

According to the Congressional Research Service's report, in 2007, the Bush administration and Israel's government agreed on a 10-year, \$30 billion military aid agreement that run from Fiscal Year 2009 to Fiscal Year 2018. The United States began funding Israel \$3.1 billion each year in 2012, an average of \$8.5 million per day, and vowed to continue doing so until Fiscal Year 2018. President Barack Obama committed to assist the Israeli government with multi-year military aid commitments during a visit to Israel in March 2013 (Sharp, 2015).

The same report states that for Fiscal Year 2015, the Obama Administration provided Israel with \$3.1 billion in direct bilateral military aid, generally known as Foreign Military Financing or FMF. The United States additionally contributed \$619.8

million to joint U.S-Israel missile defence programmes, aimed to keep Israeli borders safe from any threats from the outside world, raising the overall military aid to Israel to \$3.7 billion each year. In other words, in 2015, American taxpayers gave Israel \$10.2 million per day (Sharp, 2015).

To date, U.S. military aid to Israel is increasing. Representatives from the United States and Israeli authorities signed a new 10-year Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on military aid covering FY2019 to FY2028 at a signing ceremony at the State Department on September 14, 2016. According to the MOU, the U.S. promised to provide Israel with \$38 billion in military aid, including \$33 billion in Foreign Military Financing grants and \$5 billion in missile defence funds (Sharp, 2018, p.1).

Under the MOU terms, “Both the United States and Israel jointly commit to respect the FMF levels specified in this MOU, and not to seek changes to the FMF levels for the duration of this understanding.” The agreement also recognises that “the funding levels in this understanding assume continuation of adequate funding levels for U.S. foreign assistance and missile defence overall, and are subject to the appropriation and availability of funds for these purposes” (Sharp, 2018, p.1). The new MOU has taken the place of the \$30 billion, 10-year pact explained above.

On topics like phasing out off-shore procurement (OSP), the terms of the 2019-2028 MOU diverge from earlier agreements. Under the terms of the new MOU, the latter continues until FY2024, after which it will be phased down progressively, concluding fully in FY2028. The MOU requires Israel to furnish the U.S. with “detailed programmatic information related to the use of all U.S. funding, including funds used for OSP” (Sharp, 2018, p.6). As a result of the planned phase-out of OSP, some Israeli

defence contractors may attempt to combine with U.S. corporations or form U.S. subsidiaries in order to maintain their eligibility for FMF-financed defence contracts. Furthermore, the administration commits to requesting \$500 million in yearly combined funding for missile defence programmes with joint U.S-Israeli elements, like Iron Dome, Arrow II and Arrow III, and David's Sling, under the provisions of the new MOU (see Figure1). Previous Memorandums of Understanding did not encompass funds for missile defence, which has usually been approved through separate contacts between succeeding administrations and Congresses. While the MOU binds both the U.S. and Israel to a \$500 million annual U.S. missile defence commitment, it also states that in special circumstances, as a significant military conflict involving Israel, both sides may consent on additional U.S. support above the \$500 million annual cap.




Figure1: U.S. Military Aid to Israel over Decades (Sharp, 2018, p.8)

In a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry supporting the MOU, Prime Minister Netanyahu promised to repay the U.S. government if Israel would receive more congressional support than anticipated (\$3.1 billion per year) in the last two years of the 2009- 2018 MOU (Sharp, 2018, p.7). A number of lawmakers put the MOU's addition into question, claiming that appropriations are the legislative branch's prerogative. Senator Lindsey Graham, Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Programmes, believed the MOU was “not a treaty, and we’re not a party to this” (Obama Lawmakers at Odds, 2016). In addition to the \$3.1 billion in regular FMF provided in Title IV of P.L. 115-31, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, Section 7041(d) provided \$75 million in FMF-Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) for FY2017. News reports emerged in the fall of 2017 doubting whether Israel would receive the \$75 million in “extra FMF” appropriated in P.L. 115-31. “Israel is going to get the money,” observed State Department spokesperson Heather Nauert (Sharp, 2018, p.10).

Israel, furthermore, has been the first international operator of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the Department of Defence's fifth-generation stealth fighter jet, which is widely regarded as the most technologically sophisticated fighter plane ever built (see Table 7).

Year	# of Planes Purchased	Total Cost	# of Planes in Service
2010	19	\$2.75 billion	7
2015	14	\$2.82 billion	n/a
2016	17	unspecified	n/a

Table 7: Israel’s Purchases of the F-35 (Sharp, 2018, p.10)

Israel has ordered 50 F-35 fighter jets in three distinct contracts so far. The FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act, P.L. 115-141, included the following provisions for Israel: \$3.1 billion in Foreign Military Financing, of which \$815.3 million for offshore procurement; \$705.8 million for joint U.S-Israel missile defence projects, including \$92 million for Iron Dome, \$221.5 million for David's Sling, \$310 million for Arrow 3, and \$82.3 million for Arrow 2; \$47.5 million for U.S-Israel anti-tunnel cooperation; \$7.5 million for Migration and Refugee Assistance; \$4 million for the founding of a U.S-Israel Centre of Excellence; \$4 million for the establishment of a U.S-Israel Centre of Excellence in energy and water technologies; \$2 million for the Energy programme of the Israel-U.S Binational Research and Development Foundation (BIRD); and the renewal of the War Reserves Stock Allies-Israel (WRS-A-I) programme until fiscal year 2019 (Sharp, 2018, p.1).

Indeed, Congress and consecutive administrations have shown substantial support for collaborative U.S-Israel missile defence projects aimed at countering a variety of threats. The arsenals range from short-range missiles and rockets fired by non-state groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah to mid- and longer-range ballistic missiles in Syria and Iran. In defence authorisation and appropriations acts, Congress conducts

regular U.S financing for Israeli and U.S-Israeli missile defence programmes. In conjunction with various weapons systems, Israel and the U.S. each provide financial resources and engage in co-development, coproduction, and/or technology sharing. (see Figure 2).




Figure 2: Congressional “Plus Up” For Israel Missile Defence : FY2010-FY2017
(Sharp, 2018, p.12)

To honour the first year of the new MOU, the Trump Administration proposed \$3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing for Israel and \$500 million in missile defence aid for FY2019. The administration also asked \$5.5 million in financing for humanitarian migrants to Israel through the Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) programme (Sharp, 2018, p.1).

Added to the above, Israel receives constant diplomatic backing from the United States. Since 1982, the United States has vetoed 33 UN Security Council resolutions criticising Israel, more than the total number of vetoes cast by all other Security Council

members combined. It also prevents Arab states' endeavours from putting Israel's nuclear arsenal on the agenda of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Besides, the U.S. comes to Israel's aid in times of war and takes its side in peace negotiations. When Bill Clinton, for instance, became President, he gave free play to his pro-Israel inclinations. He immediately abandoned his predecessor's even-handed attitude in favour of a "Israel-first" policy similar to the Reagan years. Martin Indyk, a senior official on the National Security Council, outlined the new approach in a speech to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy on May 18, 1993. Indyk highlighted both the importance of keeping Israel strong while the peace process was ongoing, as well as keeping Iraq and Iran weak. Another element was called "dual containment" and a major goal of it was to guard Israel on the Eastern front (Sharp, 2018, p.1).

Concerning the Middle East peace process, stated Indyk, "our approach to the negotiations will involve working with Israel, not against it. We are committed to deepening our strategic partnership with Israel in the pursuit of peace and security." Decided to withdraw from territory, Indyk maintained, posed security dangers to Israel, and Israel would only take these risks if it knew the U.S. would back it up. Only with this kind of special relationship between America and Israel could real progress in the talks be made. There was no analogous vow to work with Arabs or Palestinians. As a result, America effectively relinquished its autonomous role as peace process manager and sided with one of the parties. Indeed, according to one American participant at Camp David in 2000, "Far too often, we functioned . . . as Israel's lawyer" (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, p.31).

With the exception of wartime alliances, it is difficult to conceive of another situation in which one country has offered another with such a high level of material and diplomatic support for such a long time. In a nutshell, America's backing for Israel is unprecedented and unique.

Remarkably, the United States, on the other hand, has granted Palestinians with only a little amount of “seed money” (Zanotti, 2014). According to a research by the Congressional Research Service, the U.S. government has never supplied military help to Palestinians. “The Department of Defence Appropriations Act, 2015, which passed the House in June 2014, contained provisions that would prohibit funds made available by the act from being obligated to the Palestinian Authority or from being used to transfer weapons to the PA”. Palestinian aid is mostly used to police their own people, as well as to meet humanitarian and development requirements. Such funds are only approved after Congress receives proof that they will be in use for “non-lethal assistance” (Zanotti, 2014).

For Fiscal Year 2015, for instance, Congress proposed \$441 million in aid, including \$70 million coming from the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account. Furthermore, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided indirect economic aid to the Palestinian people through funding distributed to U.S.-based NGOs working in the West Bank and Gaza. The CRS report claims that “funds are allocated in this programme for projects in sectors such as humanitarian assistance, economic development, democratic reform, improving water access and other infrastructure, health care, education, and vocational training”

(Zanotti, 2014). The programme goes through a verification procedure and is audited on a yearly basis.

The executive branch and Congress took considerable steps to limit and postpone U.S. funding to the Palestinians during the Obama and Trump administrations (Zanotti, 2018, p.1). Policymakers are evaluating whether this aid was helpful in achieving its specific programmatic goals, as well as promoting regional stability and U.S. political influence, thus questions about its future abound (see Figure 3). Some observers, including Israelis, were concerned about various parts of the aid, while also warning that more significant reforms could jeopardise Israeli stability and security.




Figure 3: Detailed U.S. Bilateral Assistance to the Palestinians, FY2012-FY2019 (Zanotti, 2018, p.2)

Notes: NADR = Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs, INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement, ESF = Economic Support Fund, OCO = Overseas Contingency Operations. For FY2018 and FY2019, ESF is referred to in the Administration’s budget request as Economic Support and Development Fund (ESDF).

Recent funding cuts and delays appear to be linked to political tensions between the U.S. and Palestinians over the Trump administration's policy on Jerusalem. Indeed, President Trump intimated that ongoing aid to the Palestinians could be contingent on their willingness to join in U.S.-mediated peace talks with Israel. In January 2018, a few days after Vice President Pence's visit to Israel, President Trump stated:

And when [the Palestinians] disrespected us a week ago by not allowing our great vice president to see them, and we give them hundreds of millions of dollars in aid and support, tremendous numbers, numbers that nobody understands, that money is on the table and that money is not going to them unless they sit down and negotiate peace. (Zanotti, 2018, p.3)

As the declaration above makes clear, the president's words mirrored rising tensions between the U.S. and the Palestinians. He recognised Jerusalem as Israel's capital in December 2017 and declared his intention to move the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Mahmoud Abbas, the Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and President of the Palestinian Authority (PA), as well as many other countries, fiercely opposed this U.S. policy (Zanotti, 2018, p.3).

It is questionable if President Trump's stated aid criteria applied solely to bilateral aid to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, or also to U.S. donations to UNRWA. Indeed, the administration did not allocate any bilateral economic assistance (ESF) for the Palestinians from the FY2017 or FY2018 budgets (Zanotti, 2018, p.4).

Additionally, in March 2018 Congress enacted the Taylor Force Act (Title X of P.L. 115-141). This legislation added to existing legislative provisions prohibiting the United States from providing bilateral economic aid to the Palestinian Authority (PA)

until Palestinian officials stop making payments that are deemed “for acts of ‘terrorism’” under U.S. law (Zanotti, 2018, p.1).

Following a rift between the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Hamas in the Gaza Strip in 2007, Congress raised bilateral economic aid to the Palestinians, which had begun in the mid-1990s, and started offering nonlethal security assistance. Security, economic growth, self-governance, and humanitarian needs had all received funding, with a particular focus on bolstering the Palestinian Authority's position against Hamas. Both USAID-administered projects and payments to PA creditors were included in the economic assistance. Bilateral aid levels, on the other hand, have consistently decreased since FY2013, from yearly averages of \$400 million for economic aid and \$100 million for security aid. The Administration requested \$215 million in economic aid and \$35 million in security aid for FY2019 (Zanotti, 2018, p.1).

Moreover, the United States contributes to UNRWA, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, “which provides food, shelter, medical care, and education for many of the original refugees from the 1947-1949 Arab-Israeli war and their families now comprising approximately 4.8 million Palestinians in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank, and Gaza.” The amount allocated by the U.S. government for Fiscal Year 2014 was \$250.9 million (Zanotti, 2014).

The United States contributed \$359.3 million in FY2017. Because the Administration withheld a portion of a scheduled January 2018 commitment, U.S. contributions for FY2018 totalled \$65 million (Zanotti, 2018, p.1). Considering UNRWA's reliance on voluntary donations, funding for the organisation's major

activities in 2018 and the subsequent years was in doubt, and has depended in part on contributions from other countries. Concerns regarding UNRWA's finances have influenced the ongoing public debate in the United States about the advantages and costs of the organisation's efforts, as well as the relationship between political issues and humanitarian aid. As a result, American aid to the Palestinians has been still subject to a number of legal restrictions and strict oversight from Congress.




Figure 4: U.S. Daily Assistance to Israel and Palestine (Retrieved from: <http://www.usislam.org/politics/usassistance.htm>).

By and large, it can securely be said that the U.S. has been a partial broker between the two groups Palestinians and Israelis (see Figure 4). This is in part due, as elucidated in the first chapter, to the imperial culture and the exceptionality of both American and Jewish races. In practice, however, contrary to Palestinians, the U.S. extraordinary generosity with the Jewish might be understandable if Israel were a vital strategic asset

or if there were a compelling moral case for sustained U.S. backing. Yet, neither rationale is convincing. Viewed objectively, Israel's past and present conduct offers little moral basis for privileging it over the Palestinians, and it is to discussion and examination of the real underlying forces behind American unwavering support for Israel that my study now turns.

Chapter Three:

**U.S. Wavering Support for Pretoria and U.S. Unwavering Support for Israel: A
Moral Historical Basis or a Set of Concealed Forces?**

On March 9, 2004, Christopher J. Lee, the contributing editor of the *Journal of South African and American Comparative Studies* (SAFUNDI), made an important interview with Professor Noam Chomsky. The interview's main theme was broader apartheid practiced by Israel in Palestine and its analogous case in South Africa. For Noam Chomsky, the situation in the Occupied Territories was nothing but "a Bantustan settlement." "It's very close to that. The actions are taken with U.S. funding, crucially. U.S. diplomatic, military, and economic support are crucial. It cannot be done without that," he said (Lee, 2004, p.9). He made it clear that the situation there was analogous to the United States' backing to South Africa during the apartheid era up to the 1980s with a slight difference when he argues:

As I'm sure you know, the Reagan Administration—which is basically the current people in power, including people like Colin Powell—found ways to evade Congressional restrictions so that they continued to support the apartheid administration, almost until the end. In the case of Israel, they don't have to hide it because there are no sanctions...Furthermore, there is no need for it. We ought to call for sanctions against the United States! If the U.S. were to stop its massive support for this, it's over. So, you don't have to have sanctions on Israel...Israel will of course do whatever it can as long as the U.S. authorizes it. As soon as the U.S. tells it no, that's the end. The power relations are very straight forward. It's not pretty, but that's the way the world works. (Lee, 2004, p.10)

It is clear to the observer's eye that the above deeply significant statement is very powerful for it blames the U.S. for Israel's practice of apartheid in Palestine, preceded by its same support to Pretoria, with a slight difference. It, hence, puts into question U.S. unwavering support for Israel compared to its shifting support for Pretoria, the main theme around which this chapter revolves.

The third chapter unveils the veiled forces that drive the United States' resolve to back, defend, and secure Israel, contrary to its fading support to apartheid South Africa. In the search for these tacit forces, this chapter expounds the Israel lobby, which strives to make backing Israel the "smart" political option, regardless of a foreign policymaker's own viewpoints.

The purpose of the present chapter is to probe into the U.S./Israel relationship and the impact it has had on Palestine through the lens of Robert D. Putnam's "two-level-game" theory. By examining the Israeli-U.S. relations from Putnam's theory, the two-level game, the study will show how statesmen need to negotiate at both international and national levels in order to satisfy both domestic and foreign interests, as well as how this interplay can affect the conception of the world. For the sake of achieving the study's aim, it is incumbent to sketch the shift U.S. policy assumptions had witnessed in regard to its seemingly steadfast support for Pretoria, followed by an analysis grounded on Putnam's theory perspective. Afterwards, within the space of this same chapter, it will be argued that the U.S./Israel special relationship was mostly attributable to the Israel Lobby's political clout. Hence, I will shed light on the lobby's sources of power as well as its strategies for success. Then, in order to discern its multiple dimensions, Israel's position as America's watchdog in the Middle East will be brought to the fore, besides the analysis of the two-level game's implications on the U.S./Israel relationship, and thereby the Palestinian question.

3-1-Putnam's Two-Level Game Theory

In 1988, Robert D. Putnam developed his theory of diplomatic negotiations, arguing that international negotiations should be viewed as a two-level game since

international politics (Level 1) and domestic politics (Level 2) are inseparable. National constituents and interest groups, like activist groups and labour unions, pursue their goals by urging the government to enact laws that serve their interests. Governments, at an international level, endeavour to minimise the possible effects of international events while simultaneously balancing them with the demands and expectations of their domestic constituents (Bjola & Manor, 2018, p.6). If a leader decides to prioritise domestic politics over international issues, he would fail to negotiate a treaty; and if he decides to disregard domestic concerns, he would not ratify the treaty. This indicates that there exists an intricate relationship between the two levels. Hence, the political complications for those involved in this two-level game are astounding, as Putnam argues (Putnam, 1988, pp.433-434).

Putnam's two-level theory is, hence, a political model which views negotiations between countries consisting of negotiations on both a domestic and a foreign level. The basic premise of the theory is that representatives have been assigned to two tables, one for domestic negotiations and the other for foreign negotiations (Varga, 2021, p.6).

In this case, power is a major cause behind the parties' current state. Since power is such a wide concept within the international politics, Putnam's theory narrows down the concept into only two levels. A state's place in the world politics is decided through negotiation the actor makes on both international and national levels. The state's domestic politics is affected by the deals made at the foreign table, and vice versa (Varga, 2021, p.6).

Putnam believes that the argument over whether domestic politics has a greater influence on foreign politics or the other way around is futile. He contends that as the two policies have a comparable impact on one another, the real issues in this discussion should be how and when they do so (Putnam, 1988, p.427). Many of the negotiations made at a foreign level can be conceived as a two-level game. At the domestic level, internal pressure by some groups is exerted on the government to embrace policies in their favour, while the government aims to gain power by constructing coalitions with these specific groups. Simultaneously, at the foreign level, governments try to maximise their capacity to meet the internal groups' needs and demands, while trying to minimise the results of foreign developments. The decision makers cannot ignore either of the two games (p.427).

The political head of each country appears at both game boards. Diplomats alongside other international advisors are seated at his elbows, while his counterparts from other countries are seated across the table. "Party and parliamentary figures, spokespersons for domestic agencies, representatives of key interest groups, and the leader's own political advisors" are seated at the domestic table behind him (Putnam, 1988, p.427). The basis of the two-level game is the understanding that home politics may be used to affect the outcomes of international negotiations and that foreign moves can aid in the accomplishment of domestic objectives (Varga, 2021, p.7).

The two-level game is distinct from previous theories. Indeed, despite the fact that it is concerned with all three levels defined by Waltz¹, the theory suggested by

¹ Kenneth Waltz introduced the most widely levels of analysis in the 1950s when he discerned three levels of analysis. The international-level which explains through a state's position in the international system, the domestic-level where the explanations look to the particular states culture, society and political institutions and the

Putnam differs from it in three different ways. The first difference is that it is a theory of international bargaining. The second is that the key player is the statesman, and the strategy the latter considers or opts for is an important component in international negotiations. The third difference as well as the most distinctive, is that the strategy of the statesman reflects a “double-edged” calculating game of opportunities and constraints on both tables (Varga, 2021, p.8).

It is true that the theory assumes that the statesman tries to do two things at once, namely manipulating both domestic and foreign politics at the same time. However, the strategies and tactics are controlled with what is acceptable for the other state as well as with what will be ratified by the domestic constituencies. Hence, “diplomatic tactics and strategies are constrained simultaneously by what other states will accept and what domestic constituencies will ratify.” To successfully conclude a negotiation, the diplomat must bargain on those two tables, “both reaching an international agreement and securing its international ratification” (Moravcsik, 1993, p.5).

There are two stages to the negotiation process: the bargaining phase, in which statesmen negotiate to reach international agreements, and the ratification phase, in which each country's domestic constituents decide on whether to formally or informally ratify and begin to implement the agreement (Moravcsik, 1993, p.23). An international negotiation's outcome can be determined by the strategies a statesman employs, including how he exerts influence on both his own and his counterpart's home politics.

individual-level where the explanations are made up of individual statesmen's personal and psychological characteristics.

For instance, the statesman can create fresh opportunities for bargaining benefits in the negotiation by taking control of resources or information. He can also direct the policy directly towards domestic or local groups in foreign nations, thereby looking for allies “behind the back” of his or her counterpart (Moravcsik, 1993, p.15). Nevertheless, because the statesman has no direct authority on foreign institutions and/or agendas in the nations that are considered as counterparts, he has more limited resources to influence foreign policies (p.28).

The game’s intricacy stems from the fact that one move deemed reasonable by a player on one table can be deemed unfitting for the same player at the other table. Yet, in consideration of their country's interdependence, none of the two tables can be disregarded by decision makers (Putnam, 1988, p.434). The statesman’s most important mission as well as most difficult is to satisfy all the interests, while simultaneously taking into consideration the different consequences an action can have on the ratification of a resolution or agreement (Varga, 2021, p.9).

Furthermore, a key element of Putnam's paradigm is the “win set” concept, which represents any Level 1 agreement that Level 2 constituents could approve. In fact, the win sets of the negotiating parties must coincide in order to establish a Level 1 agreement. Large win sets increase the likelihood of Level 1 agreements. Conversely, small win sets increase the possibility that a negotiation would fail. The leader may be more compelled to make concessions in negotiations if their win set is wider. However, he can attempt to pressure others into accepting concessions if the win set is smaller (Putnam, 1988, pp.435-441).

Several studies, including Leventoglu and Tarar (2005); Clark, Duchesne and Meunier (2000); and Milner and Rosendorff (1996), have experimentally examined the application of strict domestic ratification requirements to improve one's bargaining position. In 1995, Mo, a researcher, investigated how a leader may reduce his win set by allowing domestic agents veto rights over an international treaty, which enhanced his Level 1 bargaining position. In 1993, similarly, another researcher, Iida, delved into how leaders could use the uncertainty surrounding Level 2 ratification as leverage in Level 1 negotiations.

Putnam identifies three factors that influence the size of the win sets. First, L2 constituents' distribution of power, preferences, and possible coalitions determine the win set's size. The size of the win set, for example, is determined by the relative power of "isolationists," who strongly oppose all international collaboration, and "internationalists," who strongly favour international collaboration (Putnam, 1988, pp.442-443). Such is the case with the 2002 Lisowski's assessment of President George W. Bush's win set prior to the Kyoto Climate Protocol ratification. According to Lisowski's study, an "anti-Kyoto" coalition was successful in gaining a Senate resolution rejecting any international climate agreement that would hurt American economy. Furthermore, public opinion polls indicated that the political cost of failure to reach an agreement was minimal. As a result, President Bush was capable to discard the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol with little difficulty (Bjola & Manor, 2018, pp.6-7).

Besides, the second factor that defines the size of the win set is the nature of the ratification process. A treaty that requires a specific parliamentary majority, like

two-thirds of the U.S. Senate, to be ratified, for instance, has a smaller win set. Lastly, the political strategies of those in power is the third factor which determines the size of the win set. To change domestic power dynamics, governments may provide special payments to selected MPs in order to earn their support or form new alliances with domestic constituents (Bjola & Manor, 2018, p.7).

The role of public opinion in the two-level model is demonstrated by Boyer's Chief of Government model, or COG, which shows that Level 1 negotiators are constantly aware of their popularity ratings and that they must marginalise domestic public opinion if a treaty involves topics that are delicate. Using three decades' worth of polling data, Peter Trumbore, a professor of political science, demonstrated in 1998 that the public would be more inclined to engage in Level 1 negotiations if the treaty addressed issues that were thought to have major gains or losses. Political actors could mobilise the public by highlighting prospective benefits or losses through framing strategies (Bjola & Manor, 2018, p.7). Therefore, domestic constituents are thought to influence international negotiations and account for disparities in influence.

In order to make the argumentation set forth in this chapter solid and reasonable, the next section analyses the reasons behind U.S. shifting backing to Pretoria during the Reagan administration and the affect it has had on the persistence of apartheid from the view point of Putnam's theory.

3-2- U.S. Shifting Support for Pretoria and Putnam's Theory

Pretoria continued to lobby the conservative agencies of the U.S. government throughout the Reagan years. The National Security Agency and the Defence Department (CIA) were specifically targeted by Pretoria's parallel diplomacy. Officials

from South Africa suggested a “tacit trade-off” whereby the United States' commitment to downplay apartheid would be reciprocated with regional cooperation. Meetings between the U.S. government and South African authorities were therefore frequent during Ronald Reagan's first term, with the goal of strengthening this strategic agenda.

Although the Reagan administration made an effort to lobby Congress on its proposed comprehensive sanctions, this effort was hampered by internal administrative disputes. As a result, the State Department's attempts to revive Constructive Engagement were unsuccessful. Reagan's declarations at the time failed to convey any sympathy for the situation of Black South Africans or any sense that the United States genuinely desired the Republic to be liberated from white minority rule. Chester Crocker, an American diplomat and scholar who served as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, bemoaned the President's tendency to undermine his case by appearing so much like the regime he was so hesitant to break with (Thomson, 2008, p.147). Propaganda for apartheid in the United States was intense preceding a shift in policy that took place near the end of Reagan's presidency, making this time period pertinent to the purposes of this chapter.

3-2-1-Pro-Apartheid Propaganda in the U.S.

In order to solidify its propaganda operations, the South African government kept a sizable diplomatic base in the U.S. throughout the presidency of Ronald Reagan. In addition to its embassy in Washington, D.C., South Africa also maintained honorary consuls in Seattle, Salt Lake City, Phoenix, and Mobile, as well as consulates in New York, Chicago, Beverly Hills, and Houston. According to 1988 data from the U.S. State Department, these offices employed 236 individuals in total; most of them were white

South African residents and 80 of whom were diplomatic officers. Their role was to act as agents to back and help Level 1 negotiations. There were three South African Information Offices in the consulates of Beverly Hills, New York, and Chicago. In addition, the South African Tourism Board maintained offices in the same cities mentioned above (Leonard, 1989, p.10).

In fact, many of these offices were engaged in propaganda-related activities, openly or surreptitiously opposing sanctions and promoting the policies of the apartheid system. In addition to the news media and private organisations, embassy officials in Washington, D.C., maintained connections with members of Congress, other government officials, and administration officials. All of those connections would be advantageous and beneficial to Putnam's bargaining phase. In numerous other cities, South African officials established connections with local authorities, business, civic, and academic institutions and groups, in addition to news media outlets (Leonard, 1989, p.10). South African authorities and their lobbying and public relations agents, during the 1980s' Reagan years, could rely on a warm reception from conservatives and conservative organisations in the U.S.A., including Reagan administration officials and conservative members of Congress.

Pretoria's policies and assertions were largely positively reacted to by conservative think tanks with Reagan connections, most notably the powerful Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute, Stanford University's Hoover Institution, and Georgetown University's Institute for Strategic and International Studies (Leonard, 1989, p.10). Furthermore, Pretoria's propaganda efforts were facilitated by the greater conservative influence in the American media during the Reagan years.

As a result, American public relations and lobbying organisations played a major role in spreading inaccurate information to back the South African government and American corporations' interests. In addition to declaring their activities on behalf of foreign founders and the money they received from them, these businesses required registration with the United States' Department of Justice. In 1988, the South African government hired operatives in the United States for about \$3 million, exceeding the \$2 million it spent in 1985. Roughly, \$1.5 million was spent annually by the authoritarian regime to encourage tourism to the United States as part of its propaganda activities. A minimum of \$500,000 was spent on American agents by South African commercial interests in 1988 (Leonard, 1989, p.10).

