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**The Enlargement of U. S. Hegemony in the post-Cold War World**  
**Case Study: Former Yugoslavia**

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# **The Enlargement of U. S. Hegemony in the post-Cold War World**

## **Case Study: Former Yugoslavia**

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## **Declaration**

I hereby declare that the substance of this dissertation is entirely the result of my investigation and that due reference or acknowledgement is made, whenever necessary, to the work of other researchers.

Date: 4<sup>th</sup>, December, 2014

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## **Dedication**

To my beloved parents, who gave me the most precious gift one may dream of: the  
Freedom of Thinking.

To my friends Nadia, Amina with whom I had interesting debates and  
discussions, that contributed in a way or another in the development of this work.

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Many thanks to all those who have been part of my academic fulfillment in a direct or indirect way.

## **Abstract**

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States emerged as a superpower, heading the capitalist world. The US was hegemonic, in the Gramscian sense, since it relies in its decision making not only on violence but on consent as well, in the different international institutions.

With the disappearance of the US principal rival, the USSR, it was difficult for the US to define a strategy that would secure its interests, and present an argument for its actions in the international arena. During the Cold War, and through the Marshall Plan, the US was able to win assets (economic, financial, and energetic) against the USSR in Western Europe by reconstructing the broken economies of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany by aiding them financially and technically. This had been done consensually, and the case was different in Latin America, Eastern Asia, and the Middle East where violent measures had been taken to impose the economic model that would serve better the US interests at the expense of local communities. And the same objective was to be fulfilled in the post-Cold War through the policy of Enlargement that was based on further integrating the economies of Eastern Europe.

The Yugoslav case serves as an example to highlight the importance of Eastern and Central Europe in US national security, by securing the energy resources of the Caspian region and their transport to the European markets. The latter is to be achieved by admitting the ex-socialist countries of a geopolitical importance to the US-led west, into the different institutions such as the European Union, the International Monetary Fund, and NATO, etc. Therefore, the US designed Democracy Promotion as a foreign policy to support the transformation of the ex-socialist countries into 'democratic' states, by using Nongovernmental Organizations that would give financial and technical support to Eastern European countries.

US enlargement policy was not concerned only with politics and strategy, but had a deep economic interest in further integrating the world economy through the international economic and financial institutions. Neoliberalism as a post-Cold War world philosophy would dominate the political discourses of the different political parties of Eastern Europe in general and former Yugoslavia in particular. The



neoliberal practices, most importantly that of liberalization that reduces the role played by the state in economy, would weaken the centrality of the state and render it fragile against the different internal and external threats.

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

### **ABBREVIATIONS**

AFL-CIO	Union of the American Center for International Labor and Solidarity
AID	Agency for International Development
BTC	Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CPC	Caspian Pipeline Consortium
DoD	Department of Defense
DS	Democratic Party
DSS	Democratic Party of Serbia
EU	European Union
GATT	General Agreements on Trade and Tariffs
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
IFOR	International Forces
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRI	International Republican Institute
KFOR	Kosovo Forces
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NAFTA	North Atlantic Free Trade Accord
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization

OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PfP	Partnership for Peace
SNS	Serbian Progressive Party
SPS	Socialist Party of Serbia
UN	United Nations
USAID	US Agency for International Development
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
WB	World Bank
WEU	Western European Union
WTO	World Trade Organization

# **INTRODUCTION**

Since 2011 the world has been living a phase of mutation of international affairs as a consequence of the 2008 financial crisis, and new configurations have to be made to find an issue to that problem. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA), in particular, has been at the core of those mutations; regimes were overthrown in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya and installation of ‘democratic’ governments is at the order of the day, according to most media coverage. However, today’s scene of the ‘state of health’ of most of the MENA region governments is far from being democratic. There is a general consent upon the narrow understanding of ‘democracy’ as being limited to the practice of election through ballots, and by this the majority imposes its will upon the minority.

What is noticeable in the MENA political scene is that there has been change. This is a ‘peaceful’ change that has not had an impact on the different social classes (since there is no ideological background which frames the different movements of contestation), but it was a change by giving a new way in dealing with affairs. During what is called ‘the Arab Spring’ in 2011, I have witnessed and experienced what triggered in me many questions regarding democracy, civil society, national interest, and the economy of one country, and the way these elements come together to delimit the political program of a given social entity be it an association, an NGO, or a political party, that each one constitutes a means for political ends.

Right after NATO’s attack on Libya, in which the Western involvement in a country’s internal affairs became clear, the changes that hit Tunisia and Egypt came under scrutiny by the general public. Economic and strategic interests of the great powers came to the surface of the democratic demands that the MENA peoples were and are still dreaming of, and the West (the US, France, and Britain) have had to stop the Russian and Chinese spread westward. The Syrian case came to confirm the ‘interests’ hypothesis, and its complexity is at the origin of the involvement of all the nations of the region such as Turkey, Iran, Israel, Iraq, and Lebanon. All the information of rivalry over economic and strategic interests by the US and its rivals is neither new nor an interesting finding. What is important is the way a country, such as the US, is to reach those interests; the strategy the US draws for its national interest;



and the road map the US adopts for its foreign policy by having both the national and international consent on its side. The latter represents the US means in dealing with domestic and foreign affairs, since its emergence after the Great War as a potential power and a shaper of post WWI world order. Indeed, the US involvement in world affairs and its insistence on relating what goes on in the international arena to its home security was confirmed when post the WWII world order was embedded in the different international institutions and agencies that were part and parcel of US foreign policy of the Cold War era.

During the Cold War, the US committed itself to contain Communism through economic, military and strategic means that paved the way to its success and emergence as the world's superpower. However, what has been referred to as the 'end' of the Cold War was for the US just the beginning for another engagement or a second commitment to enlarge its markets, interests, and hegemony. The shift the US foreign policy from Containment to Enlargement was meant to carry on the building of an empire. According to the Historian Paul Kennedy, as the US has become a world power, it is impossible for it to remain inactive in its borders and limit its commitment to the Northern part of the globe; as the British Empire, the US has found that its new borders have been unsecure, as long as it enlarges its circle of interest<sup>1</sup>. Of course, this enlargement was the post Cold War policy for the US geopolitical and geostrategic concerns it couldn't fulfill during the Cold War, having as an obstacle Communist-Soviet Union.

The choice of a post Cold War US foreign policy was problematic for US foreign policymakers. After 1990, opinions were divided between the isolationists (inheritors of Jeffersonian political traditions) and the interventionists or the internationalists (inheritors of Hamilton's and Wilson's political traditions). The internationalists stressed the importance that foreign policy is to strengthen the institutions that build a strong America from the inside so it would serve later as a model for other countries, instead of imposing their model by force. For the interventionists, Jeffersonian

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<sup>1</sup> In his book, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, the historian Paul Kennedy compare between the great powers history had known, and deduce that as those power came to a term so will the US.

traditionalists were for adopting a foreign policy that helps in spreading the American values and ideals of democracy, freedom and human rights all over the world. The followers of A. Hamilton's traditions envisioned a foreign policy that focuses on economic international integration through opening markets because it is the only way for possible peace.<sup>2</sup>

For Bill Clinton, and through the different speeches he delivered, it is noticed that the policy he decided to undertake in dealing with external affairs was middle-in-the-road. Some political specialists refer to Clinton's foreign policy by 'Pragmatic Wilsonism' for he neglected neither current. On the contrary, the Clinton Administration was to work on democratization of some targeted countries and intervene when it is necessary. The latter happens when 'vital' American interests are under serious threat. Therefore, after the dismantlement of the Soviet Union, the aftermath of the ex-communist countries constituted one of the elements that preoccupied the US, taking into consideration the geographic situation some countries have, they were to be part, later on, of Europe's security.

The US was very sensitive to the geostrategic importance some ex-Soviet countries represented, and this fact was not to be neglected since it is related in many ways to the US National Security. The dismemberment of the Federation of Yugoslavia is to be taken as an example in order to see the contextualization of the foreign policy of the Clinton Administration: how democratization has been used; by what means was it achieved; and for what purpose. The same is applied on intervention: what are the crises Yugoslavia has known? What was the US treatment of those crises? When and why did they intervene? It is crucial at this stage to pay attention to the time and place that the US takes into consideration once setting its foreign policy agenda.

My research cannot be dissociated from the changes that hit countries of the MENA region. Regime change, ethnic conflicts and religious upheaval characterize the countries that constitute strategic importance in the protection of US interests, mainly oil. If in 11 September 1990, George Bush re-introduced the 'New World

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<sup>2</sup> See Zouhir. Bouamama, *European Security in U. S. Foreign Policy after the Cold War*, (Annaba: Al Wissam Al Arabi, 2011).

Order' into the vocabulary of foreign relations, and 9/11, 2001 which speeded up the process of this order, then the new configurations in the MENA that came out of what has been labeled 'Arab Spring' is not a haphazard or a matter of coincidence. It just reflects the translations of a geostrategic agenda setting, having the US as the leader in this process of change, and the European countries (Germany and France) as partners by sharing in financing the costly change.

Since the US got involved in world affairs, it has been committed to spread free market democratic values, that have become 'common sense'<sup>3</sup>, and thus they have to be spread to the rest of the world. From 1947, Western Europe was the first region that adopted those values through the Marshall Plan that contained the spreading of Communism. Just after the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Middle and Eastern European countries were subject to the enlargement of those values; as a matter of fact they have been absorbed by them through their joining the EU and later on the NATO but after responding to a set of conditions imposed by these regional and international institutions. After 9/11 2001, the US expanded its influence in Europe further east, reaching the Middle East and declaring war on Iraq and Afghanistan. By doing this, they have created a circle around the Caspian Sea that is of a geostrategic importance on the US National Interest road map. And nowadays, the MENA cannot be an exception to those imperative changes, since the geostrategic regions in the MENA still embed US redoubtable rival Russia's interests and its allies, most importantly Iran and China.

This is how US traditions of foreign policy, whether isolationist or interventionist, combine together to fulfill America's mission. To have a better understanding of this 'exceptional mission', it is important to know when the US adopted an isolationist/interventionist foreign policy. According to Walter Lafeber 'the United States has never been isolated or outside world political struggles. It was born in the middle of those struggles, and its great problem was- and has always been- how to survive those struggles while maintaining individual liberty at home'<sup>4</sup>. If we pass

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<sup>3</sup> Cited in Mark.McNally, John. Schwarzmental, Gramsci and Global Politics. p 45.

<sup>4</sup> Cited in John. Dumbrell, The Making of US Foreign Policy, p 9.

through the Monroe Doctrine, to Roosevelt's Open Door policy, then Truman's Containment and post Cold War Enlargement, or what has been commonly known as 'Democracy Promotion', these are suggestive foreign policies. They indicate the involvement of the US in international crises whenever they occur. If it happened the US retreats from a given struggle, it does it for tactical sake.

In fact post Cold War does not require the US to use new strategies or theories in order to deal with world affairs after 1990. It is a matter of adapting their traditional visions to the new situation. The same to be said about us; in dealing with the enlargement of US hegemony in post Cold War era, we approach the topic from the political/diplomatic, geostrategic and economic scope. It is noteworthy to mention that the Clinton Administration adopted a complementary and global strategy for post Cold War world; all the fields were interdependent and intermingle in order to draw a new vision.

As for any academic research a theoretical framework is required in order to draw a better layout to the materials we have between hands. That is why we found more appropriate to use Gramscianism (other times Neo-Gramscianism) that adopts a critical theory approach for criticizing International Relations and Global Political Economy by analyzing the institutionalized ideas at the international level<sup>5</sup>. This is relevant to our research since the US just after WW2 made of the international institutions an arm that makes the success of its foreign policy possible. After 1990, the US succeeded in spreading its ideology of market democracies by having the UN, EU, NATO and the IMF as tools in dealing with ex-Communist countries and thus spreading hegemony.

Our thesis concern lies in showing the nature and the different mechanisms of US hegemony enlargement eastward after the dismemberment of the Soviet Union at the political, strategic, and economic levels through the different politics of Democracy Promotion and the enlargement of the different international institutions by involving the ex-Warsaw Pact countries into the 'Club of Democracies'. For this, we take former Yugoslavia as an example to analyze US post-Cold War foreign policy in

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<sup>5</sup> Cited in Mark. MacNaully, John. Schwarzmantel, *Gramsci and Global Politics*

Eastern Europe. Moreover, former Yugoslavia during the 1990s was at the center of world events, and the geographic configurations that occurred in that part of the European continent affected international politics in many ways. In order to have a better understanding of the issue, we divide the research into three chapters.

In the first chapter, I introduce the theories to the study that deals with Gramscian and Coxian ideas of national and international hegemony. My choice is based on the nature of the present world order that is multipolar, in which different agents of power interfere in decision making. It is important to know where world power resides and be able to define its nature. Therefore, we need to go back two decades earlier i.e. to shed light on the 1990s, and particularly on the Cold War ‘survivor’ the US. Since the rival (the USSR) in the east was weakened, the US has had to enlarge the scope of its interests eastward by drawing road maps relying on ‘Democracy Promotion’ as a ‘soft power’ in dealing with foreign affairs. ‘Democracy Promotion’ consisted of mobilizing and financing NGOs that would show the ex-Warsaw Pact countries the way to get on the road of free-market democracies. The example of former Yugoslavia shows the success of the policy of democratization in ousting Slobodan Milosevic, which was not to be possible without the media effect. We eventually discuss the importance of the Yugoslav wars and their in US foreign policy.

Actually, the choice of former Yugoslavia is made not to show the US foreign policy *towards* Yugoslavia only, but our research is more interested in former Yugoslavia and what surrounds it; the general picture of Europe *and* Asia after the Cold War. In the second chapter we tackle: the importance of geopolitics in defining US post-Cold War foreign policy. If Enlargement was the US strategy for a post-Cold War world order, we have to know what enlargement is dealt with and to know its aims. The Enlargement strategy was mainly concerned with enlarging the European Union, the different international institutions, and all this was done during a period when Russia was weakened. One has to recall that the object of US/USSR rivalry during the Cold War was energy resources that still have importance in the eyes of US national security decision makers.

Dealing with freeing access to energy resources, in the east, as an indicator of power, rhymes with freeing access to eastern markets. Therefore chapter three is dedicated to the discussion of global economic integration of the 1990s and its consequences on former Yugoslavia. Right after the collapse of socialist economic model, most countries had to integrate the free-market economy model. As a consequence, Neoliberalism triumphed as a theoretical background to the ex-socialist countries. The Yugoslav case is to be treated differently since former Yugoslavia was in the nonaligned movement and its economy was not purely socialist since it had a special relationship with the US. We, as well, show the importance of former Yugoslavia in US economic policy, but before doing so, we try to show the reasons that led to the Yugoslav dismemberment which were economic in nature.

Through this research we hope that we will succeed in showing the nature of US hegemony in the post-Cold War era. We hope, too, that elements and materials presented in the study will serve as answers to our questions about the present day American hegemony: in what way the post-Cold War world order is different from the Cold War world order? Does Democracy Promotion serve US concerns or the targeted countries' concerns? How far is Europe important in designing a US national security? How does the US use the international institutions in drawing its foreign road map? And last but not least, how do the political, strategic, and economic fields intermingle making a common US foreign strategy?

# **CHAPTER ONE**

## **The Democratization of Eastern Europe**

## **I. 1. Gramscian and Coxian Hegemony Theories and Their Implementation on U. S. Foreign Policy of Enlargement:**

By the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, the configuration of the world map was inevitable since the regions that used to be under the influence of the USSR were about to change their politico-economic path. Indeed, with the US ‘unipolar’ moment, international relations were to respond to a ‘New World Order’ that would give a new nature to those relations. George Bush Senior, spoke of ‘a New World Order’ that would be characterized by the spread of democratization at the political level and of free-market economy at the economic level, so that world peace could be realized under the surveillance of the advanced countries and the *leadership* of the US. This project tells a lot about US hegemonic intentions, if hegemony is understood by ‘the dominance of one state over others’ (Cox1993:264); what makes this definition incomplete is the way the US dominate, and what makes it hegemonic. Here, dominance implies force and imposition; US post-Cold War strategy is followed by Western developed states in designing a project that copes with the new realities, with a minimal use of force, and great use consent by consulting the international institutions such as: the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) in order to reach compromise with the other states members over a given issue.

Our purpose in this study is to show how the US succeeds in making other states follow its strategies through hegemony at the political, geostrategic and economic levels. Both Antonio Gramsci<sup>6</sup> and Robert Cox<sup>7</sup> theorized on hegemony and perceived

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<sup>6</sup> Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937). In 1911 Gramsci began a brilliant scholarly career at the University of Turin, where he came in contact with the Socialist Youth Federation and joined the Socialist Party (1914). During World War I (1914–18), he studied Marxist thought and became a leading theoretician. He formed a leftist group within the Socialist Party and founded the newspaper *L'Ordine nuovo* (“The New Order”; May 1919). . The years spent in Prison (1926-1936) were painful for Gramsci physically and psychologically, but fruitful with his famous Prisons Notebooks 1947. Encyclopedia Britan nica 2008 Ultimate Reference.

<sup>7</sup> Robert W. Cox was born in 1926. He is a retired Canadian political science professor. He graduated from McGill University in 1946 with a Master in History. He contributed a lot in International Relations through his works on international organizations; to cite just a few: The Anatomy of Influence : decision making in international organization (1973), with Harold K Jacobson; and Production, Power and World Order (1987); Approaches to World Order (co-editor, 1996)



it as the result of class struggle, at the state level and at the international level respectively. We will apply the theory on our study and see how and to what extent the US was hegemonic in their ‘democratization project’, in its war on Yugoslavia, and through spreading free-market economy in the Balkans after 1990.

## **I. 1.1. Antonio Gramsci and Gramscianism:**

Antonio Gramsci conceptualized hegemony after the Third International in 1922. Before him, Plekhanov and Lenin spoke of hegemony of the proletariat. Since the third international, hegemony started to mean the domination of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat, from which Gramsci conceptualized his theory. Gramsci’s work consisted mainly of showing the relations between civil society (the church, the educational system, the press) and the State, both in the East (Russia) and in the West (France, Germany, Great Britain and Italy)<sup>8</sup>. For Gramsci, in the East, the State is everything, civil society is related to it and the strategy that should be adopted to be hegemonic is the ‘war of maneuver’. However, in the West, the State and civil society have a balanced relationship in which civil society is developed and the strategy here is ‘war of position’:

In the East, the State was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West, there was a proper relationship between State and civil society, and when the State trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed. The State was only an outer ditch, behind which there was a powerful system of fortresses and earthquakes: more or less numerous from one State to the next, it goes without saying, but this precisely necessitated an accurate reconnaissance of each individual country.<sup>9</sup>

This shows that Gramsci was aware of the sociocultural elements that distinguish societies from one another. This difference in the structure entails difference in the

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<sup>8</sup> . Perry. Anderson, ‘The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci’ , *New Left Review*, 1/100, November-December 1976, pp. 1-65.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid*, p. 10.

treatment and in the suggestion of solutions. However Perry Anderson in his famous article ‘*The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci*’ sees that Gramsci failed in analyzing the bourgeois class in the West. This failure made Gramsci chooses the wrong strategy i.e. ‘war of position’.

Antonio Gramsci was influenced by two elements when conceptualizing hegemony: the Bolshevik revolution and Machiavelli’s *The Prince*<sup>10</sup>. From the former, he established the idea of hegemony of the working class over the bourgeoisie. From the latter he conceptualized power mechanism in Machiavelli’s centaur ‘half animal, half human’; for Gramsci these were the images of force/consent, domination/hegemony, and violence/civilization.

FORCE	CONSENT
DOMINATION	HEGEMONY
VIOLENCE	CIVILIZATION

For Gramsci in order to defeat a third force, the first and the second forces should reach a compromise, especially if the third force is internal, because force can be used against external enemies, not against internal ones. Instead, internal enemies should be integrated and assimilated. When discussing hegemony, Gramsci developed other notions related to it, which constitute now the literature of Gramscianism. These notions are: ‘historic bloc’, ‘war of position’ and ‘war of movement’, ‘passive revolution’ and ‘trasformismo’.

#### **a. The Historic Bloc:**

The point on which Gramsci differed from Marx was the nature of production and economic determinism. For Gramsci, production is not only physical or concrete; it is the production of ideas, thoughts and their transmission through the institutions such as the family, education, and libraries. Those sociocultural elements make of a given

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<sup>10</sup> Robert W. Cox, ‘Gramsci, Hegemony and IR: An Essay in Method’, *International Political Economy*, Vol 2, Los Angeles, California, USA, 2008, pp. 193-208.

group of people consent on what defines their culture and language and becomes hegemonic over other social groups with whom they negotiate and constitute a ‘historical bloc’ to rule over a country. The ‘historic bloc’ then is a set of norms, ideas and a form of production. For example, by the end of the nineteenth century, during the period of isolationism in the US, the American society was in the process of producing a ‘historic bloc’: a democratic and free country with an economy based on privatization and free enterprise. This ‘historic bloc’ would inspire other states, or would be imposed upon other states by force or consent.

**b. War of Position and War of Movement:**

‘War of position’ and ‘war of movement’ are military phrases. When Gramsci used them it was in order to show the difference in the relationship of the State and Civil society in the East (Russia) and the West (North America, Japan and Western Europe). Concerning the strategy to win over hegemony, Gramsci thought that War of Movement was successful in Russia during the Bolshevik revolution because civil society was backward and not as developed as in the West which necessitates a war of position. What made Gramsci conclude this is his oversimplification of the nature of power relations between State and civil society in the East and the West. For him, in the East the nature of the state is dictatorial (Tsarism) and rule is by coercion, in the West, hegemony is by consent (parliamentarism).

