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NATIONAL IDENTITY CRISIS AND CIVIL WARS in 20th CENTURY SUDAN

A Dissertation submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Magister in English (Language, Culture and Society)

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Declaration**n**

I hereby declare that the substance of this dissertation is entirely the result of my investigation and that due reference or acknowledgment is made whenever necessary, to the work of other researchers.

I am duly informed that any person practicing plagiarism will be subject to disciplinary sanctions issued by the university authorities. Under the rules and regulations in force.

Date:

Signed:

Kelthoum KTIR.

Dedication:

This work wouldn't have seen light without My Mother's guidance, encouragement, devotion and patience. To Mom, who means the world to me and deserves more than the world. I am grateful for she is always pushing me forward and bringing me up whenever I fall down. I wish this can make her proud.

To the memory of my father who left before seeing any of my achievements, though small.

To my sisters Sabrina and Nardjess and their husbands Karim and Mabrouk who supported me throughout the journey.

To my brothers Mouhamed Cherif and Ismail that I love so much. My sister in law Souad. To all my nephews who prayed for me..

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ABSTRACT

This study addresses the contemporary conflict of National identity in Ex- Sudan between the Islamic Nationalists in the North and secularist Africans in the South. It pinpoints the role of colonial residues in widening the gap between ethnic groups, and the ruling Elite's assimilationist policies in fueling Civil wars in the area, which led to the Southern secession and to post secession armed conflicts. The Northern ruling Elite adopted a National Constitution based on Sharia (Islamic Law) and proclaimed Arabic the National Language. Northerners argue that the entangled model of the Islamic-Arab cultural identity accelerates assimilation of the ethnic and religious diversities in the Sudan into a homogeneous National identity, defining the Sudan as an Arab Islamic State. Yet, Southerners requested the adoption of secular laws for equal opportunities to all African languages beside Arabic and English, and mainly religious freedom. They argue that the adoption of the Islamic laws and Arabic discriminates between citizens in terms of religion and race. The Khartoum Government has always imposed Arabization and Islamization policies since the independence of the country, and failed to manage the country's diversity while trying to unify the country to build a Nation-State. In reaction, the Non-Arab Muslims and the Non-Muslim Africans resorted to violence as an alternative model of resistance. This war, hence, has caused a human disaster in this region. In view of these parameters, an interdisciplinary approach is used in this research, since it deals with the phenomenon of civil war and National identity crisis from social, linguistic, anthropological, political and cultural perspectives as well. Moreover, we rely on historiography, via the hermeneutic paradigm mainly, in order to understand the historical background of the Sudanese crisis. The majority of the primary and secondary source materials were archives and books as well as articles that will be mentioned in the literature review. The findings of the study indicate that the opportunist Elite in each group made use of the alterity

and the historical hatred between ethnic groups for their own political and economic benefits. The policies of Arabization and Islamization adopted by the Northern government failed to build a unified Nation-State, they consequently led to the longest civil wars in history. In January 2011, Southerners in the long run seceded from the North, by 99.68 % of votes for separation in the South Sudan Referendum, which gave birth to a new Nation "South Sudan Republic" where armed conflicts started, again caused by the Elite's race for power and issues of ethnic diversity, tribalism and rivalry between the Nuer and the Dinka. Besides, other major disputes about oil-rich regions on the newly set international borderline are still raised between both countries.

List of acronyms:

AAA Addis Ababa Agreement

DUP Democratic Unionist Party

GGC Graduates' General Congress

ICF Islamic Charter Front

IDR Inter Disciplinary Research.

ICC International Crime Court

NDA National Democratic Alliance

NIF National Islamic Front

OAU Organization of African Unity

PDP Peoples' Democratic Party

SSR South Sudan Republic

SANU The Sudan African National Union

SCP The Sudanese Communist Party

SF Southern Front

SNP The Sudan National Party

SPLA The Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army

SPLM The Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement

SSIM South Sudan Independence Movement

SSPA Southern Sudanese Political Association

SSU The Sudanese Socialist Union

UN United Nations

Table of content

Declaration ii
Dedication: iii
Acknowledgement iv
ABSTRACT v
List of acronyms: vii
General Introduction 1
Statement of the Problem: 2
Purpose of the Study: 3
Outline of the Research: 4
Research Methodology and Approach: 6
Literature Review: 13
CHAPTER ONE: 18
Sudan: the History of the Divide. 18
Introduction: 20
1-1-The Rise of Kingdoms and Peripheries: 21
1- 2- The Turkeyya: 23
1- 3- The Mahdyya: 26
1- 4- The Anglo-Egyptian Re-conquest: 28
1-5- Independence and the rise of Sudanese Nationalism: 33
1-6- The First Civil War (1955- 1972): 36
1-7- Numairy's rule, the Addis Ababa Agreement and The Second Civil War: 40
1-8- The Contemporary Sudan and Secession: 45
Conclusion: 48
CHAPTER TWO : 50
The Impact of Diversity and Colonialism on the Sudan's National Identity. 50
Introduction: 51
2-1- Group identity, Social diversity and multiculturalism in the Sudan: 53
2-1-1- Ethnic diversity and Tribalism: 55
2-1-1-a- The Sudan (North): 57
2-1-1-b- South Sudan: 59
2-1-2- Linguistic diversity: 62
2-1-3 Religious and Sectarian diversity 66
2-1-3-a- Polytheism and Animism 66

2-1-3-b- Christianity....67
2-1-3-c- Islam....69
2-1-4- Regionalism....72
2-2- Causes of inequality and marginalization in Postcolonial Sudan....74
2-2-1- Slavery....74
2-2-2- Colonial policy and legacy....77
2-2-3- Elitism....82
Conclusion:....83
CHAPTER THREE:....85
The Sudanese National Identity Crisis and Civil Wars....85
Introduction:....86
3-1- The Sudanese Identity Dilemma:....86
3-2- Nation Making and State Building in the Sudan:....88
3-2-1- Nation and National Identity:....89
3-2-2- National Identity:....91
3-2-3- Nationality and Citizenship in the Sudan:....92
3-3- The relationship between Language Planning, Assimilation Policy and the Civil Wars:....94
3-3-1- National language....94
3-3-2 Language Policies:....96
3-3-2-a-the British Colonial Language Policies and their Residues:....98
3-3-2-b- Arabization and Islamization:....101
3-4- the Rise of Nationalism and Civil Wars:....110
3-4-1- The Elite and Nationalism:....111
3-4-2- Causes of the Sudanese Civil War:....113
Conclusion:....117
....119
General Conclusion....119
Appendix....124
1-Tables:....125
Table 1: The Sudan's Ethnic groups and tribes.....125
Table 2: Ethnic groups and tribes spread in the South Sudanese Provinces....125
Table 3: Languages and numbers of speakers in the Sudan 1993....126
2-Maps:....128
Map 1: Colonial Africa in 1914....128
Map 2: Ethno linguistic map of The Sudan.....129

Map 3: Ethno-linguistic map of South Sudan Republic 130
List of the Sudanese Languages: 131
Map 4: Ethnic groups in South Sudan Republic 133
Map 5: Ethnic distribution in both Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan 134
Map 7: Regions and provinces of The Sudan 136
Map 8: Regions and provinces of South Sudan Republic 137
Bibliography 138
Books cited: 139
Articles and Periodicals 143
Websites: 146
Maps 146
Research Methodology References: 147
الملخص 148

General Introduction

It is widely acknowledged that the African continent, more than any other, has witnessed numerous civil wars. Historians tend to attribute these wars to the colonial presence in Africa during the 1910's "scramble to Africa"[1] where different policies were imposed on the indigenous people along the introduction of new religions and languages. Consequently the natives were facing a new cultural identity, new borders, new belonging and new ruling systems.

The Sudan is the microcosm of Africa, sharing the same characteristics with one foot in the Arab world and the other in the Savannah of the continent. It shelters a diverse society consisting of different ethnic, racial, linguistic and religious groups. Historically speaking, the Sudan had other borders before the Ottoman Empire and The Anglo-Egyptian colonialism. It was the Turks who identified its limitations during the 1820's Ottoman Empire, since it was their first slave supplier and the main State in Black Ivory Trade.

The Turks created the subaltern and the central Elite[2], and helped building new social boundaries as well. Furthermore, after the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1920, the Anglo-Egyptian rule was an extension to the former oppressions and alliances. Therefore, they continued the same policy of "divide to rule".

Statement of the Problem:

In the post-independence era, the Sudan, similarly to several other former colonies, was trying to build its own National Identity away from what the colonists tailored. The new country was faced with paramount decisions to make, naming choosing a National Language, Religion and Law. The Sudanese ruling Elite consisted of Northern Arab Muslims who declared Arabic as a National Language and Islam as the new republic's religion. These

[1] See Map 1 page :130.
[2] The word Elite in this dissertation is used to refer to the ruling group in the Sudan, whether it is the Government or the groups who affect directly or indirectly law making in the country.

decisions were accompanied by severe assimilationist policies that led to civil wars between the North and South Sudan that is to say between Christians, Muslims and other religious groups.

As an agreement to this point, it is fairly said that the Sudan is malformed from its inception, which made of it, what Johnson (2003) described, "an unwieldy political monster, permanently at war with itself in order to decide what it is and what it shall be, and whose very survival as a Nation-State is now seriously endangered" (p.5). The Southern part of the Sudan has its own cultural identity which is very different from the Northern one. This gap was widened by the British policies which were purposefully designed to raise a Southern identity related to African countries rather than to the Arab world.

In addition to the colonial residues, the Sudan was facing a struggle between different ethnic, cultural and social Elites who were racing for power and each one of them wants to impose his own vision of the country's National Identity. This struggle made the process of Nation building rather unaccomplished till now. Thus, the Sudan has witnessed the longest civil war in world history, resulting in a huge number of casualties, the birth of a diaspora, and a poor economic and civil infrastructure in many regions.

Purpose of the Study:

In this research, our principal argument is to question the reality about the National Identity crisis in the Sudan and how it affects and is affected by the civil wars that took place during the 20th Century. All along the research work, there have been four main sub topics that are certainly linked to the main one and that we would shed light on in order to give holistic answers to the research main questions: What is a National Identity in the case of the Sudan? Can we talk about a Sudanese people or Sudanese Peoples? Why does the Sudanese

State Still in the making? Is there a cultural identity clash in the Sudan or is there a problem in the National identity building process?

First, we tend to explain the role of opportunistic Elite of both groups, South and North, in using those irreconcilable differences to fuel ethnic and regional divisions for their respective benefits. Undeniably, Arab Northerners enjoy a superior position in the Sudan that allows them to impose their vision on the "other" especially that their Arab-Islamic image of the Sudanese Nation excludes citizens who reside on the geographic or ethnic margins. As a result, excluded groups seek to equalize political inclusion or territorial secession.

The Second focus in this dissertation would be on the inter-relationship between National Identity crises and civil wars in the Sudan, which resulted in the country's division and gave birth to the South Sudan Republic as an independent State. This work also investigates the assimilationist policies adopted by the Sudanese successive governments to create a National bond in The Sudan between civilians from different regions and ethnic, linguistic and religious backgrounds. Thirdly, we tend to spot the colonial legacy in escalating conflicts in the country and swaying the Sudanese Cultural and National identity.

Finally, this study sheds light on the internal political dynamics of the Sudan in the 20th century -which was the most violent century in world history. However, much has been written and more has been discussed about the civil wars and the causes led to the division that followed, there has been little material about the impact of colonial residues, elitism and the mismanagement of diversity in the Sudan, and less about South Sudan secession, and that is what we will try to bring up in this dissertation.

Outline of the Research:

This research work is divided into three main chapters. The first chapter is entitled "The Sudan: the history of the divide", where we intend to revisit the history of the Sudan

investigating the root causes of nowadays conflicts. Furthermore, we have to highlight the role of past events, especially colonialism, in widening the cleavage between the North and the South. The nature of this topic obliged us to pinpoint some historical details prior to the 20th Century, like the Turkeyya and the Mahdeya which have an important impact on the formation of the Elite. Besides, it explains the long conflict between social classes as well.

It is commonly argued that many postcolonial conflicts are rooted in colonial policies. There is barely any zone of conflict in contemporary Africa that is not related to colonial history, especially in the late nineteenth century. It is indispensable to go through the historical background of the divide when explaining the contemporary situation. Since the key to understand nowadays' conflicts lies in the past, we feel compelled to discuss how conflicts aggravated throughout history, and how the South seceded from the North.

The second chapter, "The Impact of Diversity and Colonialism on the Sudan's Instability", provides and analyses the data collected about the social structure of both countries: the Sudan and South Sudan Republic. Besides, it climaxes linguistic, religious and ethnic diversity, as well as colonial policies and the birth of the Elite. Diversity on its own cannot be considered as a cause of civil conflicts; however, it seems that the mismanagement of diversity could. Since the independence, the Sudanese government has been imposing Arabization and Islamization policies on Non-Arab Non-Muslim Sudanese treating them as inferior regardless of their cultural identity. Therefore, we will try to shed light on how diverse the Sudan is, and what role does the Elite play in decision making.

Finally, the third chapter "The Sudanese National Identity crisis and Civil Wars" shall clarify the concepts of Nation and Nationalism and how they are linked to State building. It has to mainly discuss the role of Elite in imposing one group's vision on others and how the

Sudanese National identity lost its traits during the years of discontent. We shall focus on the policies used and the causes as well as the effects of civil wars in fracturing the State.

To sum up, our conclusion brings the reader to denote how the legacy of colonialism and perpetuated civil wars would define the State of violence in post-secession Sudan and South Sudan Republic. We shall answer the following questions: why did the civil wars last for more than 17 years? Is there a Sudanese National Identity or a forged one? Was diversity the direct cause of secession or the governmental mismanagement? And to what extent did colonialism affect the Sudanese social and cultural structure? What role did the Elite play during the struggle? We shall mainly question the origins of the assimilationist policies and how they failed. Nevertheless, Can the Sudan and the South Sudan Republic succeed in building a National Identity?

Research Methodology and Approach:

Ab initio, choosing a method of research is determined by the topic itself and the field of study that the researcher intends to tackle. Thus, studying National identity crisis and civil wars in the Sudan couldn't be done within the periphery of one discipline using one distinct method. Since this study is not merely political or sociological, it is included under the interdisciplinary field of Cultural Studies due to its tangled nature.

Interdisciplinary research often requires more resources, time, effort and analysis than single discipline research but the results can be ample, in terms of progressing the knowledge base and helping to solve complex societal problems. According to Joyce Tait and Catherine Lyall (2007) interdisciplinary research is defined as "occurring where the contributions of the various disciplines are integrated to provide holistic or systemic outcomes… it can be within the social sciences or between the social, natural and life sciences" (p.1).

We should differentiate between Multidisciplinary and Interdisciplinary research. Accordingly, Youngblood (2007) defines multidisciplinary research as "what happens when members of two or more disciplines cooperate, using the tools and knowledge of their disciplines in new ways to consider multifaceted problems that have at least one tentacle in another area of study". This then stands in contrast to a definition of interdisciplinary studies as "what happens when researchers go beyond establishing a common meeting place to developing new method and theory crafted to transcend the disciplines in order to solve problems" (p. 45)

Interdisciplinary research (IDR) integrates "information, data, techniques, tools, perspectives, concepts, and/or theories from two or more disciplines or bodies of specialized knowledge to advance fundamental understanding or to solve problems whose solutions are beyond the scope of a single discipline or field of research practice". In this research, it was paramount to move from one method to another in order to study the relationship between Nation building patterns and the phenomenon of civil wars in a diverse society, from the eve of independence till the secession of the country. The Sudan, which was chosen as a case study in this research, represents an intriguing case of a diverse country shaped into a unitarian National identity imposed by one group but was not accepted by the others.

According to Dalke (2004) "the very nature of interdisciplinarity", as we understand it, "requires that those who engage in it will always be working beyond the edges of what they know how to do well; in conception and methodology, such work cannot become conventional". Certainly, when doing this research, we had to contact experts in history, political science and sociology to discuss the outcomes of State building in a diverse society. This research encompasses many intertwined fields, mainly history, politics, economics, anthropology, sociology and sociolinguistics.

This dissertation addresses issues related to society and policy with less emphasis on discipline-related academic outcomes. Certainly, “the war of visions” in the Sudan, as Deng (1995) named it, is deeply rooted in the history of those people, before the State’s creation. In addition, it deals with the successive colonial domination in the area and the residues of their policies which affected the social stratification. Nevertheless, it unquestionably goes through with the ethnic structure, the tribal division, the linguistic and religious diversity in the Sudan in order to have a clearer perspective of the nature of the State and its people.

In fact, the discipline of research dictates the variety of methodological approaches that are applicable. Thus, interdisciplinary research demands different research methodological approaches and techniques. The apparent difficulty in interdisciplinary research is demonstrated in choosing a research method. Because social sciences and humanities are complementary and automatically inter-related, as Youngblood (2007) puts it, “No discipline is an island entire in itself”.

For the key to understanding phenomena is to inspect their root causes, one used Historiography. Since each period and event in history should be treated as unique, causes and results cannot generalized. Since, According to Iggers (1984), “each historical period and context has its own account of the causes and reasons why events occurred. These cannot be reproduced, and therefore, are not generalizable.”(p.40) Here we deduce that even if the events share similarities there is always a specificity that needs further analysis. Indeed, each event is history is specific in terms of the historical era, the geographical area, and the socio political milieu. Therefore, each event and case should be studied on this basis away from generalization.

From a hermeneutic perspective, in the cultural history tradition, one must try to understand what is beyond the causality of events. Hussrel (1962) emphasized that a

researcher needs to understand the culture of the time “in order to be able to know the facts that are documented.” He explained that “documentation, after all, involves the process of how the specific culture perceived the world and its facts” (p. 13). Therefore, an understanding of the events necessitates an investigation of the documents written about the culture we study, whether written by insiders or outsiders in order to avoid biased information.

Along similar lines, Iggers (1984) asserted that the German school of historical studies necessitated understanding, he explained that Fevbre emphasized that the

> "understanding" (comprendre) of social phenomena could never be reduced to immediate "knowledge" (savoir) but always involved an attempt to explain their relationships. The hermeneutical perspective, in fact, considers this level of "understanding" as explanation. True understanding requires that what is thus explained makes "sense" to the one who is receiving the knowledge. (p.45)

Accordingly, the majority of the historical documents used in the study of the Sudan’s historiography are archives that we scrutinized and analyzed to understand the crisis in the country throughout history.

In addition to the previously mentioned methods, this research adopted the Marxist methods in studying parts of the Sudanese cultural history; it has to do with individual and social change throughout the events which will be discussed thoroughly in the dissertation. Obviously, National identity and the building of a Nation are both a political and social processes that retro-affect both arenas. A Marxist socialist method seems paramount for the purpose of explaining National identity, building Nations, diversity and civil conflicts.

Hence, it would be necessary to use the Marxist Social Conflicts method which defends a view that unequal economic statues of a group over another in the same society is the backbone of social conflicts, arguing that the "Elite" in each society formulate the law according to what suits their interests and benefits, emphasizing on the fact that power is also gained through economics. Though, the Maxist Social Conflict Method is generally used in economic analysis, we adopted it to explain the cultural dilemma in Sudan. Nevertheless the National identity is formed by the powerful groups in Sudan where power is gained by economy and belonging to one cultural group and not the other.

This study adopts this method to diagnose the problem of National identity crisis in the Sudan. Since resentment and hostility are constant elements of society, power differences among social classes as well. It seems obvious that the Elite fights over limited resources of society to gain advantages over others, as it happened in the Sudan before the secession. The Method further States that society is created from ongoing social conflict between various groups over power. Conflict theory was based on Marx' theory of class clashes and unequal economic status, it is then used to explain a wide range of social phenomena, including wars and revolutions, wealth and poverty, discrimination and domestic violence.

In order to study the causality of civil conflicts, the use of qualitative and quantitative methods is paramount and both are highly required in data collection and data analysis. Obviously, the majority of the data collected is qualitative; it consists of documents like speeches, articles, books on the topics to be discussed. In the analysis process, some data change to a quantitative shape, i.e. encoding causes and results in numbers, categorized in graphic presentation for a better understanding and to summarize the findings. Yet, some numbers are decoded and analyzed then readapted to qualitative study which is a natural process in data analysis according to Blaxter, Hughes & Tight (2006) "The quantitative and qualitative also have a tendency to shade into each other, such that it is very rare to find

reports of research which do not include both numbers and words. Qualitative data may be quantified, and quantitative data qualified."(p. 199)

In this dissertation, we thoroughly referred to relativism, cultural history and hermeneutics. Since, according to Firat (1987) relativism advocates the idea that "nothing is conceived independent of the relative experiences of different individuals and cultures, and therefore, nothing can be generally real to all, there is not one but many realities" (p.7) which explains the different historical accounts of the same event. Cultural history on the other hand, defines the use of cultural background in order to study history or how history reflects the cultural environment of a people. It is very useful when investigating cultural and National identity of ethnic groups and their linguistic and religious belonging in the Sudan.

This research is to be included under the field of Cultural Studies, which began as a critical space for interdisciplinary analysis. While the critical pedigree has been swayed to some extent, because Cultural Studies has an interdisciplinary background, it resorts to numerous methodologies. First, the use of textual analysis including semiotics and discourse analysis and sociolinguistics in order to investigate language choice and use, in addition to the existing languages within the State. Second, it focuses on studying civilizations and a people's culture through anthropological construction (tribes, ethnic groups, traditions...)

Other methods include content analysis, limited ethnography, and political integration. Also, because of its nature, Cultural Studies resorts to various theories, from post-structuralism to post-colonialism and neo-Marxism. For instance, we studied post-independence State building and the forging of the Sudanese National identity using Post-colonialism. For, we assume that the problem in the Sudan is mainly due to Colonial legacy and their efforts to divide the country.

The term “Postcolonial” is used as Ashcroft (1998) stated, “to cover all the culture affected by the imperial process from the moment of colonization to the present day” arguing that the cause is that “there is a continuity of preoccupation throughout the historical process initiated by European imperial aggression”. Hence, we shall study the imperial residues and the effects of British colonial policy on language choice and education in South Sudan, as well as the birth of a new Elite and sorting the subalterns.

The history of Cultural Studies as initiated at the University of Birmingham in the 1950's also gives primacy to traditional subaltern communities, legitimizing their representations and values above the interpretations of the same values by dominant social communities. This study would attempt to include cultural anthropology as a tool, in order to explain the structure of a society and its culture and definitely helps to draw a clearer picture of the community we chose as a case study, i.e. the Sudan.

In this dissertation we tried to scrutinize the Memory of various peoples rather than present just a shallow inspection of their past. Obviously, Memory transcends History and Culture, since Memory is not just individual: it is a patchwork of different visions, events, traditions, moments shared by groups of people, whether tribal or ethnic or linked to the country as a whole. According to Knightley (2008) it is considered “in a holistic sense, not just as an individual faculty but as socially and culturally constructed and communicated. The relationship between the individual and the collective in representing the past is positioned as reciprocal, mutually interdependent and constantly negotiated” (p.191)

Investigating Memory includes a thorough study of society, history, and culture as well. It necessitates examining the effects of past on the present and future of a people and their country. Memory is a paramount substituent of a Nation, since the latter requires a sharing Memory and founding moments. So, in order to understand the Sudanese Nation building

process and its failure, one had to dig into the cultural structure, amongst the sharing memory. Knightley summarizes that:

> Memory is addressed both as a method for investigating cultural phenomena and as a topic for cultural investigation in its own right. In both of these senses, Memory is considered as a mode of temporal consciousness which generates meaning that is ultimately contingent on past, present and future, rather than a faculty which provides a transparent window on the past. (Ibid: p. 191)

Accordingly, Knightly here pinpointed the importance of Memory to study the past and the present status of a people, as well as predicting their future.

Obviously, "Memory study" used to be included under the holistic label of Cultural Studies. Yet, recently it is being used independently both as a research method and discipline. However, according to Pickering (2008) Humanities and Sociological studies of Memory have emphasized the collective nature of remembering.

Literature Review:

Civil wars in the Sudan are the longest in the world's history; it started in 1955 and ended with the Southern secession in 2011. However, in Darfur, armed conflicts have not stopped yet. The Sudanese diversity as well as Nation building policies have always attracted researchers who studied the phenomenon politically and historically emphasizing on the role of successive colonization of the country, like Douglas, H. Johnson (2003), Andrew, S. Natsios (2012), Scopas Poggo (2009), Abdul Latif, Z and Levy, P. (2008).

Others, as Anne Marie Lesch (1998) focused on the National identity in the Sudan and the failure of integration since diversity was not taken into consideration. Along similar lines, Deng (1994) focused on Southerners' suffering during the civil wars and the assimilation policies of Arabization and Islamization, since he is a Southerner Dinka. On the other hand, Abulkheir (2003) attributed the problem in the Sudan to external forces who seek the country's wealth. He advocated the Arabness of the Sudanese people and condemns the idea of any division which would be a huge loss for the country and would, therefore, lead to its weakening. In this research we tend to investigate not only the real Sudanese identity but also what led to the identity crisis and who played the lead role in this chaotic situation.

On the other hand, Baghdadi (2013) and Berair (2010) shed light on the structure of the Sudanese society, i.e. ethnic groups and tribes, languages, religions and its social stratification. This anthropological vision was very useful when studying the Sudanese identity. El Amin Abu Manga (2010) and others focused on the linguistic assimilation, or what's known as Arabization. He highlighted how and why Arabic is chosen as a National language and how the process was implemented. Indeed, we used these finding as a basis to a further study of the society's complexion and fragmentation that affected the country's stability.