Since mid-1988, a number of agents working for the government of South Africa had signed up with the U.S. Justice Department. Among those signed up agents for South Africa, the largest sized fees were obtained by John P. Sears' law offices—\$500,000 annually, in addition to expenses— since 1980 when they were retained. Because John Sears was, in the 1980 presidential election, the manager of Ronald Reagan's campaign, he was capable of giving the apartheid regime access to the top-level officials in both Congress and the Reagan administration. The firm had assisted the South African ambassador in Washington in preparing speeches and articles, assembled guest lists of Americans to meet South African officials at social activities, and offered information to South African officials on the political scene in the United States, added to setting up legislation meetings with senators and representatives (Leonard, 1989, p.11).

Besides, in 1986, *Riley & Fox, Incorporated*, specialized in gold and Krugerrand gold coins, was appointed as agent for the South African government, and in 1987, for the South African Chamber of Mines. *Riley & Fox* was the heir to *Smathers, Symington, and Herlong*, another of South Africa's top lobbying firms, recruited in 1980 for \$330,000 in fees and expenses. The firm's principal partners were high-profile members of the Democratic Party. Following Symington's exit in 1985, the firm was renamed *Smathers, Hickey, and Riley*. *Riley & Fox* had a \$405,000 per year fee and expense deal with the South African regime in 1988, and a \$39,000 per year fee and expenditure contract with the South African Chamber of Mines (Leonard, 1989, p.11). It frequently served as a source of information for the apartheid system, getting material from offices in Washington and around the United States—specifically information about divestment and sanctions— as well as assisting in the planning of meetings and social activities for South African officials.

Added to the above listed agents, in 1988, the South African Consul General in Chicago employed Mary Kathleen Rothschild, a new registered agent headquartered in Chicago, to assist him in contacting local members of Congress, state and local officials, and establishing economic and cultural ties with South Africa. Her initial contract stipulated that she would be paid \$80,000 in fees and costs per year (Leonard, 1989, p.12).

South African corporate agents in the U.S., on the other hand, sided with Pretoria in opposing and fighting sanctions and divestment, even though they used to highlight their opposition to apartheid. For the current study, this stance is notable. Indeed, for decades, South African business leaders asserted that sanctions would

negatively affect Black South Africans and that economic growth would end apartheid. However, in response to internal reform desires and hopes, the South African administration stepped up repression and violence, which ultimately resulted in the issuance of a state of emergency.

The South Africa Foundation (SAF) was the most powerful business lobby in the United States for South Africa. In 1987, the SAF budgeted about \$300,000 on its Washington office, a rise of around \$100,000 over 1985 and 1986. This lobby identified itself as the diplomatic wing of the country's business community. In spite of attempts to distance itself from the government, the SAF hired a career diplomat who previously served as South Africa's UN ambassador, called Kurt von Schimming, as its new director-general in 1986. There were 3,300 individual and 1,600 corporate members in the SAF (Leonard, 1989, p.15).

Furthermore, a group of American firms launched a significant lobbying effort to oppose the comprehensive sanctions against South Africa that were being discussed in Congress in 1988. One such measure was the Wise amendment, which would have prohibited federal oil, gas, and coal leasing deals to oil companies operating in South Africa. The business alliance was established by the Washington, D.C.-based National Foreign Trade Council, which requested \$5,000 from corporate donors. The first backers were about 20 corporations, notably *Combustion Engineering*, *Johnson & Johnson*, *Texaco*, *Mobil*, *Caterpillar Tractor*, *Union Carbide*, in addition to *Dresser Industries*, *CBI Industries*, and *Chevron* (Leonard, 1989, p.19). All of this suggests that the United States government's backing of Pretoria was closely related to its concerns about economic interests, which in turn increased the Reagan administration's win sets.

Similarly, one of the most potent and influential defenders of the South African government and its policies in the United States was the religious right.¹ The rhetoric they delivered mirrored Pretoria's views, even though conservative Christian organisations refused to accept direct assistance from the South African government. *The South African Tourist Board* and *South African Airways* had hosted religious right-wing leaders on their visits to South Africa. In a 1986 story in the *San Francisco Examiner*, U.S. fundamentalists were described as striving to rally Pretoria's public opinion:

South Africa and its supporters are waging a campaign to influence U.S. public opinion by flying fundamentalist Christian leaders and their congregations to South Africa. Also under way is a drive to bring people from Christian broadcasting networks to South Africa, and to aid them in producing segments favourable to the government. (Leonard, 1989, p.21)

Equally significant, a research conducted in 1984 evaluated how well five yearbooks and 19 textbooks that were frequently used as sources for information in school libraries covered South Africa. The survey's conclusions indicate that most literature and almanacs' portrayals of South Africa had racist, erroneous or deceptive elements (Leonard, 1989, p.14).

Despite the fact that Africanist experts in the U.S. had addressed this issue with textbook publishers and warned against trusting information provided by the apartheid regime, issues remained. A few texts echoed the regime's phrasing, stressing “separation

¹ A core group of conservative Roman Catholics and conservative Evangelical Protestants created the informal coalition known as **the Christian right**. Mormons, Orthodox Jews, and politically conservative mainline Protestants all provide their support to the Christian right. Beginning in the late 1970s, this American political movement dominated American conservatism. In the 1980s, while Ronald Reagan was the U.S. president, the Christian right gained significant clout inside the Republican party.

of population groups.” While most of them identified racial supremacy, they largely avoided discussing economic exploitation and political dominance mechanisms (Leonard, 1989, p.14).

More significantly, South Africa used media restrictions and censorship to control the dissemination of information about the nation's circumstances and events. Consequently, they used propaganda-like misleading information to shape South Africa's image to manipulate public perception and foreign government policy (Leonard, 1989, p.33).

John Oakes, a former senior editor of *The New York Times*, described the main elements of the limitations in a statement he provided while testifying before Congress in March 1988 for the Committee to Protect Journalists:

No print or broadcast journalists or news photographers or camera crews may be within sight of “unrest,” the government’s term for protests of all types, and actions by security forces to suppress them. No news or comment concerning “unrest” or security force actions may be printed or transmitted without official authorisation. No “subversive statements” may be printed or transmitted. No systematic or repeated publication of “revolution-supportive” material is permitted. No unauthorised reports on conditions of detainees, or on strikes, boycotts or other forms of nonviolent protests, or on unlawful local political structures,” such as street committees, may be printed or transmitted. (Oakes, 1988)

So, in June 1986, a nationwide state of emergency was established, with harsher reporting limitations. This put more pressure on journalists. A number of American journalists were imprisoned and expelled from the country for apparent violations of the restrictions (Leonard, 1989, p.35).

Reporters and news executives detailed how their coverage was stifled in a June 14, 1986 *Washington Post* article. "It's getting harder and harder to cover everything in South Africa," stated Howard Stringer, executive vice president of CBS News. The South African government, according to CBS correspondent Allen Pizzey, "considers damn near everything from criticism to graffiti to be subversive" (Leonard, 1989, p.36).

Despite the fact that Black South African freelancers could provide film and accounts of protests and security force activities to American networks, network executives were reluctant to risk banishment for doing so. "Even if we used the work of a freelance person who provided the footage, there's a restriction against broadcasting it," explained Jerry Lamprecht, NBC's general manager of foreign news. According to CBS's Stringer, television crews are not allowed to use footage shot by Black people. "If we do, we'll be flown out of the country" (Leonard, 1989, p.36).

All things considered, apartheid propaganda in the United States was powerful due to the South African lobby's presence in nearly every government agency and sensitive area, as well as Reagan's cooperation with Pretoria's objectives in order to safeguard American economic interests. The two-level game's win sets were maximised since the interests of the two countries overlapped, creating a web of schemes to keep apartheid in place. Silencing anti-apartheid campaigners was the main goal of those schemes. However, throughout the second term of the Reagan administration, anti-apartheid voices were intensifying and were at their most powerful. As a result, there was an unavoidable change in the Reagan administration's policy assumptions, which had a lasting impact on South Africa's future.

3-2-2- Anti-Apartheid Voices and the Move in the Reagan Administration's Policy Assumptions

Ronald Reagan's victory in the November 1980 presidential election served as an awakening for the Anti-apartheid movement in the United States, despite the already existing pro-apartheid propaganda. With the intention of undermining liberal programs both domestically and internationally, the “new right” was gaining ground.

As previously pointed out, the new government publicly endorsed the white minority regimes in southern Africa. Many of its members worked as advocates lobbying for Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa without hesitation (TransAfrica Forum, 1982). There were still connections to government officials who were seen as supportive of liberation though, while anti-apartheid activists criticised the Carter administration for doing nothing to stop apartheid. At that time, both radical and liberal activists understood they had little prospect of gaining access to Reagan's policy-making circles.

The anti-apartheid movement did, however, achieve its greatest victory during this time in the 1980s, as it overcame a presidential veto to enact significant national sanctions against South Africa and win “people's sanctions” against the country in states and cities throughout the nation (Minter & Hill, 2008, p.787). Convincing the apartheid regime that its days were over was made possible by this achievement, which also put a lot of pressure on the regime to begin discussions with liberation organisations.

By the end of the Reagan administration, explicit backing for apartheid had lost credibility, even among many conservative Republicans. Politicians from both parties

scrambled for a place on the platform with Nelson Mandela when he first arrived in the United States upon his release from prison in 1990 (Minter & Hill, 2008, p.787).

This shift in the U.S. policy was caused by a number of factors. In addition to the ANC becoming the undisputed leader of the nation's liberation forces, there was a spike in resistance within South Africa during this period. Besides, the shift also developed from the growth and unification of American anti-apartheid and solidarity forces, especially with their congressional allies. Therefore, this increase was demonstrated by the divestment campaign's continuous expansion, public protests sparked by the Free South Africa Movement, and calculated moves by anti-apartheid leaders in the U.S. Congress, especially in the House of Representatives.

Undeniably, the anti-apartheid movement was very successful in altering the discourse around South Africa during the Reagan administration. In South Africa's regional conflicts, the far right achieved the biggest triumphs, obtaining a considerable increase in official U.S. military support for the Angolan conflict. When the issue was presented in the stark and dramatic terms of blatant racist persecution, as seen on television, the movement was able to garner media attention and political impetus. However, the solidarity movement failed to gain wider public support for its positions when opponents were able to frame the issues in terms emblematic of the Cold War (Minter & Hill, 2008, p.790).

During the years 1983–1986, the Free South Africa Movement's distinctive public presence and persistent divestment efforts came together in the context of apartheid, leading to the anti-apartheid coalition's decisive victory in the U.S. Congress. The United States government made its first cautious steps towards preparing for a

transition in South Africa, which may involve the ANC playing a significant role, as tensions mounted both domestically and internationally on the apartheid South African state.

Around 200 state and local lawmakers, trade unionists, finance experts, church leaders, academics, and grassroots organizers met with UN officials and national anti-apartheid organizers at the first national conference on state and local divestment in June 1981. At that time, no state had approved divestment legislation yet, although there were active movements in several states, including Massachusetts, California, Connecticut, Michigan, Nevada, Wisconsin, and Nebraska (Minter & Hill, 2008, p.792).

According to Richard Knight of the American Committee on Africa, 92 cities, 24 counties, and 28 states enacted people's sanctions by 1990 (Knight, 1991). Primarily, the enormous rise in African-American representation in politics in the late 1960s and early 1970s made these victories feasible. Following the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, there was a rise of significant executive and legislative authority among African Americans, not only in Washington but also at local and state levels across the nation. Willard Johnson, the head of Boston's TransAfrica branch and a pivotal figure in the MASS DIVEST movement, noted that at that time the ability to effect some change had emerged (Minter & Hill, 2008, p.792). And Dumisani Kumalo, the anti-apartheid activist and diplomat, narrated in a 2005 interview:

At one point we had bills on South Africa in the state legislatures, more than 40 legislatures. And if you look back today, the states that were successful in passing these bills, there is not one among them where the bill was just introduced either by a black legislator only or a white legislator only. It was always two legislators, one white,

one black. And if you had that combination, the bills passed. In Michigan [for example] there was State Representative Perry Bullard and State Senator Virgil Smith. And in Massachusetts, of course, you had State Senator Mel King and State Senator Jack Backman. (Goodman, 2005)

Furthermore, a number of interrelated factors led to the growth of the Free South Africa Movement, including the escalation of protest and repression in South Africa, resentment over the possibility of another four years of a Reagan presidency, and renewed vigour among African-American progressive groups and their allies, which was ignited by Jesse Jackson's 1984 presidential campaign (Minter & Hill, 2008, p.795). The movement's foundation revealed a potential for grassroots mobilization that was founded on years of earlier work by local groups around the country, including the Southern Africa Support Project in Washington (SASP).

The anti-apartheid movement in the U.S. and around the world reached its zenith in the years 1984–1986. Due to the widespread media coverage, the events in South Africa quickly affected North America and Europe. Furthermore, the steps taken by the U.S. Congress and businesses immediately affected the trust of South African and European investors and corporations in South Africa. Therefore, “movement impact on public opinion reached a critical mass and forced both the U.S. government and the business community to take material action against apartheid” (Minter & Hill, 2008, p.800).

By 1987, Reagan administration views were significantly impacted by developments affecting the Congress and public opinion, as well as the changing circumstances in South Africa. At the turn of 1985, former IBM CEO Frank T. Cary and

William T. Coleman Jr., an African-American Republican who had been Secretary of Transportation under President Gerald Ford, jointly headed an advisory board for South Africa established by Secretary of State George Schultz (Minter & Hill, 2008, p.806).

In July 1986, in the heat of the sanctions controversy, the administration chose to replace Herman Nickel, the U.S. Ambassador to South Africa, with an African American. Herman Nickel was known for his opposition to sanctions and partiality towards the white regime. After North Carolina businessman Robert Brown was debunked by corruption charges and diplomat Terence Todman flatly refused because U.S. policy lacked credibility, Edward J. Perkins, the then-U.S. Ambassador to Liberia, took the job. The Senate approved him in October; soon following the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act was passed (Minter & Hill, 2008, p.807).

This change was evident when ANC President Oliver Tambo visited U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz in January 1987. TransAfrica called the meeting “a diplomatic coup” (Minter & Hill, 2008, p.808). It was the first of its kind between a U.S. secretary of state and a movement that the U.S. ally South Africa designated as “terrorist.” The meeting happened in spite of the objection of numerous right-wing Republicans in the White House and Congress.

Between 1989 and South Africa's first majority-rule election, the backdrop for the anti-apartheid solidarity movement in the U.S. underwent a significant change. Relationships across the Atlantic reflected the discussions that started in South Africa in the run-up to Nelson Mandela's release and the challenging transition that ensued over the next four years. The incoming president, George Bush, met with Beyers Naudé,

Allan Boesak, and Desmond Tutu in May 1989. Co-president of the United Democratic Front Albertina Sisulu received an invitation to the White House the following month. In October 1989, F.W. de Klerk, the new president of South Africa, freed Sisulu's husband, Walter Sisulu, along with six other high-ranking political prisoners. In November, the ANC finally opened its first office in Washington, D.C. (Minter & Hill, 2008, p.813).

In sum, after the United States' ostensibly unwavering support for Pretoria and its notorious apartheid regime, the anti-apartheid movement could release racial equality in South Africa out of its cage, resulting in a shift in the Reagan administration's policy assumption. Based on Putnam's theory standpoint, the COG model proved to be right because public opinion was crucial in shifting the balance of power in favour of the anti-apartheid side. In this specific case, the Reagan administration did not succeed on both Level 1 and Level 2 tables, in contrast to the successful negotiation process it had previously accomplished. This was due to the Level 2 constituents who opposed the ratification of the Level 1 bargaining phase. The U.S. statesman was forced, therefore, to consider a shift in policy as a result of the minimisation of his win sets.

The scenario in Palestine is quite different, given the peculiarity of the American/Israeli/ Palestinian triangular relationship. Hence, the next section analyses the reasons behind the U.S. unshakable backing to Israel and the impact it has had on Palestine from the view point of Putnam's theory.

3-3- American/ Israeli/ Palestinian Triangular Relationship and the Two-Level Game

Against the background of the theory and concepts set forth in this chapter, the following questions will be answered: Which domestic groups/interests/events have affected U.S. relations to Israel? And how has it affected the common denominator Palestine? Which foreign groups/interests/events have affected U.S. relations to Israel? And how has it affected the common denominator Palestine?

Therefore, in what comes next, I will focus on the domestic and foreign groups and events which have helped outline the current relation between the U.S. and Israel. Yet, since the Palestinian question is and has been a large part of the Israeli-U.S. relationship, the study will bring up Palestine and the triangular relationship made up by these three parties.

It is common truth that the United States and Israel have had abiding connection since the former helped in the establishment of the latter and put pressure on the UN members to vote favourably in 1948. Events like the Holocaust and 9/11 have allowed Israel to maintain its underdog status and garner sympathy from the American public. Israel also has a powerful lobbying organisation that has been used to influence U.S. policies in favour of the Israeli state's survival. Aside from serving as a peace mediator between Israel and Palestine, the U.S. government has a variety of interests in the region.

The argument developed in this chapter is that U.S. international negotiations with Israel cannot be understood in isolation from American domestic politics. Building on the logic of Putnam's two-level game theory, government negotiations are

constrained by their domestic political actors. In what follows, therefore, the veiled compelling forces in charge of pushing Washington, D.C., to unshakably back Israel in its policy towards Palestinians will be unveiled.

3-3-1- Underlying Driving Forces behind U.S. Blind Support for Israel

The primary focus of American foreign policymakers is definitely the national interest of the United States. However, as previously said, its relationship with Israel has become a major worry in recent decades. The United States' unwavering support for Israel, as well as its subsequent efforts to spread democracy throughout the region, has outraged Arab and Islamic opinion, posing a security threat to the United States.

This is a special situation in American politics' history. Why has the U.S. embraced policies that jeopardised its own security in the name of advancing the interests of another country called Israel? One might assume that the ties that bind the two countries are based on shared interests or strong moral, cultural, and religious underpinnings.

However, as will be demonstrated below, neither of these arguments is appropriate. Instead, the United States' efforts to preserve Israel are mostly owing to the efforts of the "Israel lobby," for "no lobby has managed to divert U.S. foreign policy as far from what the American national interest would otherwise suggest, while simultaneously convincing Americans that U.S. and Israeli interests are essentially identical." (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, p.31).

3-3-1-1- The Israel Lobby in American Government: The Tail that Wags the Dog

Israeli acts are rarely criticised by American authorities, especially those vying to positions of power. Indeed, significant components of American foreign policy are

carried out with the goal of enhancing Israel's security. Even after the September 11 attacks shone a spotlight on America's unstable Middle East stance, the causes of the unique relationship between the United States and Israel have remained a taboo subject within the mainstream foreign policy elite.

Jerome Slater, a critic of U.S. Middle East policy, claims that the unique relationship has come to exist thanks to the deep cultural and religious affinities and widespread public acceptance in American society, not due to the Israel's lobby power. The lobby's power, according to Slater, is based on the American people's long-standing affiliation with the Zionist state. This work argues that for three main reasons, Slater's explanation is incorrect. First and foremost, it fails to pass the common sense test. There would be no need for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the Conference of Presidents, Christians United for Israel, and other elements of the lobby to work tirelessly to preserve and enhance the special relationship if the American public was persistently supportive of it.

Slater, besides, agrees that the lobby has a significant presence on Capitol Hill and that it “has played a major role in congressional insistence that the United States continue its unconditional support of Israel”. He also believes that potential foes such as the Arab and oil lobby are too feeble to be a substantial counterweight. Therefore, if the American people and their leadership were truly devoted to the unique relationship, a robust lobby would be unnecessary, because politicians and policymakers would not require persuasion to offer Israel with such tremendous support.

Third, the public in the United States is not enthusiastic about the U.S./Israeli special relationship. Most Americans are unquestionably sympathetic to Israel, but they

are significantly more critical of Israeli policies than their elected officials are, and they are far more inclined to embrace a tough approach to dealing with the Zionist state than most policymakers do.

A 2003 survey by the University of Maryland's Program on International Policy Attitudes found, for instance, that 60 percent of Americans said they would withhold help from Israel if it refused to compromise on its dispute with the Palestinians. More specifically, 73 percent of the respondents believed the U.S. should not favour one side over the other in the conflict. A survey commissioned by the Anti-Defamation League two years later indicated that 78 percent of Americans agreed that the U.S. should not favour either Israel or the Palestinians (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2009, p.76).

These statistics practically suggest that three out of every four Americans oppose the special relationship, even if they have a positive attitude toward Israel. The existence of a powerful pro-Israel lobbying campaign, which employs an array of strategies to guarantee that U.S. policy does not echo the actual inclinations of the American people, is then critical to maintaining the special relationship (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2009, p.77).

Hence, American public opinion does not provide answers to why the United States gives Israel such enormous and practically unrestricted support. As a result, the present section contends that the special relationship is primarily owing to the lobby's power and influence, rather than the American people's long-standing affiliation with Israel.

The term “lobby” is used as a shorthand for the informal alliance of individuals and organisations diligently working to mould U.S. foreign policy in favour of Israel.

The term “lobby” is not meant to imply that it is a unified movement with a centralised leadership or that its members do not dispute over some matters. Indeed, “the lobby is not a cabal or conspiracy, and its activities are essentially consistent with the interest-group tradition that has long governed American political life” (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, p.40).

The lobby's core comprises of American Jews who make a concerted effort in their everyday lives to sway U.S. foreign policy in favour of Israel. Their efforts include writing letters, donating money, and backing pro-Israel organisations in addition to voting for pro-Israel candidates.

It is worth noting, however, that the lobby is not often associated with American Jews. Many of them are unconcerned about Israel, and many do not agree with the lobby's positions. According to a 2004 poll, around 36 percent of Jewish-Americans stated they were “not very” or “not at all” emotionally attached to Israel. Furthermore, some pro-Israel organisations, such as the “Christian Zionists,” are not Jewish. Therefore, “not all Jews are supporters of the official Israel lobby, and many supporters of this lobby are Christians. Indeed, in numerical terms, there are more Christian evangelicals in this lobby than Jews” (Varga, 2021, p.17).

On the other hand, some Jewish-Americans disagree on some Israeli policies. The lobby's main organisations, such as AIPAC and the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organisations, are led by hardliners who supported Israel's Likud party's expansionist policies, particularly its opposition to the Oslo peace process. The vast majority of American Jews, on the other hand, prefers to make concessions to the Palestinians (Varga, 2021, p.17).

It should also be made clear that the lobby's individuals and groups do not always accord on every single matter. For example, these groups have severe disputes about the merits of a two-state solution. Nevertheless, individuals and organisations in the lobby, regardless of their differences, “share the desire to promote a special relationship between the United States and Israel” and consider that “the United States should give Israel substantial diplomatic, economic, and military support even when Israel takes actions the United States opposes” (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2009, p.64). As a corollary, some groups such as Americans for Peace Now have been placed within the lobby as they reject any cut in U.S. funding to Israel, whilst Jewish Voice for Peace has been excluded as it promotes keeping aid conditional on Israel's withdrawal from the West Bank (p.64).

Besides, some Jewish Americans feel guilty for not living in Israel and remedy this by sending money, either by buying Israeli government bonds or donating to different Jewish organisations. However, what speaks for a continuing activity is that among the American Jews, the state of Israel is seen as a guarantee for a Jewish national home which awaits the American Jews with open arms if a new anti-Semitist wave would sweep through the Western World (Varga, 2021, p.18).

There are three essential reasons for the huge impact the Jews have had on American politics. The first is that the Jewish people are very politically active. Ninety percent of the Jewish population vote in elections, which means that in a country where about 55 percent of the population vote, the Jewish population is represented with about 6 percent. The second is that the Jewish population is often situated in the most densely populated federal states such as California and New York. These federal states have

many electors and are therefore crucial in presidential elections. The third is that generally, the American Jews are very wealthy and donate large amounts to campaigns where the candidate is pro-Israel or can be persuaded into caring pro-Israeli politics, which is why the Israeli lobby groups are listened to closely. The richest Jewish society can be found in the U.S., much due to the number of rich Jewish Russians who immigrated to the country before and after 1948 (Varga, 2021, p.18).

The most eminent organisation is AIPAC. In this regard, Fortune magazine asked members of Congress to identify the most powerful lobbyists in Washington in 1997. It found that “AIPAC was ranked second behind the American Association of Retired People (AARP) but ahead of heavyweight lobbies like the AFL-CIO and the National Rifle Association (NRA).” The findings of a National Journal research conducted in March 2005 were unambiguous as AIPAC was ranked second in Washington's “muscle rankings” (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, p.41).

Furthermore, some Christian evangelicals, such as Pat Robertson and Ralph Reed, as well as former House of Representatives leaders Tom DeLay and Dick Armey, are influential members of the lobby. These “Christian Zionists” see Israel's rebirth as a religious imperative, and they ardently support its expansionist strategy, believing that constraining Israel is against God's will. Additionally, the lobby has the support of neoconservative gentiles such as “John Bolton, the late Wall Street Journal editor Robert Bartley, former Secretary of Education William Bennett, former UN Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick and columnist George Will” (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, p.41). The lobby's sources of power will be sketched out in the subsequent section.

3-3-1-1-1-The Lobby's Power Seeds

The power of Israel lobby stems from its unrivalled capacity to play interest-group politics. In terms of basic activities, It operates similarly to the farm lobby, the NRA, steel and textile workers' groups, and other ethnic lobbies. Yet, the Israel lobby's enormous effectiveness is the thing that makes it distinct. For the most part, individuals and organisations that make up the lobby are doing exactly what other special-interest groups are doing, only better and smarter. Additionally, pro-Arab interest groups are either non-existent or ineffective, making the lobby's job even simpler and smoother (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, p.42).

This efficiency can be attributed to a late nineteenth century Supreme Court decision that formed the seed of power by granting corporations the same rights as individual people in the United States. The first amendment of the American Constitution guarantees freedom of speech, which is one of such rights.

Due to the enormous level of corruption that existed in late nineteenth century American society, the court deemed money contributions to political candidates to be manifestations of political speech and so protected by the court (Blankfort, 2015, p.1). This judgment allowed well-funded “special interest” lobbies to engage in legal bribery, allowing them to influence both U.S. foreign and domestic policies. This is why, in 1907, the American author Mark Twain observed that “there was only one native criminal class in America—Congress.” A decade later, humourist Will Rogers commented saying that “America has the best Congress money can buy” (p.1).

The railroads and steel companies were the first to pay the going price, followed by the lumber, oil, and construction industries, weapons and automobile manufacturers,

airplane and communications industries. Ensuingly, what are known as health providers—doctors, hospitals, and pharmaceutical manufacturers—followed in turn.

No lobby has grown more effective in the realm of foreign policy than the organised American Jewish community's support for Israel—what is commonly referred to as the Israel Lobby and simply referred to as “the Lobby” in the corridors of Congress. When one observes that this lobby represents less than a third of America's six million Jews, its effectiveness and success are all the more remarkable. Therefore, the following paragraphs delineate its success tactics.

3-3-1-1-2- The Lobby’s Success Tactics: The Media’s Effect

To bolster American support for Israel, the lobby employs two primary strategies. First, it wields considerable clout in Washington, urging both Congress and the executive branch to continuously back Israel. Second, through repeating myths about Israel and its founding and advertising Israel's side in actual policy discussions through the mass media, the lobby aims to guarantee that public discourse about Israel depicts it in a favourable light (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, p.42). The purpose is to avert unfavourable commentary about Israel from receiving a fair hearing in the political sphere.

As has just been mentioned, the lobby's influence in the United States Congress, where Israel is largely immune from criticism, is a crucial pillar of its efficacy. This is itself an unusual scenario, because Congress nearly never skirts controversial issues. “Where Israel is concerned, however, potential critics fall silent. There is hardly any debate at all” (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, p.42).

