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**The Development of the National Security Concept  
in  
American Foreign Policy.**

**Dissertation Submitted In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of the  
Degree of Magister In English**  
**Option: American Civilization.**

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Academic Year:2008-2009.

**The Development of the National  
Security Concept in  
American Foreign Policy.**

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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank anyone who gave me the smallest help in writing this dissertation.

I am particularly grateful to the following people: the librarians at the American Corner of the National Library (La BN) for the amount of resources they provided me with and for their assistance and hospitality; the University of M'hamed Bouguerrah, Boumerdes, for offering access to the online archives of scholarly journals; the Faculty of Political Sciences and International Relations in Benaknoun, for allowing me access to their library in Algiers; and, most important of all, to my supervisor, Dr. Dramchia, who was very helpful and patient.

## **Abstract:**

Much research has been done on the inter-influence between the international situation in which the United States lives, and its conduct in both domestic and foreign policies. This dissertation falls into this category of research.

Some critics of the United States' foreign policy, such as Noam Chomsky and Howard Zinn, see that American policy is not primarily determined by the international events, but rather by the lust for power and economic interests. Other justifications such as security and the promotion of freedom in the world are used as a mask behind which these real motives are concealed.

Others, like Hans J Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, see that American foreign policy conduct does and should always depart from the circumstances of the international system and the relative position of the United States in it. The degree to which these circumstances affect national security is one of the major considerations on which foreign policy is conducted. That is, a great part of foreign policy is carried out in such a way that would make the world a safe place for the United States. To do so, there has to be a picture of the world and its relation to American national security. Therefore, whenever world circumstances change in nature, this picture will change with it. This is the main issue of this research.

This study aims at analyzing the influence of the world circumstances on the development of the concept of national security in the United States throughout three major periods: the isolationist period, from the nineteenth century to World War II; the Cold War era, from the end of World War II to the late 1980's; and the post-Cold War era, from the late 1980's till the recent years.

Throughout the history of the United States' foreign policy, there have been different views about the extent and the way in which international circumstances affected the safety and integrity of the American people and their territory. From the early years following the American Revolution to the 1940's, most Americans saw that the survival of their people and land could only be guaranteed by getting away of the conflicts of the Old World(Europe), on the one hand, and preventing the old colonial powers from reasserting their presence in the Western Hemisphere.(The American Continents). During the Second World War, this idea was affected by circumstances. The fact that the War, a world conflict that took place beyond the Atlantic, directly endangered American national security led to a break with the trust in isolation as an effective tool to ensure national security. After the War, the security of the United States was believed to require an involvement in international affairs and inevitable alliance with other powers to influence the course of events in such a way that would prevent the new danger, Soviet Union, from affecting the United States. After the international threat of the Soviet Union disappeared, a new one came to the surface: this is international terrorism. After its emergence as a major threat, Americans started to believe that their security could only guaranteed if they destroyed the capacity of every enemy that could strike before even this enemy really attempts to threaten the survival of the American people and land.

Thus, every change on the world scene carries with it a new conception of national security. This change in conception, though it can be exaggerated or distorted by foreign policy makers and the media, is mainly based on the evolution of the world around the United States.

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## **Declaration**

I hereby declare that the substance of this dissertation is entirely the result of my investigation and that due reference or acknowledgement is made, whenever necessary, to the work of other researchers.

Date: November 15<sup>th</sup>, 2008.

Signed: Rouabhia Mohamed.

**Chapter Four: The United States, International  
Terrorism and National Security.**

**Chapter One: Conceptual, Theoretical and**  
**Methodological Framework:**

**CHAPTER TWO: Ensuring Security through  
Isolationism: From the Spanish American War  
to the United States' Entry into World War II.**

**CHAPTER THREE: Security through  
International Influence and Alliances.**

## **General Introduction:**

The conduct of foreign policy in the United States has always been the interest of many scholars and researchers, both in the field of history and international politics. They have explained this process in different ways, which sometimes overlap and sometimes represent sharp contrasts to each other.

Some of the interpretations, for instance, attribute it to ideological and cultural beliefs; that is, the United States' dealing with the external world is controlled by the beliefs and principles of American society, especially those that stress the exceptionalism of the American people and their country. This usually stems from the colonial and revolutionary through the expansionist eras. In this long period, along with the development of the American people's conception of their identity, developed an attitude among Americans towards the world and their place in it that made them look at themselves, eventually, as a special group of people with ideals and values that the whole world aspires to live with. Paradoxically, this led them, on some occasions, to prefer getting away from the troubles of the external world to cherish and protect their special values and principles, and, on other occasions, to get directly involved outside their borders to spread and 'export' their ideals and experience to the rest of the world which, they thought, regional needed such an ideal model as the United States.

Other explanations, on the other hand, focus on more concrete motives. These might include the desire by American foreign policy makers to impose themselves and have a great share in the competition for power that has always been an important characteristic in international relations. Other pragmatic motives can be economic, such as the commercial and territorial interests in the American continent in the nineteenth century, the lucrative trade opportunities in Asia afterwards, and the oil interests in the Middle East region since decades ago. In some cases, such as the Panama Canal Treaty and possessions in the Philippines at the turn of the twentieth century, the motive was rather beyond the seeming targets of attention, due to the access to other, more important interests in Asia.

Another contrast exists between those who consider that domestic circumstances inside the United States influence the conduct in foreign policy on the one hand, and

those who consider that external circumstances of the world surrounding the United States are the primary factor that influences this process. As an example of the former, people in the military may look for an aggressive foreign policy to increase the defense budget. Capitalists and industrialists, for example, may call for the same kind of foreign policy but rather for the sake of appropriating sources of raw materials and capital, and foreign markets for their industries and commerce. The latter include, as an example, those who consider power relations on the international scene, such as the position of the Soviet Union in the Cold War era. These claim that the United States' external relations are rather determined by the circumstances in the world around it, and the place it holds in it and its position in relation to its different parts.

A third dichotomy is between those which are based on synchronic detailed description and analysis of a specific stage in the history of American foreign policy history, while others rely on diachronic studies that aim at following the change in this policy through time. In the former, the contemporary circumstances are the key to the understanding of any foreign policy act or attitude; that is, these circumstances are enough in themselves to get a satisfactory explanation of this issue. The latter is based on the assumption that foreign policy making is like many other areas of managing a country, a result of many successive developments, which are linked by causal relationships and which might go very far back in time.

Overall, none of the interpretations has ignored the fact that many factors, concrete and abstract, external and internal, historical and contemporary, influence the conduct of foreign policy among American foreign policy makers. In this work, I am going to study the development of an important factor in American foreign policy conduct, which has only recently been paid attention to, namely national security. This study aims at analyzing the relationship between the developments on the international scene and the way American people and foreign policy makers conceive their safety and national security. My interest in this issue was due to the hot debate, contradictions and paradoxes surrounding the United States' dealing with the rest of the world, especially after the events of September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001. The talk of 'national security', a term that has been in use since the early Cold War era, has accompanied many of the United States' involvements in the world before and since. In the last two decades,

particularly, and after the United States' deep involvements in many parts of the world, there has been a controversy about the relationship between the threat to American national security, and the United States' stance in its dealing with the rest of the world: its enemies and the opponents of its involvement outside its borders see that any aggressive acts against it are only a reaction against its arrogant intervention in the internal affairs of other countries; however the adherents of its strong presence on the world scene, including foreign policy makers themselves, look at its seemingly aggressive actions as a legitimate self-defense tool.

This led me to ask myself two questions, the second of which is the main interest of this research. The first question, then, was: "Are the United States' foreign policy makers realistic about their country's national security interests as a justification to their involvement in different, and sometimes remote, parts of the world, or are they exaggerating and using this as a tool to convince their people and the rest of the world of the legitimacy of their foreign policy decisions?". This led me to think about the American discourse about threats to their national security, on the one hand, and the real international situation itself; whether they are realistic or exaggerating, it is certain that to present any picture about these threats, it has to be related to the external circumstances so that some legitimacy can be achieved, at least in the eyes of the American public. Therefore, there is a tight relationship between the international scene and the way the United States' foreign policymakers see, or present to the world, their country's security status.

Here comes the second question and lies the topic of my research; since there is a relationship between the international scene and the American foreign policy makers' 'conception' of their national security, the development and change in the international scene would most probably lead to an evolution or a shift in this conception. Therefore, my second question was the following : how have the developments-at least the major ones- in the world surrounding the United States influenced the way American foreign policy makers conceived, or portrayed, the security of their country. The aim of this research is to try to give an answer to this question.

National security research is a comparatively recent area in the study of international relations and foreign policy making. The concept of national security, the

main issue of this study, which I hope will prove fruitful and informative, has-relatively speaking- only recently been paid attention as an independent subject and area of scientific research. About a few decades ago, it used to be almost exclusively studied by government agencies and institutions responsible for the defense of their nations. It also used to be obscured by historians and political scientists' consideration of it as part of more important, but closely related, concepts such as power, peace and anarchy, which were usually foregrounded at the expense of giving it independent attention. This is one of the reasons which made me attempt to use it as an interpretive framework for studying the United States' diplomatic history and foreign policy development. Moreover, I wanted to get out of the routine of interpreting the United States' foreign policy in terms of such concepts as capitalism, ideology, manifest destiny, democracy and other ideal or moral orientations of American politics. That is not to say that those concepts will be ignored or overlooked for the sake of foregrounding National security as an exclusive or independent factor of American foreign policy making; it rather means to look at those matters, when necessary, in terms of their relation and effect on the interpretation of the national security concept by American decision makers and public opinion throughout the major phases of the United States' external relations.

Before starting to deal with its development in the history of American foreign policy, we first have to get a clear conceptual and theoretical framework in which we will analyze this development. This will begin with a general review of some definitions, which were available and deemed useful and revealing. Moreover, there will be a look at the Realist paradigm in international relations and foreign policy study, which, I think, is one of the closest and most related to national security among the famous approaches to foreign policy making. In addition, a methodological framework for this study includes the perspectives from which the subject will be looked at, namely the case study method and discourse analysis. A chapter will be devoted to fulfilling this purpose.

After that, in the following three chapters, there will be an analysis of the three major phases in the history of American foreign policy: the Isolationist era, the Cold War era, and the post-Cold War era which is characterized by the fight against

‘terrorism’. In the second chapter, I will deal with the prevailing conception of national security that characterized the attitude of most American foreign policy makers in the era stretching from the early years of the republic to the United States’ involvement in the Second World War, with some cases that illustrate it. In this era, ‘national security’, though the term itself had not yet been widely used, if used at all, was thought to be tightly attached to the United States’ aloofness from the power relations and struggles of Europe and confining American energy to establishing a beneficial neutral stance in relation to Europe, and at the same time preventing European countries from getting close to the American continents.

The third chapter covers the conception of national security during most of the Cold War era. This conception was a radical shift from that of the Isolationist era in that it related the United States’ security to the extent to which it preventing the famous expansionist power, the Soviet Union, from controlling most parts of the world. Contrary to the previous era, this meant that to ensure national security, it was inevitable to get involved in the affairs not only of Europe, but of Asia and even Africa.

The last chapter deals with the view of national security that prevailed after the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a new conception of threat tightly related to terrorism. In this era, which continues up to now, the conception of security and threat was attached to opposition to the United States’ globalism and the spread of its economic, political and cultural presence in some parts of the world where it is unwelcome. Mainly, this focuses on the anti-American reactions in the Arab and Muslim world. What follows, then, is the first chapter and the theoretical background of this study.

## **Introduction:**

As was mentioned earlier, the first chapter sets forth the theoretical background and framework according to which the analysis will proceed. First, there will be an insight into the term and concept of ‘national security’ itself, in an attempt at selecting an appropriate definition that will be a starting point in the study of its development. Then I will discuss the Realist theory of world politics, which I deemed the most relevant to the topic of this research. This theory, which has its roots in earlier writings, is based on some major assumptions. First, it claims that human beings are naturally driven by the survival instinct. In addition, it claims that the state with its institutions is the major actor on the international scene. It also stresses the importance of power and the contrast between national order and international anarchy. After that, we will take a glance at Neo-realism, the modern and adjusted version of Realism, in addition to the methodological tools used in the analysis in the following chapters, namely the case study method and discourse analysis.

### **1.1. The Concept of National Security:**

To begin with, the term security has been interpreted differently by scholars, politicians and political scientists. It is usually characterized by its elasticity and the ambiguity of its meaning.

Usually, it is seen as consisting of an objective and a subjective side. Explicitly, it is understood as the absence of threat, danger, risk, peril or menace that can damage, harm or injure the safety of the individual (or any other entity, such as the state), and, at the same time, the absence of horror, panic and fear from all such threats. It is then a combination of “a physical condition with a state of mind” (Freedman 730). A narrower definition than Freedman’s is that of Krieger’s *The Oxford Companion to Modern Politics*: “to feel free from threat, danger and anxiety”, and a “subjective state of mind” rather than an “objective state of being”. Most often, the subjective side is considered more influential in foreign policy making than the objective one. This is because it is safer to prepare for an imaginary danger or amplify a real one than to fail to notice a major threat or underestimate its possible effects. Thus, we can define

security as “the extent of the state’s confidence in its capacity to withstand another’s power” and its assurance of being able to defend itself in case of its being attacked by a potential or a real enemy. (Freedman :732). This does not exclude the objective side of the concept; the sense of either fear or security that a state might have depends much on the real situation in which it finds itself. Though the threat may usually be exaggerated by statesmen or public opinion, there is usually a great connection between fear and threat.

In addition, considering the source of danger and risk, the security concept consists of external and internal elements. In the former, the state is concerned with the peril that a real or a potential enemy outside its borders might represent for the security and survival of the state. The latter, on the other hand, concerns the internal weakness that might undermine the safety and stability of the state or challenge its authority and power; it might as well make it defenseless in facing the external threats. For this reason, the two aspects of security are closely related and the state very often ignores the distinction between the two. One of the best examples is the witch hunt trials that took place during the early years of the cold war: in this case many U.S. citizens were suspected of practicing actions that were favorable to the Communist threat, which was represented externally by the Soviet Union. In political science the two are respectively called ‘threats’ and ‘vulnerabilities’. More often, security is defined by the threats which challenge it.

Even though the kinds of threats might encompass numerous spheres, especially economic, cultural, and social domains, it is usually understood in terms of military and political threats to the borders and citizens of the state coming from a foreign and external enemy. This is because the possible effects of political and, to a greater extent, military threats are “relatively apparent, and, if made actual, they may work their harm rapidly. Therefore, they are relatively not controversial”(Ulman:133). Moreover, in the case of military threats, the state can easily mobilize all the human and material resources, control and prevent any dissent, sacrifice can be expected and agreement and consensus are more quickly reached.

Generally speaking, the security measures concern the safety and absence of threats to the continuous existence and survival of the territory and the citizens under

the state's control; however, they are usually perceived, particularly by powerful states, as encompassing a vast set of primary concerns for the state called 'vital interests' or, to appear less materialistic and give it a moral and ideal aspect, 'core values'. As one of the most powerful states in the world, and even before reaching this status in the early twentieth century, "the United States has rarely defined its 'core values' in narrowly economic or territorial terms". Core values usually merge "material self-interests with more fundamental goals like the defense of the state's organizing ideology, such as liberal capitalism, the protection of its political institutions, and the safeguarding of its physical base or territorial integrity" (Leffler :145). The 'core values', the protection of which is seen as synonymous with national security, combine "ideological precepts and cultural symbols" with "concrete interests"(Leffler:144). The use by statesmen of either concrete or ideal interests depends on the particular circumstances facing the state and the way they and their countrymen set their priorities. Although very often the two aspects are compatible, sometimes states feel obliged either to make concrete sacrifices in economic or human terms for the sake of fulfilling a moral obligation, or to give up some of their creeds for material interests. Moreover, the problem of insecurity is "of immense scale and complexity. It stretches across all the levels of analysis from individual to global, and across a spectrum of sectors ranging from cultural and social, through economic and political, to military."(Buzan :11)

Whether in concrete or abstract terms, considering the scope on which the term security is applied and understood, there is usually a distinction between national security, global and international security. As usual, national security and other types based on a larger scale are often closely related; foreign policy making concerns only preferences and viewpoints. The national security concept is connected with the measures undertaken by the state for the defense and safety of the citizens and territory under its direct control. At the other extreme lies the concept of global security. Theories which favor such a concept adhere to and believe in the possibility and the necessity of a universal community of mankind made up of individuals who have no allegiance to any restricted institution such as the state. Such a community of individuals can be made only by the breaking of the boundaries set up by and between

states and the merging of all the individuals that are under the sovereignty of these states into a community whose members have no other allegiance or loyalty except to the community of Mankind. In such an idealistic and rather utopian society, the security concept is applied on a global term. In the middle ground lies the concept of international security. According to this concept and the theories which adhere to it, security is understood on a scale that lies beyond the limits of the state but stops short of ignoring the role played by the latter on the international scene. That is, different states -usually of common geographical or ideological features-form communities of states that share the same security interests. Each state contributes and in its turn benefits from such 'security regimes', by combining their resources and cooperating to ensure the security of all members. This concept is considered as moderate compared to the two others: on the one hand, it believes, as does the international security paradigm, in the possibility of cooperation that transcends the limits of the state; on the other one, as does the national security paradigm, it considers that the state is the major actor in international politics and that international cooperation takes place not among free and independent individuals but among equally sovereign states each of which seeks all the means available to ensure its national security including the resort to international combinations of states which are strategically (that is, in terms of defense) interdependent and whose security interests overlap (for a detailed, illustrated and comparative description of the three concepts, see Haftendorn).

Very often, greater states with relatively powerful armies and economic capacities prefer National security measures, whereas smaller states find themselves forced to resort to international security measures to make up for their weaknesses, either by combining with more powerful states or by hoping that the smaller states will outnumber the more powerful ones to strike a balance. Even in the latter case, however, the state's resort to international security measures is just another means to ensure national security.

The distinction between what national security is and what it is not is sometimes difficult or disregarded for the sake of applying the term national security on a scope beyond the state's political and geographical boundaries. That is, some statesmen may consider the security of some territories or states that lie outside their political and

geographical borders as part of their own national security. (This will be discussed in more detail and with illustrations in the third chapter). Short and usually regional direct military confrontations that may take place because of territorial, ethnic or other kinds of problems of a primarily local nature, are conventionally unrelated to the national security of a geographically remote, politically and culturally separate state. Nonetheless, they can be a key issue of foreign policy orientation for this state, which is most likely a powerful one; that is, one that can have economic or commercial interests, military bases and ideological sympathies in very remote areas. Exploiting the elasticity and subjective nature of the term, especially through taking advantage of previous events in history, statesmen and decision makers, mainly those with an expansionist yearn, can find ways in which they indirectly link those events to the national security concerns of the state they hold. Thus the national security concept can be applied on a limited geographical scope that includes the territory and population under the state's direct control, as well as on a larger scope that may reach some remote and separate areas.( see Ulman 140)

### **1.2.Realism in World Politics and Foreign Policy Making:**

The field of international politics and foreign policy making, just like other fields of research, are looked at from different methodological and theoretical perspectives and approaches. Two of the most famous and widely popular theories in international relations study are Idealism and its opponent, Realism. The major point of disagreement between the two is the nature of the human being and its influence on international relations.

For the Idealists, man is by nature virtuous and social. There is a great possibility of ensuring harmony among individual human beings whose virtuous nature will bring about a benefit for the whole community. On the other hand, the Realists do not have the idealists' optimism about Man's wide horizon and the communal spirit. Self interest and instinct are the only motives behind the individuals' behavior.

The Realist paradigm is usually considered as a combination of many smaller and finer theories; however, generally speaking, there are some common principles which

tie all the Realist theorists under the umbrella of a common theory of international relations and foreign policy making.

### **1.2.1. Human Nature**

The basis of the Realist paradigm, especially classical Realism, is usually said to be the view that they hold about the nature of the human being, which many consider, not unjustifiably, as pessimistic. Generally, “it is impossible to read the works of such prominent realists as Kissinger, Niebuhr, Kennan, and, most importantly, Morgenthau without coming to the realization that their entire outlook on international politics rested on an unflattering view of man.” (Shimko 287).

This “unflattering view of man” comes mainly from Hobbes’s conception of human nature as presented in his major book *Leviathan* 1651. In this very important and often quoted work the writer refers to the mythical era before the forming of the institution of the state in its modern sense, through what is called the ‘social pact’. During that era, Hobbes states, human beings used to live in a separate and independent way, or, at most, in small families. Each individual was striving to satisfy and fulfill his and his family’s needs and instincts. The most urging and fundamental of those needs was the guarantee of continuous existence and survival, or ‘security’.

This situation is generally called the ‘state of nature’. In this situation, there was no authority or power beyond that of the individual to which everyone was accountable and which had the legitimate right of controlling the behavior of individual humans. The latter, thus, had the legitimate and mutually recognized right to use whatever means were available to ensure their security. The most guaranteed of these means was the use of force (Roche 21). An unavoidable outcome of this situation was that each individual made the maximum effort to increase his own force and make it over that of other individuals.

However, the efficiency of force was something relative; to be able to face aggression from others, it was not enough to be strong, one had to be *stronger*. As no one could predict to what extent his force matched or overpasses that of others, each made the greatest effort to maximize his own force so that he could minimize the danger from outside attackers. Thus, and since no individual could guarantee the superiority of his power over that of others, each tried, besides increasing his own

force, to diminish that of other individuals around him. This led to a situation where even aggressing others for fear from attacks became a natural and legitimate right. According to Hobbes, “there is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can so long till he see no other power great enough to endanger him”(Hobbes 77).