EAST (Tsarism)

WEST (Parliamentarism)

STATE

CIVIL SOCIETY

CIVIL SOCIETY

STATE

COERCION

CONSENT

DOMINATION

HEGEMONY

WAR OF MOVEMENT

WAR OF POSITION

However, this classification is still ambiguous because Gramsci did not analyze very well the nature of the bourgeois class (capitalist class) in the West. Amadeo Bordiga<sup>11</sup> clarified the concept of hegemony in the West when he furthered Gramsci's analysis of the relation between the state and civil society in the East and the West by showing that since the West is much more developed, the state is stronger and its repressive apparatus is more sophisticated. The state wins the consent of the masses through the press and the educational institution. What makes the capitalist repressive apparatus more efficient than Tsarism is the fact that the West is industrially and technologically more advanced, and because the masses in the West are more inclined to believe in the myth of democracy, the legitimacy of a given government whom they voted for. The second ambiguity was clarified by Leon Trotsky and it concerns the choice of strategy. Gramsci believes that war of position is appropriate in the West while war of movement is applicable in the East. Trotsky sees a danger in abandoning one of the two strategies; for him both should be used, acknowledging that there is more position in the West and more movement in the East because of the complexity of the economic and social structures: *"In the highly developed countries with their huge living centers, with their White Guard cadres prepared in advance, civil war may assume-a far less mobile, a far more compact character, that is, one approximating to positional war"*<sup>12</sup>.

### **c. Passive Revolution and Trasformismo:**

As its name indicates, 'passive revolution' is an inert change; it means that there is no actual movement going on. It is in fact a change without the participation of the people and the 'revolution' benefits only the hegemonist class. The latter succeeds in assimilating and integrating the working class into its orbit of interest without a real revolution, or changes impacting social conditions. In fact, the hegemonist class succeeds in assimilating the working class by using the strategy of 'trasformismo'. It is

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<sup>11</sup> Amadeo Bordiga (1889-1970) was one of the leaders of the Italian Communist Party. He was a member of the Prometeo group. He was arrested by Mussolini in 1926 and after his liberation he could not play a direct role in his group. He was excluded from the Comintern too for charges of Trotskyism.

<http://www.marxists.org/glossary/people/b/o.htm#bordiga>

<sup>12</sup> Perry. Anderson, 'The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci', (1976), pp. 1-65.

the rhetoric of the working class people who aspire to a real change which involves an ideational transformation; the hegemonist class adopts the demands of the working class and tries to lessen the tone of the dangerous demands and ideas. Robert Cox wrote: *“trasformismo can serve as a strategy of assimilation and domesticating potentially dangerous ideas by adjusting them to the dominant coalition and can thereby obstruct the formation of class-based organized opposition to established social and political power.”*<sup>13</sup>

These are the four elements (‘historic bloc’, ‘war of position/movement’, ‘passive revolution’ and ‘trasformismo’) that constitute the concept of hegemony in Gramsci’s view at the state level. In the democratic West, in order to win the consent of the masses, the state opts for more sophisticated means (technology and industry) without the use of force in order to reach compromise with civil society, and keeps internal peace.

#### **I. 1. 2. Robert Cox and Neogramscianism:**

The neogramscians view hegemony not as domination by force, but as *‘domination of consent by means of political and ideological leadership’* (Simon 1982:21). Cox studied Gramsci’s concept of hegemony at the state level, then he came to believe that once a ‘historic bloc’ of a hegemonist class is established internally (nationally), it can be transmitted internationally through uniting with ‘historic blocs’ of other states and safeguard their common interests in the political and economic world institutions. Cox noted in 1983 that: *“A world hegemony is thus in its beginning an outward expansion of the internal (national) hegemony established by a dominant social class... World hegemony is describable as a social structure, an economic structure, and a political structure; and it cannot be simply one of these things but must be all three”* (Cox 1983:1971-2). Cox proposed further the mode of governance a dominant state should have that other states would aspire to:

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<sup>13</sup> Robert W. Cox, op.cit.,

To become hegemonic, a state would have to found and protect a world order which was universal in conception... an order which most other states... could find compatible with their interests.... It means dominance of a particular kind, where the dominant state creates an order based ideologically on a broad measure of consent, functioning according to general principles that in fact ensure the continuing supremacy of the leading state... but at the same time offer some measure or prospect of satisfaction to the less powerful. (Cox1987:7)<sup>14</sup>

What the neogramscians added to the Gramscian literature was the notion of the ‘transnational class’, and instead of speaking of ‘historic bloc’, they refer to it by ‘world order’. They believe that the transnational class is a capitalist class that emerged in the late nineteenth century and consolidated its hegemony by consent after the Second World War through the creation of international organizations. Cox believes that an international organization that exercises a hegemonic role should gather a set of features: “(1) it embodies the rules which facilitate the expansion of hegemonic world order; (2) it is itself the product of the hegemonic world order; (3) it ideologically legitimates the norms of the world order; (4) it co-opts the elites from peripheral countries and (5) it absorbs counter-hegemonic ideas<sup>15</sup>. The norms, ideas and the mode of production of the ‘transnational class’ in the West become embedded in the international institutions and would constitute ‘common sense’ and therefore would be transmitted to other countries automatically. For example, after the Second World War, the transnational class, with the leadership of the US, established the Bretton Woods institutions, the IMF and the World Bank. Gill claimed that:

These institutions establish ‘new constitutionalism’ of legal frameworks to enforce legal frameworks to enforce transnational interests...and legitimize the restructuring of people’s lives through propagating a neoliberal ideology (the language of competition, deregulation, downsizing, efficiency, flexibility, modernization, outsourcing, privatization and restructuring).<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> William I. Robinson, ‘Gramsci and Globalization: From Nation-State to Transnational Hegemony’ ,*Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, Routledge, Vol 8, No 4, December 2005, pp. 1-16. <[http://www.soc.ucsb.edu/faculty/robinson/Assets/pdf/gramsci\\_glob.pdf](http://www.soc.ucsb.edu/faculty/robinson/Assets/pdf/gramsci_glob.pdf) >

<sup>15</sup> Robert W. Cox, op. cit., pp. 49-66.

<sup>16</sup> Mark. McNally, John. Schwarzmantel, *Gramsci and Global Politics: Hegemony and Resistance*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 45.

What Robert Cox added to Gramsci's concept was to further and expand the theory of hegemony at the international level. The above is just an attempt at understanding hegemony from Gramsci's and Cox's views. We will try to apply those developed notions in order to see the *nature* of the enlargement of US hegemony in post-Cold War world. One of US post-Cold War political and diplomatic elements to spread its hegemony to reconstruct the dismembered Eastern Europe was through converting its countries to political and economic liberalism through *democratization*. What interests us in the following section is to show the nature of the 'Democracy Promotion' project, the purpose it serves, and the way and the means deployed to be implemented by the US by making of 'democracy' the post-Cold War *ideology*.

## I. 2. Democratization

If a survey is to be carried out about the most frequent word in today's politics, the highest rate would be 'democracy'. All the peoples of the world strive to make of 'democracy' a political system that safeguards their rights, freedoms, and makes of their countries develop and advance forward. However, the definition of 'democracy' is multi-faceted; it is not 'the rule by and for the people' only, but once the majority wins, its obligation is to protect the rights of the minority. Still, 'democracy' remains difficult to be defined for politicians<sup>17</sup>.

Despite the confusion that 'democracy' poses, American politicians and diplomats have always been eager to promote their vision of this political mode of governing suitable to all the peoples worldwide. As 'democracy' is mainly about freedoms of expression, religion and circulation, the US politicians has always believed these ideals and principles are universal. After having implemented these ideals that constitute the 'American Creed' and institutionalized them through literature, universities, schools and media during the period of isolationism, it was time to

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<sup>17</sup> Anne. Applebaum, 'The New New World Order: America and the New Geopolitics', *Hoover Press*, review 1, pp.1-20.< [http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/0817939024\\_1.pdf](http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/0817939024_1.pdf)>

promote and export this ‘national image’ to serve as a paradigm for other nations<sup>18</sup>. The myth of the ‘city upon a hill’ was at the basis of building the US, and was to be present in the different historical events the US was going to be part of.

The process of exporting the US model of democracy has had many forms, different names and one single aim. First, the ‘Open Door Policy’ was to settle peace between the trading nations in China and have equal share of trade. Second, Woodrow Wilson’s policy, summarized in his ‘Fourteen Points’, was to reach international peace by opening the sea routes for free trade and circulation of products. Third, Harry Truman’s Containment was meant to absorb the communist threat over the European market and stop its spread to Western Europe. Last but not least, Clinton’s Enlargement policy through maximizing market democracies. What is to be noticed through the different US foreign policies is that they stress upon the idea of peace between nations can only be possible through free market democracies. We will have a closer look on Clinton’s Enlargement policy since it had been implemented right after the dismemberment of the USSR and entering a new phase of world’s politics.

After the shrinking of the communist bloc, the US carried on the project of democratization of the rest of Europe at the political, economic and cultural level. ‘Democracy domino effect’<sup>19</sup> was less costly and damaging strategy in the view of the US policymakers. Combining Wilsonian idealism (spreading American ideals over the world) and Benjamin Franklin’s liberalism (free trade), Clinton’s advisors made sure that since the US is the greatest uncontested power, now it has to show that it is the greatest example for the peoples to follow<sup>20</sup>. This was to be carried without violence, use of power or any hardware, as Joseph Nye once observed: ‘The soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policy (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).’<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Susan. M. Matarese, American Foreign Policy and the Utopian Imagination, (Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001), p. 2.

<sup>19</sup> Edward. Said, Orientalism, (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), p. xxi.

<sup>20</sup> Zouhir. Bouamama, European Security in U. S. Foreign Policy after the Cold War, (Annaba: Al Wissam Al Arabi, 2011), p. 15.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid, pp. 59-60.



Democratization as a ‘soft power’ was meant to make countries transit to the ‘club of democracies’ by making political and economic reforms, i.e. to move from ‘dictatorship’ to ‘semi- authoritarian’ or to ‘pseudo-democratic’ status. These are classifications that respond to US standards of democracy. Democratization of post Cold War era has become an ideology more than a foreign policy by which the US embarked in a propaganda over democracy using all means: media, education, civil society, to make other countries conform to the American vision of a ‘free’ and ‘just’ world.

## **I. 2. 1. Democratization As a post-Cold War U. S. Foreign Strategy:**

The results of the Cold War were reached when the US maintained the status of Western Europe in the ‘Club of Democracies’. The next step was to spread the democratic influence. Bill Clinton, many times, claimed that the US ‘should seek to enlarge [market democracies] reach...enlargement of the world’s free community of market democracies.’<sup>22</sup>The presidential inaugural addresses of post 1990s and even during the Cold War were pregnant and suggestive of undertaking such a policy. Still believing in reaching peace through free markets, the US presidents emphasized promoting democracy overseas. Reagan spoke about ‘the crusade for freedom’ and a ‘campaign for democratic development’<sup>23</sup>. For his part, George Bush Senior ‘calls for democracy and human rights are being reborn anywhere’<sup>24</sup>. Clinton adopted the ‘democratic enlargement’ as a foreign policy’<sup>25</sup>. And George W. Bush worked on the ‘Global war on terror’ to fulfill his democratization project. Of course, democratization was at the heart of the New World Order with which the US arrives at gripping the world by completing its ‘empire’. As with the previous empires we witnessed Pax Romana, Pax Britannica, some historians pointed to the fact that the New

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid, p. 162.

<sup>23</sup> Michael. Cox. *et al*, American Democracy Promotion: Impulses Strategies, and Impact, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 21.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

World Order was meant to be the age of 'peace' imposed by the US superpower on the rest of the world, i.e. it is the age of Pax Americana.<sup>26</sup>

However, democratization is still ill-defined just like democracy. Is it the process of building institutions that safeguard people's freedom and liberties? Or, does it mean opening the markets for free trade to make of Western products (goods, services and culture) permeable to the remaining unconquerable markets of the 'developing' and 'under developed' world? Has the US the intention to impose just the form of its vision of democracy, or both form and substance? For the US preserving its vital interests are above all considerations. Concerning the form of democracy, 'non liberal' countries, in the vision of the US, have to implement free elections, a multi party system, freedom of expression and organization, and government accountability to the people. Some countries have these criteria at different degrees. For instance, though the US, Great Britain and France have a multi party system, power, for decades, is shared between two parties whether the conservative traditions hold power or liberal traditions do, and they are still considered as democratic. For the substance of democracy, there are many examples of countries in which the US supported regime transition and did not follow the development of democracy in there, just because those who were in power protected the American interests.

Some critics of democracy see in liberalism not only its social and political angle, but they attribute democracy's success to its economic angle. It is believed that economic liberalism is at the core of the US success .i.e. the capitalist system is at the origin of US development. It is in the US foreign policy traditions to open world's markets. After the westward expansion had been exhausted at home, the direction was to be shifted beyond the US borders. Concerning post Cold War foreign policy, Clinton's road map<sup>27</sup> was summarized in four points as follows:

- To strengthen the community of market democracies
- To foster and consolidate new democracies and new market economies

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<sup>26</sup>Edward. Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, (London: Vintage, 1994), p. 364.

<sup>27</sup>Susan M. Matarese, op. cit., p. 88, and Zouhir Bouamama, op. cit., pp. 618-619.

- To counter the aggression and support the liberation of states hostile to democracy
- To help democracy and market economies take root in regions of greatest humanitarian concern

This was to preserve the national interest in which the US saw in democratization the only possible way for such a task. The US national interest<sup>28</sup> can be summarized in two points:

- Military security (arms control, halting the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction and combating terrorism)
- Economic security (preserving market access to natural resources and keeping open the sea lanes of international trade)

We notice in these points that a major emphasis is put on free markets, as it had been undertaken in the previous foreign policies of American history. There is a great resemblance between Wilson's Fourteen Points and Clinton's Enlargement, which means that every US president has to put in the front the survival of the American way of life that is represented in Capitalism.

There have been some studies that tackled the point of the link between capitalism and democracy, in which they question why capitalists show interest in the democratic institutions, and whether their aim is to preserve equity and justice or as they are pragmatic they see in democracy the sole system that preserves their interests. They see in western market economy and its mode of consumerism a class that is producing elite to work for the sake of satisfying market needs through the education branches of engineering, business, and economics. No wonder that today's most desired university orientations that secure a better and well paid job are those of business, finance, marketing and economics.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Larry. Diamond, ' An American Foreign Policy for Democracy ' , (July 1991).  
<<http://www.dlc.org/documents/democracy.pdf>>

<sup>29</sup> Edward. Said, op. cit., p. 325.

Actually, the best way to keep the capitalist system on going, and to prevent its failure was by reducing the costs of keeping US assets abroad at safe and gaining public opinion. After what became known the ‘Vietnam Syndrome’, during the Cold War, the US was engaged in a policy of reducing military and human losses. After the Cold War these assets in Western Europe were to be enlarged to the rest of the European continent. i.e. what I call ‘the 3Es Policy’: ‘European Eastward Enlargement’. Along the 3Es process, changes occurring in this region were the result of revolutions. The first wave of revolutions was in 1989 and the second was in 2000. Whether these popular upheavals were spontaneous or had been provoked is debatable. What is sure is that the governments that were in power just after the revolutions made political and economic reforms that were in favor for free-market economy. This democratization through revolutions can be compared to Antonio Gramsci’s concept of ‘passive revolution’<sup>30</sup>. It is a concept used by movements that make use of a revolutionary rhetoric to bring down a given government while seeking at maintaining the status quo, or make changes in favor to the economic class.

## **I. 2. 2. Democratization For U.S. World Survival:**

Human history has witnessed the rise of many civilizations and empires that inspired the peoples of the world and contributed by their values, cultures and sciences in the making of human history and heritage. Often world primacy rhymes with hegemony. By the end of the Cold War, the US became a world power. In fact, the idea of an ‘empire’ has always been present in American history, ‘an imperium-dominion, state or sovereignty that would expand in population and territory, and increase in strength and power.’<sup>31</sup> Besides, the US has always been compared to the Roman Empire in its institutions, and the inherited Greek political values. Moreover, the American myth of a nation with a divine mission for redeeming the evil deeds of the humans was what nurtured the US foreign policy in all its forms. Almost two centuries after the Pilgrims

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<sup>30</sup> Cited in Mark. McNally, John. Schwarzmantel, op. cit., p. 47.

<sup>31</sup> Cited in Susan M. Matarese, op. cit., p.

set foot on the American soil, those ideas, of a holy mission and world redemption, are still present in the discourses of American politicians and diplomats. For instance, Senator Albert Beveridge stated in 1900 that ‘Americans are people, imperial by virtue of their power, by right of their institutions, by authority of their haven directed purpose.’<sup>32</sup>

Therefore, the US mission is to convert all countries of the world to its lifestyle, its economic vision of capitalistic free market democracies, in order to fulfill its New World Order of global harmony and peace. In other words, and in market terms, two Mc Donald’s cannot go to war against each other. For Clinton: ‘Democracies create free markets that offer economic opportunity, make free more reliable trading partners, and are far less likely to wage war on one another.’<sup>33</sup>

By winning the Cold War against the Soviet Union and achieving world primacy, the US’ most important aim is to prevent another emerging competitor that strives for hegemony. Countries of Western Europe had been contained through the Marshall Plan after 1945; Germany was ‘brought out’ during WW2; and the Soviet Union was brought down during the Cold War. Although the Communist bloc had been dismantled, the Russian danger was still present on the US security road map because the end of a federation does not necessarily mean the end of a dream. The US ambition to keep all rivals down was a subject of a National Security document written in 1992, in which the US aimed to ‘discourage the advanced industrial nations from challenging [US] leadership or even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.’<sup>34</sup>

In fact, the US started to lead the Western world after 1945 when all western countries were preoccupied by the reconstruction of their devastated territories. Concerning hegemony, the US became hegemonic when it emerged from the Cold War as a victor with the concession and the retreat of the USSR. This leadership and hegemony had taken form and developed in the different international institutions that came into being right after the Great War (the League of Nations), WW2 (the UN, the

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid, p. 37.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid, p. 89.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid, p. 87.

WB, the IMF and the World Trade Organization -WTO) by having the consent of the states members. Cox's notion of hegemony (a Neo-Gramscian reading) is the ability of a state to maintain its influence through a consensual relationship with other countries and 'how its character is determined by ideological and material conditions.'<sup>35</sup>The international organizations adopt the ideology of the hegemonic state and by this it becomes 'common sense' and will be imposed on other countries by acquiescing them to make adjustment of their politico-economic systems. In the case of the US, Neoliberalism is its economic, political and cultural spirit. Thus the US incites 'illiberal' countries to privatize and open their market for free trade.

### **I. 2. 3. Democratization Through Nongovernmental Organizations:**

The US has conceived Democratization as a strategy whose benefits come in the long term. It is true that it is less costly than arms, but its results are not as immediate as hardware production. However, its structure is so complex and all the sectors intermingle and participate in the making of this foreign policy that preserves the national interest. The US Congress, the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Chamber of Commerce contribute financially by funding Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) that are concerned by democratization.

All types of assistance are present to foster the process of democratization. Political assistance supports the targeted countries through strengthening the institution of civil society (religious and women's associations, human rights organizations, media, trade unions, students' associations...etc), and the body that is in charge of that is the Agency for International Development (AID). However, this body cannot work directly with government institutions for diplomatic considerations. That is why it delegates its mission to the Nongovernmental Organization (NGO), National Endowment for Democracy (NED) which in its turn grants money to other organizations such as the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National

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<sup>35</sup> Cited in Mark. McNally, John. Schwarzmantel, op. cit., p. 21.

Democratic Institute (NDI). These organizations will work directly with bodies of civil society of the targeted countries. Economic assistance is meant to foster development by adopting market-oriented reforms. And the DoD is in charge of military assistance by giving the targeted country financial or material aid.

The NED gathers alone four bodies. There is the union of the American Center for International Labor and Solidarity (AFL-CIO), the employers of the Center of International Private Enterprise, the Democrats NGO the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and the Republican NGO the International Republican Institute (IRI). All these groups have got interests by investing lots of money in democratizing the targeted countries and themselves receive funds from Congress through the Department of State's Budget<sup>36</sup>. Since its creation by the end of the Cold War, the Foreign Policy Department depended a lot on it and ignored other alternatives (the World Trade Organization, NATO and European Union admission, and economic sanctions) that might speed up the process of democratization.

Of course, one of the aforementioned alternatives to the NED had been applied but did not meet a great success. Economic sanctions<sup>37</sup> had been present in foreign policy history since Antiquity. Today's economic sanctions of the western world by the US leadership on Iran and Syria have as an aim to foster the economic and political reforms that would preserve the US geostrategic interests. During the Cold War, economic sanctions did not have an impact on the targeted countries. This was not because economic sanctions, as a strategy, were not good to use, but the environment in which the strategy was adopted was not in its favor. Seeing the competitive environment that gathered two powers: the US and the USSR, if the US sanctioned a country, this country would turn to the USSR to provide it with help. Besides economic sanctions contradicted the principal line of the foreign policy that is Containment, for Containment seeks to maximize the number of Capitalism converts, and economic sanctions reduce that number. However, during the unipolar era, the same strategy accelerated the process of democratization and this was due to the defeat

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<sup>36</sup> Larry. Diamond, op. cit.,

<sup>37</sup> Stephen D. Collins, 'Democracy Sanctions', *Taiwan Journal of Democracy*, Vol 5, No 2, pp. 69-96. <<http://www.tfd.org.tw/docs/dj0502/069-096%20Stephen%20D.%20Collins.pdf>>

of the USSR, which means that there was in the world one money lender which was the US.

What has been explained was the US bilateral program of democratization (US government institutions and NGOs). The US refers, too, to the multilateral program (the UN Development Program, the UN Democracy Fund, the Community of Democracies, Freedom House, the World Bank and the Organization of American States).

### **I. 3. Promoting Democracy in Former Yugoslavia**

At the beginning of the twentieth century, no one could foretell that Yugoslavia, as a country in the Balkans, was going to dominate the world politics during the whole century. Its first unification in 1913 was the consequence of the Balkan Wars, and its second unification in 1946 appeased the tensions between the great powers which were in a state of competition to dominate the region, until 1990 when those tensions appeared again on the surface of the chessboard<sup>38</sup>. Being part of the Balkans, Yugoslavia was at the heart of the changes that occurred in south Eastern Europe since the break up of the Roman Empire. Its geostrategic importance made it subject to frontiers change by the great powers. There was the First Yugoslavia of 1918, a kingdom which gathered Serbia and Montenegro (including Macedonia), as well as Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Austrian territory in Dalmatia and Slovenia, and the Hungarian land north of the Danube River<sup>39</sup>. The Second Yugoslavia was formed by the Communist party led by Jozip Broz Tito and the kingdom was transformed into a federation of six republics: Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia<sup>40</sup>.