The thing that helps explain the lobby's success with Congress is that a handful of important members of the lobby are Christian Zionists, such as Dick Armev, who stated in September 2002, “My number-one priority in foreign policy is to support Israel” (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, p.42). One would expect that any congressman's top goal would be to safeguard America, but that is not what Armev stated. There are, furthermore, Jewish senators and congressmen who strive to push American foreign policy into supporting the interests of Israel. Indeed, Jewish-Americans have organised a diverse range of organisations to influence American foreign policy, the most influential and well-known of which being AIPAC:

The bottom line is that AIPAC [...], has an unchallenged hold on the U.S. Congress. Open debate about U.S. policy towards Israel does not occur there, even though that policy has important consequences for the entire world. Thus, one of the three main branches of the U.S. government is firmly committed to supporting Israel. (Varga, 2021, p.18)

AIPAC, hence, is at the heart of the lobby's influence in Congress. As former U.S. government official Aaron David Miller observed, “Today you cannot be successful in American politics and not be good on Israel. And AIPAC plays a key role in making that happen” (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2009, p.66).

The capacity of AIPAC to reward senators and congressional candidates who embrace its agenda while punishing those who oppose it is the key to its success. Money is crucial in American elections, and AIPAC ensures that its allies receive funding from the numerous pro-Israel political action committees (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, p.43).

Based on this, officeholders can ,therefore, be judged to form part of the lobby if their commitment to Israel predates their arrival into public service or if they dedicate a significant proportion of their personal or professional lives, both in and out of office, to strengthening the special relationship. For this reason, it is legitimate to identify Congressman Howard Berman as an active member of the wide pro-Israel interest group for he claimed that his concern for Israel was the reason he sought to serve on the House Foreign Affairs Committee (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2009, p.66).

Conversely, when Martin Indyk, a former AIPAC deputy director of research and one of the founders of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), was assigned to a major position in the Clinton administration dealing with Middle East policy (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2009, p.66), it was difficult not to regard this as a case of an Israel lobbyist serving in government. The same might be said for Indyk's partner Dennis Ross, who joined WINEP after leaving government service, or neoconservative hard-liner Elliott Abrams, who handled Middle East policy on the National Security Council since 2002 and had a long history of pro-Israel inclinations (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2009, p.66).

Those who are perceived to be antagonistic to Israel, on the other hand, can be certain that AIPAC will donate to their political adversaries. Besides, AIPAC sponsors letter-writing campaigns and urges newspaper editors to support pro-Israel candidates. The effectiveness of these tactics is undeniable. For example, in 1984, AIPAC assisted in the failure of Illinois Senator Charles Percy, who, according to one senior lobbyist, had “displayed insensitivity and even hostility to our concerns.” At the moment, Thomas Dine, the head of AIPAC, described what had happened: “All the Jews in America, from

coast to coast, gathered to oust Percy. And the American politicians — those who hold public positions now, and those who aspire — got the message” (Tivnan, 1987, p.191).

Senator Hillary Clinton's advocacy for Palestinian statehood and her kiss to Suha Arafat, the wife of Palestinian Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat, drew harsh criticism from the lobby's groups. This would explain why J. J. Goldberg, editor of the Jewish weekly newspaper the Forward, stated in 2002, “There is this image in Congress that you don’t cross these people or they take you down” (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2009, p.66).

In this regard, Gary Jacobson observed, “Congressional challengers rarely win if they do not spend a substantial amount of money, and the more they spend, the more likely they are to win” (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2009, p.66). As one might expect, incumbents aim to restore AIPAC's confidence that they are totally committed to the special relationship. They would desire that pro-Israel political action committees (PACs) and people send money to them instead of their challengers.

Additionally, because Israel is not a high-profile topic for most Americans, most politicians will not face severe political consequences if they support Israel. The Israel lobby also has the advantage of having no rival lobby with substantial money to whom politicians can turn for assistance, as highlighted earlier.

The voting behaviour of any politician, moreover, is influenced by his or her party's inclinations. Individual politicians will have even less reason to put the special relationship into question if their party counts on donations from individuals and organisations that strongly support it—which both parties do to different extents (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2009, p.67).

However, AIPAC's clout on Capitol Hill extends far deeper. As Douglas Bloomfield, a former member of the AIPAC staff, states, "It is common for members of Congress and their staffs to turn to AIPAC first when they need information, before calling the Library of Congress, the Congressional Research Service, committee staff or administration experts." More fundamentally, he observes that AIPAC is "often called upon to draft speeches, work on legislation, advise on tactics, perform research, collect co-sponsors and marshal votes" (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, p.43).

Given all what has been said, Slater himself recognises that "there are many examples of impressive lobby successes in Congress," continuing that "the evidence amassed by Mearsheimer and Walt and others leaves no reasonable doubt [that] the power of the Israel lobby has played a major role in congressional insistence that the U.S. continue its unconditional support of Israel" (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, p.43).

In spite of the fact that AIPAC concentrates its efforts mostly on Capitol Hill, more than a third of a dozen pro-Israel PACs are involved in the presidential election. This indicates that the lobby does not only have significant clout in Congress, but also has significant leverage in the Executive Branch. This is due to the fact that, while accounting for only 3% of the population, Jewish-Americans organise large-scale political donations to candidates from both parties. According to the *Washington Post* estimation, "Democratic presidential candidates depend on Jewish supporters to supply as much as sixty percent of the money" (Edsall & Cooperman, 2003).

Moreover, significant states such as California, New York, New Jersey, Florida, Pennsylvania, and Illinois have a high concentration of Jewish voters. This allows them

to sway election results. Because their vote counts in elections, presidential candidates are prudent about inciting anti-Semitism among Jewish voters. For instance, Senator Joseph Lieberman accused Howard Dean of throwing Israel down the river and termed his statement “irresponsible” after this 2004 presidential candidate urged for the U.S. to play a more “even handed” role in the Arab/Israel conflict (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, p.44).

Slater insists that “the Jewish vote is much less important in presidential than in congressional elections, for most presidential elections are not decided by small minorities in a handful of key states (the 2000 election being one of the few exceptions)” (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2009, p.68). Furthermore, he adds that “Jewish money and votes can hardly explain the pro-Israel policies of Republican presidents, who obtain far less of both than do the Democratic presidents” (p.68).

Although Slater is accurate that most presidential elections are not decided by small margins, this notion is mostly extraneous. According to Mearsheimer and Walt, presidential candidates cannot predict whether the general election will be a landslide—as in 1984—or a nail-biter—as in 2000—and must thus act as though every vote matters. Given the high turnout rates of American Jews and their concentration in key swing states, as well as the fact that Israel is a major issue for many—though far from all—of them, it stands to reason for any serious candidate to support the special relationship unreservedly (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2009, p.69).

I agree that in comparison to Congress, the lobby has less weight in the White House. However, less does not equal zero, and I believe the lobby's influence on the

Executive Branch is larger than many academics, including Slater, assume. There is a plenty of evidence in favour of what has been said. For instance, since Israel's takeover of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, every American president has made it a priority to oppose the construction of settlements, which is comparable to colonising these territories and depriving Palestinians from having their own state. Despite the fact that every president since Lyndon Johnson, including George W. Bush, has stated that he wants Israel to end settlements, no president has been able to exert pressure on Israel to do so. Bush's father, George H. W. Bush, was the sole partial exception, as his government blocked an Israeli request for \$10 billion in loan guarantees in 1992.

The regular U.S. aid package, on the other hand, was unaffected, and the loan guarantees were authorised a few months later, after Yitzhak Rabin took office as Prime Minister (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2009, p.68). The impact of Bush's move was short-lived, as the number of Israeli settlers increased by more than double in the eight years following the signing of the Oslo peace agreement in 1993. There is a wealth of evidence that the lobby is the source of the problem. What accounts for the failure of previous presidents to put an end to settlements' building, or even to make a genuine effort in that direction, if it is not the lobby? That question is left unanswered by Slater.

Equally important, the lobby aims to mould public opinion about Israel and the Middle East. Thus, pro-Israel organisations work to exert control over the media, academics, and think tanks, all of which play important roles in shaping public opinion. Indeed, the 9/11 attacks permitted people with paranoid tendencies or ulterior purposes to conjure up an Islamic plot to destabilise the United States. During the Cold War, Muslim intents were likened to communist goals. Both groups were shown as

masterminding massive plots to take over the world. Both were portrayed as hostile to the American way of life, with covert spies and sleeper cells in the United States (Davidson, 2011, p.91).

American Zionists and American Christian fundamentalists were among the first to take advantage of this paranoid potential in relation to Islam in order to advance their goals. These groups saw the prospect of concentrating paranoid politics on American Muslims as a method to marginalize a group that was hostile to Israel and its ethnic cleansing of Palestinians. For this reason, Zionist radical Daniel Pipes has several times questioned American Muslims' patriotism and singled them out as anti-American because “a substantial” proportion of them “share with suicide hijackers a hatred of the United States” (Davidson, 2011, p.92).

Therefore, the lobby's view of Israel is broadly reflected in the mainstream media, with the vast majority of American pundits sidelining with Israel. “The debate among Middle East pundits,” journalist Eric Alterman writes, “is dominated by people who cannot imagine criticising Israel.” He lists “sixty-one columnists and commentators who can be counted upon to support Israel reflexively and without qualification” (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, p.45). Only five pundits, on the other hand, openly criticise Israeli policies or push for a pro-Arab attitude. In this context, Edward Said once said that the narrative of Israeli oppression of Palestinians was “America's last taboo,” the “narrative that has no permission to appear” (Alessandrini, 2017, p.5).

Newspapers occasionally publish guest op-eds questioning Israeli policy. The pro-Israel perspective, however, is reflected in editorials in major newspapers. “Shamir, Sharon, Bibi—whatever those guys want is pretty much fine by me,” once said Robert

Bartley, a former editor of the *Wall Street Journal* (Bret, 2002). Editorial bias is also evident in newspapers such as the *New York Times*, which hardly condemns Israeli policies and occasionally acknowledges that Palestinians have legitimate grievances, which makes it far from being impartial.

If Americans Knew (IAK), a human rights organisation directed by Allison Weir, examined the *San Francisco Chronicle's* (SFC) coverage of the Palestinian/Israeli conflict. The results of this study, which lasted from September 29, 2000, to March 31, 2001, are extremely noteworthy. The *San Francisco Chronicle* reported on 111 % of Israeli fatalities and only 38 % of Palestinian fatalities in the headlines and/or initial paragraphs of the 251 articles on the topic throughout the six-month study period (Bauzon, 2017).

In more concrete terms, Palestinian children were murdered at a much higher rate than Israeli children. It is worth noting that 27 % of Palestinians killed were under the age of eighteen, totalling ninety-three children, compared to only 6% of Israelis killed, totalling four children. Notwithstanding, the killing of five Palestinian children only out of ninety-three was reported in the *Chronicle* headlines and/or first paragraphs, while simultaneously this was met by the reporting of the killing of six Israeli children—as one Israeli teenager's death was reported three times (Bauzon, 2017).

Likewise, Israel's favouritism is reflected in the media's news coverage as well. To dishearten unfavorable coverage of Israel, the lobby organises letter-writing campaigns, protests, and boycotts against anti-Israel news outlets. “A CNN executive once said that he sometimes gets 6,000 email messages in a single day complaining that a story is anti-Israel” (Barringer, 2002).

By the same token, in May 2003, the pro-Israel Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America (CAMERA) organised protests outside National Public Radio (NPR) stations in 33 cities. It also tried to get donors to stop contributing to NPR until its coverage of the Middle East became more pro-Israel (Mearsheimer, 2006, p.46). Slater's own findings reveal that the American media is significantly more sympathetic to Israel than the media in most other democracies, including Israel itself.

There are also powerful individuals who place great importance on Israel, such as Israeli-American media magnate Haim Saban—the Democratic Party's single highest fundraiser in previous years—and gambling tycoon Sheldon Adelson—a Republican who has backed several hard-line pro-Israel organisations. Watchdog organisations such as CAMERA, Campus Watch, and ADL strive to manipulate media coverage and monitor activities on college campuses, while pro-Israel think tanks such as the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) propagate policy analysis to frame elite viewpoints on the Middle East (Mearsheimer, 2009, p. 63). Thus, anyone who criticises Israeli conduct or claims that pro-Israel organisations wield major influence over U.S. Middle East policy—an influence that AIPAC lauds—risks being labelled an “anti-Semite” (Mearsheimer, 2006, p.48).

Added to the tremendous pressure the Israel lobby exercises on the American government, backing Israel yields the United States an assemblage of benefits incarnated in the geopolitical, geo-economic, and geostrategic advantages of having a watchdog, a guardian, who safeguards American interests in the Middle East.

3-3-1-2- Israel, America's Watchdog in the Middle East

Unsurprisingly, as has thoroughly been elucidated in the previous chapter, the birth of Israel coincided with the Middle East's emergence as an oil producer and the United States' succession of Britain as the region's dominant imperialist power. Imperialist strategists viewed the Middle East as essentially a trading route to the Far East up to the Second World War. However, according to a report issued by the United States oil industry in the 1930s and 1940s, during the same period “the centre of gravity of world oil production has been shifting from the Mexican Gulf and the Caribbean area to the Middle East-Persian Gulf area and is likely to continue to shift until it is firmly established in that area” (Selfa, 1998).

At the height of the Cold War, the United States was not the only superpower to recognise the value of the Middle East. The USSR, the other major superpower, did so as well. Hence, in 1947, the USSR joined the United States in voting in the United Nations to approve the partition of Palestine. A transfer of Soviet Bloc guns from Czechoslovakia to the Zionist *Haganah* militia later supported Israel's capture of Palestine in 1948 (Selfa, 1998). In the geopolitics' logic of the time, the United States and the USSR battled for Third World allies. The loss of an ally was seen as an automatic benefit for the other side by both the Russians and the Americans.

In 1949, the United States made the first move toward financing the Israeli project by extending a \$100 million credit to Israel through the newly formed Export-Import Bank (Selfa, 1998). The United States justified its support for Israel as crucial to offset

the Soviet threat to the Middle East's oil reserves, but its underlying adversary was the region's growing nationalism.

Nonetheless, before the 1967 war, as Norman Finkelstein demonstrates in his book *The Holocaust Industry*, ties between American Jews and Israel were shaky. After Israel showed its military prowess, however, the U.S. began to reconsider Israel's role in the region, viewing it as a strong client state and a valuable destabilising force on its Arab neighbours. The latter could be possible by the prevention of Arab unity formation that would interfere with American imperial designs (Cook, 2008, p.145). Likewise, American Jews began to consider both Israel and Palestinian and Arab attacks on the Zionist state as the ideal vehicle for furthering their own goals and gaining influence.

Immediately following the 1967 war, debates erupted over Zionism's goals. Those who preached the 1948 concept of sanctuary envisioned a limited but secure Jewish state in the Middle East. Yet, a more clamorous group urged that Israel become a robust regional superpower with ties to the West's financial and military centres. The unholy alliance between religious extremist settlers and the country's military, political, and business elites was born as a result of this (Cook, 2008, p.145).

Although the world community's perception of Israel was at that time framed primarily through this first lens—Israel is a weak state fighting for survival—in Israel, the second perspective swiftly gained traction. The vast majority of Israelis, inclusive of left-wingers, desired the enormous benefits that came with Western help. The alternative was Middle Eastern obscurity, with Israel competing for world recognition

with its Arab neighbours. However, without the added benefit of oil fields in Iraq and Saudi Arabia, it was a less tempting option (Cook, 2008, p.145).

Hence, the Zionist lobby was established in the United States, with offshoots throughout Europe, obsessively looking out anti-Semitism. As Finkelstein points out, the Holocaust Industry itself was a gain to American Jewry: “huge sums to be claimed from European states ostensibly to compensate Holocaust victims but in practice to pay the inflated salaries of Jewish lawyers and promote the projects of Jewish businessmen in America and Israel” (Cook, 2008, p.145).

Even as the Cold War premise for supporting Israel—represented in “the containment of communism” —faded, Israel's role as a guardian of American interests persisted. In a 1992 article in the Israeli newspaper *Yediot Ahronot*, retired Israeli General Shlomo Gazit, former chief of Military Intelligence and West Bank Administrator, stated unequivocally Israel's valuable contribution to imperialism:

[After the Cold War] Israel's main task has not changed at all, and it remains of crucial importance. Its location at the centre of the Arab Muslim Middle East predestines Israel to be a devoted guardian of the existing regimes: to prevent or halt the processes of radicalisation and to block the expansion of fundamentalist religious zealotry. (Selfa, 1998)

Gazit, additionally, explained how Israel would continue to perform a unique role for Western allies. In this regard, he noted that in the aftermath of the disappearance of the USSR as a political power in the region, several Middle Eastern states mislaid a patron. As a result, a vacuum was formed, culminating into instability in the region (Selfa, 1998). The continued occupation of Palestinian and Syrian land by the Israeli army, its

attack on south Lebanon, and the unsettled fate of millions of refugees created the ideal environment for Arab leaders to voice their “security concerns” and “existential threat” (Cook, 2008, p.146).

“Under such conditions”, Gazit asserts, “the Israeli role as a strategic asset guaranteeing a modicum of stability in the entire Middle East did not dwindle or disappear but was elevated to the first order of magnitude.” Then he adds, “Without Israel, the West would have to perform this role by itself, when none of the existing superpowers really could perform it, because of various domestic and international constraints. For Israel, by contrast, the need to intervene is a matter of survival” (Selfa, 1998).

Thereafter, the U.S. Congress authorised an ever-increasing military aid to Israel. By the closure of the first Gulf War, Israel was obtaining about \$5 billion in annual funding from the United States—almost \$1,000 for every man, woman, and child (Cook, 2008, p.146). The Israeli economy and armed forces were efficiently bolstered by the United States.

The attacks of 9/11—much like the Munich events in 1972, when Israel first was defended by the U.S. —brought Israel and America closer as the two states bonded over a mutual enemy. The years between the two events have not led to any major changes in the relationship even though the two states have not always been in agreement. Some of the American people have become a little less critical of Palestine’s part in the conflict but there are still powerful and influential groups that refuse to acknowledge Israel’s part and actions (Varga, 2021, p.16).

Undoubtedly, Israel continues to serve as the West's "watchdog" as *Ha'aretz* declared before nearly seven decades. The enemy's names have changed from "communism" and "Arab nationalism" to "Islamic fundamentalism," but the dynamic underlying the game remains the same. Israel continues to be the United States' primary guarantor of "stability" in the Middle East, because maintaining stability entails maintaining the status quo in the region. Perpetuating the status quo, in its turn, entails preserving restrictive conditions, which can only lead to further wars. Putnam's two-level game theory's implication on this complicated triangular relationship would make this dynamic clearer and more significant.

3-3-2- The Two-Level Game's Implications on the Palestinian Question

As stated at the onset of this chapter, Putnam's theory consists of a double-edged negotiation process where the statesman negotiating must consider both foreign and domestic interests on both a foreign and domestic level. By applying Putnam's theory on U.S. relations to Israel and its affect on Palestine, it is safe to argue that the U.S. is leading an unsuccessful double-edged negotiation that has affected the whole Middle East. The reason is simple. The state has a close relationship with Israel, which has led to foreign and domestic policy treading on the same path. Yet at the same time, the U.S. has a national-interest agenda for the states in the Middle East, an area, which has become more anti-American much due to the U.S. relationship with Israel.

Therefore, the relationship between the three parties has been similar through the years, with Palestine on one side and Israel on the other and the U.S. in the middle, for the latter has interests in both parties. However, from the viewpoint of Palestine, the

U.S. took a stand when Truman decided to help in the establishment of Israel and recognised it in 1948. Palestine instead identified itself with the Arab world.

Two primary results emanate from the empirical analyses. First, Putnam points out that statesmen have more limited resources to influence foreign policies. Nevertheless, since the Israeli lobby group acts more in the interest of a foreign group than a domestic group it has been able to work on both sides and through this way the group has been able to tie both domestic and foreign policy towards the same path. Nowadays Israel has such a very close relationship with the U.S. that when the U.S. negotiates with other states, Israel is part of the deal, due to the fact that the two states are deeply intertwined ideologically and geostrategically.

Indeed, the U.S. always brings Israel—which has evidently become an eminent part of the U.S. foreign and domestic politics—to the table. The clearest evidence for the deepness of the relationship is through the number of resolutions that have been vetoed by the American government. Since 1972, the latter has vetoed many resolutions that condemn Israel, and consequently, the U.S. is alienating the rest of the world by not acknowledging or condemning the Israeli actions in the conflict as well. Anti- American sentiments have arisen as a result. Second, as mentioned before, Israel has a long history with the U.S. and the American people have earlier identified themselves with the Israelis and not the Palestinians. Therefore, the lobby group of Israel has been able to be effective.

In the negotiation table described by Putnam, the national political leader is surrounded by party and parliamentary figures, representatives of key interest groups, as well as diplomats and other international advisors. The statesman's most important

mission as well as most difficult is to satisfy all the interests, while simultaneously taking into consideration the different consequences an action can have on the ratification of a resolution or agreement. In the case of the U.S., however, almost all of the formerly mentioned figures are either Zionists, Christian Zionists, or those carrying pro-Israel bias for some reasons.

Hence, what makes the Israel lobby more powerful and more effective is that it performs both Level 1 and Level 2 roles simultaneously. As a result, its mission has been facilitated for the political complexities and impediments as well as the dangers posed by negotiation failures of the game's players are marginal to non-existent. This is what has made the relationship between the U.S. and Israel more complex and hard to redirect or break.

The story about Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan gives a good view on exactly how much influence the lobby group has. Indeed, a good example of the impact AIPAC can have is the Camp David peace talks in 1978, where President Carter was worried that Israel had more interest in a separate peace with Egypt than in a long-term peace with Palestine. This led to the Carter administration deciding, in 1980, to support the UN resolution where Arab rights on the West Bank and East Jerusalem were affirmed.

The consequence of the action was that AIPAC influenced many pro-Israelis not to vote for him in the election eight months later, and thereby also assisting in extending Ronald Reagan's margin of victory (Little, 2008, p.110). "Were it not for the lobby's ability to work effectively within the American political system," Mearsheimer and Walt

(2006) state, “the relationship between Israel and the United States would have far been less intimate than it is today” (p.40).

Therefore, a special case of Putnam’s theory is that of the U.S. relationship with Israel, for the two negotiation tables have been pushed together and are now working towards the same aim. This study has argued that this is due to the strong hold the Israeli lobby group has on the country’s policies. Another factor, besides, is that the group differs from other ones since it acts as an agent for a foreign state. Its motive as well as its members have made it one of the most successful groups in the U.S.

Nowadays, the Israeli lobby group receives a strong support from the Republican Party and especially the Christian Right. This means that politicians within these two groups are working towards the lobby group’s goal, since a politician’s goal is to be re-elected. In other words, the Israeli lobby group is strongly united with both Capitol Hill and the White House and thereby can affect policies easily.

Statesmen, furthermore, according to Putnam, do not have direct control over foreign agendas, but since the Israeli lobby group is working both nationally and internationally, it is able to influence on both levels. Therefore, the Israel lobby could make the two national and international ends meet and maximise its win sets, for the bargains gained at the two levels are the same, namely assuring the security of Israel and the continuation of its occupation to Palestine. On the contrary, it has minimised American win sets with other Middle Eastern countries due to the overt unshakable U.S. bias to Israel.

However, the lobby’s influence on Washington’s politics is not the only advantage. The lobby group has also received aid from the different events of history.

The Israeli-U.S. relationship, as previously made clear, began in the aftermath of the Holocaust and later deepened through Munich 1972 events and the events of 9/11. The Israel Lobby has utilised the “War on Terror” to convert Israel into a cultural issue, providing an atmosphere in which “to support justice for Palestinians is to be suspect, soft on terrorism, and jihadist-supporting” (Mizner, 2015, p.1).

Since then, Israel’s position as an ally to the U.S. has continued to grow. Even though the argument for Israel’s case may have varied over the years, many Americans consider Israel as the underdog and the state in need for U.S. protection:

[...] films, books and magazines continued to depict Arabs as primitive, untrustworthy and malevolent figures who bore close watching. By contrast, the eagerness of Jewish newcomers to assimilate themselves into Main Street’s mainstream and the awfulness of the Holocaust combined to reduce American anti-Semitism [...]. (Little, 2008, p.41)

This quote from Douglas Little’s book gives a good hint on how the Jews’ tragic history has gained them the sympathy of the American people. This is something the Palestinians have never had. Simultaneously, the same events that helped the Israel lobby in gaining more power and support did the opposite for the Arab world and Palestine. Where Israelis have always been seen as the underdogs and the victims, the Palestinians have been seen as the ‘terrorists’ and anti-Americans.

Furthermore, as Putnam’s theory explains, domestic politics affects foreign politics. In the present case, however, the domestic politics of the U.S. has not only made the government unable to pressure Israel into ending the occupation, but it has also protected Israel from being condemned by the rest of the world.

Moreover, Putnam writes that foreign politics also affects domestic politics, but in this case, the domestic politics of the U.S. is deeply intertwined with its position towards Israel and is therefore more difficult to change or redirect. Consequently, and because so many people in the world treat the Israel/U.S. relationship as a litmus test of U.S. behaviour, the choices that America makes will have very grave implications not only for the security of the whole Middle East, but for America's role in the world as well. As previously asked, why should any state negotiate with the U.S. when they do not act on the right terms and instead keep defending a state whose actions are seen as wrong by the majority of the world?

In sum, the U.S./Israel relationship has negatively affected the whole region in general, and the common denominator Palestine in particular, as the main Level 1 actors are either originally the Level 2 actors forming part of the lobbying game, or at best influenced by them. As part of the game, Israel has often been portrayed as the image of the feeble David encircled by hostile Arab Goliath, but the converse image is more factual. The truth is that Israel has now become the Middle East's most powerful military power. Its forces are stronger than those of its neighbours, and it is the only nuclear-armed state in the region. To the end of analysing this contradiction, and based on the study's theories set forth in the opening chapter, the subsequent chapter will unearth the obscure agendas behind the ways U.S. media and fictional arts have disproportionately portrayed crises in the Middle East and South Africa.

Chapter Four:

**U.S. Mass Media's Portrayal of Crises in the Middle East and South Africa:
Obscure Agendas**

Many of those working to improve the unfavourable perception of Arabs in America have focused their efforts on political lobbying, particularly targeting influential Zionist organizations and the propaganda machine, as shown in the previous chapter. According to John Stuart Mill (1859), truth will triumph in the free marketplace of ideas, and the foundation of American liberty is supposed to be free with active media that properly informs the populace. However, myth merged with purposefully misleading information about Arabs, Muslims, and Blacks creates false impressions that seep into the American consciousness and psyche. On TV screens and in news reports, obscene themes and portraits appear. Thus, the media have found themselves at the centre of a campaign whose main target is that the American people have to be purposefully and systematically kept misinformed or uninformed about Muslims, Arabs, Palestinians, and Black Africans, among other groups.

A close look at how Arabs and Israelis were portrayed in U.S. fiction and mass media in the last few decades of the twentieth century shows that orientalism was still very much alive in American popular culture. Likewise, the clichés produced about Black people by the U.S. media and American fictional arts in the same period tell a lot about how Americans perceived them at the time. However, this latter view to Blacks in particular changed in the closing decade of the previous century for the sake of serving a political aim. Hence, this fourth chapter seeks to excavate the obscure agendas behind U.S. media's disproportionate portrayal of crises in the Middle East and South Africa. This chapter is, hence, more analytical and exploratory than theoretical. This analysis will hopefully yield some interesting results.

The importance of the use of Edward Said's theory of Orientalism and Bell Hooks' Critical Race, Gender and Class Theory in this chapter's analysis is not only scholarly representations in the media, but also fictional arts, namely Hollywood's cinematic productions, in the second half of the twentieth century. The intertwined nature of the American press, TV channels and Hollywood movies' obscure agendas and the impact of America's hegemonic position on international relations align with the context of the analysis outlined in this chapter. Therefore, a partial aim behind the analysis conducted hereafter is to examine the fairness of representation in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Besides, it aims to analyse the sudden deliberate shift of the previously institutionalised Blacks' stereotypical representation in the U.S. media into a softer sympathetic tone in the 1980s and the 1990s.

4-1-The Late Twentieth Century U.S. Mass Media's Depiction of Arabs and Israelis

Starting with the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, one may say that throughout the process of its intervention in the conflict as a mediator, the United States of America has consistently claimed and upheld neutrality; however, the Arabs and the Palestinians contend that America has historically been inclined to protect and support Israel. Indeed, in contrast to the facts and statistics unravelled in the previous chapter showing the power Israel has enjoyed in the last five decades, the U.S. mass media portrayed Israel as a poor rabbit living amidst ferocious lions. These lions, who are unquestionably Arabs, were in the minds of most Americans synonymous to evil because of television shows, series, movies, alongside embedded news media working in concert to attain a politically orchestrated aim.