However, the nature of the human being is not only driven by purely security-seeking calculations. Driven by the lust for holding control and domination over others, Man is not always satisfied with just enough power to be able to defend himself against possible attacks by other members of his species. There are some individuals who take “pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires”(Hobbes77). Consequently, those who have just look for self-defense will be endangered by this category, and their power and force will be insufficient against attack by individuals with excessive power and with a desire to transgress their own limits and impose their force and even injure or kill others. For this reason, which is the high probability that some individuals would have excessive power and use it against others, “augmentation of dominion over men being necessary to a man’s conservation, it ought to be allowed him”.(Hobbes 77). Increase in power and force becomes thus, a necessary and legitimate right which all individuals recognize for each other. It is a “right of nature, which is: by all means we can to defend ourselves”.(Hobbes 80)

Realists argue, then, that nature imposed a permanent struggle and conflict between individuals which was mainly stimulated by the instinct of self preservation and domination over others. Each individual, in this struggle, had to survive through his own means. There was a mutually recognizable right, which no one was denied, to use power and force for security and survival. This situation was called anarchy. That is, the absence of an authority beyond that of the individual to ensure security for all.

### **1.2.2. The State and the Regulation of Anarchy:**

As pointed out earlier, in the state of nature and its anarchic condition, which is the absence of any authority that transcends that of the individual and can look after the security of all individuals, self-help is the only means available for each individual to

ensure his continuous existence. The right to do this is considered natural, necessary and legitimate, and “a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them that assault him by force to take away his life, because he cannot be understood to aim thereby at any good to himself”(Hobbes 82).

This situation made individuals feel the necessity of an institution which would have a power superior to that of each individual and to which all would have to submit for their own survival. As we have already said, Man, in his natural state, lives alone and survives by his own means. He has no desire to sacrifice his own interests, particularly his safety, for the sake of a communal life made up of a group of individuals. Since, for Hobbes, “Man is by nature a selfish calculator”, he “does not join his mates except for fear” (Roche 21). However, this does not mean that the individual will not sacrifice or give up some of his freedom and legitimate right to use force for self-defense. This can happen in situations where communal life and association with others provides more guarantee of security than individual self-help and independent means for self protection. Because of the fact that no individual can assess his relative power, there will always be a lack of guarantee for his survival because of the others’ possession of the right of using force and the unpredictability of the way and the extent to which they are going to use power. According to Hobbes, this is what led individuals to sacrifice some of their freedom and transfer it to a common and inter-individual institution with more authority than any individual and with an exclusive right to use force for the protection of all members of the resulting group of people, which is society. That is, the individual accepts to give up some of his freedom to use force, which is transferred to a single authority superior to each individual with the exclusive right to resort to force to defend individuals and to prevent any of them from threatening the safety of others. As Hobbes claims in his major book, “the motive and end for which this renouncing and transferring of right is introduced is nothing else but the security of a man’s person, in his life, and in the means of so preserving life as not to be weary of it”(82). The individual abandons the right to use force because he knows that others will do so, which will guarantee that they will have no freedom to attack him. This is done by the contract between individuals to establish a communal institution, not for the sake of the community, but

just because the resulting institution and authority will be a more efficient and guaranteed protection for each individual. This is usually called the social contract by which the society and, with it, the state was born.

Hence, the state is not a natural phenomenon; it is an artificial condition established by covenant between individuals, among whom each felt that this artificial condition is more favorable to his interest and survival than the state of nature. It has the exclusive right and legitimate authority to resort to force. By this it acquires the role of the controller of inter-individual anarchy. This would be made by the covenant between different individuals who would accept the legitimacy of the resulting institution for the general good which will ultimately benefit the individual. To fulfill such an important mission, especially among individuals whose nature is characterized by the selfish search for power, the covenant among individuals by which the state is created, and which gives it legitimacy, is not enough for this institution to face any challenge to its authority and thus to the security of all individuals, because “covenants, without the sword, are but words and of no strength to secure a man at all”(Hobbes103). The exclusive right to use force requires the existence of this force by which it can crush all resistance to its power, authority and legitimacy which become the new guarantee for the individual security. The state, thus, “controls violence by freely using its force which submits the disorders of the state of nature to the order of its power”(Roche 28).

As a consequence, the state became a tool by which internal anarchy is controlled. This does not mean that there is no dissent from this rule or that there is no case where some individuals challenge the legitimacy of the state and endanger the security of other members of the society. Such individuals do exist, but they are usually rare because the force and power of the state have a psychological effect represented in deterrence; that is, the individual knows that if he challenges the authority of the state, he will endanger his own security and thus he does not attempt such a fatal step. Moreover, any reaction that the state might undertake to crush such an attempt will be said not to originate in the state’s behavior, but in the action of the individual himself. In matters of force and legitimacy, the status of the state has to be and usually is far beyond that of the individual.(See Hobbes 107)

Instead of the isolated way of life that the individuals had lived, after the formation of the state, human beings started to feel the communal aspect of their new life. The state provided both a limit to the individual's freedom and right to use force and a guarantee of his security against any potential attack. Thus, the state's authority and power represent an alternative to the anarchy of the state of nature before forming the social contract. Internal disorder, through the state's authority, is replaced by order.

### **1.2.3. The State as a Major Actor and National Interest:**

The latter factor is a major characteristic of international politics as the Realists see it. That is, the state plays the role of an interface between the internal world of its subjects and the external world of equally sovereign states. There is a recognition of actors who influence the international scene and who are more or less independent from the state. These can function on an international level, such as the international organizations, or on a sub-state level such as ethnic groups and political parties. Nonetheless, these actors are considered secondary to the state which is foregrounded by Realists. The state grants some freedom of action to these institutions because they are either profitable or inevitable, but in world politics the state constitutes the basic unit both from an internal and external perspective: it is the first legitimate institution that other states or international institutions deal with, and the individuals and groups inside its borders cannot deal with any foreign groups without the consent of the state.

This leads us to a major issue which is national interest. Since the state is the major representative of the whole society that lives under its authority, in principle, it will not seek the satisfaction of the interest of a limited group or fraction, but it has to look for the interest of the whole society. Moreover, for the same reason, the state does not normally seek the satisfaction of the interest of the whole community of states. When associating with other states, it uses this as an indirect means for guaranteeing the interests of the group it represents. Often, this is referred to as 'national interest'. So, the state does not maintain a foreign policy which aims at fulfilling universal moral ambitions aiming at making the world a perfect place to live in for the whole of humanity. It rather looks for the satisfaction of the needs and desires of the internal

community of its citizens. The most urging and primary of these interests is the survival of its subjects or national security.

In the world system, then, each state strives to make the world politics most favorable to the continuity of its existence and survival and guarantee most of its national interest. In this way, the Realists, since Hobbes, have believed in the analogy between the individual's behavior in the state of nature and that of the state in the international system. Explicitly, in the same way that the individual endeavors to guarantee his survival and his domination over others, the state does its best to guarantee its national security. Moreover, in the international system, each state has the legitimate and reciprocally recognized right of using any means available for national survival; this implies the legitimate right to use force for this purpose.

#### **1.2.4. Power**

From what was said earlier, the state represents the major actor on the international scene and thus foreign policy making is considered as the state's pursuit of its national interest. National interest, for most Realists, is defined in terms of power.

In the course of the state's search for a guarantee to its national survival, it attempts to increase its force and power to the maximum in the same way the individual's need for survival leads him to attempt to increase his force and ensure his superiority over other individuals. In this situation, power is seen both as an end in itself, and as a means to an ultimate goal which is national survival and the preservation of the state's authority and territory (Roche 34). It is also considered as a natural and legitimate right of the human being and as a universal aspect both for individual and state behavior. This universality, as is the case with the state of nature and the instinct of survival, is due to the fact that all states are driven by the desire to guarantee to the maximum the continuation of their existence on the world scene.

However, as a result of this, some states will increase or seek to increase their power beyond the needed amount of force to guarantee national security. That is, parallel to individuals in the state of nature, states will be driven by the ambition to guarantee their domination and superiority over other states even if their own security is not threatened. Each state is driven not only by the need to ensure national security, but

also by the desire to dominate and hold control over other states. This is one of the major implications of the analogy and parallel between the state's behavior on the international scene and the individual's conduct in the state of nature. That is, the state is "a collective reflection of man's lust for power and domination"(Shimko 293).

#### **1.2.5. National Order versus International Anarchy:**

Hobbes makes an analogy between the inter-individual relationships in the state of nature and that between states in world politics. According to Hobbes, on the international scene the state acts in the same way the individual does with other individuals in the state of nature. That is, each state is primarily concerned with its survival and security. In this way the internal anarchy which used to exist before the formation of the state between individuals is replicated in the state-to-state relationship. Nonetheless, this analogy has a very important restriction. It stops short of claiming the possibility of duplicating the experience of the state on the international scene. That is, Hobbes and Realists in general claim that it is not possible, on the international level, to have an interstate institution that has the same power over states which the state has over individuals. This does not exclude the possibility of creating such an institution because they really exist. Rather, Realists argue that if an international institution is created by agreement between different states, its effectiveness and its relation with the individual states that created it will not replicate that of the state with the individual members of the society which it represents. In addition, the power of individuals and their legitimate right to use force is transferred to the state, while the power of states and their legitimate right to use it for national security is never abandoned by the state. Thus national order is opposed to international disorder.

Let us be more explicit: each state, while searching for security, will do its best to prevent other states from constituting any threat to its survival, and doing this it will increase its force which will eventually constitute a danger for other states; political scientists call this the 'security dilemma'. This is increased by the unpredictable ways and extent to which other states will use their power. What aggravates this situation is the absence of an international institution that has the sufficient power and legitimacy

to handle this dilemma. Contrary to the internal order provided by the state, international disorder is almost completely inevitable. The absence of a real powerful supranational authority whose decisions are more legitimate than those of the state and who can control interstate behavior is called international anarchy.

International anarchy for Realists, unlike the internal anarchy, is permanent and uncontrollable. In this case, the analogy between the inter-individual relationship in the state of nature and the interstate relationship in the world system stops short of assuming the possibility of creating what we may call, using Chilton's words, a "world Leviathan".

As well as considering the state as the tool by which the internal anarchy of society is controlled, it is regarded as the major protection from international anarchy. It is thus an interface between the internal world of its subjects and the external world that contains different states. According to Realism, the neglect of moral obligations and the lack of concern the state has for the interest of the community or other states in its environment is greater than the self-centeredness that the individual has when dealing with his mates around him. The latter can at least sacrifice some of his selfishness taking into account the fact that the integrity of society in general will most probably lead to the security and serve the interest of all individuals of whom he is one. In many cases, individuals might sacrifice their lives for the sake of the state. This can never be expected, at least by Realists, to happen at the international level. That is, in the absence of a universal international moral basis on which the states can found their policies, each state will either consider its behavior on the international scene as unquestionably moral since it serves the national interest, or neglect completely the moral rules of conduct and behave in a way which is similar to that of the individuals in the state of nature. In the first case, the state will establish moral rules for its external relations which are different from those by which it maintains internal integrity and stability and which are compatible with its primary motives in foreign policy conduct.

Thus, international anarchy, contrary to the state of nature which can be replaced by a more organized inter-individual relationship, is relatively permanent and inevitable. The state's behavior reflects a collective manifestation of "man's baser

desires” which include the desire to dominate others; there is “no constraint in the form of a higher authority to restrict” the state’s pursuit of such ambitions(Shimko 293). This does not mean that the international scene is a sphere of continuous struggle and war, but the possibility of war and being attacked by others is always there.

### **1.3 Neorealism:**

The Realist paradigm in international relations study, though a very popular approach in this field, faced a lot of criticism based mainly on the reality which it claimed to foreground. The changes that the world witnessed in the last decades of the twentieth century proved that some aspects of Realism were taken for granted and others were exaggerated.

Most importantly, this paradigm, in its preoccupation with the state as a major actor which is unchanged by circumstances, underestimated the role played by the other actors and at the same time the influence that the world system and its structure have on the behavior of the state. The Neorealists did not diminish the preoccupation with the state as the major actor on the international scene, but they tended to explain the behavior of states in terms of the “imperative imposed on [them] by an inherently insecure anarchical environment”(Shimko 288). If states strive to increase their power, according to Neorealism, it is not out of the human lust for domination, but they are obliged to do so because the nature of the international system and its anarchical structure. In addition, though there exists no world Leviathan, and the states in the international system do not interact in the same way as individuals do inside society, some forms of cooperation and interdependency between states proved possible. Additionally, the anarchic nature of the international system proved not as uncontrollable as it had been portrayed by Realists.

The Realist paradigm, not accepting to leave ground for other theories and approaches to foreign policy making, found it necessary to adjust to the new realities of the world system. The new version of Realism came to be called Neorealism or Structural Realism, in contrast to classical Realism.

Neorealism did not fall into the trap of diverting the approach to an idealist stance. It gave importance to the possibility of cooperation between states but still looked at

this not as proof of international harmony and self-denial by the states but rather as just another means of ensuring and guaranteeing national interest. In addition, the state was no more seen as a completely autonomous entity which makes its decisions on exclusively internal and national bases. The structure of the world system began to have its importance and changes within it started to be accounted for in terms of the structure itself and not just in terms of completely disconnected actions and sorts of behavior taken by entirely independent and completely autonomous states, without each of them taking into account the environment around them (Chilton 103). Not that the Realist came to undervalue the importance of the state for other previously neglected actors; it rather started looking at the state as part of a system which influences and is influenced by it. The international system as a whole was looked at as a consistent structure made up of equally important units in terms of function, but different in terms of their capacities to influence the world structure. Neorealism studied the behavior of states in terms of its response to the international environment. According to Kenneth Waltz, one of the prominent advocates of Neorealism, “the operation of any system transcends the characteristics of its units (that is, a system is more than the sum of its parts)”. (quoted in James 182)

Moreover, Neorealists consider power in terms of its relation to the system rather than its importance at the level of state behaviour and its foreign policy priorities. As was expected by the founding fathers who saw the balance of power in Europe in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as a guarantee of U.S. security and ability to preserve neutrality, most of the Neorealists claim that the balance of power between states in the international system is an automatic mechanism that controls international anarchy and prevents the outbreak of destructive wars.

#### **1.4.Methodological considerations:**

Having thus dealt with the theoretical framework from which this study will proceed, let us take a quick glance at the methodology according to which the theoretical principles will be applied to the development of the security concept in American foreign policy.

### **1.4.1. Case Study Method :**

For practical academic reasons, namely time, space and concision, I am not going to deal with the development of the security concept through a year-to-year analysis of the United States' foreign policy history. This is both impossible and unnecessary. The research is going to proceed through first dividing the history of U.S. external relations into major periods; then will be considered one or two cases in each period that are deemed most representative in terms of the US decision makers' view and conceptualization of the term security. This does not mean that events develop independently from each other or that each period has an exact end which marks the beginning of the following one. Things rather develop in terms of a continuum and phases of history are usually interwoven and it is very difficult to spot the beginning or the end of a historical period. However, to take our subject as an example, there are some major events that are considered as turning points in the history of American foreign policy. There are also some periods of this history that are characterized by continuity and stability in relation to the conceptualization of national security and its implications for decision making. Within each period, change takes place, but it does so slowly and unnoticeably.

Moreover, inside each of these periods, there are instances where the general views and prevailing principles are applied and manifest themselves more clearly and more representatively than other cases. Each selected case, or unit, will be studied and analyzed in its characteristics and different cases will be compared to see, through the differences between them, the major changes and breakthroughs that took place throughout time (Jocher 2003). This is usually called the case study method which is applied in many sciences and fields of research and in many variations. So, each of the selected cases will be studied thoroughly in terms of its historical and political implications for the understanding of the concept of security.

### **1.4.2. Discourse Analysis:**

In addition to case studies, there has to be a method to study the way in which the circumstances of each case influenced the conceptualization of security in American foreign policymaking. For this purpose, I am going to adopt the discourse analysis

method. This is because of the amount of information that we can infer from discourse about the context and the realities of the objective world through tracing back the influence of the latter on the conceptions made by people and reflected in their linguistic behaviour or discourse. We are not going to deal with the functional nature of discourse as a tool but in terms of its relation with and reflection of the events that surround the process of discourse. In general, “texts are representations of given practices not practices themselves”(Weiss 275).

To be more explicit, this research is concerned with the change a certain concept undergoes under certain circumstances. There has to be, then, a link between these circumstances which supposedly exist in the real objective world, and the way people visualize or conceive their environment. This link is Language. It is not language as an abstract set of rules and a collection of words and expressions but as it is used in real contexts, in terms of discourse. In short, “meanings encoded in human language have their source in the human conceptual system and the human conceptual system itself results from the physical interaction with the environment”(Chilton 47). Moreover, it is through language that “policy-making and decision-making take place”(Chilton 55).

### **Conclusion**

To sum up, this work is based two important sets of assumptions. The first one concerns the security concept itself. This concept is considered elastic and flexible. What makes it so is that it is not only connected with the actual situation where there is no threat or danger on the individual or the state, but also the fact that some threats can either be imaginary or exaggerated by the public or the officials, or looked at differently from person to person. Moreover, this concept can be of different natures or applied on varied scopes. Nevertheless, this concept is closely related to the real external environment of the individual or the state. The second set of assumptions is what is generally called ‘realism’ in world politics. This is based, first, on a view of human nature that assumes that any individual’s behaviour is primarily driven by his lust for survival. It also states that the state is the major actor in world politics and contrasts the order inside the state with the anarchy of the international system.

## **Introduction**

This chapter will cover the United States' conception of its security during the so-called Isolationist period. In this period, the most prevailing security notion was related to the stability and peace of the western hemisphere, or the American continent, and to the necessity of getting away from the conflicts of the rest of the world.

Generally speaking, the Isolationist period is understood to include the time period extending from the early years of independence to the U.S. participation in the Second World War in the year 1941(it will be demonstrated that the First World War, which is considered a break with the isolationist creed, was rather a confirmation and reassertion of the isolationist conception of American security). This era is characterized by the United States' defensive stance. The prevailing feeling was that the real threat to the United States was the possible menace to the American ideals and principles of freedom and democracy if the former colonial monarchies were left free in the western hemisphere as a whole. The major principles on which the United States foreign policy was established and maintained during this period were keeping out of Europe's alliances and preserving neutrality on the one hand, and, on the other hand, preserving hemispheric stability and security (those of the American continents) and preventing any European power from fulfilling its territorial and colonial ambition. To understand this one has to look back at the early colonial period.

### **2.1. Background and Origin:**

The nature of the Americans' way of looking at the world around them during the era of Isolationism stems from as early as the colonial period, and through the revolutionary era to the first years of the new republic. In the establishment of the early British colonies, the settlers of what is now the United States had a sense of being different and isolated, geographically as well as in the way of thinking, though not politically, from Britain (or the countries from which they had fled). Most of them either fled from a variety of dissatisfaction with their mother countries' life or, later, felt that that the freedom and autonomy, for the sake of which they left their homes and countries was not preserved by the British crown. The latter started to implement

some forms of oppression on them and to issue laws that restricted their autonomy and hindered the prosperity and independence for which they worked so hard. The development of events led to the outbreak of the American War of Revolution thanks to which the colonists established the United States of America and became Independent citizens from Great Britain.

After establishing an independent republic, Americans always had a sense of being a separate and isolated group of people whose existence as one nation originated in no common feature that brought them together other than their being individuals who wanted to have a different, new and above all, a free way of life. What came to be the myth of American freedom, for the sake of which thirteen independent colonies abandoned much of their autonomy, represented a sacred ideal that had to be preserved at all costs (Tower 01). This ideal, Americans considered, represented the 'core value' and the main reason behind the existence of both the American new republic and, later, of other newly independent nations in the western hemisphere willing to follow the same ideals and process of nation building.

Therefore, Americans always looked with suspicion to their mother country and had a past of favouring aloofness from Europe. In his farewell address, President George Washington warned his countrymen against getting into the "entangling alliances" of Europe (a phrase that became widely used later). He asserted that the task of establishing the new republic was not finished yet and that to ensure a peaceful and stable environment of this process, Americans had to keep neutral in world conflicts both to ensure its security and prosperity which relied on maritime trade. He also warned against giving European powers a free hand in the American continents. He and many Americans were convinced that Britain would try, whenever it had the opportunity, to regain its hold and control on her previous colonies or other unsettled parts of the North American continent. This view was not only held about Britain; the whole of Europe, especially the monarchies, was seen as a potential threat to the safety and survival of the United States.

Geographically speaking as well, the Americans' sense of isolation was reinforced by the fact that the Atlantic, a very huge ocean that separated the Western Hemisphere from its former colonizers in Europe, was a physical barrier against any threat. In the

context of the instability that characterized the relations between different European powers such as Spain, England and France, the oceans gave a sense of security and safety from European conflicts and their potential destructive consequences for the new republic which had not yet been prepared to face such a threat. In addition to the physical isolation provided by the ocean there was a large unexploited area west of the United States borders which had not yet been settled by Europeans, which made the Americans feel they were far from the reach of European powers and their ambitions; this belief was held, of course, as long as these geographical advantages were preserved. For this sake, they had to strive by all means to keep these advantages to their favour. This was reinforced by the War of 1812 between Britain and the United States, which mainly originated in the intervention and restrictions put on the American maritime trade by both France and, more seriously, Britain. This was considered by many as the second war of independence.

