

The stakes of the Great Algerian Liberation Revolution(1954-1962)

رهانات الثورة التحريرية الجزائرية الكبرى (1962-1954)

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تاريخ النشر: 2025/06/ 04

تاريخ القبول: 2025/05/ 22

تاريخ الاستلام: 2025/03/ 29

Abstract:

This article is concerned with examining the challenges that the Algerian revolution sought to achieve and reach in the period extending from 1954 to 1962, through its documents and texts, foremost among which is the statement of November 1, 1954 and the Platform of the Soummam Congress of August 20, 1956, and the remaining decisions taken during the conferences held by the National Council of the Algerian Revolution or the military leadership.

There is no doubt that the ambition of the revolution was great in view of its limited military capabilities, so its stakes were great, with its spread and expansion popularly and geographically, and due to the tight organization, unwavering determination and steadfastness that foiled the enemy's plans. As a result, the leadership of the revolution succeeded in internationalizing the Algerian issue and removing the Algerian question from the French sphere, and succeeded in penetrating the United Nations, despite the colonial maneuvers and pressures and temptations that it exercised on countries.

The Algerian revolution is unique among world revolutions in its ability to carry out operations inside enemy territory, its ability to neutralize opposing movements, and its success in recruiting Algerian workers to support the war effort. These are bets that forced the occupation to sit at the negotiating table with those it considered outlaws.

The revolution's achievement of these political and military stakes enabled it to draw the enemy into the fire of civil war, so that what was called "French Algeria" was not transformed into a solution, but rather into a problem that threatened the French state with the return of fascism. Perhaps the fascist right-wing organizations that were formed in Algeria, such as the French Algeria Front and the Secret Army Organization (OAS), were indicators of this. In this article, I will

answer a major question: What are the most prominent challenges of the Algerian revolution? How did the revolution embody these stakes?

Keywords: Algerian Revolution; Bets Challenges; internationalization; Take the battle to enemy territory; November 1, 1954 Declaration platform of the Soummam congress.

الملخص: يعنى هذا المقال ببحث الرهانات التي سعت الثورة الجزائرية الى تحقيقها و الوصول اليها في الفترة الممتدة بين (1954- 1962) وذلك من خلال وثاقها و نصوصها و في صدارتها بيان أول نوفمبر 1954 ومقررات مؤتمر الصومام 20 اوت 1956 و بقية القرارات التي اتخذت خلال المؤتمرات التي عقدها المجلس الوطني للثورة الجزائرية او القيادات العسكرية .

ودون شك أن طموح الثورة كان كبيرا بالنظر الى ضآلة إمكانياتها العسكرية ، لذلك عظمت رهاناتها ، بانتشارها و تمددها شعبيا و جغرافيا ، و بفعل التنظيم المحكم و العزيمة التي لا تغل و الثبات الذي افشل مخططات العدو . كنتيجة لذلك نجحت قيادة الثورة في تدويل القضية الجزائرية و أخرجت المسألة الجزائرية من النطاق الفرنسي، و نجحت في اختراق الهيئة الأممية ،برغم المناورات الاستعمارية و الضغوط والإغراءات التي مارسها على الدول.

وتتفرد الثورة الجزائرية بين ثورات العالم بميزة و خاصية نقل العمليات داخل تراب العدو و تمكنها من تحييد الحركات المناوئة و نجاحها في تجنيد العمال الجزائريين في دعم المجهود الحربي ، و هي رهانات أجبرت الاحتلال على الجلوس الى طاولة المفاوضات مع من كان يعتبرهم خارجين عن القانون.

ويمكن بلوغ الثورة هذه الرهانات السياسية و العسكرية من ادخال العدو اتون الحرب الاهلية لتتحول ما يسمى بـ"الجزائر فرنسية " ليس إلى حل وإنما كمشكل يهدد الدولة الفرنسية بعودة الفاشية ، ولعل التنظيمات اليمينية الفاشية، التي تشكلت في الجزائر مثل جبهة الجزائر فرنسية و منظمة الجيش السري OAS كانت من مؤشرات ذلك . سأجيب من خلال هذا المقال عن اشكال رئيس : ما هي ابرز رهانات الثورة الجزائرية ؟ وإلى أي مدى بلغتها وجسدتها الثورة الجزائرية ؟

الكلمات المفتاحية: الثورة الجزائرية؛ التحديات و الرهانات؛ تدويل؛ نقل المعركة إلى أرض العدو؛ إعلان 1 نوفمبر 1954، انعقاد مؤتمر الصومام.