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<sup>38</sup> The word 'chessboard' was used by Zbigniew Brzezinski in *The Grand Chessboard*, referring to Eurasia (Europe and Asia) on which the world game to control this part of the world is played by great powers.

<sup>39</sup> Encyclopedia Britannica Ultimate Reference, 2008.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.



And the Third Yugoslavia, constituted of Serbia and Montenegro, was formed in 1992, after the secession of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia Herzegovina

In the nineteenth century, the Balkans was the crossroads of the great empires. Russia, the Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary struggled to keep their interests and win new ones, or put obstacles and prevent one another from advancing to any region of influence. Indeed, the strategic position of the Balkans made it the envy of world powers, and a curse for the peoples who inhabited the land. The South of the Balkans is a door to the Mediterranean, a way to the Red sea through the Suez Canal, and the East leads to the Black Sea, and it is a way, too to the Caspian Sea. Of course, interests change with time. In the nineteenth century the control of sea routes was important. If Great Britain was for the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, it was to prevent Russia from having access to the Mediterranean<sup>41</sup>. The same was true for France and Austria-Hungary; they had supported Serbia and Croatia, respectively to stop the westward and southward Russian advancement, the reason that made the Russian region of influence limited to the Black Sea.

Geography is what makes and unmakes alliances, and interests make and unmake treaties and global rules. The peoples that constituted Yugoslavia in the nineteenth century were the Serbs, the Croats, the Slovenes, the Macedonians, the Bosnians, and the Montenegrins. But the group that played a seminal role in map drawing and history making were the Serbs who were scattered in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania. Given their religious and ethnic heritage, the Serbs were pro-Russian, the fact that made the other great powers ally with other ethnic groups and play one group against another for their own advantage. For instance Austria-Hungary supported Croatia; the Ottomans supported the Bosnian Muslims and so on.

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<sup>41</sup> Ernest. Weibel, Histoire et géopolitique des Balkans de 1800 à nos jours. (Paris : ellipses, ), p. 53.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, and especially after the Great War, there were new players who wanted to have a say on the Question of the Orient<sup>42</sup>. The Great War broke US isolationism and brought it to the concert of nations, and as early as nineteen eighteen they contributed in changing the world map. The Fourteen Points of President Woodrow Wilson, especially points 10, 11 and 12 which concern the Balkans, ended the Turkish and the Habsburg rule in the region, by giving autonomy to the peoples of the Balkans. After World War Two, Russia and Great Britain made sure that they were not to be moved away from the Balkans in the ‘percentages agreement’, the document in which the Central and Eastern European states were to be divided into regions of influence<sup>43</sup>. Yugoslavia was divided between the two as ‘fifty-fifty’. But the crisis between Stalin and Tito obliged the Yugoslavs to opt for accommodation with the capitalist powers. This made the US hold this chance in order to contain the USSR. Though the Marshall Plan was not welcomed by the Yugoslavs, they received bank loans and food aids from the US, and in 1951 an agreement was signed on military cooperation. Yugoslavia and the Balkans in general represent different interests that were mutually beneficial; in the nineteenth century, they represented the crossroads of sea routes for trade, and in the twentieth century, with the discovery of oil in the Great Middle East, they represent the shortest way leading to it. The Question of the Orient can be summarized in the following:

The Eastern question, and in this case the problem of the Balkans, is at the time of international importance due to the complexity of interest in which they are intertwined, with the importance of roads through this part of the world and which are shorter passages to the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, vestibules of India and the Far East. It appears that the slightest imbalance affects the Balkan policy of the great powers.<sup>44</sup>

The last decade of the twentieth century was struck by this disequilibrium. The great powers in fact fixed the problem in post nineteen forty-five and did not solve it. By supporting the Communist Partisans to seize power in Yugoslavia at the expense of the different nationalisms that constitute the country, this negation was to re-emerge later, and be amongst the consequences that led to the dismemberment of Yugoslavia.

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid, p. 30.

<sup>43</sup> Leslie. Benson, *Yugoslavia: a Concise History*. (London: palgrave, 2001), p. 66.

<sup>44</sup> Ernest. Weibel, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

Many suggestions have been advanced to explain the dismemberment and, the most famous one was Serbian nationalism. In fact, if nationalisms (Croatian, Albanian and Serbian) re-emerged that was due to the economic down fall caused by the strict reforms imposed by the IMF on the country. What is to be mentioned instead is that after the dismantling of the Soviet Union, the reunification of Germany and the emergence of the US as the world superpower, the map of Europe needed to be redrawn; a New World Order had to be settled. The breakup of Yugoslavia was another round for the great powers that competed on the shape Europe should have. It is true that Russia had been weakened; a unified Germany constituted such a danger to the US that its expansion needed to be moderated and played sometimes against France which had a vision of Europe not advantageous to the US. These warring interests were to be played on the Yugoslav soil and its peoples were to undergo the most terrible human tragedies in history as a French historian has noted:

After the period of depression following the disintegration of the Soviet Empire and the fall of the Berlin Wall, Yugoslavia faced with the tragic fate of being European and global heart of confrontation strategies of the big states. Border demarcation and crucible strong national identities, the singularity of the Yugoslav region amount to undergo on its soil repeatedly the horrific consequences of the struggle of empires for the development of their areas of influence.<sup>45</sup>

As the real reasons for the world wars were geostrategic in nature, the same remark has to be made when considering the real reasons for the breakup of Yugoslavia. The hidden reason for the Great War was the restructuring of Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Ottoman and the Habsburg Empire, while the reason for the Second World War was to stop the German project to build a rail way from Berlin to Baghdad for oil transportation. After the demise of the Communist Bloc, new independent states came into existence, frontiers had changed, and Yugoslavia's borders with the USSR had to be changed too.

As the US has been the most advanced and the most powerful state politically, economically, militarily, technologically and culturally, it has assigned to itself the

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<sup>45</sup> Pierre-Marie. Gallois et al. Guerre dans les Balkans : La nouvelle Europe Germano-américaine. (Paris : ellipses,), p. 62.

role of world leadership, and the other developed states have to share the costs of the ‘burden’. The US has played a seminal role in the making, unmaking and the remaking of Yugoslavia. It has used the soft power (Democracy Promotion) and hard power (US-led NATO) to reshuffle the frontiers of the region and to open it to free-market economy. Thus, Yugoslavia underwent different reforms of marketization, democratization and stabilization that correspond to the norms of the West. Democratization is just one aspect that we approach in order to understand the effects that reshaped this region of the world. As explained previously, ‘Democracy Promotion’ is a policy the Clinton administration adopted for dealing with foreign affairs. In theory it focuses on respecting human rights, establishing the state of law, and imposing vote transparency. In parallel, there is the democratization/liberalization of the economy for foreign investment. In practice, it is what we are going to see in our analysis by trying to answer the following questions: what were the reasons behind ‘promoting democracy’ in Yugoslavia? What was the US role in the process of ‘promoting democracy’? What were the implications of this policy in this region of the world? And how did the US process in democratizing Yugoslavia?

### **I. 3. 1. Making, Remaking and Unmaking Yugoslavia:**

Three processes were in the making after the collapse of the Soviet Union: spreading the democratic ideals and the spirit of free-market economy, the enlargement of NATO, and the dismantling of Yugoslavia<sup>46</sup>. The latter was achieved by perpetuating two crises (in Bosnia and Kosovo) in order to weaken the federal government in Serbia, and it was somehow successful. The US as an emerged world power was to achieve their European eastward advancement where the Soviet Union constituted an obstacle. When approaching the Yugoslav ‘crisis’<sup>47</sup> we cannot just ignore the role

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid, p. 20.

<sup>47</sup> The task of choosing titles for historical events is difficult especially when the reason and the cause for the event is not evident, whether what stir up Yugoslavia, for example come from the outside rather than from the inside of the country. Some refer to the Yugoslav ‘crisis’ (official title) by a war, or the ‘Kosovo War’ by ‘the War on Serbia’.

ideologies played in the creation of the Federation. All the different nationalisms that constituted Yugoslavia (Serbian, Croatian, and Albanian nationalism) contributed a lot in the development of their respected nation-states in the nineteenth century especially after the unification of Germany and Italy. Yugoslav nationalisms owe their existence to Karl Marx (theory) and Bismarck (practice). However, post Second World War Communism had blurred those national aspirations and created a homogeneous entity that resulted in a fake peace. With the end of the USSR, the Warsaw Pact countries started to adapt (or convert to liberalism) themselves to the New World Order (the order of economic and political US made globalization) and chose the ‘Third Way’<sup>48</sup> to cope with the then situation; that implies the rejection of state socialism (for Marx as for Lenin, the ultimate stage of Communism is the deterioration of the state).

When Yugoslavia was created in 1946 it consisted of Serbia, Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia- Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. This federation of the six republics was under Communist rule, having the Croat Josip Broz Tito as a president. Some historians translated this as a scheme of the Western powers to undermine Serbian nationalism which is pro-Russian. This could be explained by the crisis that happened between Stalin and Tito in 1948 about the type of Socialism that Yugoslavia had to choose and which resulted in Stalin’s denunciation of Yugoslav Communism. As a matter of fact, Tito started co-operating with the West, as aforementioned, politically, economically and militarily. Consequently, Yugoslavia started to undergo a set of reforms that put it on the way of liberalization, especially in 1965, the year that started to be known as ‘the reform year’<sup>49</sup>. Since then reformism would run out of control.

The peaceful entity that was created by Communism was stirred up by the strict economic reforms that struck the country. In the eighties (post-Titism), the unhealthy economic situation of Yugoslavia was caused by the sharp move to liberalism, not embedded in strong state institutions, consequently agitated the different nationalities. While ethnic groups can be advantageous to a country, they can also be a curse to it especially when the state institutions do not play the role of equal treatment towards

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<sup>48</sup> Anthony. Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998)

<sup>49</sup> Leslie. Benson, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

the different ethnic groups that constitute it, by absorbing the difference and have neutrality as a policy. Liberalism paved its way in former Yugoslavia through the bank loans Tito used to receive from the US. Those loans had hidden the economic disability and its unhealthy condition. Until nineteen eighty-three, the extent of Yugoslavia's foreign debt was officially acknowledged<sup>50</sup> and the country was 'obliged'<sup>51</sup> to resort to the IMF loans, under the strict conditions of restructuring the economy and devaluing the dinar. This situation created animosities between the northern rich industrialized republics and the southern poor republics. This economic transformation determined and conditioned the break up of Yugoslavia in the nineteen nineties. Susan Woodward explained the cause of the Yugoslav conflict as:

[...] not the result of historical animosities and it is not a return to pre-communist past; it is the result of the politics of transforming a socialist society to a market economy and democracy. A critical element of this failure was economic decline, caused largely by a program intended to resolve a foreign debt crisis... Normal political conflicts over economic resources between central and regional governments and over economic and political reforms of the debt-repayment package became constitutional conflicts and then a crisis of the state itself among politicians who were unwilling to compromise... Nationalism became a political force when leaders in the republics sought popular support as bargaining chips in federal disputes.<sup>52</sup>

Many have attributed this break up to the rise of Slobodan Milosevic and the resurgence of Serbian nationalism and calling for the building up of a 'Greater Serbia', which was just a tool in the hands of those who had got an interest in that. What is to be focused on is that all the republics aspired to nationalistic projects for building a Great Croatia, a Great Serbia, and a Great Albania. What the great powers had done in Yugoslavia was to use these nationalistic divisions and internal conflicts (and their complex constructions helped them a lot) as a vector for their regional strategy<sup>53</sup>. And it is misleading to think that the main reason for the Yugoslav conflicts was due to

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> The eighties were the decade when the monetarist spirit was dominating, spread by the couple Reagan/Thatcher, under the slogan '*there is no alternative!*' to the free-market economy model.

<sup>52</sup> Susan. Woodward, cited in K. Fouskas, Vassilis. Zones of Conflicts: US Foreign Policy in the Balkans and the Greater Middle East. (London: Pluto Press, 2003), p. 43.

<sup>53</sup> Pierre-Marie. Gallois et al, op. cit., p. 86.

internal divisions, and that nothing had been prepared abroad by the IMF and the World Bank, the two international institutions that created this economic and social destabilization with the contribution of Germany and Turkey (Washington major allies in the region). All that was done in order to have a minimum of Russian influence in the region, and that was by pointing at and accusing Serbian nationalism.

The manipulation of ethnic groups was possible by playing nationalisms against one another. Since the creation of the First Yugoslavia, the West supported Serbian nationalism and had seen in it the best guarantee for the future democratic world<sup>54</sup>. However, by the end of the twentieth century, the West switched its support to the Croatian and Albanian nationalisms, and Serbian nationalism underwent a wave of historical distortions and accusations even in the Hague Tribunal<sup>55</sup>! (Now history is to be judged in courts!). Actually, though Serbia had the aspiration to unite its people, this unification couldn't be in any way imperialistic because of the economic (agrarian society) and political conditions that would not permit it to impose its vision upon any foreign country, contrary to the US imperialism which has all the attributes for such a will. Besides, there is no political or official document such as a constitutional program that shows the intentions for building a Great Serbia, and no nationalist parties came to power to establish such a will<sup>56</sup>. As we do not identify the Tea party and the Ku Klux Klan with the US, and we do not identify le Front National with France, we can, in no way, identify Serbian extremist parties (which constitute a minority) to Serbia.

Napoleon the Third said in 1852: 'Empire is peace'<sup>57</sup>. This dictum became the wish the US wants to fulfill once enlarging its influence worldwide. The New World Order aims at establishing a Pax Americana and hegemony through the international organizations that adopted democratization as a pattern for state building after conflicts. The theorists of democratization think that democratic countries are less likely to go to war with each other, and would increase peace in the world. The series of bombardments the US embarked on (Tripoli 1986, Iraq 1991-98, Soudan and

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<sup>54</sup> Great Serbia; Truth, Misconceptions, Abuses, (Belgrade: The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 2004)

<sup>55</sup> Ibid, p. 79.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid, p. 68.

<sup>57</sup> Ernest. Weibel, op. cit., p.

Afghanistan 1998, Yugoslavia 1999) was definitely not a haphazard choice, but a planned policy. As far as Yugoslavia is concerned, the US made of Serbian nationalism a scapegoat and had chosen to support Albanian nationalism in the Kosovo War. This was enunciated by President Clinton on March 24 as: ‘*the protection of the Albanian population in Kosovo against the exactions of the repressive Serb apparatus*’<sup>58</sup>. Of course, the aim was to put away the Serbs and undermine their power for a better control of the Balkans.

In the last decade of the twentieth century, there was a situation of uncertainty and a misunderstanding of the depth and the meaning of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the reunification of Germany and the implications they had on contemporary civilization. Madeleine Albright stated in *The Birth of the Global Nation*:

I am an optimist. I believe that unity will prevail: in the next century the nations such as they are today shall be superannuated. All the states of the world shall recognize one single, global authority. The term *citizen of the world* forged in the 20<sup>th</sup> century shall receive its full meaning in the 21<sup>st</sup> century... All the nations are basically purely social arrangements, the result of adaptation to changing circumstances. Albeit occasionally appeared as something permanent, bordering on sacred, they are in fact artificial and temporary.<sup>59</sup>

This excerpt summarizes the intentions of a globalized world, having international organizations under the leadership of one global power and at the service of its orders. For instance, nation-states borders are subject to transformation in accordance to the geostrategic interests of the US. The United Nations, NATO, and the EU won their legitimacy when they adopted after the Cold War the language of democratization, marketization for a globalized world, and any state that wishes to become modern has to adopt the same ethics. Even the ex- Communist countries and communist parties in the West shifted their ideology towards liberalism in what is called the ‘Third Way’, by trying to adapt to post-Cold War imperatives, which means the decline of the role of the state and its sovereignty. The European Union can serve as an example to explain this phenomenon. Actually, once joining the EU, the states have to give up

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<sup>58</sup>Pierre-Marie. Gallois et al, op. cit., p. 55.

<sup>59</sup>Great Serbia; Truth, Misconceptions, Abuses, op. cit., p. 87.



part of their sovereignty to serve the Union, the fact that the UK was against in many occasions. Despite the economic advantages it may provide, the EU tends to create a regional identity at the expense of the diverse national identities they constitute it, as a French historian wondered:

Does the use of the concept of European identity seek only to strengthen the propagation of an ideology in the name of respect for diversity and plurality which seeks the uniformity and standardization of operating modes of companies at a global level, the eradication of particularities and thereby the weakening of the states?<sup>60</sup>

### **I. 3. 2. Geostrategy: A Post-Cold War Necessity:**

The importance of geostrategy after the Cold War has become vital for dealing with world affairs. With the imposition of economic globalization, i.e. the hegemony of free-market spirit, geoeconomy has become as important as geostrategy. The Balkans had always been subject to these two disciplines, though they had not been developed to such a degree in the previous centuries. Presently, the geographic position of the Balkans and the sea routes the region connects maintain the great powers in a constant state of war for their control. Thus, following the post-Cold War period, the US made the Balkans amongst its priorities in the execution of its program for the Great Middle East. For this, all US rivals had to be brought under control because the US was in need of a strong France, a strong Germany, a strong China, and Turkey<sup>61</sup>. Indeed, the plan is costly and needs a reliable supervision. Post-Cold War priority was EU enlargement under the supervision of the unified Germany and the leadership of the US, the fact that was going to help her to contain definitely the weakened Russia, which despite the division of the Union, Russia was still fighting for the preservation of the most important regions of influence in Eastern Europe through the Commonwealth of Independent States<sup>62</sup> (CIS).

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<sup>60</sup> Pierre-Marie. Gallois et al, op. cit., p.

<sup>61</sup> Zbigniew. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives, (New York: Basic Books, 1998)

<sup>62</sup> Ibid, p. 88.

It is said that in times of strength, empires act in a conservative way, imposing their will upon other peoples, but in periods of weakness they tend to use the language of peace and humanism<sup>63</sup>. It was the case of the British Empire and now the US follow the same path. With the ‘victory’ of the US, it has reached the apogee that enabled it to have ‘full spectrum dominance’<sup>64</sup>. With Francis Fukuyama’s theory on ‘the end of history’ incarnated in the US, in part of this victory lies decline and disintegration, especially with the economic crisis of 2008 that showed the fragile nature of the capitalist system. Right after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which its existence during the Cold War was vital for the US survival, the Department of Defense in nineteen ninety-two traced a road map that shows the intentions of post-Cold War US foreign policy. The document entitled *Defense Planning Guidance for the Fiscal Year 1994-1999*:

Our first objective is to prevent the emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere that can pose a threat to the order which once was posed by the Soviet Union... Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring competitors from ever aspiring to a larger regional or global role that is ultimately backed by the U.S., they must be able to act independently when collective action can be orchestrated or when a crisis requires a quick response.<sup>65</sup>

The piece shows that the next battle field for gaining regional influence was Eastern Europe and the crises that hit Yugoslavia confirmed what had been planned. The question that has to be asked is why the choice of Yugoslavia? In order to answer the question, one has to have a closer look at Serbia which is the heart of Yugoslavia, and it has always been, through its history and geographic position, at the heart of the events in the Balkans. On the one hand, Serbia is the point where the Danube and the Save flow. Moreover, Serbia has always been the country of economic exchange where Central Europe and Asia Minor meet. On the other hand, it is the territory upon which the Russian, the Ottoman and the Austro-Hungarian empires went to war in

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<sup>63</sup> Great Serbia; Truth, Misconceptions, Abuses, op. cit., p. 55.

<sup>64</sup> William. Engdahl, Full Spectrum Dominance: Totalitarian Democracy in the New World Order. ( Third Millennium Press 2009), <[http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/American\\_Empire/Full\\_Spectrum\\_Dominance.html](http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/American_Empire/Full_Spectrum_Dominance.html)>

<sup>65</sup> Pierre-Marie. Gallois et al, op-cit., p.

order to open a way out to the Adriatic Sea<sup>66</sup>. All these characteristics make of Serbia a geostrategic area that should be considered by the competing powers.

The series of crises that blasted Yugoslavia had been covered by humanistic intentions which are a tool in foreign policy to make interventions for the sake of geostrategic interests more humane. In the case of the US during the Bosnia and the Kosovo crises, humanist interventions helped to have the support of US public opinion and exported the image for the international opinion about a philanthropist, altruistic America that is caring about human rights and the preservation of global ethics. What is controversial is that in the Dayton Agreement in nineteen ninety-five, the US ‘negotiated’ the division of the Bosnia on an ethnic basis, which is in contradiction with peaceful coexistence, and though Kosovo asked for autonomy in nineteen ninety-two, the issue did not figure on the agreement, but later on, it resulted in the Kosovo War. Now it has become evident that human rights count little in the eyes of politicians and foreign policy strategists. When Zbigniew Brzezinski was asked about the contradictory views he had when he wrote *The Grand Chessboard* with a realist spirit, and the position he had during the Carter administration for the defense of human rights, he answered: *‘I elaborated that doctrine [defending human rights during the Carter administration] in agreement with President Carter, as it was the best way to destabilize the Soviet Union. And it worked.’*<sup>67</sup> Indeed, Wilsonian Pragmatism was the policy the Clinton administration adopted in dealing with foreign policy, and it was exactly the same way they approached the Yugoslav crises. This is because when great powers go to war, *‘they do so for reasons of national interests’*<sup>68</sup>, no moral or ethnic principles appear in the equation. In addition, winning the Cold War is one thing, and the control of market, production, transportation (of products that are considered of primary importance and the reason for national survival such as oil) is another thing. And when tackling oil, the strategic role of the Balkans becomes clearer, for it: *‘constitutes a significant transport route for oil and gas, and it is thus a strategic*

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid, p.

<sup>67</sup> Vassilis. K. Fouskas, *Zones of Conflict: US Foreign Policy in the Balkans and the Greater Middle East*, (London: Pluto Press, 2003), p. 2.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid, p. 12.

*bridge. In this context the Balkans can be viewed as the geopolitical gatekeeper between Western and Eastern Eurasia, acquiring a security dimension of paramount importance for NATO and the US.*<sup>69</sup> Those aims clarify the purpose behind the Kosovo campaign. The military intervention was to be carried out with or without the will of the Serbian government because the implications of the war are of a security order. It was the first intervention that enabled the US to settle military basis in the region of the Balkans. It was a necessary war in order to affirm the credibility of the NATO and US leadership<sup>70</sup>.