This sense of isolation, which developed into a policy later called Isolationism, allowed the United States a free hand over most of the American continent whether in terms of westward expansion or annexation of new states or the commercial hegemony in South American markets. The scope of U.S. influence and hold was applied first on the American continent then toward the Far East. Understanding the term or concept of security does not mean that the United States will only direct its foreign policy towards ensuring that the European powers would not think of re-establishing empires on the American continents. The United States, especially in the late nineteenth century, did have commercial interests in extra-hemispheric areas, especially after the Spanish American war and the declaration of the open door policy.

Thus, the term Isolationism does not necessarily mean, as it may be understood, that the United States cut off all relations with the world and had no territorial or commercial possessions outside the borders of the United States, or even did not interfere in the internal affairs of other nations. The United States did interfere in the internal affairs in North America, in the western hemisphere as a whole and even in the Pacific and Asia. Moreover, the United States interest sometimes made it interfere in some European affairs but never followed as an official and permanent or desired policy (Fensterwald 114). Isolationism rather meant aloofness from European internal

military and political affairs and, as long as possible, keeping out of conflicts that involved European powers (Fensterwald 112) This was due in part to the importance of the balance of power in Europe and the advantage this balance gave to the United States. There was, moreover, a kind of informal, unofficial and unwritten alliance with Great Britain from 1823 onward; however, this was not considered by the United States as a commitment and had not always been favoured, especially with the suspicion that Britain would have interests in the western hemisphere that threatened the United States' hegemony and dominance. This friendship was useful in making the United States gain security without making much effort by having the British as an efficient sea barrier against the domination of the sea by less friendly powers.

In addition, the term Isolationism was interpreted on different scopes from one circumstance to another. It was used in the early nineteenth century to signify getting out of entangling alliances and European conflicts and in the mid-nineteenth century to designate those Americans who opposed expansion in the Western Hemisphere. Later, at the turn of the century, it referred to American Democrats who opposed overseas expansion. After the U.S. entry into the First World War, the term denoted the opposition to U.S. involvement in it. When the war ended three years later, Isolationism was applied to the Congress's rejection of Woodrow Wilson's project of the League of Nations and the U.S. major role in it. To understand this, we have to consider some instances in which this policy was announced or used.

## **2.2. Case studies**

Both for historical and academic reasons, the second chapter will not cover the entire period on which most historians apply the term Isolationism in referring to the United States' foreign policy history. This is because the real test of Isolationism as a declared official policy and its conception of the security of the United States came relatively long after its announcement. That is, since, as we said earlier, we are concerned more with threats, we have to look at the time where either there was a threat or a perception of the external situation that made American foreign policy makers consider that there was actually a threat. In addition, going too far in the past may lead us to a diversion from our aim which is a diachronic rather than a synchronic

study. Such a task is more directed to study the differences between two periods or more rather than a detailed study of a fixed point in history. After having a basic view of the context that led to shaping the Isolationist conception of security, let us take a look at the process by which it was announced and the scale or the practical cases where it was or had to be applied. For this reason, I have selected the Monroe Doctrine as an important declaration of the United States conception of its security during this period, and the Spanish American War and American entry into the First World War. These two wars and their aftermaths, I think, are good illustrations.

### **2.2.1.The Monroe Doctrine and its context:**

#### **2.2.1.1Context:**

The situation in Europe in the few years following the end of the American War of Independence proved unstable and threatening to the security of the United States would the latter try to mingle or interfere directly in European affairs. This period witnessed the formation of the Holly Alliance, a combination between different European monarchies that felt the need to unite because of the threat to their survival of the emergence of revolutionary movements<sup>1</sup>. These revolutions threatened to overthrow the monarchical system around the world. As an extension of its general goal of preserving the monarchical system, this alliance undertook the responsibility of helping the imperial powers get back and reassert their control over their territorial possessions around the world, including their American colonies.

One of the most significant cases in the United States' history in which this alliance played an important role was the restoration of the Spanish Monarchy and the assistance given to it in reclaiming its rebellious colonies in South America. Both Britain and the United States felt that their commercial and economic interests were threatened by this attempt at restoring the previous Spanish colonies. However, the United States viewed Britain as just another European power whose imperial ambitions were as dangerous and as unwelcome as those of other European powers. Thus it took a unilateral action whose interpretation would associate its security with the safety, independence and territorial integrity of the newly independent republics in

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<sup>1</sup> This started as coalition of Russia, Prussia and Austria, which were joined by other European monarchies that were afraid that such events as the French Revolution would lead the rest of the world to overthrow their system.

South America. As was said in the first chapter, the concept of national security varies, in its interpretation, in terms of the geographical and political scope on which it is applied from one situation to another. In the case of the period of American Isolationism, it was geographically and politically understood on a scope that included the whole of the Western hemisphere, especially the new independent countries that faced the danger of being restored to the state of subjugation by their mother countries.

In geographical and material terms, the presence of European monarchies and countries in the Western hemisphere would endanger its borders and represent an obstacle towards the United States' attempt to assert and secure its position in the area, especially at the time of the Westward expansion and the acquisition of new territories. In addition, in the second half of the nineteenth century the U.S. grew in size to include states which had previously been the possession of European monarchies or their former colonies. Politically speaking, the United States leaders believed in the necessity of justice and freedom to prevent international conflicts and rebellion in internal affairs. They had so much scorn for monarchical systems and they loved their democratic system so much that they believed it to be the only solution to international conflicts. This would be done, according to the authors of the Declaration of Independence, by both ensuring democracy and justice at the internal level of the state and the association of democratic sovereigns at the international level (Shaw 280). In addition, the Americans were afraid that the presence of monarchies in the Western hemisphere would, directly or indirectly, threaten their republicanism and doctrine of democracy for which they had fought a Revolutionary war and which had involved them into a second conflict with the mother country in the War of 1812. Jefferson, Monroe, Adams and their contemporaries believed that it was better for the Latin American countries to go through the painful experience of establishing an effective democratic system than to be brought back under the bondage of European colonialism through the military and naval efforts of the Holy Alliance and the Spanish Crown (Shaw 282). The Americans believed that peace in the Western hemisphere-of which they were an important part-and therefore their security could only be guaranteed through the association between democratic and sovereign states in the American continents. Democracy in Latin American countries could be modelled on the United

States' experience, but sovereignty meant freedom from any outside oppression. Such oppression was seen to be represented by the European monarchs.

For this reason, the Holy Alliance was seen as a threat to the peace and security of the whole Western Hemisphere including the United States. Additionally, the only solution to face and counterweigh this threat of the persistence of the European systems of exploitation was through a pan-American alliance. The survival of such systems, as the Spanish rule in Cuba in the early nineteenth century, was a good justification for the necessity of taking such a step. In this context came the political declaration in which the U.S. conception of its security and survival was manifested. This came to be known as the Monroe Doctrine.

#### **2.2.1.2. The Monroe Doctrine and Hemispheric Security:**

The major view about the American security that prevailed in the Isolationist era is best represented by US president James Monroe's annual message to Congress in the year 1823. This message contained what came to be known later as the Monroe Doctrine.

During the time while Spain was being preoccupied with re-establishing its hold in South America after the Holy Alliance restored the Spanish Monarchy, both the U.S. and Great Britain, being on good terms, felt that the presence of European powers in the western hemisphere was a threat to their commercial privileges in the region. Exploiting this situation, George Canning, the British foreign minister, proposed a joint announcement of opposing any colonial presence of European powers in the American continents (La Febber, 1994 84). This was welcomed by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, but John Quincy Adams, Monroe's Secretary of State, opposed it and preferred a unilateral action by the U.S.. This was justified by the restrictions it would have on U.S. activities in the area. With this in mind, Adams played a decisive role in President Monroe's annual message to congress in December 1823.

#### **2.2.1.3. Monroe's Annual message on December 2, 1823:**

In the annual message to Congress, and after mentioning the attempts by both the Russian and the British officials to have the US cooperation to maintain their interests

in the American continents, President Monroe declared one of the major principles on which the U.S. security measures and foreign policy as a whole would be built for more than a century to come. He declared

...as a principle in which the rights and principles of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subject for future colonization by any European powers...(Commager,V I: 236)

This passage contained what came to be called the non-intervention principle. According to this principle, the U.S. would not accept any attempt by any European power to restore its colonial authority in the western hemisphere; that is, the newly independent republics, which had been colonial possessions of European powers, are not to be subjugated and submitted by their mother countries after their independence. This principle was as important to the defence of the United States as to the defence of the new republics south of the country.

The President guaranteed that the United States had already applied this to herself because it did not interfere in the "wars of European powers in matters relating to themselves", and would not do so except if its "rights are invaded or seriously injured", in which case the United States would take the necessary measures for its own defence. He also made reference to the threat that the European political system represented for American democracy, which had been "achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure". For the defence of this democracy, the president added, "the whole nation is devoted". The United States wanted to provide stability in the western hemisphere which, according to them, could only be achieved by the spread of democracy in the western hemisphere and by the function of the United States as a model for other parts of the hemisphere. Thus, the president stated that his country would "consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of the [western] hemisphere as dangerous to [American] peace and safety."

In this message, the president made an important proviso. He stated that this principle would apply to the American "governments who have declared their independence and maintained it but not to the existing colonies or dependencies or

colonies of any European power" with which the Americans had not interfered and would not interfere." More than this, even in the war between Spain and these new governments the United States did not interfere; however, the President added, his country would interfere if there was a change that, by the judgement of American authorities, would "make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security"(Commager, V I 236). He then asserted the United States' unwillingness to interfere in European wars and that it was "impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering " the United States safety and happiness (237). Equally important was his claim that, obviously, Spain could never subdue those governments from which she was so distant. The latter European power is chosen as the first case of study to illustrate the security concept of the Isolationist period which is outlined in the Monroe Doctrine. However, this case came a long time after the official declaration of the United States conception of its security in the world. This was because the case chosen has both asserted this conception and put it into practice, and brought a new phase in the Isolationist period that had important implications for the security of the United States.

## **2.3.The Spanish American War:**

### **2.3.1 Context**

As was said earlier, the real test to the United States' conception of its security in the Isolationist period came well into the late nineteenth century. One of the cases in which the United States used the principles declared in the Monroe Doctrine is the Spanish American War. This was selected because it is more illustrative and it brought a new phase in the conception of security in relation to the means by which it can best be preserved.

After the end of the American Civil War, the United States witnessed a rise in Industrial products and an increase in the importance of this sector in the economy of the country. Moreover, businessmen prospered and became so powerful that they could influence both domestic and foreign policy making. After the year 1890, when the American frontier was officially closed, industrial and commercial interests had to

look for markets as well as sources of raw materials outside their borders. To do this, they had to urge the policy making officials and convince them of the necessity of extra hemispheric possessions. Moreover, they wanted more involvement in the affairs of the South American countries, in which they often had a commercial stake which had its origin in the early years of independence. Besides, since most of the American trade with the outside world took place through the sea, the navy started to expand for the sake of protecting the commercial interests of the United States. The interest in the navy was in part due to the difficulty of raising an army that was caused by the belief that it was unnecessary to do so. The late nineteenth century witnessed an important change in the international system. Earlier, the feeling of security had been based on the fact that Europe was witnessing an era of relative stability. Additionally, the Oceans that separated the Americans from the rest of the world were seen as an effective barrier against any potential threats from European powers that might endanger the United States' safety.

In the late nineteenth century, however, events took a quicker pace and a new direction. Great European powers, especially Great Britain, France and Germany, became involved in a rivalry for the riches of the world, especially in Asia and Africa<sup>1</sup>. Moreover, imperialism became more economic and commercial than military. Many American industrialists were convinced that the United States could no longer ignore the necessity of taking part and having her share before the European powers took everything to themselves. This was the more so after officially closing the frontier, which meant the need of foreign markets and sources of raw materials. These interests and ambitions found an opportunity in the Spanish American war. The commercial and expansionist interests found an opportunity to use security discourse to fulfil their ambitions.

In this war, one of the important principles of the Monroe Doctrine was tested. This was the United States' consideration of any attempt by former colonial European powers of recovering their control in the newly independent areas of the west hemisphere as a direct threat to its own safety and a justification of the United States interference. The difficulty with this case was the restriction of the Monroe Doctrine

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<sup>1</sup> This was embodied in the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, which regulated European colonization and trade in Africa.

that interference by the United States would only take place in assaults against independent nations in the western hemisphere.

In the year 1895, war broke out between the Cubans and the Spanish colonial masters. The former asked for complete independence and autonomy, complaining that their colonial administrators had not fulfilled their promise of improving their living conditions. The Spanish commander in Cuba, General Valeriano Weyler, was notorious for his cruel treatment of the Cubans. Under his command, the Cubans were put into what was called the 'concentrados', or concentration camps. The Cubans looked for U.S. recognition of their independence and assistance in getting the Spanish out of their land. They were in part influenced by the American Revolutionary War against Britain and expected the Americans to identify with their cause.

Both the American public and leaders did identify with the Cuban belligerents. However, they did not want to risk going into war with Spain unless there was a real justification and above all, a way of implementing the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. This, in fact, embodied a dilemma. On the one hand, Spain was trying to recover its control over parts of the western hemisphere, which, according to the Monroe Doctrine, was considered a direct threat to the safety of the United States. On the other hand, Cubans had not gained their independence yet, which is relevant to the proviso that Monroe inserted in his congressional message in 1823. Moreover, the United States had a lot of citizens in Cuba. Although most of these were traders interested in the natural resources of the Island who went there on their own responsibility, they were not denied the right of protection by their country. Besides, the commercial interactions between the United States and Cuba were a vital source of economic prosperity. So, the United States in one way or another had a stake in the quarrel.

American foreign policy makers, due to their analysis of the issue and to the public call for intervention, did intervene to unravel the crisis. They did not rush to a direct confrontation with the Spaniards. At first they resorted to offering arbitration between the two sides, trying to convince the Spanish to give some autonomy to the Cuban rebels and fulfil their promises of improvement.

However, a combination of public anger and the failure of Spanish leaders to fulfil their needs were enough to make a minor lead to the outbreak of a war between the two countries. Many newspapers used propaganda by amplifying the harsh treatment of the Cubans by the Spanish. In spite of their exaggeration, these newspapers succeeded in increasing the call for direct confrontation with the Spanish. So, when the first opportunity came, the United States did not hesitate. In February 1898, the *Maine*, a U.S. passenger ship which was heading towards the Havana port, sank in very mysterious circumstances. There was a public conviction in the United States that this was a Spanish deed for which there had to be retaliation. Whether this was done by the Spaniards or not had no significance in the atmosphere of anger in the United States which had been waiting for an outlet long before the incident. In these circumstances, the United States declared war on Spain

### **2.3.2 Declaration of War:**

The document which I have chosen to illustrate the United States' use of the Isolationist conception of security as a justification of its war against Spain is President McKinley's War Message of April 11, 1898. In his war message, the president stressed the damage caused to the United States by the conflicts in Cuba and the danger which faced both the national interest of his country and the stability of the hemispheric situation.

The president said that the revolution was just a successor of many other insurrections in the area. He complained that the crisis in Cuba had caused much damage and unrest among American citizens, leaders and traders who had commercial interests in the Island. He called attention to the "enormous losses to American trade and commerce," the "irritation, annoyance and disturbance among" Americans, to portray the fact that hemispheric stability, which was considered a vital and necessary factor in the security of the country, was disturbed by the belligerency between the two sides. He also stressed that the United States did not willingly abandon its neutral position, but circumstances which should stay out of the country's attention had a harmful effect on the interest of the American citizens. This also stood in the "way of that close devotion to domestic advancement" and made foreign affairs, which should

not bother the United States' policy makers, come as a disturbance to the preoccupation with domestic affairs. (Commager VII 02).

The president also stressed that in spite of these circumstances, his country tried to settle the matter by mediation between the two sides but failed because of Spain's unwillingness to fulfil its promises. He stated that his country did its best to reach a peaceful and satisfactory solution to the conflict. He did not deny that in the beginning the Spaniards showed compliance with the United States suggestion by releasing American citizens who were under detention for being connected with the Cuban rebels. Moreover, they promised to improve the living conditions of the Cubans and their treatment by the Spanish administrators. Because these measures failed, the president further suggested an armistice for the negotiation of peace through the United States arbitration.

The president reasserted that going to war was just an inevitable step in the course of events and the only means to preserve the principles of security outlined in the Monroe Doctrine. He stated in his message that the only remaining options were the recognition of the rebels as belligerents, the recognition of Cuban independence, intervention to end the war through the neutral arbitration, or intervention in favour of one or the other of the belligerents. (Commager V II 03). The first two options, if unattended by the United States intervention, would add more fuel to the fight. There remained, according to President McKinley, intervention either as a neutral arbitrary or in favour of one side or the other. He said that there was "friendly intervention in many ways" but these had not succeeded in ending the fight (id.03).

Most important of all, however, is the President's justification of his country's "forcible" intervention which gradually reached its ultimate form, that of going to war with Spain. He did not restrict this to the incident of the *Maine* which, in itself, would not have been of great significance. For him, the incident was just an illustration of the "elements of danger and disorder" which had already been present and which inevitably affected the United States (Commager, V II 04). After hinting first to the "barbarities, bloodshed, starvation and horrible miseries" affecting the Cubans and claiming that the "cause of humanity" was one of the reasons for U.S. intervention, he added that it was "no answer to say this is all in another country", for "this [was]right

at [the Americans' ] doors." Next, he mentioned that the life and property of American citizens in Cuba needed protection, which no other government could ensure. Then he mentioned the threat posed by the crisis to the United States' national interest, embodied in "the very serious injury to the commerce, trade and business of [American] people." As a further hint to the United States safety, the President stressed that the conditions of affairs in Cuba, an island so near the United States, was a menace to his country's peace and a constant danger to the American citizens and their property.

Finally, the President mentioned the "tragic event" of the sinking of the *Maine*, which was the clearest illustration of the risk of the continuation of the crisis in Cuba. He related that a court of inquiry concluded that during the night of February the 15<sup>th</sup>, the ship, which was heading for Havana Harbour on a peace mission, was destroyed by an external "explosion-that of a submarine mine". He did not accuse the Spanish government or officials of having sunk the ship, because there was not enough evidence. He emphasized, however, that this incident was, at least, "proof of a state of things in Cuba that [was] intolerable," and a confirmation that the Spanish Government could "not assure the safety and security to a vessel of the American navy in the harbour of Havana on a mission of peace." The president then asserted the United States "right and duty to speak and act", "on the behalf of endangered American interest"; he asked for permission from Congress to ensure a definite and full end to the crisis and establish a Cuban government capable of maintaining order and "ensuring peace and tranquillity and the security of its citizens as well as " those of the United States.

The war not only reasserted the United States' leading position in the hemisphere, but it also brought new implications for its conception of its national security, both for the opponents and exponents of expansionism. After the signing of the peace treaty with Spain, the United States got hold of the Philippines, Guam and Puerto Rico. This brought the United States beyond the continental borders and led to a controversy. On the one hand, anti-expansionists argued that the new possessions and territories would require great costs for their protection since they would be under U.S. control, whether the latter was direct or not. In addition, it brought the United States closer to other

nations of the world, thus getting nearer to the threat. An attack on peripheral possessions, even if not on the United States mainland, would mean an attack on the United States sovereignty and citizens present in those peripheries. On the other hand, and using the same issue, which is the United States presence in the areas outside the western hemisphere, expansionists argued that this would make the United States more secure by bringing the first lines of defence to the periphery. This would keep the threat away from the continental borders of the country and make it able to strike back quickly in case of the presence of a real threat. . In any case, the Isolationists' belief in the necessity of not trying to meddle with European conflicts did not fade, and the First World War, though it may appear to some as a total break with Isolationism, is in fact another proof of the prevailing of the Isolationist conception of security.

#### **2.4. The First World War:**

The First World War is the other case that I have selected to illustrate the prevailing view claiming that the United States' security could only be guaranteed if it kept out of the conflicts that took place outside of its borders and its territorial and commercial peripheral interests. This is shown in the United States' staying out of war despite some provoking events, the way it entered the war and the reaction to its entry after the war ended.

##### **2.4.1The Challenge to American Neutrality:**

When war broke out between the Allies and their enemies, the American people and leaders were emotionally affected by the destruction and loss of human lives which the war brought about. However, the historical aloofness of the United States and its strong belief in its efficiency made the idea of the United States' willingly involving itself in the conflict unlikely. Still, there was much concern about these events for good reasons. Most Americans of Anglo-Saxon origin took sides with the Allies for the obvious reason of identifying with their Anglo-Saxon brothers. Additionally, the United States and Great Britain had entered an era of two decades of informal alliance and friendship. Others were of German origin or German-born, and they were very worried about their beloved ones in their mother country. This was

added to the effort of activists as social reformers, women's rights movements and pacifists who saw the war as a barrier to the human development that they claimed to adhere to. These worries, however, were more about stopping the war than about interfering in favour of one side or the other.

Despite this, the war at its beginning had no direct physical impact on the United States. The country's relatively isolated geographical and strategic position made many American businessmen and industrialists able to take profit by selling munitions and weapons to the belligerent countries but at the same time to keep away from the perils and dangers of the conflict itself. The ability of the United States to remain out of the fighting and make profits at the same time was an important advantage that many Americans wanted to preserve. The United States became a creditor country and sectors that produced war-related items-such as metal trades, food processing, mining and transportation-flourished during the war. The United States used a "clever combination of profit and avoidance" (Zieger 17). Moreover, it took the opportunity of the Europeans' preoccupation with the war to spread its influence abroad.