INTRODUCTION:

The Algerian Revolution articulated its objectives through various documents, beginning with the November 1, 1954 declaration, proceeding through the decisions of the Soummam Congress on August 20, 1956, and culminating in the program of the Second Tripoli Conference. These objectives can be categorized into internal and external dimensions, as well as military and political aspects. Furthermore, they can be delineated into pre-liberation and post-liberation goals, or into short-term, medium-term, and long-term aims.

These objectives reflect the strategic vision of the historical leaders, who explicitly defined their goals and the means to achieve them. They also described the nature of the governmental system that would prevail in Algeria after the end of colonial rule.⁽¹⁾

The central question is: What were the most prominent objectives of the Algerian Revolution on internal and external levels? Did these objectives evolve with the development and expansion of the revolution, or did they remain constant from the moment the revolutionary project was announced?

1. The Evolution of the Revolution's Stakes on the Internal Front

At its inception, the Algerian Revolution was perceived by both centralists and conservatives as a high-risk or even suicidal endeavor. However, the revolutionaries who orchestrated its commencement were acutely aware of the formidable challenges ahead, acknowledging that the struggle would be prolonged yet ultimately victorious.⁽²⁾ For them, this period epitomized resilience and defiance.⁽³⁾

What initially seemed an unattainable dream transformed into a palpable reality through the new circumstances imposed by the Algerian Revolution. From this historical juncture, the revolution dictated actions, rendering the occupying forces' responses merely reactive. As the revolution's influence spread and its activities intensified, its objectives correspondingly expanded. These objectives can be delineated as follows:

1.1. Strategic Timing in Initiating the Revolutionary Movement

The revolution's architects emphasized the urgency of declaring the revolution, despite its numerous challenges. It was imperative to capitalize on the global context, notably the French military's defeat at Dien Bien Phu and their subsequent withdrawal from Indochina. Seizing this moment was crucial; any delay could have resulted in the French colonial regime consolidating its forces, directing undivided attention to suppressing the Algerian uprising, and potentially relegating the Algerian cause to obscurity. ⁽⁴⁾

1.2. Overcoming Psychological Barriers and Securing Popular Support for the Revolution:

The genocidal acts perpetrated by the French 19th Army Corps in May 1945, notably in Sétif and Guelma, aimed not only to suppress the national movement and terrorize the Algerian populace but also to eradicate any aspirations for freedom among Algerians.

In this context, the initial revolutionary leaders faced the daunting task of finding an alternative to the charismatic leader Messali El-Hajj from within the ranks of the national movement to lead the revolution. The collective memory of the Algerian people was scarred by the atrocities of 1945, making it challenging to invoke these events in the November 1, 1954 proclamation. The primary objective of this proclamation was to galvanize popular support for the liberation struggle, encouraging the populace to join and organize within its political, administrative, and military structures. Ultimately, it was the people who would judge the success or failure of this endeavor. Consequently, the November 1, 1954 statement deliberately omitted references to the May 1945 massacres, even though these events had reinforced the conviction that the colonial system was incapable of reform and underscored the necessity of revolutionary action.

The Algerian people were the primary stakeholders in the revolution, a sentiment expressed by the historical leaders in the November 1, 1954 document, which directly addressed the populace: "O Algerian people... you are the ones who will issue your judgment regarding us. ⁽⁵⁾ " The people's

contributions were vital in compensating for the revolution's technical shortcomings compared to the colonial forces, which held superiority in various domains. The populace served as the source of supplies, intelligence, and an unending pool of recruits. ⁽⁶⁾

Recognizing the critical role of the people in this existential conflict, the colonial army endeavored to alienate them from the revolution through economic initiatives, psychological warfare, the establishment of forbidden zones, and internment camps. A fierce competition ensued between the Algerian revolutionaries and the occupiers to win the allegiance of the Algerian people; the side that secured popular support would ultimately prevail. Documents from the liberation struggle highlight the importance of maintaining close ties with the populace and emphasize the necessity of justly punishing anyone who violated this relationship or whose recklessness could be exploited by special administrative factions to arm the people against the revolution. ⁽⁷⁾