However, what the US feared the most was Russia's foreign policy after the Cold War was to keep the orthodox bloc strong in the Balkans. But the encirclement of Yugoslavia through Muslim Albanian and Turkish expansion, with the support of the US could limit Russia and enclose it in the Eurasian terrestrial mass, with no access to the seas<sup>71</sup>. After the end of the Cold War, the US considered the Russian issue as a 'Black whole'; with the independence of Ukraine (cultural, linguistic and religious heritage) and Azerbaijan (the door to the Caspian Sea), Russia lost parts of its geostrategic and geoeconomic control<sup>72</sup>, especially with the configuration and withdrawal of its frontiers. Thus the aim of the US was to undermine the Russian imperialistic intentions through its containment; in other words, to make Russia join the European Union and bring it under the leadership of the US. Though the task proved easy to realize under Boris Yeltsin, the election of Vladimir Putin as a prime minister in nineteen ninety-nine changed the equation. During the 1990, the US tried by all means to prevent Russia from having a say on world affairs, and it had worked to prevent any political alliances (German-Russian, Franco-Russian, and Russian-Chinese) that would threaten the American hegemony in Europe or Asia Minor. Thus all alliances are to be kept under constant supervision for the safety of the US national interest. Though the US Cold War foreign policies contained Communism, they did not entail the destruction of Russia, and the liberal economic reforms in China strengthened rather than weakened the Communist- led Chinese state.

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid, p. 24.

<sup>70</sup> Pierre-Marie. Gallois et al, op. cit., p. 78.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid, p. 36.

<sup>72</sup> Zbigniew. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 87.

As far as the EU is concerned, it constitutes for the US the political and economic device for European eastward expansion. America assigned this regional role to Germany rather than France because their national interests are the same. Since its first unification in the nineteenth century and through the twentieth century, Germany aspired to move eastward and create a federation (the point on which the US was against) of European states under its leadership. After the Cold War, this dream was to be possible only under the security of the US. For America, it is advantageous to have an enlarged Europe but without political power. The US intervention in Bosnia could be read as a reaction to the Maastricht Treaty of nineteen ninety-two. The latter was the first step for the states of the European Union in which they had shown political and security aspirations. The Bosnian Crisis was the first political challenge to the EU in which they were incapable to solve, and it represented an opportunity to the US to limit the security and political priorities of the EU. As we mentioned before, though the crises took place in Yugoslavia, on a European soil, their implications went beyond the Federation. With the division of the Soviet Union, the routes of oil and gas fields were opened to US, German, French, Chinese and Turkish investments. This does not exclude the Russians who were not ready to withdraw from the geostrategic chessboard. Two opposed pipeline projects were to be implemented. On the one hand we have the Moscow-Everan-Teheran axis; on the other we have the Baku-Ankara-Washington axis. The two axes struggled for the considerable oil interests in the Caspian region. The first works on transporting the oil to the Georgian port Batumi via Novorossiysk. The second consists of transporting oil from Baku via Georgia to the Turkish port in Ceyhan<sup>73</sup>. The War in Kosovo was to follow. We develop this point later in details in the second chapter.

### **I. 3.3. The ‘Carrot and Stick’ Policy:**

Democracy promotion in Europe in general and Yugoslavia in particular was perpetuated by agents (actors) and institutions. After the Second World War, the US had much cooperation with the Yugoslav President Tito, on whom they counted for

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<sup>73</sup> Pierre-Marie. Gallois et al, op. cit., p.

reforming the economy. The IMF and the World Bank, through bank loans, succeeded in imposing the conditions that moved Yugoslavia from socialism to liberalism. After 1990, the US relied on the unified Germany in Central Europe and assigned to it the role of the European Eastward Enlargement, and Turkey had a region of influence in Asia Minor to stop the Russians and be of use as the Trojan horse in the Middle East. By succeeding in bringing Yugoslavia into naught in 1992 (Serbia and Montenegro), and now with the independence of the Kosovo territory in 2012, the US increased its influence on the Balkans region.

The US was concerned that a unified Germany would seek an alliance with Russia in order to find an agreement on the Yugoslav issue right after the end of the Cold War and by this ending the American influence in the Balkans<sup>74</sup>. This is what explains the net refusal of the US to the French demand for managing and commanding the “South” (of Europe); thus, Germany received the American mandate for managing Central and Eastern Europe. The US was not only worried, but all it was necessary for it to make western powers share the costs and the ‘burden’. As Joseph Nye exclaimed, the US *‘cannot got it alone’*<sup>75</sup>, it needs the cooperation of Europe (and later Russia once contained and brought under the umbrella of the EU) to establish its hegemony in Eurasia. However, assigning to Turkey such a role is due to the fact that it constitutes the pivot in the Middle East. If Brzezinski and Jacques Attali insisted on the rapprochement of Turkey and Israel and the joining of Turkey to the EU, it was for the protection of the Middle East in general and Israel in particular<sup>76</sup>.

Besides the diplomatic and political procedures it undertook in dealing with the Yugoslav issue, the US resorted to a psychological arm by demonizing the Serbs and Serbian nationalism, an old tradition since the nineteenth century. Indeed, the Serbs had been subject to demonization by the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Croats. After 1990, the Serbs were compared to Nazis and Slobodan Milosevic to Hitler. Through the CNN effect, a true campaign of demonization was launched against the nationalism that was for a unified Yugoslavia. This was the reason why the West

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<sup>74</sup> Zbigniew. Brzezinski , op. cit., p. 55.

<sup>75</sup> Cited in K. Fouskas. Vassilis, op. cit., p. 29.

<sup>76</sup> Pierre-Marie. Gallois et al, op cit., p.71.

legitimized Croatian and Albanian nationalisms over the Serbian one; it simply did not serve their interests.

A democratized Yugoslavia is possible only when divided and re-built on the EU image by having free-exchange zones between the different newly independent states<sup>77</sup>. Right after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Slovenia declared independence in 1990, Croatia in 1991, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia in 1992. Germany was the first country to acknowledge the newly independent Croatia and Slovenia. But in 1991, the Bush administration passed the Foreign Operations Appropriation Act which stipulated that any republic within the Yugoslav Federation which does not declare independence within six months will lose US financial support. The aid of course went to the republics directly, not to the Yugoslav government, which means that the US imposed economic sanctions on Yugoslavia in order to pressure it to give independence to the republics<sup>78</sup>. The economic and military sanctions culminated when the UN and the EU followed the US on this decision. Now, with the third Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), after the ousting of Slobodan Milosevic, the US aid to Serbia was put under three conditions which were: cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia ICTY; ending support for separate Bosnian Serb institutions; and protecting minority rights and the release of political prisoners<sup>79</sup>. The delegation of nation-state responsibilities to transnational institutions end the role and the sovereignty of the state, and put its service.

What should be mentioned as a source for US intervention in Yugoslavia is the well prepared platform that was reserved to its dismantling as a part of the New World Order. In 1984, during the Reagan administration, the White House planned for a new way to approaching Yugoslavia. Ronald Reagan had approved the National Security

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<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> Michael. Parenti, ' The Rational Destruction of Yugoslavia ' , <<http://www.michaelparenti.org/yugoslavia.html> >.

<sup>79</sup> Steven. Woehrel, ' CRS Report for Congress: Conditions on U. S. Aid to Serbia ' , 2008, <[www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21686.pdf](http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21686.pdf) >.

Decision Directive on *'US Policy towards Yugoslavia'*<sup>80</sup>. The memorandum was classified and was released later. The memorandum states that *'an independent, economically viable, and militarily capable Yugoslavia serves Western and US interest'*. It develops three points that the US should follow in dealing with Yugoslavia. The first point is to *'promote the trend toward an effective, market-oriented Yugoslav economic structure'*<sup>81</sup>. This is congruent with the IMF structural adjustment programs imposed upon Yugoslavia and that the workers objected to by demonstrating. The second point is about encouraging *'Yugoslavia to play a moderating role within the nonaligned movement and to counter Cuban and Soviet influence in that organization'*<sup>82</sup>. This might have contributed and precipitated the process of the Soviet demise. The third point is about military cooperation and the US arms supply to Yugoslavia.

In order to translate this memorandum into actions, the 'Project Democracy' was going to be of use later on, in implementing changes in Yugoslavia. The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) with its core institutes: the International Republican Institute (IRI), the International Democratic Institute for International Affairs, the Centre for International Private Enterprise and the American Center for International Labor Solidarity started working on the Yugoslav soil with what the US considered as democratic movements. Paul B. McCarthy, the representative of the NED, stated in a conference in nineteen ninety eight:

The NED has been assisting democracy building programs in the former Yugoslavia since 1988 and in Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo since the disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation. During the wars of Yugoslav succession and the U. N. embargo, NED was one of few Western organizations, along with the Soros Foundation and some European foundations, to make grants in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and to work with local NGOs and independent media throughout the country.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> Ronald. Reagan, 'NSDD on Yugoslavia' , (March 19, 1984), <<http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-133.htm>>

<sup>81</sup> Ibid, p. 2.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid

<sup>83</sup> 'How the US Created a Corrupt Opposition in Serbia' , <[emperors-clothes.com/news/ned-1.htm](http://emperors-clothes.com/news/ned-1.htm)>



Knowing the fact that the NED is partly funded by the US Congress, it shows the interests the US had in Yugoslavia that were geopolitical, strategic and economic at the same time. Under the guise of ‘Democracy Promotion’, the NED could even intervene politically by helping financially and strategically the Serbian opposition against Slobodan Milosovic. In the same conference, McCarthy continues developing the idea of assisting the democratic political opposition:

The West should help the democratic political opposition develop a concrete program which offers positive alternatives to the destructive policies of the Milosovic regime. Democratic think tanks, independent research organizations and expert groups should be supported to develop these alternative policy recommendations. Furthermore, dissemination of this new democratic thinking to the broad public must be encouraged by fostering close cooperation among the think tanks, opposition parties and the independent media. Think tank progress focusing on practical policy development can also be helpful in identifying and nurturing new leaders. In addition, assistance in policy formation, U.S. organizations like the IRI and NDI should continue to provide opposition political parties with expertise in coalition building, message development, media outreach, improving the operations of party branch offices and election monitoring.<sup>84</sup>

Years later, Yugoslavia saw the birth of the students’ movement Otpor<sup>85</sup> that succeeded in ousting Milosovic and bringing to power the opposition party- the Democratic Party of Serbia. Otpor (literally “resistance”) and the Democratic Party of Serbia both received financial assistance and training from the NED, in addition to the Serb Nationalists and the Albanian Separatists. This is how the US NGOs intervened legally in Yugoslavia in order to pursue the ‘democratic’ reforms that Milosevic did not judge useful and good for Yugoslavia.

In addition to implicating NGOs in international relations, NATO played a seminal role in bringing apart the Yugoslav Federation. It undertook military actions while questions about the meaning of its existence were asked. What is noticeable is that NATO’s role developed from a defensive to an interventionist role. Under the Dayton Accord, the US through NATO obtained the first role in the military field; the

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<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

<sup>85</sup> Tariq. Ramadan, *L’ Islam et le réveil arabe*, (Paris : Presses du Châtelet, 2012), p.

Europeans were granted the High Representative; the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was given the elections, arms control and regional stability<sup>86</sup>. Besides the role played by NATO in the Balkans, the EU adopted the ‘Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe’<sup>87</sup> to build the post-conflict states. Even the adoption of the term ‘South Eastern Europe’ instead of the ‘Balkans’ shows the intentions to join post-conflict states to the EU, and the first step was by getting rid of the term that has an oriental, eastern connotation and recalls the times of conflicts<sup>88</sup>. Of course, there had been no dialogue or negotiations over the Pact; it was just imposed by the International Community upon the Balkans.

All the different US-led international institutions continue to provide conditional assistance for more reforms in Serbia after ousting Milosevic, and with the presence of the transnational institutions such as the KFOR or the United Nations International Administration mission in Kosovo in order ‘to preserve political and economic development’, make of Kosovo and the other newly independent republics of Yugoslavia protectorates of US imperialism, as the head of the Partnership for Peace announced that his party’s policy was to establish a western protectorate; he considers that ‘*Macedonia fills all the criteria to become a protectorate governed by the West*’<sup>89</sup>. This would help the US to finish its task in the Balkans if all state leaders behave as such, and then the US would preserve its geostrategic interests through Democracy Promotion.

#### **I. 4. Media Role in Politics and in Shaping U. S. Public Opinion**

In a democracy, the debate over communication between the government and the public is still not established. Some researchers in communication claim that governments in a democracy are transparent and the public is well informed to choose

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<sup>86</sup> Mamoru. Sadakata, ‘The Balkans between the EU and NATO: Focusing on the Former Yugoslavia’, *Romanian Journal of European Affairs*. Vol. 6, NO. 3, 2006, pp. 38- 44. <[http://www.ier.ro/documente/rjea\\_vol6\\_no3/RJEA\\_Vol6\\_No3\\_The\\_Balkans\\_between\\_the\\_EU\\_and\\_NATO\\_Focusing\\_on\\_the\\_Former\\_Yugoslavia.pdf](http://www.ier.ro/documente/rjea_vol6_no3/RJEA_Vol6_No3_The_Balkans_between_the_EU_and_NATO_Focusing_on_the_Former_Yugoslavia.pdf)>.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

<sup>89</sup> Pierre-Marie. Gallois et al, op. cit., p. 93.

freely and decide for its lot and for the country's destiny. Others explain the complexity that characterizes democratic governments in imposing their view, of a given issue, upon the public and make use of certain means of communication to shape a 'public opinion' that would adopt the same view. Indeed, unlike dictatorships that are characterized by imposition, the management of public opinion in democracies proves more complicated and sophisticated, since it relies on engineering consent<sup>90</sup> and persuasion. As the US is considered one of the most 'democratic' countries in the world, it will help us in showing the nature of their government, and how it uses or misuses the media in formulating their domestic and foreign policies.

Speaking about US media without referring to Edward Bernays<sup>91</sup> would provide us with an incomplete analysis of the relation between US government and US public opinion. Edward Bernays was the founder of professional Public Relations at the beginning of the twentieth century. As a publicist, he applied the techniques of marketization on the propagation of any idea. Thus, propaganda was established as a science that could be used by anyone to achieve a given goal (religious goals, economic or political). Bernays regarded propaganda as: *'a perfectly legitimate form of human activity. Any society, whether it be social, religious or political, which is possessed of certain beliefs, and sets out to make them known, either by the spoken or written words, is practicing propaganda'*<sup>92</sup>. Propaganda has been largely used in the USA by religious groups, secular groups, political parties, the different economic and financial conglomerates and the department of defense. Each sets its own agenda and work on making it acceptable by the general public. In this regard, Walter Lippmann considers propaganda as *'a regular organ'* in setting domestic and foreign policies by the different US governmental and non-governmental bodies. Unlike E. L. Bernays who was for an elite government (a government ruled by technocrats) to decide for the public, W. Lippmann was against this idea and considered it as an element that

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<sup>90</sup> Edward. Bernays, 'The Engineering of Consent', <[http://gromitinc.com/lego/Library/Engineering\\_of\\_consent.pdf](http://gromitinc.com/lego/Library/Engineering_of_consent.pdf)>.

<sup>91</sup> L. Bernays, Edward is a counsel on public relations, a profession he contributed in its foundation. He served many governments, trade associations, and profit & non-profit organizations. He is the author of Propaganda, Crystallizing Public Opinion, Speak Up for Democracy, and Take Your Place at the Peace Table.

<sup>92</sup> Edward L. Bernays, Propaganda, 1928.

weakens the democratic process since manipulation of public opinion is legitimized and negates free will on which democracy was built upon<sup>93</sup>.

For Bernays, the legitimacy of an elite government sprang from the nature of the public who generally accept old ideas and traditions, and who is afraid of change, knowing that change sounds with development and the US cannot develop if it sticks to what the majority wants; those who aspire to move forward and suggest new ideas are those who are going to constitute the elite that will be in charge for engineering consent. Moreover, Bernays made of the techniques of mass production applicable on media in order to persuade the masses of a given issue. He believed that in an age of mass production, *'there must be techniques for the mass distribution for ideas. Public opinion can be moved, directed, and formed by [propaganda].'*<sup>94</sup> In relation to this, Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky define mass media as a machine which produces ideas, concepts and views, and transmit them to the general public who would conform to them. Therefore mass media:

serve as a system for communicating messages and symbols to the general populace. It is their function to amuse, entertain and inform, and to inculcate individuals with the values, beliefs, and codes of behavior that will integrate them into the institutional structures of the larger society. In a world of concentrated interest, to fulfill this role requires systematic propaganda.<sup>95</sup>

Media and the communication field in the US had been established since the beginning of the twentieth century and they developed in parallel with the development of democracy. In general, US public opinion regards democracy as an elected government, respecting the norm of 'checks and balances' in ruling the country according to the federal model of government. Therefore, the US believe that their development and success is due to this democratic model (that was the sum of their

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<sup>94</sup> Edward L. Bernays, 'Manipulating Public Opinion: The Why and the How' . *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol 33, Issue6, (May1928), pp. 958-971.< <http://truty.org/PDFs/Media/BERNAYS-ManipulatingPublicOpinion.pdf>> .

<sup>95</sup> Edward S. Herman, Noam. Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media. (London: Vintage Books, 1994), p. 1.

cultural heritage and the different experiences the US passed through), and that for this reason, their duty and responsibility is to export it to the world. Thus, those countries whose model of government does not correspond to theirs, are not truly democratic, which means not developed.

In fact, US media development worldwide started after the end of World War Two. Efforts to promote the notion that the mass media facilitate the adoption of a democratic mode of government began to have adherents in the US and abroad. Indeed, in theory, mass media hold governments accountable to the democratic principles. But the media approach when dealing with foreign policy takes a different turn; a turn that has to do more with the balance of powers at times, rivalry between world powers other times, than with democratic values. One can hardly forget that the same powers that hold today's satellites and control news flow were the same imperialistic powers that '*controlled physical transportation around the globe and which thereby maintained contact with their centers of trade and their colonies*'<sup>96</sup>, during the nineteenth and the twentieth century. Anthony Smith claims that the news agencies of the USA (Associated Press and United Press International), Great Britain (Reuters) and France (Agence France Press) used to share '*spheres of influence... [This era] was to end, and an era of open competition began. The inhibited zones of influence, nevertheless remained, and each agency sought to maximize the advantages of the markets with which history endowed it*'<sup>97</sup>. This is true to the extent that today's world notions of democracy and development correspond to free-market definitions promoted by the US and its allies in most regions of the world.

US efforts to develop an independent media sector in Eastern Europe began after the fall of the Berlin Wall in nineteen eighty-nine. Independent media were to enable the Warsaw Pact countries to transit to a 'democratic' system of government. Public (governmental) and private (non-governmental) bodies, were to fund this operation of 'media democratization'. For instance, the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in 1983 during Reagan Era has for a mission to develop

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<sup>96</sup> Anthony. Smith, The Geopolitics of Information: How Western Culture Dominates the World. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 74.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid, p. 82.

independent media in Eastern Europe; and in 1999, NED's activities included scholarships for journalists to study US media practices, and provide targeted countries with media outlets; Bill Clinton created the International Public Information Group to “‘counteract’ [enemy] propaganda’ and bolster support of ‘foreign audiences in support of US foreign policy’ to ‘promote democracy abroad’ ‘Barber 1999)’”<sup>98</sup>. Piers Robinson believes that US ‘media democratization’ as a foreign policy was not carried out haphazardly; instead it is coherent with their geostrategic priorities to establish their hegemony.<sup>99</sup>

In the coming analysis, we will try to study the different techniques that govern the mass media; to know whether the US government uses media in shaping public opinion; to see whether the US government relies on public opinion in the formulation of its foreign policy; and to show how the US covered post-Cold War wars in Yugoslavia (in Bosnia 1995 and Kosovo 1999).

#### **I. 4. 1. Public Opinion Engineering:**

Public opinion has grown in importance since the Vietnam War, especially with the negative repercussions it had on the US government. Public support to implement a given policy (be it moral or immoral) would define the nature of results a government would have; any government who has not ‘*a sympathetic public opinion is bound to fail*’<sup>100</sup>(*Samuel Insall*). The latter necessitates a deep knowledge and consciousness of the nature of the US public: what is it composed of? What does it want? And how can it be managed? Indeed, managing public opinion has developed into a distinct branch of research in communication which is Public Relations that is governed by its own rules and techniques. The mass media (written press, radio and TV broadcasting, and internet) are the bridge between the public and the government. Both written press and

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<sup>98</sup> Michael. Barker, ‘Civil Society, Empowered or Overpowered: The Role of the Mass Media in “Promoting Democracy Worldwide’’, p. 5. <[http://www.adelaide.edu.au/anzca2006/conf\\_proceedings/barker\\_mj\\_civilsociety\\_empowered\\_overpowered.pdf](http://www.adelaide.edu.au/anzca2006/conf_proceedings/barker_mj_civilsociety_empowered_overpowered.pdf)> .

<sup>99</sup> Cited in, *Ibid*, p. 2.

<sup>100</sup> Cited in Edward L. Bernays. *Propaganda*, op. cit., p. 75.

broadcasting bodies are subject to techniques that enable them to reach the goals intended in the agenda-setting.

However, before discussing the media and their agenda-setting and techniques, it is important to note that in the US, the media do not only deal in politics and public affairs, but they are also concerned with business, finance and economy. As a matter of fact, formulating any policy in the US (be it internal or foreign) is subject to many interests merge. E. S. Herman and N. Chomsky say on this matter:

[...] the dominant media firms are quite large businesses; they are controlled by very wealthy people or by managers who are subject to sharp constraints by owners and other market-profit-oriented forces; and they are closely interlocked, and have important common interests, with other major corporations, banks, and government. This is the first powerful filter that will affect news choices.<sup>101</sup>

This first filter is to define the nature media agenda-setting and the frame it would adopt for their goal. Jim. A. Kuypers describes agenda-setting as *'the role the media play in focusing the public's attention on a particular object or issue over another object or issue...second level agenda-setting posits that the media can focus attention on particular attributes within a particular object or issue'*<sup>102</sup>. Agenda-setting includes the different techniques of public persuasion. For instance, the Manichean vision of the world, especially during wars, has been embedded in journalism since the Industrial Revolution and the appearance of the press. The good/evil dichotomy is present in any war coverage. In the mass media, techniques such as placement, context, fullness of treatment (or omission), and words choice affect public opinion to interpret an event in favor of a given policy. In their coverage, the mass media rely on 'facts' in order to make event coverage 'objective' and 'impartial'. However, facts take their meaning

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<sup>101</sup> Edward S. Herman, Noam. Chomsky, op. cit., p. 14.