The Americans were still confident in the efficiency of the Monroe Doctrine to scare away any European venture that would endanger the interests of the United States. The security of American interests was thought to be preserved by the country's policy of neutrality. Nonetheless, there was an indirect alignment with the Allies and Britain in particular, which was seen in the commercial advantages the latter had during the war.

There were circumstances which could have shattered this belief and confidence, but they did not. One of them was the sinking of the *Lusitania*. This was a British passenger liner which was sunk by German submarine *U-20* on March 7, 1915. This incident led to the death of 128 American citizens who were on the ship. The fact that this incident did not lead to the United States' entry into the war is not surprising. Two weeks earlier, the Germans had declared Britain and the surrounding seas as a war zone on the pretext that Britain had earlier violated the neutrality maritime rights with the blockade on Germany. Some Americans, who opposed the United States' indirect and commercial involvement (let alone military involvement) in the war as a deadly mistake, believed that the passengers who travelled on belligerent ships and entered

war zones had to assume responsibility for their own safety. Many believed that if the American state defended this risky behaviour by some of its citizens, it would be abandoning its neutrality and meddling with European affairs by getting into war zones. This view was especially held by William Jennings Bryan, President Woodrow Wilson's Secretary of State, who recommended that, if his country claimed its neutrality rights in the seas, this would be applied to Britain as well as to Germany. According to him, the United States' obvious, though not direct, alignment with the Allies would bring about provoking the Germans and their allies. Though this view was not immediately adopted by the President, it was believed, later, that it was a sound judgement.

This did not prevent a reaction on the part of the United States. Wilson sent three notes to the Germans. One was sent on May 13, in which he claimed the right of the United States citizens to travel on merchant ships; the second note was sent on June 9, in which he waved aside German claims that the ship carried munitions and denounced German submarine warfare, particularly on commercial vessels. However, he soon denounced the British blockade as illegal. The note sent on July 21 was more resolved: any further sinking would be considered unfriendly and would mean that the United States could rightly interfere. There were some small incidents, but the Germans were clever in finding excuses and avoiding conflict with the United States because of their not being ready in terms of sea power. In this course of events, Bryan was still convinced the American passengers and businessmen should not get near the war zones and that the country should not be dragged into conflict with Germany for adventurous attempts by some American citizens to enter these dangerous areas. He also tried to make the United States as firm with Britain as it was with Germany. Not having succeeded, he resigned. The president managed to make the Germans reduce some of their aggressive maritime policies; this was, however, just an attempt by the Germans to avoid direct conflict with the United States for which it was not ready. There were many other smaller incidents than that of the *Lusitania*, but in each case the Germans made apologies and pretended that these were accidental mistakes.

The Americans' commercial involvement in the war grew to such an extent that it made many of them believe in the necessity of strengthening their military basis. This

was because many Americans felt that the war made the world a dangerous place and that their commercial relations, most of which were maintained with the Allies, would provoke some violent reactions from belligerents, especially the Germans, who were aware of the increasing United States' indirect alignment with Great Britain. Thus, the United States' growing international trade, which could be seen as one of the 'core values', needed protection. Consequently, many patriotic organizations, military leaders and security-minded Americans urged for "increased military appropriation, a larger army and more energetic and professional military establishments" (Zieger 33).

Still, military preparedness was not an easy task. Many religious and social groups opposed it on the basis that it would lead to the inevitability of the United States' involvement. Moreover, the long years of aloofness and relative stability in Europe in the nineteenth century had made many Americans believe that it was unnecessary to maintain a large army. This was reinforced by the confidence America had in the efficiency of the British Navy, now a close friend, in securing the seas. Additionally, America was full of recent immigrants who either belonged to the Axis pact countries or fled conscription at home. One should bear in mind that the defence budget was provided through taxes and that peacetime conscription laws were not strict enough to ensure sufficient human power in the army. This made the task of military preparedness dependent on convincing the public of the importance of the threats and the danger of waiting until it was too late. The difficulty lay in the fact that it was impossible to generate popular enthusiasm for such a measure, because there seemed to be "no remotely plausible threat to the physical security of the country"(Zieger 39).

As soon as the Germans regained confidence in their sea power, they launched again, in early 1916, their unrestricted submarine warfare. They threatened to sink any merchant ships sailing in the war zone around the British Isles. This return to submarine warfare was more aggressive, which led Wilson on April 18 to warn the Germans of severing diplomatic relationships. Germany, again, pretended to comply. The President succeeded in making his country avoid entry into the war. As a consequence, he secured re-election with the slogan "he kept us out of war."

What reinforces the argument made earlier, that the United States was willing to maintain its neutrality and keep out of European alliances, was the fact that in spite of

its bias and indirect alignment with Britain and the Allies, it maintained its complete independence and made efforts to stop bloodshed peacefully. Wilson, in his attempt at seeking a way to be an intermediary who could convince the belligerents to stop the fight, believed that all the countries of Europe should assume their part of responsibility. In early 1917, Germany launched again its aggressive submarine warfare. Although the anti-war sentiment still prevailed, the relationships with Germany worsened and Wilson severed diplomatic links with the country.

It was soon perceived that the United States' entry into the war would not be a violation of the Isolationist creed set in the Monroe Doctrine. On the contrary, it was necessary to maintain both the balance of power in Europe and, more importantly, hemispheric stability, which were vital to ensure that the doctrine would be respected by other countries. To be more explicit, the Americans who opposed their country's participation in the war on the basis that the German power did not represent a direct physical threat had to reconsider their belief when Germany proved the contrary. In late February, the United States discovered a German plot to persuade Mexico to go to war with the United States with the promise to help her recover the territories that the United States had obtained from Mexico after the Mexican War. This came with the Zimmermann Note, sent by the German Foreign Secretary in Mexico. Consequently, the movement towards war hastened.

Although both houses of Congress voted in favour of entry into the war, the United States asserted many times that it was doing this on her own behalf and as an independent belligerent. Due to Wilson's idealistic aims, it was also stressed that the country's war aims were nobler than those of their European counterparts: Americans entered the war as the last resort to end the bloodshed which would affect the United States either directly or indirectly. The threat that the German power represented was not neglected or underestimated, but being a war enemy of Germany did not mean that the United States would officially join the Allies. In spite of their relatively inexperienced troops, they tried to be as autonomous as possible. The U.S. participation was to apply the principle of hemispheric defence.

### **2.4.2 Wilson's war message:**

What is interesting about the United States' entry into the First World War is that it had not taken place until President Wilson was convinced that the German empire represented a real physical threat to the security of the United States. This was not only because of the discovery of the Zimmermann note, but also because of the threat that the success of the Germans would be to the United States with the rest of Europe. A German victory would mean that they would control most of Europe and the Sea routes through which the United States made most of its commercial exchanges with the European world. Moreover, the United States' entry, as mentioned, was accompanied by a serious attempt at preventing the European powers from believing that the United States did that for the sake of the Allies. Americans repeatedly stated that they entered the war on their behalf and fighting side by side with the Allies was just due to their being fighting against the same enemy.

This was clear in Wilson's war message to Congress on April 2, 1917. He alluded to the German violation of neutrality rights of the United States by its submarine warfare which did not make any distinction between neutral and belligerent ships, and affected even merchant and civilian ships. He stressed that the United States' resort to war, which was accelerated by the Zimmerman note, came only after "armed neutrality [was] ineffectual enough at best." He also mentioned the fact that the German Government was working against the Americans' "peace and security", not only by aggressive submarine warfare, but also by attempting "to stir up enemies against" the United States at its "very doors", and that "the intercepted note to the German Minister at Mexico City [was] eloquent evidence." He also made it clear that his country's entry into the war would not mean any hostility towards the German people or its ally governments. They entered the war "only where [they were] clearly forced into it because there [were] no other means of defending [the United States'] rights."

### **2.4.3 Aftermath:**

The official end of the First World War was marked by the signing of the Versailles Treaty on June 28, 1919. President Wilson wanted a world based on the model of the United States. He saw that only cooperation and collective security measures could promote peace in the world and prevent another world conflict. In early February of

that year, President Wilson presented a draft for the League of Nations, an international institution which he hoped would fulfil the dreams of a world without violence and war. He presented a Draft Covenant for the League and went home to convince his countrymen that their country had to take the leading role in this institution. After a hot debate over the League and the United States' role in it, the Senate rejected the idea of the United States' mingling with the rest of the world, especially Europe. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge opposed the ratification of the treaty because he considered it as incompatible with the United States' interests: it would endanger the United States' superiority in the western hemisphere and diminish the credibility of the Monroe Doctrine. Some thought that the treaty, which was humiliating for the Germans, would provoke their retaliation; they also expected the League of Nations to drag their country into endless wars; they made an analogy between it and the Holy Alliance, because it was not as universal and fair as it was claimed to be (Zieger 120)<sup>1</sup>. There was an attempt by Senator Lodge to make the Senate ratify the United States' participation in the League by proposing some reservations which would guarantee the Monroe Doctrine. Wilson saw this as impossible because the reservations would be incompatible with most of the League Covenant's articles. In addition, the 1920 election witnessed the victory of Warren G. Harding who promised his country the "going back to normalcy".

Another illustration of the prevailing of the conception of American security in hemispheric scope, the United States' neutrality and the ocean's efficient barrier against potential threats from Europe was the reaction of the United States' entry into the First World War and the implications that this would have for the country's relation with the rest of the world. Many critics said that their country had not been neutral enough in their dealing with the belligerents. They said that it was clear that the United States claim and defence of neutrality rights was not maintained on equal terms; that is, the United States was not as firm with Britain in terms of sea rights as it had been with Germany. Moreover, Wilson's use of the neutrality rights of the eighteenth century was outdated in the new realities of the era of the First World War. Even those

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<sup>1</sup> Americans were not familiar with the idea of being bound by international agreements that put constraints on their dealing with the rest of the world. Supporting international peace through arbitration and mediation did not make much sense for most of them at that time.

who did not oppose their country's entry into the war thought that this would have been done on pragmatic rather than idealistic grounds. That is, Wilson thought of the war against Germany as a defence against a real physical threat against the United States. This was adopted by many Realists such as George Kennan and Hans J. Morgenthau (Zieger 80).

Further proof of the triumph of Isolationism was the confirmation of William Jennings Bryan's claims to Wilson before the United States' entry into war. This came in the thirties, with the administration of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. During this time, European issues came to interest the United States policy makers again. There was some criticism of the administration's internationalist policy which was encouraged by bankers and money-minded interests who benefited from international trade. There was also an investigation by Congress that reached the conclusion that the United States had not been neutral enough prior to 1917. Trade in ammunition and war industry products with the belligerents during the war "was thought to be the cause that involved the U.S. in a conflict in which she should have had no stake." (Zieger 159). In addition, it was concluded that the American citizens' travel in ships of belligerent countries and inside war zones should have been prevented by laws. Thus, remembering the *Lusitania* crisis, four neutrality acts were passed in the years 1935, 1936, 1937 and 1939. These acts had in common the fact that they aimed at preventing any irresponsible behaviour from American citizens whose independent actions would drag the country into another involvement in European internal affairs and, thus, lead to conflict with them.

To illustrate, we can take a look at the Neutrality Act of May 1, 1937, which vindicated the position taken by Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan prior to the United States entry into the First World War. In the first section of the act, it was stated that when the president saw that there existed a state of war between foreign nations, it was considered "unlawful to export, or attempt to export, or cause to be exported, arms, ammunitions or any implements of war from any place in the United States to any belligerent state" that the president might name (Commager 378). In addition, it was added in subsection 1(c) that in the existence, in a foreign state, of a civil strife which would make the export of arms, ammunitions or other implements of

war from the United States to such foreign state endanger the peace and security of the United States, it would be proclaimed by the president and thus be considered as unlawful. Stricter than this, was subsection 2(a), which extended the constraints to the materials that are not considered as arms, ammunitions or implements of war, but on which the restriction is necessary to "preserve the peace of the United States or to protect the lives of citizens of the United States"( Commager 379). This Act, in Section 5, established a Munitions Control Board which would control the manufacturing and exportation of weapons and war related products. The Board would supervise the trade of such products in such a way as to prevent incidents that would provoke other states, especially during time of war between other nations or civil strife in a foreign nation. It would also be responsible for punishing American citizens who violated this Act. Besides restrictions on the exportation of American war products, Section 7 of the Act concerned the use of American ports in the same way. It stated that in time of war in which the United States is neutral, when the President suspects that a foreign or domestic vessel is carrying "fuel, men, arms, ammunitions, implements of war or other supplies to any warship, tender or supply ship" of a belligerent country, he could take the necessary action if he finds it necessary "to maintain peace between the United States and foreign states, or to protect the commercial interests of the United States and its citizens, or to promote the security and neutrality of the United States." The President could take the necessary measure even if there was no concrete evidence; this measure was to "require the owner, master or person in command" to give sufficient guarantees to the United States that his vessel would not "deliver the men, or any part of the cargo, to any warship, tender or supply ship of a belligerent state" (Commager 381). If, however, a vessel is found by the President or any person authorized by him to have previously delivered the already mentioned implements of war, it would be prohibited from departure from the United States ports during the whole period of the war. In Section 8, whenever it was found necessary to put restrictions on the use, by" submarines or any armed vessel of a foreign state" of the American "ports and territorial waters", to maintain peace between the United States and other states, or "to protect the security of the United States", it would be prohibited for any such vessel or submarine to enter the ports and

territorial waters of the United States. (ibid). The Act was reinforced by another one in 1939, and it was a good proof of the prevailing of the isolationist shell that used to protect the United States from external dangers.

**Conclusion:**

The circumstances of the isolationist period made Americans believe in the necessity and effectiveness of getting away from world conflicts in protecting their territorial integrity. Although some events, such as the First World War, showed that this policy could not prevent aggressive actions against the United States, they, if looked at carefully and if related to the principles of isolationist policy and the Monroe Doctrine, are good illustrations and tests of the efficiency of the United States' stance taken at that time. The Monroe Doctrine, for example, became equivalent to an international law that gave the right of self protection to the United States from what it, and not necessarily all the countries of Europe, considered as a threat to its security. The break away from this policy needed some change in the circumstances in the world surrounding the United States.



## **Introduction:**

During the late 1930's and early 1940's the United States tried to maintain its neutrality and avoid interfering in European affairs at any cost. Even when the Second World War was declared, it succeeded in remaining officially neutral. However, it soon became clear that the United States' interest and security could not be detached from that of Europe. The interdependence of the two sides of the Atlantic in economy and trade had important implications for security matters. Thus, circumstances led to a gradual shift in the United States' conception of the safety of its territories and the extent to which it could be isolated from circumstances overseas. This shift accelerated and asserted itself in the Cold War era.

This chapter will cover the United States' conception of its national security during the Cold War era and, more importantly, the way this conception came about. This can be done by examining the world environment in which this conception occurred and its effects on the foreign policy conduct of the United States. This conception owes much to the Second World War and its consequences on American security. It did not, however, appear in its final form just after the war broke out. This took place in a rather gradual way, though the developments that led to it did not take as much time as those leading to the Isolationist conception. First, then, we have to take a look at how the American foreign policy makers and many of the American people lost their trust in the Isolationist policy as a means to ensure their national security.

### **3.1. Background:**

The United States, as we saw in the second chapter, carried on its policy of Isolationism until the outbreak of the Second World War. Even before this war, however, international events changed the world in a way that made many Americans, though not a majority, feel the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of continuing to keep away from world events.

In the 1930's, instability came back to Europe and the world again. In 1935, Germany went back to armament, threatening the security of the whole continent of Europe. Adolph Hitler, a chief official in Germany became head of state. He was leading the German Nazi Party, which was based on nationalism and racism. He

formed an alliance with the Fascist Italian leader, Benito Mussolini in 1936, the year both intervened to back General Franco, a Spanish military leader who revolted against the republican government. He occupied the Rhineland, annexed Austria in 1938. In the same year, the Munich Agreement was signed between the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy. Under this agreement, Germany got hold of the Sudetenland, which was part of Czechoslovakia with a German-speaking population. The French and British officials hoped that this treaty would guarantee the peace of Europe; however, in March 1939, Hitler took the rest of Czechoslovakia. In August the Soviet Union formed an alliance with Germany and Britain did the same with Poland. On September 3, Hitler attacked Poland and, two days later, France and Great Britain declared war on Germany. Thus, the Second World War broke out. Hitler had expansionist ambitions aiming to dominate as much of Europe as he could. Russia took one third of Poland and Italy and Japan, after they got out of the League of Nations, joined the Germans and Russians. The three countries became known as the Axis powers, while their enemies were called the Allies. Later, in July 1941, Germany attacked its ally, Russia.

### **3.2. Early Reaction of the United States:**

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who had been influenced by Wilson's idea of the United States' active and leading role in relations with Europe, wanted to get into the war to prevent a German victory and to help France and Germany. He, however, did not want to enter the war with the same idealistic goals as Wilson had. He rather looked for realistic and concrete arguments that would be mainly based on the threat of the Germans and their allies on the physical security of the United States. So, at the beginning, the President and the like-minded officials interfered in an indirect way to influence the outcome of the war. He did not hesitate to give financial help to the Allied forces. In 1939, a new Neutrality Act was signed to make some amendments to that of 1937 in a way that would favor the Allies. This act added the 'cash and carry' principle; that is, the belligerent countries could purchase war products from the United States on their own responsibility: they had to come to the United States' ports, pay for the products and then carry them on their own ships. This was indirectly in

favor of Britain who had easier access to the United States ports and the Atlantic Ocean than, say, Germany. In addition, in March 1940, the president signed the Lend-Lease Act that gave \$ 7 billion to Britain and the Allies. In agreement with Finland and Britain respectively, the President made Greenland and Iceland covered by hemispheric defense laws. In Iceland, he was given the right for naval bases by Britain in exchange of destroyers. Indirectly, then, FDR, as the President is commonly called, aligned the United States' security with Great Britain and its Allies (Schultzinger 175). Moreover, there was a secret friendship between Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister, and FDR, which lasted till the latter's death. From the beginning of the war, the President and many American officials started to plan for the postwar world based on international cooperation which would be maintained by a United Nations Organization, which would replace the ineffective League of Nations and which would give the United States a leading role in international affairs. As a primary role, this organization would ensure freedom of the seas and disarm aggressor nations like Germany.

In this way, Roosevelt was both avoiding direct involvement in the war and provoking the Axis power to react in a way that would give him a good justification to enter the war. He wanted this to avoid opposition at home, especially with the memory of the failure of Wilsonian ideals to convince the Americans to get out of their isolationist shell (Wilson's failure in the short term should not obscure the fact that he was just ahead of his time). Particularly, he did not want to allow Germany to dominate Europe and the Atlantic, or Japan to dominate China, Asia and the Pacific. This would inevitably threaten the United States' interests in the two regions.

There were many in the United States who opposed their country's meddling with the belligerents' affairs but soon Roosevelt found the means to make all their claims sound incredible and dangerous to the United States' security. The United States did not hesitate to use its diplomatic means to refrain Japan from imposing its control over the Asia-Pacific region. The Japanese were trying to materialize a seemingly ideal, but imperialistic, principle in the region. This was called the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere", which used the idea of a united East Asia free of Western influence to guarantee Japan's exclusive imperial interests in the region. The concept,

though it was a tool in the hands of imperial Japan, was not much different from the Monroe Doctrine of the United States. Nonetheless, Roosevelt was afraid that this would endanger American commercial interests in the region, especially those that relied on the open door policy in China. He imposed an economic embargo on Japan that would weaken its war capacities. Thus, the Japanese were provoked by the United States to react aggressively, and this gave Roosevelt the reason he had been looking for. (See Russett 45)

### **3.3. Pearl Harbor and the Strike to Isolationism;**

On December 7, 1941, Japanese planes struck the American fleet in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The attack destroyed 7 battleships and led to the death of about 2,400 Americans (Schultzinger 180). This represented a crucial event in the history of the United States that can only be matched by the attacks of September 11, 2001. The result was a total blow to the Isolationist spirit of many Americans. The President had the reason he had been looking for to justify the declaration of war on the Axis powers. Even though Japan's action was just a reaction and result of the provocation of the United States and their indirect but influential alignment with the Allies, the majority of Americans started to feel that their Isolationist attitude towards the world was no longer a guarantee for their national security. The next morning Congress approved a joint resolution by President Roosevelt to declare war. Soon Hitler declared war on the United States, and, thus, its involvement in the war was no longer to sustain the Allies, but "to defend itself, and the attack on Pearl Harbor was the most dramatic demonstration that the Republic was in peril" (Schultzinger 182). To guarantee the surrender of the Japanese, the United States, under the orders of President Harry S. Truman, who succeeded FDR after his death, used the nuclear bomb in August 1945 over the Japanese cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

When the United States entered the war, it did not make any difference between Japan and its Allies. There were those who argued that their country should only fight Germany, but there was a strong conviction that the enemy or the threat did not come from a single country, but from the instability of the whole world which was due to letting the Germans have a free hand in Europe. Many officials started to feel that the

United States had to play an important, and even a leading role in the postwar world to prevent the appearance of a new threat to its security. The United States' entry into the Second World War brought about a new and totally different vision of its security and the means by which it could be preserved.