The mass media are channels (or, less frequently, a single channel) of mass communication that reach a wide audience by disseminating news, views, advocacy, propaganda, advertisements, artwork, entertainment, alongside many other forms of expression. Television, radio, print, audio, film, video recording, and the Internet—particularly the World Wide Web and social media—all are considered mass media in the broadest definition of the word (Britannica, n.d.).

In addition, the term mass media can also refer to a broad category of organizations, either private or public, such as newspapers, magazines and journals, wire services, libraries, book publishers, added to radio and television corporations, and motion picture companies, that create or distribute specific forms of expression through these outlets (Britannica, n.d.). Remarkably, mass media enterprises that were previously limited to less modern technologies now have various platforms thanks to the introduction of the internet as a mass communication mode since the late 20th century. For instance, it has increasingly become typical for books, magazines, journals, and newspapers to be published online or via Web-based applications—knowing that some publishing firms have opted for completely giving preference to the print medium in favour of the Web medium—and for movies, TV shows, and music to be available on specific websites or via streaming services.

Finally, a collection of primarily private companies that print or broadcast news and news commentary for a nationwide audience is another typical reference point for mass media in the United States of America. In this regard, the mass media have frequently come under condemnation, in a collective or individual manner, for perceived liberal or conservative bias in their coverage of important political, economic, and social

subject matters (Britannica, n.d.). The latter meaning of mass media is used in the upcoming section, which focuses on U.S. newspapers and TV channels.

4-1-1-The Newspapers and TV Channels' Portrayal of Arabs/Palestinians/Israelis in Late Twentieth Century

The concept of “race” played a significant role in shaping Americans' perceptions of other peoples in the early 1900s, particularly as the number of immigrants from southern Europe and the Mediterranean region increased. People of these ‘inferior’ races, who were not as white as those in northern Europe, elicited harsh reactions. Tensions were made worse by the creation of Israel, the rise of oil as a significant economic force, and the Middle East's status as a key military location after the Second World War’s closure, particularly in relation to the containment of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Strong nationalist movements advocating Arab and Muslim unity and fighting imperialism converged with this in the Muslim world (Suleiman, 1999, pp.34-35).

These interconnected factors frequently fuelled the so-called fundamentalist Islam against U.S. policy in the region. Hence, American people’s opinion towards such Islamic and Arab movements was significantly influenced by nationalist opposition movements and other religious movements both rebelling against governments that had friendship with and were endorsed by the United States, particularly when their strategy resorted to individual or group acts of destruction, usually targeting civilians (Suleiman, 1999, p. 35).

This being said, the American media was largely responsible for the unfavourable image of Arabs and Muslims in the course of the twentieth century. A brief review of

these opinions as expressed in the American newspapers and television channels, and how they have been mirrored in polls of the country's public opinion is provided below.

Arabs are categorized as the 'other', as non-Christian, outside of Western culture and civilization, outside of the developed world, and even outside of any discernible 'minority' group. Specifically for Arabs, they are "white but not quite" (Suleiman, 1999, pp.43-44). Put another way, although they are racially classified as 'white' in the U.S. today, they are generally treated and seen as the non-white 'other' by the general public.

This section groups the mass media's portrayal of Arabs into three categories: the first category is the Arabs' distorted image in the American media; the second studied topic concerns the Palestinians' portrayal versus the Israelis' portrayal; and the third category focuses on and compares between the pre and post 1990s decade. These three categories do not conflict with one another, and they do match the main research themes developed in the present work.

4-1-1-1-Arabs' Stereotyped Image

The clichéd portrayal of Arabs in American and Western media has been the subject of much investigative research. In fact, one of the most significant authors to have theorized about stereotyping is Jack Shaheen, a mass communications professor at Southern Illinois University. Shaheen illustrated in his writings how harsh and derogatory images about Arabs perpetuated by the American media follow a child from childhood up to college graduation. Through "editorial cartoons, television shows, comic strips, comic books, college and school textbooks, novels, magazines,

newspapers and in novelty merchandise”, Arabs were disregarded, marginalized, demonized and presented as the “bad guys” (Semaan, 2014, p.17).

His work *The TV Arab* drew its conclusions from “eight years of television viewing” (Shaheen, 1984, p.4). He had recorded more than 100 popular entertainment shows, cartoons, and documentaries about Arabs that were broadcast on network, independent, and public channels, for a total of approximately 200 episodes, starting with the 1975–1976 TV season. Given this, Shaheen (1984) asserts:

Turn to any channel, to any show from *Benson* to *Hart* television is full of Arab baddies—billionaires, bombers and belly dancers. They are virtually the only images of Arabs viewers ever see. An episode of a popular entertainment program may be seen by 40 million people the first time it is telecast. With reruns, the program may attract a total of 150 million viewers. (p.4)

Interestingly enough, this type of negative imagery was repeatedly aired during prime time. This can be contributed to the fact that Arabs were frequently, in the late 1970s, the subject of ridicule and jokes provided by people like Sonny and Cher and characters like Archie Bunker on “All in the Family” comic series.¹ Upset by the poor service at a local Arab dry cleaner, Archie warns Edith, “Don’t go near that Ay-rab again unless you got a dirty camel to wash.” When his son-in-law Michael disapproves of the unkind comment, Archie responds, “They’re born pirates, all of ’em” (Shaheen, 1984, pp.59-60).

¹**All in the Family** was an American television situation comedy that aired on CBS for eight seasons (1971–79). The show continued from 1979 to 1983 under the title “Archie Bunker's Place”. It is about a working-class white family living in Queens, New York. Its patriarch is Archie Bunker (O'Connor), an outspoken, narrow-minded man, seemingly prejudiced against everyone who is not like him or his idea of how people should be.

Indeed, American television shows played a major role in the framing of a distorted image about Arabs in general in the twentieth century. For instance, amidst the 1979 oil shortfall, a “Saturday Night Live”¹ skit showed “The Bel Airabs,” as destitute Bedouins who, through the misfortune of Abdul, the clan's chief, were transferred to California like modern-day Beverly Hillbillies: “And then one day he was shootin’ at some Jews, and up through the sand came a bubblin’ crude” (Shaheen, 1984, p.60).

American cartoons about Arabs did not show any improvement. When Tarzan unintentionally offended a slender sheik in the 1970s animated series *Tarzan, Lord of the Jungle*,² a comic book Arab with a sword cried out, “Only this blade will satisfy me . . . letting flow your coward’s blood!” Several years later, in *Marvel Comics*, two Americans held captive by a stereotyped Arab potentate were freed by GI Joe and a group of American commandos. This Arab “has been known to behead jaywalkers” (Little, 2008, p.37).

Additionally, an offensive depiction of ‘the Arab mind’ with several lobes, including “vengeance,” “fanaticism,” and “blackmail,” was painted in 1985 by a political cartoonist. After drawing two creatures that emerged from the trash, only one of which was a rodent, another cartoonist inquired, “What is the difference between a rat and [Yasser] Arafat? Response: “The rat has more friends.” Another humour cartoonist designed a panel without a caption that featured an Arab executioner

¹ In 1975, the American sketch comedy and variety show **Saturday Night Live** had its television debut on NBC. Performing comic sketches that satirized the then modern politics and culture, the show included a huge and diverse number of newer cast members and repertory actors.

² **Tarzan, Lord of the Jungle** was produced by the Filmation studio for Saturday mornings as an animated series. It was aired on CBS in 1976. This was the jungle hero's first animated series.

dressed in white, clutching a gory scimitar in one hand and a bleeding globe in the other (Little, 2008, p.37).

This orientalist imagery was equally reiterated in the mass media among newspaper reporters and television journalists. Numerous academic studies have examined how the American press has portrayed the Middle East. These studies have almost all demonstrated that there is prejudice and bias against Muslims and Arabs. The common technique is to identify and constantly highlight the negative traits of Muslims and Arabs while concurrently highlighting the positive traits of the adversaries of the Arab world. Naturally, the press greatly exaggerates a people's negative traits by grouping them together and failing to counterbalance them with positive traits (Suleiman, 1999, p. 35).

In light of this, ABC television anchor Peter Jennings acknowledged in 1975 that “there is definitely an anti-Arab bias in America,” which has regrettably resulted in “stereotyping in the media” (Ghareeb, 1983, pp.105-106). Jim Lehrer, cohost of PBS's evening news hour, concurred in the early 1980s that the media's obsession with Middle Eastern terrorism and sectarian conflict “feeds the stereotype that many Americans have of Arabs as bloody people who just go out killing each other all the time” (pp.259-260).

Lehrer did not hold back when asked by an interviewer for suggestions on how Arabs and Muslims in general could combat this prejudice. “This is not a public relations image problem. This is a reality problem,” he said sardonically. His thoughts undoubtedly focused on the ongoing civil war in Lebanon and the fifty-two Americans who had just been freed from 444 days of captivity in Iran (Ghareeb, 1983, pp.259-260).

The *New York Times* reporter Anthony Lewis concurred. Lewis told Arab American media expert Edmund Ghareeb, “When Mr. Arafat appears on an American television program, he comes across as a mixture of that romantic desert Arab you spoke of, but without the romance.” “But you know, he does look a bit bloodthirsty,” Lewis lashed out in response to Ghareeb's remark that many Americans appeared to incorrectly view Arafat as “a bloodthirsty terrorist” (Ghareeb, 1983, pp.199-200).

Therefore, the editors of the *New Republic* warned in 1980 that “the widespread casual violation of such standards threatens all potential victims of racial slurs.” “Arabs [and Muslims] have been the victims of ugly racial stereotypes in recent years.” It should end. Yet, it is still going strong (Shaheen, 1997, p.36).

Early in 1982, Jim Hoaglund of the *Washington Post* remembered how it became evident to him that Western writing generally—not just newspapers but books and comics, too—presented a distorted picture of the Middle East as populated by Arabs who prowled around with blades in their teeth (Ghareeb, 1983, pp.227-228). After a year, John Cooley from the *Christian Science Monitor* concurred that Arabs had unjustly been depicted negatively in print and digital media. In fact, Cooley admitted that it is likely that Arabs remain the only minority group in the United States that anyone feels comfortable derogatorily portraying (pp.210-211).

In fact, prejudice towards and bias against Muslims and Arabs remains undetected mainly because observers—even purportedly unbiased scholars—frequently concur with the portrayal of Muslims and Arabs found in television, motion pictures, and other forms of media. There is no bias if that is how Muslims and Arabs really are.

Put another way, as some studies have indicated, Americans harbour prejudices toward Muslims and Arabs but are unconscious of them (Suleiman, 1999, p. 36).

As a result, even Arab leaders became subject to negative portrayal. For example, an aggressive and vengeful campaign that simultaneously portrayed President Jamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt as “Hitler on the Nile” and “crypto-communist” was launched against him in the 1950s. Moreover, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian people in general were painted as terrorists, particularly when a case of terrorism garnered headlines, irrespective of the PLO's condemnation of the incident. In addition, the U.S. administration classified Libyan Qaddafi as an initiator of worldwide terrorism; as a result, his identity as a human was taken away from him and he was deemed a “mad dog” (Suleiman, 1989, pp.251-252).

Discussed here are not the merits of any of these cases. The argument put forth here is that because of the unfavourable perception that Americans hold of Arabs and Muslims, it is simple for those who harbor animosity toward the Arab population to incite public opinion against Arab leaders, nations, or groups. In pursuit of particular agendas, Zionist leaders take advantage of this circumstance, and so do leaders of the United States, policymakers, and aspirants to politics.

In a *Wall Street Journal* op-ed article published on October 4, 1984, Amos Perlmutter vilified Muslim countries and warned of an “Islamic war waged against the West, Christianity, modern capitalism, Zionism and communism,” all together. He stated that the top goal of U.S. policy was to get prepared to fight a war against Islamic populism (Shaheen, 1997, p.36).

In his January 29, 1990, *New York Times* “Editorial Notebook” column, Karl E. Meyer described Arab Muslims, stating that their creator originates from the woods, and their zealot originates from the desert. This what constitutes the primary distinction between the East and the West (Shaheen, 1997, p.37). Another *New York Times* editorial warned against U.S. “anti-Muslim sentiment” when Operation Desert Shield was initiated by President George W. Bush during the Gulf War, which transported over 200,000 Americans to Saudi Arabia. The editorial claimed that bigotry prospers on defamatory stereotypes and that the crazy Arab is today's equivalent of the “Teutonic hordes and the yellow peril”. Echoing the *Times*' advice following the war, General Norman Schwarzkopf warned the American forces leaving Dhahran, Saudi Arabia: “You are going to take back home the fact that ‘Islam’ is not a word to be feared, a religion to be feared. It is a religion to be respected, just as we respect all other religions. That's the American way” (p.17).

A wave of anti-Muslim and anti-Arab prejudicial and racist views raced across the United States and Canada as an immediate consequence of the fight, despite Schwarzkopf's counsel and the *Times* editorial. In his book *The Gulf Within*, reporter Zuhair Kashmeri notes that many Canadians of Arab or Muslim descent realized that, similar to their American counterparts, they were being associated with the enemy during the government's war against Iraq. They experienced violence, racial harassment, and intolerance on the streets, at their places of employment, and in schools (Shaheen, 1997, p.18).

Attacks on American Arabs started as soon as Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and they persisted until the war concluded on February 28, 1991. According to an

American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), there were over 119 attacks on American Muslims and Arabs. For instance, Sam Hussein said that shortly prior to the plane's takeoff, passenger Mohammad Ghonoudian was removed from a Miami to New York trip and subjected to a three-hour interrogation. After the World Trade Center bombing on February 26, 1993, in which six people were killed and numerous more were injured, assaults escalated for it was said to be carried out by a small group of Arab nationals and Muslims (Shaheen, 1997, p.18).

Unfortunately, some accounts on the attack led many Americans to believe that all Muslims were involved in domestic terrorism, as noted by James Brooke, a reporter for the *New York Times*. Shortly following the explosion, certain journalists claimed that Islam was to blame rather than concentrating on the criminal cases against specific perpetrators. Leslie Gelb stated in an article for the *New York Times* that "Islam does not recognize coexistence as a basic doctrine." The idea of world order in Islam is incompatible with coexistence (Shaheen, 1997, p.18).

The accused individuals were recognized by their nationality and religion in a number of articles. For instance, "Militant Islam Battles Against Western Values: Violence on Fringe of Fundamentalist Renewal" appeared in the headline of the *Washington Post* on March 5, 1993. Martin Sieff cautioned readers in a May 7, 1993, *Washington Times* article to be on the alert to search for "Islamic terrorists." Additionally, on January 9, 1994, an article published in *USA Today* had the headline, "Radical Islam, West, Face Off Again in NYC." The narrative focused on the jury selection process for the World Trade Center bombing. "This is going to be one of the

most important trials... in the whole war between radical Islam and the West,” reporter Steven Emerson is cited as saying in the article (Shaheen, 1997, p.18).

It is clear to the observer’s eye that overlooked in articles was the fact that terrorists, regardless of where they are from, are a very small minority whose actions are driven more by politics than by religion. As a result, journalist Jan Goodwin asserted in her 1994 book *Price of Honor* that it is popular in the West to label all Muslims as terrorists, extremists, or fanatics, serving as the new pariahs. “They have filled the bogeyman niche under the bed where communists used to lurk... There is a perceived oil well in every backyard, a stretch Mercedes and a camel in every garage, a Kalashnikov machine gun in every closet, and a harem in every home,” she explained (Shaheen, 1997, p.37).

Amidst this, the director of the Muslim Public Affairs Council, Salam al-Marayati (1994), highlighted a *Times-Mirror* poll from 1994 that showed 29% of Americans who thought that Islam posed a security danger to the West and the United States (p.27). Furthermore, the University of Chicago's John E. Woods, a professor of Middle Eastern history, observed that Islam became the world's new evil power shortly following the fall of Communism (Shaheen, 1997, p.37).

A striking instance is Mortimer B. Zuckerman, who used to frequently utilize Muslims as scapegoats. He wrote in June 1996 that “Muhammad could violate... a pact with the Meccans” and that he had a “doctrine” of disobeying treaties, claiming that the Prophet Muhammad was dishonest. Zuckerman went on to say that Yasser Arafat would not keep his word to Israel, but would instead follow Muhammad's lead. For him, Arafat

adhered to the teachings of the prophet Mohammed, who made treaties with enemies when he was weak and broke them when he was strong (Zuckerman, 1996, p.106).

Regarding Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), would Zuckerman use the same language when referring to Moses or Jesus? The editor implied in a false and morally repulsive way that Muhammad was untrustworthy. It is the same as informing people that the so-called Protocols of Zion, the claimed blueprint used by Jews to repress innocent people, are real. Consider how the world would have responded if the editor had cast doubt on President Clinton's sincerity by arguing that Jesus Christ was unreliable (Shaheen, 1997, p.37). Zuckerman later issued an apology.

Additionally, in the *Newsweek* article dated August 19, 1996, editors sarcastically asked, "Must Muslims wage holy war with aliens to extend Islam?" Meanwhile, the *New York Times* article dated August 14, 1996, claimed that in Islam, they find it hard to distinguish between political causes and religious causes. This statement made *Extra!* magazine reader Ralph Bonheim question if contributors to the Christian Coalition are conscious that they are participating in a religious practice (Shaheen, 1997, p.38).

A number of *Reader's Digest* articles from 1994 to 1997 supported the false narrative that Muslims and Arabs despise civilized people in general and Americans and Israelis in particular. According to Ann Bardach (1993), "fundamentalist extremists have found nesting sites throughout the country [U.S.]," as she stated in her January 1994 *Digest* column titled "All in the Name of Islam" (p.123). In her view, press censorship is practiced by American Muslims who object to "any kind of scrutiny or criticism of Islam." The media, she claimed, have pushed out an array of feel-good

features on Muslim culture, striving to be politically accurate (p.127). There were no instances in her essay, however, of censorship or “feel-good” writings, nor was there any proof of fundamentalist “nesting sites.” She implied in the first paragraph that all Muslim women face persecution. “There are one billion Muslims in the world, so we're talking hypothetically about 500 million women who might want out,” the Canadian official she quoted said, referring to the possibility that they would seek sanctuary in the West, where they could thrive. A colourful graphic in her article portrayed a covered woman in black and Ayatollah Khomeini with his arm extended, and his fist clinched. “Women are being abused, even mutilated... All in the Name of Islam,” the caption says (p.123).

Bardach excluded some important information from the essay explaining that Muslim women have enjoyed greater financial property and constitutional liberties than women in America and Europe for several centuries. The Qur'an (93:195, 4:124, 16:97, 40:41) makes it very evident that women and men are treated equally; they are each other's guardians, engage in regular prayer, give donations, and try their hardest to serve God. For their positive or negative conduct, they receive their fair amount of prizes or punishments. She also failed to clarify that there are problematic parts of Muslim women's status from a Western perspective, just as there are problematic aspects of Western women's status from a Muslim perspective. A large portion of Muslim women have husbands, fathers, and siblings who affectionately treat them and have high regard for them, similar to the women who live in the West. Despite the fact that Muslim women make excellent doctors, journalists, teachers, and housewives, these professions are rarely highlighted in media narratives.

Besides, in January 1995, “A Holy War Heads Our Way,” written by Fergus M. Bordewich, was an additional essay that appeared in the *Digest*. In an attempt to underscore the notion that readers should be afraid of Islam, the editors positioned an unrelated graphic picture of dead victims next to a burned-out bus above the title of the paper (Bordewich, 1995, p.76). The author cautioned readers that an increasing wave of radical Islam poses an imminent danger not only to Western safety concerns but also has the potential to carry acts of terror to the United States (p.77).

Brian Eads reported that “Muslim Arabs... 300 men on foot, horseback and camels” were killers and enslaved Christians in Sudan, in the *Digest*'s March 1996 issue. According to Eads' article, “Slavery's Shameful Return to Africa,” slaves in northern Sudan were frequently tortured and physically assaulted (Eads, 1996, p.77). In addition, they were shipped to Libya and other Persian Gulf nations, where they underwent branding like animals (p.79). Although the article he wrote focused solely on Sudan, and it included accurate details about the heinous crimes committed by slave traders who killed and abused innocent people, Eads deceived readers by applying the same negative criticism to all Muslim Arabs. Rather than appropriately characterizing the slave traders as people from northern Sudan, Eads identified them as “Muslim Arabs” and “Arab slave traders,” who are enforcing “Islamic law” (p.78).

Furthermore, another essay by Bordewich, titled “Alarm Bells in the Desert,” was published in the July 1996 *Digest*. Bordewich (1996) called the leaders of Saudi Arabia “royal grafters” and said that “Islamic extremism” was a threat to them (p.49). For him, worrying Islamic preachers and a plethora of religious fanatics threaten the House of

Saud. Bordewich cites a Saudi who informs him that educators and pupils are engulfed in an almost insane Islamic zeal (p.51). Despite providing one-fifth of the oil imported by the United States, Saudi Arabia was raising red flags in the desert nation. According to Bordewich, the United States could be wise to distance itself from a dishonest partner in light of the growing tide of Islamic extremism (pp.52-53).

Columnist A. M. Rosenthal of the *New York Times* highlighted how every American is impacted by international terrorism in the *Digest's* issue of February 1997. Rosenthal claimed that nearly all acts of terror against the United States have their roots in the Middle East in his essay “Why Do We Tolerate Terrorism?” He stated that Syria, Iran, Sudan, Libya, and Iraq are the countries funding terrorism (Rosenthal, 1997, p.108). That being said, it is untrue and detrimental to argue that terrorism is only the creation of Iran and the Arab world. Rosenthal ought to have cited the Patterns of Global Terrorism study from the State Department's Office of Counterterrorism as well as the 1995 report in *Los Angeles Times*, which revealed that 94% of people charged with “terrorism” in the United States were neither Arabs nor Iranians (Shaheen, 1997, p.40).

On August 24, 1996, the *New York Times* reported, one month after the fatal July 17, 1996, disaster of TWA Flight 800, that leaders of many terrorist groups in the Middle East, supported by the Iranian government, met in Teheran shortly before the flight to prepare for acts of terrorism. The next day, August 25, 1996, an essay in the *New York Times* stated that TWA had a long and notable history of working in the Middle East, one of the most unstable regions in the world (Shaheen, 1997, p.42).

According to conservative columnist Jeffrey Hart, an “immediate” and “devastating attack” against a Mideastern nation is the proper response to a terrorist act by “Muslims” as reported in *The Washington Times*. He said that there is no justification for not seeing Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Iran as one cohesive unit. When warned against fatalities among civilians, Hart responded that he there would be no harm in blowing up “date growers” and “camel drivers” (Shaheen, 1997, p.42).

Based on the aforementioned instances, among many others, it is clearly noticeable that the orientalist imagery was largely reiterated among U.S. press reporters in the 1990s, and that there was press bias against Arabs/Muslims by perpetually highlighting the bad qualities of Arabs and Muslims. In what follows, the same orientalist imagery, largely spread among television journalists in their news coverage, will be brought to the fore.

After finishing his eight-year study, Jack Shaheen came to the conclusion that ABC, NBC, and CBS, considered as the three major networks, deserve criticism for they were all offensive. “Television tends to perpetuate four basic myths about Arabs,” he wrote. “They are all fabulously wealthy; they are barbaric and uncultured; they are sex maniacs with a penchant for white slavery; and they revel in acts of terrorism” (Shipler, 1985, p.6).

As far as this latter myth is concerned, Steven Emerson persisted in insinuating that the Muslim world and the West were at war for over a year following the 1993 Trade Center bombing. During his appearance on the CBS TV program “Eye on America,” he said that American Muslims are raising money for a “holy war” in the Middle East and here in the United States. On the CBS TV program “60 Minutes,” he

made an identical statement on November 13, 1994. A few days later, viewers of Emerson's documentary on PBS "Jihad! in America" on November 27, 1994, learned that it sounded probable that radical Muslims would soon attack Americans (Shaheen, 1997, p.19). Emerson distinguishes Muslims from Americans in his documentary. Consequently, hate crimes or derogatory remarks may have been directed towards peaceful Muslims who show respect to the United States.

Sadly, documentaries like "The Sword of Islam" and "The Islamic Bomb," books titled *The Fire of Islam* and *Inflamed Islam*, and newspaper and magazine articles titled "Muslim Time Bomb" and "The Roots of Muslim Rage" joined Emerson's "Jihad!" After the bombing of the Trade Center, Muslim and Arab Americans were harassed once more. In a restaurant in Raleigh, North Carolina, one was attacked. "I hate Muslims," said his attacker to him. "I hate you all" (Shaheen, 1997, p.19).

The media accounts about the explosion of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995, were no different. The attack stole the lives of 169 people and wounded 500 more. Even though there was no Arab or Muslim engaged, suspicion was aroused right away. Arab-looking males in sportswear were reported to be fleeing the area by media, security personnel, political leaders, and terrorism specialists shortly after the terrorists demolished the Murrah building (Shaheen, 1997, p.20). The assumption that the accused persons were "Middle-Eastern-looking men" was adopted by the media in the absence of concrete evidence and reliable eyewitnesses. Reporters started raising questions about Arabs and Muslims who live in America concerning their patriotism and moral character.

Though there was no proof that the three individuals in custody had anything to do with the case, CNN said on April 20 that federal investigators had apprehended three males of Middle Eastern descent without providing any references. Investigations revealed that the accused were innocent. Reporters for CNN referred to it as “a Beirut-style car bombing” (Bannin, 1995, p.4). The expert on terrorism from the University of Oklahoma, Stephen Sloan, informed CNN's Bobbie Battista that he believes there is an increased likelihood it was a Middle Eastern act. The headline of *USA Today* on April 20, 1995 read, “Bomb Consistent With Mid-East Terror Tactics.” The *New York Times* conjectured on April 20 that Oklahoma City was the target of Arab-Muslim terrorists since in the city there were more than three mosques that had hosted gatherings for certain Middle Eastern organizations (Shaheen, 1997, p.20).

Additionally, Tom Snyder, the host of a talk program, forewarned his audience about Oklahoma's high proportion of Muslim students. The blast was possibly carried out by Hamas, a violent Palestinian Muslim organization, according to speculation on CBS Evening News. Steven Emerson implied during the newscast that only Arabs are frightening America and claimed that the bombing was carried out with the goal of causing the greatest number of victims. “Middle Easterners have that trait,” he asserted. Additionally, Emerson advised viewers not to trust Islamic organizations when they disclaimed any form of involvement (Shaheen, 1997, p.20).

Unsurprisingly, the reports that followed TWA Flight 800's catastrophic crash on July 17, 1996, which ended the lives of 230 people, were no different from the previous case. John McWethy of ABC TV informed viewers the day following the disaster that the network has obtained material seemingly implicating terrorists in the

Middle East. He added that the Movement for Islamic Change had sent a written warning, which ABC News had learnt about (Husseini, 1997, p.20).

On PBS's "McLaughlin Group," journalist Morton Kondracke stated that his mind invariably turned to the Middle East and specifically to Hizbullah and Hamas. A former FBI officer told Dan Rather on "CBS Evening News" that if this blast was a terrorist attack, the people he spoke with would wager on radical Muslims. According to CNN, three extremist Muslims were on trial in New York at the moment for allegedly conspiring to blow up American airlines. The TV channel claimed that it was not attempting to draw any conclusions from this (Husseini, 1997, p.21).

In his turn, Charles Grodin working for CNBC questioned: "They blow up 241 Marines in Lebanon. They blow up 19 airmen in Saudi Arabia. Two hundred and thirty people are blown up over New York. What religion puts you closer to what God that you're responsible for blowing up people?" "Who could Grodin mean by *they*?" responded reporter Sam Husseini, and "what *religion* could Grodin have in mind?" He stated that the conjecture remains invalid even if the antagonists are Arabs, and that it is not appropriate for journalists to make uninformed inferences (p.21). The 25-year-old TWA jet most certainly broke apart due to "catastrophic mechanical failure," as NTSB officials had been stating for months, and FBI Director Louis Freeh finally admitted this on May 7, 1997 (Shaheen, 1997, p.20). At that time, no journalist attempted to address this truth or provide an apology for the false information that was being disseminated.

From the events and their coverage exposed above, one can reach the conclusion that the Arabs' stereotyped image in the American media was crystal clear to the observer's eye. In what follows, more light will be shed on the stereotyped image of a

particular Arab group—namely the Palestinians—in the American media as opposed to the Israelis’ more positive image.