<sup>102</sup> Jim A. Kuypers, *Press Bias and Politics: How the Media Frame Controversial Issues*, (London: Praeger Series in Political Communication, 2002), p. 8.

when framed and organized into a coherent story line that corresponds to the agenda-setting<sup>103</sup>.

The impact of the mass media is so huge on public opinion. They can manipulate it to vote for a government or against it. In theory, the mass media are considered as the ‘fourth Estate’ that safeguards and makes governments accountable to the democratic principles. However, their growing power which is linked to free-market imperatives and logic makes them compete with US government and work against it. The question ‘who pressures who?’ imposes itself. Do mass media pressure the US government in making policies? Or does the US government control the mass media for its ends?

Eytan Gilboa remarks that mass media researchers set two fundamental frameworks to distinguish between the role of the two powers (the Executive and the Fourth Estate): ‘News management’ and the ‘CNN effect’. We talk about News management when the US government uses the mass media as a tool in its hands such as the 1991 Gulf War, the 2001 Afghanistan War, and the 2003 Iraq War. Conversely, we talk about the ‘CNN effect’ when the US government is pressured by the media to intervene upon a ‘humanitarian’ basis such as the ‘humanitarian’ interventions in Bosnia 1995 and Kosovo 1999<sup>104</sup>. However, other researchers such as O’Hefferman think that there is a ‘*mutual exploitation*’ between the two powers. Media need US government leaking and information of foreign affairs, and the US government needs media to shape US public opinion for an issue. ‘*Consequently, the government and the media incorporate each other into their own existence, sometimes for mutual benefits, sometimes for mutual injury, often both at the same time*’<sup>105</sup>.

Though we still have not established who of the two powers has control upon the other (the Executive or the media), our real interest lies in the role of public opinion in the formulation of foreign policy in the US. There are two wings of realists that characterize the role of public opinion in foreign policy. On the one hand, we have the right-wing realists who regard public opinion as unimportant, given the ignorance of

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<sup>103</sup> Ibid, p. 7.

<sup>104</sup> Eytan. Gilboa, ‘Television News and U. S Foreign Policy’ , *Press/ Politics*, vol 8, issue 4, p. 97-113.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid, p. 97.



the public of foreign affairs. The latter is taken care of by the elite which knows what a proper policy the US should adopt. On the other hand, the left-wing realists consider public opinion an important element in dealing with foreign policy. The mass media are seen as playing a major role in manipulating public opinion. We adopt this view when dealing with media coverage of the wars in former Yugoslavia in the nineties. But, to what extent does this influence US government decision-making?

Former secretary of the state Madeleine Albright said that global decision making is influenced by public opinion because:

[...] you know what is going on and there is a real-time sense about things...it makes you have to respond to events much faster than it might be prudent because facts may come in incorrect but you do not have time to put them in context, so you respond to just a little nugget of fact, and then when you learn the context later, things change.<sup>106</sup>

From this statement we learn that the fates of countries that are subject to military interventions are between the hands of reporters of foreign affairs and the quality of their coverage. We wonder whether the US government ignores all the other agendas: geostrategic and economic, and relies only on the mass media. From the statement of the former Secretary of State Colin Powell in 1993, it seems that the mass media complement the government's agenda in dealing with foreign affairs; he argued that: *'live television coverage doesn't change the policy, but it does create the environment in which the policy is made.'*<sup>107</sup>

In fact, the US government does not only prepare public opinion to go for a given policy, but tries to enlarge its scope of persuasion and prepare international opinion to support it. The latter would be ensured through democratizing mass media techniques worldwide. Many agencies of media development abroad came into being; the largest one is the US Agency for International Development (USAID) which is divided into four regional bureaus: Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and the Near East, Europe and Eurasia, and Latin America and the Caribbean. The agency has also three functional

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<sup>106</sup> Cited in, *Ibid*, p. 99.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid*.

bureaus: Global Health; Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance; and Economic Growth, Agriculture and Trade<sup>108</sup>. In 1999, the Broadcasting Board of Governors became an independent federal agency for international audiences. It includes: the Voice of America, Alhurra, Radio Sawa, Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, and Radio TV Marti<sup>109</sup>. Of course, the democratization of the mass media entails the promotion of US political, economic and cultural views.

#### **I. 4.2. US Mass Media and the Former Yugoslav Wars (1990s):**

After the Cold War, the US mass media framing did not undergo a radical change; it kept the major frame lines intact and brought some modifications that would be adequate to a globalized world. Post-Cold War world wars coverage respected the US media Manichean world view; in the coverage of the Bosnia War 1995 and the Kosovo War 1999, the ‘good guys’ were on the side of the US and their allies who represented the democratic principles and development, and the ‘bad guys’ were the Serbs and their allies who stood for dictatorship and underdevelopment.

During the 1995 Bosnia War, media coverage explained that the roots of the war had ethnic origins. At the beginning of the Yugoslav conflict in 1991, people used to talk about the Orthodox Serbs who were opposed to the Catholic Croats and Bosnian Muslims, and then the conflict involved the alliance of the Bosnian Croats to the Bosnian Muslims against the Bosnian Serbs. This labeling insinuated that there was an ‘ethnic conflict’ in Yugoslavia. Besides the ‘ethnic’ framing of the conflict, the ambiguous US mass media coverage of the events taking place in Yugoslavia and their inability to explain the real origins of the conflict based on solid of evidence made them manipulate US public and international opinion by misusing some official information, which made the quality of the coverage sensational and biased<sup>110</sup>. For instance, media reports on the ‘Srebrenica massacre’ were variable; the number of Bosnian Muslim victims varied between 2, 500 and 8, 500. Then the official reports

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<sup>108</sup> *Center for the International Media Assistance (CIMA)*, National Endowment for Democracy (NED), December 2007, pp. 1-28.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid*, p. 12.

<sup>110</sup> Eytan. Gilboa, ‘Television News and U. S Foreign Policy’ , *Press/ Politics*, vol 8, issue 4, p. 97-113.

for the ICTY (the International Crime Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia) fixed it at 7,500. The number of victims was reported without any supporting evidence: satellite photos or names of the victims<sup>111</sup>. And reports considered the Bosnian Muslims the only worthy victims of the war; though there was ‘ethnic cleansing’ of 250,000 Serbs in Krajina in Croatia in August 1995. Some journalists omitted this fact and others argued that the Croats acted out of revenge.

However, during the Kosovo War 1999, media manipulation of information reached its peak. The techniques of labeling and information omission were to be used in order to gain US public and international consent for NATO intervention. Media coverage made the illegal intervention of NATO (without a UN mandate) legitimate and gave it a ‘humanitarian’ frame which made the intervention legal. Media frame of the Kosovo War opposed Albanians whom the US supported, to the Serbs who were still considered responsible for the problems caused in Yugoslavia, having as a leader the Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. Media description of Milosevic was based on demonization; he was referred to by words and phrases with negative connotations, such as: ‘evil dictator’, ‘a cruel and determined enemy’, ‘a brutal dictator’<sup>112</sup>, and ‘a new Hitler’ by Bill Clinton<sup>113</sup>. These bad connotations did not reflect the reality but were meant to shape an opinion supportive of intervention. However, labeling of the Albanian side as victimized was in favor of their cause. Before NATO attack on Kosovo, the US considered the Kosovo Liberation Army as a terrorist group who aimed to destabilize the region. In 1999, according to mass media, KLA members became ‘allies’ of the US and ‘rebels’ who were fighting for democracy. One can note here that the US Public Relations agency Ruder Finn was hired by the KLA and the Albanian lobby in the US to work on and sell the image of the KLA internationally. Francesca Morrison notes that the primary goal of the KLA was to establish a ‘Greater Albania’: *‘interviews with Ruder Finn, the media firm in New York, who were hired by the KLA, acknowledge that the ultimate goal of the KLA*

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<sup>111</sup> Edward S. Herman, The Srebrenica Massacre: Evidence, Context, Politics. (See <<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/>> ; and see <<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/legalcode>>

<sup>112</sup> Kuypers, Jim A, op. cit., p.10.

<sup>113</sup> Michael. Parenti, op. cit.,

*marketing campaign was for NATO military intervention against Serbia, Independence for Kosovo Albanians and the re-establishment of a Greater Albania*'<sup>114</sup>.

In addition to negative labeling, the media omitted some information that made the Serbs seem not in favor of negotiations and refuting the resolution of the conflict peacefully. Two omissions were made regarding the Rambouillet Peace Agreements (1999) that gathered the officials of Belgrade and KLA leaders. The first one was the omission of Appendix B<sup>115</sup> that would expose Yugoslavia to foreign intervention. The second was the 23<sup>rd</sup> March Serbian National Assembly counter proposal (the Serbs rejected the Rambouillet Agreements because of Appendix B) which consisted in resolving the conflict into the frame of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the UN, plus including the autonomy of Kosovo. Indeed, silencing the Serb side played a major role in the acceleration of the process of NATO intervention.

The media used numbers as a means of presenting 'facts' in order to convince people and show them the atrocities done by the Serbs. Different figures (number of deaths, destructions, mass graves etc) were reported from different sources during the Bosnian War and the Kosovo War that were exaggerated and served for the propaganda campaign. After the conflicts, experts gave new figures which were less than the figures reported by the media during the conflict. The following table shows the figures during the two Yugoslav wars and the new figures after the wars:

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<sup>114</sup> Francesca E. Morrisson, 'Paramilitaries, Propaganda, and Pipelines : The NATO Attack on Kosovo and Serbia', 1999, <<http://www.wou.edu/las/socsci/history/Senior%20Seminar%20Thesis%20Papers%20HST%20499/2007/thesis07/Francesca%20Morrison.pdf> >

<sup>115</sup> Appendix B: 'NATO' s personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY, including associated airspace and territorial waters. This shall include, but not limited to, the right of bivouac, maneuver, billet and utilization of any areas or facilities as required for support, training, and operation.'

<b>Bosnia War 1995</b>		<b>Kosovo War 1999</b>	
<b>During</b>	<b>After</b>	<b>During</b>	<b>After</b>
Raped women by Bosnian Serbs soldiers between 25,000 & 100,000	Helsinki Watch noted that the figure was given by the Bosnian and Croatian governments and might be exaggerated	State Department reports on mass graves and 100,000 to 500,000 missing Albanians	Independent sources (experts in surveillance photography disconfirmed the information and judged it an exaggeration
7,500 to 8,500 bodies (executed and buried)	No evidence either of mass graves or bodies until now	Madeleine Albright claimed 80,000 Muslim death in genocide attacks	-NATO claimed 2,246 deaths & 3,800 missing person including all ethnic groups. -ICTY claimed 2,108 deaths (a figure that does not distinguish between combatants and civilians)
		NATO claimed 744 strikes against Serb tanks, 450 artillery pieces destroyed, 18 armored personnel carriers, and 14 tanks	Experts claimed 58 strikes, 20 artillery pieces destroyed, 220 armored personnel carriers, and 120 tanks

What is still sure and logical in both conflicts is that the two sides were belligerent and in a state of war and both committed atrocities and war crimes. The numbers cannot be seen to privilege either side, despite the media tried to communicate ‘the logic of numbers’ to the different audiences. Instead of clarifying what was really at stake in Yugoslavia, journalists and media pundits became the victims of media framing: simplification of complex issues ; explaining a complex issue in a 3 minutes-sound bite; journalists were victims of the lies of government officials and Public Relation agencies, who both had their own agenda and communicated false information. As a

result, the manipulated figures and the sensational coverage gave the audiences the impression that a human genocide in the Balkans was taking place, and made the US-led NATO argument legitimate for a ‘humanitarian’ intervention in Kosovo.

All that had been explained was on providing the ‘right’ argument to the US public and international opinion to support the ‘humanitarian’ intervention. However, the success of Milosevic’s ousting and the Belgrade government weakness was prepared from the inside. Note that the US media development assistance to Serbia played a major role in changing former Yugoslavia. In a USAID pamphlet of 2003, the writers show that the goal of the USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives in 1997 ‘*was to fund programs and media outlets that could disseminate messages pushing immediate political change ...pushing the reform agenda*’<sup>116</sup>. Besides US federal funding, private donors contributed in the regime change by helping local NGOs, students associations and youth organizations through broadcasting their activities and giving voice to their programs. The best example to mention is OTPOR (literally ‘resistance’) a student association that played a seminal role in defeating Milosevic in the 2000 election, through their ‘non-violent movement’<sup>117</sup>.

The US mass media agenda-setting and the frame they adopted in covering the dismantlement of former Yugoslavia were not a coincidence. The alliances the US government chose to make with the Croats, the Bosnians and the Albanians, was due to the geostrategic interest they have in the Balkan region. In the second chapter, we will see the different geostrategic implications of the Yugoslav conflicts in the nineties, and right after the unification of the two Germanys and the collapse of the Soviet Bloc. Consequently, the reshaping of Europe was imperative, especially in defining the new balance of powers there in favor of US geostrategic and geoeconomic interests.

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<sup>116</sup> Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination. ‘U. S Media Assistance in Serbia July1997-2002’ . USAID PPC Evaluation Working Paper, No 10, November 2003, pp. 1-33. <[http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PNACU777.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACU777.pdf)>

<sup>117</sup> Ibid, p. xi.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

# **The US Post-Cold War Double Enlargement**

The German geographer Frederic Ratzel (1840-1904) claimed once that to make war is to shift borders to the regions of others<sup>118</sup>. Post-Cold War Europe witnessed different geographical modifications as a consequence to economic and social changes and resulted in the reunification of Germany, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and then the dismemberment of former Yugoslavia. European geography in general and the Balkan geography in particular, was changing with the establishment of new frontiers that were the result of two major wars: the Bosnian (1995) and the Kosovo war (1999).

Our aim in this chapter is to shed light on *geopolitics*; a field of major importance for nation-states formation. The use of the term and exposing it to the public was not allowed, during the Cold War due to its use by the Nazis to expand their influence eastward, and thus it was marginalized. However, it re-emerged with force after 1990 and became the ideology the world powers (mainly the USA, Germany, and Russia) relied on when setting their foreign policy agenda. The US showed a huge interest in Geopolitics in order to draw its post-Cold War energy security agenda, as far as oil and gas were concerned, especially in the regions that were inaccessible to it during the Cold War. However, Russia's influence in those regions (Central and Eastern Europe) after their independence has still had its weight and has constituted a hindrance for US eastward enlargement.

US eastward enlargement had as an aim, the expansion of the influence of NATO and the EU, by converting the former Warsaw Pact countries to free-market democracies. Both organizations underwent a redefinition of their aims and the role they would play in order to cope with the new realities of the post-Cold War world. The Balkan Crisis presented a challenge with a security dimension that had implications on how NATO and EU were to be defined, and on the nature of the aims they were to fulfill.

US major concern after the collapse of the Communist bloc and the re-unification of Germany was how to keep security in Western European Union (WEU) and then

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<sup>118</sup> Zouhir. Bouamama, European Security in US Foreign Policy after the End of the Cold War, (Annaba: Al Wissam Al-Arabi, 2011), p.196.



expand/enlarge it to the east. However, this presented a great challenge; indeed, a re-unified Germany meant a strong Germany with its own vision of an EU that contrasted with that of another European power, France. The question that arose then was how the U. S. was going to deal with this situation and create a balance of power in Europe without putting at risk its vital interests?

## II. 1. Geopolitics as a Post-Cold War Ideology

Geopolitics has started to evolve as a scientific field of study since the 19<sup>th</sup> century, especially with the fulfillment of the concept of the nation-state which engendered the emergence of different nationalisms and the growing rivalry between the European nations for territorial expansionism. It studies the relation between man and its environment; how a given group of people sets policies to approach their environment. Geography has been at the core of national and international relations. It defines the state by its frontiers, whether continental or maritime; as well as the nature of the ‘historic bloc’ it produces nationally, and the world order it sets internationally. Europeans developed different theories on man and environment that served their territorial expansion.

For instance, Frederic Ratzel developed the concept of *Lebensraum* or ‘living space’ that makes the state subject to rivalry with other states, and in a state of constant struggle for survival through territory expansion<sup>119</sup>. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the Swedish political geographer Rudolf Kjellèn (1864-1922) coined the term *geopolitics* and defined it as: ‘*the theory of the state as a geographic organism or phenomenon in space that is a land, territory, area or most spatially as a country*’<sup>120</sup>. He too, as Ratzel, emphasized the fact that the state is in an inevitable struggle for existence. However, the most famous theory of the 20<sup>th</sup> century that still has an impact on today’s

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<sup>119</sup> Faisal. Ahmed, ‘From Resource to Trade Diplomacy-Revealing the Hierarchical Nature of Geopolitics’ . *The Romanian Economic Journal*, Year XIII, no 35, (1) 2010, pp.3-33, <<http://www.rejournal.eu/portals/0/arhiva/je%2035/je%2035%20-%20ahmed.pdf>>.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid, p. 4.

formulation of world order is Sir Halford John Mackinder's *heartland* theory. It takes into consideration the position of the state, its resources and their means of communication. For Mackinder, world history turns around the *Eurasian pivot* (Eurasia corresponds to Siberia and Central Asia); the pivot around which the 'Great Game'<sup>121</sup> is played is the heartland. His famous dictum states that: '*Who controls East Europe command the heartland; who rules the heartland command the World Island; who rules the World Island command the world*' (Mackinder 1919, 194). On the same line of *Heartland* theory, Karl Haushofer (1869-1946), a German army officer and a political geographer, termed Mackinder's heartland the *Eurasian Bloc*. He insisted that Germany had to be unified with Russia and Japan to counter the Allies during the Inter War years. This project was not realized when the Nazis attacked the Soviet Union in 1941. Even the American analyst Nicholas Spykman (1893-1943) developed Mackinder's *heartland* theory during the Second World War. For him to possess the rims is more important than to control the interior of lands. Thus, the theory came to be known the *Rimland*, and his formula was: '*the one who controls the Rimland, controls Eurasia; the one who controls Eurasia grasp hold the fate of the world between his hands*'<sup>122</sup>

As far as New World geopolitics is concerned, the U. S. established a policy towards its environment that enabled it to protect itself from the outside world and enabled it to consolidate its internal structure. From the Monroe Doctrine 1823 to the Truman Doctrine 1947, the US was able, through its geopolitical performance, to establish its hegemony through what the Russian historian Alexander Gelyevich Dugin termed *meridional expansion* and *latitudinal expansion*<sup>123</sup>. The Truman Doctrine, in Dugin's view, is a continuation of the Monroe Doctrine but by moving eastward and containing the Communist expansion into the Eurasian mass. He deduced that post-

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<sup>121</sup> The 'Great Game' was the first geopolitics that explained global rivalries for world division between the European Empires, especially between Great Britain and Russia at the end of the nineteenth century over primacy in Central Asia. The term is attributed to Arthur Conolly, an intelligence officer of the British East India Company. Petar. Kurecic, 'The New Great Game: Rivalry of Geostrategies and Geoeconomics in Central Asia, *Hrvatski geografski glasnik*, 72/1, 2010, pp. 21 – 48.

<sup>122</sup> Viatcheslav. Avioutskii, *Géopolitiques continentales: Le monde au XXIe siècle*, (Paris : Armand Colin, 2006), p. 4.

<sup>123</sup> Max. Ostrovsky, 'The Idea of Eurasia' , pp. 1-47, <<http://www.ef.huji.ac.il/publications/ostrovsky.pdf>>.

Cold War world will witness a further extension of the Truman Doctrine in the former Soviet sphere. He stated that:

[T]he Atlantists have already achieved the integration of their continent's territories, have firmly consolidated their grip on the shore-zones of Eurasia, and it remains for them only to advance further, expanding these zones into the depth of the continent and destabilizing internal circumstances within the limits of the *Heartland*.<sup>124</sup>

The following maps show the two phases of US expansion, according to Dugin.



**Map 1: US Meridional Expansion<sup>125</sup>**



**Map 2: US Latitudinal Expansion<sup>126</sup>**

Post-Cold War world witnessed the resurrection of geopolitics as an important field for drawing a world strategy especially regarding energy security. For the U. S, both the Bush administration and the Clinton Administration were aware of the new

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<sup>124</sup> *ibid*, p. 24.

<sup>125</sup> *ibid*. p. 23.

<sup>126</sup> *ibid*.

realities after the collapse of the Soviet Bloc that necessitated new strategies. Post-Cold War environment in Europe was composed of the emergence of nationalisms aspiring to independence, the re-emergence of a strong Germany, and the Russian influence was still present in the former Soviet sphere though the Communist influence withered. This chaotic setting would engender instability and insecurity that would endanger US interests in Europe. Indeed, Europe represents in the US strategic map a route that would connect the energy resources (oil and gas) of the Caspian to the Western market; the security of the Caspian energy resources requires the security of Europe.

## **II. 1.1. U. S. Energy Security Concerns:**

Since the end of the Second World War, oil has been considered as a crucial element in preserving US national security. Throughout the Cold War, the US strived to keep its energy zones of influence in the Middle East and gain new ones in Central Asia. It succeeded to contain the Soviet advancement in Afghanistan 1979 and in Iran during the reign of the Shah and prevented it from reaching the waters of the Persian Gulf. Central Asia has always been the playground of the great powers who desire to have control over the region. Since the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Great Britain battled with Russia over Afghanistan, and with the discovery of oil, the 20<sup>th</sup> century witnessed the bloodiest wars over the control of energy routes (the Berlin-Baghdad Project) between Germany, Great Britain, France, Russia and the US. And with the end of the Cold War, and the independence of Central Asian countries, the US would accelerate Containment policy and emancipate Central Asian countries from Russian control. The latter still has a great influence in the region and does not seem to give up what constitutes for it too a national security. Thus, post-Cold War world would see the evolution of two rival energy security projects in Central Asia: the first is led by a regional/continental power, Russia; the second is led by an outside power, the US, which would hinder Russian monopoly over energy in the region.