1.3. Absorbing the Colonial Forces' Reaction to the Initial Revolutionary Operations:

The initial directives for the units executing the operations of November 1st, emphasized the establishment of secure refuges. These sanctuaries were intended to mitigate the anticipated retaliatory measures of the colonial forces, ensuring the resilience of revolutionary networks during the critical inception phase. The French military, upon analyzing the November 1 operations—including the number of insurgents, the weaponry employed, and the intensity of specific hotspots—endeavored to swiftly contain the burgeoning insurgency. The revolution faced formidable challenges during this juncture, which were surmounted through pivotal events such as the August 20, 1955, offensive in the Second Wilaya and the remarkable resilience demonstrated during the Battle of El Djorf in late September of the same year.

1.4. Arming the Revolution:

At its inception, the Algerian Revolution grappled with significant armament challenges. The National Liberation Front (FLN) initiated their struggle using leftover World War II weaponry, including Italian Statti rifles, French Mosquetons, German Mausers, hunting rifles, and improvised explosives. This limited arsenal underscored the revolution's material deficiencies, prompting colonial authorities to attempt to suppress the uprising in its infancy.

Early efforts to procure arms from Morocco proved unsuccessful, resulting in limited operations in the fifth region. ⁽⁸⁾ In the Aurès region, a critical area of resistance, Commander Mustafa Ben Boulaïd was dispatched to the Tunisian border to secure weapons, but he was apprehended during the mission.

The revolution's initial operations on November 1, 1954, comprising approximately seventy actions against colonial forces and settler interests, resulted in eight fatalities, four injuries, and some material damage. This outcome highlighted the revolutionaries' lack of resources, despite their courage and determination. Consequently, the FLN leadership advised avoiding direct confrontations, focusing instead on quick ambushes to seize enemy weapons. Ali Kafi, a prominent figure in the revolution, noted, "There was a race between us and the occupation forces in the process of collecting weapons from the Algerians, and we were always ahead of them." ⁽⁹⁾

The scarcity of arms hindered recruitment efforts, with instances of Mujahideen being martyred without ever having wielded a weapon. ⁽¹⁰⁾

This challenge persisted until the ceasefire in March 1962. While arms shipments were attempted across the Mediterranean Sea, the French navy's vigilance severely restricted this route. Recognizing that land borders with Tunisia and Morocco remained primary conduits for arms into Algeria, the French military, under General André Morice in 1957, initiated the construction of electrified and mined barriers, known as the Morice Line, to seal these borders.

This border closure strategy led to increased casualties among the revolutionaries and disrupted the flow of weapons and ammunition. Colonel

Omran, head of the Armament and Supply Directorate, reported on July 8, 1958, that 6,000 fighters had been martyred in just two months in the area of Bouchakouf .⁽¹¹⁾

In their quest for arms, the FLN sought assistance from neighboring countries. Libya, under Prime Minister Mustafa Ben Halim, provided access to border airstrips in "Talut" and south of Fezzan. These locations were intended for use by "Dakota" aircraft to transport weapons into Algerian territory. Additionally, the FLN trained pilots in Syria and Egypt, and some received helicopter training in the Soviet Union. However, as negotiations progressed and a ceasefire approached, these aerial supply efforts were not fully realized.⁽¹²⁾

1.5. Expanding the Revolution Nationally and Establishing Control

The architects of the Algerian Revolution drew lessons from earlier fragmented resistances, which lacked unified national leadership and coordination. They recognized that for the revolution to succeed, it needed to transcend regional confines and achieve nationwide participation. Initially, the revolution's activities were concentrated in specific areas, notably the Aurès region, which experienced intense revolutionary operations. In response, the French colonial administration deployed substantial military forces to these hotspots, aiming to suppress the burgeoning insurgency.

Despite facing significant challenges during this nascent phase, the revolutionaries demonstrated remarkable resilience. A pivotal moment was the Battle of El Djorf in the autumn of 1955, where revolutionary forces showcased extraordinary steadfastness, dispelling notions that their endeavor was a futile or suicidal mission.⁽¹³⁾

The revolution's strategy of nationwide expansion proved successful over time. After overcoming initial hurdles, revolutionary activities spread from the Aurès to other regions: reaching Djurdjura in March 1955, extending to northern Constantine in September 1955, and advancing into the Oran region by April 1956. By late November 1956, the revolution had

permeated the entire national territory.⁽¹⁴⁾ Notably, in November 1957, revolutionary forces began targeting colonial petroleum interests in the Great Western Erg region, signaling a significant escalation in their operations.⁽¹⁵⁾

1.7. Unifying National Movements and Neutralizing Opposing Factions

From its inception, the leadership of the Algerian Revolution aimed to consolidate various nationalist movements into a singular front, urging all factions to join the liberation struggle under the FLN and its military wing, the National Liberation Army (ALN), setting aside ideological differences. This unity was crucial for presenting a cohesive resistance against colonial forces.