4-1-1-2-Palestinians’ Negative Image VS Israelis’ Positive Image

In the 1990s, Palestinians, in particular, were tightly identified with terrorism in American mass media. For instance, an article published in the *New York Times* press on October 30, 1990, reported:

Saudi Arabia has reported that armed Palestinians from the Abul Abbas organization have entered Kuwait and are helping Iraqi troops on internal security and border patrols. The group, which carried out the Achille Lauro hijacking in 1985 is affiliated with the PLO and is now based in Iraq. (Matthews, 1992, p.99)

The above statement denotes that, during the Gulf Crisis, the Palestinians were backing Saddam Hussein, which occasionally manifested itself in anti-American demonstrations. This statement therefore aligns with the special attention that the Palestinians have received in the media. It associates them with terrorism by drawing a link between the PLO and terrorism, and in this case, it associates them with Iraq, which is a surefire way to end any Palestinian's aspirations to live a better life in the future. Many contend that by endorsing Iraq, the Palestinians reversed any gains they may have gained up to that moment and, in the eyes of the world community, they have even stepped backwards.

It is challenging to dispute this in the Western world. It is simple to argue, though, that Palestinians should be portrayed in all media in a more balanced manner. Nonetheless, from a one-sided viewpoint, Palestinians are frequently linked to violent terrorist incidents in the U.S. media. According to Jack Shaheen’s statement in 1990:

The Palestinian-as-terrorist stereotype has evolved over a period of four decades. There are numerous similarities between the savage American Indian depicted in early Westerns and the dehumanized Palestinian portrayed in current movie dramas. In the 1980s, 10 of the 11 feature films that focused on the Palestinian portrayed him as Enemy Number One. Producers selectively frame the Palestinian as a demonic beast with neither compunction nor compassion, who abducts, abuses, and butchers men, women and children. (Matthews, 1992, p.100)

Shaheen deplors that, as a result of pictures like these in the media, people tend to forget that, like all other people, the vast majority of Palestinians desire peace and detest violence. The Palestinians are rarely depicted as victims of assault, oppression, and violence or even as regular people; instead, they almost entirely appear as violent propagandists dressed in fatigues and kuffiyehs. Has the viewer ever witnessed a Palestinian writing poetry, holding his wife or children, or engaging in any other activity that is considered “normal”? questioned Shaheen (Matthews, 1992, p.100).

Indeed, numerous studies have demonstrated the blatant orientalist bias present in the majority of American reporting about Palestine. Mearsheimer and Walt (2007) contend in *The Israel Lobby* that there is a significant bias in American media coverage of Israel that favours Israel (p.169). The authors assert that official and informal groups with sway over news, politics, and the media purposefully and systematically support Israel in the United States. These groups have made a concerted effort to deliberately propagate pro-Israel views, which contributes to the bias in American news coverage. Both Noam Chomsky and Edward Said have made observations about bias in news stories, particularly in relation to the discussion of Palestinian resistance, in *Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question*. Chomsky addresses the

filtering of news concerning violence in Israel and Palestine in his chapter “Middle East Terrorism and the American Ideological System.” He regularly cites the *New York Times* and criticizes it for its unjustified demonization of Palestinians and naive admiration for Israelis. According to him, just as under the rule of thoroughly cleansed history, when Palestinians commit acts of ‘terrorism’ in their view, Israelis respond or retaliate—possibly too violently. The truth is frequently rather different in the real world (Chomsky, 2001, p.109).

According to Chomsky, mainstream media has seldom condemned Israeli terrorism and has frequently even applauded it. In the meantime, without any supporting information or context, Palestinians are held responsible for inciting attacks (pp.134-136). Furthermore, Said (2001) notes in his chapter “The Essential Terrorist” that “most writing about terrorism is brief, pithy, totally devoid of the scholarly armature of evidence, proof, argument” (p.150). Thus, rather than showing evidence of the humanitarian crimes perpetrated, news coverage of Palestinian violence is characterized by orientalist stereotypes.

As 1985 drew to a close, the press examined the entire year's share of horrific acts of international terrorism, such as the killings in Larnaca on September 25 and the kidnapping and killing of an American tourist on October 7 aboard Achille Lauro. The attack on October 1, done by Israel, was excluded from the list. *The New York Times* mentioned the Tunis bombing in its extensive year-end analysis of terrorism, characterizing it as an act of retaliation that had little impact on Palestinian violence and sparked international indignation. However, it was not classified as terrorism (Chomsky, 2001, p.102).

On December 31, 1985, Israeli troops alongside their South Lebanon Army (SLA mercenaries) attacked a Shi'ite Muslim village in southern Lebanon, forcing all of its inhabitants of about 2,000 people to flee while blowing up houses, setting others on fire, and apprehending thirty-two young men, effectively ending the year of bloody international terrorism. The village's elderly residents, women, and youngsters were reportedly pouring into a town outside the Israeli security zone, where the UN force maintained its base of operations (Chomsky, 2001, pp.104-105).

Reported from Beirut, this report was assembled from testimonies cited by the Lebanese police, a journalist from the conservative Beirut newspaper An-Nahar, and the Shi'ite Amal movement. Joel Greenberg, reporting from Jerusalem, offered an alternative account based only on the unidentified claim that “villagers fearful a SLA reprisal fled the Shi'ite village of Kunin after two SLA soldiers were slain in the village” (Chomsky, 2001, p.105).

This is illuminating given the discrepancy between the two accounts. One big advantage of Israeli propaganda is that most media journalists are based in Israel. Two significant benefits result from this. First, the news is delivered to the American public via official Israeli eyes. Second, given the volume of reporting, the Israeli propaganda apparatus and its numerous U.S. affiliates can resentfully object to the fact that Arab crimes are overlooked while Israel is thoroughly examined for any small inadequacy, on those rare occasions when U.S. journalists write something crucial rather than just depending on their friendly hosts.

Problems can arise when one is unable to handle the news properly. This occurred, for instance, during the 1982 Lebanon War, when Israel was unable to control the firsthand accounts provided by journalists stationed in Lebanon. This generated a large protest over claimed atrocity mongering and falsification in a “broad-scale mass psychological war” perpetrated against the ‘pathetic tiny Israel’, another proof of the entrenched anti-Semitism of world opinion. Israel, then, became victimized as the target, not the attacker. It is simple to show that the accusations are untrue and frequently ridiculous, and that the media dutifully twisted events to support Israel—a difficult task for reporters trying to avoid Israeli terror bombs (Chomsky, 2001, p.105).

In fact, Israeli sources frequently provided testimony that was substantially harsher than what the American press published, and what was published in American newspapers was frequently a much-softened version of what reporters truly saw. However, despite the obvious ridiculousness of the accusations, they were treated extremely seriously, and the fair criticism of the media for its submission to the Israeli-American viewpoint and its erasure of disagreeable facts was, once again, completely disregarded.

As shown above, very few studies have conducted extensive content analysis on bias against Palestine, despite the fact that numerous academics have drawn attention to instances of bias against Palestine in media in the United States (Chomsky (2001), Said (2001), Zelizer et al. (2002), Mearsheimer and Walt (2007), Bazian (2015)). There may not be many technical studies of orientalism available because supporting the Palestinian cause with commentary often provokes strong reactions. “The climate of intimidation and censorship surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, both inside (at all levels of

the education hierarchy) and outside the U.S. academy, is real and longstanding,” says Sara Roy (2010) in response to this type of academic suppression (p.24). Consequently, a great deal of content analysis research is carried out by nonprofit and advocacy groups.

While several academics have discussed shifts in public opinion, none have specifically linked changes in news coverage because the latter never witnessed a significant shift. The following paragraphs will focus on the *New York Times*' coverage of the Palestinian First Intifada, focusing on the portrayal of both Palestinians and Israelis.

As far as the historical context is concerned, December 1987 saw the start of the First Intifada, which continued until September 1993. Four Palestinians were killed by an Israeli army truck in the beginning of the Intifada, but it swiftly gained popularity. First-time activists who were incensed by Israel's 20-year occupation of the West Bank and Gaza led the movement. This popular movement was met with extreme force by the Israeli authorities. Khalidi (2021) details the repercussions:

From the beginning of the First Intifada to the end of 1996—nine years, including six when the intifada was ongoing—Israeli troops and armed settlers killed 1,422 Palestinians, almost one every day. Of them, 294, or over 20 percent were minors sixteen and under. One hundred and seventy-five Israelis, 86 of them security personnel, were killed by Palestinians during the same period. (p.172)

The real scope of the movement and its human cost were not adequately covered by the majority of American news outlets, including the *New York Times*. Reporting on Israel and Palestine for the *New York Times* staff seemed to be biased toward Israel in general (Khalidi, 2021, p.172). A. M. Rosenthal and Thomas L. Friedman were among the most

active writers on Israel and Palestine-related articles during the First Intifada. A. M. Rosenthal is regarded as one of many “passionate defenders of Israel” in Mearsheimer and Walt’s eyes. Additionally, Rosenthal was known for faulty reporting, after his imprecise account of the Genovese incident (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007, p.170).

Noam Chomsky (2001) finds fault with Friedman's reporting for a number of reasons, notably his denial of Israeli terrorism against Palestinians and his fixation on studying the consequences of what he refers to as Palestinian suicide bombings, in spite of the lack of evidence (p.107-108). Besides, Friedman “almost never takes the Palestinians' side or advocates that the United States distance itself from Israel,” according to Mearsheimer and Walt.

Max Frankel was the *New York Times* executive editor during the First Intifada, with final editing rights over all published articles. In his memoir, Frankel even acknowledged his own pro-Israel inclination:

I was much more deeply devoted to Israel than I dared to assert. . . Fortified by my knowledge of Israel and my friendships there, I myself wrote most of our Middle East commentaries. As more Arab than Jewish readers recognized, I wrote them from a pro-Israel perspective. (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007, p.172)

Over 16,000 articles about Israel and/or Palestine were published in the *New York Times* during the First Intifada. Of them, approximately 40% mention Palestinian organizations or individuals as references, whereas approximately 93% mention Israeli organizations or individuals as references. The findings of Holly M. Jackson's study of logistic regression analysis showed that, compared to 5.9% of all references to Israelis, 11.9% of all references to Palestinians utilized violent language (Jackson, 2021, p.6). The

evolution of the percentage of references in the *New York Times* that utilized violent language during the First Intifada appears on Figure 5.




Figure 5: Percent of References to Palestinians and Israelis that Used Violent Language in the *New York Times* during the First Intifada (Jackson, 2021, p.6)

As the figure shows, when referring to Palestinians at the beginning of the period, references to Israelis were much less likely to employ violent harsh language than those to Palestinians. As the Intifada drew to a conclusion, the statistics grew somewhat more equivalent. In this instance, equality of statistic does not equate to equity of portrayal because Israeli violence was, in fact, substantially higher than Palestinian violence during this time.

In 15.7% of the *New York Times* reports, Palestinians were referred to in the passive voice. However, reports have shown that only 6.4% of Israelis were referred to in the passive voice. This indicates that over twice as many references to Palestinians as to Israelis were made in the passive voice by the *Times*. The tone and objectivity scores associated with these references to passive voice are displayed below in Figure 6.




Figure 6: Passive Voice References to Palestinians and Israelis during the First Intifada (Jackson, 2021, p.7)

Note: Objectivity (on the right) and Tone (on the left). Zero values denote neutrality, negative values denote a negative tone, while positive values imply a positive tone. Higher objectivity in the reference is indicated by more positive objectivity values, which also mean less opinion present.

As the figure plainly illustrates, references to Israelis were often more objective in the passive voice; however, references to Palestinians were not only more common in the passive voice but generally had a more negative tone. The rhetorical implication of utilizing the passive voice is to minimize the guilt of Israeli aggressors in causing Palestinian misery by de-emphasizing or hiding those who are doing such bad actions against Palestinians.

A thorough examination of the articles that Jackson's content analysis revealed in detail both validates the bias that was found and identifies other biases that exist but are harder to measure. For example, Thomas L. Friedman's article "Proposals for Peace" from October 1988 had the highest usage of the active voice in reference to Israeli subjects and the passive voice in reference to Palestinian subjects during the First Intifada. While Friedman fails to quote any Palestinian individuals or organizations, he does present a "solution" for peace in his article through the perspectives of several Israelis. In his opening paragraphs, Friedman presents Sasson, a Jewish grocery store owner, as the person who holds the key to a Palestinian-Israeli peace settlement. Sasson has an overt anti-Palestinian bias. Friedman explains:

Everything Sasson had learned, smelled and touched his whole life had led him to the conviction that the Arabs would never willingly accept a Jewish state in their midst and that any concessions to the Palestinians would eventually be used to destroy the Jewish state. To emphasize this point, Sasson would hold up the index finger of his right hand and pretend that his left hand was a butcher knife. . .he would then pretend to chop off bits of his finger until he got down to the knuckle. . . he would pronounce with great conviction. . . 'That's what the Palestinians will do to us if we give them a chance.' (Jackson, 2021, p.7)

As shown above, Friedman joyfully highlights Sasson's viewpoint throughout his article, even though Sasson's claims are violent. Friedman, meanwhile, presents his news story's Palestinian characters with considerably less sympathy. He and the Israelis he quotes in his article most of the time use the passive voice when speaking of Palestinians. He quotes an Israeli official, for instance, when offering solutions to the conflict, stating that "the Palestinian government would be granted autonomy" and that "only after Palestinians' rights...have been recognized will they be able to focus on their

interests” (Jackson, 2021, p.7). The actor who must acknowledge Palestinian rights and grant their government autonomy is not mentioned in either quotation, even though it is evidently the Israeli government.

Conversely, the most frequent usage of the active voice in reference to Palestinians and the passive voice in reference to Israelis during the First Intifada was documented in an essay published in December 1990. A qualitative analysis indicates considerable anti-Palestinian sentiment even though the active voice is used frequently to refer to Palestinians (Jackson, 2021, p.7). Far beyond the quantitative findings, this qualitative examination demonstrates strong anti-Palestinian bias.

Another instance is Joel Brinkley's article “Divided Loyalties” published on December 16, 1990, which portrays Palestinians residing in Jordan as violent and filthy. Brinkley asserts generalizations and incongruous statements regarding the beliefs of all Palestinians, such as that “Palestinians are not only openly hostile to the United States, they also want a war” and “Palestinians seem intent on dragging Jordan into political and economic ruin” (Jackson, 2021, p.7). Random quotes from Palestinian sources serve as his “proof” for these assertions; the reasons for his selection of these quotes are not evident, and he frequently qualifies their remarks negatively.

Brinkley uses a sensational superfluous quotation from a 20-year-old Palestinian woman named Selwa Farhan, who declares, “We are ready to fight anyone, kill anyone - Israelis, Americans,” as she leaves the practice field, her green eyes flaming (Jackson, 2021, p.8). Brinkley takes Selwa's quote as a causal relationship even though he does not try to prove that it is indicative of the views of millions of other Palestinians. In addition, Selwa's out-of-context comment is further undermined by the animalistic

terminology he employs to characterize her. “Green eyes flaming” sounds more like the actions of an animal in search of prey than of a female in her twenties.

Brinkley uses subtle but devastating orientalist strategies in his article to dehumanize other Palestinians. Eroding the humanity and reliability of the ostensibly innocent Arab is a typical form of orientalist bias, as seen in the American film *American Sniper* and Samuel Jackson's classic *Rules of Engagement*. According to Brinkley's report, even the front page of the *New York Times* uses this similar tactic. Brinkley writes about the Palestinian attorney Yousef Hamden in his article: “Dressed in a white shirt and gray silk necktie, hair carefully coiffed, he leans forward in a high-back leather chair behind a rosewood desk. But Palestinian rage burns just below his proper establishment surface.” Even though he has a majestic demeanor, Hamden nevertheless has a fiery temper as he “burns” with rage (Jackson, 2021, p.8). This description represents a poisonous narrative that holds that no Palestinian can be trusted, no matter how innocent or nice they seem. Because it increases Israeli animosity toward Palestinians, this type of media bias is extremely damaging, as scholars like Jack Shaheen have contextualized.

Each narrative has multiple perspectives, and as the example above illustrates, the Western media has historically hushed, distorted, or excluded the Palestinian viewpoint. It is imperative, therefore, to acknowledge that there is a significant need for development in this particular part of the media due to the high global visibility of the Palestinians, which is mostly due to their involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the inherent lack of balance in the connected news reporting.

While reporting violent instances involving Palestinians should not be disregarded, it is important to counterbalance these reports with positive narratives about

the Palestinian people. According to journalist Edward R. Murrow, most of the time, what people do not see is equally significant to what they do see (Matthews, 1992, p.101).

Overall, Americans have a negative perception of Arabs in general and of particular Arab peoples, primarily Palestinians, even if the general term “the Arabs” generates a greater negative response than any of the nations or peoples that make up the Arab world. Arabs are the most negatively perceived group among Middle Easterners. Consequently, they were perceived in a recent survey to be rich yet at the same time “backward, primitive, uncivilized,” with peculiar clothing, abusing women, and looking “strong, powerful,” “treacherous, cunning,” “warlike, bloodthirsty,” and “barbaric, cruel” (Suleiman, 1989, p.251). Not all Americans hold these opinions, nor do most Americans embrace the majority of these viewpoints. However, there is no denying that Americans have an attitude and generalized, albeit imprecise, inaccurate, and nearly always negative perceptions about Arabs that occasionally verge on racism.

The American mainstream media, which critics believe has kept a biased perspective of the occupation that favours the Israeli narrative over that of the Palestinians, has been a major factor in maintaining conflict. Yousef Munayyer, a Palestinian-American political analyst, asserts that:

...the media coverage of this [Palestinian-Israeli] issue – when it is in fact covered – is covered in a fairly unfair and biased way. It has created this perception that the Israelis are somehow the underdogs and the Palestinians are somehow the aggressors, when really the entire world recognises that Israel, in fact, occupy Palestine – not the other way around. (Siddiqui & Zaheer, 2018, p.2)

Tamara Kharroub, assistant executive director of the Arab Centre in Washington, D.C., contends that Palestinians' dehumanization is a common theme in media reporting in the United States. Kharroub criticizes the media for always not revealing or publishing the names of civilians murdered in the nonviolent protests. She maintains that this falls in direct opposition to the regular reporting on Israeli victims, where their lives, pictures, and mourning families are frequently discussed and presented (Siddiqui & Zaheer, 2018, p.4).

Because the U.S. media portrays the conflict in a way that completely obscures the power imbalance between the Israelis and the Palestinians, Israel's critics find the pro-Israel coverage in the U.S. to be especially problematic. While the former has one of the most sophisticated armies worldwide, the latter is frequently equipped with nothing more than rocks and rockets—more precisely portrayed as “enhanced fireworks” (Siddiqui & Zaheer, 2018, p.4). Stated differently, no line of differentiation is drawn between the Palestinians, who are undergoing military occupation, and Israel, the occupier. For the same reason, the late twentieth century Hollywood cinematic productions were, in the eyes of many critics, no less different from the U.S. media as far as Arabs, Palestinians, and Israelis are concerned.

4-1-2- Late Twentieth Century Hollywood Productions’ Clichés about Arabs/Palestinians

Cinema, being one of the most influential types of media, is of seminal importance in creating representations by using the language, images and symbols as powerful tools in its movies. In the United States’ context, cinema overwhelmingly equals Hollywood. This latter, soon growing into the national film industry of the United States, was formed

by a collection of movie firms that originally travelled to Los Angeles to flee the harsh winter locations in New York and Chicago early in the twentieth century. The benefits of filmmaking in southern California, especially its diverse landscapes, which are essential for outdoor, on-location photography, quickly elevated Hollywood to the nation's preeminent position as the hub for film production (Metz, 2006, p.374).

Hollywood's classic film industry was centered on a studio system by 1917. The industry became a monolithic entity as a result of a few enterprises controlling it. These companies' hierarchies were well-established by the 1930s. The “big five,” as movie historians refer to the main studio companies, were Paramount, MGM, 20th Century Fox, Warner Bros., and RKO. These film studios possessed substantial holdings in the production, distribution, and exhibition sectors of the film business, indicating that they were fully vertically attached. The “little three,” so named because they had less invested in exhibition real estate, were a rung below the top of the ladder. These were namely United Artists, Columbia, and Universal. This hierarchy was sometimes divided differently since RKO did not have the same magnitude of an exhibiting status as the so-called “bigger four.” Republic and Monogram were even smaller production companies operating outside the studio system, specializing in low-budget genre movies (Metz, 2006, pp.375-376).

Well-known is the fact that both the media in general—including its fictional arts’ wing Hollywood— and the U.S. government work in concert and are inseparable elements in the power politics game. Hence, the increasing rate of Hollywood movies’ contrastive representation of Arabs in general, and Palestinians in particular, on the one hand, and Israelis on the other during the second half of the twentieth century, is

alarming and raises questions over the hidden ideologies intended to perpetuate through these movies. In this regard, a number of movies are worth being discussed.

The Ten Commandments (1956) is a film that follows the biblical story of Moses freeing the Israelites from Egyptian slavery and guiding them to the Promised Land. It does, in fact, dramatize the Old Testament story of Moses' life. Moses is an adoptive Egyptian prince who rescues his true brothers, the Hebrews who are in slavery, and then leads them upward to Mount Sinai, where he is given the Ten Commandments by God (Shaheen, 2001, p.473). In addition to portraying Egyptians as evil people deserving God's wrath, the movie was religiously infused with moral and political lessons about revolution, freedom and slave states.

Very similar techniques are used in the Hollywood film *Exodus* (1960) to depict the Israelites' resistance against Nazi persecution. The narrative, which took its cues from Leon Uris's novel of the same name, explores the Zionist interpretation of Israel's founding. The movie depicts the Jewish people's perseverance in escaping Nazi Germany and the British Mandate in order to reach Palestine. The film reinforces American perceptions of Israelis as heroes and Arabs as villains and thereby it is strongly biased towards Israel in its battle with the Arabs (Shaheen, 2001, p.189). Besides, more than any other portrayal by Hollywood or the media in general, this film inflamed American public opinion in favour of Israel and mirrored American engagement in the Middle East.

The other instance was *Lawrence of Arabia* (1962), one of Hollywood's finest productions of the previous century, including performances by Omar Sharif, Alec Guinness, and Anthony Quinn—three of the best actors of their era—that will never be

forgotten. Ironically, the film gained surprising popularity, particularly among Middle Eastern viewers, as it depicts the bravery of the British hero portrayed by Peter O'Toole in his adventures in the occupied Arab countries. In order to oppose the vicious and self-serving Turkish Empire, the main character tries to bring the Arab tribes together (Arti, 2007, p.8). The idea of exoticism persisted on screen despite the film's unrepresentative portrayal of the Middle East.

A new wave of 'politically minded' movies hit cinemas during this time, particularly after 1972, when political developments reinforced the already skewed perception of the Middle East as the site of the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) powerful group, known as "Black September." The latter group abducted and killed eleven Israeli athletes during the Olympic Games, thus reinforcing the notion of the radical Arab opposition to Israel. Subsequently, Hollywood produced *Black Sunday* (1976), a movie that depicts the spread of terrorism from the Middle East into the West (Shaheen, 2001, p.104-105). In the film, an organization akin to "Black September" plots to blow up Miami's Florida Stadium, where the American President and spectators were attending a game, using the Goodyear Blimp. *Black Sunday* depicted a true extension of the Orientalist technique of hiding alternative realities and warping the Middle East's image in a way that plainly aided American imperial goals in the region.

Amidst this, Hollywood's releases of *The Ambushers* (1967), *Embassy* (1973), *The Jerusalem File* (1973), *Slavers* (1977), and *Black Sunday, Operation Thunderbolt* (1977), portrayed American involvement in the region as that of "protection" rather than "invasion." These movies frequently demonstrated how America defends the area against the increasing threat of radicalism and terrorism from the Middle East. With

blatant disregard for the Palestinian viewpoint and indifference to the pain they endure under occupation, these films openly endorse Israel in its conflict. The films depict Israel as an advanced nation surrounded by extremist nations, in an attempt by the Zionists to secure American support for Israel as an ally. For instance, in *Operation Thunderbolt*, all Westerners support Israel in its fight against Arab hijackers, portraying Arabs as a manifestation of the Nazi threat. "I don't trust Arabs they are really dangerous they will kill us like the Nazis," one Israeli says to a doubtful German in the movie, and his claim turns out later on to be true (Shaheen, 2001, p.358).

Increasingly, Hollywood movies made Middle Eastern 'terrorism' a reality, and *Prisoner in the Middle* (1974) further strengthened the American-Israeli alliance when the United States decided to send one of its heroes, Tony Steven, to locate and defuse a nuclear weapon that had gone missing in order to rescue the entire world from Arab 'terrorism'. The movie makes clear how biased Hollywood is against the Arab and Muslim communities (Shaheen, 2001, p.380). *Rosebud* (1975), which has the same premise as *Black Sunday*, depicts a CIA operative attempting to free three affluent young Greeks who had been taken hostage by PLO terrorists (pp.402-403). Even further evidence for the connection between terrorism and the Arab-Israeli conflict may be seen in the 1976 movie *The Next Man*, in which Palestinians kill Israelis and Arabs who oppose peace kill Americans (p.349). The movie is a glaring illustration of the Orientalist practice of hiding alternative facts about the area. According to Marouf Hasian (1998), these films support American involvement and presence in the Middle East while also helping the government's political line; therefore, the Arabs ought to be

portrayed as a filthy, undeveloped, and inferior race that requires and will always need assistance from the West (pp.210-215).

Hollywood shifted its attention back to the Middle East when the Cold War came to an end. As a result, Hollywood produced a brand-new subgenre of thriller movies that featured Arab characters prominently in addition to validating the perception of them as vicious and deadly. In real terms, Arab instructional descriptions served to highlight the superiority of the American hero in comparison to the inferiority of his Arab counterpart, as exemplified by films like the *Delta Force* series (1986-1991), which were produced in Israel and either supported or funded by Israelis (Arti, 2007, p.12). The terrorist opponent was viewed as heinous religious extremists devoid of compassion for families and capable of horrific actions, making them targets for annihilation. The movie, which obviously used Hollywood exaggeration to fictionalize the 1985 TWA hijacking, depicted Arab terrorists as plotting to blow up Miami with a nuclear bomb.

Using Khomeini's Fatwa, the terrorist leader saw his hijacking as a “jihad” against U.S. imperialism and Zionism. The American rescuers annihilated the terrorists and freed the passengers in a suspenseful dramatic framework. One comment from Lee Marvin, who starred in the first *Delta Force*, reads, “I like what the picture says...Audiences love to see the bad guy get it. We start blowing up everybody. That’s good old American revenge” (Shaheen, 2001, p.158). The association between Islam and terrorist activities, included in *Delta Force*, is not new. What may be most upsetting to Middle Easterners is the connection between the shouts of ‘Allah Akbar’ and terrible deeds.

Hollywood explored terrorist activity in the *Hostage* television series (1982–1986–1990). Terrorists from the Middle East are shown as trained into believing they are capable of blowing up not only Westerners but also Middle Easterners themselves, with no mercy afforded to women and children. The Orientalist discourse, which portrays the Orient as a helpless society in need of the Occident to save it from itself, is presented too in these series.

The aforementioned themes were prevalent in films such as *Navy Seals* (1989), which rationalized American intervention in the Lebanese civil war by exaggerating the country's oppression and presenting it as the “Swaziland of the Middle East,” characterizing Beirut as a “shithole” populated by “rag heads” (Shaheen, 2001, pp.14-15). In the film, Charlie Sheen travels to disarm extremist Arab organizations like Amal, Hezbollah, and Druze of their US-made Stinger missiles, and he saves the Americans and Israelis who have been ruthlessly taken hostage.

In *Raiders of the Lost Ark* (1981), featuring Harrison Ford as an archaeology professor who travels to Egypt to stop the Nazis and Arabs from capturing the priceless ancient Ark of the Covenant, Hollywood associated the Middle East with the threat posed by the Nazis. This movie demonstrates the evolution of Hollywood's portrayal of the connection between the Nazis and the Arabs, particularly in light of *Lawrence of Arabia* (1962), which depicts Western attempts to unite Arab tribes against the Ottoman/German menace during World War I. This illustrates the increasing trend of seeing Arabs and Muslims as “others,” isolating them in a closed society. In the 1990 film *Not Without My Daughter*, Sally Field plays an American lady who is the wife of the Iranian-born physician Betty Mohmody. This latter forbids her and her daughter

from returning to the U.S.A., representing a brutalized Iranian social structure. After that, she embarks on a risky plan to leave the country. In the movie, Iran is depicted as a backward country caged in the Middle Ages (Shaheen, 2001, p.47).