In fact, what was at stake in Central Asia-that, from the geopolitical point of view constitutes Eurasia- in the 1990s were the oil and gas fields in the Caspian zone that were highly significant for the US, and a threat for Russia, once the US would seize them. The American post-Cold War geopolitics architect, Zbigniew Brzezinski, attached in his writings a great importance to the region by referring to it as the richest, most populous, and represented a transition zone between the Western and Eastern world:

Eurasia is home to most of the world's politically assertive and dynamic states. All the historical pretenders to global power originated in Eurasia... Eurasia accounts for 75% of the world's population, 60% of its GNP, and 75% of its energy resources... A glance at the map also suggests that a country dominant in Eurasia would automatically control the Middle East and Africa. With Eurasia now serving as the decisive geopolitical chessboard, it no longer suffices to fashion one policy for Europe and another for Asia. What happens with the distribution of power on the Eurasian landmass will be of decisive importance to America's global primacy.<sup>127</sup>

As far as energy is concerned, the Caspian Sea issue grew in importance and became an alternative to the Persian Gulf as it has huge oil and gas reserves ready for exploitation. In parallel, what impedes the exploitation is the geographical position of the sea; the Caspian Sea is enclosed by Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Azerbaijan, and Russia. In order to export its resources to Europe, the Gulf region or to Asia, it has to be opened up. Thus the real challenge is not the exploitation of the resources but their exportation and transportation<sup>128</sup>. This proves a hard task especially when it generates conflicting interests, mainly between Russia and the US; each one tries to impose its transport infrastructure project that would enable it later to be hegemonic in the Central Asian sphere. Moreover, the Caspian issue generates three circles that were subject, and were going to be affected by the developments it would undergo:

- The first circle concerns the countries that surround the Caspian Sea: Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Iran.

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<sup>127</sup> Zbigniew. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Strategy and its Geopolitical Imperatives, (New York: Basic Books, 1997), p. 31.

<sup>128</sup> Aymeric. Chauprade, Introduction à l'analyse géopolitique, (Paris : Ellipses, 1999), p. 70.


- The second circle concerns the countries which constitute an oil and gas pipeline route: Turkey, Iran, Armenia, Georgia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and China.
- The third circle is concerned by the seas and oceans that would relate the Caspian to the world economic centers: the Black Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and the Sea of China.<sup>129</sup>

These three circles are impacted by the energy concerns led by the US and Russia in the region and the two powers try to gain influence over them in order to establish their hegemony on the region. As it has been said earlier, in order to open up the Caspian Sea and enable the exportation of its energy resources, two axes in a state of rivalry embattle their respected projects to be realized: the Washington axis and the Moscow axis. The second axis, already has a pipeline from Baku (Azerbaijan), crossing Grozny (Chechnya), to Novorossiysk (Russia). With the Washington axis supervising the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline project, the US would weaken the dependence over former Soviet infrastructure and end the Russian monopoly over energy routes. It is worth noting that in 1993, the first agreement for oil exploitation in Tengiz field, over forty years was signed between the US and Kazakhstan. Tengiz oil would be transported to the Russian port Novorossiysk. In fact this was a pact between Chevron and the Russian Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) that holds 24% of shares. The US has been very careful in implementing their energy security agenda in the region without infringing on the Russian interests at once. The agreement Chevron-CPC can be considered as a ‘consolation prize’ for Russia that was not to console it for too long. The US has negotiated with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan the joining of Tengiz oil field from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, to the BTC pipeline project –removing Russia from the energy pipeline routes map. However, Russian influence is still highly present in Central Asia. Therefore, Russia strived to eliminate the threat of losing control over energy route, and in 2002 an alliance of gas producers grouping: Russia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, was created under the

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<sup>129</sup> Ibid.

rubric of ‘Eurasia Gas Alliance Project’<sup>130</sup>. The latter marked the coming back of Russia as a power that still has a say in world strategies, and can be read as a response to the signing of a legal framework for the realization of the BTC pipeline in November 1999, during the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) Summit in Turkey. The success of Russia with Central Asian countries reflects the weakness of US influence in the region. However, the US seized the opportunity of a weak Russia, during the 1990s to gain influence in the Balkans and end definitely the Russian presence there.



**Map 3: Oil and Gas Pipelines<sup>131</sup>**

From the geopolitical point of view, the negative consequences the Balkans Crisis in the 1990s had on Russian influence in the region cannot be hidden. The Yugoslav dismemberment enclosed Serbia and had cut its reach to the Adriatic Sea by losing its vital port in Montenegro. The existence of a Bosnian state, too, was advantageous to the Washington axis and the growth of the Turkish and German influence in the

<sup>130</sup> Deniz. Deger, *The Evolution of Central Eurasia Policy of the US in the Post-Soviet Era and the Geopolitics of the Caspian Oil*, (Middle East Technical University, 2006), p. 47, unpublished, <<http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12607703/index.pdf>>.

<sup>131</sup> Vassilis. K. Fouskas, *Zones of Conflicts: US Foreign Policy in the Balkans and the Greater Middle East*, (London: Pluto Press, 2003), p. 16.

Balkans, while the Moscow axis and its orthodox allies lost their grip. What is important to mention during the Yugoslav dismemberment, in connection to energy issues, is that the Balkan region constitutes a strategic position for the transfer of oil and gas from the Caspian to Europe. For instance, the trans-Balkan pipeline project connects the energy resources in the Caspian, through the Bulgarian port Bourgas then Macedonia, to the Albanian port Durres. It is worth mentioning here too that this pipeline crosses 20km of southern Kosovo<sup>132</sup>. Be it a coincidence or not, Vassilis K. Fouskas, a Senior Research Fellow in European and International Studies, is categorical, concerning the NATO military campaign over Kosovo: '*...it is no accident that NATO mounted its Kosovo campaign and that the largest American Foreign military base built since Vietnam is that of Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo, financed by the Brown and Root Division of Halliburton, the world's biggest oil services corporation.*'<sup>133</sup>.

US major overseas interest has always been concerned with energy security that is considered part and parcel of its national security. Thus, its foreign policy has been guided by *realpolitik*, or geopolitics, but covered by an ideological discourse founded on morale and what is considered to be as the 'American Creed'. The policy of Democracy Expansion and the humanitarian intervention campaigns in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s were just a humane façade to energy security imperatives that would define the US world status vis-à-vis the EU and Russia.

## **II.1 2. Post-Cold War Russia:**

With the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, the geographic position of Russia had changed enormously. Russia's frontiers shrank when the Baltic and Central Asian states gained independence. This change entailed changes in its internal and foreign politics at all levels, be it political, economic or strategic. This situation had engendered weakness

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<sup>132</sup> Ibid, p. 24.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid.



especially in the international arena, and Russia's decision making in the international institutions such as the United Nations (UN) did not have the weight it used to have during the Cold War. However, Russia's political and strategic weakness was not to last too long, and has started to recover through the different co-operations it signed whether with its rivals (the US) or its neighbors (China, India and Iran).

It is still not well established whether the Cold War has really ended, or the post-Cold War era has marked just a change in the world order, by moving from a bipolar to a multi-polar world, with the emergence of new rivals such as China and the EU, striving for primacy. The 1990s Russia's world situation was similar to that at the end of the Great War. With the Bolsheviks in power, Russia's foreign logic was anti-territorial. With the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk between Russia and Germany in 1918, the Bolsheviks gave up Poland, Ukraine, the Baltic provinces, much of Belarus and the Trans-Caucasus; what represented the Tsarist dream. Like the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the end of the century had been dominated by the Russian leadership of what was known as the reformists (led by Boris Yeltsin who was pro-American) who did not attach importance to territories and borders<sup>134</sup>. The latter facilitated the dismemberment of the Soviet Union. However, they had drawn a foreign policy that would keep their strategic interests in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (that Russia had created after the dissolution of the Union), and would be used to be part of the Soviet sphere, such as keeping Kaliningrad (ceded to the USSR by Germany in Potsdam agreement) as a military zone. The foreign policy came to be known the '*near-abroad*'<sup>135</sup> and it joins Eastern Europe, Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Baltic States. Most of the countries in these regions are not part of the CIS, but the Russians refer to them to stress the fact that they still have an influence there.

The US presence in the ex-Soviet sphere after the Cold War was a threat to Russia's national interest which was the same as the US's; it was energy security. The US have been present in Europe through NATO, and their first Cold War priority was to enlarge it to the East by joining countries of the ex-Warsaw Pact countries.

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<sup>134</sup> Dmitri. Trenin, The End of Eurasia, (Washington DC: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2001), pp. 70-71.

<sup>135</sup> Deniz. Deger, op-cit., p. 101.

Although Gorbachev agreed on the re-unification of Germany, the Kohl-Gorbachev treaty prohibited the enlargement of NATO beyond the old Iron Curtain<sup>136</sup>. With Yevgeny Primakov as Prime Minister of Russia in 1998, to rely on the logic of ‘no enlargement’ was not sufficient; Russia had to adopt a foreign policy alternative in dealing with US-led West through negotiations<sup>137</sup>. Despite the suspicions the Russians had had towards the Atlantist Bloc, they continued to co-operate with Western countries and Russia became member of different organizations such as the OSCE, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), and it signed in 1994 NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP). However, PfP made the Russians furious for it included all Central and East European (CEE) countries. Even Boris Yeltsin denounced such an initiative towards eastern countries, claiming that it would generate: Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation; NATO’s hegemony would divide Europe; a threat to Russian national security; It would weaken Russian military industry in its traditional markets<sup>138</sup>.

This partnership has accentuated the division inside the CIS into two blocs. One is pro-Moscow, grouping Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The other is pro- Washington and gathers Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. The partnership was also mainly advantageous to US interests in the CEE countries and constituted a strategic danger for Russia. Every new asset gained by the US and its allies through NATO enlargement is a loss of traditional Russian assets; it was a *zero sum game*. As a reaction to such a policy, and in order to counter US influence from advancing further East, Russia had opted for a strategy, at times coercive, other times consensual. It was heading to: boost military and security concerns with CIS; use division inside NATO to influence decision making; move eastward and build a partnership with China founded on common interests (security threats which are pursued by NATO enlargement)<sup>139</sup>.

But, before understanding Russia/ NATO relation, or what can be named US rapprochement towards Russia via NATO, we have to look at the organization and

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<sup>136</sup> Encyclopedia Britannica Ultimate Reference Suite2008.

<sup>137</sup> Zouhir. Bouamama, op-cit., p. 543.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid, pp. 527-28-29.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid, pp. 545-47-50.

what has become after the ‘end’ of the Cold War. Not only NATO that underwent changes, the EU, as well, has gained great importance in drawing the US post-Cold War strategy (enlargement) of security. Both organizations were at the heart of the Yugoslav Wars; they had separate roles at times, were rivals other times. In the following section, we will elaborate the EU and NATO roles in the post-Cold War era, and see how former-Yugoslavia, as a battle field, was subject of their rivalry.

## **II.2. The Implications of Wars in Former Yugoslavia**

As we have developed in the former section, energy concerns in the Caspian region, after the independence of Central Asian countries from the communist grip, were at the top of US energy security strategy after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It seems from afar that the Balkan Crisis in the nineties, with the dismantling of Yugoslavia had no relation with the Caspian. Our hypothesis is that it had, especially at the organizational level (NATO and the EU), and on the balance of power in Europe. The ‘end’ of the Cold War reset the world order as it became by the end of the Great War. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the map of Europe has changed: the re-unification of Germany (1989); with the Yugoslav dismemberment, new states had emerged: Croatia (1991), Slovenia (1991), and Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995).

The implications of these changes on great powers were as follows: Germany was pro-secessionism and was the first to recognize the independence of Croatia and Slovenia, former German zones of influence against Russia and the Ottoman Empire during the 19<sup>th</sup> century. This led to the escalation of emancipation demands in the other parts of the Yugoslav federation. France and Britain opposed the dismemberment that would be advantageous to Germany and would empower its presence in the Balkans; concerning non-European states, in the beginning, the US were against the dismemberment, relying on Yugoslav neutrality towards Russia. However, the step made by Germany vis-à-vis Croatia and Slovenia, made the US reconsider Germany’s role in post-Cold War Europe, and how it could be adjusted to remake the geopolitics

of the continent by not allowing any Germano-Russian rapprochement. Thus, the US would assure the balance of power and supervise the evolution of European development through NATO.

At the organizational level, the new realities in the nineties required new strategies, which entail the redefinition of NATO and the EU. The political climate at the beginning of the nineties was not clear; it was characterized by the eruption of political and economic crises, which engendered instability and insecurity. The same was true with the US. It could not set a foreign policy agenda until 1995, the *National Security for Engagement and Enlargement*<sup>140</sup> under the Clinton administration that saw the inevitability of relating domestic affairs with the world abroad. In the preface to the document, Bill Clinton insisted that the preservation of the American way of life goes with global security:

Protecting our nation's security — our people, our territory and our way of life — is my Administration's foremost mission and constitutional duty. The end of the Cold War fundamentally changed America's security imperatives. The central security challenge of the past half century — the threat of communist expansion — is gone. The dangers we face today are more diverse. Ethnic conflict is spreading and rogue states pose a serious danger to regional stability in many corners of the globe. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction represents a major challenge to our security. Large scale environmental degradation, exacerbated by rapid population growth, threatens to undermine political stability in many countries and regions.

This climate of global insecurity was to be absorbed by NATO's eastward enlargement, by joining the ex-Warsaw Pact countries. This enlargement is believed to project democracy and expand peace worldwide. However, geopolitically, as Containment served to stop the Communist expansion, Enlargement would encircle Russia in the Eurasian landmass and hinders its reach to warm waters. As an instrument of enlargement, NATO would undergo a new definition for its post-Cold War purpose and mission.

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<sup>140</sup> A National Security for Engagement and Enlargement, (Washington DC: the White House, 1995) <<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nss/nss-95.pdf> >.

In relation to NATO enlargement, EU enlargement went hand in hand with it. We have to mention here that as Europe was subject to different conflicts at the beginning of the twentieth century, at its end, it still constituted a major component between the US and Russia. Indeed, as interests were intermingled (those of energy and economy), it is difficult to show the fault lines between NATO and EU enlargement. The US image of Europe was to serve as an economic and diplomatic force to expand free-market democracy ideals. However, at the defense level, the US weakened the efforts made by the OSCE to constitute a military EU that would later on challenge the US-led NATO. Indeed, NATO enables the US to control the EU diplomatically and militarily, and its post-Cold War new strategic concept served to keep the balance of power in Europe, as we will show in the following.

## **II.2. 1 The Role of the EU and NATO Enlargement in US Post-Cold War Strategy:**

Post-Cold war US strategy towards Europe in general, and the CEE in particular was based on three main elements: the re-evaluation of states and their regionalization by respecting former Cold War classification; setting regional and interests' priorities and the different ideological and organizational tools that deal with them; and defining the post Soviet threat that would constitute the challenge in order to define a strategy for the new world order.<sup>141</sup> These constitute US military and defense concerns, which would enable 'Democracy Promotion' implementation for a 'peaceful' world order. To do so, the US attached great importance to the Transatlantic Alliance and the role it would play in reconstituting world affairs, which were characterized by the renewal of geopolitical rivalry of great powers.

As NATO served the US in containing Russia and controlling Western European Countries during Cold War, its new purpose after the Cold War was not to undergo a

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<sup>141</sup> Deniz. Deger, op. cit., p. 3.

big change, but to continue the task assigned to it. NATO's first Secretary General Lord Ismay (1952-1957), clearly said in 1949 that '*NATO's purpose is to keep the Russians out and the Germans down*'<sup>142</sup>. During the nineties, different NATO summits were held in order to define the line the organization would follow to cope with the new changes. It is worth noting that the different suggestions and debates around reforming NATO did not stress the fact that NATO was transforming from a *defense* organization to a *political* organization<sup>143</sup>, involved in domestic political affairs of different countries. This had enabled the US to be engaged in different political affairs that would serve its regional interests. Indeed, NATO's new strategic concept went hand in hand with US post-Cold War strategy. NATO's reform generally, as summarized by Vassilis. K. Fouskas, focused on the:

- political and ideological redefinition of the 'enemy'
- redefinition of NATO's operational area
- organizational restructuring of the alliance<sup>144</sup>

US '*enemies*' can be identified, when its '*friends*' are identified first. The second point was concerned by whether NATO's area would remain Northern America, Western and Southern Europe and put in danger US interests in a changing world, or would it go beyond it: '*out of area or out of business*'. The third point stresses the importance that NATO's new concept must be followed by institutional reforms. NATO's New Strategic Concept of Rome in 1991 set as a purpose '*European security*' that was going to be achieved through '*cooperation*'. The US and WEU countries have '*to share roles, risks and responsibilities*' for '*management crisis and conflict prevention*'<sup>145</sup>.

Amongst institutional reforms NATO had to make, there was the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (1991; it became later the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council) to provide political and security views. There was, as well, Partnership for Peace (PfP 1994) through which NATO's enlargement to the East was executed. This institution

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<sup>142</sup> Vassilis. K. Fouskas, op. cit., p. 32.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid, p. 37.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid, pp. 34-35.

<sup>145</sup> NATO's Official Website

<[http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_23847.htm?selectedLocale=en](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm?selectedLocale=en)>.

was transitional for non-WEU countries that wished to join NATO, provided that they met a number of conditions. During the Brussels Summit in 1994, NATO was mainly concerned with the joining of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries despite Russian opposition. PfP served also as a mediator between Russia and the US-led West through cooperation and peaceful resolution of conflicts. Through PfP, the US intended to control Russian moves because its purpose (which is eastward Enlargement) was contradictory to the Russian strategy which was halting NATO from expanding. NATO Enlargement became a fact; what was at stake was when and how a given country could join it.

NATO's enlargement was not a subject of debate in the international arena only. Inside America, it divided the American political elite between pro-enlargement and isolationist (for them, Enlargement is costly and not a priority). However, different parts in the US intervened to convince US public opinion of the necessity of enlargement. For example a military industrial corporation which financed Clinton's 1996 presidential campaign formed a pressure group under the name of '*NATO Enlargement Committee*' in order to convince Congress that US and NATO interests are one<sup>146</sup>. Even Bill Clinton warned from neglecting world affairs to the detriment of domestic ones: '*... We must help our publics to understand this distinction: Domestic renewal is an overdue tonic. But isolationism and protectionism are still poison. We must inspire our people to look beyond their immediate fears toward a broader horizon.*'<sup>147</sup>. Thus, the Yugoslav wars were of great significance, both for the US, as a post-Cold War leader, and NATO, as an organization with a purpose.

After the Cold War, the continuity of NATO operations went parallel to US world leadership, and the security of Europe was subject to this parallelism. The new geopolitical climate of Europe was announcing hints of a geopolitical competition between the traditional European powers that were confined during the Cold War, between the Atlantic forces and those beyond the Iron Curtain. For instance, Germany which has a strategic position could constitute the nucleus of European unity '*from the Atlantic to the Ural*', as de Gaulle once said. Germans geopolitical ambitions were

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<sup>146</sup> Zouhir. Bouamama, op. cit., p. 597.

<sup>147</sup> Bill. Clinton, ' UN General Assembly, New York, September 27<sup>th</sup>, 1993 ', , <<http://www.state.gov/p/io/potusunga/207375.htm>>.

first marked by the recognition of the independence of Slovenia and Croatia by Germany. The Yugoslav wars that succeeded the disintegration can tell us two things about NATO:

- About the Bosnian War (1995), the US intervened in the conflict to absorb the influence of Germany and Turkey (NATO members and US allies) in the region; and reposition NATO in the new Europe.
- Concerning the Kosovo War (1999), observers could note a concrete, credible, and real purpose to NATO, through Allied Force Operation and new territorialization by taking control over the Balkans.<sup>148</sup>

NATO's credibility was twice on the menu of US strategists. The first was during the Bosnian conflict when William Perry, Secretary of US Defense stated that: '*...what is on issue is the coherence of NATO, the future of NATO and the role of the US as a leader of NATO.*'<sup>149</sup> The second was during the Kosovo War by Zbigniew Brzezinski, underlining the fact that: '*The failure of NATO would mean both the end of the credibility of the Alliance and the weakening of the American world leadership.*'<sup>150</sup>

The benefits of the Yugoslav Wars in general, and the Kosovo War in particular, for the Alliance were huge, geopolitically. NATO then could position itself in Eastern and Central European countries, that were Russian assets, and by doing so, Russia was encircled and denied access to Western and Southern Europe. Thus, NATO's eastward expansion, as a result of the 1999 Kosovo War, had realized the following, according to Alex Callinicos:

- It both maintained the position of the US, established during the Cold War, as the leading power in Western Europe and extended it eastward.
- It legitimized the penetration of the economically and strategically crucial zone of Central Asia by a US-led NATO, now authorized to undertake 'out of area' operations.
- It amounted to a new strategy of encirclement directed to Russia that US-policymakers had concluded was unlikely somehow to

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<sup>148</sup> Aymeric. Chauprade, op. cit., pp. 245-246.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid.



metamorphose into a prosperous liberal democracy and would therefore have to be contained.<sup>151</sup>

The great powers cooperation under NATO had created a multilateral environment in Europe. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the social, economic and political crises that characterized the ex-Warsaw Pact countries were to have negative consequences on the security of Europe by generating instability and insecurity. The latter constituted the first challenge for the EU to prove itself as a political union, while it represented a danger for US security and energy interests in the regions that had not to be subject of rivalry.

## **II.2. 2. EU and NATO's Rivalry over EU Security:**

The independence of countries in the ex-Soviet sphere and the geopolitical changes that occurred in Europe was a challenge to international institutions and the different treaties and accords that were signed to keep the Cold War Order. It is not only the economic and social changes that were the cause of the independence of the CEE countries; political decision contributed to this change and maybe hastened it. For example, the recognition of Germany of the independence of Croatia and Slovenia from the Yugoslav Federation in 1991 was the first political act of a State that led to frontiers change in the Balkans, and by doing so, Germany violated the Helsinki Conference Final Act of 1975 that stipulated the inviolability of the frontiers of the Second World War order, and the non-interference of any state in other states' internal affairs<sup>152</sup>. The Collapse of the Soviet Bloc in 1990 and the reunification of Germany in 1989 cannot be considered as a political decision because they followed a process of social and economic changes that led to their actual state, then. All these social,

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<sup>151</sup> Alex. Callinicos, 'The Grand Strategy of the American Empire', *INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISM JOURNAL*, Issue 97, Winter 2002. <<http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/writers/callinicos/2002/xx/strategy.htm> >.