As far as Nation and Nationalism are concerned, several contradictory definitions were given by scholars. Connor (1994), for instance, defines Nation as a "self-differentiating ethnic group" and sees that "Nationalism is the synonym of Ethnonationalism" (p. 42). While Deutch saw that "Nation is a cultural entity" insisting on the paramount role of communication in creating societies and culture, since communication necessitates the use of one language as a medium, the rise of a National language is required in the Nation building process.

As mentioned earlier, different languages coexist in a diverse society which make it difficult to impose one official language that is spoken by the majority of the individuals marginalizing other vernaculars; e.g. the case of Arabization in post-independent Arab countries for the sake of Union and National Identity building. This sense of Nationalism per se is facilitated by "Globalized communication and movements" which is, according to Delanty & Kumar (2009) "also driven by the relentless concern with meaning and identity that is a feature of the present day. It is both a reaction and a product of globalization" (p. 3)

There are countries where more than one official language are used, like Canada, India and many former French and British countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. In comparison, this is not the case with religion, since we don't find a person with two religious faiths or belong to different sects because of the uniqueness of faith and religious appartenance. According to many scholars, the religious alterity plays an enormous role in the National Identity crisis and civil wars, "the major civilizations in human history" according to Huntington "have been closely identified with the world's great religions; and people who share ethnicity and language but differ in religion [may slaughter each other]" (1996, p. 42)

The case of the Sudan which was the largest country in Africa before the secession, is an excellent example of a country "Divided not between Islam and Christianity" according to Lesch (1998) "but between religiously sanctioned Arab cultural and political domination and an armed politico-cultural rejection of the same by the Black Africans". However, most scholars defended the view that the civil wars are caused for religious reason, in our research we tend to explain that the problem goes beyond religion.

Civil wars have several causes. Marta Reynal-Querol, for instance, emphasized that "Social and ethnic conflicts are recurrent phenomena affecting many countries. Ethnicity is at the center of politics in divided societies…However, not all ethnically divided societies

evolve into civil war. There are also experiences of good relationships among individuals of different cultures within a country." (2002, p.1) On the other hand, Donald Horowitz (1985) argues that the problem is mainly economic. This is what Sambanis (2001) points out in a survey of literature, arguing that "economic studies of civil war have successfully identified an empirically robust relationship between poverty, slow growth, and an increased likelihood of civil war and prevalence".

The latter problems are obviously the characteristics of "Fragile States" which Mcloughlin (2012) claims to be the main cause of civil wars. In World Bank review of 2007 these States "have consistently grown more slowly than other low-income countries, and the rate of extreme poverty is rising within them. They lag behind in meeting all the Millennium Development Goals; with a 50% higher prevalence of malnutrition, 20% higher child mortality, and 18% lower primary education completion rates than other low-income countries".

More specifically, Ayers (2012) accentuates three related dimensions of explanation which are ignored by orthodox framings of civil war and which she summarizes in the introduction of her paper in the following points

> (i) the technologies of colonial rule which (re)produced and politicized multiple fractures in social relations…(ii) the major role of geopolitics in fuelling and exacerbating conflicts within The Sudan and the region, particularly through the cold war and the 'war on terror'; and (iii) The Sudan's terms of incorporation within the capitalist global economy.

In addition to that, Fearon and Laitin (2002) who studied thoroughly civil wars and their impact on individual and National identity agreed that: “An influential conventional wisdom holds that civil wars proliferated rapidly with the end of the Cold War and that the root cause of many or most of these has been ethnic Nationalism”. Obviously, all these issues are noticed in the Sudan who survived the longest civil conflict in the world.

The specificity of this research is that it will focus on the rise of the Elite in the Sudan and its corporation in decision making and State building. Consequently, this work will also scrutinize the role of the colonizer in widening the cleavage between groups, therefore planting the seeds of conflict between the South and the North. In addition, we shall study the different visions of Nationalism which escalated wars between both camps. Accordingly, one will study Nationalism and Nation building based on the Sudanese experience. It was essential to study the relationship between Nationalisms and power using both Gellner’s model and Anderson’s theory.

CHAPTER ONE:

Sudan: the History of the Divide.

“History isn't about dates and places and wars. It's about the people who fill the spaces between them.”
— Jodi Picoult, The Storyteller

Introduction:

The Sudan used to be the largest country in Africa before South Sudan emerged as an independent country in 2011. The country covered the area of 2,376,000 square kilometers and is rich in water resources, fertile agricultural land, minerals, mines, oil reserves, and cattle. Before the independence of South Sudan Republic (SSR), the Sudan used to have borders with the Red Sea, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, Kenya and Uganda. In order to understand the root causes of the National identity crisis which led to the secession, it is paramount to go back in time and scrutinize history once again. Historians claim that the secession was due to ongoing strives and civil wars between the Arab Muslim North and an African Christian and Animist South for several causes.

It is widely acknowledged that the country suffered a National identity crisis aggravated by countless reasons, amongst the impact of centuries of slave raiding and trading as well as successive colonial existence in this area. Undeniably, the Sudan enjoys a geostrategic location, for it is considered as the open gate to Central and East Africa; it is as Oppong (2010) positioned "the Eastern end of the great trade route stretching along the open savannah South of the Sahara" (p. 4) Therefore, its history has been linked with or influenced by Egypt, its immediate neighbor to the North and other countries like Lybia and Congo mainly.

Consequently, the Christianization, Islamization and Arabization of the Sudan are the results of the extensive process of missionary activities, commercial contacts, demographic movements and large-scale acculturation. To sum up, we cannot discuss the matter of the ongoing civil wars in the Sudan outside the history of the divide; since we agree with Idris (2005) when he wrote "it is true that history is not given, but constructed." This, in part,

explains why historical reconstruction is essential "if we seek to understand the crisis of the postcolonial State in Africa" (p. 14) and in the Sudan in particular.

1-1-The Rise of Kingdoms and Peripheries:

The Sudanese borders were the outcome of the Turks expansion during their rule in North Africa. *Qui ante*, the Sudan was once a number of Sultanates collocated in the Northern part. Those Sultanates were the outcome of a combination between numerous tribes originating from different ethnic ancestry. First, Sennar Kingdom which was built in the 16th Century, precisely in 1503 along the Blue Nile encompassing the Ethiopian foothills, the Nuba Mountains and White Nile plains[3].

Around the 17th Century in the area of Western Sudan, Darfur Sultanate was founded South Dar Fartit and Bahr el Ghazal. Darfur has a diverse population maintaining their tribal identity with its beliefs, culture and characteristics. They even prevented marriages with other tribes in order to keep their purity; the only link prevailing at that time was religious belonging to Islam. Dr Mustafa Ahmad Aboulkhir (2006) described Darfur as a miniature of the Sudan in terms of ethnic and linguistic diversity.

The Sudan had witnessed years of discontent and wars, between those kingdoms, for several causes mainly about boundaries between exploitation zones. During the 18th century, their main activity was slave raiding and slave trading. Since each kingdom represented a center power, they brought slaves from hinterlands. Each Sultanate had its proper periphery for raiding and exploiting other resources. The problems between Tribes and regions started in this period and it still affects nowadays' denigration and racism.

[3] In 1504, "a Funj leader, Amara Dunqas, founded the Black Sultanate (As Saltana a Zarqa) at Sannar…in Southern Nubia and had supplanted the remnants of the old Christian kingdom of Alwa. The Black Sultanate eventually became the keystone of the Funj Empire.

The goal from going back is history is to acknowledge the significance of the historical legacy of slavery and colonialism in the crisis of postcolonial National identity and citizenship in the Sudan. Along similar lines Idris (2005) explains that in the Sudan "the legacies of slavery, the slave trade, and colonialism are particularly significant in understanding the interplay between the processes of State formation and Nation-building, and the crisis of democratic citizenship and violence." (p.4)

Slavery dated before the Turkeyya[4] and the Anglo-Egyptian condominium, even before the coming of Arabs and Islam. Johnson (2003, p.3) asserted that "pagan and Christian Kingdoms were active in the organized raiding of their peripheries". So, The Sudan was defined as a land owned by dominant kings "mek" who brought manpower, wealth and food surpluses on which the States built their power from hinterlands e.g. Nubia and South Kordofan (ibid, p.2). Thus, the relationship between these tribes and the central Sultan was not strong, it was rather described as a ruler collecting taxes and a ruled paying them.

The Contact with the Muslim world for commercial reasons led to the gradual spread of Islam in the area, especially with the "wandering holy men" who were welcomed by people there. They were given lands and cattle as gifts, and women as wives. Certainly, it was with the coming of Arab merchants to the Sudan that Islam was firstly introduced and spread, in parallel with literacy in Arabic. Hence, adapting Islamic legal principles brought the Sudanese kingdoms together though widened the gap between center and periphery i.e. hinterland.

Johnson (2003) as well as Hassan (2002) and many others asserted that Muslims and non-Muslims continued to have stable relationship without "jihadist fervor". Furthermore some Muslim pastoralists such as Baqqara and the Rufaa[5] found refugee when allying with non-Muslim Dinka. Though declared as Muslim kingdoms, kings continued to claim

[4] Turkeyya or Turkeyah is the period when Sudan was ruled by the Turks during the Ottoman Empire.
[5] Names of the pastoralist tribes.

customary rights not based on Islamic regulations, because Islam was introduced by individual clerics and different Sufi orders, which explains the constant conflicts between Muslims during the 19th C due to conflicting interpretations of religion. As a consequence to the wars between those sultanates over scars resources, as well as tribalism which fractured their union, the Egyptians found an easy way to invade the region.

1- 2- The Turkeyya:

Because of fragmentation and tribalism, the Turkish invasion succeeded to take control of the land, except for the Fur Sultanate which remained independent half a Century after the Turks invasion. After the Napolianic Wars, Muhamed Ali[6], as a ruler of Egypt and Turkey, invaded the Sudan in 1820, looking for a supply of gold and slave soldiers in order to expend in the near East and Mediterranean coast in the name of what Johnson (2003) called "the Turco-Egyptian tribute" (p.4). According to different historical accounts, the Northern and the Eastern parts of the country were the first to be conquered. Therefore, they helped the Egyptian to reach the upper Nile region for slave raiding. It was then when the South became a slave supplier for both Northerners and Egyptians as well. By 1821, they have conquered sufficient of the territory to establish themselves.

Mohammed Ali asserted that the Sudan was not a part of the Ottoman Empire, but the Southern province of Egypt which was regained. Though, their expansionist ambitions went further to claim more and more of the surrounding territory. In 1875, the Fur Sultanate was finally conquered and borders of the Sudan reached the deeper towards Equatoria.

Those new borders resulted of dividing different tribes and families between the Sudan and Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia,

[6] Muhamed Ali Pasha is a Turkish King who rulled the Ottomon Empire. He was an Ottoman Albanian commander in the Ottoman army, who rose to the rank of Pasha, and became Wāli, and self-declared Khedive of Egypt and Sudan with the Ottomans' temporary approval. The dynasty that he established would rule Lower Egypt, Upper Egypt and Sudan until the Egyptian Revolution of 1952.

Libya, Kenya and Uganda. Which explains how diverse is the Sudanese society and why they had a lack of National identity and didn't belong together. It explains also the help each tribe receives from their families beyond the Sudanese borders e.g. the Masalit in Darfur who were supported by the Masalit in Lybia and chad. It also explains the Lybian intervention during the Numairy's rule.

According to Deng (2001, p.5) the Southerners represent "the groups which were excluded from the official symbolic expression of Nationalism had to accept being citizens of a Nation towards which they [did not necessarily feel any attachment]". It means that people who were oppressed and denigrated for their cultural identity and roots did not accept the Arab National Identity because of the Arabs' mistreatment and subjugation, especially after the oppression and slavery that the Northerners exercised in the South. This policy *inter alia* fed the hatred between both groups that lasts to present days.

Though it started before the establishment of the Sudan as a country, slavery flourished with the Turks. Johnson (2003) noted that there are two main intertwined historical reasons that contributed in the division between North and South during the Turco-Egyptian control of the area. The first was the impoverishment of some areas of Northern Sudan through new forms of taxation on lands ownership, which increased Southward expansion for slave raiding and trading. The second was slave owning and domestication, since it was during the Turkeyya that domestic slavery became a trend in the Northern Society.

At that time, commercial companies from different countries exploited the South for ivory, gum Arabic and slave trading which became an institution of the Sudanese life throughout history. Since, both government and companies had armies of free men and slaves, ambivalence of slave soldiers and slaves in general as inferior race didn't change and persisted even after the abolition of slavery in 1833 by the Act of the Parliament of the United

Kingdom abolishing slavery throughout the British Empire. Although, according to Prunier (1993) this "amorphous Black African space" was fused by conquest to "the equally amorphous Muslim and superficially Arabized North, the memories of the slave trade were to remain as a burning feeling of pain and resentment".

With the Khedive Ismail's rule, the country witnessed the integration of British advisors and intervention. Indeed, the Khedive Ismail was in favor of a secularist British law which was not welcomed by the Muslim Sudanese. This secularism has started a kind of Islamic revival within some brotherhoods and Sufi sects causing a union emerged between them against the atrocities of the ruler. Meanwhile a sense of Nationalist rising emerged on the surface. In this context, Lecsh (1998) asserted that:

> In a sense the Turkeyya did create the first foundation for some sort of National feeling, at least in the Muslim Northern Sudan. The considerable variety of tribes, whether they were technically considered as Arabs (Shaiqiyya, Ja'aliyin, Danagla, Rufa'a) or as arabized (Rizzeyqat, Missiriya, Habbaniya, Hawazma) or even non-Arab (the various Beja groups in the East, the Nubians in the North), all became conscious of a certain similarity of destiny vis-à-vis the foreign Turco-Egyptian master. (p.48)

Here we can clearly see that the Sudanese had put aside their differences in order to defend themselves from the Turks. It is fairly said that it was the first time that the Sudanese see themselves as an entity.

While Northerners were raising a feeling of adversity against one enemy which is the Turco-Egyptian conqueror, the African Southerners found themselves confronting two

oppressors, the colonizer and the Northerners since both represented potential slavers. The Turks exploitation of manpower and resources, in addition to the tributes imposed on the Sudanese, caused people to revolt and unified against them. Therefore, rejecting their differences epitomized a dawn of Nationalism in the Sudan. Unfortunately, this colonial era left dangerous residues on the Sudanese society since it defined the South as an exploitable periphery, encouraged the ambivalence of Southerners as lower status citizens, and intensified racial segregation.

1- 3- The Mahdyya:

According to many scholars, The Mahdyya[7] was the period of early Sudanese Nationalism. Where a new understanding and application of Islam was introduced, a religion which was different from the one proclaimed by the Turks, and it was in the name of "good Islam that the bad Islam of the Turks was denounced" as Prunier (1993, p.3) put it. In 1881, it was with the coming of the Mahdi[8] Muhammad Ibn Abdalla, who according to Johnson (2003) "began a religious crusade to unify the tribes in Western and central Sudan" (p.4), that the State witnessed a union between conflicting tribes. For the first time, instead of having slave armies fighting for fiefdom, a sense of jihad was pervading.

The Mahdi led a Nationalist revolt terminating in the fall of Khartoum in 1885. According to Natsios (2012) slave raiding decreased during the Mahdist control it even diverged to "incursions into the South tended to be almost exclusively for plunder; for food during the great famine of 1888-1892, or for more slaves to add to the dwindling supply of domestic labor and military recruitment" (p.6). Still, Northern Sudan has been united by Islam and therefore confronts the South with a political and cultural unity which the South lacks.

[7] The period under Mouhamed Ibn Abdalla, named the Mahdi.

[8] The Mahdi means in Arabic "the expected savior" his real name was Muhammad Ibn Abdalla a charismatic religious leader that led a Jihad against the Turks by unifying the country. His fame boosted when they won the war and succeeded to build the First Sudanese State.

The presence of South Sudanese soldiers in the Mahdist's army as well as administration was a clear evidence of the Sudanese Nationalism at that early age of a Republic. Unfortunately, despite the collaboration of Southerners in the government, racial segregation remained as cruel as it was during the Turkeyya. Especially that the Mahdi imposed allegiance to the Imam[9] and his Khalifa[10] as a condition of citizenship, which raised a conflict between the followers of the Mahdi (ansaar) and the unbeliever Muslims and non-Muslims (koffaar), who later on helped the Anglo Egyptian colonizer to overthrow the Mahdist State and claim a right in governing the Sudan.

Shortly thereafter, the Mahdi died but his State survived until the coming of the Anglo Egyptian force in 1898 led by Lord Kitchener. According to Johnson (2003, p.6) "the Mahdist State developed its own form of internal colonialism" in addition to the corruption of sheikhs and the ineffectiveness of those who ran the government administration after the Mahdi's death, the Sudanese people rose against it and submitted to the new yet old Egyptian Master. During the years of the Egyptian presence in the country, the Turco-Egyptians had developed a very close relationship with the Khatmiyya one of the Muslim Brotherhoods a Sufi sect and an important family in the north with a hidden hatred to the Mahdist government and family. The Khatmiyya was the one who helped the Egyptians in their re-conquest.

The Mahdi was considered as the first to create an Islamic political movement based on puritanical interpretations of the Holy Quran. The same movement kept reappearing throughout the Sudanese political map naming the Umma party which contributed in the coming discontent years of modern Sudan. Indeed, the Mahdi's status as a "Holy man" prompted Sadiq al Mahdi, his great-grandson, to win 1966 and 1986's elections. As far as his legacy is concerned, Andrew Natisos (2013, p.42) notes that the Mahdi was the one who

[9] The Mahdi himself was considered as the Imam and he was considered by others as a "prophet".
[10] The Khalifa is the Mahdi's predecessor or the one to be named to rule after his death.

"started a long line of (failed) attempts to control the Sudan's periphery through manipulation, repression and conquest" and added that he encouraged the three tribes' mission to "Islamize and Arabize the South".

1- 4- The Anglo-Egyptian Re-conquest:

The Sudan was proclaimed a condominium in 1899 under British-Egyptian administration. Apparently, the control was in the hands of both powers, whereas in reality, all policies and administrative decisions were taken and applied by the British. In fact, the condominium gained its legitimacy in the international court as an Egyptian claim to regain their Southern territories. Britain couldn't get the Sudan under its "political protection" without having Egyptians as allies, especially after the Fachouda incident with the French who were also eager to set foot into the Sudan.

We agree that the different British policies imposed on both North and South, helped in widening the gap between the two regions. As we notice, these actions were similar to the policy adopted in India under the pattern of "divide to rule", where the colonizer made use of ancient rivalry between people in order to set them apart with a focus on the identity. As we said earlier, the Sudanese frontiers were the result of Ottoman dispersion, which made the Sudan a malformed state from its inception.

The Merghani family, the founders of the Khatmiyya sect established by Mohamed Othman El Merghani who maintained a strong opposition against the Mahdi according to Hamadnallah (2010), supported in a remarkable way the Anglo- Egyptian dominance in the Sudan against their fellow Sudanese. They represented the category of disgruntled Muslims who were regarded as an Elitist group during the condominium. In fact, the British made use of the Khatemyya's religious rivalry with the Mahdiyya by subsidizing them in order to gain the support of all the citizens who were against the previous rule.

The British took several decisions concerning the North. First, they reinstalled the tribal leaders who were once replaced by Mahdist agents. They also supported Sunni radical Islam over the Sufi orders. Along similar lines, Johnson (2003) asserted that the British "orthodoxy against fanaticism in a constitution of a board of Ulama" (p.3), in order to get rid of the prevailing sectarianism. Noticeably, the British policy tried by all means to erase the Mahdiyya trace from Northerners Memory which was hard to apply as a policy. Since, the colonizer couldn't force the acculturation process in the deeply Arab Muslim North they designed another plan for the South.

The British didn't find problems in getting the Southerners out of the Mahdists loyalty since they were not under it. The Sudanese borders were set in 1903 in order to define the Southern borderline and stop the external invasions from competitive powers present in that area at that time. Unexpectedly, the main problem that faced the condominium in the South is how to convince the Southerners who were independent for several years to accept a new master. Historically, apart from being under slave raiding and exploitation, the South has never been under the rule of the Turks or the Mahdiyya, except some areas in the Northern part as Bahr el Ghazal.

Southerners perceived the Turks, Egyptians and Northerners as enemies. Accordingly, the British were categorized in the same column by Southerners who rejected the Egyptian crown too. This inspired the British to work on a different pattern in order to convince them of their uniqueness and acceptance of their indigenous African identity. The British tried to show that, at the contrary to the old government which burned their villages, stolen their cattle and enslaved them; their government was better. As a result, what the British did was even worse. Accordingly Johnson (2003) accentuated that:

> Appearances were often against them; especially when, in response to local defiance, or even local indifference, the troops of the new government burned villages, seized cattle as 'fines', and carried off war captives and hostages to distant prisons or for conscription in the army, all in the name of establishing a government authority. (p.10)

Throughout the condominium period, the South, in addition to other neglected districts in the East and the West, remained on the margin of the Northern government. Actually, the Southerners represented the majority of the Egyptian army, mainly its garrison in the Sudan. The residues of the 19th Century's enslavement of Southerners were manifested in the way Northerners, Egyptians and even British treated them. The latter on the other hand, tried to preserve the Southerners' Afrocentric identity away from Arabs in general and Muslims in particular. Consequently, the "Southern policy", where the British colonizer basically focused on missionary educational system as well as the closed district ordinance, was a mile stone in the rise of a unique Southern identity, therefore strives between the North and the South in terms of National identity which will be acutely discussed in the next chapter.

During WWI, the British Empire was in need of man power and financial resources to supply their army during battles in the Middle East. Consequently, the British opted for an obligatory recruiting in the South mainly. As far as the financial support is concerned, they seized cattle from pastoralist tribes in the Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal instead of tributes that they couldn't pay. In sedentary areas, high taxes were imposed on the landlords. In case of inability to pay, lands were seized too (Bekhit 1982, Johnson 2003, Sidahmed 2005).

Because of the Closed Districts ordinance, where tribes were centralized in specific zones and prohibited from dealing with each other from the mid-1920, the South became

weaker and made it easier for the imperial power to exploit their resources and control the Southerners who had no common cultural, racial, linguistic, religious or regional identity. In fact, a "divide to rule" strategy wasn't just applied to widen the cleavage between North and South, but also to divide the Southern tribes in order to exploit their resources. These policies used by the colonial power in 1920 were well studied in an irrefutably pragmatic way.

As a result to the different patterns tailored for both North and South, "the religious divide" as Johnson (2003) highlighted "was imposed on a country which was not in the inspiration or intention, religious" (p.9). Since his coming, Lord Kitchener announced that the British administration came to the Sudan in order to "appease the Muslims pain…help to establish an Islamic country on the just and legal bases and especially to build Mosques and found righteous Islamic beliefs" according to Bekhit (1983, p.32). In 1899, Cromer promised the leaders to respect Islam as a religion and avoid any law that would oppose Sharia. On the other hand, it neglected the South which was considered as a supply of money and manpower. Rather than developing Southern infrastructure, the colonial legacy was to promote wars and continuing conflicts between people, making use of tribalism, ethnicity, regionalism, and all conflicting differences.

Britain decided to transfer power from central sovereign government to the local government of the Sudan, employing indigenous as well as customary law, which was known as "Devolution". During the Native Administration, the authority was in the hands of chiefs (Omdas and Shouyoukh) who represented the political Elite of the Sudanese society. Unlike the families who had helped the Turco-Egyptian rule, Prunier (1996) asserted that "given their past histories, the Ansar logically tended to be anti-Egyptian while the members of the Khatmiyya were closer to Cairo" (p.12). Chiefs were also given judicial administrative powers. Yet, their administrative work was supervised by British Districts Commissioners.

In the South, there was an integration of indigenous structures and laws. According to Idris (2005) there were two main sedentary agriculture kingdoms in the South; the Azande and the Shilluk, where authority was hereditary and any innovation in the ruling strata was definitely unacceptable. On the other hand, for the Pastoral societies like Dinka, Nuer, Murle, Mundani….etc the British innovated the chiefs courts. Besides, these different patterns adopted in South Sudan affected the imbalanced growth, yet the same pattern was used in Uganda that holds different communities too: pastoralists and sedentary.

In the sedentary agriculture communities, courts were accessible most of the year which helped in evolving a more powerful order and more bureaucratic lines. While in pastoralist communities, in contrast, there were mobile courts which dealt generally with cattle cases and which were accessible only during dry seasons, those courts were encouraged to collect fines and taxes rather than applying justice. This affected the administration staff employment when Southern Sudanese were recruited into lower levels of the civil service.

During WWI, Britain brought Sayyid Abdurrahman El Mahdi[11] to power. This man according to Natsios (2012) was "ideologically both anti-Turkish and anti-Egyptian" (p.41) and backed up Islam as a religion, which promoted the pro-British sentiment and encouraged the Sudanese to fight under the British flag. Since the Egyptian crown was itself under the British control, it was difficult to accept its sovereign, as a result the Egyptian soldiers and administrators were expelled from the country in 1924 after the assassination of the British governor general, Lee Stark, by Egyptian Nationalists. Despite the fact that the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty "allowed the return of a limited number of Egyptian troops in 1936 to Khartoum" (Ibid, p.42), British officials continued to believe that the Sudan was a British territory.

[11] Sayyid Abdurrahman El Mahdi was the son of the Mahdi and the leader of Ansaar sect.

1-5- Independence and the rise of Sudanese Nationalism:

Since the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1924 included not only the British withdrawal from the Suez Canal, but from the Sudan too, according to Johnson (2003), Britain tactically opted for the Sudan's independence before the birth of Nationalist movements who claimed their right of self-governing. In order to keep the largest section of Northern Nationalists on its side, Britain prompted the Sudan independence case in the United Nations. But with the Free Officers coup of July 23rd, 1952 in Egypt under the control of Gamal Abdul Nasser, the political map changed. The new Egyptian government declared the Sudan as an independent country separate from the Egyptian Monarch. Although the Egyptian government tried to convince the newly inaugurated government in the Sudan and the Northern Elite to join the Arab Union, or what was called the Union of the Nile Valley.