### **3.4. Implications for the Security Concept:**

Thus, the circumstances that brought about the United States' entry into the Second World War made the American policy makers reconsider the bases upon which they understood and tried to preserve their security. Both geographically and economically speaking, it became clear that the isolationist shell, behind which the United States covered itself and which was made of geographical barriers and economic and commercial independence, could no longer hold in the changing world environment of the late thirties and early forties. After the United States was obliged to be involved in the European war, there was a major transformation of the conception that the Americans had of their security and its implications for foreign policy making.

#### **3.4.1 From Hemispheric Defense to Collective Security:**

Even before the United States' entry into the Second World War and especially in the years 1940-41, the Americans had to reconsider their belief in the assurance about their safety from external attacks and whether the policy of neutrality and the geographical barriers were still efficient in securing the U.S. territory. After the German-Russian pact and the German imperialistic ambitions became clear, the United States started to feel the threat. But the way to avoid this threat was, as usual, to stay out of the war (Earle 186).

However, with the collapse of France in 1940 and with Britain in danger, the balance of power in Europe, on which the United States counted so much for ensuring its continuing preeminent position in the world's economic system, was distorted. It was realized that the "Axis control of the Atlantic" signified "serious, menacing and unavoidable problems of a political, economic and military character" (Earle 186). The United States acquired naval and air bases from Britain in the Caribbean, Newfoundland and Bermuda in the interest of the national security of the United States

in exchange of destroyers given to Britain; this, however, was believed to be a continuation of the United States' hemispheric defense (Earle 187).

Anglo-Saxon agreements were driven, at least in part, in the United States' interest in the continuity of the British sea power as one of the most important means by which the United States could ensure that no European nation could threaten hemispheric security ( Earle 187). Acquisitions of bases in Greenland and Iceland and the Lend-Lease Act were other means of using whatever means available, short of officially joining one side or the other, to preserve national security. The United States established bases in the Atlantic for strategic reasons in the same way it did in the phase of the westward expansion, possessions overseas and the Pacific protection tools.

More importantly, after the attacks on Pearl Harbor, there developed a strong belief in the impossibility of dissociating national from international security. That is, the belief in the efficiency of aloofness from world conflicts as a means of security was shattered. Soon it was felt that "the United States became part of an active, interdependent world"(Anderson 02) In addition to this, with the development of science and technology that facilitated contact between nations through the air, the reliance on such geographical barriers as oceans and long distances became unreasonable.

### **3.4.2 National Security and Collective Security:**

As was mentioned in the first chapter, the distinction between national security and international security must not lead to the fallacy of thinking that the two are separate. The distinction rather concerns the scope on which security measures are taken. Even though during the Isolationist period the United States based its security measures on a hemispheric scope, we can say that these measures were not really collective in the proper sense of the word. That is, the United States made most of its decisions relating to security interests, even those concerning the whole western hemisphere, in a unilateral way. In addition, it took independence earlier than its counterparts in central and South America and could thus claim to be a model for the other countries, being economically and technically more advanced than they were. It thus assumed the

responsibility for protecting the countries of the western hemisphere (as it had done in the Spanish American War). Rather than being considered a collective security measure, which would imply the participation, willingly and on a relatively equal status, of all the nations concerned, the United States' parental attitude towards its newly independent neighbors can be explained as an attempt at preventing the European powers from getting so close to its borders as to represent a direct physical threat.

In the Second World War and, more importantly for our research, in the Cold War era, the United States used the security concept and issued security measures that made it associate itself with many other powers around the world, which had in common the fact of being faced by the same threat (or thought they were). During the war, the threat was the occupation of the world by Germany and the other Axis powers. This made the United States hate any dictatorial or totalitarian regime which had international ambitions, which Germany was, and made it believe that such a regime would threaten the security of the whole world and inevitably that of the United States. The image of the spread of the German power in Europe and its indirect effect on the United States' security was used many times by American foreign policy makers to justify their reaction to the spread of the new totalitarian regime and, thus, the new threat of the Soviet Union and its communist regime.

Therefore, the United States' relation with the rest of the world changed dramatically. In 1945 a new international organization, which was in great part engineered by President Roosevelt, came into existence. This institution aimed at preserving international peace and preventing such aggressive nations as Germany from threatening the stability of the whole world. This was to be done through international cooperation and collective security measures. The United States, contrary to its reaction to Wilson's League of Nations, assumed a very active and leading role in this new organization ( Jones 212). After the surrender of Japan, Italy and Germany, this organization's role was to prevent these powers from threatening the peace of Europe and the whole world through preventing their rearmament. These countries, especially Germany, were soon controlled by international efforts in a way that would

make them unable to represent a threat to the rest of the world. Soon, however, a new threat to the United States was arising.

### **3.4.3 The Soviet Union and the New Threat:**

In the year 1922, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was formed, as a result of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. The U.S.S.R was a multinational socialist empire. It added to its territories four more republics in 1940. After the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union got hold of Eastern Germany and most of Eastern European countries. Their communist and socialist ideology, which was based on Marxist doctrines and which aimed at overthrowing capitalism, was soon looked at by the United States as a major threat to its democratic system. This was due to the fact that the Soviet Union started spreading its ideals all over the world. The ideological difference between communism and socialism on the one hand, and capitalism and democracy on the other, cannot be thoroughly explained here, because my interest is not a contrast between the two systems. More important are the Soviet Union's expansionist ambitions in the world and their effect on the United States' security measures. This concerns the United States security measures in the Cold war. This was the opposition between the United States and the Soviet Union from the end of the Second World War (technically, even before) to the late 1980's. This was characterized by the attempt of each to have more power than the other and, more importantly, the view of the Soviet union as a major threat to the national security of the United States, which made the latter conceptualized on a global rather than hemispheric scale.

It is true, especially after the Vietnam War and the Controversy it raised over the United States' involvement in remote parts of the world, a new and retrospective interpretation of the Soviet behavior in the early years of the Cold War opposed this view. This interpretation, which was embodied in the Revisionist and Post-Revisionist views, looked at the actions of the Soviet Union in the early years following the Second World War as a legitimate step towards ensuring the security of its borders, and claimed that the Cold War conflicts were 'fabricated' by the United States' foreign policy makers. Since this research looks at the way the concepts that resulted from

major events on the international scene, and not the origin of these events, it suffices to mention only an example of this criticism. One of the critics, Howard Zinn, in *A People's History of the United States* (1980), gives another explanation: he said that after the Second World War, the American public "seemed to favor demobilization and disarmament" which made it necessary for the Truman administration (Roosevelt had died in April 1945) to "create an atmosphere of crisis and cold war"(397). He did not deny the existence of a rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, which both emerged from the war as the two great powers that would replace the old ones (mainly France, Great Britain, Spain). However, he claimed that this rivalry was exaggerated to an extent that represented the Soviet movements in Europe and elsewhere as a real threat to the United States. The Administration created a hysteria and fear of the Soviets that would justify intervention abroad and repression at home. (The 1950's Witch Hunt is a good example.)

Nonetheless, this view did not produce a 'Vietnam War consensus', contrary to the 'Cold War consensus', that represented a general agreement that the United States could not remain inside its isolationist shell (see the sections below). Moreover, in spite of this criticism, the prevailing feeling that portrayed the Soviets as a threat did not fully disappear until the official end of the Cold War.

#### **3.4.4. The Domino Theory and the Perception of the Soviet Threat:**

One of the most illustrative principles of the global scale on which the United States based its security conception in the Cold War era was the "domino theory". According to this theory, events in one area of the world, if unrestricted by a counteraction, would influence the neighboring areas and then this influence would move further until reaching distant areas from the first incident. This view had been present before, but it came into wide use and popularity during the early years of the Cold War; it was particularly attributed to President Dwight D. Eisenhower. This belief was a justification of the United States policy makers' resistance to the spread of the Soviets' communist ideology in some parts of the world which were geographically and politically remote from the United States. A particular case is the United States involvement in Korea. In this case, the United States interpreted the invasion of South

Korea by North Korea as an effect of a communist victory in China in 1949. That is, the Communist takeover in China was seen as a Soviet attempt to spread its ideology in the region which carried on in fulfilling its objective by trying to ensure a communist takeover in Korea. The American administration was blamed because it did not prevent the Communist takeover in China. Thus, if the United States overlooked the Korean crisis, the Soviet Union would go on with its project until spreading its influence on most of the world.

The origin of the triumph of this belief is found in the Second World War. This was by making an analogy between the spread of the Soviet ideology and its control over some parts of the world and the behavior of the German empire prior to and during the Second World War. Hitler's Germany, because it was not resisted by other powers, especially by the United States, imposed its control over some parts of the world. Eventually, this led to the outbreak of a destructive war and Germany disturbed the peace of the world. The course of events led the United States to be affected by this in spite of its relative neutrality and geographical remoteness. In a similar way, it was believed, the Soviet Union would, if not resisted by the United States, spread the communist ideology and, eventually, destroy the United States' political and economic principles. The Soviet attempt to spread its ideology and strengthen it in Eastern Europe was interpreted as an attempt or a potential cause for the humiliation of the United States (Jervis and Snyder).

Moreover, as was mentioned before, the core values or vital interests of the country are not always determined on a territorially and geographically limited basis. In some cases, these core values, the preservation of which is an important condition for a country to have its national security, can be in very remote areas in the world. This was best illustrated by the United States' 'containment policy', aiming at blocking the spread of communism and Soviet influence around the world, which made the United States claim to have interests all around the world. The domino principle was not only interpreted on geographical grounds; it also concerned the influence that an event has on another. That is, if the Soviet behavior is ignored on small issues and areas with little interests for the United States, this would lead the Soviet Union to carry on its advance to a point where it would be too late for the United States to take

action. So, a state interferes in matters that appear as trivial, to prevent the development of events to a more important point (Jervis and Snyder 25).

President Harry S. Truman's Radio Address on April 11<sup>th</sup>, 1951 illustrates this view. In this report to the American public, President Truman, referring back to the Second World War and its origins, tried to justify the United States' involvement in as remote a place as Korea. He claimed that if the Soviets succeeded in Asia and accumulated more power, the United States would be among "its principal victims." To stress the importance of acting on an international scale, he claimed that the "peace-loving nations"(members of the United Nations) had to "act together" before they were "picked off one by one". He indirectly made an analogy between the contemporary conduct of the Soviet Union and that of the Fascist and Nazi expansionist movements in years preceding the Second World War: in the same way that the War was due to the absence of a multilateral action by the "free countries" to block those expansionist movements from reaching a point where they could not be resisted easily. From the speech it could be concluded that inaction towards the Soviet Union's expansionist policies would lead to results that would be as catastrophic as the Second World War: a third World War, which he claimed to be preventing by interfering in Korea.

In addition, since the United States would consider events in other parts of the world as closely related to its security, no matter how far these events seemed to be, it had either to prevent their development in a way that carries with it the likelihood of being a threat, or change it in a favorable direction. This was done by alliance formation. The domino effect was implicated in this case. That is, if the United States ignored the Soviets' triumph in a small or insignificant issue or part of the world, this would affect the country's reputation, especially among its allies. This is more important when it made promises to these allies. A failure to fulfill one promise would affect the allies' attitude to other promises by expecting the same failure. As a result, this would make the country lose an important factor in its security measures, which is the trust and cooperation of the allies. When a country considered its own action, it might be more interested in the credibility of threats to its security, than in the credibility of its promises; it applies this more easily when it considers the behavior of

the enemy. The Soviets' failure to abide by international agreements on some issues such as arms control, would make the United States expect the same behavior in other cases. This is considered as a good justification of some of the United States' anticipatory actions and actions based on this interpretation of the Soviets' behavior. (Jervis 26) Therefore, as a means of defense, the United States tried to act firmly and oppose aggressively the spread of the Soviet influence, even in areas that seemed of little strategic importance to it. Because continuity is what people expect, "undesired behavior on one issue or in one area of the world must be resisted in order to prevent it from becoming accepted as normal" (Jervis and Snyder 28).

An important implication for the United States' foreign policy making is actually a seemingly paradoxical aspect of the domino theory. The proponents of the domino theory will behave in such a way as to counteract the domino effect by their measures. For example, if a state backs down on an issue or in a certain area in the world, it would do its best to prevent the same thing from happening elsewhere or on another issue. That is, a defeat somewhere would make both allies and enemies expect the state to fail on another issue; when the state acts more successfully on the next issue this would invalidate the already established issue due to the first defeat. This is not, however, as paradoxical as it seems. The domino theory proponents do not claim that the domino effect would not be stopped. They rather claim that it is the normal and predictable course of events, and that it will necessarily operate if left unopposed. They use this to justify their active involvement in the world. That is, the United States would arrange the dominoes in such a way that the fall of one would not necessarily mean the fall of the others. In more concrete terms, this could be done by imposing the United States' presence in an area before the Soviet Union got its hold on it (id.37). In short, "states do react to a loss by taking strong counteractions" to prevent the effect that this loss would have on their reputation (id.38). There is another paradox with the domino theory: even if the state gained in one issue or area in the world, this would not always make others expect it to behave as successfully elsewhere. Sometimes, a victory requires that the state exhaust most of its resources, thus making it unable to face another issue later on. This is the more so if the public opinion is taken into consideration, which would not accept the sacrifices and the costs of these victories,

since it contributes to a great extent in human and material terms. This did not undermine the effect of the domino theory on the United States' security conception. There are some circumstances that make the domino theory more valid than others. These even determine the extent of this validity and the nature of the effect.

#### **3.4.5.Circumstances that Influence the Domino Effect Belief:**

There are certain conditions under which the domino effects are more likely, and thus, the domino theory is more convincing and valid. For instance, the structure of the international system and the state's position in it is of great significance. In case of nuclear power and deterrence for example, the reputation of the state and the influence of the domino effect on them is more important than the physical losses or gains. This is because nuclear power is more effective than alliance formation. In addition, since the world during the era of the Cold War was characterized by bipolarity, or the dominance of two powers on the international scene, the domino theory appeared more convincing. It is easier to predict the intentions and behavior of one power through its precedents than to do this with a multiplicity of actors on the international scene. In addition, there was the risk that the neutral countries would follow the lead of the Soviet Union if they saw in it the wave of the future. These neutral countries, which mainly belonged to the non-alignment movement, were not neglected by the United States. This was because their continuing neutrality was neither beneficial nor guaranteed by the United States ( Jervis and Snyder 40).

In addition to the international situation and the relationship between superpowers in general, the particularities of each situation influence the way and the extent to which the domino effect will operate. If the state is a large and important one, the domino effect and its expectation are more likely to operate than when the state is small and strategically more important. In addition, retreats or defeats on one issue are more likely to produce expectations and operations on similar issues than on those of a different nature. As yet another instance is the legitimacy of the state's action if the state retreats on a more legitimate issue, this would make it more likely to retreat on issues which do not have a direct impact on its security. Moreover, if the state is small and has internal problems which make it helpless in facing any great power, there is

more probability that this state would join the power that sees it as a potential danger. It thus resorts to align itself with this power, both to avoid conflict with it and to use its partnership as a defense against other aggressors. This leads us to another closely related theory that prevailed in the United States' conception of its security during the Cold War, which is called the 'Bandwagon theory'.

#### **3.4.6 Bandwagon Theory:**

A closely related theory to that of the falling domino was the bandwagon theory. Most of the time, its principles were used by policy makers either in combination with the domino effect or interchangeably with it. According to this theory, when a new power emerges and starts to represent a threat to the neighboring states, the weaker states which cannot afford to protect themselves against a potential attack by this power, would seek to align themselves with it for two reasons. The first reason is that this power would represent the wave of the future and its partnership will bring about some prestige and protection for the weak state. The second one is that this would reduce the likelihood of being attacked by it because the weak state is on its side (Waltz 51). This was also done by making an analogy with Eastern and Central Europe, which aligned itself with Hitler prior to the Second World War (Larson 85).

There were many who believed the opposite, but the United States' policymakers always find clues from the real context that can help them change the interpretation of the international situation. The opposing view is what is usually called the balance of power theory. According to this theory, when a new state rises in power and starts to represent a threat to the other states, the latter are expected to unite and combine their resources by forming alliances which, by their numerical superiority, would match the power of the rising state. Advocates of this theory use as a proof some weak states that were vulnerable to the Soviet domination but firmly resisted joining its bandwagon; these are Iran, Turkey, India and Pakistan. However, American decision makers, when seeing this, believed that these states would not be able to resist forever if they did not receive help from the United States, especially if they were weak economically. This can make them more vulnerable to such Soviet actions as imposing its economic and commercial presence in these countries. Usually, the American foreign policymakers

apply the Bandwagon theory when they portray the Soviet threat, and the balance of power when they make alliances all over the world. That is, they claimed the existence of the risk that small states would join the bandwagon of the Soviet Union, and to prevent this they made the balance of power mechanism work effectively.

Thus, to justify an interventionist foreign policy, the United States decision makers claimed that a return to isolationism would make the allies of the United States join the bandwagon of the Soviet Union. This means that if the weak states find an ally, it is the balance of power which works, whereas if these states did not find an ally whose partnership would match the Soviet power, they would join the bandwagon of the Soviet Union. So, very much similar to the domino theory in its effect, bandwagon images led the United States to make anticipatory actions in the world. Accordingly, the United States, whenever it expected the Soviet Union to be interested in one area of the world, tried to impose its power in it so that the small countries in that area would not align with the Soviets. Some of the implications of this idea were the Marshall Plan of 1947. Moreover, imposing the United States' presence in those small states would be easier and safer than letting those states join the Soviet Union and, therefore, increase the power of Communism.<sup>1</sup>

One of the mechanisms of the domino effect and bandwagons is physical or material: the dominance of one area can add to the state's strength in terms of territory and resources which it will gain from the periphery. Moreover, geographically speaking, the aggressor's access to one area can allow it to have access to the neighboring areas. Another form which can be more important sometimes is psychological. This was a matter of prestige both among the allies and the adversary. If an allied nation sees the United States act insufficiently in any area of the world, this would make it question the trust it has in the United States and thus make it lose its importance as an ally. The United States dealing with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949 is a good example. Consequently, "a country which is unwilling to stand up for one ally is presumed to be unwilling to stand by others as well." This

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<sup>1</sup> The term 'small' is used geographically. These countries, which included previous powers as France and Britain, emerged victorious from the war, but they suffered devastation and the destruction of their infrastructures, which made them in desperate need for foreign economic aid. To provide this aid they risked the loss of their sovereignty to such an economically powerful state as Russia.

would increase or bring about the probability that less powerful allies would change sides. As well as the allies, some neutrals that formally joined neither of the two superpowers, directing almost all of their interest to domestic issues, would be strategically important. That is, if one of these neutrals sees in the Soviet and its ideology an advantage to its prosperity, it would not hesitate to align itself with it and join the bandwagon. (Jervis and Snyder 33).

### **3.5.Foreign Policy Makers and the New Conception of Threat:**

As the first President after the end of the War whose presidency coincided with the development of a new picture of the United States' security status, Truman and his administration had much credit in the new phase of the development of the concept of national security in the United States, and which prevailed during most of the period between the early 1950's and the end of the Cold War.

#### **3.5.1The Falling Domino Principle and the Truman Administration:**

Although the falling domino principle is attributed to President Eisenhower's speech in April 1954 about Indochina, its use as a principle in the Cold War era finds its origin in the Truman administration. As Douglas J. McDonald puts it, the domino principle refers to "a perception of the nature of a growing global threat, intimately linked with the policy of containment, by a society and government" who found great responsibilities thrust upon them at a time when they had not been prepared for this yet (McDonald 112). The main principles of the containment policy and security concept in the postwar era developed rather in a gradual way from 1946 to 1950. During this period, there was a gradual formation of the image of the Soviet behavior as a global threat which represented a great danger for the whole world including the United States. This did not mean that this image or conception had not been present before. It rather means that before the end of this period, there was more controversy about the extent to which the Soviet Union represented a threat to the United States and about which states were more strategically important for the United States in case the latter would align with foreign states to face the Soviet threat. After the threat became more clearly perceived, the controversy focused on the issue of how many resources the

United States would devote, and with which nations it would intervene, to face the perceived threat. Some believed that there should be a selective choice of states with which the United States would be involved in the fight against Communism, and thus less spending on military preparations. On the other hand, some others believed that all states were important since they were interdependent (McDonald 113).

The former are called by McDonald "strongpoint" strategists while the latter are called "perimeter" strategists. The strongpoint strategists called for the establishment of security perceptions on the bases of the available resources of the country. The perimeter strategists, on the other hand, argued that resources had to be supplied in such a way as to meet the security circumstances as perceived in the early years of the Cold War. These attempted to get more resources and state support of the containment. The strongpoint strategy was favored by the Truman administration before 1948. From 1949 onward, however, there was a shift towards the other strategy. Some events that accelerated this shift were "the Truman Doctrine(1947), the Czech coup and the Berlin blockade(1948), the fall of China and the Soviet nuclear detonation (1949) and the outbreak of the Korean war(1950)".(McDonald 113). In the year 1950, the United States' policymakers had concluded that these events were "a pattern of communist expansion that threatened any vulnerable nation that stood in its path, that is, dominoes" (id.114).