<sup>152</sup> Helsinki Conference Final Act 1975, <[http://www.csce.gov/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Files.Download&FileStore\\_id=2290](http://www.csce.gov/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Files.Download&FileStore_id=2290) >.

economic and political factors that led to changes at the beginning of the nineties represented a challenge to the EU to test its ability in managing its crises on its own, and a further step for the US to spread its influence further east.

Before the Maastricht Treaty 1992, Europe presented a market and built a strong economic identity during the Cold War which was only possible because the US provided a secure environment for its economic development. But the treaty established the European Union and presented an attempt to create not only an economic EU, but to form a political and a defense union, that would respond to the political changes in the continent. This fact alarmed the US, for the creation of a political EU meant weakening the US influence in Europe. As a result, the US pragmatic line was to make EU existence possible but under its control. Bill Clinton's doctrine for the EU was to have a '*separable but not separate*' defense identity from NATO. Thus, US strategy of *Leadership by Partnership* contained the following notes:

- Preventing the emergence of an EU strategic pole independent from NATO;
- encouraging the formation of a defense EU identity inside NATO;
- realizing a strategic Euro-Atlantic partnership in managing common Western interests in the world.

We have to mention here that like the Maastricht Treaty, in Amsterdam Treaty 1997 also, there had been attempts to build a political EU mainly from France and Germany, whereas the UK claimed that political union weakens states' sovereignty, but at the same time did not mind NATO's supervision over the EU<sup>153</sup>. Even Germany, though it was for a political Europe, had its vision of it that was contradictory to France's. All these divergences of EU leading states enabled the US to turn a state against another (at times supporting the UK, other times Germany) and consolidated its presence in Europe.

Z. Brzezinski in his work *The Geopolitical Triad: Living with China, Europe, and Russia* (2000) described the US- EU relations in ten points. For him, Europe lacks the ideological frame that would result in a political EU because of the different visions each country has of the EU and this difference would weaken the union. Concerning a

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<sup>153</sup> Vassilis. K. Fouskas, op. cit., pp. 82-83.

EU of defense, Brzezinski was not worried that a military EU would constitute a rival to NATO, because Europeans were ready neither to pay nor to die for Europe's security. The Decalogue of basic US premises and guidelines is as follows by Brzezinski:

1. Europe remains America's natural and pre-eminent ally.
2. An Atlanticist Europe is essential to a stable Eurasian equilibrium.
3. An autonomous European defense capability, in any case unlikely in the near future, should not be opposed by the United States.
4. ....
5. ....
6. The United States should seek an enlarged NATO in Europe but not an 'out of area' NATO.
7. The United States has a bigger stake in Europe's enlargement than in Europe's integration.
8. NATO and the EU should work together on joint plans for further expansion.
9. ...
10. ...

Through its partnership with the EU, the US would consolidate the path on which the union would evolve. Not having the EU as a rival in Europe did not mean its exclusion from participating in managing the new geopolitical change, under US leadership. 'Democracy Promotion' and NATO enlargement eastward were not to be held only by the US. They are programs that require a strategy, a great risk, and a significant financial support; it was impossible for the US, as Joseph Nye put it, to 'go it alone'. Even if the US were to act unilaterally, it would risk the integration of the EU that it was fighting since the 'end' of the Cold War. The latter is unlikely to happen since the EU countries lack a common political vision. Indeed, the US has had the habit to act multilaterally when necessary. Some called Clinton administration's strategists '*instrumental multilateralists*' for their reliance on multilateralism and cooperation with EU great powers only when they see it necessary. Even Madeleine K. Albright underlined the fact of acting collectively or individually was a matter of strategic choice: '*The president said in his inaugural address speech that America would act militarily with others when possible but*

“alone when we must.” ...we support the use of force on a multilateral basis when it is in our interests to do so. As Secretary Christopher put it, we see “multilateralism as a means, not an end.”<sup>154</sup> Multilateral or unilateral actions were best presented during the Yugoslav conflicts, and it hid the conflictual nature of geopolitical interests inside the alliance.

As mentioned before, the crises occurring in Europe in general, and Yugoslavia in particular constituted a challenge to the political and defense concepts of the EU. For France and the UK, the Yugoslav disintegration would awake the traditional geopolitical German interests, which then would challenge their interests in the region. The disintegration would also mean that something was wrong with the Maastricht Treaty for a united Europe<sup>155</sup>. As for Germany, though it was for Croatia and Slovenia’s independence, it objected to the Bosnian independence because it would renew the Turkish influence in the region. Consequently, the US intervened carefully in the Bosnian War to reset the balance of power in Europe under its own supervision because it feared a split in NATO. However, the Kosovo War showed military and defense short-comings of EU capabilities<sup>156</sup>. Here too, the US won this round and could consolidate its position in the region.

What the Yugoslav disintegration in the nineties can teach us, in relation to its implications on US-EU relations, is that the whole conflict revolved around borders reconfigurations to ensure energy security for both powers. States’ sovereignty did not matter under the slogan of ‘*humanitarian intervention*’ because sovereignty, as Carl Schmitt defined, and reported by K. Fouskas, ‘*is not a constitutional or legal matter, but a matter of power*’.<sup>157</sup>

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<sup>154</sup> Zouhir. Bouamama, op. cit., p. 627.

<sup>155</sup> Ljubomir. Cucic, ‘Implications of the War in Former Yugoslavia on the US-EU Relations’, *Politi~ka misao*, Vol. XXXV, 1998, No. 5, pp. 136—150, <<http://hrcak.srce.hr/file/51090>>.

<sup>156</sup> Deniz. Deger, op-cit., p. 91.

<sup>157</sup> Vassilis. K. Fouskas, op-cit., p. 111.

### II.2. 3. The EU as US Post-Cold War ‘Iron Curtain’:

During the Cold War period, the ‘*Iron Curtain*’ had two functions: one political, and one geographical. Its political function served to divide Europe between the capitalist and the communist ideology. This ideological separation served the geographical function of the ‘*Iron Curtain*’ as a discourse to hide the strategic interests of both the US and Soviet Russia, to the detriment of Germany, France, and the UK. Therefore, we use ‘*Iron Curtain*’ in relation to the EU to show the still ongoing battles of strategic interests, between the different actors who have participated in the formation of the EU. We relate it to the US strategy towards the EU because through its different interventions in Europe, be it diplomatic or military- and especially with its Enlargement Policy-, the US has used the EU as a counter-weight against Russia, and to diminish its influence in Eurasia. Thus, the new European territories that came under the US-led West constituted a new border in the East; this separation came to be known the *Demarcation Line*; a term which ‘*has replaced the Iron Curtain in the post-Cold War era. This new reference states implicitly that two rivals exist and that refers to a conflictual dimension we have to override if we want peace and stability in the region...the more NATO and the EU stretch their reach, the more demarcation lines we have. This responds to the gradual enlargement logic*<sup>158</sup>, as explained in Z. Bouamama’s *European Security in US Foreign Policy after the Cold War*. Then, how did the US benefit from the formation of the EU in formulating its post Cold War strategy for the region?

With the attempts of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty to build a political Europe, and the 1993 Copenhagen Summit for enlargement, it was clear that the European identity lost its civilizational reference<sup>159</sup>. EU leading states set criteria that were common for any country that wished to join the EU such as: democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. As Brzezinski noted that in this case, we cannot establish the final eastern borders for the EU. For him, Europe has a common civilization

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<sup>158</sup> Zouhir. Bouamama, op. cit., pp. 455-456.

<sup>159</sup> Viatcheslav. Avioutskii, op. cit., p. 23.

based on common Christian traditions<sup>160</sup>. But he further warns that the US should be careful in dealing with the EU and has to control the co-operations that might keep it away from Eurasia; a Russo-German or a Franco-Russian co-operation, for instance, must not happen for it threatens the US presence in the region. A Russo-German co-operation is probable because history has shown the possibility of such an alliance. Germany has the choice to make alliances both with the East and with the West. The US did not forget the German-Soviet Pact of 1939 which enabled Soviet Russia to recover the Baltic States and Poland (Rapallo) that it gave up by the Bolsheviks in 1918<sup>161</sup>. Therefore, the US was still concerned with controlling the evolution of the EU.

What facilitate the control of the formation of the EU by the US are the different visions in Europe to create a political EU. Though Germany, France and the UK all agree on enlarging the Union, the way and the form this enlargement would have remains a point of disagreement. Concerning France, Europe enables it to regain its old greatness and be an important participant in international affairs. It would realize de Gaulle's dream of the *Europe of Nations 'from the Atlantic to the Ural'*. European institutions would be founded on cooperation between national entities, excluding any Atlantic relation. For Germany, it called for a federation of Europe, in the image of the German model. Germany has to rely on Europe for national liberation, and on the US for its security. Accordingly, a Europe of the US is not an option for its foreign policy. This would make Germany a crucial and a key partner for the US in Europe. Besides, the US considers that the European powers have regional interests, contrary to theirs which are global. France disagrees with this definition and classification, claiming that its interests go beyond Northern Africa; they are present in Black Africa, Asia and the Middle East, too. Contrary to France, the US definition corresponds to Germany's which has regional interests in Central and Eastern Europe, and copes with the US strategy of enlargement for both the EU and NATO<sup>162</sup>. This can be illustrated through the Yugoslav Wars, when the position of France was to support Serbia as a counter-weight against the US and German

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<sup>160</sup> Zbigniew. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 81.

<sup>161</sup> Aymeric. Chauprade, op. cit., p. 243.

<sup>162</sup> Zouhir. Bouamama, op. cit., p. 378.

influence in the Balkans. Therefore, as Germany became a '*key partner*' to the US, the Germans were included in the Euro-Atlantic strategy for enlargement, by being in charge of the IFOR in Bosnia.

All in all, the US strategy after the dissolution of the Soviet Bloc has had as a priority to supervise the newly independent states which are sources for energy resources. The geostrategic shift from *Containment* to *Enlargement* was meant to respond to the new geopolitical changes, and a new world order had to be drawn for Eurasia in general and Europe in particular. Enlargement was concerned discursively by spreading the values of free-market democracies by joining the CEE countries to NATO and the EU in order to have world peace. Strategically, it was found that not only the US which had a strategy to gain more influence in Europe; France, Germany, the UK, too, had their own geopolitical visions about the new world order. The Yugoslav example has shown the degree the conflicting interests can reach, and that behind the ideological discourse on humanism, geopolitical interests were hidden.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

# **Post-Cold War Expansion of Economic Integration Further East and Its Consequences on Former Yugoslavia**



This chapter would cover the shift in the economic direction at the global level in general, in Eastern Europe, and in Yugoslavia in particular, right after the collapse of the communist bloc. The world economy witnessed in the 1990s an unprecedented integration into the model of free-market economy; a *global* world was to be born having the international economic and financial institutions as a basis for the take-off of the ex-communist countries. A new ‘disideologized’ political economic philosophy, the ‘third way’ would serve countries in transition to the free-market economic system as a platform for ‘change’. This would not be without consequences to many Eastern European countries, especially for former-Yugoslavia, which witnessed a violent ‘coup’ due to the implemented economic reforms that generated two bloody wars, the Bosnian and the Kosovo wars.

The origins of global economic integration go back to the inception of the international economic and financial institutions in 1944. The IMF, the WB and the General Agreements on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) played an important role in building what is known today the European Union and strengthened the presence of the US in the international arena. Their role would accentuate in the post-Cold War era to further expand the area of free-market economic model further east. Following the neo-Gramscian perspective, we noticed that states in those international institutions represent their strategic interests in accordance with transnational companies’ interests of their respective countries. Thus, inside the international economic and financial institutions a consensus is built around the national and strategic interests of states and business in making decision for a specific indebted country.

Thus as our case study concerns former Yugoslavia, we will shed light on its economic situation during and after the Cold War period. We will try to show the internal economic factors that led to its dissolution and the foreign factors, represented in the specific relation it had with the IMF and the US, and how the US instrumentalized the IMF in formulating its foreign policy vis-à-vis Yugoslavia following its national security agenda.

### III. 1. Globalization of Economic Liberalism

The term *globalization* has been recurrent since the ‘failure’ of communism as a socio-economic system in competing with capitalism during the four decades of post-Second World War. As the origins of globalization vary, a clear and definite definition cannot be given. However, as the scope of our study covers US ‘hegemony’ in post-Cold War world, we would approach *globalization* from a neo-Gramscian perspective. Indeed, at the dawn of the collapse of communism, the international arena witnessed the rise of many potential global state-actors rivaling with the US economically, such as Germany, Russia and China, the growing role of the international financial and economic institutions [IMF, WB, and the GATT/ the World Trade Organization (WTO)], and the transnational companies with interests going beyond the national borders. All that constituted a multilateral world with all the different constituent actors, and having economy as a means to establish the balance of power.

As Cold-War geopolitical order was characterized by demilitarization (with a great presence of wars in the Third World) and the spread of international institutions of arbitration. The post-Cold War order witnessed a growing interest in economy to draw the national security map of the different industrial (the US, Germany and France) and emerging countries (Russia and China). The *soft power*<sup>163</sup> theory that is embodied in technology, the information revolution and economy was to replace (not completely) military hardware. States’ priorities were shifted, then, to economic production, finance and trade. Those aspects, with the help of technology, are transnational in nature; they crossed nation-states borders to make of the globe a connected web of different interests. This led some strategists like Kenichi Ohmae to claim that the importance of nation-states was reaching its end since the state no longer organizes economic activity<sup>164</sup>, especially with the triumph of free-market economy.

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<sup>163</sup> ‘soft power’ is a concept by Joseph Nye that democratic states use to establish their hegemony through consent rather than coercion. ‘Soft power’ can be under the form of, for example, economic aid. Nye coined the concept in 1990 in his book *Bound to lead: The Changing nature of American Power*.

<sup>164</sup> Sukru. Inan, ‘Goeconomic Policies for Regional Development: Turkey as a Catalyst for Eastern Europe’ , EKONOMIKA, 2005, p 30-45. < [www.iiss.org/-/media/Images/Events/.../64319.pdf](http://www.iiss.org/-/media/Images/Events/.../64319.pdf)<

The post-Cold War international scene was also characterized by the rising role of the different international economic and financial institutions; the IMF, the WB-both are 'autonomous' and specialized agencies affiliated to the UN<sup>165</sup>-, and the WTO as agents of free-market economy; and regional institutions that of the EU, North Atlantic Free Trade Accord (NAFTA), and East Asia. New roles were attributed to each institution since new interests had emerged in the East after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Concerning regional institutions, we have the interests of different dominant states that would direct and instrumentalize the institutions according to their economic strategies<sup>166</sup>. And within those dominant states influential companies would, with the consent of with their respective governments, secure their regional or international investments. At the national level, the different interests of the government and companies meet to define a common economic strategy for the national interest. Here, the military strategist Edward Luttwak<sup>167</sup> confirms that economic liberalism opened the door for the emergence of companies at the national, then the international level (multilateral companies) with specific aims, and it is in the obligation of their states to stand by them to conquer new markets and expand their interests. Politics in the post-Cold War world is at the service of economy and the different political agents (state technocrats) must have the ability to reach economic aims through diplomatic means<sup>168</sup>. Contrary to Ohmae, Luttwak accords great importance to the state. For him, the important means for a state to reach world primacy is its dominance of world economy instead of wars:

Military threats and alliances have lost their importance with the participation of international trade.... therefore, the economic priorities are no longer hidden and come to the fore ... In the future, it may be the fear of the economic consequences regulate commercial litigation and certainly more policy interventions motivated by powerful strategic reasons. And it will take an external threat to ensure the unity and internal cohesion of nations and countries, this threat is now economic or, more accurately geo-economic.<sup>169</sup>

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<sup>165</sup> Theodore. H. Cohn, Global Political Economy: Theory and Practice, (Pearson/Longman, 2005). p.24.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid, p. 27.

<sup>167</sup> Edward Luttwak is an American military strategist. He has drawn the change of state interest from politics to geoeconomics in his article 'From Geopolitics to Geoeconomics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of Commerce'. Geoeconomics is a branch of Geopolitics.

<sup>168</sup> Pascal. Lorot, Introduction à la Géoéconomie, (Paris : Ed Economica, 1999), pp. 11-12.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid, p. 12.

Therefore, *geo-economics* would govern post-Cold War international relations where influential states would be having focus on conquering markets and qualified employment for industry, biotechnology and finance. The aforementioned have the characteristics of what the neoliberals call for: more market freedoms.

Thus, we would limit our scope in dealing with globalization to economy, and would assume that globalization *'is a political outcome contingent upon the prior creation of a global neoliberal financial environment, which acts to impede the full circuit of capital.'*<sup>170</sup> If we were to define *Neoliberalism*, we would have to be keen to distinguish between the *neoliberal theory* and the *neoliberal practices*. The first, as defined by David Harvey, *'is ...a theory of political econom[y]...that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade.'*<sup>171</sup> The role of the state is limited to securing the private property and creating the different markets. Beyond this, the state should not intervene.<sup>172</sup> From the latter, *neoliberal practices* can be derived as follows: deregulation (no government regulation in economic activities), privatization (by converting state-owned enterprises to private owners), and liberalization (the retreat of governments from financial markets).<sup>173</sup> Neoliberalism was a resultant to the collapse of the Bretton Woods economic system (1947-1970s) which was based on Keynesian mixed economy<sup>174</sup> and what Harvey refers to as *embedded liberalism*.<sup>175</sup> The 1980s and 1990s witnessed the rise of Neoliberalism as a hegemonic political and economic discourse of national and international political, economic and educational institutions; it has become *'common sense'*.<sup>176</sup>

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<sup>170</sup> Ray. Kiely, *The Clash of Civilizations: Neoliberalism, the Third Way and Anti-Globalization*, (Boston: Lieden, 2005), p. 115.

<sup>171</sup> David. Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 2.

<sup>172</sup> Ibid.

<sup>173</sup> Joseph. Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents*, (London: Penguin Book, 2002), p. 59.

<sup>174</sup> Keynesian mixed economy (Keynesianism), a theory by John Maynard Keynes. It is an economy where both the private and state sectors play a role. It meant to build welfare 'states' in the destructed Europe after the end of the Second world War.

<sup>175</sup> David. Harvey, op. cit., p. 11.

<sup>176</sup> Owen. Worth, 'Beyond world order and transnational classes: The (re)application of Gramsci in global politics', pp. 19-31., In *Gramsci and Global Politics*, (London: Routledge, 2009).

Through the association of globalization to Neoliberalism, it can be assumed that globalization is not ‘given’, a fact of life that just follows the evolution of the world, but it is rather determined by social, political and economic factors, especially embedded in Cold War different international institutions. The point whether globalization is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ is relative. However, advocates of neoliberal practices claim that, for instance, since free-market reforms ‘succeeded’ in Mexico and Brazil in the 1990s, then the case is true for the rest of countries. As Ray Kiely writes in his book, this was possible only when imports were cut.<sup>177</sup> Other countries suffered economic hardship as a result of free-market reforms, like Chile and Argentina. Contrary to advocates of globalization, such as Anthony Giddens, who regards globalization as inclusive, Manuel Castells<sup>178</sup> views it as hierarchical since inclusion depends on the access of the different social classes to the network society.<sup>179</sup> Globalization optimists would guarantee the sustainable development of states through free-market reforms by referring to David Ricardo’s notion of *comparative advantages*<sup>180</sup>. For example, two countries can get mutual benefits by importing from one another what one country does not have. Globalization skeptics such as Kiely is not convinced by this argument because

Ricardo’s provisos concerning the mutual benefits of free trade do not hold, and balanced trade, perfect competition and full employment do not exist. Therefore, countries do not have equal capacities to compete in the world economy, either through resource endowments or absolute costs and so the unqualified case for free trade is undermined.<sup>181</sup>

Therefore, Ricardo’s conditions of balanced trade, equal competition, and full employment, for a ‘win-win’ situation cannot be satisfied in the real world and accept the neoliberal practices.

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<sup>177</sup> Ray. Kiely, The Clash of Civilizations: Neoliberalism, the Third Way and Anti-Globalization, (Boston: Brill, 2005), p. 73.

<sup>178</sup> Manuel Castells (born in 1942), is a Spanish sociologist who analyzed the post-modern information age. His researches are also associated with globalization and communication. One of his important and well know books is The Rise of the Network Society in 1996 .

<sup>179</sup> *Ibid*, p. 22.

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid*, p. 42.

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid*.

### III.1. 1. International Financial and Economic Institutions and Their Growing Role in the Post-Cold War World:

With the collapse of communism and the ‘triumph’ of free market capitalism, the practices of the latter became more embedded in the international institutions such as the IMF and the WB. The ‘triumph’ was interpreted by scholars of international relations as a ‘hegemonic’ moment. Above, we have mentioned that the international institutions with the state and multinational companies constitute agents of power and hegemony, and in the case of the post-Cold War world, they are agents for neoliberal hegemony, having the free-market system as a mode of production. We have to recall that hegemony in post-Cold War world is exercised by the different agents of power through a balance of coercion and consent to reach the strategic ends that are financial, economic, and political.

According to Robert W. Cox, the post-Cold War world order came into being because of the post-Second World War Bretton Woods’ world structure which lasted until the 1970s and made of the US a hegemon, and spread what the political scientist Stephen Gill calls the *international historical bloc*<sup>182</sup>. The latter was the result of the reached consent between the US government, the business class, and civil society absorbed by the interests of the earlier through ‘passive revolution’, inside the US, then through history. This alliance constituted the US *national historical bloc*. Therefore, after the Cold War, the *international historical bloc* evolved to become the *transnational historical bloc*<sup>183</sup> forming interests beyond state and class boundaries, and creating new conditions for re-enforcing trans-national capital.

Some scholars such as the Neorealists argued that with the end of the bipolar world where the US enjoyed a world position that qualified it as hegemonic, now we are living a period ‘after hegemony’ (Keohane 2005). There is some truth in that,

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<sup>182</sup> Cited in, Andreas. Bieler, AdamD. Smith, ‘A Critical Theory Route to Hegemony, World Order and Historical Change: neo-Gramscian Perspectives in IR’, *Capital and Class*, N 82, pp. 85-113. <<http://www.artsrn.ualberta.ca/courses/PoliticalScience/661B1/documents/BielerMortonCriticalTheoryHegemonyChange.pdf>>.