In January 1956, the Sudan was declared as an independent republic. Hence, this plea was supported by Britain, Egypt and the United States on the 19th of the same month. On the same day, the Republic of the Sudan was accepted in the Arab League. It seems that power was transferred from Britain to the Northern Sudanese Nationalists with the same colonial pattern and administrative folders "using the same desks and buildings" as Abdalla (2002) put it (p.50). For the Southerners, who perceived Northerners as enemies, it was the beginning of a new struggle against ethnic, religious and linguistic segregation and marginalization.

Those fears were heartened when Northern Nationalists adopted Arabic as a National language denying how diverse their country is, and how consequently sever the problem would become. Johnson (2003) agreed that"the Sudanese Nationalist movement never achieved a mass following and in fact was divided within itself about whether to follow a purely Sudanese Nationalism or a broader pan-Arab Nationalism. It can be argued that it never fully pursued either" (.p.13)

Hence, the Sudanization of the country was criticized by historians (Abdallah 2002, Poggo 2009, Natsios 2012) to be premature. Evidently, the Sudan was the first British colony in Africa to be granted independence after WWII and the first to witness the longest unstoppable civil wars in the world's history. As a consequence of residue of the colonial policies, the country didn't enjoy time for peace. Along similar lines, Masabo (2014) also accentuated the impact of the British policy when he wrote that "the British capitalizing on the existing social racial parity instituted the Southern Policy (1922-1947) which intensified the North-South divide which later led to the outbreak of the first civil war following the military muting in 1955 marking the beginning of Southern secessionist struggles". As we notice that the North- South discontent was implanted in the Sudanese historical roots and aggravated by the weak administration which was led by incompetent clerks and "intellectuals" from the North.

Al Azhari, for instance, was the leading figure of the Sudanese Nationalism and was the first to raise Southern Sudan's case. He tried to convince the Congress of the importance of the South for Northern economic development and insisted on putting it under control, caring less of their secessionist demands. Although, the National Parliament included Southern delegates who were less educated and poorly in hold of administration work, due to the educational system in the South, pinpointed the Southern inability to any form of self-government during the Juba conference of 1947.

Meanwhile, the Sudan was facing its first choice of self-governing legislature and the terms of their self-determination statute which was an agreement between the existing political parties, the Southern delegates, as well as the British members of the Sudanese government on the main constitutional draft in 1952. The Khatmiyya as well as the pro-unionist parties boycotted the assembly at first, yet contributed in drafting the statute through the Constitutional Amendment Commission. The Assembly rejected the Southerners' demand

to appoint a Minister for the South, according to Poggo (2003) “the issues which most concerned Southerners were again decided without their participation” (p.25).

At the end of 1953, the first Parliament elections took place with the participation of all parties, especially the most important religious NUP and UMMA parties in the North who, based on what Natsios (2012) wrote “either tried to minimize the Southerners’ influence in the independence movement or excluded them entirely from the process because they were neither Muslims nor Arabs” (p.26). Al Azhari’s NUP _which was still advocating union with Egypt and during the campaign_ promised Southerners a full representation. The Southern intellectuals and politicians on the other hand, joined the Liberal Party.

The NUP won major seats in the election, with Al Azhari as a Prime Minister under the Governor General. Since the Parliament majority was anti-unionist, union with Egypt was impossible to concretize. The Liberal Party’s representatives on the other hand plead for a “separate administrative status for the South, proposing federalism as a constitutional solution” (Ibid) which was rejected by the government who appointed Northerners to all the higher positions in the South, while the few Southerners that are employed according to Poggo (2009) “are subjected to humiliating conditions.” (p.52)

This decision caused Southern politicians and intellectuals to consider this step as a Northern colonization of the South, consequently it led to the Juba Conference where Southerners accentuated on their main demand of self-determination and the rise of the South as an autonomous State totally independent from the Khartoum rule. With the rise of separatist voices in the South, we agree with Johnson (2003) that the Northern government readjusted his statute and accepted the Federation “only as a tactic to secure Southern votes in the parliamentary manoeuveres which preceded independence” (p.27). During the Sudanization process, all British officials were replaced by Northerners in a physical removal

of the British presence. Thus the number of Northerners increased in the South, mainly teachers in Public Schools, army and police officers as well as merchants. This increased the feeling of Northern domination and Southern discontent.

1-6- The First Civil War (1955- 1972):

In the post-independence period, the Sudan witnessed struggles and strives resulted of the Anyanya Rebellion which lasted seventeen years from 1955 to 1972. It began five months before the Sudanese independence became formal. It started with the British administered the Sudan Defense Force Equatorial Corps mutinied in Torit, and in the following days in Juba, Yeri and Manidi according to D'agoôt (2012). These separatist Southerners began an initially low-intensity civil war aimed at establishing an independent South. More than half a million people died during this war, and violence became a predominant status in the Sudan.

Regionalism, Sectarianism, tribalism in addition to the Nation building process by ineffective government; are all causes to ignite war between North and South. Zerai (2010) asserted that:

> The euphoria of independence, the optimisms and the dreams that came with their perceived disconnect with the agonizing past, soon disappeared into thin air. A hard-won independence soon turned into a nightmare. On the eve of the independence, conflict over the Southerners' perceived sense of marginalization broke out between the South and the central government in the North, and it continued unabated until 1972. (p.2)

We deduce that Southerners disappointment and rage was caused by the denigration they endured under the Northern government. Consequently, the mutineers fled to Uganda which

was still a British colony and asked for the colonizer's help to regain order in the South. Britain on the other hand refused to send its troops to the Sudan and rather backed up Al-Azhari's government so it wouldn't intensify the Egyptian influence .According to historical records, a notable number of Northerners who worked in the South were killed. Nevertheless in other statistics, Southerners claim the opposite.

In a governmental attempt to catch the mutineers, some fled to border countries because of tribal and blood connection with people there. Others were caught, tried and executed, according to Poggo (2009) "this provided the impetus for organizing a guerrilla movement whose primary aim was to avenge the dead, as well as to assert independence for the people of Southern Sudan" (p.49). Consequently, the Equatorians saw themselves as the leaders of Southern Nationalism, since they were the first to revolt for independence.

When declared fully independent, the Sudanese government promised the British as well as the Egyptians to consider the Federation constitution seriously and restore order in the South. Since the Sudanese Protocol, that both the British and the Egyptians signed, defines their protectorate role which was clarified in this paragraph taken from the Anglo- Egyptian Protocol:

> The policy which the High Contracting Parties undertake to follow in the Sudan within the framework of the unity between Great Britain and Egypt under the common Crown of Egypt will have for its essential objectives to assure the well-being of the Sudanese, the development of their interests, and their active preparation for self-government and consequently the exercise of their right to choose the future status of the Sudan. (Doran, 2002, p.10)

Unfortunately, the newly born country with various unsolved problems of Nationhood was led by an inexperienced government. So the issues of geographical vastness, conflicting histories and corrupted greedy successive governments contributed altogether to the ignition of Civil Wars which, according to D'agoôt (2012) "originated in the periphery while the country's rulers tended to see the Nation normatively as an unproblematic sovereign inheritance contested by ungrateful troublemakers' rival regional cognoscenti saw National identity as a work in progress" (p.2).

In fact, armed conflicts in the Sudan were just a logical outcome of a long history of oppression, because "the violent political conflicts in the Sudan" as Idris (2005) put it "are manifestations of legacies of the past, namely slavery and colonialism. These legacies in turn structure the relationship between the racialized postcolonial State and its oppressed groups" (p.10). Before the rise of a secessionist sentiment in Southern Sudan, the Southern political parties asked for federalism which was, as we said earlier, rejected by the Northern government who perceived it as an initial step towards secession, in addition to the corrupted Southerner politicians who used their positions for personal benefits.

In 1958, a bloodless Military coup d'état led by general Abbud took control of the country. This government put an end to the debate vis-à-vis the Sudanese National Identity. Since, General Abbud's government followed a policy of Arabization and Islamization in the South with special focus on education, according to Natsios (2012): "Abbud's military council believed that the only way to unify the country was to extend Arab culture and Islam to the South, which they preceded to do" (p.54). As a result, they built schools and transferred the missionary schools under governmental control where Arabic was the instruction medium while English was taught in Secondary School. In addition to that, they encouraged conversion to Islam especially among students by restricting churches.

The majority of Southerners fled to other countries or joined the rest of the mutineers in the bush in 1960-2 to form both "the exile political movement" and the basis of a guerrilla troop which was named afterwards The Sudan African Nationalist Union (SANU). Their guerrilla was named after a type of poison –Anya nya and their revolt was considered by many historians as the true start of the First Civil War rather than 1955 mutiny.

The Sudanese economy was deteriorating since Abbud's government had no effective economic policy, which caused mass civilian discontent concretized in Khartoum demonstrations. This period obliged in a way general Abbud to step down in October 1964 then replaced by a civilian government. Hence, the "October revolution" against Abbud's Military government was seen as the first civilian reaction against dictatorship according to Natsios (2012). As a consequence to the fall of Abbud and regaining civilian rule in Khartoum, Clement Mboro, the Minister of the Interior, who was the head of the Southern Front, and the leaders of the exile movement were invited in the Sudan to participate in the Round Table.

It was at that particular event that a split in the SANU party was noticed, between those who advocated secession on one hand and those who favored self-determination under a federal rule on the other. Furthermore, several violent events worsened the relationship between the North and the South despite the huge efforts to unify the shattered country. The main event was the infamous "Black Sunday"[12] which was considered as "a race riot". This event convinced the government that the "Southern Problem" had to be taken seriously. To avenge the assassinated civilians of "Black Sunday" and army officers killed in the South, the governmental army forces killed many Southern civilians and a number of their Elite on different occasions. Consequently, more Southerners fled and joined the Anyanya militias.

[12] The Black Sunday: Mistakenly, Southerners who were at the Khartoum airport waiting for Mboro, whose flight was delayed, reacted in a violent way to his assassination rumor so they killed hundreds of Arabs in December 1964's riot.

Although the Anyanya rebellion forces marked a regional Southern Nationalist union against the North, tribal division and rivalry caused fraction between leaders who advocated altered political ideologies. Henceforth, instability was the only description of the political environment prevailing in the Sudan between 1965 and 1969. Therefore, in 1967, Joseph Lagu[13], helped by the Israeli colonizer in Palestine, succeeded to unify the Southern militias despite their differences. The Zionists provided the secessionist forces, who named themselves the Southern Sudan Liberation Front (SSLF), with modern arsenal and training so that they can be, for the first time, in equation with the North. Yet, tribalism and ethno-nationalism kept reemerging on the surface, then led to major division in the SSLF.

1-7- Numairy's rule, the Addis Ababa Agreement and The Second Civil War:

May the 25th marked the beginning of a new era in the Sudanese history, a date that will change not only the decade to follow but the future of the country drastically. Colonel Jaafar El Numairy (spelled also Numeiry) led a successful bloodless coup d'état in what was called May Revolution or May Order. Hence, Numairy's governing system was an imitation of Gamal Abdel Nacer's rule in Egypt, since he called his committee the "Committee of Free Officers" and embraced the same secularist socialist Pan Arab ideology. Before enhancing an Islamic political vision, Jaafer el Numairy nationalized all the companies and projects in newly found oil fields in Abyei and Bentiu. During his rule, the Sudan witnessed a period of peace, especially when he insisted on diplomatic talks to solve the Southern problem.

Numairy was strong enough to resist several attempts planned to topple his sovereign. Amongst, one elaborated by his own communist party and another organized by a coalition between the DUP and UMMA Islamic parties. As a reaction to those uprisings, He killed a

[13] Joseph Lagu is a South Sudanese military figure and politician. He belongs to the Madi ethnic group of Eastern Equatoria state, South Sudan. In May 1960 he graduated from the military college in Omdurman and was commissioned as an officer in the Sudanese Army and posted to the 10th Brigade, Northern Command. In the period 1978–1979, Lagu served as the second President of the High Executive Council of the autonomous region of Southern Sudan.

large number of communists who led the 1971 coup; he also under-sieged and killed 12000 of the Ansaar soldiers and their Imam according to Abdallah (2002) and Sidahmed (2005). On the other side, Southern forces were well trained and equipped by the Zionists which encouraged them to bring the civil war to a new level. At the interim, Numairy was backed up by his allies from the communist bloc Egypt and the Soviet Union. As a tactical move, he appointed Abel Alier[14] as a minister of Southern affairs; the latter accepted the position on a condition that Khartoum should start peace talks with the Southerners.

A unilateral ceasefire was declared after the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement first meeting in 1971. A year later, on March 27th 1972, the agreement was signed giving birth to a Federal Sudanese State in which "South would be governed by a legislative assembly and a council of ministers" as Natsios (2012) put it "and English was to be the language of instruction in schools" (p.54). For the first time in the Sudan, peace was at hand until a radical change in Numairy's ideology stormed the country.

During six years of rule, Numairy succeeded to end the first civil war in a peaceful way without any armed intervention. He was also able to develop the infrastructure plans and designed a new constitution to replace the one previously put by the British in the dawn of independence. The president, though, lost the communist party support after the 1971 coup and the Umma party after the Alba Island massacre, according to Johnson (2003) "he centralized autocratic power in his own hands using brute force to suppress opposition on both the left and the right" (p.43) as a result, we notice that he gained more enemies than supporters.

[14] Abel Alier Kwai (born 1933) is a South Sudanese politician and judge who served as Vice President of Sudan between 1971 and 1982 and as President of the High Executive Council of the Southern Sudan Autonomous Region between 1972 and 1978. He is an internationally respected judge, human-rights lawyer and activist on behalf of Christians in the Sudan. Former Vice President of Sudan (1971–1982), he served as the first president of the High Executive Council of Southern Sudan.

As a response to the Addis Ababa Agreement, which accorded autonomy to the South, officers in Darfur tried a coup in order to express their secessionist demands or at least regional autonomy as the South did. It might be convincingly argued that besides natural causes, namely intermittent seasonal rainfall, the problem in Darfur was caused by government neglect which led to the underdevelopment of the region. Darfur has a majority of Muslim inhabitants if not all according to Menon without the least disenchantment. Therefore, the main problems facing the region were basically economic and tribal: this will be mentioned in the section dealing with tribalism.

When Numairy lost his public and international support, he adopted an Islamic agenda in order to save his sovereign. First, he released the political prisoners and put an end to the Ansaar persecution as a step towards reconciliation with Saadik el Mahdi, the leader of the Umma party, who enjoys a wide support by the Sudanese. Then, he promised the Islamic coalition to "renegotiate the terms of the Addis Ababa Agreement" that the Islamic leaders and precisely Hassan el Turabi did not accept (Idris, 2005; Natsios, 2012). As far as Numairy's sudden Islamic wake is concerned, embracing the Islamic parties was much more controversial, since it would nullify the AAA with the South, thus, he had to assume the consequences of his decisions, even if it would launch a second civil war.

On the basis of the evidence currently available, it seems fair to suggest that Hassan el Turabi's Salafist ideology was rooted in the Egyptian Brotherhood. El Turabi returned from exile as Numairy's attorney general, which consequently brought back the NIF to power in order to change the secular judiciary code with Sharia. This step would definitely turn the country's status upside down. For instance, El Turabi proposed the "Hudhud punishment"; which included cutting thieves hands, stoning adulterers, and cutting a hand and a foot from opposite sides for witch craft. This law caused civil dissatisfaction, especially in the non-Muslim South. Though, for the record and according to many references (Hassan, 2002;

Johnson 2003; Prunier, 1993), this punishment was never used against non-Muslims, and for Muslims it necessitates clear evidence, so it was not practiced in an arbitrary way.

However, Numairy wanted to keep control on the South with its natural resources, so it was out of question to nurture any separatist sentiment in the South or in any other region. The Southerners, eager to get their autonomy, started a new tactic since it became clear that the AAA was a bogus. As a result, Lagu started gathering his men in the South to protect what they have been fighting for since the independence. On the internal plan, the main issue that faced the Southerners was regional, that Equatorians, led by Joseph Lagu, supported Southern subdivision so they wouldn't be under the sovereignty of Dinka. The latter, on the other hand, led by Abel Alier, advocated the Southern union which they considered as the most powerful weapon against Khartoum.

The Islamization process in the country aggravated the situation, since Northerners and Southerners, Muslims and Non-Muslims, advocated secular law rather than the NIF Islamic version of Sharia based Law. This transition prompted the Southerner revolutionary fervor and led to a separatist demand with Southern self-government that has nothing to do with Khartoum, and clear international borders which were the cockpit in the AAA, and remained unsolved till now. It is fundamental to note that the "revolt against the State emerged first as political opposition to centralized/racialized despotism and demand" Idris (2005) noted, "for more inclusion in State institutions."(p.5) Then, it became a clear secessionist call afterwards.

Many reasons contributed in alienating Southerners from the governing regime in the North mainly, as Natsios (2012) listed "the South's physical isolation, high illiteracy rates, and lack of both infrastructure and institutional capacity would have slowed the process down to a crawl no matter who was in charge in the North"(p.50). Besides, Numairy made use of

the Southern factionalism and infighting to have stronger hand in the region, what John Garang[15] described as "a divide to rule policy." (Cited in Khaled, 2010)

In 1983, Numairy made his declaration of the Republic Order Number One which divided South Sudan into three provinces with separate capitals. according to Natsios (2012) this declaration "replaced the Southern regional assembly in Juba with three much weaker legislative bodies with no independent fiscal authority…eliminated the separate Southern army units and substituted Arabic for English as the official language" (p.50). The ex-Southern army units were taken to serve in the North in a strategy to weaken any mutiny or civil disobedience in the South. Hence, this declaration was considered as a major step towards nullifying the AAA and away from any peace accordance.

Moreover, issues about the regional borders emerged on the surface with the discovery of oil fields in Bentiu and Abyei, Numairy ordered to transfer raw oil directly through long lines of pipes to Port Sudan –East Sudan- for export instead of building refineries in the provinces near the oil fields. This was a method planned to keep wealth out of the Southern region dominance during the semi-autonomous regional government, or in case of secession; "the semi-autonomous region thus" clarified Johnson (2005) "had qualified legislative authority, poorly defined economic powers, and an ambiguous understanding about the nature of the security forces" (p.40).

To put in a nut shell, the regional border issues intertwined with economic and military biased decisions about the South caused the Bor mutiny in May 1983, which led to the Second Civil war with secession and full independence from North as their main objective.

[15] Colonel John Garang de Mabior was a Sudanese rebel leader, founder of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) which fought a 22-year civil war against the northern-dominated, Islamist Sudanese Government. He was made vice president of Sudan on the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, shortly before his death.

1-8- The Contemporary Sudan and Secession:

The overthrowing of al Numairy in April 1986 did not put an end to civil wars in the South, but with the new peace talks which were held by the new government and the Southern rebel forces, a dawn of quietude was at sight especially when both sides signed the Koka Dam; a joint declaration of principles clarified Shay Shaul (2007). It was agreed to take action in anticipation of the assembly of a constitutional convention for the resolution of the main political disputes between the North and the South.

The conflict worsened when the NIF joint the coalition headed by Sadek el Mahdi. In the North, the sectarian based elections kept Khartoum under the control of NIF and UMMA parties, who advocated Islamization and Arabization as main policies. In the South, John Garang unified the Southern militias as the "Anyanya II" rebellion, always at war with the central government in the North since the abrogation of the AAA.

The ascent of Omar el Bashir to power in 1989 marked a turning point in the Sudanese history, when together with Hassan al Turabi founded a Fundamentalist Islamic regime. Al Turabi encouraged Muslims to join the DDF Militia for jihad in the South. The (1990-1993) regime in Khartoum according to Shaul (2007) "initiated the process of the country's Islamization and introduced a series of military steps with the aim of defeating the South" (p.207). The main causes that weakened Southerners' forces according to Shaul are: first, the leadership and tribal divide within the SPLM, especially the rise of different leaders with different interests. The second cause was the decrease of aids given by neighboring countries naming Uganda and Ethiopia.

Khartoum, helped by its new ally Iran, won several battles against the Southern army, which forced the latter to agree on the peace talks in Abuja. This attempt was a failure since Southern leaders were divided and did not reach joint demands. In 1994, the governmental

forces attacked the South and succeeded in recapturing several provincial cities "including Kaja Kaja on the Ugandan borders, which was John Garang's headquarters and the passing spot to get ammunition and aids" (ibid). This was certainly one of the main reasons that led to the achievement of peace talks between the rival parties. Al Turabi influence on Khartoum political environment was obvious in the extremist approach adopted when dealing with Southerners and war stormed the country, with the Northern government fueling divisions and tribal clashes in the South.

However, the 2001/ 9/11 attack on the USA and the western war on terror obliged Al Bashir to adopt a rather secular law since the Sudan was classified among terrorist countries. After what happened in Afghanistan and Iraq, Al Bashir accepted US mediators in the peace talks to reach a ceasefire fearing that the Sudan would be the next target in US war. In October 2002, the parties agreed on a ceasefire declaration that would last for six years. After this period, a referendum would be conducted in the South in order to decide whether the Southern Sudan would choose self-determination and independence or unity with the North.

According to Marina Ottaway and Mai El-Sadany (2012) "The signing of the CPA in 2005 put an end to open North-South warfare, but all other problems continued to simmer. These conflicts are now again coming to a head with the failure of the separation process". Despite Omar el Bashir's speech delivered on the anniversary of independence day in which he Stated that the Sudan "is interested in a comprehensive peace in the framework of which there will no longer be hegemony of one party in the country" (cited in: Shay 2007), Southerners voted for the rise of the independent Republic of South Sudan in 2011.

Radical Islamic movements demonstrated against the secular change that the government opted for and the old time friends El Bashir and El Turabi became worst enemies. The Sudan was dealing with several problems at the same time. For instance, the Southern

independence gave rise to the secessionist voices in Darfur, where people started armed insurgencies against the governmental army forces in 2003. In addition to the tribal war between the pastoralist (Baggara) and the farmers (Masalit) tribes in the region because of drought, the government declared war against rebel militia in Darfur, which caused death and more than 70.000, and 20.500.000 displaced Darfuri in different refugee camps according to the Foreign Affair study.

Both international and the Sudanese private media announced that an ethnic cleansing was exercised by the government on people in the Darfur[16]. Though, according to Terrie Alford Dufagier, the head of the mission of a human organization Doctors without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontiers MSF), "ethnic cleansing is not the right term to use when we talk about Darfur, however it is undeniably a human tragedy" (as cited in: Abulkheir 2006, p.61). In addition to that, SPLM members claimed that the government is conducting ethnic cleansing in the cities near the borders, in order to insure majority Arab and pro-governmental citizens in the oil rich areas, and then the votes would automatically be in favor of the North. The new Southern borders for the North would remain the most complicated issue, since in 2012, armed conflicts in the area increased causing the foreign oil companies to leave the country. Consequently there were no oil exports through Port Sudan during 2012 until the coming of the Chinese.[17]

Throughout the discontent years and till now, the Sudanese civil wars were characterized with what Muhareb (2011) described as "the multiplicity of interests and influence both emanating from within and outside the country". Therefore, the mutineers, who were released from prison, continued their struggle for independence. The Sudanese

[16] https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2004-09-01/darfur-destroyed-ethnic-cleansing-government-and-militia-forces
[17] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/south-sudan-civilians-are-trapped-in-conflict-over-oil/2012/05/01/gIQAUX6buT_story.html

Security adopted a "North peril strategy" based on intimidation, burning, prison, public execution and arbitrary arrests that aimed according to Poggo (2009) "at instilling awe of Arab power in the minds of Southerners" (p.67).

The fight for natural resources and oil rich bordering provinces of Bentiu and Abyei aggravated the insurgencies in the area, since it is no longer a regional border in question, it is an international one. According to El-Sadany and Ottaway (2012) "active fighting between North and South took place mostly in the center of the country, around the old North-South internal boundary. Complicating matters, the area crossed by this poorly defined border turned out to be rich in oil, making it a vital resource for both sides". To Sum up, the separation took place while a mass of major problems remained unsettled which led to clashes between the newly separated countries.

Conclusion:

Talking about the traditional rivalry in the Sudan between North and South, shows how identical it is to "Africa" which was, according to Ali Mazrui, "torn between the forces of anarchy on one side, in the sense of decentralized violence, and the forces of tyranny, in the sense of orchestrated centralized repression" (cited in Harir, S.& Tvedt, T. 1994, p.34). For, the secession of the largest country in Africa gave birth to the newest Nation in the world the Republic of South Sudan, which "moved from the euphoria of independence to the harsh realities of building a Nation in an impoverished region awash with arms"[18]under the presidency of Salva Kiir since 9 July 2011. Problems in the South did not end with its separation; tribalism fractured the newly built country, just few years after independence. For Reik Mashar, the ex-Vice-president, led a coup d'état against the current government. This attempt was aborted by the government forces, yet the conflicts between the Dinka and the Nuer are still on a rage.

[18] http://www.france24.com/en/20131217-south-sudan-riek-machar-rebel-statesman-coup-leader

In the North, Omar el Bashir who has been the president since 1989 extended his 26-year in April 2015 "with a 94.5% landslide win in a general election that was boycotted *en masse* by opposition groups on the grounds that it was a political charade"[19] according to several newspapers. In addition to that he has been indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity over the government's role in the Darfur conflict. In his interview for the Guardian he took responsibility for his actions in Darfur and pinpointed that it has nothing to do with an ethnic cleansing and that there are "traditional conflicts developed to insurgencies against the State, so the army fought those rebels who were carrying arms against the State"[20].