However, not all nationalist leaders aligned with this vision. Notably, Messali El-Hadj, a prominent figure in the Algerian nationalist movement, declined to support the FLN. Instead, in December 1954, he established the Algerian National Movement (MNA), which opposed the FLN both domestically and internationally. This schism led to violent confrontations between the FLN and MNA, resulting in significant casualties among Algerians in both Algeria and France.

In addition to internal nationalist disputes, the revolution faced challenges from *Harki* groups recruited by colonial authorities aiming to fragment and weaken the liberation efforts. These included *Kobus* and factions led by figures such as Bachaga Boualem and Sherif Ben Saidi in the fourth and sixth wilayas (provinces). The FLN confronted these counter-revolutionary organizations with determination, ultimately diminishing their influence. This steadfastness compelled the colonial regime to acknowledge the FLN as the sole legitimate representative of the Algerian people, solidifying its leadership in the struggle for independence.⁽¹⁶⁾

1.8. Forcing the Enemy to Recognize the National Liberation Front as the Sole and Legitimate Representative of the Algerian People:

At the onset of the liberation revolution, its early leaders extended an honorable offer to the colonial authorities, aiming to prevent bloodshed and expedite the resolution of the Algerian people's aspirations for freedom.

However, the colonial regime dismissed this proposal, relying on its substantial resources to suppress the revolution in its infancy. This confidence was reflected in the significant escalation of French military presence in Algeria between 1954 and 1960.⁽¹⁷⁾

Despite the formidable military campaigns and strategies employed by France, the Algerian revolution demonstrated remarkable resilience. This steadfastness contributed to the fall of several governments within the French Fourth Republic, culminating in the events of May 13, 1958, when both civilian and military factions precipitated a crisis. Subsequently, General de Gaulle assumed power and intensified efforts to quell the revolution using all available means.

Although the National Liberation Army (ALN) began the revolution with military operations, it masterfully concluded the battle against Colonial France with powerful popular uprisings both within Algeria and on French soil. Notable demonstrations, such as those on December 11, 1960, and October 17, 1961, underscored the deep connection between the Algerian populace and the liberation movement. These mass mobilizations compelled the colonial authorities to acknowledge the strength and endurance of the revolution, leading to the recognition of the FLN as the legitimate representative of the Algerian people. This acknowledgment marked a significant shift from earlier dismissals, as the French government realized that prolonging the Algerian conflict risked igniting a civil war within France itself.

General de Gaulle came to a decisive realization following the mass demonstrations of December 11, 1960: despite enduring immense suffering and systematic torture, the Algerian people remained steadfast in their support for the FLN. Their resilience proved that no amount of repression could break their will or force them into submission.

In March 1961, Pierre Joxe, the official in charge of Algerian affairs, attempted to undermine the FLN's legitimacy by advocating for a "Round Table" approach in an interview with *La Dépêche d'Oran*. In response, the FLN refused to participate in the first Evian negotiations, rejecting any

attempt to dilute its status as the sole representative of the Algerian cause. By that time, alternative nationalist factions, such as the *Missalist* movement, had lost all significant presence and influence on the ground.

France, desperate to end the conflict, sought to negotiate a truce before entering formal peace talks. De Gaulle even used the metaphor of “putting the knives back in the kitchen” to suggest an end to hostilities. However, the FLN firmly rejected these preconditions, recognizing them as mere tactics of manipulation and deceit.

The situation took a dramatic turn with the growing threat of civil war within France itself, as fascist elements became increasingly radicalized. The demonstrations of October 17, 1961, further solidified de Gaulle’s recognition that the FLN was the sole and uncontested representative of the Algerian people. Determined to accelerate the peace process, he initiated new rounds of negotiations, beginning with meetings in Lucerne and Neuchâtel in late October 1961, followed by the second Evian talks between February and March 18, 1962. These negotiations addressed crucial issues, including the status of the European minority in Algeria, economic relations, and military arrangements.