### **3.5.2. The Shift from the Strongpoint Strategy to the Peripheral Strategy:**

In the early years of the Cold war, the attention of American foreign policymakers was focused on the European countries in perceiving the threat of Soviet communism. This was due to the fact that those countries or states were closer to the Soviet Union and thus, more vulnerable to the underlying domino effect than others. The threat was perceived in terms of the Soviet attempts at interfering in those countries in such a way that would bring to power pro-communist leaders. These would later on show allegiance to the Soviet government and submit to its control. Thus, they would be used as a tool to advance the communist presence further. Gradually, the Soviet actions around the world made the United States more determined to rebuff the Soviet claim that it was doing this just to ensure its security and not to impose its domination

around the world. Both public opinion and Congress, however, had been reluctant, during the early years of the Cold War, to consider any military actions that were explicitly against the Soviet Union (McDonald 116). Thus, the administration had first to rely on means other than military spending, and to reconsider the states in terms of priority and relevance to the national security of the country. Although the media and public opinion were convinced that the United States had to maintain a more resolute position in facing the Soviet threat, the scope on which the responsibilities of the United States were believed to exist were not global in the complete sense of the word. Thus, during the early years of the Cold War, the prevailing and triumphant stance in American foreign policy making was the view that the Soviet threat had to be met by the country's resistance; however, this resistance was rather regional, Eurocentric and vague in not applying it to particular states but to regions. (McDonald 117)

Soon, however, the other view gained ground after the events that took place in the period between the end of the Second World War and the United States' involvement in the Korean conflict. At the beginning, there was great opposition inside Congress to the ideas of providing more resources for containing the Soviet threat at a universal level. The idea of states being affected by the situation in other states and all being an influence on the rest of the world including the United States was used to convince Congress to provide more resources for the containment policy. It was argued by perimeter strategists that the United States had to impose its power everywhere in the world to ensure national security. In the United States' calculations of priorities to its security, made by the Joint Chiefs, the focus was mainly on Europe, with Asia in general and nationalist China in particular, led by the Mao Zedong, a communist, at the bottom of the list.

What accelerated the shift towards the perimeter strategy was the Soviet Union's shift in its dealing with the world. This, in its turn, is explained as a reaction to the United States' behavior. After the latter proposed to European countries financial and economic help (i.e. the Marshall Plan) the Soviet Union abandoned any idea of friendly relations with the United States. It saw this program as a means by the United States to isolate the Soviet Union in Europe and to gain indirect control on the region through economic dependency, and was convinced that the "West, led by the United

States, was intent on creating a hostile encirclement of the Soviet Union”(Parrish and Narinsky 37). As a reaction the Soviet decided to form a new coordinating center for European Communist parties. The new organization would be used both to “mobilize resistance to the Marshall Plan in Western Europe, and to consolidate Soviet control over the countries of Eastern Europe.”(id.38) On 22-27 September 1947, representatives of nine Communist parties met in Poland to discuss the formation of such a new international Communist organization, the ‘Cominform’.

This was meant as a tool to coordinate the efforts of the communist ideologists around the world. It made a more overt confrontation with the West by claiming it to have imperialistic ambitions that were as greedy as those of Hitler at the outbreak of the Second World War. They claimed that the Marshall Plan and other steps taken by the United States to get closer to Europe had been just a pretext to enslave Europe economically and politically (McDonald 121). In addition, the Soviet Union started to make troubles in the internal affairs of some European countries such as France and Italy, and to provoke violence. This became more obvious when the Soviet Union vetoed most American policies concerning the reconstruction of Europe in the December 1947 Meeting of the Foreign Ministers. (id.121). Soon, however, the Soviet Union found that its opportunity did not lie in Europe but in Asia. Still, however, the Truman administration kept low military spending, promoted naval rather than land power. The United States’ monopoly of the atomic bomb was seen as efficient to deter the Soviet Union.

The following events and developments led to a gradual shift in the perception of the Soviet threat and its intentions in Europe and the rest of the world. On Feb. 24, 1948, the Czech Communist Party overthrew the established government in Czechoslovakia. This was believed to be Soviet-inspired rather than the result of an internal problem of that country. Many Americans made an analogy between this incident and Hitler's behavior in the 1930's. The United States’ policymakers claimed that this incident proved the hypothesis that the nations contiguous with the Soviet satellites were vulnerable to the Soviet incursion. In the spring of 1948 the United States reacted by increasing the economic aids given to the European countries for reconstruction. In addition to this, the Soviet Union imposed a blockade on the city of

Berlin, which convinced the Truman administration that the Soviets' " goals were, like Hitler's, unlimited." Eventually, the United States resorted to the collective security measures which were embodied in the formation of NATO. The United States aligned itself mainly with Western Europe and extended its support to Greece, Turkey, and Iran.

Later, the events mentioned earlier combined with more significant ones to make the perimeter strategy triumphant at the end. The Cominform was involved in promoting uprisings in Southeast Asia to overthrow existing governments and establish communist regimes that would later claim allegiance to the Soviet Union.

Moreover, Dean Acheson, who replaced George Marshall as Secretary of State in January 1949, had more support for the perimeter strategy than did his predecessor. He could convince many in Congress that all the communist takeovers around the world were supported by the Soviets. He made Congress believe that the threat of the Soviet Union required that the United States intervene, not only in Europe, but wherever the threat of communist and Soviet presence was slightly felt. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan had to be extended to Asia since the Soviet influence in Southeast Asia meant that the whole region of Asia would be vulnerable to the communist threat. The event that helped Acheson convince Congress of this idea was the communist takeover in China in early 1949. The communist behavior in Europe and in Asia, then, started to look as instances of the same threat to international order. By the summer of the year 1949, there was no doubt that the communist parties of China and Asia in general were tools in the hands of the Soviet leaders who were trying to dominate the world as a whole.

The State's policy Planning Staff declared that the loss of the region of Southeast Asia would "critically affect the security of Japan, India, and Australia and eventually the United States"(McDonald 130). The National Security Council made a study which concluded that the fall of China would lead to the fall of all of Southeast Asia. The perception of the Soviet threat changed not only in the United States' government but in the whole American society. Other changes in the world situation contributed to the strengthening of the new perimeter strategy. This was the Soviet detonation of the atomic bomb in September 1949. This meant that the argument of the strongpoint

strategists that the United States' monopoly of nuclear power would deter the Soviets was no more reasonable.

Moreover the United States was not only concerned with the Soviet movements, but also with the influence of communist takeovers in some countries on the neighboring ones. That is, there could be a communist insurgency first, then the allegiance of the new communist regimes to the Soviet Union. This was explained by the principle of the bandwagon effect, which claimed that the Soviets' influence in a region would make states in that region see that they were not ready to face the threat and might as well conclude that the Soviet power could be used to their own advantage through aligning themselves with it, as the Chinese did. Therefore the United States started giving military assistance to France and Britain which were the two major western powers in the region. Japan was of greater importance than China in terms of the security of the region and its impact on the United States whether directly or indirectly. So, the United States' efforts had to be directed towards assuring that the states of Southeast Asia would not feel obliged or forced, or even interested in bandwagoning with the Sovietist. The Soviet and Chinese leaders improved their relationship and Ho Chi Minh announced, in early 1950, his alignment with the People's Republic of China. The threat of bandwagoning was even seen among the allies of the United States who considered the United States as passive and very soft on the Soviets.

Containment of the Soviet threat, then, reached Southeast Asia in late December 1949. The departments of defense and of state reached a consensus on American policy towards Asia. This included developing stable states, containing Soviet influence and maintaining the balance in the region (McDonald 131). The United States tried to prevent the bandwagon effect by making these countries economically independent (from the Soviets, of course) so that they would both be able to resist the Soviet threat and feel that they were self-sustaining enough; thus, they would not need Soviet help. Financial help was given to Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, the French in Indo China and Japan. These actions, though not as important as the Marshall Plan and NATO in Europe, indicate an "increase in the perception of threat in the region" (McDonald 130).

Dean Acheson replaced George Kennan , an advocate of the strongpoint strategy, with Paul Nitze, who believed in the "strategic interdependence of all areas of the world"(McDonald 130). There was more conviction among American foreign policy makers that "each and every nation around the entire perimeter " was "interdependent with U.S. security"( McDonald 131). On the eve of the Korean War, the advocacy of taking military action on a universal scope was the triumphant stance towards dealing with the Soviet threat.

Thus, after a series of developments, the United States, which emerged after the Second World War without a clear and conclusive conception of its relation to the rest of the world in general and to the Soviet Union in particular, reached a kind of consensus that portrayed the threat to the United States' security as the expansionism and power of the Soviet Union and its communist ideology. American officials, or at least most of them, became convinced that the United States had to be directly involved in the world, not only as an equal participant in international affairs, but as a leading actor in the conduct of international peace which became closely tied to the security of the United States. The perimeter strategy, then, was accepted as the general set of guidelines for the conduct of foreign policy and security measures of the United States.

The domino theory was very much in accordance with the containment policy of the Truman administration. It allowed foreign policy makers and analysts to make predictions about the Soviet behavior and its following steps by making an analogy between what it did somewhere and what was expected to happen in the neighboring areas. Truman's acceptance of the domino principle in the Middle East and Western Europe was just an antecedent to the extension of its scope in Southeast Asia. After the development of the nuclear capacity of the Soviets and the strengthening of the Chinese communist regime, this view met more acceptance than the strongpoint strategy. It became used as a weapon against those who wanted to adopt a more selective approach to deal with the Soviet threat by making a distinction between the strategically important nations and those that had little or nothing to do with the affairs of the United States. It justified the belief in the strategic importance of every region and of every nation in that region by claiming that the Soviets' domination of any

nation is not just an end in itself, but also an intermediary step towards occupying more areas by transferring its influence to contiguous areas and, finally, occupying as much of the world as it could. This would, according to the theory, jeopardize the security of the whole world including the United States. So, the importance of any nation is not in itself, but in its relation with the neighboring ones and, thus, its influence on the situation of the whole world.

Moreover, the domino principle was a tool in the hands of foreign policy makers to convince the public and congress of the necessity to raise more funds and increase the budget of military spending. As McDonald put it, "the Czech coup would not have been as likely had the Czechoslovakia not had a common border with other communist nation"(McDonald 135). He made the same statement about China, whose borders with the Soviet Union contributed a great deal to its becoming a communist nation; in its turn, communist China contributed to the communist takeover in Indochina.

The domino belief contributed much to the prevention of a communist takeover in Burma, Thailand, Malay and the Philippines (McDonald 135). Moreover, even though there was some public rage at the United States' participation in the Vietnam War, which was mainly done in application of the domino principle, the later presidents of the cold war era, mainly Reagan, would revive the domino principle after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979.

### **3.5.3. Implications for Foreign Policy and Security Measures:**

The new concept of national security in the United States, then, had changed in its view of the nature of the existing threat and the best way to deal with it. The threat shifted from the European ambitions in the western hemisphere and the danger of meddling with European affairs, to the Soviet ambitions in the whole world and the risks entailed in giving it the opportunity to carry out its plans. Moreover, contrary to the Isolationist period, when the United States associated its security with the new republics of the American continents, in the postwar era it aligned itself with most nations that were part of the non-communist realm, especially those that were in danger of Soviet Penetration. This perception had been first maintained on a European scale, including most countries of Western Europe and those which were not part of

the communist world but threatened to be so. This led the United States to depart from its traditional skeptical attitude towards all European Powers.

Accordingly, the United States, besides being an active member of the United Nations, associated itself with the states of Western Europe in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which was an important step towards the assertion of collective security measures as a more efficient means than isolation for ensuring national security. Before that, it offered economic help to the European states that suffered economically and financially from the Second World War. The first line of defense, then, was transferred to Europe. Chilton, among many, considers this not as a break with traditional American foreign policy outlined in the Monroe Doctrine and its interpretation by different foreign policymakers of the isolationist era, but as just an extension of its scope and boundaries.

#### **3.5.4. The Truman Doctrine:**

One of the most illustrative reactions of the United States to the perceived Soviet threat in the early Cold War is the Truman Doctrine, in Truman's message to Congress of March, 1947. In this message we perceive both the domino and bandwagon effects . The President asked for economic assistance for Greece and Turkey as a preventive measure against the Soviet potential threat to these two countries. He mentioned the terrorist activities led by Communists against the established government. Moreover, he directly referred to the security of the United States, which would be threatened if "the totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermined the foundation of international peace"(Commager 525). Totalitarianism unmistakably referred to the USSR, though this was not explicitly mentioned. The fall of Greece "under an armed minority", the President stated, " would lead to the same fate for its neighbor, Turkey and this would lead to "confusion and disorder ...throughout the entire Middle East." He warned that the disappearance of Greece from Europe would have a great effect on the whole of Europe and, eventually, this would be" disastrous...for the world." The President argued that poverty and strife were the seeds that lead to the victory of such regimes. So, he asked Congress for \$400 million and for the sending of American personnel to Greece and Turkey to help them

get on their feet so that they would not join the bandwagon of the Soviet Union. As a result, in May an act was passed to authorize assistance to Greece and Turkey.

This demonstrates the extra hemispheric view of national security that resulted from the Second World War and the United States' involvement in it. It led first to bringing the front lines of defense to Europe and the Near East. Soon, however, this regional view was extended to Southeast Asia and thus completed the process of globalizing the United States' security conception.

### **3.6.Cases:**

#### **3.6.1.National Security Council, NATO and the Korean War:**

As a result of the increasing concern among American foreign policy makers about the security of their country, a National Security Act was passed on July 26, 1947 (Commager 541-542). According to this Act, a National Security Council was formed, consisting of the President and many other high officials. The major role of the NSC was to advise the President about domestic, military and foreign policies relating to the national security. As part of it, the Central Intelligence Agency was established; its function was to gather intelligence relating to national security and, later, to undertake covert and secret actions around the world to prevent the spread of the Soviet Union's power in many areas around the world.

Another important step in security measures was the United States signing, on 4 April, 1949, of the North Atlantic Treaty, which produced the North Atlantic treaty Organization, or NATO. This treaty was consistent with the Monroe Doctrine in associating American national security with that of non-communist European countries. It was an effort at cooperation between countries of the Atlantic, most of which were democracies and usually referred to as the Western bloc, to ensure their security through collective measures. These countries were to "unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security" (Commager 556). The treaty stated that the attack on any of the member countries would be considered as an attack on all of them. This meant that in case of an attack on one country, it was the duty and the right of the other countries to defend it. At its beginning, however, NATO was more political than military. It aimed, however, at deterring the Soviet

Union and its satellite countries from envisaging the invasion of any of the non-communist European countries.

More relevant to the globalization of the scope on which national security was conceptualized was the National Security Council (NSC) and the Korean War. From 1947 onwards, the United States pursued what is called the containment policy, which aimed at preventing the spread of the Soviet Union's power through communist takeovers around the world. It started first on a regional or European range, since the Soviet threat was perceived as relevant only in Europe. Later, however, and especially after the Korean war, it became more global. An important element in the security discourse was NSC-68. This was a study done by the NSC and concluded on April 14, 1950. It was top secret but its principal implications were made public later on. This was related, in part, to the Soviet explosion of the atomic device in August 1949. The belief that the United States' monopoly of atomic weapons was an efficient means of defense against potential Soviet attack no more made sense. Moreover, the communist takeover in China the same year made many believe that the Soviet expansionist ambitions, or what is called the Kremlin's design in this document, was unlimited (Chilton 128). This was seen as a serious success of the Soviets to spread their power and ideology.

This document portrayed the world in a bipolar state. On the one hand was the 'free world' of the United States and western democracies, and on the other was the world of the Soviet Union and its satellite countries which were used as a tool of its expansionist policies. It was stressed that the Nuclear weapons of the United States were insufficient and that the United States military capacities were inadequate, taking into account the international situation of that time. It stated that the Soviet threat did not lie only in Europe or used only economic intimidation; it was a global threatening power that would risk a third world war to fulfill its designs. Its objectives were no more local or confined to Europe. Thus this document stressed the necessity of globalizing the containment efforts of the United States and increasing the military capacities in traditional war tools to face the Soviet threat. Mere economic help to European countries aligning themselves with the United States was no more adequate. This document, even though its real effect could be seen after the Korean War,

contained most of the basic principles of the United States security measures during the entire era of the Cold War.

### **3.6.2.The Korean War:**

The most decisive and influential event in the early years of the Cold War was the invasion of South Korea, on June 25, 1950, by communist North Korea. Korea, after the defeat of the Japanese, was temporarily divided at the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel. In South Korea the United States established a military government while in North Korea the Soviet did the same. The details of this war are not of great importance. The northern government became communist and aimed at uniting the country under communism. More relevant is the United States' reaction.

Two days after the invasion, Truman released his war message to Congress. The President referred to the United States and the refusal of North Korea to execute the UN Security Council to stop the invasion. This meant that the United States was entering the war to fulfill its commitment to the United Nations. It did so, because during the war, the United Nations participated with troops from many member countries of the organization. More important was the President's statement that "Communism passed beyond subversion to conquer independent nations and [would then] use armed invasion and war"(Commager 560). Another effect was the view of China as the duplication of the Soviets in Asia or, at least, a strong tool in the hands of the Kremlin to fulfill its design. This was seen in the President's reference to Formosa, a strategically important island near China, where the Chinese Nationalists had escaped after the fall of China to Communism. He stated that the occupation of Formosa by communist forces would be "a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to the United States forces..."(ibid.560).

The war officially ended in 1953, and left a great mark on the United States' foreign policy and security measures. It ended the controversy about the Soviet threat and led to the triumph of the perimeter strategy. Moreover, it led to an increase in the army and militarizing NATO and making it more efficient. Moreover, the communist takeover in China was looked at, retrospectively, with the blame on the Truman administration for the fall of China. This country was seen as more hostile and pro

Soviet after the war. More importantly, the domino effect, though the term was used only later, became more valid than before, since the North Korean communist takeover was seen as a result of the fall of China and the influence this had on North Korea. In addition, it led to the United States' extension of the containment policy to Southeast Asia and, later, their involvement in the Vietnam War.

In addition, the fear of the bandwagon effect and the importance of reputation in domino mechanisms were also important. In June 1950, the United States was afraid that reluctance to resist the North Korean invasion would undermine its reputation among its European allies. This was because they would expect it to behave on European issues, such as that of Germany, in the same way. This would make them abandon it and maintain a neutralist policy. They were afraid that the Federal Republic of Germany, which was under the control of the United States and its allies, would be left alone if attacked by the pro-Soviet Democratic German Republic.(Larson 97).

### **3.6.3.The Vietnam War and its opponents.:**

Convictions of the Cold War did not always have the same strength or the same popularity among policy makers or public opinion. Neither was the conception of the Soviet threat and its implications for the National Security. The opposition to the United States' involvement in the Vietnam War (1959-1975), which took place between the communist North Vietnam and its opponent, South Vietnam is a good illustration. The United States' involvement in his war, which was part of the Cold War conflicts, was seen as a big mistake and proof that claims about the threat that the Soviet Union represented for the United States were exaggerated. Many Americans saw that their country had been too involved in the world and that it should stop wasting the lives of many Americans in conflicts in which they had no stake. In addition, there was a belief that the Vietnam War, between the Communists and their opponents, was an internal affair rather than part of an international plot of the Soviet Union's expansion in the world at the expense of the United States' strategic and economic interests. Some even claimed that the Soviet Union's unfriendly behavior was due to provocation from the United States which denied the Soviets their right of self protection in the early years of the Cold War.

However, many foreign policy makers, especially during the Cold War, considered that the war, which had been started off by the communists' attack on their opponents in the south, was, like the Korean war, a result of the Kremlin's expansionist conduct and its meddling with the internal affairs of other nations. In the same way that the war in Korea was seen as a result of the Communist takeover in China, the latter was used, in its turn, to explain the outbreak of conflict in Vietnam. For example, President Lyndon Johnson, in a speech in 1965, attributed the Vietnam crisis to interference from China, which he saw as an aggressive and repressive state, just like the Soviets. Moreover, he saw, as Truman during the Korean conflict, that the war was part of a "wider pattern of aggressive purposes."

Moreover, even this criticism did not bring about a national consensus to end the Cold War. Though opposition to the Vietnam War was among the major reasons that led to the *détente* - an improvement in the United States and Soviet relations - it did not bring about a national consensus to end this conflict. In addition, events in the late 1970's revived tensions and the Cold War had to wait until the late 1980's to witness some real diversion towards a less pessimistic view of the Soviet Union.

### **Conclusion:**

Thus, during the Cold War era, the United States tightly linked its national security with the circumstances in Europe, first, and then in the whole world. It identified itself, in conceptualizing its security, with Western European countries and others around the world with democratic and liberal political and economic systems. This led to abandoning, though not completely, the idea that the United States could maintain its security by not interfering in events around the world. The Isolationist beliefs related to national security could survive as long as the circumstances, both local and international, were favorable and as long as the policy of isolationism was efficient, in an age which had still believed in the effectiveness of geographical barriers and internal conventions and neutrality in maintaining the safety of the country. When these circumstances changed, the isolationist principles changed as well. After it became difficult to maintain neutrality without some great loss in both economic and human terms, and after the interconnection of different parts of the world became so

strong that events in one region could influence others on the other side of the world, and after technological developments made the geographical barriers meaningless, a new security conception emerged. The latter had important implications for foreign policy making that would last for decades to come.

## **Introduction:**

Towards the end of the Cold War, and with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, there was a great possibility that the American public opinion would call for a cut in the military spending and global commitments of their country. This worried many adherents of the United States' involvements around the world. To prevent this, the latter were forced to find a new and equally convincing justification for the continuity of the interventionist and internationalist attitude in foreign policy making that prevailed most of the Cold War era. Such a justification could not be found in a more convincing issue than an urgent need to protect the national security of the country.