In another speech, El Bashir explained that no other secession will take place. He claimed that his government's objective in all this is "to see all the Sudanese people come together, a unified and consistent circle, leaving out all nepotism, regionalism and tribalism."[21] In due course, we wonder; would a National identity be constructed unifying those fragments? Would peace see light in such a diverse country? And how two rival countries sharing a long horrifying past and fighting for borders would live as neighbors? If the split was for an independent Southern identity, why would they fight for their tribal one after the long waited independence? Is it really a war for identities or for resources?

[19] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/17/sudan-reacts-to-omar-al-bashirs-international-law
[20] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q5ywKAZLuOw
[21] http://allafrica.com/stories/201501020275.html 1-1-2015

CHAPTER TWO :

The Impact of Diversity and Colonialism on the Sudan's National Identity.

"…An essential right of the primitive, which is recognized today as the right to develop a form of civilization of its own. Each population is a type of civilization which must obviously fit universal design of values, human rights and needs of economic and cultural relations. It's the right to freedom, cultural and religious autonomy, and the free development of the personality"
Adolphus- Peter Elkin
Australian Anthropologist, June 1947.

Introduction:

Civil wars in Africa are generally attributed to ethnic, cultural and religious diversity. Especially that the independent countries were faced with a new identity within a new geographic area. As Huntington (1993) accentuated that in the post-Cold War world

> Flags count and so do other symbols of cultural identity, including crosses, crescents, and even head coverings, because culture counts, and cultural identity is what is most meaningful to most people. People are discovering new but often old identities and marching under new but often old flags which lead to wars with new but often old enemies.

We conclude that the cultural identity counts, therefore building a National Identity in a diverse society is rather a hard process.

Along similar lines Kuo (1985) assumes that the presence of competing ethnic and cultural groups in the countries normally means that the establishment of new Nationhood requires the refinement of a new "National identity" (Cited in: Gill, 2014, p.17) which was not easily accepted. Building a new identity, as far as the Sudan is concerned, was too difficult to accomplish, mainly due to the history of hatred between the North and the South, as well as Northern myth of Arabs cultural superiority that led to the marginalization of other groups. Yet, in contrast to the number of ethnic groups which remained the same since the formation of the Sudanese State with its international borders, the number of armed groups is increasing.

It is commonly argued that armed conflicts in the Sudan are played on several grounds. Obviously, cultural diversity is not the only reason behind the unstoppable conflicts in the

area, for other causes lie beneath. Although, alterity has generally been the key reason why people from the same country kill each other, this is not the case in many diverse countries like Canada and the USA. Besides, even if usual strives had taken place in postcolonial States with diverse complexion at the dawn of independence, armed conflicts did not last for 17 years? Taking the case of Nigeria for example, the Biafran war lasted for just 3years.

Santos (1984) noticed that ethnic, linguistic, religious, and ideological alterity causes armed conflict between people within the same borders "at the beginning of State formation" (p. 63). Since making a Nation and building a State are not random processes, they necessitate a planning and a unifying bend. In order to build a Nation, generally, specialists from the running government try to collect data about the social aspects and structure of the population, that's to say how many ethnic groups are there in the country and who are they and in how many tribes are they divided? How many languages and dialects are spoken by the citizens? How many religions and sects do people follow? And to what extent does regional development affect the governmental issues?

Nevertheless, building a Nation with one National Identity is hard to imply on a postcolonial country, like the Sudan, divided from its inception between an Arab Muslim North and an African Animist and Christian South. It might be convincingly argued that segregation in a diverse society creates a gap between the Elite and minorities that causes wars. Along similar lines, Stephen Evera (2001) argues that "The more severely Nationalities oppress minorities living in their States, the greater the risk of war." (p. 35) This means that if minorities feel oppressed by the government, they will rather rise against it, and unity will be an impossible goal to achieve.

During data collection, we noticed the Sudan's dense diversity, and how complicated it is to raise Nationhood sentiment within those who do not feel belonging together. As we said

earlier, the Sudan is unique in its complexion, in addition to its geostrategic location with one leg in the Savannah and the other in the Arab world. Several causes led to this social "mélange", but first we need to know the definition of the key concepts identity, group identity, and social diversity.

Thus, one shall question what role do ethnic, religious and linguistic multitude play in slowing down the Nation building process? Is the Sudan a Nation or still in the making? Therefore, we agree with Iyob and Khadiagala (2006) that "a deeper understanding of the complex interplays of political, historical, cultural, and geographical factors and what they imply for current peace initiatives" is paramount to unravel this enigma.

2-1- Group identity, Social diversity and multiculturalism in the Sudan:

In order to study diversity, we need first to clarify the concept of identity, which is generally recognized as what Deng (2003) specified as "the way individuals and groups define themselves and are defined by others on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, language, and culture" (p.1). Identity has been at the heart of all social conflicts since it is a deeply rooted psychological and social concept that affects the individual and the group it belongs to. Accordingly, when different groups coexist together within the same geographic area, they form social diversity which is defined in the Free English Dictionary as the condition of having or including people from different ethnicities and social backgrounds.

In social science, social diversity equals Multiculturalism; which is the co-existence of diverse cultures, where culture includes racial, religious, or cultural groups and is manifested in habitual behaviors, cultural conventions and values, patterns of thinking, and communicative styles. Along the same lines Margaret Anderson and Howard Taylor (2008) in the preface of their book *Sociology: the Essentials* define diversity as "the different experience created by social factors such as race, ethnicity, class, gender, age, religion, sexual

orientation, and region of residence". Therefore, a multicultural society shelters different identities from different ethnic groups, tribes, and people believing in different religions and using different languages. In spite of their differences, those people form one Nation and share the same geographical area, within the same borders framed by colonizers and imperial presence in the area, regardless of this Nation's structure.

Yet, as groups compete for power, material resources, and other values, these dynamic forces may implicate collaboration, rivalry, or conflict. Although in the context of the Nation-State, Deng (2003) accentuated that:

> The conflict of identities occurs when groups, or more accurately their Elite, rebel against what they see as intolerable oppression by the dominant group, often expressed in denial of recognition, exclusion from the mainstream, marginalization, and perhaps the threat of cultural annihilation or even physical elimination.(p.1)

Deng's views are grounded on the assumption that the State is divided to ethnic groups struggling for power control. Obviously, the majority forms the strongest group which oppresses the others. It means that Arabs marginalize other ethnic entities and annihilate their cultures, i.e. languages and beliefs, or even ethnic cleansing while constructing the Sudanese Nation and unity.

The following data is an analysis of the elements forming the Sudanese diversity as well as factual information and background study to uncover the racial and ethnic constituents, multilingual setting, religious diversity and regional discrimination. In the coming section we have used cultural anthropology to study diversity, in addition to quantitative and qualitative research methods to analyze numbers and statics. We provided

maps explaining the deployment of the ethnic and linguistic groups in order to understand the difficulties facing this Nation's unity.

2-1-1- Ethnic diversity and Tribalism:

Ethnicity is a term that was derived from Greek "Ethnicos" the adjective of "ethnos" meaning people of Nation (Cashmore, 2004, p.142). Ethnic groups are no longer viewed as primitive, but are the outcome of history, designed by administrative procedures classification, political organization, and socialization. Posner (2003) also indicates that the ethnic landscape is important because the subtleties of ethnic competition and conflict rise not from the presence of ethnic groups, but from the pattern of their relative sizes and geographic distribution.

In political theory, Kumar Rupesinghe explained that "ethnicity" describes "a group possessing some degree of coherence and solidarity… composed of people who are aware, perhaps only latently, of having common origins and interests"[22]. In social sciences, it is described as the relationship between groups, and classification according to cultural and genetic origins, which explains the inner borders between ethnic groups; between the "in-group" and the "out-group". Thus, Teferi (2012) accentuated that an ethnic group "is not a mere aggregate of people but a self-conscious collection of people united, or closely related, by shared experiences and a common history" (p.63).

Along the same line Anne Mosley Lesch (1998) punctuates that "some analysts consider that ethnic groups are based on long-standing bonds that stress the significance of residence on the same territory and common language, religion, or skin color…Those markers of sameness and difference are seen as fundamental to social groups"(p.1). Accordingly, members of the group distinguish their ethnicity as biologically determined based on

[22] http://archive.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu12ee/uu12ee04.htm

bloodline from which the group's unity results. We notice that similarity in groups form "a people", who share specific cultural characteristics that raise a sense of Nationhood and belonging. In a Nation-State, no matter how many ethnic groups live together, there is always one group who controls the political system and the economic activities for their own benefits.

Certainly, the hegemony of one race on others within the same country, leads to the rise of minority Nationalism or what is known nowadays as "ethno-Nationalism". This movement is strengthened by the emergence of new formulations of minorities designated as "ethnico-National" or even "linguistico-cultural ""' according to UNESCO studies. An ethnic group is divided into several tribes, which are smaller groups of individuals sharing the same cultural and genealogical aspects in addition to ancestry and region. Posner (2005) defined a tribe as "an ethnic community that is or was historically organized under the authority of a traditional chief" (p.55).

Benedict Anderson (1991) advocated the point that "ethnicity is imagined" since people may not know each other not even hear about the existence of the majority of the clan yet "the image of their close association lives in the minds of every member, this image of close association maybe created through media messages, which try to convince people by explaining then about the community sharing origins, traditions, and common goals" (p.52). Consequently, we deduce that ethnic belonging is a manufactured process rather than a natural one, since Nationalism is implanted via media and the educational system, where the ideas are better absorbed by the youngest generations.

It is paramount to search deeper and to study the Sudanese ethnic and tribal structure thoroughly, since the latest statistics held in 2008 announced that there are 39 million people in the Sudan, and 8.2 Millions in the South, with "more than fifty ethnic groups, which they

subdivide into at least 570 distinct peoples. The largest groups are self-defined (in descending order) as: “Arab, Dinka, Beja, Nuer, Nuba, Nubian, Fur, Bari, Azande, Moru, and Shilluk” who speak 115 languages (Baghdadi 2013). Because Arabic was the official language in the Sudan before secession, the majority use it as a lingua Franca.

2-1-1-a- The Sudan (North):

The Sudan, which was the Northern part of the ex- Sudan, is as diverse as the South, since it shelters many Arab-African and Black African tribes. The majority of those who claim Arab lineage and ancestry are Dinka, Nubians and Shilluk who adopted Arabic language and Islam. However, Bankie (2007) asserted that “The people who call themselves ‘Arab’ have their rightly recognizable share in building that civilization since they are a mixture of Arabs and indigenous people” (p.3).In fact the intertwining of the ethno-linguistic fabric in the Sudan, which is taken for granted to be heterogeneous, reflects homogeneity as well. Since all the Sudanese are undeniably Africans with different shades of skin color.

It is fairly said that with the coming of Arabs and intermarriages between them and the native tribes of African ethnicity gave birth to lighter skinned groups speaking Arabic as a Mother Tongue. According to Lesch (1998) and Johnson (2003) the Arab genealogy that the Northern Sudanese claim is fabricated and fictional. As a matter of a fact, many indigenous peoples call themselves Arab because, over the centuries, they adopted the Arabic language, customs, and Islam. In that sense, most Arabs in the Sudan are Arabized Nubians, Dinka, Nuba, Shilluk, Fur, or Beja.

Fabris Wisman (2008) wrote that among this big ethnic mosaic the Arab Muslim culture seems to form the majority, since 70% of the population is Arab Muslims with 30% divided between Christians and Animist majorly distributed in the South (cited in Baghdadi, 2013). Arab tribes are generally found in the North to Middle South Bahr El Arab, the Dams

and bushes Region, amongst the Shekia and Djaalia. In the Red Sea region too; Kassala, Eljazira, Senar and the Nile, the White Nile, Kadaref and North Kordofan. Arabs who live in the Blue Nile region are descendants from Kinana tribe, living side by side with the Funge, the Felata and the Watawit.

Arabs, Nubians, and the Dinka N'gook tribes with its nine streams occupy the area of West and South Kordofan. The Humer Messya Arab tribes live in the area of Abyei, oil rich and pastoralist zone. Although Abyei, historically and geographically, belongs to South Kordovan Province, which is officially part of North Sudan after the secession, the Dinka Ngook and South Sudanese government reclaim it, which made of it a conflict zone. Darfur on the other hand, shelters 500 tribes and 100 dialects, the first group are Afro-Arabs who are nomadic pastoralists naming Mahamid, Mehria, Zyadia, Djlidat, Selamat, Zouraikat, Abala, Beni Hussein, Maalya, Taaisha, Kababeesh, Houtya, and Terdjem. The second stream is the Non-Arab Africans who are farmers in nature. The Fur, who gave their name to the Province, are the majority; in addition to the Zagawa who are divided between the Sudan and Chad.

In the Nuba mountains, which are located in the Southern part of South Kordofan, we find the Nuba, Arabs and 50 African ethnic groups with pinpointing cultural and linguistic differences. Wisman (2006) noticed that despite the fact that this area has seen several missionary waves to spread Christianity, the number of Muslims is considerably surpassing the number of adherents of other faiths (cited in Baghdadi, 2013). We must insist on the deference between the Nuba people are not related to the Nubians farther North near Egypt. They represent a "bewildering complexity" of cultures and more than 50 languages, naming Shona and Ndebele. According to the census of 2008, held by the government, the numbers of Nuba are unclear. Some Nuba sources suggest there are up to two million, but the numbers of migrants, displaced people, and refugees cloud the issue. Nubians on the other hand live in the North and reach Aswan in Egypt, they are deployed on the sides of the Nile.

In the far-East on Eretria borders, the pastoral tribes of the Beja ethnic group spread around the area, this group belongs to Northern Hametic culture alongside with Beni Amer stretching out to the Ethiopian borders. In the same area we find the pastoral Tjeri ethnic group with its several tribes whose main job is herding which causes their contact with other tribes beyond the borders. In the area between Beja and Beni Amer live the Funj who are an ethnic mixture of both Arabs and Africans, they are one of the first group ruling the area and the founders of Suba kingdom in the South and North to South Khartoum. In the following table we present a demonstration of the ethnic groups and their tribes, and the areas they inhabit in North Sudan (The Sudan after secession)[23].

2-1-1-b- South Sudan:

South Sudan, fundamentally, enjoys an ethnic and cultural diversity by having over 60 major ethnic groups. Regardless of their shared aims, each one has uniqueness in terms of social structure, cultural traditions and a sense of identity. This diversity gave the country a unique feature of "colorful richness of these traditions" as a positive aspect, and "a threat to National unity and a collective sense of National identity" (global security report) as a negative one. After the referendum held on January 9th, 2011, South Sudan was declared on July 9th from the same year an independent country; the 24th in the African union and 193 in UN.

On the surface of 648000 square kilometers, deploys a population of 11,562,695 (July 2014)[24] in 10 Provinces with 30 districts. According to the Global security reports "indigenous people of South Sudan can be broadly categorized into the Nilotic, Nilo-Hamitic and the South Western Sudanic groups" with Dinka 35.8%, Nuer 15.6%, Shilluk, Azande, Bari, Kakwa, Kuku, Murle, Mandari, Didinga, Ndogo, Bviri, Lndi, Anuak, Bongo, Lango,

[23] (See table 1-1 Appendix)
[24] South Sudan Demographics Profile 2014.

Dungotona, Acholi as major groups in addition to other smaller groups according to South Sudan a demographic profile 2014.

2-1-1-b- 1-Nilotic groups:

This ethnic branch includes the Dinka, Nuer, Shiluk (Collo), Murle, Kachiopo, Jie, Anyuak, Acholi, Maban, Kuma, Lou (Jur), Bango, Bai, Gollo, Endri, Forgee, Chod (Jur), Khara, Ngorgule, Forugi, Siri, Benga, Agar, Pakam, Gok, Ciec, Aliap, Hopi, Guere, Atuot, Appak, Lango, Pari, Otuho and Ajaa. Nilo-Hamitic groups include the Bari, Mundari, Kakwa, Pojula, Nyangwara, Kuku, Latuko, Lokoya, Toposa, Buya, Lopit, Tennet and Diginga. The South-Western Sudanic groups includes Kresh, Balanda, Banda, Ndogo, Zande, Madi, Olubo, Murus, Mundu, Baka, Avukaya, and Makaraka. (Baghdadi, 2013; Global security papers, 2015; Lesch, 1998)

Various peoples who live in the area of Bahr al Jabal and its streams are commonly called “Nilote”. The term refers to people speaking languages of one section of the Nilotic sub-branch of the Eastern Sudanic branch of Nilo-Saharan and sharing a myth of common origin. The Nilotes are physically and culturally alike, including their economy like cattle-raising and farming. However, diversity among the Nilotes remained obvious in their social structure and the hierarchy between sub-groups.

For instance, the Dinka, is one major group forming approximately one-third of the total population who were widely distributed over the Northern portion of the Southern region, particularly in the High Nile and Bahr al Ghazal. The next largest group was the Nuer who presents half the number of Dinka. The Shilluk, the third largest group, had only about half as many people as the Nuer, and the remaining Nilotic groups were much smaller (Baghdadi, 2013; Global Security Report 2015). In fact, The Dinka consists of twenty-five tribal groups while the Nuer are divided to nine or ten groups.

2-1-1-b-2 The Nilo-Hamitic groups:

The Nilo-Hamitic ethnic and linguistic groups: Bari-speaking (Bari, Kuku, Pojulu, Kakwa, Nyangwara, Mundari; 2%), Nyepo, Lokoyo, Luluba, Latuko, Logit, Lango, Toposa, Domjiro, Jiye, Mourle Group. Those groups are known for their lighter black skin, they are pastoral tribes like the Nuer and the Dinka. They live in the area of Bahr el Jabal and extend to Kenya, they are known for poverty and Nudity especially the Baria.

2-1-1-b-3- The Sudanic groups:[25]

The Azande (2%), Muru (1%), Ndogo, Sere, Mundo, Biri (Balanda/Fertit), Madi, Bongo (Fertit), Baka, Feroge (Lesch, 1998); form the majority. They concentrate on the West bank of the White Nile to the Western borders of South Sudan republic. Some of them spread in Bahr el Ghazal province, to Western Equatoria. The majority are farmers who are sedentary tribes, who were exposed more than others to the development of the area in matter of schooling and law courts (Johnson, 2003). The sedentary tribes enjoyed more rights than the pastoral ones, because they enjoyed more stability, so it was easier for them to attend schools. There are pastoralist tribes among this group, naming the Tobossa who live in the Mountain areas and Central Equatoria. It was from this region that Joseph Lagu led the Anyanya rebellion in 1955- 1972.

These results are consistent with other studies which have shown that ethnic diversity is the main characteristic of the Sudan, and it is deeply rooted in its past. Despite the fact that the Sudan has ended up identifying itself more with the Arabs than with black Africa, the non-Arabs are still fighting for the particularity of their identity. This issue is central to the contemporary problem of the reality of the Sudan and National integration. It was recognized as a righteous demand for self-determination by different marginalized groups.

[25] See table 1-2 in the Appendix

2-1-2- Linguistic diversity:

Like many of the tropical African countries, the Sudan is characterized by linguistic density and diversity which is considered as a two edged sward. In a multilingual country, it is challenging to choose a National language among 151 languages spoken by several tribes. It is widely acknowledged that "the sociolinguistic profile of the Sudan" according to Ahmad (2012) "is essentially characterized by linguistic difference, which is historically connected with the cultural difference and operations of language ideologies."(p.4)

Historically speaking, the name 'Sudan' holds an important implication, because it bears very strong identity representation, since it refers to the black skin colored people who live in that area previously known as "Ard Assudan"; which means the Land of Blacks. The Arabized people of middle Sudan, generally speaking, tend not to recognize themselves as black Africans but rather as lighter skinned Arabs. Hence, a mass of disapproving terms was created in the culture and colloquial Arabic of the Sudan which dehumanize the black Africans. Ironically, all scholars insist on the role of intermarriages and relationships between slave owners and their slaves that gave birth to a miscellaneous race of Afro-Arabs with different degrees of darkness.

The data yielded by this study provides strong evidence that there are 151 living languages in both the Sudan and the South Sudan, in addition to 9 extinct languages. In the Sudan, there are 8o languages, the majority was categorized under the Afro-asiatic linguistic family, and the second mostly spoken languages are Nilo-Saharan (see map 2[26]). In the South Sudan, the 71 languages are originally (Nilotic) Nilo-Saharan with few Niger-Congolese language family mostly spread along the Western borders (see map 3)[27]. Whereas the Niger-

[26] Map 2: Ethno linguistic map of Sudan, p. 144 of this work.
[27] Map 3: Ethno-linguistic map of South Sudan republic, p. 145 of this work.

Kordofanian or Nilo-Hamitic linguistic family used in the Nuba mountain is one of the eldest languages on earth and spoken nowhere else.

Before secession, the Sudan was_ and still is_ specific in terms of its linguistic diversity and density as well as other salient aspects such as Abu Manga (2010) listed "the instability of its language situation, the unbalanced demographic weights of their speakers, the multiplicity of its border languages and the existence within its territories of a number of West African immigrant languages" in addition to "the [endangerment] of the majority of its languages" (p.3). The main causes of language instability are civil wars and drought, and obviously the nature of pastoral tribes who move around the regions, inside and outside the borders.

Since the Sudanese government has little interest in collecting data about languages in the country according to Mansour Khaled (2000), the government neglected the fact that the Sudan is a multicultural society[28], that is what we noticed when we contacted the Sudanese Embassy in Algiers for statistics and maps of the ethno-linguistic diversity and their answer was that Arabic is the only language in Sudan and the Sudanese are Arabs. Although the language situation in Sudan, as Abu Manga and Youssef Khalifa (2005) stated:

> Is continuously changing and is extremely unstable, unstable more than any other place in the world. Languages in Sudan had been changing for about thirty years. They had been in continuous moving from their original places due to the displacement suffered by those who speak it…There is also a change in the numbers of people who speak any language. The change might be an increase or a decrease in the number of

[28] See Table 1-3 in the Appendix

speakers according to the social or political or linguistic situations.

The dominant discourse in the Sudan is Arabic, according to the survey held in 1995 and another one in 2008, Arabic is considered as a Lingua Franca, L1 and the Mother Tong for more than 80% of the population and L2 and L3 for the rest. The reason behind the wide use of Arabic in the Sudan is the ruling Elite's choice to adopt it as a National language since independence, which is named by sociolinguists and anthropologists: the Arabization process. The main theoretical premise is that all constitutions, laws and administrative paper work were written in Arabic. Education along the same lines was imposing Arabic on all the Sudanese regardless of their linguistic identity. In the South, Dinka and Nuer form the majority however they chose English as a National language, since no tribe would accept the superiority of one group's language over their own.

Table (1): Languages and numbers of speakers in the Sudan 1993[29]

Language	**Number of speakers**	**Percentage**
Arabic	13,191,340	51.1%
Dinka	2.740.900	10.6%
Beja	1.181.335	4.6%
Nuer	1.160.398	4.5%
Fur	663.913	2.6%
Zande	648.783	2.5%
Bari	418.920	1.6%
Masalit	406.310	1.6%
Fulfulde	392.100	1.5%
Koalib	386.713	1.5%
Toposa	306.375	1.2%
Hausa	295.775	1.1%
Lotuho (Latuka)	290.575	1.1%
Shilluk	236.565	0.9%

[29] Ibid p3

92 other The Sudanese languages	3.498.840	13.6%
Total 105	25,818,842	100%

We can notice in the table above that no language can serve as a National language which should be the language spoken by the majority, except Arabic. Dinka, for instance, is used mainly in the South, precisely in the area of middle and South Western regions. In addition to the listed languages, there are other languages shared with bordering countries mainly because of the tribal spread in the area, which shows clearly the arbitrary borders.

Ostler (2005) described the Sudanese linguistic hegemony as "the area of permanent Arabic advance also included at the margin, and rather later, a more Southerly zone in Africa, Mauritania in the West, and Chad and The Sudan in the east; here Arabic spread later through trade contacts, and would have replaced some Chadic and Cushitic languages" (Cited in Berair, 2010, p. 3). Before the Arabization of Middle Sudan, these people were in a dynamic contact with each other. The Sudan is actually an ancient land with ancient people and an ancient civilization, the least to be expected is that people there are interrelated in many ways and especially ethno-linguistically.

Hence, some languages are used by a number of ethnic groups in the Sudan and the South Sudan, are also shared in almost all West African countries. In the following table we find a list of the major languages shared in the Sub-Saharan African belt[30].

It is evident that almost two thirds are bilingual with different degrees of proficiency in Arabic, in addition to a local language (Berair, 2010). It is quietly affirmed that the Sudanese engagement was encouraged by the association of Arabic with Islam and explains the collocation of both Islamization and Arabization processes. Ferguson asserted that

[30] See table 1-5 Shared languages in the Appendix

"Arabic language myths form a fairly well integrated single body of attitudes and beliefs" (1977, p. 376), which means that Arabic was glorified by the Elite because of its solid association with Islam on one hand and to ethnic superiority on the other.

2-1-3 Religious and Sectarian diversity:

It is noticeable that both Sudan and South Sudan are multi-religious countries, and were so before secession. The Sudanese religious alterity is between Muslims, and Christians and animists, in addition to the Muslim sects in the North, and the polytheists in the South. According to the 2008 census, Christians represent the majority of the Southern population with a minority of Muslims and Animists, whereas Islam forms the majority in the Sudan with a minority of Christians and Animists. With the weakening of the Christian kingdoms, between the 14th and 16th centuries, many Islamic and Arabized kinglets began appearing and eventually succeeded in replacing the old faiths. Religious alterity molded the backbone of the Sudanese civil wars, though according to Johnson (2003) the religious divide was imposed on a country which was not purposefully religious, which means that religious alterity was used by certain actors in order to widen the cleft between groups.