Ultimately, the Algerian revolution succeeded in securing all its strategic objectives. The FLN forced the colonial power to recognize its legitimacy, compelling France to abandon its dismissive rhetoric. The French authorities, who once referred to the FLN and its fighters as mere *fellagha* (bandits) and outlaws, were now forced to acknowledge them as equal counterparts at the negotiating table. From the outset, the FLN had extended an offer of peace to prevent further bloodshed, and in the end, the enemy had no choice but to accept this reality.

2. 1. Internationalizing the Algerian issue:

The internationalization of the Algerian issue was a pivotal strategy in the country's struggle for independence. At the onset of the revolution, the FLN sought to elevate the Algerian cause onto the global stage, countering France's portrayal of Algeria as an integral part of its territory. By broadcasting their declaration from Cairo, the FLN aimed to garner diplomatic support, particularly from Arab and Muslim nations. This effort

bore fruit at the Bandung Conference in April 1955, where the FLN received international recognition.

French aggressive actions inadvertently furthered this internationalization. Notably, the hijacking of the Algerian delegation's plane on October 22, 1956, the French forces' bombing of the Tunisian village of Sakiet Sidi Youssef on February 8, 1958, and the tripartite aggression on Egypt on October 1956, drew widespread international condemnation. Such actions highlighted the regional implications of the conflict and swayed global opinion against French colonial policies.

A significant milestone in this diplomatic endeavor was the establishment of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA) on September 19, 1958. Led initially by Ferhat Abbas, the GPRA functioned as the FLN's government-in-exile. This governmental body played a crucial role in lobbying for international support and challenging France's narrative on the global stage. ⁽¹⁸⁾

2.2. Unifying the Struggle Across North Africa:

The Algerian national movement, since the establishment of the Bureau of the Arab Maghreb Liberation and the efforts of figures like Abdelkrim al-Khattabi, aspired to a unified front across North Africa to collectively challenge French colonial rule. However, this unity remained elusive, with each country—Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco—pursuing its own path to independence¹⁹. French colonial authorities sought to prevent the convergence of these liberation movements by engaging in separate negotiations with Tunisian and Moroccan leaders, aiming to isolate the Algerian revolution. ⁽²⁰⁾

Despite the aspirations expressed at Tangier, the envisioned unity did not materialize as hoped. French colonial authorities succeeded in isolating the Algerian revolution by negotiating separately with Tunisian and Moroccan leaders, leading to the transfer of French forces from Tunisia and Morocco to Algeria and the reinforcement of border defenses. The Tangier Conference, held from April 27 to 29, 1958, symbolized a collective desire for Maghreb unity. However, it also represented an attempt by President

Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia and the Moroccan Monarchy to capitalize on the Algerian revolution and the Maghrebi people's aspirations for independence to pressure French President Charles de Gaulle for concessions. This underlying agenda did not go unnoticed by the leadership of the Algerian revolution. ⁽²¹⁾

2. 3. Transferring the Battle onto Enemy Territory:

Maurice Papon, the Prefect of the Paris Police, emphasized this strategy in the fifth chapter of his book "Les Chevaux du Pouvoir, ⁽²²⁾ " under the section titled "The Battle of Paris: Attack Plan—Stakes and Means." He wrote: "The Liberation Front aims to dismantle the Algerian National Movement, weaken the police, and undermine the stability of France. The stakes are high for the Liberation Front organization. The strategic objective is twofold: firstly, to gain complete control over Algerian immigrants... and secondly, to exert direct or indirect pressure on the colonial regime or colonial forces. The FLN then exploits the facts of the military confrontation to achieve the best conditions in negotiations, aiming to force the Paris government into actual or disguised surrender by sowing terror, in the hope of undermining the moral and psychological resistance of the French people in their homeland, gradually coercing public authorities into submission." This 'second front strategy' was developed by the rebellion leaders and implemented on the ground by the Federation of the Liberation Front. These political objectives guide and direct several tactical actions:

- a. The complete elimination of the *Messalist* movement and exclusive control over Algerian immigrants in France.
- b. Securing financial resources from Algerian immigrants to fund the war in Algeria and France.
- c. "Utilizing urban warfare to serve the revolutionary war by imposing the presence of *Fidaiyeen* on French metropolitan soil, disrupting the tranquility of the capital, Paris, and asserting itself as an armed and organized movement. To achieve these objectives, the Liberation Front had to possess significant strength, not merely in numbers, but through effective organization on the ground. Since November 1,

1954, the Liberation Front has continuously developed a secret organization in Algeria, later expanding it to the metropolis by relying on Algerian immigrants. Thus, the Federation of the Liberation Front was established in France, becoming the most robust organization developed by the rebellion.”⁽²³⁾

- d. “The Federation of the Liberation Front has a dual structure: a political-administrative organization and a paramilitary organization. The former aims to organize Algerian immigrants within trade unions, student organizations, and other associations, severing their ties with the French administration and the communist movement, while collecting monthly subscriptions to support the revolutionary effort. The paramilitary organization, on the other hand, executes the directives of the political leadership.”⁽²⁴⁾

2. 4. Winning Over Liberals and Leftists Within Enemy Territory:

The Algerians possessed a deep understanding of French political dynamics and the ideological struggles among its parties and movements. This awareness had developed since the early days of colonial rule and was further refined through the growth of Algerian migration to France. As a result, they were well-acquainted with the stances of both the right and the left on Algerian affairs.

Leveraging this knowledge, Algerians engaged with politicians, parliamentarians, and intellectuals to raise awareness of their plight and petition for support against the entrenched colonial system. With the outbreak of the liberation revolution, mere sympathy was no longer sufficient—the revolution required active allies. Consequently, contact was established with intellectuals who upheld the ideals of the French Revolution, adhered to communist principles, or were affiliated with the Catholic Church.

The revolution’s bet on securing support from these ideological circles proved successful. Many individuals were drawn to the cause, recognizing that the actions of the French army in Algeria and within France itself contradicted both the principles of the French Revolution and the teachings

of Jesus Christ. Notable figures in this movement included Fernand Iveton, executed in 1956 after declaring, "I will die, but Algeria will be independent." Others included Maurice Audin, assassinated by General Bigeard's paratroopers; Sergeant Maillot, who supplied arms to the revolution before being killed in the High Atlas Mountains in 1957; as well as Annie Steiner, Francis Jeanson, Robert Barrat, and members of the Jeanson Network. Additionally, the revolution garnered support from renowned intellectuals such as Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Félix Colozzi, Pierre Chaulet and his wife, ⁽²⁵⁾ and journalist Jacques Vergès. Beyond France, the revolution also attracted allies from Germany, Argentina, and other nations, who contributed in various capacities.

2. 5. Forcing the Enemy into Civil War:

The rapid expansion of the Algerian revolution—both geographically and in terms of popular support—forced the colonial administration to increase its military presence and escalate expenditures. However, despite these reinforcements, the resilience of the revolution thwarted all military strategies and so-called "pacification" efforts. Consequently, seven successive governments failed miserably in their attempts to suppress the uprising, ultimately leading to the collapse of the Fourth French Republic, which was already in its death throes. The fascist coup of May 13, 1958, delivered the final blow to a republic accused of incompetence in containing the Algerian revolution. ⁽²⁶⁾

The newly established Fifth Republic, under General de Gaulle, employed every possible means to crush the revolution and subdue the Algerian people. Economic development projects and psychological warfare were deployed alongside military operations, most notably the Challe Plan, launched on February 6, 1959. However, even this large-scale counterinsurgency effort failed to eradicate the National Liberation Army. By September 19, 1959, General de Gaulle had introduced the term "self-determination" as one of three possible solutions to the conflict. This prompted Colonel *Argoud* to remark: "Nine months after the launch of the Challe Plan, the man was already half-convinced of its failure because he did not understand the nature of the war or the nature of the enemy,

believing that eliminating the rebellion was merely a technical matter.”⁽²⁷⁾

The frustration of the fascist elements in Algeria culminated in violent uprisings. In January 1960, their defiance of de Gaulle's authority escalated into street blockades, and paramilitary factions opened fire on French gendarmes, killing around twenty officers. This marked the first instance of colonialists turning their weapons against one another.