In James Cameron's action movie *True Lies* (1994), featuring Arnold Schwarzenegger, Arabs are once again shown as terrorists. Combining gangster, western, thriller, comic action, and romance elements, the film takes on the terrorist threat in a manner reminiscent of James Bond. Arnold Schwarzenegger plays Harry, an undercover agent who teams up with his sidekick to thwart the schemes of a vicious Arab terrorist organization called Crimson Jihad. This portrays American anxieties about being singled out by Islamic terrorism. Harry and his companion Tom successfully penetrate the criminal schemes of Salim, the leader of the splinter gang, by breaking into his mansion's computer system. The idea was to acquire the nuclear weapon that had been taken from Kazakhstan and use it to pressure the United States government to comply with his threats of destroying an American city every week until its forces leave the Arabian Gulf (Shaheen, 2001, p.55).

In fact, not only does the film celebrate American victory over “Islamic Terrorism,” but it also portrays Americans as victims. In practice, the United States was facing an untenable circumstance at the time; the first Gulf War's coalition was becoming more and more fragmented due to the consequences of the UN sanctions that the United States was enforcing. These sanctions resulted in the tragic deaths of hundreds of Iraqis and contributed to the country's ongoing poverty. America is shown in the film as being there to stop the “bad guys,” so Harry will appease the audience by defeating the terrorists and serving them justice. Salim hangs himself by his pistol belt

in one scene as Harry pilots a Harrier and eliminates every Arab terrorist, with the remainder being “squelched” in large numbers (Shaheen, 2001, p.501).

Besides, the movie promotes the idea that Crimson Jihad, a group that has absolutely no reservations about utilizing WMDs, is a threat to Western interests throughout the world. As a result, such an Arab representation of a civilized West or Occident against a primitive East or Orient validates Said's Orientalism. The vicious stereotype of Palestinian Muslims as violent zealots adorning traditional ‘kuffiyeh,’ a sign of their conflict with Israel, is relentlessly maintained by *True Lies*. It also attempts to characterize all Arabs as being similar to Crimson Jihad (Shaheen, 2001, p.501).

Arab-American organizations criticized the film after it was released, calling it a “distortion machine.” They contended that the movie's link of terrorists with Islam stemmed from the fact that the terrorists were Arabs. Janet Maslin said in response to this that the action and conversation are occasionally excessively filthy; the terrorists are crass, spectacularly offensive ethnic caricatures; and there are a lot of dead bodies. Whether people like it or not, “those are the rules of the game” (Arti, 2007, p.15). Regardless of whether one asserts that Hollywood was not adhering to the U.S. political agenda, the coordination between them has been documented several times. James Cameron, the film director, made an interesting observation after the government backed the film with all of its resources: “I think the nature of how we create movies is really changing now. The studio thanks for their cooperation, the U.S. Department of Defense and the United States Marine Corps Aviation.” (Shaheen, 2001, p.500)

Based on the stereotypical image Arabs in general and Palestinians in particular had been robed with by the U.S. press, TV channels, and Hollywood movies in the

second half of the twentieth century, and contrary to the more positive image Israelis enjoyed, it can be said that Edward Said's analysis in his theory of Orientalism has been to a far extent valid. The implications of his theory would reveal some interesting facts and results. This is what will be shown in the analysis below.

4-1-3-Implications of Edward Said's Theory of Orientalism on the U.S. Mass

Media's Portrayal of Arabs/ Palestinians and Israelis in Late Twentieth Century

As explained in the first chapter of this dissertation, the Western approach to controlling, reorganizing, and exerting power over the Orient is known as Orientalism. The resilience and power of Orientalism can be attributed to hegemony, or more accurately, to the outcome of cultural hegemony in action. This is highly sensed and visibly seen in U.S. foreign policy behaviours as hegemony is both an objective and a practice and it is thereby given priority in the U.S. political agenda to attain its aims in the Middle East—expounded in the second chapter of this dissertation. In simple terms, hegemony is the end result of Orientalism; the latter serves as a tool used by the West, and the U.S. in this regard, to justify its imperialistic immoral policy in the Middle East to receive less criticism and dissent.

Orientalism can be characterized through applying Michel Foucault's notion of discourse, which Edward Said found to be very helpful. He contends that without analyzing Orientalism's discourse, one will not be able to apprehend “the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage, and even produce, the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period” (Said, 1979, p.23). Indeed, discourse analysis is of paramount importance when one wants to detect the mechanisms

through which the West maintained a steadfast hold on the peoples of the Middle East. It entails the consideration of how certain frames of thought are normalized and given priority in discourse while others are marginalized. Therefore, if the ideal race is continuously framed by the mass media as being white, European, and Christian, this normalizes it in the mainstream discourse on race. In their turn, other races will experience marginalization. This also holds true for the methodical, intentional demonization of a certain race. According to Edward Said, each writer leaves their unique, defining touch on this anonymous corpus of writings that together form a discursive framework called Orientalism.

Besides, the Western intellectual serves the hegemonic culture, as Said's theory of orientalism makes clear. This is to a far extent true as Western intellectuals, with an emphasis on American intellectuals in this work, serve their own hegemonic culture by disseminating stereotypes about the Orient that are void of any scientifically empirical grounds. Said's *Orientalism*, then, offers criticism to Western texts that have attached the Orient to a negative image through a series of recurrent clichés and stereotypical imagery, portraying the East as an exotic and degraded other.

The methodology he followed in studying and analyzing these texts required two methodological devices, namely strategic location and strategic formation—as mentioned earlier in the first chapter. The former describes the author's position in his text vis a vis the Oriental material he tackles or explains, and the latter analyzes the relationship between various texts from different periods and eras belonging to different textual genres that earns them power in the culture at large. In the upcoming paragraphs, the strategic location of American authors in their texts about the Orient in the second

half of the twentieth century will be unravelled. The aim is to clarify, in regard to cultural discourse and interaction within a culture, that the common knowledge shared in it is representations rather than the truth.

In spite of the fact that the Orient has been, since the second half of the eighteenth century, the subject matter of a multitude of novels, poems, philosophies, political theories, economic theories, and imperial administrations' policies, the present work focuses on the production of an Orientalist discourse in the U.S. mass media with its 3 main types: the press, TV channels, and Hollywood cinematic productions. These three types serve the research objectives of the present study highlighted in the introduction. Based on the media images, stereotypes, and misrepresentations discerned in the first part of this same chapter, the present analysis divides them into themes.

The first theme displayed to Western viewers is that of the Arab world's backwardness. The latter is exemplified in the desert, a home for the barbaric Arabs known as camel drivers and date growers. Through the perpetuation of such a setting that always defines Arabs, this made it 'common truth' for the Western viewers that the desert equals barbarism and backwardness, while the city equals civilization and development. Besides, this Oriental view of backwardness seemed to be eternal and not subject to change or positive transformation. In other words, this representation is tightly related to, in Edward Said's words, "a bad sort of eternity".

Another theme takes Arabs as an object of ridicule and mockery. This was clearly visible in "All in the Family" comic series highlighted earlier, among many other series, talk shows and movies. This purposeful representation usually portrays Arabs as stupid, coward, dirty, and are resembled to animals for the sake of their underestimation.

Added to the above themes, the demonic nature of Arabs is another recurrent theme in the U.S. mass media. Arabs' ruthlessness, mediocrity, danger, bitter hatred towards 'civilized' peoples, and villainous nature are all characteristics that define who Arabs are. Chief among these characteristics are the themes of cruelty and corruption. Cruelty as a theme includes the media images of indiscriminate killing, vengeance, fanaticism, and blackmailing. To seem convincing, Arabs are portrayed as wielding swords and scimitars with knives in their teeth to satisfy their bloodthirsty desire. Corruption, too, is carefully placed in the narratives of the U.S. mass media. It revolves around the idea of cheating, lying, and violating pacts by not keeping one's word.

Moreover, Arabs' dependency on the so-called 'civilized races' is a theme that the U.S. mass media strive to instill into people's minds. The American hero is always there to save Arabs from their enemies who are putting them under subjugation. The ostensible noble aim of protection, which is far from being invasion, colours the media's narratives in regard to American presence in the Middle East. Simultaneously, the same heroes who tend to save and protect Arabs abhor them for being the 'bad guys' and thereby underscore the Orientalist discourse that the Orient is an imperiled society in need of Western intervention to save it from itself. This is but a justification of the U.S. unjustified presence in the Middle East for covert indirect imperial aims and gains.

Besides, Arab women's oppression and abuse is highly visible as a theme as well. Indeed, the only image that identifies them is their persecution by Arab men with all brutal means leading these women to think of escape and yearn for refuge in the West. Arab women are always portrayed as wearing black with muted voices and silenced lips. They have no right for amusement, nor can they perform jobs outside their houses.

Worse is the idea that their main mission in life is to satisfy Arab men's sexual lust as being 'sex maniacs.' In some Hollywood movies, very few are those Arab women who are not victimized. If it is the case, these women are portrayed as assistants to Arab men in their terrorist acts against the West.

Furthermore, another theme establishes the Arab countries as radical terrorist nations. As was already made clear in the previous sections of this same chapter, most Arab countries—including Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Sudan, Libya, among others—added to Iran are portrayed as posing a serious threat to the West for they sponsor terrorism. This is due to some Arab countries' extravagant wealthiness, next to what is called Islamic extremism and radicalism. The end result would be a devastating Muslim holy war on the West under the name of Jihad. By the same token, Arab leaders are either labelled "bloodthirsty terrorists", "mad dogs", or "Hitler on the Nile".

This theme is closely bound to the theme of Arabs' practice of terrorism as the former is the source and the motherland of the latter. Both the invention as well as the amplification of such a theme have systematically and gradually been done by the various U.S. media conglomerates in the three types selected for the present study. Terrorism as a theme entailed both the demonization of Arabs as being the aggressors on the one hand, and the victimization and heroism of Israelis and Americans on the other. To this end, Arabs are portrayed as religious fanatics with no mercy who are capable of committing horrific crimes, hence serving as an extension to the Nazis. This requires the demonization and distortion of the terms "Jihad" and "Allah Akbar". Part and parcel of the game is the attempt to distort Islam's image as being the religion of

the vast majority of Arabs. Islam is always responsible for any bombing taking place in the U.S. aiming to establish a new world order to extend Islam.

All the aforementioned themes have helped establish a suitable platform for the theme of otherness. Due to the multitude of negative characteristics and traits Arabs have, which are not balanced with any positive traits, they have become seen as a secluded villainous race that needs to be excluded from the Western civilization. Therefore, Arabs have become enemy number one to the West in general, and Americans in particular, exceeding the danger both Nazis and communists posed to them in the past.

It is worth highlighting, however, that what is hidden or ignored by the U.S. mass media is often as important as what is shown. Purposefully not made public is the fact that Arabs possess some qualities that make them deserve respect for by other cultures. These include Arabs' honour, loyalty, family bonds, generosity, personal integrity, humanity, politeness, and respect to women, among many other traits. The aim behind overlooking these qualities is the Orientalist Western strategy to control, reframe, and have command over the Orient.

Of special importance to the present work is the dichotomy of Israelis' description versus the Palestinians' description by the U.S mass media. Israel is a civilized nation that can comfortably serve as an ally to the West; hence, its people are friends to the white race and can fit within the realm of civilized nations. They are most of the time portrayed as courageous heroes who are patient and peaceful living in the pitiful little Israel and surrounded by ruthless evil neighbours. The best example is the

movie *Exodus* that highlights Jewish endurance and sends a message about their revolutionary spirit and freedom.

Moreover, it has previously been shown that many American newspapers, chief among which *New York Times*, demonize Palestinians without a single basis and have an uncritical regard for Israelis. All acts of violence or terrorism done by Israel are said to be ‘acts of retaliation’ and are therefore often celebrated. In fact, the Israelis’ violent tone when describing Palestinians is taken for granted, while Palestinians are labelled violent and depraved when doing the same thing. Furthermore, most of Middle East commentaries are written from a pro-Israeli perspective.

On the other side of the spectrum, Palestinians in particular are strictly tied up with terrorism in the U.S. media. They were in the 1990s accused of helping Iraqis invade Kuwait, next to being demonic beasts who are purveyors of violence wearing “Kuffiyehs”. To stress their underestimation, an analogy has recurrently been drawn between the savage American Indian and the dehumanized Palestinian through the use of an animalistic language to describe them. This practice aims at undermining the allegedly innocent Palestinian's humanity and reliability to feed the hostility against him.

All the themes that have been outlined in this section, added to many others, form part of what Edward Said called “strategic formation”. Through their perpetuation in a plethora of U.S. mass media outlets, they have been turned into truth in the unconscious mind of the Western reader and receiver. Indeed, through analyzing the relationship between these Orientalist texts, one can reach the conclusion that they have acquired mass, density, and referential power. Said expounds that they are representations not truths.

Throughout the twentieth century, Blacks have proved to be no exception to the stereotypical image forcibly placed to identify Arabs and Muslims. The Black race, either in America or Africa, was subject to oppression and underestimation, and therefore an easy target of ridicule and worthlessness for the U.S. mass media. Various factors, however, intertwined to make a noticeable shift in the representation of Blacks in the 1990s for some undeclared political aims. The following part of this chapter is mainly devoted to the discussion and comparison between the U.S. mass media's portrayal of apartheid Pretoria and post-apartheid South Africa in the 1990s.

4-2- The U.S. Mass Media's Portrayal of Apartheid Pretoria

Substantial social and political developments in Africa have long been underreported by the American media. A great deal of these events went unreported. Events were frequently framed to serve American objectives, especially in the context of the Cold War, when many African crises were presented as pitting East against West. Furthermore, news coverage was overly simplistic or racially stereotypical, portraying Africans as inferior to and dependent on Westerners, particularly White people, either explicitly or implicitly. Africa overall was portrayed as a vulnerable, inferior, and backward continent (Danker-Dake, 2008, p.9).

Ebo in his article "American Media and African Coverage" stated that the purposeful and systematic way in which U.S. news media companies select international newsworthy events reflects their bias, resulting in an unfavourable depiction of Africa (Danker-Dake, 2008, p.9). One of the most glaring examples of flawed news coverage is that which concerned apartheid Pretoria in the second half of the twentieth century.

The American media's treatment of this topic was quite distinct as what was taking place inside the country was having direct implications on the portrayal of Blacks and apartheid in South Africa. Therefore, because the internal events occurring at home in the U.S.A. had a strong impact on the U.S. administration's foreign policy assumptions vis a vis apartheid in South Africa, it is incumbent to highlight the U.S. mass media's portrayal of Black Americans in the second half of the twentieth century.

4-2-1-The U.S. Mass Media's portrayal of Black Americans

Firstly, the linguistic depiction of ethnic and racial relationships in the United States of America is intimately associated with the concept of a prevailing culture that has triumphed throughout the country's history and has driven most non-European cultures and identities to the periphery of cultural space. Therefore, the culture of Protestant English-speaking Europe, at times known as "White" culture, has come to be associated with the "elite" culture. However, members of other racial and ethnic groups who do not fit into the dominant culture have always been referred to by different terms that emphasize their status as "others" or outsiders in contrast to the nation and culture of the United States (Melnychuk & Saburova, 2021, p.1). Eventually, both the disparaging terms (Negro, Redskin, Chink, etc.) and the more "politically correct" ones (Black, Native American, Chinese American, etc.) turned into ideological tools that allowed white Americans to be at the centre of national and cultural identity formation while othering and marginalizing other racial and ethnic groups (p.2).

The hierarchical nature of racial and ethnic relations in a given society is greatly propagated and repeated by the mass media. T. Van Dijk (1991) examined in his book *Racism and the Press* how ethnic minorities are portrayed in the media and concluded

that this latter serves as a vehicle for the spread of racist ideas and values held by the elite, the dominant social group in the community. According to him, a news article's structure and content are determined by the social context, which encompasses the hierarchy of relationships between ethnic groups. This includes the headline, news selection, and semantic arrangement of the text. The frequent usage of the designation “Black” to describe African Americans in contexts where White Americans are typically not referred to in terms of race highlights the marginal status of “others” or outsiders in American news reports.

In fact, there have been numerous stereotypic misconceptions regarding the traits or behaviours of African Americans since the era of American slavery. Some stereotypes claim that African Americans are low achievers and have undesirable personality traits like immorality, or dishonesty, and stupidity (Pernicová, 2014, p.8). These stereotypes affected the early depictions of African Americans on television, when they were portrayed in clichéd characters.

For instance, African-American humor has its origins in the history of enslavement. Slave humour, disguised as plantation humour, developed from the South as a sort of comical spirit. This implies that African-Americans' success at humor is not surprising. Regretfully, this success has not adhered to the comic heritage in its purest form.

African-Americans have waged a losing war for equitable representation and truthful portrayals of their people on television since the medium's inception. The glorification of ghetto settings and unemployment as a lifestyle in the 1970s only succeeded the roles of maid and handyman of the 1950s. In the 1980s,

some positively inviting family-oriented sitcoms were finally broadcast on television, providing a glimmer of hope (Horn, 1999, p.1). The how and why of these very diverse and abrupt shifts in the way African-Americans are portrayed are examined in this study.

One significant issue during television's early years was the employment of African-American entertainers. The historic American context of post-World War II encouraged fair and equal consideration of African-Americans and unbiased representations. Regrettably, this was a country with deeply ingrained racist customs and institutions. The television business had to decide how much it should sacrifice viewership and advertising revenue in order to further egalitarian ideals by showcasing black talent (Horn, 1999, p.1).

Horn's study revisited and expanded upon the concepts offered in Marlon T. Riggs' 1991 documentary "Color Adjustment" by means of a historical analysis. The documentary examined the utilization of stereotypes and both the favourable and adverse portrayals of African-Americans in television sitcoms to tell the story of fifty years of African-American actors in television in the latter half of the twentieth century. In order to demonstrate how these stereotypes affected African-American actors' careers and usage, as well as how they impacted African-Americans' lives, the documentary closely examined the television industry (Horn, 1999, p.2). Four stages in the evolution of African-American imagery were identified in the documentary. Horn proposed another fifth stage.

The first stage addresses how stereotypes became accepted as standard norms on television. The second stage centres on African-American performers' cultivation of stereotypes in order to keep stable jobs. The 1970s, which are characterized as the self-

exploitation years of African-Americans in television and movies, represent stage three. The fourth stage depicts the growth of positive African-American representation in the 1980s, referred to by Riggs (1991) as the “Cosby Era” (p.3).

The 1950s incarnate the first stage, which saw the emergence of radio personalities on TV and the perpetuation of outdated stereotypes in the new media. The 1960s embody the second stage, which included African-American actors' development of stereotypical images to sustain consistent work. The introduction of the mammy maid, shuffled walking, and high-pitched giggles—characteristics that made African-American characters lovely, funny and manageable for white audiences—came from this time.

The third stage includes the 1970s, a period characterized by African-Americans' self-exploitation in movies and television. The production partnership of Norman Lear and Bud Yorkin was credited with generating African-American television sitcoms at the height of their popularity. The fourth stage, embodied in the 1980s, saw the emergence of a more socially conscious theme for African American television with shows like “Frank's Place” and “Cosby Show” that emphasized family values and addressed social issues. African-American performers were granted higher levels of standard by their peers (p.9).

The documentary ends with the fourth and last stage of development being completed in the late 1980s. Horn (1999), however, suggests that the way African Americans are portrayed in sitcoms has another additional stage of development. This latter addresses the 1990s and the renewed popularity of the African-American situation

comedy and the new appearance of standup comedy shows intended exclusively for African-American audiences on television networks (p.9).

Indeed, the success of “the Cosby Show” in the 1990s opened up more financially rewarding chances for African American actors. Sadly, there was not much of a need for African-American actors as there was for African-American situation comedies. Stand-up comedians were gradually taking their place. In this stage, the shift from actors to comedians signaled the creation of an entirely novel type of comedy. This latter drew viewers in with satire, spectacle, and contempt. With the debut of two additional networks, WB and UPN, in addition to NBC, CBS, ABC, and FOX, the nightly roster of situation comedies starring African Americans grew to be abundant (Horn, 1999, p.66). The images broadcast on television constituted a combination of all previously mentioned stages of development.

The aforementioned stages of development in the portrayal of Afro-Americans on the U.S. television had a political reason behind, strictly attached to the development of the Black Movement in the country already explained in the previous chapters. Hollywood, in its turn, witnessed some stages of development in regard to African Americans’ portrayal in its movies for the same political reason.

In retrospect, the novel titled *Gone With the Wind* was optioned for a film adaptation in the 1930s in America. Jill Watts, a history professor at California State University, declared to the CBC Radio that the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) started urging MGM, a popular Hollywood film company, not to produce it for they were worried that it would reinforce the stereotypes made about the Black people. Following its initial release, *Gone With the*

Wind ultimately came to be seen as a defense of slavery and an affirmation of Black inferiority. The Black caricature that was prevalent in movies at this point was the maid, portrayed by the Black performer Hattie McDaniel (Ideas Show, 2021).

As noted by Watts, the Black people experienced a fresh round of disappointments from post-World War II Hollywood. They nearly vanished from the screen as they competed for less and smaller roles. Additionally, Hollywood began to produce more movies about and for white women; one such movie is *Mildred Pierce*, featuring Joan Crawford. Some critics questioned whether Hollywood was purposefully concentrating on stories about white women in order to circumvent issues regarding the portrayal of Black people. Hollywood's history saw a brief and intriguing time between 1946 and 1950 when attempts were made to use the “passing” genre—which depicts white people attempting to reconcile with “the other”—to examine racism and anti-Semitism. Hollywood produced films referred to as “Negro tolerance movies,” which portrayed light-coloured Black people as outsiders who could “pass” and take advantage of white privilege while uncovering racial discrimination (Ideas Show, 2021).

In *Lost Boundaries*, the 1949 movie, a Black doctor along with his immediate family settle in a tiny New Hampshire village where the locals mistake him for white. “Obviously these films are not about Negroes at all; they are about what whites think and feel about Negroes,” said novelist and critic Ralph Ellison. Hence, “the morale of these passing stories,” said Weisenfeld, “is for White viewers: It's only a problem for you when you found out they were Black. And so, yes, this Black doctor, this Black nurse, this magazine writer, these people are really just like you” (Ideas Show, 2021).

In the 1960s, Hollywood largely refrained from getting involved in the American Black civil rights movement. According to Cameron Bailey, artistic director and co-head of the Toronto International Film Festival, Hollywood has not traditionally been in the business of unveiling to Americans the brutal realities of their everyday lives. Images of this enormous upheaval were missing from the TVs, despite the fact that buildings were burning, political figures like Martin Luther King Jr. were being killed, and uprisings alongside protests were visibly blocking the streets. In Bailey's viewpoint, the movies tried to reassure Americans that everything would be fine; hence, none of these images was depicted in Hollywood's cinematic productions. Therefore, if they were to engage in conversation about race, it would be in a more palatable way (Ideas Show, 2021).

In Sydney Poitier's 1967 film *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner*, a young white woman introduces her Black fiancé to her parents at home. At the time, it was thought to be a highly liberal movie. To gain acceptance within white society, Sydney Poitier needs to look amazing, be the most charming person on screen, and be flawless in every way, as Bailey stated. He goes on to say that Poitier had a symbolic significance for America since he dedicated his career to portraying outstanding Black individuals (Ideas Show, 2021).

The Blaxploitation genre first appeared in cinema in 1970 and featured strong depictions of Black people who were adamantly furious, frequently violent, and occasionally actively pursuing the objective of "killing white people." The five years that marked the Blaxploitation era saw the production of hundreds of films with striking

soundtracks, provocative attire, and, some would argue, shocking images. “There’s going to be sexuality, nudity, violence, drug use directed specifically at a younger Black audience,” says John Terry, a professor of history at South Texas College (Ideas Show, 2021).

Blaxploitation was the first genre to thoroughly subvert the early film clichés of submissive maids and butlers, even if Black characters had begun to be shown with more empathy and depth after World War II. Black characters became frequently presented as criminals who were out for vengeance, usually against White people but also against each other. They resembled superheroes in certain ways. According to Bailey, they were fierce fighters who frequently prevailed over a white-run corporation; and for Black audiences to see those films at the time was extremely transformative (Ideas Show, 2021).

In the *New York Times* editorial “Black Movie Boom: Good or Bad?” from 1972, the president of the NAACP's Hollywood branch, Junius Griffin, stated: “If Black movies do not contribute to building constructive, healthy images of Black people, we shall have lost our money and our souls. We shall have contributed to our own cultural genocide by only offering our children the models of degradation, destruction and dope.” Griffin also criticized the fact that the “white power structure” was funding pictures of the aggressive Black criminal (Ideas Show, 2021). The popular Blaxploitation movie *Shaft* and *Sweet Sweetback's Baadasssss Song* were both directed by Black filmmakers but funded by white production groups; MGM, a major Hollywood distributor, handled the distribution of *Shaft*.

Responsively, the L.A. Rebellion film movement was founded by a number of rising independent filmmakers who attended the UCLA Film School in reaction to Blaxploitation and classical Hollywood movies. Not all of them were Black Panthers. Many took inspiration from the freedom movements of the developing countries. Reforming Hollywood was the goal of some of them. An associate professor of cinema and media studies at the University of Chicago named Allyson Nadia Field argues that many L.A. Rebellion filmmakers were more concerned with creating citizens than with making money. They made films that were totally different from Blaxploitation and Hollywood iconography (Ideas Show, 2021). A movie like Charles Burnett's *Killer of Sheep* examined Black manhood and the consciousness of a Black youngster in place of sequences involving weapons, drugs, and women.

A distinctive period in Black movie history had ended by the 1980s. Without the support of a strong infrastructure, the L.A. Rebellion movement faded while the NAACP continued to put pressure on Hollywood to give up on Blaxploitation. Even if several filmmakers from the L.A. Rebellion and Blaxploitation still worked, a significant period in cultural history had gone. There was also a more significant shift occurring in Hollywood. Independent film was being absorbed by the film business, which was undergoing a transformation and transitioning into the blockbuster period (Ideas Show, 2021).

Afterwards, in 1989, Spike Lee's \$6 million film *Do the Right Thing*, which painted a complex and endearing picture of a Black neighbourhood, burst onto the scene

as a critique of racial injustice. The then film reviewer Bailey remembers being the sole Black-skinned person at the press screening:

I remember afterwards that there some people who thought that film was going to cause riots because they saw a Black character played by Spike Lee in the film commit an act of property damage as a result of just the fury he was feeling in response to ... the situation in his community and the lack of respect for the Black community. (Ideas Show, 2021)

Bailey claims that although *Do the Right Thing* is still regarded as a seminal movie, there are not many other films that are as insightful about Black America as this one. He claims that movies with the “white saviour complex,” a cinematic device in which white characters save people of colour, are what Hollywood shows audiences more of. Examples of these movies include *Hidden Figures*, *Mississippi Burning*, *Green Book*, and *The Help*. Bailey noted that a long-standing and rather persistent issue in Hollywood is that those who fund, produce, distribute, and market motion pictures tend to think of movies as having less commercial worth when a non-white person is the main character (Ideas Show, 2021). Following the same lead, the coverage of events related to the practice of apartheid in South Africa and the U.S. government and media’s stance towards the issue was subject to the same stages of development.

4-2-2-The U.S. Mass Media’s Portrayal of Blacks and Apartheid in South Africa

In the 1950s and the 1960s, there was little coverage of events in South Africa with a total deliberate neglect to the practice of apartheid in the country. Hence, Pretoria, when talked about, was portrayed in positive lenses as an economic ally to the U.S. making

racial segregation seem as the ‘normal’ practice. It is worth noting that, in the 1960s, the imperial gaze to non-whites was suspended.