2-1-3-a- Polytheism and Animism:

Before the coming of Christianity and Islam, Africans were Polytheists and Animists. They had their own rules and traditions in addition to specific ancestral stratifications within the tribes. Animism[31] is a belief that "natural objects, phenomena, and the universe itself have desires and intentions; and the hypothesis that there is an immaterial force that animates the universe according to many definitions. However, tribal religions are considered both pantheist and Animist, since it is based on the belief that each tribe has its own ancestors who

[31] For Africans and primitive cultures around the world, this religion represents "a particular form of animism, for the soul of the ancestor is thought to become a god."(Wundt, 1921, p.20)

return to give them power and guide them. Consequently, tribal religions are different from one tribe to another. Animism is practiced by Southern Nilotic tribes where they choose a totem to worship; it might be a wild animal, a tree or a river. For the Shilluk, *exampli gratia*, it is Nyikang who can talk to them through the king "Retb" according to Levy &Abdul Latif (2008, p. 89). They also believe that "the river holds herds of ghost animals, which are tended by the spirits in the bush" (Ibid)

Though the coming of both Islam and Christianity decreased the number of Animists in the Sudan, it did not obliterate their beliefs. According to Michel Jaflarian (cited in Berair, 2010) despite the fact that Christian numbers increased, the ethnic religions and tribal religions increased from 117.537.000 in 1900 to 266.281.000 in 2009. They adapted both Christianity and Islam without losing their African identity with its beliefs and spirituality; this explains their drift towards Sufism rather than Radical Sunni Islam.

According to many historical accounts, before the coming of Islam and Christianity, Animists did not fight about religion, since they respected each other's beliefs ancestries and totems. However, sedentary and pastoralist tribes were struggling for hunting fields and herding areas especially in the Nilotic South. Religious wars started with Christians and Muslims who tried to convert people to their religion. Henceforth, Southerners were closer to the Christian faith than Islam, obviously due to the rough assimilation policy used by the latter and a history of enslavement linked to the Northern Arab Muslims. The Islamization policy consequently helped in pushing non-Muslims to reject Islam.

2-1-3-b- Christianity:

Christians in 1930 represented just 17% of Southerners while Muslims represented 30% based on the numbers Feki (2012) gave. Christianity spread in the Sudan begun with the arrival of missionaries from different parts of Europe, Egypt and even from Abyssinia the

oldest Christian kingdom in Africa. According to the acting General Secretary of the Sudan Council of Churches, the seven principal Christian groups, in both Sudan and South Sudan Republic; are Roman Catholic, Anglican, Presbyterian, the Sudan Pentecostal, the Sudan Interior, Presbyterian Evangelical, and the Inland African Church[32].

In light of that, we notice that even Christians are divided into groups. Historically speaking, old Evangelic and Coptic Christianity which were rooted in East Africa, mainly the Sudan Egypt, Abyssinia and Ethiopia were demolished by the colonizers and was substituted with different modern versions of Christianity. In Nubia and other kingdoms, the fall of Christianity, according to Lobban (2008), was due to "internal weakness and dissolution of these kingdoms rather than to Arab invasion and conquest, as had been the pattern in the first century of the Muslim calendar in North Africa" (p.25)

Christians were treated as minorities, they were treated as low class citizens with less civil rights. They were chased out of their homes to semi-permanent refugee camps without water or electricity. In 1991, the government demolished those ghettos and forced the inhabitants to move to deserted places out of the city of Khartoum without even providing shelters (Brown, 1994). This act ignited the spark of an ongoing revolution causing the death of 200 people and more were injured.

In the Sudan, religious freedom was neither tolerated nor respected by the government who adopted Sharia as Law foundation and system of life. The Christian minorities, before secession, were considered as "the most important Christian minority living in a Muslim country ruled by Muslims" (ibid. p.32). For they were marginalized and treated as inferior citizens with less wages and no involvement in decision making, Pope Jean Paul II visited the

[32] SOUTH SUDAN 2012 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT

country on February 10th 1993 in order to encourage Christians and discuss with Omar el Bashir the future of the catholic community in the Sudan.

The integration of Christianity to the Sudanese was completed by missionaries who built schools and accepted the Sudanese diversity, at least pretended so. As the missionaries were expelled from both the Northern and the Southern parts of the Sudan under General Aboud's Government in 1958, their schools were transferred under the government control where Arabic was progressively the medium of instruction. Ironically, while encouraging conversion to Islam, there was a remarkable alteration towards Christianity by Southerners and non-Arabs. As a matter of a fact, missionaries did not care much about Animism, they were rather against Islam. Since the latter was unifying the North and a unified Sudan was not what the West was looking for.

In 2014, El Bashir declared the Sudan as an Arab Muslim country and gave orders to demolish a number of churches under the excuse that the Christian minority in the Sudan consists of a small number of individuals that do not necessitate other churches to be built[33]. Consequently, Christians' identity was threatened and such an act can only jeopardize the peace process. It also heightens the feeling of hatred and dissension amongst Christians. In the South both Animists and Christians have been coexisting together in a peaceful religious atmosphere since no one is imposing his religion on the other. As South Sudan won its independence, they adopted a secular law which treats all religions as equal.

2-1-3-c- Islam:

According to the 2008 United Nations' census, more than half of the total population is Muslim, most living in the North where Muslims constitute 75 percent or more of population. While, relatively there were few Christians, most of them living in the South. The Sudanese

[33] Sudan bans construction of all new Christian churches. 17 juil. 2014
http://www.christianpost.com/news/sudan-bans-construction-of-all-new-christian-churches-123424/

Islam spread out with the Ulama and holy clerks because of the Sudan's geostrategic location for pilgrims coming from West Africa, for its accessibility to the holy places as clarified by Lobban (2008) this "brought the Funj ever closer to the heartland of Islam" (p.25).

Thus, due to the coexistence of the holy men with indigenous people, the first seeds of acculturation began with their Katatib[34] and Zawaya[35], and even teaching Quran in the market place. As a result, Bankie (2005) asserted that "the local people transformed from the traditional and Christian choirs to the Sufi chanting smoothly" (p.15). Many Sufi orders spread in the Sudan in the past and still exist holding a great political and religious power, as well as topping the social scale mainly: the Khatemiyya order. Sufi "Turuq"[36] spread with different interpretations of the Quran and many people claiming Prophecy. The main Sufi orders that flourished in post-Christian Sudan were the Qadiriyya, Tijaniyya, Shadhiliyya, and Khatmiyya. Those "Turuq" existed in the North African region except the latter.

The Khatmiyya exists just in the Sudan and it was founded by Sayyid Mohammed Uthman al-Mirghani al-Khatim, it includes sub-Sufi orders like the Naqshbandiyya, Qadiriyya, Shazaliyya, Junaidiyya and Mirghaniyya (Yussef, 2008). Sectarianism within the Sudanese Muslim community was one of the causes of alterity that established social segregation and an unstable relationship between Sunni and Sufi Muslims. For the Khatimyya held a good relationship with the Egyptians during the Ottoman colonization of the country in 1820's. This special relationship paved the way to the Anglo Egyptian condominium in (1896- 1955) by building alliances[37].

[34] Katatib (pl) Kouttab (s) /ku'tæb/ is originally an Arabic word, it is a small traditional Quranic school.
[35] Zawaya (pl) Zawiya (s) the term zawiya refer to a Sufi lodge, which is more like a monastery with worshipers and Ulama who teach Sufism and Quran.
[36] Turuq (pl) Tariqa (s) are Sufi orders and organization. Each one of them is named after the Sheikh who started it. Those Shoyoukh are seen as saints so worshipers build Zawya for their mausoleums and believe in their power to guide them closer to Allah.
[37] See The Turkeyah in chapter 1.

Yahya Ibrahim noted that “a rival came into the scene represented in scholastic Islam that could only be acquired through classroom teaching at such religious centers like al-Azhar in Cairo” (cited in Bankie, 2005, p.68). Consequently, with the coming of radical Islam and the rise of “el Mahdi” Muhammed Ahmad who brought the Sunni standardized Islam, under which a sense of Nationalism and unity arose in order to fight the colonizer. The Sudanese forgot their differences for once and acted as one entity against the oppressor. Yet, as soon as the war ended and the Sudan won its independence, people were divided again, this time a new religious margin was drawn between the Ansaar (believers) and the Koffar (deniers).

In the present, Sunni Islam led by the NIF under the rule of Al Turabi is based on Salafist Islam which is against the Mahdyah and the Sufi Turuq as well. However, Lobban (2008) explained that “ the present-day functioning of the turuq represents a vital, yet unofficial aspect of the practice of Islam in the Sudan, at times a thorny problem as their leaders answer to no higher authority than God” (p.26). The Ansaar and their leader Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahman were against the Khatmiya’s leader Sayyid 'Ali al-Mirghani. According to Keddie (1972) both of these Sufi movements organized “youth groups and the leaders of both movements supported competing parties in the run-up to independence” (p.168)

It is widely acknowledged that Jaafar el Numairy was the first president to declare the Sudan as an Arab Muslim State embracing strict Sharia law as basis to be applied on all the Sudanese whatever religion they follow. This decision *inter alia* had affected the country’s whole future. Since Numairy’s union with Saddek el Mahdi and Hassan el Turabi is the main cause of the nullification of the Addis Ababa Agreement, therefore the direct cause of the second civil war.

The Islamization process continued under the rule of Omar El Bashir by denigrating not only other religions, but also the non-Arab Muslims who are revolting now for equality. In fact, many Muslim Africans think that their ethnicity and particular forms of Islamic practices

are denigrated and suppressed by the current ruling Elite. In this part, we were just shedding some light on religious alterity, therefore a further study of the acculturation process_ whether Islamization or Arabization_ will be targeted in the next chapter.

2-1-4- Regionalism:

Social structure and elitism in the Sudan had to do with regionalism and more specifically the history of the region which defines one's position, mainly its ethnic structure and nature during the slavery era. According to Johnson (2003) "coming from the peripheries of the State thus defined one's status within State, and in this respect territorial origin did become a factor in social stratification"(p. 35). The Sudan is divided, as we have seen earlier, to 18 States or provinces listed as follow

Province	States	Location
Blue Nile	Al Jazirah Blue Nile Sennar White Nile	South Eastern part
Darfur	Central Darfur East Darfur North Darfur South Darfur West Darfur	Western part
Kassala	Kassala Al Qadarif Red Sea	Eastern part
Khartoum	Khartoum (Capital)	The center of The Sudan
Kurdufan	North Kurdufan South Kurdufan West Kurdufan	Southern part
Northern (Shamalia)	Northern River Nile	Northern part

Table 5: Provinces and regions of The Sudan.

Since the choice of Khartoum as a capital by the Turks during their invasion in 1820, this province has continuously been the heart of the Sudanese government and economy. At the contrary to other regions which lack the minimum infrastructure development, the center enjoyed another level of luxury. Other regions, naming Darfur as an example, are counted

among people who are living below the poverty line, which is “less than a dollar a day” based on World Bank Report (2012). Except Khartoum, all the other regions live a hundred steps behind world development.

Provinces are marginalized, tribes are living in a primitive environment, and wars for the herding areas are still ongoing for the reason that government’s economic carelessness led to abort building dams and providing water to the far lands. Clearly the regional topography also plays a major role as clarified by Oppong (2010):

> Northern Sudan is comprised of desert and the Nile Valley. Western Sudan is very dry, thus people and animals must remain in reach of permanent wells, making the population unevenly distributed and sparse. Several mountain ranges in the far South, Northeast, and West break up the flat terrain. The Sudan is abundant in rich mineral resources including petroleum, natural gas, iron, zinc, gold, and uranium.(p.21)

In fact, the topography of the Sudan affected the distribution of people in each area, and the fact that it is one of the richest countries in Africa made of it a desired land by colonizers from time immemorial.

Furthermore, regionalism was obvious in governmental positions and wealth division. Since the provinces located on the borders helped in keeping the tribal contact outside the country, and which facilitate other countries to use groups’ anger against the government, naming El Kadhafi’s intervention with Darfur and Chad with South Sudan.

Province	States	Location
Bahr el Ghazal	Aweil Aweil East Eastern Lakes Gogrial Gok Lol Tonj Twic Wau Western Lakes	West South The Sudan
Equatoria	Amadi Gbudwe Imatong Jubek (containing the National	South

	capital city of Juba) Maridi Namorunyang Terekeka Yei River	
Greater Upper Nile	Boma Eastern Bieh Eastern Nile Jonglei Latjoor Northern Liech Ruweng Southern Liech Western Bieh Western Nile	East

Table 6: Provinces and States in South Sudan Republic.

In pre-secession Sudan, the South was marginalized as a whole for many reasons. Now, the main problem lingers in the centralization of Equatoria which holds the capital city Juba. Bankie (2005) explained that it always divides into two categories "the stigma of slavery, blackness and people of African identity, who occupy the margin and surrounding periphery" and the second is "the pre-stigma of the free, non-black and Arab, who occupy the center" (p.13). During the Anglo-Egyptian condominium, Equatorians and other sedentary tribes enjoyed the privilege of going to schools in Bor and Malekl, which helped in establishing the base for the intellectual Elite in that region. In addition to that, the Anyanya rebellion started from Equatoria which led the Dinka, as explained by Johnson (2003), to raise a sense of competitiveness against the Nuer and led to South Sudanese discontent over power.

2-2- Causes of inequality and marginalization in Postcolonial Sudan:

2-2-1- Slavery:

Centuries ago, slavery had been a rooted phenomenon in "Bilad assudan" the country of black people. Ever since the Kush civilization and the rise of kingdoms, it persisted during the Turkeyya then the Anglo-Egyptian condominium, the Sudan presented the Subaltern and slave raiding zone. Actually, the first treaty between Muslims in Egypt and Nubians is known as "al Baqt" (the pact) which consists of exchanging slaves from Nubia for provisions from Muslims for more than 100 years (Deng, 2004; Johnson, 2003; Sidahmed &Sidahmed, 2005). This pact was controversial, since real Muslims were against Slavery and forbade wine,

though according to historians, naming Ali Bekhit, Johnson, Lesch, Sidahmed; wine was included in the provision list of exchange.

Yet, During the Turkeyah this trade flourished that the Sudan became officially a raiding zone in order to provide slaves and ivory; in addition to a new fashion of domestic slaves introduced by the Turks and spread in Egypt (Johnson, 2003, p.45). Hence, the Arabized tribes raided not only the South, Northern peripheries also were targeted. According to Johnson (2003) "the culture of slavery is truly the catalyst behind the bad treatment of the black Africans of the Sudan, who live in the periphery around the Arabized middle" (Ibid)

People who used to live in the peripheries, Northern or Southern African Sudanese, were collected in terrific ways described as "human hunting" (Deng, 2004; Prunier, 1996). First were the Kings and merchants of old kingdoms, then the Arabs who were called the "Jellaba"[38]. So According to Abd el Salam and Alsir Sidahmed (2005) Chronology, it was just in 1838 that:

> Captain Salim Qabudan, Turkish sailor, successfully penetrates the *sudd* swamp in Southern Sudan. This breakthrough launches an era in which the South becomes the object of ruthless plunder – primarily of ivory and slaves – first by the Egyptian government, then expatriate merchants, and eventually Northern Sudanese.

This step towards the heart of Sudan raised greed amongst slave raiders and created a problem between the Ottoman and the British.

[38] Jallaba is a plural adjective in the Sudanese colloquial Arabic literally meaning the procurers. The singular is jallā bi. The term originated in reference to the intermediary slavers who were mostly Arabized Sudanese (Johnson, 2003, p.3).

Slave trade had sweeping effects on social and economic structures of the country and mainly on those who have been prey for raiders. In addition to marginalization and denigration, they felt rather vulnerable. Slavery's tragic consequences were clarified by Sidahmed and Sidahmed (2005) as follow:

> The social fabric and structure of the Southern tribal groupings, and other communities which fell prey to slave plunder, suffered tremendously from the impact of this human hemorrhage, with gradual disintegration of their traditional institutions, and a perpetual State of insecurity and vulnerability of their homeland. (p. 13)

Obviously, the impact of slavery on the social status of ex-slaves was noticed in job granting and schooling. Since, the Jallaba were the first to pay allegiance to the Mahdia which was the center of Northerner's pride, in order to bridge their way to top the social stratum. However, Khediwi Ismail opposed this trade and unsuccessfully tried to abolish it. The British, on the other hand, backed with its colonialist pragmatism worked on their alliance with the ruling Northern Arab Elite by accepting their traditions. Although officially declared abolished, slavery according to Saikinga (1996) continued to be "tolerated as a practice and culture".

To sum up, before the colonial invasions and policies of profitable investments, the Sudanese were not aware of the cleavage between their identities. However, "if Arab and African identities resulted from the practice of enslavement during the pre-colonial period", Idris (2005) argued, "the colonial State gave it a new legal dimension by institutionalizing these racialized identities through colonial polices of indirect rule"(p.16). Nowadays,

Northerners still marginalize Africans in general and Southern Sudanese in particular who were referred to as *abid* (slaves).

2-2-2- Colonial policy and legacy:

According to the number of papers and books written about civil wars, religion and ethnicity are at the heart of all of the Afghan, Indian, Nigerian, Chechen, Eritrean, and the Sudanese civil wars. Obviously, colonialism has always a hand in these conflicts since the majority of these wars took place in post-independent countries. Therefore, those violent conflicts would be the legacy of colonialism and what Edward Said (2003) identified as "residue of Imperialism" (p.30).

During the colonial era, all historical records were written by the colonizers, that is to say their biases and their measured stereotyping of the colonized. Nevertheless the postcolonial State, according to Idris (2005), has "reproduced the invented colonial discourse on Africa to legitimize its power over diverse peoples and histories History instead has become a major site for identity-formation in the postcolonial context" (p.15). Therefore, in this section, we tend to expose the poisonous residues of colonialism on the Sudan.

2-2-2-a- New geography:

Daniel N. Posner (2003) summarized historical facts about how colonialism in Africa reshaped the borders. He explained that:

> Studies of colonialism provide a particularly rich source to document it. For example, Howard Wolpe shows that the Igbo of Nigeria were a product of colonial boundaries Terence Ranger shows that the Manyika of Zimbabwe were "created" by missionaries. Crawford Young traces the origins of the Ngala of present-day Congo to Henry Stanley's misinformed labeling of the people he encountered on his river explorations. Philip

> Gourevitch shows that the emergence of Hutus and Tutsis as distinct identity groups in Rwanda was a product of Belgian administrative fiat."(p. 128)

All those studies show the immense role of colonial existence in widening the cleavage between different ethnic groups and how they still suffer its legacy. Here is one of the discriminating barriers building colonial strategy. Universally, many scholars acknowledged the pragmatism behind dividing Africa based on places of interest rather than tribal or ethnic identity. Ali Mazrui (2011) highlighted how diverse is Africa and that dividing it to ethnic and tribal based mini-countries will lead to fragmenting countries, as much as the continent.

2-2-2-b- The Southern Policy

the Southern policy did not just separate the North from the South but also it built blockades between tribes from the same ethnic group by centralizing inner group connections and destroyed all out-tribe ones under the "Closed district policy", so it is fairly argued that "colonialism", as Posner (2003) explained it, "affected not just the formation of ethnic groups, but also their numbers, relative sizes, and spatial distributions" (p.129). The Civil Secretary's famous Statement on Southern policy in 1930 highlighted that the administration of the South was to be developed along African, rather than Arab lines, and that "the future of the Southern Sudan might ultimately lie with the countries of British East Africa rather than the Middle East" (cited in: Johnson, 2003, p.60).

The Southern Policy practices mean that the Southern pattern was designed to alter form the Northern one. Consequently a plan like the one used in India was tailored based on a divide to rule which led to present civil wars, then to secession. A question, that Mezrui entitled one of his controversial articles, pops up to our minds *"Is it Pakistanism in The Sudan?"* (Mazrui, 2011), the term Pakistanism is recently used by many scholars to describe a religious based separation, yet the term, according to Mazrui (2011), was first used in the

1950s by Kwame Nkrumah who “was afraid of what he called "Pakistanism" – partition on religious grounds in Africa”.

Socially, the British imposed a clothing policy which was known as “the Galabia policy” that included preventing Southerners from wearing Galabia or white Amama, which are Northern Arab Muslims specific traits, they even prevented Southerners from selling them. Instead, they designed new colorful clothes for Southerners, to distinct their African identity. At the contrary to the Muslim preachers and Imams, who were prevented from passing the borders drawn towards the South, Missionaries were encouraged and given total freedom in preaching converting and teaching Christian values to Southern Sudanese. They even adopted Sunday as a weekend in the South while they kept Friday in the North.

In addition to the troubled relations between central tribes and subalterns because of slavery, the invasion of Ottomans, Arabs, and eventually the British in the nineteenth century caused some ethnic groups to rise against each other since some of them were able to accommodate themselves with the intruders while others did not. This was a clear colonial strategy to instigate insurgencies between groups that will lead to wars, ultimately. Hence, (Ayers, 2012) explained that the colonial strategy focused also on:

> Politicized multiple fractures in social relations, bequeathing a fissiparous legacy of racial, religious and ethnic ‘identities’ that have been mobilized in the context of postcolonial struggles over power and resources the major role of geopolitics in fuelling and exacerbating conflicts within the Sudan and the region, particularly through the cold war and the ‘war on terror’. (p.176)

A closer look at the historical facts indicates that some sections of the Dinka were more accommodating to British rule than were the Nuer. These Dinka treated the resisting Nuer as

hostile, and hostility developed between the two groups as a result of their differing relationships to the British. Accordingly, the struggle of identity quest and the rise of ethnic and regional Nationalism came to the surface so "African and Arab thus", according to Ayers (2012), "were transformed from flexible cultural identities to rigid political identities through the State policies" (Ibid). We notice that the colonial power, even in post-independence era, has always influenced the peoples, the tribes and worked as a decisive impediment.

2-2-2-c- Education and Law.

It is generally noticed that the problem of tribe's nature, whether sedentary or pastoral, affected the educational system during the Anglo-Egyptian rule. Therefore, people in sedentary tribes enjoyed more exposure to education and stability by having schools and courts. The educational system at that time was a colonial tool to draw a new social barrier between the Sudanese by giving birth to New Elite, since Gordan Memorial College was the one which gave birth to all the Sudanese intellectuals according to Johnson (2003) and Natsios (2012). After independence, this college was transformed to Khartoum University, which was the best reputed university in Africa until 1990.

Linguistic boundary is another aspect of the role of education in the colonial separatist efforts. Natsios (2012) affirmed that "while Arabic was the language of the government and business in the Northern Sudan, English was the language of a thin layer of local tribes elders and officials governing the South, as well as the language of instruction in scattered Christian missionary schools"(p.37). In the South, they introduced learning and education through churches, an education that was designed to teach primary and artistic tutoring as well as introducing English as the main medium for teaching and learning. In the process, they destroyed all Quranic and Arabic Madrassa in the South. They even prevented Arabs or any teacher from the North to work in Southern Schools.

Towards widening the gap between North and South, the British ruler took an important step, a major one actually, by developing other tribal languages giving them a written form using Latin letters, they even included them in school programs and started using them in legal papers, which made those language spread all over the South (Bekhit, 1982). In fact, the colonial strategy to build and give a new identity to the South was done through Northern cultural alienation and suppression of any unifying links.

Mouatassem El Bashir (cited in Abdalla, 2002) pointed out to the fact that the colonial education system was meant to produce minor intellectuals with minimal education level; in order to have low employees not able to rule the country after independence. Therefore, the country would be always in need for the colonizer. Along the same lines goes Johnson (2003) who described the education in the Sudan as a means to leave an open window so that the British would come back under legitimate reasons in the future.

As far as Law and court were concerned, Northerners, who were unified by Islam, continued adopting Sharia law in their courts. The British could not force or even think about changing Northerners' laws and education. We agree with Bekhit (1982) who attributed the British fear from Northern anger to the former's need for the latter's support, and that Islam and Arabic were sacred to Northern Sudanese who cherished their identity.

Islam for the Northerners was considered as a way of life and not just a religion; so imposing English in schools and spreading Christianity in the North was impossible. Therefore, the British helped adopting scholar Islam and inaugurated a Ulama Council in order to reduce sectarian alterity in the Muslim community of the Sudan. For what reasons we may ask, that is what we will discuss further in the next chapter.

The New Elite who consisted of the educated Sudanese were thinking of ruling the country since they were seen as "pet children of the protectoral government " according to Poggo (2009). However, Britain opted in her indirect rule for switching to the indigenous

government, which relies on chiefs, Omdas and traditional tribal, religious and regional leaders. Obviously, this action made the graduated minority feel disappointment and betrayal.

Since the class of "educated Nile River Arabs Professional Elite" according to Natsios (2012), saw the British Native Administration policy of indirect rule "through the tribal nobilities from what it was_ a subtle way to consolidating power and disempowering them" (p. 40), those graduates would be the first seed of the Sudanese Nationalism which would manifest itself through this new class of professionals in the later years of British rule, though it never developed a popular base.

2-2-3- Elitism

As the Arab Elite who rule the Sudan belong to the "superior race", according to their stratification, the other groups, mainly Africans, are marginalized and stripped from their rights. Though in the Sudan, the racist barrier is rooted in their ideologies, Idris (2005) propounds the view that "under the influence of its Elite centered in Khartoum and linked with Egypt, the Sudan identifies itself as an Arab rather than African Nation" (p.20). Northerners, in fact, tend to identify themselves with the Arabs, especially the Egyptians. Hence, the Arab Elite had predicated upon "a rewriting of the Sudanese history, and the utilization of particular historical narratives to lay claim to a single unified National identity: the Arab identity" (Ibid. p.12).

There is overwhelming evidence corroborating the notion that the Northern Elite had had a link with some Egyptian rulers throughout history. Actually, orthodox accounts of political violence tend to focus narrowly on the root of superiority, as we have seen earlier, which goes back to the colonial policy, since the history and nature of the State in contemporary Africa is deeply embedded in the colonial foundation. It is obvious that the colonial rule institutionalized ethnic and racial rights and privileges, and thus created unequal forms of citizenship.