Amidst this turmoil, the European settlers in Algeria established the French Algerian Front (FAF) to pressure de Gaulle into resigning and abandoning Algeria. However, their actions triggered an even greater response: mass demonstrations by Algerians from working-class neighborhoods on December 11, 1960. Convinced of the necessity of resolving the conflict through negotiations, de Gaulle called for a referendum in early January 1961, in which the majority of the French people voted in favor of his approach.

In response, extremist factions among the military and civilian settlers resorted to increasingly desperate measures. Pierre Lagailarde, Raoul Salan, and Jean-Jacques Susini founded the terrorist Organisation de l'Armée Secrète (OAS) and orchestrated the coup of the four generals on April 21, 1961. By this point, de Gaulle—along with the broader French population—recognized that the war in Algeria posed a direct threat to the stability of France itself. The continuation of hostilities risked plunging the nation into full-scale civil war.

2. 6. Forcing the Enemy to Recognize Algeria's Independence While Preserving National Territorial Unity :

Throughout the negotiation process, the French authorities sought to manipulate Algeria's territorial integrity, particularly by attempting to exclude the Algerian Sahara from the discussions. The strategic and economic significance of the region had grown considerably following the discovery of oil in 1956, along with the colonial army's advancements in missile testing at Hammaguir and nuclear experiments in Reggane. Moreover, the Sahara was crucial for maintaining France's land and air links with its African colonies, which were rich in natural resources,

particularly in the Sahel and West Africa.

During the second round of the Evian negotiations in April 1961, the French delegation withdrew when confronted with the Algerian delegation's unwavering stance on the Sahara issue. This moment of deadlock was followed by large-scale demonstrations in the summer of 1962 across Algeria, organized under the directives of the FLN to affirm the country's territorial integrity. The widespread mobilization ultimately forced General de Gaulle to concede in September 1961, paving the way for negotiations to progress on other outstanding issues.

Through a combination of military resistance, mass demonstrations, and strategically calculated economic concessions, the Algerian liberation movement succeeded in compelling the colonial power to recognize Algeria's full independence. This recognition effectively nullified all colonial laws imposed since 1830, including the 1947 Statute of Algeria. The official ceasefire agreement on March 18, 1962, marked a decisive victory, soon followed by General de Gaulle's formal acknowledgment of the independent Algerian republic.

3- Conclusion:

The Algerian Revolution successfully achieved all its internal and external objectives, as outlined in its official documents. This success was not the result of chance but rather the product of carefully planned strategies, backed by the necessary material and human resources. Each objective was pursued with unwavering commitment to principle and rigorous execution.

Among the revolution's key accomplishments was forcing the colonial power to recognize the FLN as the sole representative of the Algerian people and securing Algeria's right to self-determination, culminating in the ceasefire agreement signed on March 18, 1962. Another major victory was ensuring the recognition of Algeria's territorial unity, despite French efforts to isolate the Sahara for its strategic and economic significance.

French politicians and historians commonly refer to the struggle as the *Guerre d'Algérie* or the *Guerre d'indépendance d'Algérie*. However, Algerian politicians and academics insist on the term *Révolution de*

libération algérienne. This distinction is significant, as each term carries distinct historical and political implications. The term "war of independence" implies a conventional military conflict between two opposing armies, with independence as its sole objective. In contrast, the "Liberation Revolution" signifies a broader transformative movement—one that extends beyond the armed struggle to encompass profound cultural, economic, political, and social change.

This revolutionary vision was formally articulated at the second National Liberation Front conference, known as the Tripoli Pact, held after the signing of the Evian Accords. The pact declared: *"The end of the armed revolution does not mean the end of the struggle; rather, the struggle must continue, be strengthened, and expand to build the revolution in the fields of state and society."* This statement underscored the revolution's long-term objective: not only to achieve independence but also to establish a new political and social order, free from both colonial rule and the threats of neocolonialism.

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(4) جبهة التحرير الوطني ، الأمانة العامة ، بيان اول نوفمبر 1954

(5) Idem.

⁽⁶⁾Argoud Antoine , **La Décadence ,l'imposture et la tragédie** , Fayard ,

Paris ,1974, p :

⁷ عبد الحميد زوزو، وثائق ارشيفية عن حرب التحرير الجزائرية و مقدمة في كتابة تاريخ الثورة ، الامل للطباعة و النشر، تيزي وزو، 2019، ص6.