This need would mean the existence of a threat. Thus the foreign policy makers had just to look for this new threat that would replace that of the Soviet Union and its expansionist policy. This was found in the Arab and Islamic world, particularly in the Middle East region. Although the term is subjective and has not yet found a standard definition agreed upon by the whole world, the term "international terrorism" encloses all manifestations of this threat.

### **4.1.The United States and International Terrorism:**

A reservation has to be made before dealing with this issue concerning the national security of the United States. When the term 'terrorism' is used, it is not considered as a standard label that means the same thing for everyone in the world. The term is still a subjective and controversial one. When I use the term 'terrorism', I rather mean its conception by the American foreign policy makers (or at least the way they pretend to conceive it, or make others, including both domestic and international public opinion, share it with them). This will be clearer when I come to the extent to which the United States uses international cooperation to combat terrorism.

#### **4.1.1.Definition:**

A major problem on the international scene, especially in the pre-September 11, 2001 world, was the perception and definition of terrorism, which has always been subjective. Moreover, there can be some agreement on condemning acts of violence and considering them as part of terrorism between the United States and some of its

allies; however, these do not have the same implication for foreign policy making in terms of the kind of approach to be taken, and the extent to which it should be applied on the field.

The problem of definition is more complicated when it comes to the Third World countries and even more so when these countries are Arab or Islamic ones. In many of the Third World countries, the leaders are those who once came to power by acts of violence against the previously established governments. They see many acts that the United States would call terrorism as a legitimate right for self-defence or fighting oppression. Moreover, the similarity between the way they came to power and what is called "terrorism" by the United States would make their support to the United States' fight against terrorism a contradiction of their principles. In addition, they do not have the same alignments as European states, which may think that terrorism is a threat to the whole western civilization, though not to all western countries with the same degree. This is also due to the fact "that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter "(Jenkins 779). Most of what the United States call terrorists claim to be using violence as their legitimate right, since, they say, they are at war. Even states themselves do not have the same conception of terrorism as the United States does. The Arab-Muslim world does not look, for instance, at Hizbollah in Lebanon or Hamas in Palestine as terrorist groups. They are rather considered as "freedom fighters" who use their legitimate right for self defence against the foreign occupation by Israel and its ally, the United States.

In spite of this, for academic reasons, we have to follow certain principles that most definitions agree with. Harvey W. Kushner, for example, in *Encyclopedia of Terrorism* (2003) says that definitions of terrorism hinge on three factors: the method (violence), the target (civilian or government), and the purpose (to instill fear and force political or social change).

Cronin, a specialist in International terrorism at the Library of Congress, says that though "terrorism" is one of the most subjective terms, there are general fundamental characteristics that distinguish it (Cronin 31). Among these he stated political change as the main objective of terrorist acts, which are usually viewed by its agents as acts of justice, whether divine or man-made (ibid.33). In addition, terrorist acts usually target

even innocents who might have no relation with the people viewed by terrorists as the real enemies in practical and strategic terms. More importantly, terrorism does not abide by any international law, nor does it recognize the legitimacy of international organizations such as the United Nations. In fact, terrorism covers activities that date back to the late eighteenth century. It has evolved through time or, rather, it took different forms at different times, in consequence of the different circumstances and objectives beyond its emergence. Considering the enemy against which terrorism directs its actions, Cronin states that terrorism has been against empires, colonial powers and the US-led international system marked by globalization. The latest version is called modern terrorism, but we will simply call it terrorism, because even adding the word 'modern' does not make the term more precise, especially with its subjective nature.

Another important fact about terrorism is the distinction between terrorism and international terrorism. The former aims at afflicting terror and fear on the government of the state in which its executors live, for the sake of some political changes which they want to oblige the state to follow, or which they want to implement after having defeated the state and replaced it in power. International terrorism, on the other hand, aims at targets that belong to other states. In the case of terrorism that came from other parts of the world but was directed against the United States, these targets can either be in the countries where these terrorists live, or in other countries around the world; after September 11<sup>th</sup> these targets included even those in the United States itself. Moreover, most of the time these are diplomatic headquarters which contain the United States' officials or places where American citizens are present. This does not mean that the United States is the only target of terrorists attack; but it considers itself as the major target, and when it goes beyond that it identifies itself primarily with the western civilisation. This is because most of the other targets are states that have a close friendship with the United States. In the 1980's, these included "France, Israel, the United Kingdom, and Turkey" (Jenkins 779). Nowadays targets include most of the European great powers and parts of Asia. Moreover, not all countries feel equally threatened by terrorism, or being attacked for the same reasons as the United States. In the world environment which is more or less governed by international law and in

which all members are interdependent, the United States found it hard at the beginning to fight terrorism as effectively as it would have liked to.

Another fact about terrorism is that terrorism is different from conventional wars between states. The terrorist threat is not a clear war waged between two nations or two alliances that have definite headquarters, political and military organization very much similar to its enemy, in an open and face to face confrontation. This kind of war-terrorism- was not envisaged by the founders of the American republic or their successors, nor was it familiar to the American military forces from the early years of the nation-building process to the late Cold War era.

Most of the terrorist attacks are executed by individuals, against targets that cannot be predicted with much exactitude. These individuals, or 'terrorists', resort to wars that look like guerrilla warfare. They use tactics that make them flexible and mobile. They are not regular soldiers or armies who fight under the command of the leaders of their nation. They do not usually target military sites that may retaliate or that may pose a threat to their existence, as is the case in conventional warfare. Instead, they attack embassies, kidnap American citizens around the world and attack other vital United States diplomatic headquarters.

Another similarity between terrorism and guerrilla warfare is that it aims more at producing psychological and political rather than physical or military effects. Similar to the Second World War, terrorism aims at affecting all areas of life and not only military targets or official headquarters of the enemy (Jenkins 776). However, in conventional warfare, though civilians are sometimes victims of conflict, they are recognized as bystanders. Their being victims is seen as an inevitable result of the conflict, whereas terrorists make little distinction between civilian bystanders and military participants in the conflict. Everyone can be a target: from diplomatic personnel to ordinary citizens on a plane or in a public place; terrorists do not make a distinction as long as their main objective, to be heard all over the world through the media, is achieved. An important consideration about terrorism, then, is that it is planned and executed by new kinds of actors.

#### **4.2.Independent Groups and State-Sponsored Terrorism.**

International terrorism is adapted as a tool by new kinds of actors on the international scene. The first type of these actors, which emerged in the last decade of the Cold War, includes states that the United States President George W. Bush called 'Rogue States' (Samuel 632). These are states which are characterized by dictatorial regimes that do use violence against their own people and that do not abide by international law and can harm other nations without taking into account what consequences this would entail their own people. Good examples of the states that the United States include in this category are Iran since 1979, and Iraq under Saddam Hussein. Another type of states that the United States currently considers a threat is weak and fragile states that are easy preys to violent and fanatic regimes such as Afghanistan under the rule of Taliban. The last major type of actors include international terrorist organizations that have different sources of sponsors, including, besides the two previous types, individuals and such institutions as charity organizations that covertly divert their assets to terrorist groups around the world (Samuel 98) A fourth type of actors include individuals with fanatic ideologies and financial or political power who have a strong hatred for the United States. This kind of actors, however, has now become looked at as part of one of the three previous types. Ossama Bin Laden, for instance, would not have reached the state of an international threat if he had not established the Al Qaeda, the most notorious international terrorist organization. As another example, Saddam Hussein, the previous leader of Iraq, is looked at as part of the rogue state which he had established and managed.

While deciding on foreign policy decisions, the United States officers do not make a significant distinction between them except in some matters of strategy or tactics. They are usually treated under one term: "international terrorism". They were also considered as equally threatening to the national security of the country both at home and abroad.

#### **4.3.Globalization and International Terrorism:**

A very important term that usually goes with international terrorism as a threat to the United States is Globalism. This notion is necessary to understand both the origin of

the threat and the factors that made it more dangerous and serious than earlier threats, or that made modern terrorism more serious than earlier forms of it. On the one hand, globalization led to the dissatisfaction of some Arab and Muslim groups, making them resort to terrorism as a way of showing discontent; on the other hand, it gave those groups greater power in achieving their objectives on a worldwide scale, especially after the development of the Internet.

#### **4.3.1.Rejection of Globalization and anti -Americanism:**

Most of the threat to the United States stems from the cultural, political and to a lesser extent the economic presence of the United States in the Arab and Muslim world. The two terms, "Arab" and "Islamic", are not identical as many people think. Take, for instance, Afghanistan and the Taliban's assistance to Ben Laden, or Nasser's and Saddam Hussein's resistance to the United States which aimed at reuniting the Arab world starting from political ideologies that did not take the dream from a religious point of view. Even if the resistance to the United States' domination in the Arab Muslim world has not always been from the same position or with the same motivation, there are many aspects of the United States' globalism which faced opposition, namely "Westernization, secularization, democratization, consumerism, and the growth of market capitalism"(Cronin 45). However, the United States did not seem to make much distinction between the two, especially since they have similar aims represented by the desire to get the United States out of the Middle East region.

An important factor is the perception of many groups inside the regions where there was such economic and cultural penetration by the United States that it was responsible for many evils that befell their countries, including the loss of indigenous culture and corruption in religion, language and economy, to name only a few aspects of this unwelcome change. Anti-Americanism, which many Americans do not - or pretend not to - understand, is actually not against the Americans themselves as a state or a population, but rather as the leader of globalization, which the terrorist groups consider as the main threat to the Arab cultural identity and economic prosperity. In other words, "anti-Americanism is closely related to anti-globalization" (Cronin 52).

The major form of these reactions is found in Islamic fundamentalism and Arab nationalism.

Thus, the new phase of modern terrorism which the United States is facing has its origins, according to a specialist, in the emergence of the idea of Islamic "Jihad" against the foreign influence of not only the United States but also the Soviet Union. This era is said to have started with the Iranian Revolution which resulted in the coming to power, in 1979, of a group with a religiously motivated ideology which saw the American presence in the modern world as a threat to the values and customs of Muslim societies. In addition to this, the revolution against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, led by Osama Ben Laden, who was at that time backed by the United States who had a stake in getting the Soviet Union out of the Middle East region, sprang from the same idea. Thus, modern terrorism is very often driven by religious motivations that lie deep in the psyche of the human being, and for which he can even sacrifice his life (Cronin 38). This can even be understood if we look at Americans themselves, whose soldiers in Iraq now, or Afghanistan earlier, were driven by the belief that they were cleansing the world of an existing evil. This was exactly the same attitude of religiously driven resistance to the United States' and the Western world's presence in the Arab and Muslim world that considered them as the evil that must be at least driven out of the Islamic lands and society.

Although religious terrorism is neither a product of the late twentieth century, nor the only type of terrorism, it is now more spread than in the past and more spread than other types of terrorism that were once more significant<sup>1</sup>. It is considered by many as more dangerous than other types. Modern terrorism, which is usually backed by religious beliefs and which coincided with and reacted against American-led globalization, is more dangerous than earlier and even other contemporary forms of terrorism for many factors. These factors are both linked to religious fanaticism and globalization.

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<sup>1</sup> Three other types are distinguished by Cronin :left wing terrorism inspired by Communism, Right wing terrorism inspired by Fascism, and ethnonationalist or separatist terrorism that followed the process of decolonization. All types have had different periods of prominence but the religious one is currently the prevailing type.

Concerning religion, Islamic Fundamentalism is usually evoked when talking about terrorism. According to most American policy makers, the term includes political and religious movements whose main objective is the return of their countries and all the Muslim states to the teachings and values of Islam that are found in the Holy Book, 'Koran'.(Samuel 384). Fundamentalist groups differ in their political and even religious interpretation of the teachings of Islam, but most of them agree that the Muslim societies are in decay because of the secularism of their governments and the cultural influence of the West. Not all of these movements follow the same means of implementing their objectives, but most of them are considered either an urgent threat, especially those which use violence, or a potential danger that might lead to the emergence of violent groups.

#### **4.3.2.The Fatality and Scope of the Terrorist Threat.**

Taking into account what has been said earlier, we can understand the distinctive features of terrorism that distinguish it from previous threats. The kind of terrorism that the United States has been facing since the late years of the Cold War, and which had been updating its means and force and widening its scope at the same time, is more dangerous, especially when it comes from religious (or cultural) opposition. Religious terrorism, which is the most common, is the most dangerous because, first, its agents usually look at the world in terms of good, which they represent, and evil, which covers everyone that does not share their creed. Sometimes this includes even people of the same religious sect whom they believe are traitors; a good example of this is found in terrorism inside Muslim countries or against Muslim citizens everywhere by groups who claim to be fulfilling the teachings of Islamic values such as Djihad, which in principle is not directed against Muslims. A second factor is that these groups usually do not care about public opinion, or even about opposition from their own religious sects, because they think that they are fulfilling the will of God; this objective for them is more important than anything, including their lives, which they sacrifice. Martyrdom is what they look for. Related to this is a third factor: terrorist groups do not care about secular laws since they reject all that secularism stands for. Fourth, since the groups consider their targets, as well as their ideology and

creeds, as evil, they do not think of improving or changing their beliefs, but rather aim at destroying them and replacing them with theirs. The fifth reason is that terrorist groups usually draw their financial and material support either from nongovernmental groups, or from states that provide this indirectly, as a last resort since they cannot afford to get into a direct and open conflict against their enemies ( for details, see Cronin 41).

Another set of factors that make modern terrorism more dangerous has to do with globalization itself. As well as stirring their anger and being the main situation that they reacted against, globalization gave terrorists some advantages they could not have gained in a different international system. In an interdependent world where state borders do not have much significance, and where information technology developments made the world a small village, it became easier for those groups to be virtually, if not literally, omnipresent. The use of mobile phones, the internet and instant messaging has made it more difficult for intelligence agents to track terrorists before, or even after they execute their attacks. Cyber terrorism, which consists of attacking websites rather than real people, and which rather causes technical or economic harm, has been taken advantage of; nonetheless, loss in human lives has always been the preferred target whenever possible, and the development of information and communication technologies has been used as a means which is subordinate to killing. As Cronin summarizes, these technological developments have “enhanced efficiency in many terrorist-related activities, including administrative tasks, coordination of operations, recruitment of potential members, communication among adherents, and attraction of sympathizers”(ibid.47). The collection of data related to targeted sites or individuals is also possible, as well as spreading information related to the making of weapons and bombs, for example, among members of these groups worldwide. In addition to this, they propagate their ideologies and win new adherents through clandestine websites.

At the operational and organizational levels, globalization has allowed terrorists to move across borders more easily, especially with the increasing openness between members of the European Union, which they consider both as targets and sources of shelter and financial sponsoring. In addition, even if international laws exist, detention

and arrests of alleged terrorists are not made through the same procedures in every country. At the financial level, these groups benefit from global and multinational sources of finance which are in abundance around the world. These include legitimate corporations that divert their profits to terrorist organizations, non-profit organizations and charities and illegitimate enterprises such as international drug smuggling and kidnapping. In brief, there is a strategic picture of “an increasing ability of terrorist organizations to exploit the same avenues of communication, coordination, and cooperation as other international actors, including states, multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and even individuals” (Cronin 51).

It is true that countries which are threatened by terrorist attacks have strengthened their physical defence and security measures throughout the last decade, but the terrorists also have been flexible, changing methods or targets whenever necessary. From kidnapping diplomats and taking hostages, surrounding embassies, they moved to "detonat[ing] car bombs on city streets and set[ting] off bombs in airports, train stations, restaurants, department stores, and discotheques," suicide attacks and hijacking airplanes (Jenkins 775). They even got hold of some biological weapons which are more dangerous, and can have effects on a wider scope that can last even longer than ordinary weapons. Another aspect that makes terrorism difficult to fight is that terrorists do not have predictable targets or timings for their strike, they "can attack anything, anywhere, anytime and governments cannot protect everything, everywhere all the time"(id.778). In addition, the cost of fighting terrorism is not limited by the number of terrorists or their strength, but by the number and importance of targets that are likely to be hit, and these are, as was said, unlimited in number.

Moreover, terrorism can sometimes be sponsored by states. This makes it more powerful in material terms. The states that sponsor terrorism usually have an interest in the terrorist acts that bring about results favourable to their objectives, especially if the latter cannot wage a war using the conventional weapons of most of the states. These have shelter and income which make it unnecessary for them to rely on population support. Unlike guerrilla warfare, in which the belligerents rely at least on a faction of the population, terrorists do not care about the public's attitude towards their acts, since most of them do not exclude civilians from their targets. What is important for them is

to achieve fame and strike a psychological blow on their enemy. This is achieved more easily when common citizens are victims, because there would be a great possibility that they would blame their government either for the inadequacy of its security measures or for provoking such attacks by their policies around the world.

#### **4.4.Development:**

Terrorism, especially the religious type, became apparent as a real force in international affairs after the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

#### **4.4.1. Before September11:**

Since the late 1970's, religious terrorism has been increasingly significant as a threat to the United States. Since then, it has gained more ground in relation to the other types of terrorism, and, as in the case of Iraq and Nationalist anti-American feeling, worked hand in hand with them. Moreover, the United States became increasingly targeted by these attacks, since " the percentage of international attacks against U.S. targets or U.S. citizens rose dramatically in the 1990s, from about 20 percent in 1993-95 to almost 50 percent in 2000 "(Cronin 43). Moreover in the early 1990's, there was a decrease in the number of terrorist attacks to 382 attacks per year, in comparison with the average 543 attacks per year in the 1980's. By contrast, the number of casualties increased since these attacks, using the advantages of technological development, became more lethal. There were also some incidents, such as the bombing of the United States Embassies in Nairobi and Dar Essalam in 1998. So, the number of casualties per incident rose from "102 killed in 565 incidents in 1991 to 741 killed in 274 incidents in 1998" (Cronin 43).

The first significant dealing with terrorism in the United States' foreign policy came on October 23, 1983. A suicide driver exploded his truck in the Airport of Beirut, killing 240 United States Marines that were part of the Multinational Peacekeeping Force ( Jenkins 780). This was a very significant incident since it demonstrated the United States' vulnerability to such attacks and, more importantly, its incapacity to retaliate or to defend its subjects against such attacks. A commission was formed,

moreover, to investigate the case and came up with the conclusion that terrorism had become a serious threat that the United States government and military forces were not prepared for. In 1984, President Ronald Reagan issued the National Security Directive, which was meant to combat terrorism and preserve the reputation of the United States' government among its allies, public and even among its enemies, including the Soviet Union. Moreover, it was soon perceived that this threat did not only target military or police headquarters, but also aimed at threatening the whole country.

A considerable number of suicide bomb attacks took place in the years 1983-84. These targeted the American Marines and the American Embassy in Beirut and that of Kuwait, and the American Embassy annex in East Beirut. They demonstrated that a more resolved approach to deal with terrorism and more serious consideration of its threat had to be taken by the United States. In June 1985, the hijacking of TWA flight 847 received a remarkable media coverage ( Jenkins). An important aspect of this incident made the American public more interested in the issue of terrorism and their administration's dealing with this new threat. Then a discotheque frequented by Americans in West Berlin was bombed; Libya, who was accused of the planning of this and further attacks, was punished. It became clear that state-sponsored terrorism was, at least for the United States, "a threat to national security, a form of war that must be countered like any other form of war"(Jenkins 786).

#### **4.4.2. After September 11:**

As was said, International terrorism has been, even before the events of September 11<sup>th</sup>, a real and undeniable threat to the security of the United States. The difference, however, between these and previous acts of the same nature is seen in two important aspects: they left greater casualties, and, contrary to their precedents, stroke the United States at home rather than in its diplomatic headquarters or military bases abroad. Thus, it led to the direction of more attention, at least in the minds of the public, towards this issue as a threat to the lives and property of the American citizens. It was the more so since the target was ordinary citizens rather than the military.

What is called international terrorism has been a threat to national and external security for a long time. What these events brought as a change was just a more

resolved approach to the threat. It made a new phase in the perception of threat and the implication this perception has on the foreign policy conduct. As the United States was attacked at home, and not in international diplomatic or commercial headquarters abroad, the threat became more significant and, according to American foreign policy makers, new tactics and attitude towards the world had to be taken. It was believed even before the events, that what the United States call "radical Islamic fundamentalist groups pose a major terrorist threat to U.S. interests and friendly regimes."(Perl 1).

More important than before became the state-sponsored terrorism. Thus, the United States, as in the Cold War era, made an analogy between what happened in Afghanistan and what will happen in other places all around the world. This is the use of the analogy between the Afghan regime during the era of the Taliban, and another Islamic regime taking power, especially in the Middle East region. Even earlier, and after the Iranian revolution brought to power what the United States would call a radical Islamist group, American officials tried to influence the political situation in a way that would eradicate this Islamist group which would represent a threat to the United States. In the September 11<sup>th</sup> events, American foreign policy makers found a good justification and a tool by which they could convince the other parts of the world that the United States was making a crusade against an evil that would threaten it even if it were geographically remote from the attackers.

#### **4.5. Implications for Foreign Policy Making and Discourse:**

Even though the United States had been dealing with international terrorism from about twenty years earlier, the major unified and officially pronounced response to the new threat came in the National Security Strategy of September 2002, which contains what is called the 'Bush Doctrine'<sup>1</sup>. First, this discourse outlines the major sources of threats mentioned earlier :Terrorist organizations, weak states that harbour them, and 'rogue states'. Accordingly, President Bush introduced the new policy towards ensuring the national security of his country. It consisted mainly of three principles: pre-emption, unilateralism and the promotion of democracy and economic development in the third world.'(Samuel 100).