The Elite played, and are still playing, a major role in exploiting divisions and tribal conflicts for their own social, political or economic interests and benefits, regardless of ways and means used to reach their goals. As an agreement to this point, Lesch (1998) convincingly argued that

> Elite and leaders (re)structure ethnic identity for instrumental reasons, such as to enhance their own power and to mobilize the populace behind their political goals. Identity can be manipulated and certain aspects can be more salient at certain times and in certain contexts. A complex ethno-politics can emerge in which political leaders seek to control the actions of members of their own ethnic group and to affect the relative power and position of their group vis-à-vis others. (p.9)

Even though secession solved, apparently, the Arab Elite' subjugation of Southerners, the problem of Southern multi-ethnicity and Elite groups struggle over power emerged on the surface. Actually, Mazrui (2011) once predicted that, when he explained the ongoing strife in the area, claiming that after the excitement of independence is over, we have to worry about the smaller groups in the South that may not accept the Dinka's hegemony as a potentially dominant "tribe".

Conclusion:

Northern-based Nationalism in the Sudan has created, for itself, according to Idris (2005), "a genealogy that stretches into the Islamic Arab past and suggests a primordial and essential identity shared by all those who reside within the Northern Sudan, regardless of their particular ethnic, racial, and cultural orientations" (p.15). The culture of the Arabized Northern Sudanese and the Islamization has been presented as the unifying factor of the

Sudan bringing together diverse “primitive” tribal groups within collective identity through the Arabization and Islamization instruments.

Yet, this fabricated National identity was imposed on the Sudanese, which explains the Southerners’ rejection. Southerners, for instance, rejected this historical lineage to the Arabized National identity, insisting on their uniqueness and Ethno-Nationalist sentiment visualizing the Arabization and Islamization process as a Northern racism. So civil wars were caused by imposing a fabricated National Identity in order to unify a diverse society. But, were the Arabization and Islamization vehicles regarded as acculturation or identity cleansing?

CHAPTER THREE:

The Sudanese National Identity Crisis and Civil Wars.

> "Language use is central to the formation of group boundary…the link between language and identity encompasses political and cultural dimensions… the cultural dimensions contain, inter alia, the negotiation of one's individual identity in and through language" (Stephan May, 2001)

Introduction:

In the Sudan, cultural identity, ethnicity and lineage have always played an important role in government control and State building, mainly in language planning and law making. The role of the Elite, as we mentioned in the previous chapter, obviously affects those choices. Johnson (2003) argued that "those fully participating within the State increasingly identified themselves with [Arab lineage] while at the same time identifying those who lived outside the State not only [unbelievers but as slaves or as enslavable]" (p.75). Hence, the Sudanese used real or fabricated genealogy to prove their Arabness in order to be treated as full citizens.

In this chapter, we will first try to discuss the issue of Sudanese identity. Then, we shall try to explain the concept of Nation, the process of building a Nation, including language planning, policies, and assimilation. Furthermore, we shall focus on the National identity crisis in the Sudan under the assimilation policy and how it gave birth to multiple Nationalisms. In addition, we will scrutinize the process of group identity manufacturing and imposition. Finally, we shall discuss post-secession strife in the area and the problem facing National identity building in multi-ethnic and multi-cultural societies.

3-1- The Sudanese Identity Dilemma:

From its inception, the Sudan was divided into two groups; the free slave raiders and traders, and the enslavable subalterns. Despite the fact that slavery was abolished centuries ago, the Sudanese with darker skin are still treated as slaves and always referred to as "Abd" which means slave in Arabic. Intermarriage with light-skinned people would be determinedly sought as seeking a lighter shade of blackness which means an opportunity to be accepted in a higher social stratum.

By the turn of the 15th century, Arabs entered the country and tried to modify the indigenous Sudanese identity, even the names of the kingdoms. Gradually, the Sudanese tribes were under the growing influence of their Islamo-Arabized peers. In response to that, Lecsh (1998) explained, it explicitly showed an Arab and Islamic orientation with "the new formations of Arabized tribes began claiming Arab descent" (p.54)

This was mainly perceived as the beginning of an identity adjustment process. In order to have access to power and to be at least accepted as free humans, Bankie (2007) affirmed that African people "tended to drop both their identities and languages and replace them with Arabic language and Arab identity". There was a new wave of conceptual awareness of race and colour, since the shades of blackness were perceived as authentic racial differentiations. A Sudanese-bound criterion for racial colour was formed by which the light black was seen as an Arab (called *wad* Arab and *wad balad*) i.e. white or at least non-black, while black Sudanese were seen as Africans and slaves.

As far as the Arab lineage of the Sudanese is concerned, Francis M. Deng (1995) concluded that the Arabized people of the North were Africans who used intermarriages with white or light skinned people as a "blood cleansing method". As a rebuttal to this point, Abdallah (2001) specified that the Northern Sudanese are Arabs, since the Sudan was a natural extension of Egypt which was separated by the Turco-Egyptian rule only in 1820. Based on the latter point of view, since Egyptians are Arabs, the Northern Sudanese should be Arabs too. The majority of Sudanese writers, like Youssef Hassan (2005), Aboulkheir Ahmad (2006), Bekhit (1982) and Abdallah (2001) defend Sudan's Arabness and some of them even claim lineage with "Aa'l Elbeit"; which means decedents of the Prophet Mohammed (PBUH).

3-2- Nation Making and State Building in the Sudan:

According to Henderson (2008, p.53) the postcolonial era saw newly independent countries facing dual challenges of "building the institutional apparatus of the State (State-building), while simultaneously constructing an overarching National identity among disparate cultural groups (Nation-building)." Obviously, the dilemma of citizenship remains at the heart of the African civil conflict, since to this day the ruling Elite define who belongs to the State and who does not. The Elite, unquestionably, play a major role in setting social barriers based on ethnicity and regionalism.

There seems to be a compelling reason to argue that colonial rule left the colonized bankrupt after taking the country's wealth. In addition, a number of irresponsible officials with lower education and leaders who were not ready for such a huge responsibility were appointed to control the country. Holsti (1996) approved that:

> The colonial State's main purposes had nothing to do with preparation for ultimate Statehood, and everything to do with economic exploitation, building some infrastructure and communication, settling migrants, organizing plantation agriculture, introducing extraction of surplus through taxes, organizing some semblance of lower-level education and religious activity, and providing "law and order" so that these tasks could go on unhindered (p. 62).

In contrast, colonial rule widened the cleavage between ethnic groups using different policies, as mentioned in the previous chapters. The colonists also boosted one group's power over the others, which fed the Elite superiority sentiment. Hence, during the decolonization process,

Henderson (2008) asserted that "an institutional vacuum was created within African States, which left them as relatively easy prey for organized insurgency" (p.53)

In the Sudan, Arabs or the Arabized people are at the head of the Government, holding all economic assets in addition to political hegemony, as they have always been at the centre of power, even before independence. On the other hand, Africans have always been the subaltern civilians at the lowest stratum of social hierarchy, due to years of slavery and 'black ivory trade'[39]. Corruption, abuse and poor management all resulted in Southern stagnation, since the South has tended to lag behind while the North developed.

Evidently, the only time a Southerner reached a high rank in government was when Abel Alier served as Vice-President of the Sudan (1971- 1982) under Numeiry's rule, and as President of the High Executive Council of the Southern Sudan Autonomous Region between 1972 and 1978. Unfortunately, all the Sudanese Governments failed to deal with diversity and kept repeating the same mistake by imposing Shariah-based law and Arabic as a sole medium of communication, which marginalized other ethnic groups and their languages, automatically leading to civil wars and encouraging the idea of secession.

3-2-1- Nation and National Identity:

It is essential for us to clarify the concept of Nation and how it is linked to language and cultural heritage, since it is defined differently from one scholar to another. Rightly so, Deuch claimed that "Nation is a [cultural entity]" insisting on the paramount role of communication in creating societies and culture, because "membership in a people consists in wide complementarity of [social communication]. It consists in the ability to communicate more efficiently; and over a wide range of subjects, with members of one large group than with outsiders" (cited in Guibernau, 2007. p. 13).

[39] Term used to refer to slave riding and trading in the African Horn.

On the other hand, Benedict Anderson (1991) defined it as "a political project of identity creation, employed to create a Nation and to achieve a [coherent collective identity], and in the mobilization of people within a certain territory". He continued by highlighting the fact that the Nation, in terms of time, is conceived as "a solid community moving steadily down (or up) history" (p.26). He insisted on defining it also as "a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited [imaginings]" (p.60), since he advocated a view that Nations and ethnic groups are imagined entities.

We must keep in mind that Nation is not the State. Actually, the State is a self-governing political entity with internationally recognized boundaries and a government that provides public services and military power. It enjoys sovereignty, meaning that no other State has authority over its territory. Hence, Max Weber identified State in his 1918 lecture "Politics as a vocation" as that "institution which exercises the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical power within a given territory," and by physical power he referred to governmental security units like the army, the police and others.

A Nation is normally defined as a culturally homogeneous group of people, larger than a particular community. Its members share a common historical experience generally including a common language and often a common religion. When a Nation of people has a State or country of its own, this is called a Nation-State according to Wayne (2006). However, a Nation can exist without a corresponding State. Large groups that intersect State boundaries, such as the Kurds who are dispersed across Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Turkey, may constitute such "Stateless Nations" as Guibernau (2003) named them. The State is generally defined by a geographic superficiality and Law codes that must be obeyed.

3-2-2- National Identity:

National identity is, according to Guibernau (2007), "a collective sentiment based upon the belief of belonging to the same Nation and of sharing most of the attributes that make it distinct from other Nations." She argued that believing in common "culture, history, kinship, language, religion, territory, founding moment and destiny have been evoked with varying intensity by people claiming to share a particular National identity" (p. 11). Therefore, National identity is the feeling of belonging to a group of people that share the same civilization which encompasses language, religion, culture, history and symbols.

Usually, the process of Nation building is overseen by the Elite, who sway the Memory of a people, so Guibernau (2007) insisted on "the relevance of antiquity, the constructed or immemorial origin of Nations and National identity, matters regarding the legitimizing role of history, and the significance of territory in the construction of National identity" (p.9). This notion is generally created in times of resistance against the colonizer, when citizens from the same State set aside their ethnic, linguistic and religious differences, creating a unity that would not last in peace time. Along similar lines, Conner (1994) argued that a National identity is a "fundamentally psychological and non-rational" feeling of belonging and readiness to sacrifice oneself for collective symbols, since a nation is a self-differentiating group.

Ernest Gellner (1983) linked National identity with the rise of Nationalism, which he explained from a political view primarily as

> A political principle which holds that the political and the National unit should be congruent. Nationalism as a sentiment, or as a movement, can best be defined in terms of this principle. Nationalist sentiment is the feeling of anger aroused by the

> violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfillment. A Nationalist movement is one actuated by a sentiment of this kind. (p.6)

Based on these definitions, we may conclude that there is a presence of two distant Nationalist sentiments, whether imagined or real, and that both have followers who advocate their belonging to one and not the other, each group claiming its authentic identity as Sudanese citizen vis-a-vis the other. For instance, the Arab-Islamic image of the Sudanese Nation excludes citizens who reside on the geographic or ethnic margins: persons who define themselves as African rather than Arab, ethnically or linguistically. On the other hand, Africans from different ethnic groups acknowledge the fact that those who claim Arab lineage are Arabized Africans and that they are not considered Arabs even by Arab countries.

3-2-3- Nationality and Citizenship in the Sudan:

Ethnic and regional alterity intensify the difficulty that some Sudanese more than others find in proving their citizenship, mainly in terms of legal papers, especially that some ethnic groups are spread inside other countries. This issue makes drawing an identity border almost impossible. In fact, Nationality in the Sudan requires proof of ancestry. This negates the very concept of citizenship, which Jok (2013) claims presupposed "equality in the eyes of the law and the right to live anywhere within the National territory regardless of religion, ethnic origin, or sex" (p.50). Dr Assal (2011), however, summarizes the difference between citizenship and Nationality as far as the Sudan is concerned: "Citizenship has a precise legal definition, and provides access to specific rights. Nationality is often defined more broadly, with reference to origin and to membership in a culturally defined community." (p.13)

Since the Sudan has a National identity issue because of intrastate wars, it has always been difficult to identify the right position of its citizens. However, the problem is mainly

social rather than political, and it is obviously linked to the circles depicted by the Elite who have the power to control the country as well as its wealth for their own welfare. It is important that the ruler, according to Gellner (1983), should "belong to the same ethnic or National group as the ruled" (p.1).Yet, in the Sudan the ruler always belongs to the central group and Northern Elite, denigrating the others who reside outside this circle. As a consequence, those who show loyalty to the government are treated better than others, while those who show opposition are penalized.

It is commonly acknowledged that diversity represents a key issue in social stratification and alienation. Assal (2011) claimed that "in multi-ethnic countries like the Sudan, where ethnicity provides a basis for stratification, emphasizing Nationality instead of citizenship results in disenfranchising the less privileged segments of the population." Indeed, there are hierarchies in the Sudan: the one between South and North, the ones between ethnic groups from the same area, and the one between families and members inside each group.

To sum up, with residues of colonialism, slavery and two devastating civil wars, the Sudan is still in the building process. However, using the same policy will not lead to better results. Hence, Gellner (1983) pointed out that "when the State is unable of reform itself, it is always tempted to use coercion. However, by enacting impressive policies to deal with ethnic dissent, the State further loses credibility, then legitimacy. The adoption of drastic measures reveals the State's critical weakness; violence itself may delegitimize the State" (p.7). This explains that the failure of the Government to elaborate adequate policies which respect the country's diversity should give rise to insurgencies against the State, which is judged to be unfair and illegitimate.

3-3- The relationship between Language Planning, Assimilation Policy and the Civil Wars:

The language planning process is fundamental in building a Nation State, since it defines the linguistic barriers and the State's cultural identity. Language choice was at the heart of the Sudanese civil war. Abu- Manga (2010) elucidated that language along with culture were "among the important issues in two civil-war-ending negotiations and agreements between the central governments, on the one hand, and Southern Sudan, on the other hand" (p.6).

Language goes hand in hand with culture, so the emergence of one language as a National one would cause the alienation of more than 120 languages as well as their cultures, traditions and religions. Arabic specifically is considered as a 'sacred language' conveying a "sacral culture... linked to a superterestrial order of power" according to Benedict Anderson (1991, p.12). Elsewhere, Abu-Manga (2010) explained that "because of such [extra-linguistic reasons], the colonial and post-colonial language policies were based on competition between the two language parties (Arabic/indigenous languages), erroneously believed to be mutually exclusive" (p.6) and by extra-linguistic reasons he means the sacred position of Arabic for Arabs and its link with Islam as a religion.

3-3-1- National language

In a Nation building process and identity formation, language plays a vital role, especially within diverse societies. Many studies on Nationalism and the emergence of Nations (Tarling, 2004; Nair 2009; Gomes and Rahman, 2009; Guibernau, 2007) have shown that a broadly shared language is the most significant and critical component in the successful building of a Nation. Yet it generally causes discontent between different language users when one language is nationalized over the others.

One may ask: how does a government choose a language to be nationalized within a range of hundreds of others? Which variables is the choice based on? Well, in the case of the Sudan, Abu Manga (2010) asserted that the variables are mainly: "the demographic size of speakers and the functions, prestige and historical weight of the language" (p.6). Unfortunately, about 90% of the Sudanese indigenous languages do not possess any of these variables. They are therefore regarded as threatened and endangered (Ibid). Accordingly, Arabic is the only language that does possess these characteristics in the Sudan, based on the data mentioned and discussed in the previous chapter.

It is quite obvious that the failure to manage diversity was the direct cause to South Sudan's secession and its emergence as an independent country. Later, in Post-independence, Southerners carefully chose their National language, which is English. Yet they committed to making laws to accept other languages and officially use each language in the area where it is mostly spoken, in order to spare the country a linguistic dilemma that may cause insurgencies. For instance, in Juba, road signs and nameplates are written in English, Dinka and Nuer, while in the area where Shiluk, Beja or Zande are spoken, the official papers and templates are in both English and the language mostly used in the area. According to Jok Madut Jok, even the name of the Sudan should be changed since in some languages the sound /s/ doesn't exist, so the alternative would be "Thudan" (Jok, 2005), while others wanted a less discriminating name that wouldn't put the skin color in focus.

Huntington (1996) highlighted the fact that while "people of the same race can be deeply divided by civilization; people of different races may be united by civilization" (p. 42) and by civilization Huntington means religion and language. The Sudanese people are racially, linguistically, religiously, tribally and regionally divided. Yet one cannot deny that external intervention served to widen the cleavage between the Sudanese and the South Sudanese. Arabization in the Sudan was linked to Pan-Arabism and the vision of the Arabs'

emergence as one ‘Umma’ (Nation) more than a National perspective of the Sudan as a State. The problem of belonging to a larger civilization circle was then for the Sudanese government more important than internal issues.

3-3-2 Language Policies:

On the eve of independence, Nationalist leaders immediately pursued policies of Arabisation (ta’rib), by endorsing standard literary Arabic at the expense of English and other existing languages. The Northern leaders wanted to build a specifically Sudanese identity and the further it could be from what the colonial rulers aspired the better. However, Southerners who assumed that the British would declare the South as an autonomous State had expected to be independent from both the Arabs and the British, which was not the case.

With the coming of Arabs during the kinglets period, Arabic was taught by merchants for marketing reasons, as well as by a number of Sufi holy men who built katateeb in order to teach the language and Islam to non-Muslims. The holy men reached deeper places in the Sudan, especially Darfur. This contact made Arabic learning gradual and smooth, like a natural process of L2 acquisition. Nevertheless, Fadlalla (2004) pointed out that the acquisition of Arabic as a second language “didn’t necessarily lead to the assumption of the Arab identity” (p.71).

Arabization in the Northern regions, according to Hasan (1967) was arguably “an even bigger work-in-progress and had occurred over many centuries following the first contact of Arab Muslims with Nubia in 651 CE” (p.22). Some groups tend to define themselves as Arabs like the agrarian Ja’aliyyin of the riverine Northern region, and the pastoralist Baqqara of the West, who claim genealogies of descent from Arabs who had entered the country in the Islamic era. Furthermore, Fadlalla (2004) asserted that the Ja’aliyyin descend from the Adnani group who originally come from Saudi Arabia, whereas the Juhayna people who are

Gahtaniyyin, springing up from South Yemen, were Arabized people who intermarried with the Sudanese Africans, rather than genuine Arabs.

On the other hand, the Nubians of the far Northern riverine Sudan kept their language as well as their cultural identity while embracing Arabic as a lingua franca in the broader region. It is important to mention, once again, that the Nubians used to be Coptic Christians and their language was one of the rare old languages that had a written form, while the majority of the languages in the Sudan were traditional and tribal. Hence, tribal languages made communication more difficult, since there was always a need for a translator in gatherings and generally merchants were the translators, for traveling merchants needed to learn the languages through their contact with others. The Nubians converted peacefully to Islam and learned Arabic. They started using it as a Lingua Franca without losing their linguistic identity. According to the 2008 census, Islam now represents the major religion for Nubians.

Originally, Arabic was the most widely spoken language in the North and it was even understood and used by merchants in the South. In addition to that, Arabic held a prestigious position among the Sudanese since it was introduced to the country centuries ago. Of course the Sudanese Muslims, according to Sharkey (2012), historically "relied on it not only for devotional purposes but also for the recordkeeping that Arabic literacy enabled" (p.429), taking into consideration the geographical proximity with Egypt and the Arab peninsula. Hence, Arabic, as we said earlier, enjoyed all the variables of a National language.

The Sudan was immediately accepted in the Arab League on the 19th January 1956, in the same month that it won its independence. Johnson (2003) claimed that the Sudan was not given the time to think of its Identity as a Nation. In addition, the Arabization policy was closely linked to Islamic ideologies, as it was maneuvered by Muslim leaders who wanted to

break from the colonial period and start anew by building alliances with the Arab countries rather than the African ones. This, in due course, caused conflicts about National identity among non-Arabs, which consequently led to the civil wars.

3-3-2-a-the British Colonial Language Policies and their Residues:

The British used to fear Islam; more specifically, they feared another anti-colonial jihad, like the Mahdist jihad of the 1880s. There was a huge link between Islam as a religion, Arabic, and power. What distinguishes the Sudan from other countries with similar characteristics according to Abu-Manga (2010) is:

> The parallelism that exists between language, on the one hand, and ethnicity, religion and power, on the other hand: Arabic is generally identified with Arab ethnicity, Islamic religion and power, whereas the indigenous languages are generally identified with non-Arab (African) ethnicity, Christian and traditional African religions and lack of power (with a limited space for exceptions). (p.12)

Obviously, Arabic as a language and Islam as religion are intertwined, since the former is the language of the Quran, which is the basis of the Islamic religion and the source of Sharia. Islam gave Northerners a unifying sense which empowered them in front of the British and the Turks as well.

Therefore, the British colonial rule decided to divide the Sudanese territory into an almost completely Muslim North, and an Animist Christian South. Education, of course was the perfect instrument that colonial Britain used to erase, or at least sway, the colonized identity. Indeed, the stronger and the larger an ethnic group gets, the wider the language they use spreads, giving place to linguistic clashes and cleavages, which Foucault highlights as

what might be called “the social appropriation of discourses” (cited in: Berair, 2013). He went on to explain that “any system of education is a political way of maintaining or modifying the appropriation of discourses, along with the knowledge and powers which they carry.”

The British helped make Arabic the language of education and administration in the North. Yet they kept teaching the English language to give birth to the New Elite, consisting of a group of bilingual intellectuals who would perpetuate British rule in the country. Obviously, these strategic changes were meant to preserve the distance between the two parts of the country.

In the South, English was used in administration and education, either by governmental schools or Missionary schools, which were given ‘spheres of influence’, according to Berair (2013); Johnson (2003); Sharkey (2012). On the other hand, they strictly prohibited using Arabic and kept the South a closed District; they even deported all Arab Northerners who had business there back to the North. The Southern Policy didn’t just alienate Southerners from the Northern culture, but helped in spreading English as a language and imposing their perception of African culture, in what Prunier (1993) pointed out as “the Galabia Policy”.

Undeniably, colonial rulers tried by all means to convert Muslims and non-Muslims to Christianity through education and by supporting Christian missionaries in their quest. As it was impossible for them to apply this policy successfully in the North, they found it easier to target the South. It was a clever move from the British to use the history of alienation and segregation between the two culturally distant yet geographically close parts of the country. Clearly, Southerners already feared and hated Northerners for their collaboration with the Turks and Egyptians in the Black ivory trade. Nevertheless, the number of Southerners killed

in the British closed Districts[40] surpasses what Northerners had ever killed according to Bekhit (1982) and Natsios (2013).

Regionally, the British concentrated more Khartoum, thus neglecting the rest of the country. Unfortunately, the same thing was done by the rulers in the post-independence era, which explains the imbalanced development and the poor infrastructure in the Eastern and Western parts of the country. Niblock (1987) asserted that "the British rule who confirmed the pattern of uneven development that would continue to hobble the Sudan". Even the educational system was not the same in all the areas, as we have mentioned.

Obviously, the British language policy in the South was a separatist strategy, giving the native languages a written form using Latin letters. This step was studied thoroughly by British specialists who called for a Committee to reveal it in the Rejaf Language Conference in 1928. Sharkey (2012) stated that in this conference, the participants "devised an official list of 'languages and dialects' spoken in Southern Sudan and identified six languages (Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, Bari, Latuko, and Zande) that would be 'suitable for development' in textbooks." (p.434) Therefore, teaching in Primary Schools was carried out in one of the native languages and it was only in High School that English was compulsory.

It seems that the Sudanese Elite were divided between those who were pro-Britain and those who were pro-Egypt. It was with the help of the Egyptians that the Sudan won its independence, therefore in its immediate aftermath, Sudanese leaders developed a close relationship between with Egypt. Northerners held the temporary government through an indigenization process, also perceived as the Sudanization of the country, which gave them the priority to mastermind the country's future.

[40] Closed districts policy is part of the British Southern policy, where southerners are shot at sight if one goes from one tribe to another without a pass or at night. So in addition to alienating the South from the north, the British worked on separating tribes to weaken the South. This policy is mentioned in the second chapter.

As a result, Southerners were convinced that ambivalence and denigration would continue, if not become worse. The British policy in all its colonies was based on building cultural distinction between groups of people, as explained earlier in chapter two, in order to weaken the colonized by dividing them to sub-groups who would continue to fight each other even after independence.

3-3-2-b- Arabization and Islamization:

The ongoing history of Arabization in the Northern region, according to Sharkey (2012) "reflects complicated patterns of migration and helps to explain why the Sudan 1956 Census identified 38.8% of the population as 'Arab' but 51.4% as primary speakers of Arabic" (p.435). The link between Arabic and Islam made the Arabization process easier with Muslims, therefore colonial officials wanted to weaken Arabs by attacking their identity, so they "implemented policies to weaken Arabic pedagogy and, to prevent non-Muslims from acquiring Arabic literacy" (ibid).

The assimilation policy at the first stage, as Stephan May's (2012) explained was based on:

> Increasing pressure on minority language speakers to speak the majority language, particularly in formal language domains… It is often precipitated and facilitated by the introduction of education in the majority language. It leads to the eventual decrease in the functions of the minority language, with the public or official functions of that language being the first to be replaced by the majority language (p. 1).