⁽⁸⁾ محمد بوضياف، التحضير لثورة 1 نوفمبر 1954. دار النعمان للطباعة و النشر ، ط2 ، الجزائر ، 2011. ص

⁽⁹⁾ علي كاي ، المذكرات " من المناضل السياسي الى القائد العسكري"، دار القصة للنشر ، الجزائر ، 2011 ، ص ص 69-72.

⁽¹⁰⁾ Cdt Azzedine, **Les Fellagas**, éd ENAG, Alger ,1997,p 74.

⁽¹¹⁾ Rapport au CCE par le colonel Omar Ouamrane , responsable de la Direction

de l'armement et du ravitaillement général (ALN-FLN-Bureau central du

Caire).Document N :41,in Mohamed Harbi, Les Archives de la révolution

Algérienne,Dahlab , Alger, 2014 ;p 189. ينظر أيضا : قندل جمال ،خطا اندري موريس و شال و موريس .

على الحدود الجزائرية التونسية و المغربية و تأثيراتهما على الثورة الجزائرية (1957-1962)، دار الضياء ، الجزائر ، 2006.

⁽¹²⁾توفيق المدني ، حياة كفاح ، دار عالم المعرفة ، الجزء الثالث، "مع ركب الثورة الجزائرية"، الجزائر ، 2010، ص ص 213-225.

⁽¹³⁾ قال بمذاكل من ايف كويرير و فرنسيس كويليت .

⁽¹⁴⁾ ينظر خريطة انتشار الثورة التحريرية في كتاب :

Guy Pervillé , **Atlas de la guerre d'Algérie** , édition Autrement , paris , 2011, p 18.

⁽¹⁵⁾ ينظر كمين تسلغة في 6 نوفمبر 1957 **Les Combats sahariens** de Renaud Charles Patrick,

في دحمان تواتي و آخرون، الثورة التحريرية في أقاليم توات .

(16) Papon Maurice , **Les chevaux du pouvoir , le préfet de police du général de Gaulle ouvre ses dossiers (1958–1967)**, éd Plon ,Paris , 1988,p 159.

(17) كان عدد القوات الاستعمارية شهر نوفمبر 1954 : 58000 عسكريا ثم 75000 شهر جانفي 1955 ثم 100000 شهر جوان 1955 ثم 186000 شهر فبراير 1956. أنظر/ زوز عبد الحميد ، المرجع السابق ، ص 10.
كان لدى الجيش الفرنسي سنة 1954 طائرة هليكوبتر واحدة وفي سنة 1955 ثلاثة ثم بلغ عدد المرحويات نحو ثلاثين سنة 1956 ثم وصل الى 160 مروحية في جوان 1957. أنظر في هذا / زوزو عبد الحميد ، المرجع السابق ، ص 10.

(18) Reda Malek , **L'Algérie à Evian .Histoire des négociations secrètes 1956–1962**,éd Dahlab , Alger , 1995 ;p :

(19) بيان اول نوفمبر 1954.

(20) دحمان تواتي ، **مؤتمر طنجة : مشروع التوحيد في مواجهة مخطط التجزئة**. المجلة التاريخية المغاربية ،مؤسسة التميمي للبحث العلمي و المعلومات ، العدد 150 ، مارس 2013، ص ص 107-127.

(21) Mohamed Harbi , **Les Archives de la révolution algérienne** , Document n :53 (**Rapport politique provisoire du GPRA par Ahmed Boumendjel** (Aout 1959),éd Dahlab, Alger , 2014 ;pp267-271.

(22) Papon Maurice , **Les chevaux du pouvoir , le préfet de police du général de Gaulle ouvre ses dossiers (1958–1967)**, éd Plon ,paris , 1988,p 159.

(23) Papon Maurice , **Les chevaux du pouvoir , le préfet de police du général de Gaulle ouvre ses dossiers (1958–1967)**, éd Plon ,paris , 1988,pp 159-160.

⁽²⁴⁾ Ib , id , p 162

⁽²⁵⁾ له كتاب: اختيار الجزائر صوتان و ذاكرة .وكان من مؤسسي صحيفة المجاهد.

⁽²⁶⁾ Jacques Massu , **Le Torrent et la Digue ;Alger du 13 mai au barricades** .éd
Rocher ,Paris ,1997,p 15.

⁽²⁷⁾ Antoine Argoud , **La Décadence l'imposture et la tragédie** , éd Fayard ,
paris , 1974.p 122.