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<sup>1</sup> For the full Document, see "Bush Doctrine, The", in the *Microsoft Student with Encarta Premium* , 2008 edition.

The first principle is a break up with the policy of deterrence<sup>1</sup> followed in the Cold War. Pre-emption is the attack on enemies even before they constitute a real threat. That is, since terrorist acts cannot be predicted in a detailed way, and since terrorists are not stopped by the fear of a massive retaliation from the United States, the latter will not wait for its enemies to have enough power to strike, because in such a case the casualties in human lives would be unpreventable. Any potential threat to the United States will be attacked immediately after they are perceived, by American foreign policy makers of course, as such.

Unilateralism, though not really new as a tool in foreign policy making, is so as a declared and assumingly legitimate form of action. The United States, though it saw that the new threat affected the whole world and the Western countries in particular, would not wait for the agreement of other countries or take into consideration any forms of international law. Furthermore, it pictured itself as the only alternative of terrorists' dominance in the world; the famous phrase of President Bush is "You are either with us, or against us." Any country or organization not cooperating with the United States or standing in its way in the new war will be considered a threat and thus a legitimate target of the United States' war on terrorism.

Finally, since most terrorist groups obtain shelter from dictatorial or weak states, President Bush claimed that the United States would intervene in such kinds of states to put an end to the environment in which terrorist groups find shelter and adherents. This is to be done by promoting democratic and liberal ideals to prevent such states as Iran and Iraq from influencing the other neighbouring states. Moreover, the spread of capitalism and economic prosperity would put an end to poverty, which is one of the major sources of terrorism.

## **4.6. Cases:**

### **4.6.1. Weak States and International Terrorist Organizations: Afghanistan and Al Qaeda:**

The most notorious instance of independent organizations and individuals is Al Qaeda and its well known leading figure, Osama Bin Laden. He has abandoned his rich

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<sup>1</sup> The accumulation of power to an extent that would make a potential enemy unwilling to strike first for fear of a more costly retaliation.

family in Saudi Arabia and joined the Al Qaeda organization to become one of its leading figures. He vowed to devote all his life to fighting Judaism and Christianity, especially the Israeli presence in the Palestinian conquered territories, and the United States' support for this presence. The nature of this organization, its being a non-state actor, makes it more dangerous because international law and the peaceful means of resistance such as deterrence, which used to be efficient during the Cold War era, cannot be applied here. This organization has no limited territory where it can be targeted easily, no subjects or population whose life is of primary importance, and no fear of death because of the belief in martyrdom.

During the 1980's and early 1990's, the United States was preoccupied with ending the Cold War and with settling some of its undesirable effects, in such places as Bosnia, Rwanda, Taiwan and China, North Korea and South Korea relations. However, the threat soon became apparent to some in Washington. In 1992 and 1993, the United States soldiers faced tough times from Somali fighters trained by Bin Laden in Aden and Mogadishu respectively. This threat even reached the United States in the bombing of a truck in the World Trade Centre in 1993, which did not have much or long lasting effect on the media because the Americans thought they could control the situation when they arrested several conspirators. They had the illusion that criminal law was enough to face this threat ( Wedgwood 358).

From then Al Qaeda remained active, though not with much success, in its Southeast Asian divisions and in establishing relations with other regional groups with the same ideology and objectives such as the group of Abu Sayaf in the Philippines. It also made some unsuccessful attempts in the United States itself, usually using explosive vehicles or jets. Meanwhile it was successful in the Middle East region in targeting local sites with American citizens or soldiers in them. Two truck bombings took place that targeted, respectively, the United States' military training centre in Riyadh in 1995, killing five American soldiers, and the Khobar Towers military barracks in Saudi Arabia in 1996, killing ten others. The development of Al Qaeda witnessed an important episode in 1998, in which the casualties were relatively high, when it bombed the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar Essalam killing 224 people, including 14 Americans, and wounding 4,500 ( Wedgwood 359). Alleged Al

Qaeda sites in the Sudan and Afghanistan were attacked by the United States in retaliation; however, these faced much criticism from some experts who claimed that the targets were ill chosen. In October 2000, Bin Laden struck an American destroyer without sinking it in the harbour of Aden.

Though such events as the bombing of the American embassies in 1998 strengthened the conception of Islamist groups as a major danger for the United States, the events of September 11, 2001, had a different and stronger effect on this conception. It became clear then that the threat did not only concern American citizens, diplomatic headquarters and military bases abroad, but even penetrated the American soil itself, which for years had been considered impenetrable. More importantly, the attacks used hijacked American airplanes, targeted some of the major symbols of American power and leadership in globalization, the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and produced more casualties than any other attack. This shook the confidence that American citizens had in the efficiency of their leaders' security policy, which could not prevent the loss of so many lives. Fear, horror, sorrow, panic and, above all, *confusion*, prevailed in the country. This was exactly what Bin Laden wanted: the strongest psychological impact possible. He reminded many Americans of the attack on Pearl Harbor during the Second World War.

He spoke with pride about his success and threatened to go further. Then there was talk of what had been considered a catastrophe which would wipe out entire populations: the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Wedgwood 361). Reports say that in the late 1990's both Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda members were working together on chemical weapons. This strengthened the idea that the new threat faced by the United States did not look like any conventional threat before the end of the Cold War. The new enemies were unconventional in the sense that they ignored international law and dared target civilian sites and people, and also in their being omnipresent. This meant that the traditional framework of security policy, including human rights, did not work any more. It also meant that the military action which would be taken had to consider that the new threat was characterized by decentralization.

The first thing to do was to attack Al Qaeda's headquarters in Afghanistan, after the refusal of the Taliban regime to hand over Bin Laden to the United States. The Taliban regime was also overthrown as a warning to any state or regime which might think of harbouring or assisting terrorist groups. At the legislative level, the problem was in striking a balance between national security and official documents, both American and international, that guaranteed human rights (Wedgwood 363). The latter made it difficult for authorities to arrest and detain suspects without clear and concrete evidence. These documents included reservations that took into account the cases of emergency. However, which parts of the laws in these documents, and to what extent they can be ignored is not specified. Therefore, there was not a great obstacle to putting aside privacy laws and human rights for making investigations and tracking residents, especially aliens, who had connections with terrorist groups. The image of the Witch Hunt of the early years of the Cold War era reappeared. In addition, the CIA and the FBI had different methods of operation and were legislatively isolated from each other. The FBI controlled inside the United States while the CIA had jurisdictions in dealing with matters of external nature. However, the efforts of these two organizations were soon coordinated and there was either the passing of new laws or actions that were based on the principle that in a state of emergency, national security is superior to the democratic principles and human right laws.

#### **4.6.2. Rogue States: Iraq:**

After having dealt with the Taliban and overthrowing the regime in Afghanistan, the United States pronounced its counterterrorist policy more openly and asserted that it would not make any distinctions between terrorist groups and those who harbour them. This policy is outlined in the National Security Strategy of September 2002, and includes what came to be known as the Bush Doctrine. The United States also toughened its policy towards what is called state-terrorism and the possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by some unfriendly states. Moreover, the United States was aware that the threat of Al Qaeda had not disappeared yet, so the state of emergency had not ended. In addition, the danger of WMD was far greater than that of hijacking planes or using explosives in trucks, especially since the states

concerned have close ties with many fighting groups that the United States consider as terrorist organizations (including Palestinian resistance groups and Hezbollah).

One of the major difficulties in fighting terrorism was that deterrence, a policy followed in the Cold War and based on raising the state's power to an extent that would make its enemies unwilling to strike because of the fear that the costs will be high in human and economic terms in case of retaliation by the concerned state, could not be applied with the new enemies. The terrorist organizations and even 'rogue states' cannot be deterred by the United States' power, because most of them are willing to take risks and do not care about the effects of a retaliation from the United States. Thus, a new strategy called preventive war (which is not completely new, in fact) was implemented: the United States will no more wait for its enemies to strike, but it would attack any potential source of threat before the danger becomes real or reaches American soil. (This leads us to confirm what was said in the first chapter, namely that security is the absence of fear rather than the absence of real threat only).

Concerned were three major states, Iran, Iraq and North Korea which became known as the 'Axis of Evil'. These states were accused by the United States of possessing Weapons of Mass Destruction that represented a threat to the security of the United States and the whole world; in the case of Iraq and Iran, by being closely linked to and by harbouring members of Islamist terrorist organizations. The three faced a lot of attempts led by the United States through the United Nations Security Council inspection teams and sanctions to reduce their nuclear power (if it existed). However, North Korea's strategic importance did not seem to match that of Iran and Iraq. This is another proof that the United States' strategic (and economic) interests in the Middle East region were of great importance. (Nguyen).

The perception of Iran and Iraq as a threat to the United States' security, and the necessity of destroying their power had been present in the White House since as early as the Iranian Revolution and the Gulf War. September 11<sup>th</sup> just gave a good excuse which the United States foreign policy makers used to convince both American and international public opinion. Of the two, however, Iraq was an easier target because of some pretended legitimacy that could be achieved because of its regime's human rights abuses.

This case is illustrative of the fact that the United States does not make the difference between religiously motivated terrorism and the version of Saddam Hussein which was based on Arab nationalism: both meant a threat to the United States' strategic, and economic, interests in the Middle East region. Saddam Hussein had connections with many groups that the United States had listed as terrorist organizations, and had threatened the security of Israel, the United States ally and major tool in preventing an efficient Arab or Islamic union in the region. He gave support to such organizations as Abu Nidal Organization and the Palestinian Liberation Organization. The main action that Hussein took was in 1990, when he invaded neighbouring Kuwait.

The United States intervened in 1991, in an international coalition, in fear of a movement of Iraqi troops further to Saudi Arabia, thus threatening its interests in the oil reserves of the region. This was called the Persian Gulf War. After the end of the war, Iraq faced sanctions from the United Nations Security Council and remained under an embargo until the United States' invasion in 2003. The UN Security Council created UNSCOM, a special commission to search for and dismantle Weapons of Mass Destruction, which Hussein was accused of possessing. Tensions characterized the US-Iraq relations since then and this culminated in the United States' invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and its occupation since then.

### **Conclusion**

The post-Cold War era then was characterized by the United States conception of the threat to its national security as stemming from opposition to its cultural and economic influence around the world from what it considers as religious fundamentalists and dictatorships, such as Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas, and Saddam Hussein's regime. The reaction was more aggressiveness and involvement on a unilateral basis whenever possible; this is best understood in the famous Bush phrase: "you are either with us, or against us."

The new conception of threat led to new conceptions of security. Since this threat stems from the opposition to the United States' Globalism, it had to be faced with making the globalization process stronger than this opposition. Moreover, since this new threat does not abide by international laws, the United States found itself obliged to act on a unilateral basis and ignore international legitimacy.

### **General Conclusion:**

National security is one of the major issues taken into account before the United States' foreign policy makers – or any of their counterparts in other countries - conduct foreign policy. Thus it has always been a necessity to have an idea, image or conception of it at all stages of foreign policy history. The fact that this image is based on exaggerating or underestimating the international scene has not been our concern us here. In any case, this conception, whether based on a realistic interpretation or distorted image, is closely tied to the developments in the world around the United States.

First, when the western world was divided into the Old World, consisting of the major European powers and monarchies, on the one hand, and the New World, including the United States and the newly independent American countries on the other, the United States identified its security with the latter. This was because they all shared a history of a search for freedom and self-rule, while the European Powers represented the threat to the newly won blessings of liberty and progress by their expansionist ambitions and desire to regain, at least indirectly, their control over the riches of the other side of the Atlantic. Moreover, the European world was characterized by the continuous rivalry for power among the great states. Besides the geographical remoteness and the Atlantic as a barrier, the United States gained a strategic and economic advantage by being neutral -though not completely- in European conflicts. In addition, it was close to the riches and benefits of the New World. This, in addition to the growth of a feeling of exceptionalism among Americans, safety and security for them meant preserving their neutrality rights in Europe and their commercial and economic hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. Thus they decided not to interfere in European conflicts or let European powers get close to the American continent.

Therefore, during this period, the United States' foreign policy makers issued foreign policy measures that would widen the gap between the two worlds. They knew the strategic importance of the new republics and old European colonies in the Western Hemisphere, as well as the vital commercial and economic advantages they could obtain in this region. The commitment to this policy was proven in the Spanish

American War. During this war, the United States was trying to prevent a major European power, Spain, from getting as close as to constitute a threat to its strategic and economic interests in the region. Besides, the United States' neutrality during the early years of the First World War reinforced this stance. In spite of the indirect alignment with Britain and its allies, Americans could preserve the blessings of their declared – though not totally committed to – neutrality. When they entered the war, they tried to convince the world and themselves that they were doing so for self-defence and that their fighting side by side with the Allies was not proof of siding with one part against another, but an unplanned and inevitable result of facing the same threat. They were fighting on their own behalf. This unwelcoming attitude towards the idea of siding with any extra-hemispheric association was more expressed in declining to join the League of Nations.

Soon, however, new realities changed this image. After the conflicts of the Second World War, though not unprovoked by the United States itself, directly affected the safety of American subjects and assets, it became clear that isolation and aloofness were no longer affective means of ensuring national security. Expansionist Powers, if left uncontrolled by the United States, would either threaten or lead to threaten its safety and territory. The Second World War was the lesson: German and Japanese expansionist ambitions led to a direct threat to the United States. In the same way, it was thought, the Soviet Union's expansionist ambitions would endanger the United States' national security. The transition towards the new view was considerably gradual, though it took less time to form than that of the Isolationist era. At first, with the new technological developments and the evolving economic interdependence of the different parts of the world it became clear that neither the geographical barriers nor the policy of neutrality would guarantee the safety of American territories and citizens. Americans had been aware of this from the early years of the twentieth century. However, it was only after the hard strikes on Pearl Harbor that the trust in the effectiveness of the isolationist policy as a means of guaranteeing national security lost ground. After the disappearance of the isolationist conception of national security, there came, gradually, a new conception of threat and of national security. The former was embodied in the Soviet Union, which manifested expansionist ambitions in

Eastern Europe and in Southeast Asia respectively. With the analogy between Hitler's ambitions in Europe and the Soviets' moves, Americans believed that indifference towards such moves would lead to the same results as those of the Second World War. Therefore security meant the containment and limitations of the Soviet Power by any means possible, including international alliances and interference elsewhere. During this struggle, the Cold War, the United States got out of its isolationist shell and acted on an international scale, trying to prevent events in any part of the world from threatening its interests and safety, either by keeping the status quo or by bringing about change which sometimes affected the internal affairs of other nations.

After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, a new reality emerged on the international scene, and with it emerged a new conception of security. The new threat did not come from a great power that the United States could challenge face to face: it came from 'rogue states' that would not abide by international law or be deterred by the accumulation of force, and from weak states and global organizations that had almost nothing to lose, and everything to gain in terms of the psychological impact on their major target: the United States. The new threat was different in important ways, which made the new struggle different from traditional wars that used to take place between two or more powerful states with relatively similar economic, political and military capacities; the new war was against enemies most of whom either have no geographical or political unity, or are ready to jeopardize the safety of their own people and cannot be deterred by the United States' military superiority and its power to strike back with more casualties. This new threat came mainly from the Arab and Muslim world where there is strong cultural and sometimes political opposition to the United States' presence in the region of the Middle East and its obvious alignment with the state of Israel, which most Muslims consider their major enemy. According to American foreign policy makers, and in addition to their risk-taking spirit, these enemies could not be stopped by international pressure because they abandoned their international legitimacy and denied the legitimacy of international organizations and the public opinion in other parts of the world. Thus, they could strike anywhere and at anytime, and both their chosen targets and the timing of the execution of their attacks could hardly be predicted. To be safe from

these threats, then, meant depriving them of any opportunity to strike before they really became a threat: it meant to strike any source of potential threat so that it will have no power of doing so. There is a very high risk in waiting for the threat to manifest itself clearly on the international scene, because it would be very late. This led the United States to toughen its policy measures both on a national and an international scale. President George W. Bush involved his country in two wars against Afghanistan and Iraq, and since the invasion of the latter, the major concern of the White House on the international scene has been to ensure that the new regime in this state would always take into account the United States' interest.

However, soon the cost and efficiency, and even the necessity, of the United States' presence in this state and in Afghanistan, though in the latter it is less direct, raised a sharp controversy and opposition. This is due to many factors, the most important of which are the exceedingly high human and material costs, the end of Saddam Hussein and his regime – in addition to the fact that the claim that he possessed dangerous weapons of mass destruction was not proven – and the turning of American citizens to more important domestic issues, namely the economic crisis both at home and abroad. Thus, during the electoral campaign of 2008, John McCain, the Republican candidate was chosen to succeed Bush because he had the same attitude towards the war in Iraq, namely the belief that the withdrawal of American troops would not be possible unless complete victory is guaranteed. Opinion polls during the campaign and the final victory of the Democratic candidate, Barack Obama, in November 2008, show that, at least, the uncompromising stance of Bush and McCain no more interest the American public opinion. The Obama presented a milder and more moderate stance towards the issue.

However, the opposition to the war in Iraq did not bring about a final end to it. A lot of opponents of the war had previously supported it. Moreover, the patriotic feelings and the fears that emerged after the events of September 11 are still present. Another factor is that the deterioration of internal economy and the international economic crisis led to a diversion towards domestic affairs and thus public opinion cares less about whether the troops are withdrawn or not. That is to say, Obama's victory might have been mainly due to the will of the electorate to leave the Iraq issue

behind rather than to favouring his foreign policy program over that of his Republican counterpart. This might lead us to another important issue: the extent to which foreign policy matters in electoral campaigns.

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## Title and Abstract in Arabic:

### تطور مفهوم الأمن القومي فى السياسة الخارجية الأمريكية

الكثير من البحوث عنيت بالعلاقة بين الأوضاع العالمية المحيطة بالولايات المتحدة من جهة، وكيفية إدارتها للسياستين الخارجية و الداخلية.

بعض نقاد السياسة الخارجية الأمريكية مثل Noam Chomsky و Howard Zinn يرون أن هذه السياسة ليست متعلقة بصفة أولية بالأحداث الدولية ولكن بالأحرى متعلقة بالشغف إلى السلطة والمصالح الاقتصادية. التبريرات الأخرى مثل الأمن القومي ونشر الحرية في العالم هي فقط قناع للدوافع الحقيقية.

آخرون مثل Hans J. Morgenthau و Kenneth Waltz ز يرون أن هذه السياسة تنطلق دائما من الأوضاع في النظام العالمي وموضع الولايات المتحدة فيه. مستوى ودرجة تأثير هذه الأوضاع على الأمن القومي هو من أهم الاعتبارات التي تتأسس عليها السياسة الخارجية. بعبارة أخرى جزء كبير من السياسة الخارجية يجري بطريقة تهدف إلى جعل العالم مكانا آمنا للولايات المتحدة. لهذا الغرض يجب أن توجد صورة عن العالم وعلاقته بالأمن القومي الأمريكي. و منه كلما تغيرت أوضاع العالم الذي تتواجد فيه الولايات المتحدة تغيرت معه هذه الصورة.

هذا البحث، إذا، يهدف إلى تحليل تأثير الأوضاع العالمية على مفهوم الأمن القومي في الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية خلال ثلاث مراحل مهمة : المرحلة الأولى هي مرحلة العزلة من بداية القرن التاسع

عشر إلى الحرب العالمية الثانية. المرحلة الثانية هي مرحلة الحرب الباردة و تمتد من نهاية الحرب العالمية الثانية إلى أواخر الثمانينات. المرحلة الثالثة و تتمثل في فترة ما بعد الحرب الباردة من أواخر الثمانينات إلى السنوات القليلة الماضية.

على مر تاريخ السياسة الخارجية للولايات المتحدة ا كانت هناك آراء مختلفة حول مدى وكيفية تأثير الأوضاع الخارجية على سلامة الشعب والتراب الأمريكيين من السنوات الأولى التي تلت الثورة الأمريكية إلى الأربعينيات من القرن العشرين، كان يرى معظم الأمريكيين أن سلامة بلادهم متعلقة بالابتعاد عن نزاعات العالم القديم (أوروبا) من جهة، و منع القوى الاستعمارية من إعادة فرض سيطرتها على النصف الغربي للكرة الأرضية. سرعان ما تأثرت هذه الفكرة بأحداث الحري العالمية الثانية. حقيقة أن هذه الحرب التي اندلعت في الجانب الآخر من المحيط الأطلسي عرضت الأمن الأمريكي للخطر أدى إلى التخلي عن الثقة في فعالية سياسة العزلة كوسيلة لضمان الأمن القومي. بعد الحرب، ساد الاعتقاد أن أمن الولايات المتحدة يتطلب تدخل الولايات المتحدة في الشؤون الدولية للتأثير عليها بشكل يمنع التهديد الجديد (الإتحاد السوفيتي) من التأثير على أمنها. بعد اختفاء التهديد السوفيتي ظهر خطر جديد تمثل في الإرهاب الدولي. بعد ظهوره كخطر كبير، أصبح الأمريكيون يعتقدون أن سلامتهم مرهونة بتدمير أي قدرة لأي عدو قادر على الهجوم حتى قبل قيام هذا العدو بالتهديد الفعلي للولايات المتحدة.