Based on May's description, assimilation in the Sudan followed the same oppressive pattern. Although they are part and parcel of the Sudanese linguistic map, and their speakers are78 Sudanese by law, the shared languages may still face a difficult constitutional problem relating to the newly adopted (and endorsed in the Interim Constitution of 2005) language policy whose first clause reads: "All indigenous languages of the Sudan are National Languages and shall be respected, developed and promoted" (cited in: Abu Manga 2010.p.6) This has never been the case in the Sudan.

Languages were used as vehicles to spread religions, whether it was Islam or Christianity, so language and culture became inseparable, as Bennabi (2008) explained, just like two sides of a coin. For Muslims, Islam is not just a religion, it is rather a system of life and the Quran is a constitution; Arabic, for the Muslims, is part of its miraculous power: "The tongue of him they wickedly point to is notably foreign, while this is Arabic, pure and clear" (the Glorious Quran – The Bee (An Nahl):16, verse:103)[41]. Christianity, on the other hand, was translated to indigenous languages by missionaries who were at the head of Education in the South and the Nuba Mountains which were not already Islamized yet.

Arabic definitely possesses all the variants of a National Language, which made it the primer choice to be designated as a National Language by the government, but were the policies adopted by the Sudanese Government accurate? Skutnabb-Kangas and Philipson (1994) asserted that "linguistic majorities, speakers of a dominant language, usually enjoy all those linguistic human rights which can be seen as fundamental, regardless of how they are defined. On the contrary, most linguistic minority groups in the world do not enjoy these rights" (cited in: Skutnaabb-Kangas, 2002, p.8). Despite the fact that imposing Arabic on non-Arabs as well as Islam on non-Muslims was not the right policy, rulers continued doing it

[41] "وَلَقَدْ نَعْلَمُ أَنَّهُمْ يَقُولُونَ إِنَّمَا يُعَلِّمُهُ بَشَرٌ ۗ لِسَانُ الَّذِي يُلْحِدُونَ إِلَيْهِ أَعْجَمِيٌّ وَهَٰذَا لِسَانٌ عَرَبِيٌّ مُبِينٌ" الآية ﴿١٠٣﴾ من سورة النّحل.

over and over again, from General Ibrahim Abboud's governance (1964) to Omar El Bashir (2016).

It was important for the Sudanese to build a new identity in the post-independence era, yet the government neglected the fact that the Sudan is a diverse country. Consequently, with the multitude of ethnic groups and languages, we agree with Abu-Manga (2010), who deduced that the Sudan needs – among other solutions – "to implement a language policy that should be guided by a will to respect the linguistic diversity and human rights of all people, at both the individual and the collective levels" (p.7). Certainly, we perceive this action as vital to attain a reasonable degree of socio-political stability.

Sandell (1982) highlighted that "in 1950, an International Commission for Secondary Education, comprised of British, Sudanese, Egyptian, and Indian delegates, endorsed the Nation-wide teaching of Arabic and suggested that teaching Southern Sudanese children in 'vernacular' languages was 'a waste of time and energy'" (cited in: Sharkey,2012, p.435). Accordingly, Arabic was easier to be used and taught throughout the country due to the number of its users.

The policy of Arabization was gradual and divided into phases, and since the South was majorly non-Arab and non-Muslim, the mission was even harder. First, the government recruited American and British Missionaries to translate the Bible into simplified Arabic so that Southerners could get familiar with the language. Second, they noticed that the Sudanese teachers lacked the competency to teach Arabic as a second language, especially to non-Muslims, so they hired teachers from Egypt to aid them with this task. During the Pan-Arabism period, Egyptian, Palestinian and Syrian teachers were experts in teaching Arabic as a second language. Therefore, they were recruited by both the Sudanese and the Algerian Governments for the purpose of Arabization.

Meanwhile, Egyptian linguists advised to give the indigenous vernaculars a written form using the Arabic Alphabet instead of Latin. Sirr al-Khatm al-Khalifa, who led this Arabization initiative, noticed that the educated Southerners "didn't like the introduction of Arabic in the South. Since, politically, they feared Northerners' domination via cultural and linguistic cleansing" (cited in: Ibid, p. 455). Northerners were trying to erase their African identity while implanting the seeds of an Arab hegemony.

The policies instigated the Southern troops to mutiny in Torit, declaring the First Sudanese Civil war. In 1957, the Southern Federal Party delivered a proposal demanding the acknowledgment of English alongside Arabic as an official language; Christianity along with Islam as a State religion; and they insisted on "the transfer of the Sudan from the Arab world to the African," according to Johnson (2003, p.50). However, the central government considered the manifesto as a rebellion and captured its leaders, who were sentenced to seven years in prison for treason.

In the same year, Northern politicians nationalized the missionary schools in the South, and allocated a huge budget to the spread of Islam in the Southern areas (Johnson, 2003; Poggo, 2002). In 1958, General Ibrahim Abboud, who came to power, was a clear supporter of both Arabization and Islamization. His government immediately initiated Arab Islamic Institutions (Maahed) in Southern Sudan, and ordered the building of many Khalawa[42] which were considered later on as Primary Schools.

In 1962, Abboud's regime expelled all the missionaries from the South, accusing them of promoting rebellious and secessionist thoughts among Southerners. In the same year, a group of students and Southern Nationalists wrote a petition to the United Nation denouncing

[42] Quranic schools.

Northern policies in the South and the manners they adopted to impose both Arabic and Islam on non-Muslim, non-Arab Southerners.

According to Scopas Poggo (2002), the regime encouraged Southern students to convert to Islam by "making promotion to higher schools and access to scholarships contingent upon their embracing Islam" (p.74). Ironically, a huge number of Southerners were converting to Christianity instead, especially after the missionaries were expelled, since Christianity represented for them a vehicle of cultural resistance.

As a reaction to the cultural oppression imposed by the Arab North, the Anyanya rebellion created jungle schools where they decided to adopt the British model to teach both Christianity and their vernaculars via Latin letters, as it has been taught by missionaries. Southerners were convinced that they have no chance to attain governmental positions, since Northerners were in hold of the country and even if they learned their language and converted to Islam, Southerners would never be accepted as equal citizens. Ultimately, Sharkey (2012) pinpointed that:

> what Northern politicians regarded as National unification looked like cultural colonialism to Southerners, who had no input into policy-making…with the government openly promoting the Islamisation of schools as well as their Arabisation, the politics of religion, language, and education became inextricably tangled (p.436).

Obviously, the policies of Arabization and Islamization, which were markers of cultural hegemony, were at the heart of civil discontent and certainly fueled the horrific Sudanese civil wars. Hence, 1972 marked the end of the civil war and Numairy's Addis Ababa agreement

which gave Southerners freedom to choose their National language and religion without dividing the country.

Of course, Southerners chose English as a National language because the Nuer did not accept Dinka as a National language over their own, and neither did the Dinka, nor any of the other major linguistic groups. In the North, Arabic became the language of the majority while minority languages were denied and enduring what May (2012) named a "linguistic genocide". This is a phenomenon that he explained as a process which begins "with the younger generation along with a decrease in the fluency of speakers as the minority language is spoken less, and employed in fewer and fewer language domains" (p.2). Therefore, a linguistic genocide starts with marginalizing other vernaculars at the expense of the language of the ruling group.

For May (2001), "language use is central to the formation of group boundary". He further argued that "the link between language and identity encompasses political and cultural dimensions. The political dimension is associated with particular ethnic and National identities, whereas the cultural dimensions contain, inter alia, the negotiation of one's individual identity in and through language" (cited in: Abu Manga, 2012, p.20). Accordingly, the majority of linguists and anthropologists, like Fadlalla, Ferguson and May, assert that speaking and spreading a language, Arabic in the case of the Sudan, does not give the speaker a new identity.

Unfortunately, for mere political reasons, Numairy didn't keep his promises when he attributed Sharia as law basis and Arabic as a National language. Hence, the AAA became void. This prompted Southerners to a mutiny which escalated in a second armed strife. Islamization, on the other hand, was a governmental strategy to erase the culture of the indigenous people, mainly their traditions and rituals, replacing it with Arab-Islamic culture.

This policy was perceived as a forced assimilation process. Since Islam had a unifying factor, from the time when it was spread in the Arab peninsula, the Arab tribes unified and people switched their loyalty from their tribes to the "Islamic Nation" and Islamic faith. Religious leaders hoped in vain that it would have the same result in the Sudan.

There is ample support for the claim that governments opted for Islamization so they can destroy the bound between tribes on the borderline. Of course, a number of alliances between tribal groups outside the Sudan facilitated the entry of weapons and supplies into the mainland. In the Sudan, tribalism was stronger than linguistic, religious or regional union. According to Edward Said (1994) "tribalism is fracturing societies, separating peoples, promoting greed, bloody conflict, and uninteresting assertions of minor ethnic or group particularity" (p.20).

Arabs were the strongest ethnic group who represented the Majority in the North, so they influenced policy-making and the cultural identity of the country. It is not surprising that they have, therefore, attempted to shape the identity of the country according to their own vision: Arab culturally and Muslim in its religion. Although the Assimilation policy succeeded in spreading the Arabic language and culture, whether it was used as a Lingua Franca or a Mother tongue, it did not erase other languages and identities. On the contrary, it helped nurture a sense of self-awareness among the speakers of threatened languages.

Since 1965, the Sudanese Government has been trying to Sudanize the country in order to get rid of colonial legacy, opting for the Arabization project, which targeted social services such as education, and the media. The assimilationists saw that language, as Schmidt (2000) asserted, "is a necessary bond, an essential instrument for people to imagine themselves members of a unified society of equal individuals" (cited in: Ferguson, 2012). Besides, it helps transcend ethnic division, facilitates communication and fosters National State consciousness.

The adoption of certain aspects of Islamic law or the sharia by the central government in 1983 greatly influenced the nature of relations among these groups in modern times. Abdullahi Ahmed An Naim, a Sudanese Professor of Islamic Law at Emory University School of Law in Atlanta, argues that the ideological concept of the NIF party, which intends to direct all public institutions of the Sudan towards "Islamic fundamentalism", is a difficult parliamentary task to undertake without counterforce of a serious resistance from the Christians and the Animists of the South. This group has derived its modern National identity from the secular Christian West.

Unity in the Sudan was not concretized because it was not just based on language policy application, but involved religion with language planning on the one hand, and the inappropriate British colonial cultural policies on the other. The imposition of the Sharia in 1983 and the policy of Arabization in the Sudan in general have relegated people of the Southern Sudan to the status of subjects rather than citizens. Hence, in the face of the rise of Islamization and Arabization as vehicles for facilitating the domination of the central State, Lesch (1998) explained, "Christianity would get involved and eventually it would become, along with Africanism, the ideological backbone in countering Islamo-Arabism" (p.40)

The Arabization policy continued in the 1990's, since the government Arabized education even in medical schools, where, according to Sharkey (2012) they insisted on translating books and references from English to Arabic. As a result to this linguistic supremacy, the South Sudan Republic, as we said earlier, declared English as a National language with a chart concerning linguistic tolerance. At the eve of South Sudan independence, Mazrui (2011) wrote his famous article comparing what was happening in the Sudan with what happened in Pakistan before, asserting that "Southern Sudanese have played the religious card, accusing Northern Sudanese of religious intolerance".

Evidently, President Omar el Bashir announced the Sudan (the Northern Part) as an Arab Muslim country and ordered to demolish the newly built churches under the pretext that the number of Christians already existing in the country is small and does not necessitate new churches. In support of this point, Abdullah, the Sudanese Minister for Guidance and Religious Endowments, reportedly explained that "due to the country's separation from South Sudan Republic, where many Christians have fled, the existing churches in the Republic of the Sudan are sufficient for the Nation's minority Christians" (cited in: Christian post, 2014)[43].

Sharkey (2012) mentioned that a Sudanese Islamist writer named Hasan Makki (1990) made an argument about "cultural elitism, double standards, and insincerity among the Sudanese advocates of Arabisation". Makki exclusively criticized the Sudanese Muslim Arabophone Elite for sending their children to private schools that were originally founded by Christian missionaries. "It wasn't just for their children learn English" he explained "but also to escape from overcrowded government schools"

Hasan al-Turabi (b. 1932), who was the founder of the NIF in the 1989 coup, was an example of this hypocrisy since he himself had attended a Christian missionary school as a youth in Khartoum, and had later studied in Paris "where he earned a law degree at the Sorbonne, [but] he supported a regime in the Sudan that promoted (a poor-quality) Arabic-Islamic education for the masses" (Ibid). Obviously, the Sudanese started questioning those policies which led to the protest in Darfur and Beja, since both regions were suffering of poor infrastructure, which resulted in an uprising taking place in the East and the West parts of the country.

Arabization failed in South Sudan mainly because the government schools never managed to provide high-quality education, and although instructions were given in Arabic to

[43] http://www.christianpost.com/news/sudan-bans-construction-of-all-new-christian-churches-123424/ 17 juil. 2014

make students feel like valued citizens, Wöndu and Lesch (2000) explained that this was regarded by South Sudanese as a means of "subjugation" (p.80). The Northern government had monolithic pretensions which would erase diverse cultures that were the basis of the Sudanese Identity. Taking a middle-ground position the SPLA leader, John Garang, praised the idea of a 'New Sudan' that would not only tolerate but also respect and celebrate the country's linguistic and cultural diversity. Many Southern Sudanese intellectuals and scholars have described this pluralism in terms of 'African' rather than 'Arab' identity, since African here is entailing diversity.

3-4- the Rise of Nationalism and Civil Wars:

The relationship between Nationalism and many of the current wars in Africa is unclear. Armed conflicts such as those taking place in Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Sudan, Congo and elsewhere today are thought to have been caused either by the end of the Cold War or by the impact of globalization, or a blend of both. Seemingly, in a worrying number of analyses, Abbink, Bruijn and VanWalraven (2003) emphasized that "these wars are considered a sign of reversion to an age-old barbarism said to be characteristic of Africa" (p.66), mainly the tribal rivalry that would lead to fracturing the whole continent.

Yet based on the data we have analyzed, Arabization and Islamization policies have cultivated a heritage of strife and hatred between South and North Sudan that was already present from time immemorial. The Sudanese civil war was an ongoing story of violence divided into two major phases, the first Civil war or the Anyanya Rebellion that grew between 1955 and 1972, and ended by the AAA in 1972, resulting in half a million casualties. Automatically, when a people's identity and existence is at stake due to years of oppression, a sense of Nationalism springs in them and they fight for it. Sharkey (2007) affirmed that "the Arabization policy also accompanied, in some quarters, the growth of an ideology of Arab

cultural and racial supremacy" (p.1), therefore, when their Cultural identity is endangered people are led to mutiny.

3-4-1- The Elite and Nationalism:

The role of the Elite and their colonial visional legacy led to the rise of ethno-nationalism. Said Adjumobi argued that "it de-individualizes citizenship and makes it more of a group or community entitlement. Rather than the State providing a common bond for the people through the tie of citizenship, with equal rights, privileges, and obligations, both in percepts and practice, people's loyalties are bifurcated." (cited in: Abbink, Bruijn & VanWalraven 2003, p. 330) In the Sudan, the Elite's role in shaping the new Nation and excluding groups is to be considered as a residue of imperialism.

Elsewhere, Norman Wayne (2006) proclaimed that "Nationalism is a kind of a political culture: it colours how we identify ourselves, how we justify policies and political programmes, and how we mobilize support for such programmes. It is a way of doing politics." (p.5). By imposing a mono-vision Nationalism, the Elite encouraged minority Nationalisms, which would defend what was endangered with the help of the other group's hegemony.

Undeniably, religious alterity plays an enormous role in a National identity crisis and seems to be a major cause of internal strife and civil wars. Indeed Huntington (1996) argued that "the major civilizations in human history have been closely identified with the world's great religions; and people who share ethnicity and language but differ in religion [may slaughter each other]" (p. 42)

The Sudan is a State where more than one group considers itself to be a Nation or even a National community, as tribalism, ethnocentrism or linguistic proliferation are considered as forms of Nationalism. There is more than one Nationalist discourse, more than one Nation-

building project. The Sudan is relevant to the category that Norman (2006) described in his preface as "multinational States" which "have one dominant majority Nation that sees the State as its own", and by the dominant majority he refers to the ruling Elite. Other groups are marginalized and stripped of their rights, in addition to being totally excluded from the government.

The Sudanese historical and political circumstances have shown the impossibility of concretizing the project of comprehensive Nation-States in countries where a single vision of history and identity has been imposed over diverse ethnic and cultural communities. According to Conner (1994) "there are, by conservative estimate, something like 5,000 ethnocultural groups in the world, and around 200 States; or on average 25 per State" (p. 29) which explains the rise of majority and minority, oppression and internal conflicts between groups, fostering a sense of ethno-Nationalism.

Indeed, the definition of Nationalism differs from one scholar to another and from one field to another. Hutchinson (2005), for instance, stressed in the first pages of his book *Nations as Zones of Conflicts* that "the central difficulty in the study of Nations and Nationalism has been the problem of finding adequate and agreed definitions of the key concepts, Nation and Nationalism" (p.30). As we have seen earlier in this chapter, different definitions are given the concept of Nation, yet they all have a common point, which is communities with common myths, shared memories, and a shared language.

Nationalism on the other hand, is generally qualified as an imagined sentiment according to Anderson (1992), or as a political project with established ideas that are more often fabricated, according to Gellner (1984). Along the same line, Connor (1994) defined it as an ethnocentric sentiment. Yet when different visions of Nation and opposed feelings of Nationalism coexist in the same country, a clash between disparate groups would

automatically take place. In this case, the vision of an Arab Muslim Sudan contrasted to African Christian Animist Sudan resulted in the longest civil war in history, which consequently led to the secession of the Southern part.

In fact, the supremacy of one race over others within the same country leads to the rise of minority Nationalism or what is known nowadays as ‘ethno-Nationalism’. Hutchinson (2005) explained that this movement is strengthened by the emergence of new formulations of “the claims of minorities designated as "ethnico-National" or even "linguistico-cultural ”” (p. 4). Besides, the assertion of independence by different groups is considered as a social phenomenon that indicates the rise of modern societies.

3-4-2- Causes of the Sudanese Civil War:

Although National identity crises and assimilation fueled the armed conflict in many countries, they weren’t the only sparks that ignited civil wars. Many scholars studied the causality of civil wars from different angles. Marta Reynal-Querol in her article “Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil Wars” emphasized that “social and ethnic conflicts are recurrent phenomena affecting many countries. Ethnicity is at the center of politics in divided societies…However, not all ethnically divided societies evolve into civil war. There are also experiences of good relationships among individuals of different cultures within a country.” (2002, p. 29). She studied this phenomenon quantitatively using the scientific approach and positivism, finding out that religiously divided societies are more likely to endure intense conflict than countries whose people are fighting for resources based on interest groups or language divisions.

On the other hand, Donald Horowitz (1985) argues that the problem is mainly economic since for him, “ethnicity embodies an element of emotional intensity that can be readily aroused when the group’s interests are thought to be at stake”. Along similar lines, Sambanis

(2001) affirmed that economic studies of civil war have successfully identified an "empirically robust relationship between poverty, slow growth, and an increased likelihood of civil war and prevalence". In fact, the Sudan has been suffering from recurrent civil wars in different parts of the country since its independence in 1956. The Sudanese conflicts are attributed to political, economic, religious and cultural marginalization of the peripheries by the government in Khartoum.

Poverty, inadequate infrastructure, economic and cultural alienations are obviously the characteristics of "Fragile States" according to Mcloughlin (2012), who raised the claim that civil wars always take place in states characterized by ongoing violence and insecurity, a legacy of clashes, weak governance and the inability to ensure the efficient and equitable distribution of public goods. In 2007's World Bank review, these States have consistently grown slower than other low-income countries, and the rate of extreme poverty is rising within them. They lag behind in meeting all the Millennium Development Goals; with a 50% higher prevalence of malnutrition, 20% higher child mortality, and 18% lower primary education achievement rates than other low-income countries.

More specifically, we propose that civil wars in the Sudan are mostly caused by colonial legacy, poverty and social and cultural exclusion. It is commonplace to characterize political violence and wars in Africa as 'internal', compressed in the term 'civil war', since the concept of 'civil war' refers to internal conflicts, and is described to be both ideological and political. Civil wars, according to Feher (2000) are officially attributed to "the existence of old and intractable "bad blood" between neighboring or intertwined communities", and in a related way, "the exploitation of these ingrained feelings by ruthless warlords" (p. 40), which means that the warlords used these wars to propagate gun markets.

Since the Sudanese people are racially, linguistically, religiously, tribally and regionally divided, this emergent National identity can only be achieved by equality between groups. In either case, it is expected that the emergence of a new National identity is not likely to be a natural or spontaneous process, but an Elite-made project. However, the core problem in the Sudan is one of general Arab racism vis-a-vis Africans. South Sudan represents a different ethnoculture: non-Arab African ethnic groups, very little Arabic language and traditional African religions, with the tendency to identify with the African rather than the Arab world.

With different visions of Nation State and after a long fight for independence, 99% of the South Sudanese voted in 2011 Referendum for secession from the Republic of the Sudan. The conflict, which Idris (2005) described as a "civil war of interlocking civil wars" (p.45), has led to grave human rights violations, crimes against humanity and severe humanitarian crises, mainly in the south of the country.

Similarly, in his typology of guerrilla insurgencies, Clapham lists 'separatist insurgencies', 'reform insurgencies' and 'warlord insurgencies', in addition to the 'liberation insurgencies'. He argues that revolts against independent African States initially grew out of failures in the decolonization process, putting in power governing groups widely considered as alien and illegitimate by the people. Eritrea and Southern Sudan were given as examples (as cited in: Abbink, Bruijn & VanWalraven, 2003, p.12)

With internal borders becoming international ones, any war between the old enemies (the Northern Arabs and the Southern Africans) and new neighbors would have severe consequences on the international plan. The ongoing wars took place in the Southern part of the Sudan, the 'first' and 'second' Sudanese civil wars as they are known, are often described as 'the Southern problem'. Since colonial rule until the referendum in 2011, South Sudan has

been marginalized and has witnessed 17 years of civil war. Consequently the country is defined as one of the poorest countries, lacking basic life necessities.

Meanwhile, tensions between the Sudan and the South Sudan Republic continue due to unresolved disputes regarding border issues and oil. The problem between both countries is no longer over identity and Nationalism but for economic reasons and resources. Yet within both countries, internal struggles continue. In the Sudan, Darfuris are raising separatist demands caused by the governmental marginalization of the region, since Darfur (North and South) is lacking crucial infrastructure, though it is considered one of the richest regions in gold and natural resources.

Conflict broke out in the South Sudan Republic on 15 December 2013, and the world's newest Nation is now facing a major humanitarian disaster. More than 1.3 million people have been displaced and an estimated 4.9 million are in need of urgent humanitarian assistance, declared the UN humanitarian briefing document in 2014. A first coup d'état took place after 2 years of South Sudan's independence. Fighting broke out in Juba, and rapidly spread across four States: Central Equatoria, Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile. Thousands of people were killed (estimates suggest at least 10,000) or wounded in the fighting, and hundreds of thousands were displaced (UN Report). President Salva Kiir has accused ex-Vice President Riek Machar of an attempted coup, which the latter denied.

Machar assumed leadership of what he called a 'rebellion', and the army split as clashes occurred around the country. Hutton (2014) asserted that "the violence escalated along ethnic lines, though these divisions are not straightforward and the conflict dynamics are extremely complicated" (p.76). The problem is mainly tribal and ethnic in the South, as Johnson (2003) predicted that the Dinka did not want the Anyanya rebels to take Equatoria as a sanctuary during the first civil war, since The Nuer would take the credit and would automatically hold

governmental positions whenever the South wins independence or Federal rule under the Union. In due course, post-independence South Sudan has witnessed armed conflicts between the Nuer and the Dinka, which led the UN to declare the crisis in February 2014 as a "Level 3 emergency, representing the highest level of humanitarian disaster" (UN report).

Conclusion:

It is easy to perceive that the South is very different both historically and culturally from the North in the Sudan. Hutchinson (2005) and Jok Madut Jok (2008) have drawn attention to the deep and often unforeseen socio-cultural impact of prolonged conflict on local societies. The Nuer example illustrates that violence too can be extreme. Indeed, the ones who lose, as Hutchinson (2005) suggested, "are consigned to a social and spiritual oblivion in order to release a more destructive use of violence against enemy government troops". This reshapes the social memory of resistance and probably even weakens its effectiveness.

To sum up, most civil wars have taken place in postcolonial countries, especially in Africa. This is due to using military force in the inclusion or exclusion policies while tailoring a new National identity, which almost certainly leads to an armed reaction from the other camp. This is especially if a new Nation is based on one group's vision, i.e. Arab Northerners in case of the Sudan. "A civil war demonstrates" according to Abbink, Bruijn and VanWalraven (2003) "that the declared notions of National reconciliation and the slogan of 'unity in diversity' do not always receive the desired acknowledgement in terms of political pluralism and tolerance" (p.322). As such, identities are said to be exploited by the avaricious Elite for their own individual goals.

The Sudan has thus to be imagined anew, not only as a State but also as a cultural and social entity along with the values of customary law. That a recreation of traditional Sudanese concepts, namely religious identification, clan belonging and National identity should remain

central and not affected by Western, Arab or Islamist ideas seems reasonable but is by no means a certain solution, considering intrastate wars. The new generation of wars in Africa is grouped with those in the Balkans, central Asia and elsewhere as part of a wave of so-called ‘new wars’, since Africa is perceived as an integral part of the world rather than as a marginalized region. It is appealing to drop the word “civil” before “war” when talking about intrastate wars since, as Ayers pointed out, “there is nothing civil in a war”, and the term should rather be used as an oxymoron.

General Conclusion

In an area of 2,376,000 square kilometers, the Sudan is home to more than 600 tribes who speak more than 150 languages and more than 200 dialects. Today with more than 39.1 million people it is obvious that it witnesses conflicting cultures, especially under the Northern elitist governmental bias. The Sudan has a history of colonialism that has constantly reshaped the country geographically, socially and culturally.