Over the decade, American journalists in the 1970s portrayed South Africa as a symbol for the country's racial issues (Sanders, 1997, p.2). The resurgence of colonial portrayals of Afrikaners and Africans throughout the decade was one of the biggest changes in the coverage of South Africa. This came after the 1960s temporary restriction on these kinds of portrayals. These changes in portrayal occurred with the international media, despite the Department of Information and the anti-apartheid organizations' concerted efforts to shape the South African 'story.' Nonetheless, it must be noted that over the decade, the British and American media continued to rely heavily on the South African English-language press (p.2).

As a result, throughout the 1970s, South Africa's two centuries legacy of the racial “other” remained to have a significant impact on how news was reported and presented. The views, explanations and methods of interpretation used by visiting staff writers and foreign correspondents bear similarities to those of white explorers of Africa in the nineteenth century. This suggests that, while the imperial gaze may have become fuzzy or sometimes avoided during the post-independence era of the 1960s, by the 1970s it had been vigorously restored. Edward Said examined how the perception of Arabs in American popular culture has changed after the Second World War in his groundbreaking book *Orientalism*. Similarly, in the 1970s, coverage of South Africa by the media worldwide showed that ‘the African’ *and* ‘the Afrikaner’ were both able “... to accommodate the transformations and reductions—all of a simply tendentious kind—into which they are continually being forced” (Sanders, 1997, p.225).

For instance, The *New York Times* is frequently referred to as the only “newspaper of record” in the United States. Since Joe Lelyveld's deportation from South Africa in 1966, the *New York Times* was barred from entering the country and kept correspondents in Nairobi and Lagos. Charles Mohr, the Nairobi correspondent from 1970 to 1975, covered the Republic every year before the newspaper was allowed to open its Johannesburg office once again. Graham Hovey was the one who authored background articles and editorials from New York (Sanders, 1997, p.43).

Anthony Lewis was the most frequently featured commentator among the other *New York Times* columnists. Lewis wrote on South Africa in his twice-weekly column “Abroad At Home - At Home Abroad” for more than twenty years, in addition to his two trips to the country in 1975 and 1979. During the course of the Angolan war, Tom Wicker began to discuss issues related to South Africa. Around this period, southern African issues started to make their way into American politics (Sanders, 1997, p.43).

Wicker went back to South Africa three years later, spending several weeks there and writing his three-weekly “In The Nation” column from there. The *New York Times* was eventually allowed to open its Johannesburg office again in 1976. Thereafter, South Africa was extensively covered. Managing editor Seymour Topping travelled to southern Africa a year later and conducted an interview with John Vorster, the then prime minister of South Africa. The *New York Times* published a strong editorial in November 1977 that refuted South Africa's long-standing claim that international media outlets applied “double standards” to their reporting:

In our letters columns today, Johan Adler, the Deputy Consul General of South Africa asserts that his troubled country is ‘a microcosm of the world’... In fact, South Africa is not a microcosm of the world. Indeed, it is unique: the only state where an entire

segment of the population -in this case, the nonwhite majority - is altogether denied participation in national politics solely because of race ... Ever since the horrors of Hitler's Germany became known during World War II, there has been almost universal agreement that deprivation and suppression based upon ascribed membership in a racial, religious, or ethnic group are morally unacceptable. South Africa is unique in its explicit attempt to build an entire society upon such racial suppression. It is therefore clearly deserving of censure. (Sanders, 1997, p.44)

It is clear that there was a shift in bias done by the *New York Times* that unquestionably went hand in hand with the internal changes that had taken place in the U.S.A. In its turn, it was not until the 1950s that the *Washington Post* hired any overseas correspondents. However, up to the 1970s, the newspaper employed twenty-three stringers to assist its eleven reporters. The *Washington Post's* Africa correspondent David Ottaway provided regular assistance to stringers handling South African coverage during the decade.

In the first half of the 1970s, the *Washington Post's* columnists gave little attention to South Africa, with Jack Anderson being one exception. Nonetheless, William Raspberry, Rowland Evans, Robert Novak, and Stephen Rosenfeld paid the Republic a visit within the first eighteen months of the Carter presidency. Undoubtedly, South Africa had emerged as a significant policy topic in Washington, D.C. Both Karl Meyer and Stephen Rosenfeld were responsible for writing editorials about South Africa for *The Washington Post* (Sanders, 1997, p.45).

The *Wall Street Journal* followed a technique in gathering foreign news that was characterized by *Time* magazine in 1980 as one that lumbered rather than sprinted for news. *Time* did concede, nonetheless, that the editorial page of the journal could

represent the most significant conservative voice in the United States. Prior to the hiring of Richard Leger as an Africa reporter in 1977, London handled all of the continent's coverage with just five abroad offices. Staff members from the *Wall Street Journal* rarely paid the Republic more than one visit annually. Typically, South African stringers handled news from South Africa, which was not very common. In the 1970s, George Melloan, the deputy editor of the *Wall Street Journal's* editorial page, was the sole senior Journal staff member who visited the Republic. One single survey on South Africa appeared in The *Wall Street Journal* and it was clearly intended only as a countermeasure to the impending sanctions (Sanders, 1997, p.46).

Ken Whiting, the Republic's lone American resident correspondent, noted in 1973 that while he was serving in South Africa:

I haven't seen as many political changes as you might expect, and putting over trends about a party that has been entrenched for 25 years isn't easy to readers accustomed to elections with landslides one way or the other. In any case, there isn't that much interest in the States about South Africa. American editors remain interested in Indo-China, Europe, problems in the Middle East and South America. I guess Africa comes after all that lot. (Virginia Waite, 1973, p.34)

This was true even when it concerned an important event like that of South Africa's invasion of Angola in 1975-1976. According to Marsha Coleman's analysis of renowned American newspapers' coverage of the Angolan war, the U.S. press failed to present South Africa's intervention in the same critical and emotive terms as it did to the Cuban case, and it underreported the country's involvement altogether (Coleman, 1982, p.2).

Nevertheless, Coleman's argument failed to recognize the relative shift in American media coverage of Angola after the invasion by South Africa and the predominance of the Cold War paradigm. This change in stance was clearly linked to the extraordinary string of “leaks” that members of Congress and other opponents of American engagement in government agencies had provided to the press. According to a reliable source in the State Department intelligence, during the next two months, starting on November 7, there were so many leaks regarding American covert operations in Angola that the public only missed minor details; every significant piece of information was reported in the newspapers (Sanders, 1997, p.161).

The American media eventually succeeded in trying to modify the way they reported the conflict as new information became available, despite the fact that this process had a slow impact and that they were guilty of both mindlessly repeating the administration's distortions of the events in Angola and oversimplifying the conflict there as a conflict between Communism and anti-Communism. The investigative reporting of Oswald Johnston and Seymour Hersh, which implied that the United States had been the first country to ignite the conflict by providing covert funding to the FNLA—the National Front for the Liberation of Angola—was one of the main drivers of this shift (Sanders, 1997, p.161).

David Anable's article in the *Christian Science Monitor* revealing the ties of the U.S. oil company *Gulf Oil* to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) exemplified the complexities of the American involvement, stating that “ironically,... American elements are aiding and bankrolling opposite sides.” He was worried that the U.S. was supporting liberation organizations in Angola and was

closely aligned with the white leaders of the Republic of South Africa, who were the architects of apartheid. This could potentially harm diplomatic ties with other African nations, particularly Nigeria, which was the second-largest foreign oil supplier of the U.S. at the time (Sanders, 1997, p.161).

The Pike Committee's revelations of CIA operations continued to occur at this time. Senior political analysts gradually started to voice their concerns about U.S. engagement in Angola. In Luanda on December 13, the MPLA showed four South African detainees to the media during the time of American reflection. Five days thereafter, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the FNLA were completely prohibited from receiving any more funding by the U.S. Senate in a historic vote (54 to 22). The media's portrayal of the situation quickly changed to match the new facts. This did not imply that the American media abruptly shifted its sympathies to the MPLA, but rather it became more impartial. As Leslie Gelb noted, Pentagon officers expressed dissatisfaction with the United States' increasing sense of identity with South Africa (Sanders, 1997, p.162).

An editorial in the *Washington Post* denounced President Ford's criticism of Cuba, saying that Americans did not hear Mr. Ford denouncing Zaire or South Africa, because those countries had soldiers in Angola supporting the 'American' side. Journalists at the *Post*, for their part, were against any foreign meddling in Angola, as mentioned in the editorial. However, Cuba could at least assert, as Fidel Castro did, that African blood "runs abundantly through our veins" on the basis of sound racial arguments (Sanders, 1997, p.162).

A few reporters even allowed themselves to be imaginative. Anthony Lewis, for example, conjectured, “Suppose the United States had immediately objected when South African troops entered Angola in force last October. This country would now have a degree of credibility in Africa as a friendly, disinterested power” (Sanders, 1997, p.163). The change in U.S. coverage was additionally reported by *The Wall Street Journal*. On December 19, an editorial was published endorsing the Ford administration's proposal to augment UNITA-FNLA's funding. A staff writer made the following observation four days after the Tunney-Clark amendment was passed: “The outlook for American interests isn't particularly bright... the U.S. is backing the less competent, more poorly organized side. It is also the side with the weaker political credentials—14 African nations have recognized the MPLA regime so far” (p.163).

The consensus in the American media about U.S. engagement in Angola had significantly changed by early January. This was clearly caused by a number of significant failures in judgment and decision-making made by U.S. strategists. Yet, it is interesting to note that one of these failures, according to the *Washington Post*, was the underestimation of the extent to which the United States would be publicly tarnished as “the collaborator” of South Africa's racist government once Pretoria's troops walked into the conflict. The fact that President Ford persisted in talking tough about the Angolan issue throughout that time period was the element that made this shift in the consensus in U.S. media remarkable (Sanders, 1997, p.163). Given all what has been said, anti-apartheid activist Daniel Schechter observed in 1977 that the American press had a contradictory paradoxical position on the nation's white minority (pp.223-224).

In the early 1980s, the debate over the issue of the U.S. engagement in the Angolan War faded. The *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* openly expressed their backing to the policies embraced by the new Republican president Ronald Reagan which determined his government's relationship with South Africa, chiefly the 1981 Constructive Engagement policy and the government's opposition to sanctions. For instance, the *New York Times* September 15, 1985, article authored by Susan F. Rasky defended the president's policies and criticized the anti-apartheid movement, using a derogatory tone. The article titled "Anti-Apartheid Protest Gains Ground" claimed that the anti-apartheid protest movement, which "barely existed 10 months ago", was not organized by intellectual conscious members as Rasky states:

The movement has been embraced by a new generation of students often branded too apathetic to be stirred by social causes and it has won support from a band of young Republican conservatives who see the apartheid issue as an important opportunity to strike a new tone for their party. (p.16)

Besides, the article quoted Neal J. Smelser, a professor of sociology at the University of California at Berkeley who had documented social protests since the beginning of the 1960s when the Free Speech Movement first began on the Berkeley campus. The anti-apartheid movement, according to Smelser, was both a response to and an echo of the conservative political climate in which it arose. It appeared "as a tremendous boon to frustrated student radicals who haven't had a cause they could sink their teeth into." The article also defended the Constructive Engagement policy which reflected "the administration's insistence on seeking change through diplomacy" (Rasky, 1985, p.16).

Two months after the House of Representatives passed an anti-apartheid bill in May 1986, the *New York Times* op-ed article "What to Do about South Africa; Avoid

Imposing Sanctions” fiercely opposed the bill and warned the U.S. citizens from approving sanctions. In the author’s view, in the race to cleanse apartheid, “sanctions will not only frustrate this ambition, but in fact will boomerang” (Holladay, 1986, p.29). This was attributable to a startling fact that remained, even though this course was undoubtedly going to be seen by many as a moral gesture. South Africans, both white and Black, were to be financially poorer and, more significantly, poorer due to the absence of the U.S. advice advocating for peaceful solutions if the United States were to weaken or give up an effective governmental, commercial, and cultural presence. Hence, it was scarcely a moral path.

Clear to the observer’s eye is the fact that the *New York Times* was reiterating the Reagan administration’s rhetoric and reflecting its line of thought. The *Washington Post*’s articles were milder in tone, but still parroted the government’s stance. For instance, in the December 6, 1984 article titled “Protest Movement against Apartheid Continuous to Grow”, both staff writers implicitly hinted at the immature nature of the anti-apartheid protest movement when they attached the protests with “the look and feel of youth, with jeans-clad college students spilling across the pavements and chanting in loud, impassioned voices” to free South Africa (Saperstein & Evans, 1984).

The article’s closing paragraphs quoted a number of individuals who expressed their opposition to economic sanctions. One member of the Foreign Relations Committee, Larry Pressler, said he supported the protests and generally agreed with the tough statements made by the House Republicans. However, if the United States imposed sanctions on every country with which it disagreed, it “wouldn’t trade much” (Saperstein & Evans, 1984).

When Congress officially enacted the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) on October 2, 1986, both newspapers' tone turned to be softer and more balanced. The following day, October 3, 1986, the *New York Times* article "Senate, 78 to 21, Overrides Reagan's Veto and Imposes Sanctions on South Africa" explained the different provisions of the law; it described them using a rhetoric of neutrality. It also quoted some proponents to sanctions, like Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts, who said: "The Senate's action today expressed the best ideals of the American people. The message to countries all over the world is, the United States will lead, and we're proud to lead" (Roberts, 1986).

Three years later, the *Washington Post* began to put into question the U.S. government's inability and unwillingness to strongly enforce South Africa sanctions, for which it deserved criticism. The August 19, 1989, article "South Africa Sanctions Poorly Enforced" stated that the General Accounting Office (GAO) released a report in which it blamed the State Department for failing to provide the U.S. Customs Service with a list of South African products barred from entering the country under the terms of the 1986 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. The report's author, Edward M. Kennedy, declared in a statement that GAO had discovered a "shocking lapse by top Reagan administration officials, who failed to apply elementary enforcement procedures in carrying out the anti-apartheid law" (McAuliffe, 1989). Clearly noticeable is the fact that the *Washington Post* no longer agreed with the Reagan administration's policies and even strived to expose some practices.

Following Nelson Mandela's release from prison, his June 1990 visit to the U.S. was a historic event, which most American newspapers celebrated. The *New York Times*,

for instance, characterized him in its front page as “the living symbol of resistance to South African apartheid” who “swept tired but triumphant into an emotional New York Welcome” (Kifner, 1990).

A study of American media coverage of the 1994 South African elections revealed that the media, particularly the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times*, presented the issues in a way that promoted dialogue, peacemaking, free elections, and inclusive governance by framing them in terms of American democratic values (Meseret Chekol, 2000, p.523). Furthermore, the media in the United States promoted a positive image of the post-apartheid South Africa and discouraged violence. Additionally, the media presented pro-election organizations and people favourably while portraying unfavourably any factions opposed to free elections and a single unified national government. Therefore, the majority of “positive” media coverage tended to focus on South Africa. This coverage was framed to highlight America's role in the expansion of democracy, making it appear “positive” as it promotes unity and democracy (p.523).

The study clarified how the media's frequency distribution of issues was taking place. The future of South Africa, including how the government of national unity would handle power dynamics, racial relations, the country's economic trajectory, and efforts to improve the lives of the impoverished majority, was the issue of primary concern for the *New York Times*. However, the election itself—its significance, how it affected the livelihoods of the deprived majority of people who were denied the right to vote, and the logistical challenges encountered in pulling off this massive endeavour—was the issue of primary concern for the *Washington Post* (Meseret Chekol, 2000, p.527). In

brief, the *Post* concentrated on currency issues occurring at the time of reporting, whereas the *Times* was more concerned with the period following the election.

The election event itself (casting votes) and counter-election action were two additional topics that the *New York Times* prioritized by order of frequency distribution, while the *Washington Post* focused heavily on South Africa's future and counter-election action. This indicates that the topic of both articles' second-most important concern was the same. Furthermore, both periodicals made the same decisions regarding their three most significant topics, although having different rankings. According to ranking order, the *Washington Post's* apartheid system and both papers' negotiations and election results also garnered a lot of attention. Stated differently, the *Post* allocated 9% of its overall coverage space to each of the three topics—apartheid, negotiations, and election results (Meseret Chekol, 2000, p.527).

The five topics jointly account for 78% of the *New York Times'* overall coverage. In a similar vein, the six issues collectively comprise about 80% of the *Washington Post*. From this, one may infer that, in general, the agenda-setting strategies used by the two newspapers to cover the South African elections were fairly comparable.

Both newspapers denounced any type of counter-election action, including violent protest marches, explosions, or boycotts of elections. A great deal of the responsibility was placed on the white separatists' shoulders, who were primarily conducting a bombing terror campaign in the weeks leading up to the election. These groups were portrayed by the *Times* and the *Post* as insane racists, socially excluded individuals, and their attempts to rig the elections were seen as fruitless. They called them a variety of names, including 'terrorists,' 'mad bombers,' 'a fringe of white

supremacists,' 'cowards,' 'Nazi-style extremists,' and 'racial zealots,' to mention a few (Meseret Chekol, 2000, pp.529-530).

The previous paragraphs of this section focused primarily on the American newspapers' articles and reports devoted to the discussion of the practice of apartheid in South Africa in the post-World War II era up to the 1990s. Less focus has been given to the U.S. TV channels' coverage of the issue for they were denied access to South Africa by Pretoria for many decades and thereby coverage was scarce up to the 1980s.

John Corry, from the *New York Times*, discussed the matter on a November 5, 1985 article titled "TV's Coverage of South Africa". He stated that limited by South Africa was the filming of "any public disturbance, disorder, riot, public violence, strike or boycott, or any damage to any property, or any assault on or killing of a person." He showed disappointment explaining that in a system like this, everyone loses, even the government imposing the restrictions—though Pretoria does not seem to realize this. For him, this issue provides insight into the level of development of television journalism. The images that the government sought to remove were the ones that television relied on, showing raging crowds of people, collapsing dead bodies, and charging police (Corry, 1985).

Hence, South Africa was a late adopter of television journalism. Newspapers and magazines faced constraints, and apartheid was a narrative they covered for decades. For instance, South Africa refused to grant visas to several reporters and expelled one reporter from the *New York Times*. Television journalists came and went from South Africa, albeit never consistently (Corry, 1985).

Because of the complex relationship that existed between the Black Americans' fight for egalitarianism and racial equality at home and the U.S. media's portrayal of apartheid in South Africa in the second half of the twentieth century, Bell Hooks' *Critical Race, Gender and Class Theory* has been used in this dissertation to decode the different elements of this web and analyze the reasons behind alongside the end-goal of the U.S. policymakers. All the aspects of this multi-faceted political game will be unravelled in the upcoming last section of this chapter.

4-2-3- Implications of Bell Hooks' Critical Race, Gender and Class Theory on the U.S. Mass Media's Portrayal of South Africa's Blacks in Late Twentieth Century

Bell Hooks' theory unravels the discursive representation of Black identity, and strategies for resistance to racialised systems of power. Hence, the analysis entails two important dimensions. The first one unveils the mechanisms and tools used by the Westerners to dominate 'inferior' races—epitomized in the Black race in this regard—in order to assert Western hegemony over these races, taking into consideration the self-interest game. The second one shows the counter-hegemonic movement of the so-called 'inferior' Black race to resist the racialized powers.

As far as the first dimension is concerned, the present study's main concern is the issue of race, to which the issue of class is tightly linked; however, the issue of gender is minor to the objectives of this work. The so-called 'inferior' races usually belong to the lower classes. They are unskilled workers who have low-wage jobs and live in poor neighbourhoods. This was exactly the image that strictly identified Black Afro-Americans in the American movies and comic strips in the second half of the twentieth century. The jobs they held included primarily maids and handymen, while an important

segment of Blacks were portrayed as jobless and hence criminals and outlaws. Rare was the act of portraying them as accepted within white society, only by being ‘perfect in every way’.

Hooks, alongside Edward Said, stress the important role media play in the circulation of these misrepresentations. The previous sections of this chapter have shown how did American TV shows, Hollywood cinematic productions, and newspapers make racist distinctions between whites and Blacks based on their skin colour.

Blacks in general, mainly Africans, were portrayed as being dependent on, and inferior to, Westerners, helpless, inferior, and backward. Hollywood movies prior to WWII defended slavery and promoted Black inferiority. Black Americans in particular were portrayed in a way that made them seem as possessing undesirable personality traits like immorality, or dishonesty, and stupidity exemplified in low achievement. As a result, they became a source of humour and thereby Blacks were well-known in the comedy industry. Stereotypes became television norms.

In movies, Blacks were identified with being unapologetically angry and often violent with the goal of killing whites. Through time, more evocative and dangerous imagery was intentionally surfaced like sexuality, nudity, violence, drug use, criminality and revenge against each other and against white people. All these personality traits provided for the genocide of Black culture by showing prototypes of degradation and moral decay. The “white saviour” complex has never left the screen through Hollywood movies assuming that there would be greater financial value for this cinematic device.

All these negative images provided about Black characters, when deeply looked at, reveal some serious realities about the hidden ideologies inserted within them. The maintenance of racism as an accepted ‘normal’ practice in society would provide a safe stable platform for the hegemonic elite to persist and maintain a steadfast control over the whole society. At an international level, the Western world can only preserve its supremacy and powerful status by keeping ‘other’ non-white races powerless.

The strategies followed are perfectly explained in Hooks’ theory, which adopts Lacan’s psychoanalytic semiotics through the use of specific types of discourse which target “the inter- and intra-subjective dimensions of human development” (Milovanovic, 1994, p.176). The first two types of discourse, namely the discourse of the master and the discourse of the university, provide clear descriptions of how hegemonic powers in the U.S. take hold of and take advantage of the Black deprived segment of society.

As expounded in the first chapter, four main terms in the aforementioned discourses are identified by Lacan. These terms include $S1$, $S2$, $\$$, and a . While $S1$ stands for master signifiers, which are described by Lacan as “key signifiers that derive from early childhood experiences,” $S2$ stands for knowledge, which is always present inside any chain of signifiers and is constructed by society. $\$$ denotes the subject’s specific desire, and finally, the a which Lacan defines as “le-plus-de-jouir: the excess of enjoyment, and what is left out” (Milovanovic, 1994, p.177). The four structural locations in which these terms position themselves include agent, other, truth, and production. While the first two structural positions reside in the conscious level of the subject, the last two reside in the unconscious.

The discourse of the master for Hooks is as follows: S1 (agent) is positioned in the top left hand corner, S2 (other) is placed in the top right hand corner, \$ (truth) is found in the bottom left hand corner, and a (production) is located in the bottom right hand corner (Milovanovic, 1994, p.178).

Here, agent (S1) can stand for prevalent whites in the U.S.A. who tend to deliver messages of racial supremacy through presenting master signifiers (S1), like white skin privilege. The other (S2), in the present study for instance an African American male, then interprets these signifiers as knowledge; therefore, for the specific individual in this case, the disadvantages associated with being a member of a racial minority have now been exacerbated by another disadvantage which is distinct systems of subordination. The latter is internalised and produced in the unconscious *le-plus-de-jour* (a). This process returns back as the desire of the other (S2) forms and takes for granted a truth (\$) that fortifies the position of the whites (agent, S1) (Milovanovic, 1994, p.178). This integration can illustrate how privileged whites—due to their subject position—can actually form and keep a higher status in society.

This was clearly visible on TV and in cinema in the U.S. throughout the twentieth century prior to and after WWII. The creation of stereotypic images about Blacks and their perpetual repetition on the screen formed the first step of development of African-American images. Hollywood movies too were giving a bright image to slavery and supported Black inferiority. These master signifiers (S1) were interpreted by African Americans (the other, S2) as knowledge. Hence, Afro-American actors themselves cultivated these stereotypic images to maintain steady employment. The self-exploitation of Afro-Americans in film and television became so popular in the 1970s

maintaining the same stereotypic images. These represented the second and third stages of development of African-American images previously highlighted. The Blaxploitation genre in cinema was also indicative of the negative and degrading image given about Blacks. This idea was then internalized and transmitted to the unconscious mind of whites presenting le-plus-de-jour (a) and Blacks (S2) constructed the same truth (\$) in their turn making the privileged position of whites reinforced. Oppression, exploitation, and domination are inevitable outcomes during the process.

The discourse of the university is as follows: S2 (agent) is positioned in the top left hand corner, a (other) is placed in the top right hand corner, S1 (truth) is found in the bottom left hand corner, and \$ (production) is located in the bottom right hand corner (Milovanovic, 1994, p.178).

In this particular case, the agent can stand in for racism (knowledge), which is an acquired behaviour through the process of teaching and learning. This body of knowledge, which is basically socially constructed, is enacted by the a (other) who thereby results in the production of le-plus-de-jour. The latter becomes the \$ (production) desire of the subject which in turn constructs the master signifiers that give birth to differences based on race as S1 (truth). Thereafter, the other elements tied to race, class, and gender intertwine, quite often resulting in positions that are inconsistent and structurally opposing, or intersectionality. The ensuing political implications spring from claims that factual (truth) inequalities exist between groups due to the fact that they are naturally given.

In the context of the aforementioned integration in particular, the Black minority, the focus of this analysis forming the subject, is not granted a full role in society. This

integration could explain how racism, the prevailing ideology, is persistently propagated even by Afro-American individuals (the individual subjects) who see their own circumstances to be abusive and exploitative. The prevalent knowledge (racism as a normal practice) here introduces itself as a master signifier (truth), that is produced and reproduced by the subject's discursive position(s). This integration definitely epitomizes the formulation of the conditions of control, domination, inequality and oppression in the United States. Thus, the common dominant ideology that America is a nation without racial divisions is, in fact, not accurate.

It is clear, as postmodernists argue, that subjectivity characterises all knowledge which is always influenced by personal, cultural, and political views (no objective truth) (Schneider, 2003, p.94). Hence, in Hooks' words "no independent reality other than in the minds and practices of those who create them and recreate them exists" (Stuart & Milovanovic, 1999, p.5). In other words, all knowledge is seen as a social artificial construction which then becomes a resultant of people making superior judgments about one race or culture over another.

Here, consent to systems of domination comes forth as people take the discourses of class, race and gender that circulate throughout the media, the state and the educational system for granted. As one may perceive, both Bell Hooks and Edward Said share common conviction that the media are of paramount importance to the production of accepted—originally unaccepted and misleading—claims. This proved to be, to a far extent, right as in the portrayal of both Arabs and Blacks the media with its three main types—TV channels, newspapers, and Hollywood movies—played a major role in shaping people's perception of these 'minor' races in an extremely bad way. As far as

Blacks are concerned, some reasons intertwined to make the portrayal bad. The following paragraphs will highlight the political aspect of the current analysis.

Blacks were most of the time since their coming to the American continent as slaves up to the late twentieth century overlooked and humiliated. The absence of any massive powerful movement asking for Blacks' rights and firmly demanding equality made it easier for the agent (American whites) to impose control over and dominate the media and the other (other races). Because racism was practiced in the U.S., it was also seen with positive lenses when harshly practiced by the government of Pretoria in South Africa. Other considerations were taken into account including U.S. strategic interest in apartheid South Africa to overcome the communist ghost alongside its economic interest exemplified in the large investment market that guaranteed supremacy to U.S. economy. Both of which were thoroughly elucidated in the second chapter of this dissertation. All these reasons pushed the U.S. policymakers working in concert with the U.S. media to represent Blacks negatively.

Ironically, it was this same media which decided for some unstated political reasons to draw a more positive image of Blacks starting from the mid-1980s onward. The reasons included the human rights' considerations due to the growing power of the anti-apartheid and Black movements in the U.S. mainly in Congress—the House of Representatives— influencing public opinion and thereby pushing a change of President Reagan's policy in his second term. This was made clear in the third chapter of this dissertation.

Therefore, a remarkable change happened in the portrayal of Blacks by the American media in the late 1980s. This was tightly linked to the second dimension of

the present work's analysis, namely the counter-hegemonic movement of Blacks to resist the racialized systems of power. This can be explained by the third and fourth types of discourse of Lacan's psychoanalytic semiotics, which are the discourse of the hysteric and the discourse of the analyst.

The discourse of the hysteric is as follows : \$ (agent) is positioned in the top left hand corner, S1 (other) is placed in the top right hand corner, a (truth) is found in the bottom left hand corner, and S2 (production) is located in the bottom right hand corner (Milovanovic, 1994, p.179). The hysteric (subordinated) \$ here attempts to communicate his or her pain (inferior status) to the other (S1) whose only response or answer takes the form of master signifiers' presentation like stereotypes or anomalous groupings—namely differences based on race.