Thus, the artificiality of the African State was not, per se, the only reason that caused conflicts to erupt. Despite the fact that it was a colonial construction that brought within its cartographic inclusions of diverse ethnic groups, conflicts started when the State failed to manage this diversity and to provide equal rights to all its citizens. Therefore, during this study and based on the data collected and analyzed, one deduces that diversity is not the main problem in the Sudan; rather, the fragility of the State and the policies adopted by the governments are.

Obviously, ethnicity represents the perpetual basis of human history and affects the Nationalist vision for each group. However, when a group claims racial, cultural, ethnic and even linguistic superiority other groups are generally marginalized and treated as subjects rather than civilians. They are denied their basic rights as well as participation in decision making and governmental activities. The Elite, on the other hand, are the ones who decide upon who is to be considered a Sudanese citizen and who is not, and they are those who chose the Arabization and the Islamization policies as a means of assimilation.

Inclusion into a society basically requires participation in political events and decisions, equality before the law and protection from State power, dignity for the weak and poor, and social fairness and security. Yet all the previously listed rights are only for those who are regarded as real members of the Nation. Undeniably, the modern principles of inclusion are

familiarly tied to ethnic and National forms of exclusion, which gives the strongest groups a sense of superiority, by belonging to one ethnic or National group and not the other.

On the one hand, the contemporary principles of democracy, citizenship and popular sovereignty have endorsed the insertion of a number of groups who were previously treated as subjects and subordinates. On the other hand, new forms of exclusion based on ethnic or national criteria settled, largely taken the wrong way by the grand theories of modernity as a universalistic and classless model of society since belonging to a specific National or ethnic group determines the rights the modern State is supposed to warranty. Modern Nation-States according to Gellner are founded on the trinity of democracy, citizenship and National self-determination; which is not the case for the Sudan. Southerners did not feel belonging to the Sudanese Nation that was built and tailored by the Northern Elite. Consequently, Southerners were considered as less than citizens and with no democracy given. They fought for more than 17 years just for minimal rights, namely their cultural identity.

It is unquestionable that the colonial legacy has lingered at the root of the Sudanese conflict as we have discussed in the dissertation. The British colonizer first built barriers between different ethnic groups through its policy of closed districts and what is known as the Southern policy. Second, it gave birth to the new Elite that were not educated enough to rule the country. Third, they established the first linguistic policies and accentuated Northern and Southern overlapping cultural identities. They fourthly focused on Khartoum and the central region in contrast to other regions which have been enduring all sorts of marginalization since. Finally, they gave control to the Northern Elite, knowing the catastrophic future that the country will endure, and this was, according to Holsti (1996), done intentionally.

Historically speaking, “absolutist States” preceded “National ones” which created large circles of cultural, religious and ethnic consistency. In diverse communities where the ethnic

background has been more complex and usually the product of empires based on some sort of indirect rule and communal self-government, the lobbying of ethnicity resulted in a series of Nationalist wars. The latter were aimed at realizing the ideal Nation-State where sovereignty, community and Nation come together. Though National groups in the Sudan are undeniably attributed as ethnocentric groups, since each one of them is rather presumptuous about the authenticity of their Sudanese identity.

A people who feel culturally endangered by the hegemony of another culture will automatically revolt and defend their identity and sense of Nationhood. Forced assimilation, such as Arabization and Islamization, or the physical exclusion of those who have always been 'minorities' and are thus perceived as politically untrustworthy, encouraging dispersed co-Nationals living outside the country to turn back home. These are some of the decisions taken regarding Nation-State formation. In actual fact, what is known as ethnic cleansing or ethnocide, and is too often linked to 'troublesome Balkans' or in 'tribalistic Africa', has been the way of Nation building in several Modern Nation-States, a well-known example would be the United States of America, which was built on the bones of Native Americans.

To put it in a nutshell, the Nation building process in postcolonial Sudan was tainted with the spread of Pan-Arabism between 1950's and 1960's. There is a growing recognition that the Sudanese Elite, who were both the product of British Colonial legacy and Egyptian Arab Nationalist education, failed in designing a National Identity that would embrace the country's diversity. Therefore both internal and external factors caused civil wars in the Sudan and fueled their existence for such a long time, making of it the longest civil war in the world's history.

This dissertation did not tackle the causes of civil war per-se; it rather focused on the cultural aspects of this phenomenon. Although we cannot deny the economic and political

reasons behind the wars between several Sudanese groups, we tried to focus on the cultural causes and consequences of the overlapping relationship between national identity crisis and civil wars. Through interdisciplinary, historiography and qualitative methods we attempted to clarify the role of colonial residues, the Elite's opportunism and assimilationist policies in swaying the Sudanese National Identity, as well as in feeding crises and leading to destructive civil wars. As a result, a National identity that doesn't tolerate the groups' cultural identity will certainly fail, since cultural identity surpasses the importance of a National one for the majority.

The conflicts in the Sudan killed an undefined number of people in both camps, yet the majority were Southerners, estimated at 700.000. Conflicts continue in South Sudan Republic between rival ethnic groups, and in Darfur between the Janjaweed and the Darfuris. One may ask: will this country find peace one day? Will millions of displaced people find their way home without fear? Will this "political monster" find reconciliation with itself? Will the Sudanese accept the fact that their country is a diverse State? Only the future could answer these questions.

Appendix

1-Tables:

Table 1: The Sudan's Ethnic groups and tribes.

N	State	Capital city	Ethnic groups and tribes.
1	Khartoum	Khartoum	Arabs (74%) other Ethnic groups (26%) Arab-Muslims form the majority. African Muslims. Christians. Animists
2	Red Sea	Port The Sudan	Arabs- Beja- Beni Amer- Tejiri
3	Nile	Damer	Arabs
4	Northerner	Dengla	Arabs- Nubians
5	Kassala	Kassala	Arabs- Beja- Beni Amer- Tejiri – Anguesna
6	Gedaref	Gedaref	Arabs- Funj- other pastoralist groups
7	Blue Nile	Ed Damazin	Arabs- Funj- Felata- Watawit.
8	El Gezira	Medani	Arabs – Funj
9	Sennar	Singa	Arabs –Funj
10	White Nile	Kosti	Arabs
11	Northern Kordofan	El Obeid	Arabs
12	Southern Kordofan	Kadugli	Arabs (Red Messiria form the majority) Nuba (Nuba mountain) Dinka (N'gook)
13	Western Kordofan	Al Fula	Arabs (Kinana, Kawahla, Awlad Hmid, Messireya)- Nuba- Dinka (N'gook with its nine streams)
14	Northern Darfur	Al Fasher	Fur- Arab (Mahamid- Al Salamat)- Al Maalya- Beni Helba- Oum Djeloul- Zagawa- Felata- Abu Darg.
15	Southern Darfur	Nyala	Arabs (Zouraikaat)- Al Taaicha- Kababish- Hebania- Masserya- Fur- Tama-Mararit- Berti
16	Western Darfur	El Geneina	Arabs (Al Salamat- Mahamid - Taaicha- El Zouraikaat)- Fur- Zagawa- Massalit- Tanjer

Table 2: Ethnic groups and tribes spread in the South Sudanese Provinces.

N	Provinces	Capital	Ethnic groups and tribes
1	Upper Nile	Malakal	Nuer- Shulk- Dinka- Arabs and others

2	Jonglei	Bor	Nuer- Dinka- Shulk- Anuek- Baria and others
3	Unity	Bentiu	Shulk- Nuer- Dinka- Arabs and others
4	Warrap	Warrap	Dinka and others
5	Lakes	Rumbek	Dinka and others
6	Northern Bahr El Ghazal	Aweil	Dinka- Fertit- Arabs (Zeraikaat) and others
7	Western Bahr El Ghazal	Wau	Azande- Fertit- Dinka and others
8	Eastern Equatoria	Torit	Anuks- Ashuli- Turkana- Latuka- Baria- Topossa and others
9	Western Equatoria	Yambio	Baria- Azande- Didenja- Nmouli and others
10	Central Equatoria (Bahr El Jabal)	Juba	Baria- Didenja- Nmouli- Arabs and others

Table 3: Languages and numbers of speakers in the Sudan 1993[44]

Language	**Number of speakers**	**Percentage**
Arabic	13,191,340	51.1%
Dinka	2.740.900	10.6%
Beja	1.181.335	4.6%
Nuer	1.160.398	4.5%
Fur	663.913	2.6%
Zande	648.783	2.5%
Bari	418.920	1.6%
Masalit	406.310	1.6%
Fulfulde	392.100	1.5%
Koalib	386.713	1.5%
Toposa	306.375	1.2%
Hausa	295.775	1.1%
Lotuho (Latuka)	290.575	1.1%
Shilluk	236.565	0.9%

[44] Ibid p3

92 other The Sudanese languages	3.498.840	13.6%
Total 105	25,818,842	100%

1-4- **Table 3: Border languages**[45]

Neighboring Country	Language
Egypt	(Nile) Nubian, Arabic, Beja
Libya	Zaghawa, Arabic
Chad	Zaghawa, Arabic, Maba, Daju, Kanuri, Massalit, Tama, Daza, and others
CAR	Banda, Kara, Yulu, Sara and others
DRC (Congo)	Zande, Baka, Avokaya, and others
Uganda	Acholi, Alur, Madi, Kakwa, Kinubi and others
Kenya	Luo, Kinubi, Teso
Ethiopia	Murle, Nuer, Shilluk, Koma (Gumuz).
Eritrea	Beja, Tigre, Tigrinya and Arabic.

1-5- **Table 4: Shared languages**[46].

Language	Shared with
Fulfulde	Senegal, Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger Republic, Nigeria Cameroon and Chad
Hausa	Nigeria, Niger Republic, Ghana, Togo, etc.
Songhai	Mali, Niger Republic, Benin
Kanuri	Nigeria, Niger Republic, Chad

[45] Abu manga 2010 p.4
[46] Abu Manga 2010.

2-Maps:

Map 1: Colonial Africa in 1914[47].



[47] https://www.pinterest.com/source/exploringafrica.matrix.msu.edu/



Map 2: Ethno linguistic map of The Sudan.[48]

[48] Retrieved on 25/03/2015 at 19:01 from http://motuzikin.com

Map 3: Ethno-linguistic map of South Sudan Republic [49]



[49] ibid

List of the Sudanese Languages:

Sudan (80 living languages) :

1. Acheron (Achurun, Asheron, Aceron, Garme)
2. Afitti (Affitti, Dinik, Ditti, Uriatti)
3. Aka (Fa-C-Aka, Jebel Silak, Jebels Sillok, Sillok)
4. Ama (Inyimang, Nyima, Nyiman, Nyuwing)
5. Arabic, Standard (Arabe Standard)
6. Arabic, Sudanese Creole (Juba Arabic, Pidgin Arabic, Southern Sudan Arabic)
7. Arabic, Sudanese Spoken (Khartoum Arabic)
8. Bedawiyet (Bedauye, Bedawi, Bedawiye, Bedja, Beja, Tu-Bedawie)
9. Berta (Barta, "Beni Shangul", Burta, Wetawit)
10. Boguru (Buguru, Kogoro, Koguru)
11. Burun (Barun, Borun, Cai, Lange)
12. Dagik (Buram, Dagig, Dengebu, Masakin, Masakin Dagig, Masakin Gusar, Reikha, Thakik)
13. Dair (Dabab, Daer, Thamiyi)
14. Daju, Dar Fur (Beve, Daju, Daju Ferne, Fininga, Nyala-Lagowa)
15. Daju, Dar Sila (Bokor, Bokorike, Bokoruge, Mongo-Sila, Sila, Sula)
16. Dilling (Delen, Warkimbe)
17. Dinka, Northeastern (Padang, White Nile Dinka)
18. Dinka, Southwestern (Rek, Western Dinka)
19. Doman
20. El Hugeirat (El Hagarat)
21. English
22. Fulfulde, Adamawa (Fellata)
23. Fur (Dala, For, Fora, Fondungra, Forok, Forta, Furakang, Furawi, Kadirgi, Konjara, Korra, Kungara, Kurka, Lali, Onage, Yerge)
24. Gaam (Ingassana, Ingessana, Kamandi, Mamedja, Mamidza, Metabi, Muntabi, Tabi)
25. Ghulfan (Gulfan, Wuni, Wunombe)
26. Gula (Kara, Kara of Sudan, Yamegi)
27. Gumuz (Debatsa, Deguba, Dehenda, Gombo, Gumis, Mendeya, Shankillinya, Shanqilla)
28. Hausa
29. Heiban (Abul, Ebang)
30. Jumjum (Berin, Olga, Wadega)
31. Kadaru (Kadaro, Kadero, Kaderu, Kodhin, Kodhinniai, Kodoro)
32. Kanga
33. Kanuri, Central ("Beriberi", , Bomouans, Bornu, Kanouri, Kanoury, Kole, Sirata, Yerwa Kanuri)
34. Karko (Garko, Kithonimshe)
35. Katcha-Kadugli-Miri
36. Katla (Akalak, Kalak)
37. Keiga (Algang, Demik, Keiga-Al-Kheil, Keiga-Timero, Yega)
38. Kelo (Kelo-Beni Sheko, Ndu-Faa-Keelo, Tomasi)
39. Kenuzi-Dongola (Dongola-Kenuz, Dongolawi)
40. Ko (Fungor, Fungur, Kau)
41. Koalib (Abri, Kawalib, Kowalib, Lgalige, Ngirere, Rere)
42. Krongo (Dimodongo, Kadumodi, Korongo, Kurungu, Tabanya)
43. Kwama (Afan Mao, Amam, Gogwama, Goma, Gwama, Koma of Asosa, Nokanoka, North Koma, Twa Kwama, Takwama)
44. Lafofa
45. Laro (Aaleira, Laru, Ngwullaro, Yillaro)
46. Logol (Lukha)
47. Logorik (Ligun)
48. Lokoya (Elyria, Koyo, Loirya, Lokoiya, Lokoja, Loquia, Lowoi, Oirya, Owoi, Oxoniok)
49. Lumun (Kuku-Lumun, Lomon)
50. Mabaan (Barga, Gura, Maaban, Meban, Southern Burun, Tonko, Tungan, Ulu)
51. Masalit (Jwisince, Kaana Masala, Massalit)
52. Midob (Meidob, Midobi, Td, Tid-N-Aal, Tidda)
53. Molo (Malkan)
54. Moro (Dhimorong)

Southern Sudan (71 living languages) :

1. Acholi (Acoli, Acooli, Akoli, Atscholi, Dok Acoli, Gang, Log Acoli, Luo, Shuli)
2. Aja (Adja, Alja)
3. Anuak (Anyuak, Anywa, Anywak, Dho Anywaa, Jambo, Nuro, Yambo)
4. Arabic, Sudanese Creole (Juba Arabic, Pidgin Arabic, Southern Sudan Arabic)
5. Avokaya (Abukeia, Avukaya)
6. Bai (Ban)
7. Baka (Tara Baka)
8. Banda, Mid-Southern
9. Banda, Togbo-Vara
10. Banda, West Central (Golo)
11. Banda-Banda
12. Banda-Nbrès (Banda of Nbrès, Banda-Nbre)
13. Banda-Ndélé (Banda of Ndélé, Nyele)
14. Bari (Beri)
15. Belanda Bor (De Bor)
16. Belanda Viri (Belanda, Biri, BGamba, Gumba, Mbegumba, Mvegumba)
17. Beli (Beli, Behli, Baili, Jur Beli)
18. Bongo (Bungu, Dor)
19. Burun (Barun, Borun, Cai, Lange)
20. Daasanach (Daasanech, Dama, Dasenech, Dathanaic, Dathanaik, Dathanik, Gallab, Galuba, Gelab, Geleb, Geleba, Gelebinya, Gelubba, Ghelebe, Marille, Merile, Merille, Reshiat, Russian Federation, "Shangilla")
21. Didinga (Di'dinga, Lango, Toi, Xaroxa)
22. Dinka
23. Dinka, Northeastern (Padang, White Nile Dinka)
24. Dinka, Northwestern
25. Dinka, South Central (Agar, Central Dinka)
26. Dinka, Southeastern (Bor, Eastern Dinka)
27. Dinka, Southwestern (Rek, Western Dinka)
28. Dongotono
29. English
30. Feroge (Feroghe, Ferroge, Kaliga, Kaligi, Kalike, Kaliki)
31. Gbaya (Kpala, Kpara, Kparla, Kredj, Kreich, Kreish, Kresh)
32. Indri (Yandenika, Yandrinka)
33. Jumjum (Berin, Olga, Wadega)
34. Jur Modo (Jur, Modo)
35. Kacipo-Balesi
36. Kakwa (Bari Kakwa, Kakua, Kakwak, Kwakwak)
37. Karamojong (Kanmojong, Kanmonjong)
38. Keiko (Kaliko)
39. Komo (Central Koma, Como, Gokwom, Hayahaya, Koma of Daga, Madin)
40. Kwama (Afan Mao, Amam, Gogwama, Goma, Gwama, Koma of Asosa, Nokanoka, North Koma, Twa Kwama, Takwama)
41. Lango (Langgo)
42. Lopit (Lafit, Lafft, Lafite, Loft, Lopid, Loppit)
43. Luwo (Dhe Luwo, Dhe Luwo, Giur, Jo Luo, Jur Luo, Jur Luwo, Luo)
44. Ma'di (Ma'adi, Ma'di)
45. Mabaan (Barga, Gura, Maaban, Meban, Southern Burun, Tonko, Tungan, Ulu)
46. Mandari (Chir, Kir, Mondari, Mundari, Shir)
47. Mangayat (Buga, Mangaya, Mongayat)
48. Massalit (Jwisince, Kaana Masala, Massalit)
49. Moda (Gbara, Gberi, Gweri, Muda)
50. Morokodo (Ma'di)
51. Moru (Kala Moru)
52. Mundu (Mondo, Mondu, Mountou, Mundo)

52. Midob (Meidob, Midobi, Tid, Tid-N-Aal, Tidda)
53. Molo (Malkan)
54. Moro (Dhimorong)
55. Ngile (Daloka, Darra, Masakin, Mesakin, Taloka)
56. Nobiin (Fiadidja-Mahas, Mahas-Fiadidja, Mahas-Fiyadikkya)
57. Olu'bo (Lolubo, Luluba, Lulubo, Olubogo, Oluboti, Ondoe)
58. Otoro (Dhitoro, Kawama, Kawarma, Litoro, Utoro)
59. Shatt (Caning)
60. Shilluk (Chulla, Colo, Dhocolo, Shulla)
61. Shwai (Ludumor, Shirumba, Shuway)
62. Sinyar (Shemya, Sinya)
63. Tagoi (Tagoy)
64. Talodi (Ajomang, Gajomang, Jomang)
65. Tama
66. Tegali (Tagale, Tegele, Tekele, Togole)
67. Temein (Rone, Ronge, Temainian)
68. Tese (Keiga Girru, Keiga Jirru, Teis-Umm-Danab)
69. Tigré (Khasa, Xasa)
70. Tima (Lomorik, Lomuriki, Tamanik, Yibwa)
71. Tingal (Kajaja, Kajakja)
72. Tira (Lithiro, Thiro, Tiro)
73. Tocho (Tacho, Toicho)
74. Tulishi (Kuntulishi, Thulishi, Tulesh)
75. Tumtum
76. Uduk (Burun, Kebeirka, Korara, Kumus, Kwanim Pa, Othan, Twampa)
77. Wali (Walari, Walarishe)
78. Warnang (Werni)
79. Yulu (Youlou)
80. Zaghawa (Beri, Beri-Aa, Berri, Kebadi, Kuyuk, Merida, Soghaua, Zagaoua, Zagawa, Zauge, Zeggaoua, Zeghawa, Zorhaua)

Extinct languages :

1. Baygo (Baigo, Bego, Beigo, Beko, Béogé, Beygo)
2. Berti
3. Birked (Birgid, Birguid, Birkit, Birqed, Kajjara, Murgi)
4. Gule (Anej, Fecakomodiyo, Hamej)
5. Homa
6. Mittu
7. Nding (Eliri)
8. Togoyo (Togoy)
9. Torona
50. Morokodo (Ma'di)
51. Moru (Kala Moru)
52. Mündü (Mondo, Mondu, Mountou, Mundo)
53. Murle (Adkibba, Agiba, Ajibba, Beir, Merule, Mourle, Murelei, Murule)
54. Narim (Lariim, Larim, Lariminit, Larimo, Longarim, Nariim)
55. Ndogo
56. Njalgulgule (Bege, Begi, Beko, Ngulgule, Njangulgule, Nyolge, Nyoolne)
57. Nuer (Naadh)
58. Nyamusa-Molo
59. Olu'bo (Lolubo, Luluba, Lulubo, Olubogo, Oluboti, Ondoe)
60. Opuuo (Ansita, Cita, Cita, Kina, Kwina, "Langa" , Opo, Opo-Shita, Opuo, Shita, Shitta)
61. Otuho (Latooka, Lattuka, Latuka, Latuko, Lotuho, Lotuka, Lotuko, Lotuxo, Olotorit, Otuxo)
62. Päri ("Lokoro")
63. Reel (Atwot, Thok Cieng Reel)
64. Suri (Surma)
65. Tennet (Tenet)
66. Thuri (Dhe Thuri, Jo Thuri, Shatt, Wada Thuri)
67. Toposa (Akara, Kare, Kumi, Taposa, Topotha)
68. Turkana
69. Uduk (Burun, Kebeirka, Korara, Kumus, Kwanim Pa, Othan, Twampa)
70. Yulu (Youlou)
71. Zande (Azande, Badjande, Pazande, Sande, Zandi)



Map 4: Ethnic groups in South Sudan Republic [50]

[50] Retrieved from http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4bea5d622.pdf .



Map 5: Ethnic distribution in both Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan

Map 6: Regional division of the Sudan [51]

[51] Ibid

Map 7: Regions and provinces of The Sudan[52]

[52] http://sudanreeves.org/2014/09/10/ethniclinguistic-map-of-sudan-and-south-sudan/



Map 8: Regions and provinces of South Sudan Republic[53]

[53] ibid

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الملخص:

تتمحور هذه الدراسة حول الصّراع الحالي على الهوية الوطنية في السّودان_ قبل التقسيم_ بين دعاة القومية الإسلامية في الشّمال و الإفريقيين دعاة العلمانية في الجنوب. وتسلّط هذه الدّراسة الضّوء على دور الرّواسب الاستعمارية في توسيع الهوّة بين الفرق الإثنيّة، ودور السّياسات الإدماجية التي وضعتها النّخبة الحاكمة في تأجيج الحروب الأهلية في المنطقة، والتي أدّت في الأخير إلى تقسيم الدّولة بالإضافة إلى النّزاعات المسلّحة في فترة ما بعد الانقسام. وقد اعتمدت النخبة الحاكمة في الشّمال دستورا قوميا مبنيّا على قوانين الشّريعة الإسلامية مع إعلان اللّغة العربيّة لغة رسمية وطنية بحجّة أنّ النّموذج المتشابك للهوية الثقافية العربية الإسلامية يسرع في عملية دمج التنوعات العرقية والدينية في السودان وقولبتها في هوية وطنية متجانسة محدّدّين السودان كدولة عربية مسلمة. من جهة أخرى طلب الجنوبيون اعتماد القوانين العلمانية لتكافؤ الفرص بين جميع اللغات الإفريقية إضافة للعربية والإنجليزية، وخاصة المطالبة بالحرية الدينية وذلك لأن اعتماد القوانين الإسلامية والعربية برأيهم يميز بين المواطنين من حيث الدين والعرق. اعتمدت حكومة الخرطوم سياسات التعريب والأسلمة منذ فجر الاستقلال، ممّا جعلها تفشل في إدارة التنوع في السودان في محاولة منها لتوحيدها وبناء الدولة القومية. فلجأ المسلمون غير العرب والأفارقة غير المسلمين إلى العنف كردة فعل على السياسات المتبعة، باعتباره نموذجا بديلا عن المقاومة مسبّبة كارثة إنسانية في هذه المنطقة. اعتمدنا في هذا البحث على منهج متعدد التخصّصات، لأنّه يتناول ظاهرة الحرب الأهلية وأزمة الهوية الوطنية من منظور اجتماعي ولغوي وأنثروبولوجي وسياسي وثقافي. بالإضافة إلى استخدام التاريخانية، اعتمادا على النموذج التفسيري ، من أجل فهم الخلفية التاريخية للأزمة السودانية. اختلفت المصادر الأولية والثانوية المعتمدة بين المحفوظات والكتب وكذلك المواد التي سيتم ذكرها في مراجعة الانتاج الفكري. كما تشير نتائج الدراسة إلى أن انتهازية النخب في كل مجموعة استفادت من الغيرية والكراهية التاريخية المتأصّلة بين الفرق العرقية وذلك للوصول لمآرب سياسية واقتصادية خاصة. إلّا أن سياسات التعريب والأسلمة المعتمدة من قبل حكومة الشمال فشلت في

بناء أمة موحدة، ممّا نتج عنه أطول الحروب الأهلية في التاريخ. في يناير 2011 انفصل الجنوبيون عن الشمال أخيرا ب 99.68٪ من الأصوات لصالح الانفصال في استفتاء جنوب السودان، والذي نتج عنه دولة جديدة "جمهورية جنوب السودان". بيد أنّ النزاعات حول المناطق الغنية بالنفط على الحدود الدولية المنشأة حديثا لا تزال ثائرة بين البلدين. والمثير للدهشة أن الصراعات المسلحة بدأت في جمهورية جنوب السودان الوليدة، كذلك بسبب سباق النخبة على السلطة وقضايا التنوع العرقي والعصبية القبلية والتنافس بين النوير والدينكا.