The above creates the knowledge presented by the hysteric in the information receiver, which then forms *le-plus-de-jouir* (a) as truth. Therefore, truth, as a result, is not acknowledged, for the subject is unable to construct discourse that embodies her or his desire. The dominant discourse serves as a reflection and perpetuator of this hopelessness, as the subjugated subject has no other way to express their anguish (Milovanovic, 1994, p.179).

In this context, the hysteric would represent the subject in a subordinate position who might communicate her or his pain to a dominant status person by narrating everyday occurrences that result in distinctive and particular narratives (storytelling). The prevalent group usually tends to advance prejudices. This group enjoys power, voice, and representation, and defends discriminations aiming at imprisoning the minority groups in the cage of disadvantaged position (Schneider, 2003, p.99).

This was the case of Blacks in the 1960s and the 1970s when they were fiercely fighting for their rights in the streets and their voice was absent on TV screens and in cinematic movies. This was simply because the dominant group denied them their rights and decided not to give it grandeur and depth and show this on the screens in order not to make people nationally and internationally pay attention to it. By the same token, Pretoria was portrayed by the U.S. newspapers in positive lenses as an economic ally and racial segregation was welcomed. The 1970s brought the reemergence of colonial representations of Africans and Afrikaners. The press also, as previously highlighted, underreported the event of South Africa's invasion of Angola in 1975 without the use of any negative or emotional terms. The turning point came when leaks about the U.S. escalation of the conflict—by secretly funding the FNLA—were revealed. This led the press discourse to change in terms of tone and rhetoric. By and large, the dominant group in society at a national level as well as hegemonic countries at an international level downplay the suffering as well as the shining aspect of minority groups as they own the dominant discourse (the media). For the reason of the unacceptability of these stories, this amalgamation can put into question both the acceptability and unquestionability of white people's stories.

The hysteric's suffering can be presented in a substitute narrative other than prevalent discourse, hence the subject now performs the job of an alternative truth conveyer. This amalgamation that studies the individual perspective may provide some help in comprehending intersectional individuals' predicament (Schneider, 2003, p.99).

Equally compelling to the present study is the act of Bell Hooks'—by merging both critical race theories and post-modern thought—description of her theoretical

foundation utilizing the metaphor of a circle. Within this circle, the powerful social locations are positioned in the centre and the others somewhere on the margins. She argues that the view is clearer from the outer rings. People who have been subject to abuse by race and class have to “recognise the special vantage point our marginality gives us and make use of this perspective to criticise the dominant racist, classist, sexist hegemony” (Ken, 2007, p.5). According to Hooks, one “privilege” associated with social locations in the centre is the ability of residents to arrange their lives with a somewhat severe disregard for the ways in which their advantages affect the lives of those positioned at the margins. Hooks’ model particularly “criticises the obliviousness and carelessness that characterise the powerful centre locations, and highlights the keen perspectives of those who have little choice but to be aware.”

In her view, the notion of “yearning” provides a basis for a counter-hegemonic political standpoint that integrates race, gender and class as dimensions of social power. Furthermore, “marginality” for Hooks is seen with different lenses as an important location for the production of knowledge on the one hand and for engaging in political resistance to power on the other. “The yearning that wells in the hearts and minds of those whom such narratives have silenced is the longing for critical voice” (Hooks, 1990, p.27).

Hence, the discourse of the analyst is strictly linked to the above idea, and it is as follows: a (agent) is positioned in the top left hand corner, \$ (other) is placed in the top right hand corner, S2 (truth) is found in the bottom left hand corner, and S1 (production) is located in the bottom right hand corner (Milovanovic, 1994, p.179). Here, the best representation of the analyst is found within the critical race theory concept of petit

apartheid. The latter stands for segregation in public spaces for public facilities. This theoretical ideology (a) is presented to the \$ other (hysteric) who, taking into consideration this novel information, starts to construct alternative master signifiers (the petit apartheid linear continuum) that describe numerous discrimination forms.

Thereafter, these forms of discrimination are presented as knowledge that transcends suppressive language restraints where the production of a conception of truth starts to take place. The latter reverts subsequently to le-plus-de-jour (a). This process creates a foundation of truth that backs up the information given to the hysteric and supports the analyst's growing accumulation of knowledge (Milovanovic, 1994, p.179).

The usefulness of this integration lies in the subordinated individuals' (Blacks) ability to identify the many aggressions—along the constructed petit apartheid continuum—they suffer from. If the subject's place is found within an intersection of recognised sites of oppression within the American society, each factor can be considered apart in an individual manner. The subject, or the exploited individual, becomes “a revolutionary subject” thanks to this discourse, for usually the individual initially deconstructs the racial oppression and later on he consciously reconstructs labels through the petit apartheid ideology. Hence, he “provides a formal way of deconstructing repressive language barriers and recognising these aggressions as they are so rarely ever acknowledged or addressed by the dominant members in society” (Schneider, 2003, p.100).

As far as Afro-Americans are concerned, because of the prevalence of counter-hegemonic discourse in the 1980s' America, the “Cosby Era” emerged with positive

African-Americans' depiction and thereby more socially conscious themes that emphasized family values and brought up societal issues surfaced on American TV. In the 1990s, there emerged stand-up comedy shows on television targeting only Afro-American viewers. These formed the fourth and fifth stages of development of African-American images previously elucidated. Likewise in Hollywood, the Blaxploitation genre was abandoned in the 1980s, and movies began to explore the consciousness of Black characters and depicted racial injustice with a nuanced loving portrait of the Black community.

Politically speaking, this depiction accompanied the anti-apartheid policies of the U.S. government in the mid-1980s in response to the pressure of the anti-apartheid campaign in the country and the ongoing growth of the divestment campaign. Racial integration in South Africa became widely welcomed by U.S. policymakers. Hence, newspapers in the United States, particularly the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*, presented arguments in favour of compromise, rapprochement, free elections, and inclusive governance in 1994 prior to South African elections. They portrayed pro-elections groups positively, while condemning counter-election activity.

In summary, one must note that the different integrations or amalgamations elucidated above do not have to address every concern that comes up in relation to the complex issues of race and class. However, integrating the principles of critical race theory into Lacan's four discourses is of paramount usefulness for the purposes of this study since it offers a conceptual framework within which the intersections of race and class may be carefully examined in relation to the case studies under consideration.

Similarly, the first part of this chapter has tackled the implications of the strategic location and strategic formation of Edward Said's theory of Orientalism on the U.S. media's depiction of Arabs/Palestinians and Israelis throughout the twentieth century in concert with U.S. policymakers. Both researchers, Said and Hooks, share common conviction that the media are highly responsible for the distortion of specific races' image to attain political, economic, and geostrategic goals. Through the perpetuation of these images in a plethora of U.S. mass media outlets, they have been turned into truth in the unconscious mind of the Western reader and receiver. Both Edward Said and Hooks argue that they are representations not truths.

Based on the analysis done in both sections of this final chapter, it is worth noting that, fortunately by the end of the twentieth century, Black Africans and African Americans have started to receive a more positive image drawn by the U.S. media—something which never happened to Arabs up to contemporary times—for some undeclared political reasons. This would give a negative image about the impartiality of U.S. diplomacy regarding its divergent actions vis-à-vis two similar cases of apartheid.

CONCLUSION

The United States has long played a pivotal role in the intermittent pursuit of peace in the Middle East by serving as the mediator between Israel and the Arab world. However, many observers believe that the United States must fulfill its declared position as an “honest broker” if peace is ever to be achieved. Up to contemporary times, far less progress has been made toward peace as a result of U.S. mediation than was expected. This is attributable to a number of factors, which include chiefly the U.S. silent lips on the Israeli brutal policy of apartheid practiced on the Palestinians. This scenario becomes especially surprising when a parallel is drawn with the 1990s U.S. diplomacy’s aggressive reaction to, and dismantling of, apartheid in South Africa.

The present research has been conducted using a Comparative Case Study approach (CCS) following a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). With the adoption of case study research in political sciences, I have attempted to achieve the research objectives by systematically and empirically comparing two case studies. This comparison has formed the backdrop of the analysis undertaken in the present work. With a focus on South Africa's apartheid era and the Arab-Palestinian/Israeli conflict, the present study sought to reconstruct and revisit American diplomacy in Africa and the Middle East as it was developed in the latter half of the 20th century. In order to reveal the fundamental aims of American foreign policy, it also compared and contrasted the two case studies. This dissertation has examined this oversimplified connection by highlighting the numerous parallels and discrepancies between the United States' intricately folded diplomacy over Israel's practice of apartheid against the Palestinians and its diplomacy over Pretoria’s practice of apartheid against South African Blacks. As a result, I could come up with a number of causal inferences.

Based on the Qualitative Comparative Analysis methodology, the six steps have been applied in the present analysis. The first step, which required the use of a detailed theory of change, has been epitomized in the use of the political theory known as Putnam's Two-Level Game theory and a couple of cultural theories, namely Edward Said's Orientalism and Bell Hooks' Critical Race, Gender, and Class Theory. The political theory's usefulness lay in its ability to identify U.S. public diplomacy's two levels of negotiations—national and international—and how balancing them either maximizes or minimizes the 'win sets' of the game resulting in a specific foreign policy behaviour. Both cultural theories' usefulness appeared when they perfectly explained both the hegemonic culture's mindset and the intertwined relationship between the government and the media for the sake of disseminating stereotypic images about a target race to achieve unstated objectives. The second step, based on the identification of cases of interest, has been explained several times throughout the present work. It is exemplified in the U.S. diverging policies towards two similar cases of apartheid in South Africa from 1948 to 1994 and Israel's same practice on the Palestinians up to now with the help of the U.S. three major types of media including newspapers, TV channels and Hollywood movies.

The set of factors responsible for the discrepancy in U.S. policy, as part of the third step, included the shared cultural exceptionality of both Americans and Israelis, the Israel Lobby, the self-interest considerations and human rights considerations. The scoring of factors in the fourth step has also been explained. For instance, the first factor mentioned above cannot fully account for the U.S. unprecedented generosity with Israel. More logical and factual factors include the Israel Lobby and self-interest

considerations. The last factor mentioned was applied to Blacks but never to Palestinians proving that it is not a strong factor. However, it appears as a forceful factor that pushed the U.S. to unwillingly consider a change in policy.

The dataset's analysis forms the bulk of the fifth step which has been the subject matter of every single chapter in this dissertation; all of which analysed the different combinations of factors. The first chapter painted a clear picture of the theoretical, conceptual, historical, political, and cultural backgrounds of the whole study. Together, they created the foundation for the current investigation. Besides the outlining of the study's theoretical framework and the historical and political dimensions of both case studies, the chapter's main contribution was showing how the myths of Manifest Destiny and American/Zionist exceptionalism shaped the U.S. imperial culture and contributed to the justification of racial inequalities and segregation. The second chapter focused on public diplomacy as a tool used by the United States of America to achieve its aims and interest in both the Middle East and South Africa. In its mission to assess the impartiality of the U.S. public diplomacy, the chapter examined in depth important facts and events that took place during the United States' intricate diplomatic efforts to resolve the apartheid crisis in South Africa and its partial diplomacy with relation to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.

The third chapter outlined in detail the political theory of the present research known as Putnam's Two-Level Game theory and its implications on both the triangular relationship between the U.S., Israel, and Palestine; and the U.S. relationship with Pretoria. This chapter contributed to the uncovering of the main reasons behind the U.S. steadfast support to Israel, chiefly the Israel Lobby and the watchdog job that Israel

performs to serve the U.S. and protect its interest in the Middle East. The last chapter shed light on and scrutinized the paramount role the U.S. media played, and still play, in serving the U.S. government in misinforming the public. It also uncovered how these stereotypic images contributed to the acceptance of racial segregation against both Blacks and Arabs in the second half of the twentieth century. In doing so, it bridged the connectedness of Edward Said's theory of Orientalism to the U.S. media's portrayal of Arabs and Palestinians, and Bell Hooks' Critical Race, Gender, and Class Theory to the U.S. media's portrayal of Blacks. These portrayals had implications on the Arab-Palestinian/Israeli conflict and apartheid Pretoria respectively.

The last step of the QCA required the interpretation of the findings and revision of the theory of change. The findings relate to each case study individually, then together. As for the case study of the Arab-Palestinian/Israeli conflict, the effectiveness of the U.S. as a Middle Eastern diplomatic conciliator has been put into question. Within the folds of this work, it has been argued that de facto, the phrase "honest broker" takes a blatant irony in the context of the peace process in the Middle East. When examining the relationship between Israel and the several U.S. participants in that process, it is important to note that Dennis Ross, the Clinton administration's main negotiator, was connected to the influential American Israel Public Affairs Committee, AIPAC. Given the delicate job Ross had been given, his ties to the influential pro-Israel lobby raise questions about whether he was a trustworthy candidate for the mediator or whether his nomination was a reflection of an inherent bias in U.S. policy.

The present study has argued that the latter seems far more reasonable, proving that when addressing the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, the United States has been led by

partisanship rather than impartiality due to some geo-economic, geopolitical, and geostrategic interests. It is for this reason that the United States remains devoted and determined to closely monitor a distant Middle Eastern issue called the Palestinian question and ensure Israel's survival in the face of the myriad of intricate and significant regional challenges confronting the global hegemon today.

As a result, instead of serving as a spur for further discussion, it has helped to stall the peace process. The United States has, indeed, been Israel's most partisan ally, and its commitment to Israel is so strong that former President George W. Bush was called “anti-Israeli” for holding up a pledge of \$10 billion for loans to the Jewish state to put pressure on it to stop establishing illegal West Bank settlements (Rosenthal, 2010, p.1).

Simply put, one inference from an analysis of the Palestinian-Israeli narrative suggests that American ideals, such as Manifest Destiny and the Monroe Doctrine — tracing their roots back to their Puritan ancestors— have long been at odds with their actual practices. They have both been used as weapons to achieve American expansionist imperialistic goals. The same applies to the theoretical and practical frameworks of public diplomacy. While public diplomacy is built upon one main characteristic, impartiality, in practice the United States of America has not been even-handed in its mediatory role in the Palestinian/Israeli conflict.

Simultaneously, the noticeable capacity of Israel, one of the smallest nations on earth, to influence the Middle East policies of the world's only superpower has left those who are fighting for justice for the Palestinian people and the peoples of the region in general perplexed, puzzled, and frustrated. One could argue that the imperial culture that

the U.S. and Israel share has hindered the former's attempts to mediate the complex conflict between the two races on an existential and political level in an unbiased manner.

However, it has been demonstrated in the present study's different chapters that the 'exceptionality' of the American and Jewish races, as well as their common imperial culture, only partially account for the United States' remarkable generosity and favouritism towards the Jews. This puts into question the relevance of the concept of political culture in accounting for U.S. foreign policy toward Israel. Rather, the true driving forces are a combination of the Israel lobby's enormous influence on American politics, as well as the U.S. hegemonic security needs and national interest requirements, both of them are based upon a necessity for the existence of Israel.

Therefore, the Israel lobby's significance to this study surfaced when it came to influencing and moulding attitudes in accordance with Israel's best interests. In the current study, I outlined the factors that contribute to the explanation of why the American Congress, Executive Branch, and media rarely criticise Israeli policy, seldom challenge Washington's unwavering support for Israel, and sporadically address the lobby's impact on U.S. policy.

Another inference suggests that Americans intervene diplomatically in the Middle East for their interests in the first place. Their ideals are introduced to give their mediatory role a sense of legitimacy. Therefore, the U. S. diplomatic foreign policy pursued purposefully in the Middle East in general, and vis-à-vis the Palestinian question in particular, has been solely motivated by national interest considerations. The

latter has repercussions on geopolitical, geostrategic, geo-economic and cultural calculations.

In this regard, a one more inference unravels. In the course of U. S. diplomatic foreign policy vis-à-vis the Palestinian question, U.S. “Special Relationship” with Israel and partisanship have proved to be to a large extent compatible for the former is the cultural and religious justification of the latter whenever the idea of self-interest is smelt.

Indeed, the American ruling class has been actively pursuing its distinct interests in the Middle East for almost a century. The easiest way to describe these objectives is as imperialistic ones, which have always focused on gaining control of the energy resources in the area through geostrategic means.

The crucial point is that America is still dedicated to Israel's welfare and security, and that any U.S. proposal in the process of settling the Palestinian/Israeli conflict will strengthen Israel's security rather than jeopardise it. However, the strategy of utilising military, material, and moral assistance from the United States to instill confidence in Israel to proceed with the peace process has not produced the expected outcomes.

Still, America is accused of exhibiting double standards: one for Israel and another for the Palestinians. By using international justice to provide justifications to the war in Afghanistan, George Bush the son made an important move, as he had to maintain the same level of justice for the Palestinians in his statements in order to be consistent. Verbal promises, however, are no longer very credible. His father failed to fulfill his vow of justice for the Palestinians following the Gulf War. He was evaluated based on his deeds rather than his words. As a result of its failure to meet the moderate Arab demands on Palestine, America failed to secure clear Arab support in its fight against

worldwide terrorism. America is also charged for adhering to a definition of terrorism that exclusively serves Israel. Hence, for many years, Arab and Muslim organisations have been calling for a revised definition of terrorism that does not include activities against occupation, but in vain.

On the other side of the political spectrum, it only takes a one day stay or two in the Occupied Territories for a non-white South African to be transported back in time to pre-1994 and understand that apartheid is still in place under Israel as a colonial power. For this reason, the present study has highlighted the second case study of U.S. policy stance towards Pretoria's imposition of institutionalised racial segregation after 1948, discussing South Africa's lobby in the U.S., the Black Movement and the rise of humanitarian voices in the U.S., American relations with the African National Congress (ANC) to which Nelson Mandela belonged and the divestment policy. All these aspects of U.S. foreign policy have been looked at from a critical eye in comparison to the U.S. steadfast support to Israel.

The U.S. is a racial-based society, which finds it hard to consider racial equality. The act of the late 1980s U.S. government's unexpected refusal of apartheid as it unfolded in South Africa, something which previously had not been criticized by U.S. policymakers for more than four decades, was not a foreign policy choice but a public diplomacy's obligation. That is to say, the circumstances under which an abrupt change in U.S. policy towards apartheid occurred dictated upon it a necessity of change in tendency. These circumstances, as elucidated within the folds of the present dissertation, coupled both an internal pressure inside America epitomized in the Black Movement and other white anti-apartheid and humanitarian voices and the turmoil they caused at

home, added to the external international pressure and foreign policy calculations in the Cold War climate.

Another inference surfaces in this regard. The U.S. does not make any move or serious steps towards the attainment of racial equality and the achievement of democracy in any corner of the globe unless its own national interest considerations are put at stake. The reverse theory is also true, meaning that the U.S. finds no harm in approving the immoral practices of a friendly power if this latter serves the U.S. interests in the first place. These two inferences are perfectly applicable to the case studies of South Africa and Israel respectively.

The U.S. media outlets have been playing no small part in the whole self-interest game. Hence, this dissertation analysed how the strategic location and strategic formation of Edward Said's theory of Orientalism had implications on how Arabs/Palestinians and Israelis were portrayed in the American media, in collaboration with American policymakers, over the course of the twentieth century. Based on Bell Hooks' psychoanalytic semiotic four discourses, the same applied to the negative representation of Blacks followed by a more favourable depiction from the mid-1980s onward. Both theorists, Said and Hooks, agree that the media perform a major role in slanting or beautifying the perception of particular races in order to achieve geostrategic, geopolitical, and geo-economic objectives. The Western reader and recipient's unconscious mind has been conditioned to accept these images as fact due to their widespread use in the American mass media. Hooks and Edward Said both contend that they are nothing but representations that are far from being facts.

After a careful consideration of both the Palestinian question and apartheid South Africa on a separate manner, and taking into consideration the definition of apartheid provided in the introduction, crystal clear is the fact that both case studies are cases of apartheid. However, that of Israel's brutality practised on the Palestinians is "apartheid of a special type"; it is broader apartheid.

The Israeli system of militarized racial discrimination is, indeed, analogous to apartheid South Africa. Chomsky proposed the term "Bantustan settlement" to describe the situation in Gaza. As part of its apartheid policies, the National Party government of South Africa designated Bantustan as an area exclusively for the Black residents of South Africa and South West Africa. In Chomsky's view, with whom the present work unquestionably concurs, even the two-state solution put forth in the 1993 Oslo Accords is comparable to the apartheid system that existed in South Africa as a result of the building of the separation wall (Lee, 2004, p.2). The planned location of the wall was a few kilometres inside the Green Line. In 1994, however, Israel began building the first 60-kilometre barrier along its border with the Gaza Strip in order to extend its advance into the Occupied Territories and seize control of the water supplies and thereby ensure that Israel holds the aquifer (p.3). In fact, about 80% of it is put to use in Israel. In contrast to the Palestinian towns next door, which lack water, the Israeli settlers enjoy swimming pools and lush gardens. A pail of water requires Palestinians to go miles. Consequently, a few hundred thousand Palestinians are now battling to exist after the separation wall helped solidify control over the water sources and seize some of the most fertile Palestinian territory.

The sole distinction between South Africa's and Israel's situations is that Israel is not required to conceal apartheid because there will not be any penalties or sanctions. The United States of America did not, and does not, intend to impose any type of sanctions on Israel.

Given all what has been said, the three research hypotheses responding to the research questions posed in the introduction and the research objectives can safely be confirmed. Therefore, the U.S. mediation efforts in the course of its public diplomacy practiced vis-à-vis apartheid South Africa and Israel have not been impartial and even-handed and did not fulfill the requirements of public diplomacy as they have been biased to a party at the expense of the other. Additionally, the U. S. diplomatic foreign policy pursued vis-à-vis apartheid South Africa and the Palestinian question has been solely motivated by national interest considerations. The latter has repercussions on geopolitical, geostrategic, geo-economic and cultural calculations. Furthermore, the U.S. media have, to a far extent, been used by the U.S. government as a powerful tool to cement and spread stereotypical images about Arabs, Palestinians, and Blacks to serve the hegemonic culture. Once the political picture is altered, the U.S. media's images are altered in turn.

All in all, the second half of the twentieth century is the era that formed the bulk of this dissertation's analysis to uncover the complexities, challenges, and reasons of U.S. diplomatic efforts in Africa and the Middle East. On the whole, this study has been intended to provide readers with the tools needed to follow with a critical eye day-to-day events in Africa and the Middle East. Hence, those with a modicum of humanitarian awareness can be strongly reminded by the analogy presented in this dissertation that

they must stand with their Palestinian brethren in their struggle to overthrow the apartheid regime in their occupied territories.

In spite of the tremendous efforts devoted to the completion of the present study, there exist a number of limitations that have been inescapable. First, due to the multifaceted nature of the topic discussed and space limitations, the researcher wished she could devote space to discuss the Arabs and Blacks' depiction in both the *National Geographic Magazine*—epitomizing and influencing U.S. popular culture—and American literature in late twentieth century. They could, alongside the three media types analyzed in the present work namely newspapers, TV channels, and Hollywood movies, provide an in-depth analysis to achieve the dissertation's research objectives more thoroughly. Any attempt to cover all the aforementioned types, in more detail, would have required a substantially longer work than the one produced here. Second, the primary sources and documentation available about the U.S. foreign policy towards apartheid South Africa are scarce in comparison to the large body of literature available about the Palestinian question and the American mediatory role in it. This what has hindered, to some extent, the investigative nature and the analysis of the present study.

In contemporary times, U.S. goals concerning reforming the political and economic landscapes, the outlook for Middle East peace talks, a sustainable energy balance, security needs in the region, and counterterrorism progress have all been adversely affected by events that have swept the Middle East since early 2011 and especially since October 7, 2023. This latter date, in which the Palestinian resistance movement Hamas led an amazingly well coordinated attack on Israel in an operation that Hamas named “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood”, is highly significant. This is due to the

fact that American diplomacy and foreign policy in the Middle East since this date have been encountering significant hurdles and major challenges—chief among which an ill-fated threat to American watchdog’s security. Therefore, a brutal ongoing Israeli war on Gaza funded primarily by the U.S. has been taking place, next to the Israeli escalation of violence and expansion of settlements in the West Bank. This has been more complicated by Israel’s war on Lebanon started on October 1, 2024, to feeble Hezbollah’s military force. Besides, the unexpected collapse of the Assad dictator regime on December 8, 2024, has started a new era of a free Syria. Based on this amalgamation of significant events, a number of questions arise. First, in the light of the aftermath of the genocide on Gaza and the recent developments in Lebanon and Syria, how will the balance of power in the Middle East be influenced with a specific emphasis on the U.S. role in it? Second, after the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020 to normalize Israeli relationships with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, will “the deal of the century” be possible between Saudi Arabia and Israel under current circumstances? And how will the Trump administration strive to make it happen? All these questions can serve as topics to be expanded in future research.

In conclusion, deep worries about American double standards will continue to drive Arab public sentiment as long as the U.S. and Israel maintain firm ties. Furthermore, as long as it ignores Israel's unlawful expansion in the West Bank and does not denounce Israeli violence in the Occupied Territories, the United States' diplomatic involvement in the peace process will remain questioned. Therefore, a comprehensive analysis of it has been necessary; a task that this dissertation has strived to probe into.

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تلخيص

تعيد هذه الأطروحة النظر في الدبلوماسية العامة الأمريكية كأداة للسياسة الخارجية في إطار العلاقات الدولية بعد الحرب العالمية الثانية. يتناول العمل مسألة تباين المواقف و السلوكيات الدبلوماسية الأمريكية في مواجهة حالتين متشابهتين من الفصل العنصري الذي تمارسه جنوب أفريقيا وإسرائيل. تكشف الدراسة عن الأهداف الرئيسية للسياسة الخارجية الأمريكية من خلال مقارنة دراسات الحالة الخاصة بعصر الفصل العنصري في جنوب إفريقيا والصراع الفلسطيني/الإسرائيلي. يحقق صناع القرار في السياسة الخارجية الأمريكية هذه الأهداف من خلال العمل بالتنسيق مع وسائل الإعلام الأمريكية، التي تنحت الروايات لتشكيل الرأي العام. لذلك، يهدف هذا العمل بشكل أساسي إلى تقييم مدى حياد الدبلوماسية الأمريكية، وبالتالي تسليط الضوء على الأسباب الضمنية غير المعلنة التي تفسر الاختلافات في السياسة الأمريكية تجاه سيناريو هين متشابهين للفصل العنصري. ثانيًا، يسعى العمل إلى إظهار كيفية تعاون وسائل الإعلام الأمريكية وحجب الستار عن تواطؤها مع الحكومة الأمريكية لإنتاج تمثيلات نمطية للعرب والسود بالإضافة إلى ادعاءات استطرادية خادعة. ولتحقيق أهداف البحث هذه، يتجسد الإطار النظري للدراسة في نظريتين ثقافيتين- وهي نظرية الاستشراق لإدوارد سعيد والنظرية النقدية للعرق والجنس والطبقة لبيل هوكس - ونظرية سياسية أخرى تعرف باسم نظرية لعبة بوتنام ذات المستويين. يتم إجراء هذا البحث باستخدام منهج دراسة الحالة المقارنة (CCS)، وهو في المقام الأول نهج نوعي، و يتبع منهجية التحليل المقارن النوعي (QCA). تكشف نتائج البحث أن الدور الوسيط للولايات المتحدة في سياق دبلوماسيتها العامة التي تمارسها تجاه الفصل العنصري في جنوب أفريقيا وإسرائيل لم يكن محايدًا وفشل في تلبية متطلبات الدبلوماسية العامة العادلة. إلى جانب ذلك، فإن الأسباب غير المعلنة الكامنة وراء ذلك ارتبطت ارتباطًا وثيقًا باعتبارات المصلحة الوطنية، التي لها انعكاسات على الحسابات الجيوسياسية والجيواستراتيجية والجيواقتصادية والثقافية. وبالمثل، أثبتت وسائل الإعلام الأمريكية، إلى حد كبير، أنها مسؤولة عن ترسيخ ونشر الصور النمطية عن العرب والفلسطينيين والسود لخدمة ثقافة الهيمنة الأمريكية؛ وبمجرد أن يشهد المشهد السياسي تغيرات، تتغير أيضًا طريقة تمثيل وسائل الإعلام الأمريكية.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الدبلوماسية العامة، الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية، جنوب أفريقيا، إسرائيل، فلسطين، الفصل العنصري