<sup>183</sup> Ibid.

especially with the rise of potential rivals to the US, the US is no longer the world hegemon. But hegemony as a subject of rivalry still exists. Therefore, we would argue that what characterizes the post-Cold War world, as far as power is concerned, is that the world structure, order, or rule favors hegemony but does not produce hegemon(s). As the Cold War world order was a contest over hegemony and produced the US as a hegemon, so would be the post-Cold War world order but not in an identical way. The main concern, however, for scholars such as John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge is that *'whether this new hegemony can hope to be stable-and if so, how, and in what terms-is a moot point... It is not yet clear how a new ideology of transnational [economic] liberalism might be associated with particular conceptions of hierarchy and territory.'*<sup>185</sup> However, the international financial and economic institutions, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, began to play a vigorous role in establishing a neoliberal economic hegemony, and in re-shaping the ex-communist bloc after the neoliberal image.

After the Soviet Union dissolution, the IMF and the WB had the task of managing the transition of the ex-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe from a planned economy to free-market-economy. They have been the most active international institutions in world economy that set programs for development and give loans to countries in order to move toward the free-market system. With the 'triumph' of free-market capitalism, the IMF and the WB became centers for neoliberal ideology through the practices they impose on indebted countries, such as deregulation, privatization, and liberalization, that were the bases for what came to be known as *structural adjustment*.<sup>186</sup> The problem lies in the generalization of those reforms to all indebted countries without taking into consideration the social structure and the economic situation specific to a given country. In relation to this point, Joseph Stiglitz noted in *Globalization and Its Discontents*:

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<sup>184</sup> We prefer to be accurate in our use of liberalism. We believe there are two sorts of liberalism: one political, the other economic. We make the distinction since we dealt with political liberalism in our first chapter covering the promotion of democracy. This chapter is devoted mainly to economic matters.

<sup>185</sup> John. Agnew, Stuart. Corbridge, *Mastering Space: Hegemony Territory and International Political Economy*, (London and NY: Routledge, 1995), p. 164.

<sup>186</sup> David. Harvey, op. cit., p. 29.

The leaders of the 1917 Revolution recognized that what was at stake was more than a change in economics; it was a change in society in all of its dimensions. So, too, the transition from communism to a market economy was more than just an economic experiment: it was a transformation of societies and political structures.<sup>187</sup>

I would anticipate citing the Yugoslav example just for the sake of illustration, and the point would be dealt with in details in the second section of this chapter. If former-Yugoslavia underwent a deep social split that was not due to ethnic hatred but rather due to the economic reforms the Yugoslav society was not ready yet to implement. Its social, ethnic, and economic construction had to have adequate reforms; reforms that sprang from its social construction and not imported programs that might have worked elsewhere, but would not, necessarily, work with it.

If we go back to the initial vocation of the IMF<sup>188</sup>, as designed by the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, the institution meant to promote world economic stability by stabilizing currency-exchange rates, expand international liquidity, and making the dollar the main international currency and its value was convertible to gold at a fixed price.<sup>189</sup> With the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the 1970s (due mainly to the Vietnam War and over militarization), the IMF sacrificed stable money and liberal trade and kept as a goal financial freedom.<sup>190</sup> Stiglitz further explains that the institution became absorbed by '*capital market liberalization...that serves the interests of the financial community*'<sup>191</sup> and abandoned social well-being and world stability.

We have to bring under light the responsibility of the then world hegemon, which was the US, in reshaping and redirecting the IMF. Since its inception, the IMF has been dominated not just by the wealthiest industrial countries but also by the private interests of the commercial and financial companies of those countries (the case is true with the WB and the WTO)<sup>192</sup>. And the US Treasury is the IMF's largest shareholder

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<sup>187</sup> Joseph. Stiglitz, op. cit., p. 135.

<sup>188</sup> We would concentrate on the IMF because we believe it has been the most influential and determining international institution in world's affairs, as far as states' economic program shaping are concerned.

<sup>189</sup> Britannica Free Encyclopedia Ultimate Reference 2008.

<sup>190</sup> Ray. Kiely, op. cit., p. 173.

<sup>191</sup> Joseph. Stiglitz, op. cit., p. 230.

<sup>192</sup> Ibid, p. 18.



and the only member with a veto power.<sup>193</sup> The latter shows the great importance the US pays to the IMF and uses it as agent for enlarging the horizon for its global strategy and expanding the interests of its private companies.

### **III.1. 2. The ‘Third Way’ As a Theory and Practice for the Post-Cold War World:**

With the ‘triumph’ of free-market capitalism at the beginning of the 1990s, and the conceptualization of globalization as the theory for backing this mode of production, many theorists, supporting or denouncing globalization, opened the debate on the fate of the ex-communist and socialist movements inside and outside free-market countries. With the expansion of the free-market economic model by the US-led West into Central and Eastern Europe, and in order to make the economic transition possible, most of the ex-communist parties moved from the left to the center or to the center-left to make political, and more specifically, economic transition possible. A new political trend witnessed a rise and had been appropriated by some political parties to define and justify their political moves<sup>194</sup>. *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy* by Anthony Giddens was a conceptualization of the post-Cold War world with the new challenges it was facing in politics and to overcome them without falling in the trap of the ‘values’ that had become traditions of both the left and right. For Giddens, the ‘third way’ meant ‘*a framework of thinking and policy-making that seeks to adopt social democracy to a world which has changed fundamentally over the past two or three decades. It is a third way in the sense that it is an attempt to transcend both old-style social democracy and neoliberalism*’<sup>195</sup>. Many have not shared this view because of the nature of the post-Cold War world order, with its different agents of power (the state, civil society, and business) that differ from one country to another and the role they play at the national and international level in a

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<sup>193</sup> Ibid, p. 102.

<sup>194</sup> Anthony. Giddens, *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), p. 25.

<sup>195</sup> Ibid. p. 26.

globalized world. For his critics, Giddens failed to guess the interests of the different agents of power which show their national and international direction, as Ray Kiely remarked: *[he] conflates agency with outcome and as a result underestimates the importance of agency, power relations and historical specificity.*<sup>196</sup>

For Giddens, the disappearance of communism reflected its failure and its disability to cope with the new social, economic and technological challenges. As far as Neoliberalism is concerned, Giddens judges it as a theory suffering from incoherence in concept and practice. While demanding more economic liberalism, neoliberalism calls for more social restraints. On the one hand, neoliberals disapprove state intervention in markets, and on the other hand, they approve nationalism and state intervention at the international level. They are mainly concerned by economic liberalism.<sup>197</sup> However, Giddens sympathizes with some neoliberal values such as individualism, and sees globalization as being more inclusive<sup>198</sup>, the thing his critics reproached him for.

Some of Giddens' critics argue that the 'third way' just continues on the same neoliberal lines and tries to adapt or adjust socialism to the market<sup>199</sup>. The 'third way' can be interpreted, from a Gramscian perspective, as a 'passive revolution', when the state in consent with business (both national and transnational), adopts social aspirations just in discourse to reach market ends.<sup>200</sup> Therefore, with the 'triumph' of the US-led Western economic model during the Cold War, the new economic agenda was to be furthered to the ex-communist countries. To spread their influence, the US perceived it only by expanding their neoliberal free-market economic model. As they succeeded with the Marshall Plan to shape a Western Europe in which their interests go on the same line with theirs, so it would be the same case with the rest of Europe and Asia. And this is how globalization came to be closely related to the 'third way'.<sup>201</sup>

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<sup>196</sup> Ray. Kiely, op. cit., p. 13.

<sup>197</sup> Anthony. Giddens, op. cit., p. 15.

<sup>198</sup> Ray. Kiely, op-cit., p. 22.

<sup>199</sup> See Jules. Townshend, 'Giddens "Third Way" and Gramsci's "Passive Revolution"', pp. 156-172. In *Gramsci and Geopolitics*, (Oxen: Routledge, 2009).

<sup>200</sup> Ibid.

<sup>201</sup> See Ray Kiely.

It is no coincidence that both the Clinton Administration and the Blair government appropriated the name ‘third way’ since they found in it what was necessary for their national and international agendas. Although Giddens sympathized, in the beginning, with the political projects of the US and British leaders, he later became skeptical and had some reservations at the end of their mandates<sup>202</sup>. In fact, to argue Giddens’ intentions through his book is not the aim of our research. Our interests lie in the ‘third way’ as a theory; how far it can be associated with globalization and Neoliberalism; and how it served the US-led West in their economic strategies to program the transition of the ex-communist countries. Indeed, the ‘third way’ can be read as a project, as Ray Kiely stated:

Anthony Giddens’ Third Way can be considered as globalization theory...largely taking not only capitalism, but neoliberal capitalism for granted; this is a political **project** that claims to respond to the fact of globalization, but in the process, promote policies that deepen neoliberal capitalism. This is regarded as being both inevitable-there is no alternative-and desirable.<sup>203</sup>

Perhaps Giddens’ limitation was concerned with the explanation of the flagship concept of *globalization*. Kiely insisted many times on the understanding of globalization as an outcome of the historical progression of the capitalist mode of production and the way it affected the formation of social relations consciousness nationally and internationally. While Giddens has a positive attitude towards globalization and sees it ‘*as a phenomenon ranging beyond much more widely than the global marketplace*’<sup>204</sup>, Kiely comments on this and sees it as an attempt to depoliticize globalization (since economy and politics intermingle), ‘*because globalization had literally arrived “from nowhere”; it was a fact of life*’<sup>205</sup> that states have to deal with.

### **III.2. Economic Decline As a Source of Yugoslavia’s Dismemberment:**

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<sup>202</sup> Anthony. Giddens, ‘The Third Way Revisited’, Policy Network, <[http://www.policy-network.net/pno\\_detail.aspx?ID=3868&title=The+Third+Way+revisited](http://www.policy-network.net/pno_detail.aspx?ID=3868&title=The+Third+Way+revisited)>.

<sup>203</sup> Ray. Kiely, op-cit., p. 4.

<sup>204</sup> Anthony. Giddens, op. cit., p. 64.

<sup>205</sup> Ray. Kiely, op. cit., p. 82.

Many essays, articles and studies dealing with former Yugoslavia attributed the shrinking of the federation to the ethnic and nationalistic constituents of the federation. The split was not 'peaceful' as it was the case with the Soviet Union. It was characterized by violence and bloodshed. Some of the scholars who were interested and studied the Yugoslav case of secession, like Susan Woodward and Beverly Crawford, assume that the violent split of the Yugoslav federation has origins in the one-sided economic reforms the state was subject to, without any institutional back up and the withdrawal of the state from the economic scene.

We have then to go back to the eve of post- Second World War 'second' Yugoslav construction and especially shed light on the economic changes brought by Josip Tito. In fact, Titism as a political and economic doctrine was based on non-alignment- neither coping with the capitalistic model of development nor the communist one- and decentralization<sup>206</sup>. The latter had brought a coup fatal to the federation which started to show its signs in the early nineties. The efforts spent by Tito to weaken the Soviet grip on Southern Eastern Europe and his rapprochement with the West were not sufficient and were meaningless with the solid construction of the internal elements of multinational Yugoslavia.

The economic situation in former Yugoslavia before its disintegration in the 1990s was marked by a gradual evolution in market liberalism. The decentralization of the state gave economic responsibility to local governments, which means that local agents (constituted of different nationalities) were in charge of the economic change. For instance, as industrialized states, Croatia and Slovenia had more interests in liberalizing their economies than the rest of the Yugoslav states. Treating equally economically the different states that constitute the Yugoslav federation on equal terms was the main challenge that faced Tito in reconstructing Yugoslavia right after the Second World War.

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<sup>206</sup> Encyclopedia Britannica Ultimate reference Suite, 2008, (Josip Tito)

However, Tito's efforts proved inefficient to build a federation with a strong economy. With the neoliberal sweep in the West, more free-market reforms were required from Yugoslavia and the 1980s economic reforms that were introduced to the country in order to obtain loans from the IMF and the US, had just deepened the economic demise of Yugoslavia and widened the gap between industrialized and non-industrialized multinational Yugoslav states. The economic situation of the 1980s represented a political opportunity for local Yugoslav governments to display their nationalism one against the other and resulted to what became known as the Yugoslav dismemberment with the secession of Slovenia and Croatia in early 1990.

### **III.2. 1. The Economic Situation in Former Yugoslavia before 1990:**

Since the collapse of communism as a political and an economic system, free-market and democracy '*panacea*'<sup>207</sup> would put the ex-Yugoslav republics on the way to Western-like development. However, the socio-economic formations of the 'second' Yugoslavia after the end of the Second World War show that the economic reforms the federation had witnessed were already liberal in nature. 'Titoist' Yugoslavia, and especially through the policy of non-alignment, had relations with the West in general and the US in particular, besides having loans from the IMF and in exchange, implemented economic reforms advantageous for the market. The reforms followed by Tito, be it constitutional or economic, had a negative impact on former-Yugoslavia as a federation that instead of uniting the different nationalist constituents, created an unequal environment where nationalities (Serb, Croat, Slovenian, Bosnian and Montenegrin) competed economically and politically, and had as a consequence the dissolution of the federation with the secession of Croatia and Slovenia.

In her essay on the causes of cultural conflict, Beverly Crawford assumes that *'political and economic decentralization threaten to break down established*

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<sup>207</sup> Beverly. Crawford, 'The Causes of Cultural Conflict: An Institutional Approach', in *The Myth of 'Ethnic' Conflict: Politics, Economics, and 'Cultural' Violence*, (Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley, 1998), p. 15. < [escholarship.org/uc/item/7hc733q3.pdf](http://escholarship.org/uc/item/7hc733q3.pdf)>.

*community and the liberal focus on individual self-reliance threatens historical bonds and leads to deep insecurities.*<sup>208</sup>In the case of former Yugoslavia, when Tito broke off relations with the Soviet Union, he designed a new model of socialism based on the market. For this, in 1963 ‘*self-management*’ socialism was the translation of economic decentralization in factories. There was a decentralization of decision-making from the center (the Yugoslav state) to the republics, and then to the workers’ councils.<sup>209</sup>Self-management socialism or what other scholars name self-management nationalism was the first element that prepared for the dismemberment of Yugoslavia in the nineties. It weakened the central state and empowered the republic in making decisions in many fields. Local entrepreneurs and politicians worked more for their republic than for the Yugoslav state; they identified themselves with their republics since what links them to the federal state lost its *raison d’état*. Beverly Crawford further elaborates on decentralization in former Yugoslavia:

[...] the weaker the central government became, the more allocative authority fell into the hands of regional party elites. The deepening economic crisis and the collapse of social welfare system made their patronage networks increasingly important because their aid became indispensable in keeping both enterprises and individuals afloat; they made significant allocative decisions in the economy, as well as political and administrative appointments based on ethnic and cultural bonds created in their local communities.<sup>210</sup>

The fact shows that the economic direction a country chooses, impacts its social formation if it is not accompanied by an institutional framework that would absorb the differences of the social formation without weakening the state.

Most scholars working on Yugoslavia claim that the transition from socialism to free-market capitalism happened with the ousting of Milosevic in 2000. The fact is that former Yugoslavia started moving to market economy with Josip Tito. This can be shown in the different stages former Yugoslavia witnessed through the different economic and political reforms. For instance the 1965 economic reform reduced

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<sup>208</sup> Ibid, p. 16.

<sup>209</sup> Encyclopedia Britannica Ultimate Reference Suite, 2008, (Josip Tito).

<sup>210</sup> Beverly. Crawford, op. cit., p. 25.

enterprise dependency on the central state by removing regulations.<sup>211</sup> As an example of political reform, the 1974 constitutional reform that stipulated more decentralization of the republics at all levels. It later led to the accentuation of the different nationalistic spirits and turned down Yugoslavism. Besides, former Yugoslavia relied on the different US economic and military aid and the conditional IMF loans which it had them in exchange of further market-economic reforms. For instance, the reforms of liberalization and global integration brought in the 1980s undermined central state institutions that were supposed to provide stability<sup>212</sup>.

Yugoslavism, as a provider of political stability, was more economically advantageous for Serbia, Bosnia, Macedonia and Montenegro than for Slovenia and Croatia. As industrialized republics, Croatia and Slovenia (through the territorial distribution of investments) would not transfer the resources to the other republics and this is one of the reasons for their secession. However, the poor republic (that had agrarian economies) depended on the central state for development funds and subsidies<sup>213</sup>. In the light of this, it seems that Tito's dream of Yugoslavism and the practices he fulfilled to realize this dream were paradoxical. The practice of decentralization worked for the independence of the industrialized republics, Slovenia and Croatia, and led to their independence.

### **III.2. 2. The Economic Situation in Former Yugoslavia after 1990:**

With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the barriers that halted the free-market economic model from expanding eastward, and possibilities to conquer the Central and Eastern Europe in general and Yugoslavia in particular, economically, were the order of the day. Globalization of economic integration paved its way in Yugoslavia through the IMF loans and US aids when the central state resources were brought to naught. Especially with the election of Slobodan Milosevic

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<sup>211</sup> Beverly. Crawford, op. cit., p. 214.

<sup>212</sup> Ibid, p. 202.

<sup>213</sup> Ibid, p. 218.

as president in 1989 and the secession of Slovenia and Croatia the US-led ‘international community’ pointed at Serbian nationalism with the leadership of Milosevic as the sole and main cause for the disintegration of Yugoslavia. As we have explained earlier, the cause for the disintegration was economic and was accentuated with the economic hardships in the 1980s with the retreat of the state to subsidize the poor republics Serbia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo due to decentralization. This resulted in bloodshed and a heavy record of casualties in all the republics. Even with the ousting of Milosevic in 2000, the economic situation was not stabilized. On the contrary, as weakened and independent states, the ex-Yugoslav republics in general and Serbia in particular underwent harsher economic reforms that further weakened their welfare system<sup>214</sup>.

If we are to analyze the economic situation in the 1990s, not much was recorded during the period. The political situation was over covered by Western-led international media. The Yugoslav internal problems (with some international backing) resulted in two Yugoslav wars (Bosnia 1995 and Kosovo 1999). Even though, Milosevic maintained social peace in the form of guaranteed jobs and other benefits<sup>215</sup>. All economic indicators witnessed a fall in employment, GDP, and poor functioning of social services. This was due partly to the UN sanctions imposed on the ‘third’<sup>216</sup> Yugoslavia that isolated it politically and economically<sup>217</sup>, and served as a means of pressure on former Yugoslavia to cooperate according to the US-led West foreign policy agenda.

During the 1990s, the world political scene was characterized by the emergence of a new trend that went with the economic shift from socialism to economic liberalism.

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<sup>214</sup> Aleksandra. Piletic, ‘The Impact of Neoliberal Policies in Transitional Economies of the Western Balkans’, *Institute of Social Studies*, pp.1-11. <[http://www2.euromemorandum.eu/uploads/piletic\\_neoliberal\\_policies\\_in\\_transitional\\_economies.pdf](http://www2.euromemorandum.eu/uploads/piletic_neoliberal_policies_in_transitional_economies.pdf)>.

<sup>215</sup> Slavisa. Orlovic, ‘Political Transformation and Socio-Economic Changes in Serbia’, in *Welfare States in Transition-20 Years after the Yugoslav Welfare Model*, (Sofia: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2011), p. 267. <[library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/sofia/08711.pdf](http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/sofia/08711.pdf)>.

<sup>216</sup> On June 25, 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared their secession from the Yugoslav federation. Macedonia followed suit on December 19, and, in February–March 1992, Bosnian Croats and Muslims voted to secede. With such events, Serbia and Montenegro created a new federation, adopting a new constitution on April 27, 1992 and ‘third’ ‘Yugoslavia’ came into being.

<sup>217</sup> Slavisa. Orlovic, op. cit., p. 267.



Such a shift in politics had as subject political parties who modified their ideologies from left to right. The ‘third way’ as a theory of globalization permitted leftist parties of Eastern and Central Europe, to move to the center and define themselves as social-democratic parties, even the most radicals of them. Former Yugoslav parties in general and Serbian parties in particular, were not spared this phenomenon and the 1990s witnessed the re-birth of many parties that had socialist and leftist traditions. For instance, the 1992 Democratic Party (DS) Program defined itself as a modern civil party, and with the Program of 1997 the ideological direction was defined as being a party of the center. However, in 2001, the party gave up the ideological definition and was content in describing itself a social-democratic party. Another party the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) was also in opposition during the 1990s and can be characterized as conservatively-national and socially conservative. But during the 2000s the DSS was associated to another party the G17 plus which is economically liberal in nature and in the different government in the 2000s occupied the key departments of economy and finance. Other radical and anti-West political parties changed their principles and radical leftist attitudes after 2000, amongst them the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), and the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) (which seceded from the Serbian Radical Party). With the exception of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) that refuses to change its radical position and still refuses to cooperate with the Hague Tribunal.<sup>218</sup> This move towards the center, abandoning ideological references, and acceptance of Western cooperation can be explained as the relative ‘triumph’ of Neoliberalism economically that later changed the political attitude of the different parties, and this move can be translated as a means of survival of the leftist political parties.

With the coming of what is referred to by some scholars as the ‘first democratic’ government in Serbia in 2001, with Vojislav Kostunica of the DSS as President of the ‘third’ Yugoslavia and Zoran Djindjic of the DS as the Prime Minister (until 2003), more strict economic reforms were brought and were neoliberal in nature. Prices were liberalized, control of foreign trade abolished, socially owned enterprises privatized

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<sup>218</sup> Ibid, pp. 265- 266.

the banking and financial systems reformed<sup>219</sup>. A relative stabilization of growth was registered at the expense of the welfare system. Moreover, as far as labor is concerned, the transition toward a more liberal economy weakened the labor corps and the worker's rights were lost with the introduction of the Labor Law in 2001 followed by the Adoption of the Employment Law in 2003. The latter was done to make of Serbia an attractive place for foreign investments<sup>220</sup>.

With the second 'democratic' government (2004-2007), having Kostunica as a Prime Minister and Boris Tadić as President, the economic reforms carried out by Kostunica which dealt mainly with cuts in public consumption, were '*contributed by the IMF pressures, introduction of VAT, which increased the numbers of taxpayers, and therefore the budget revenue. Also, this government started with the reduction of the number of employees in public administration, army and partially in public enterprises.*'<sup>221</sup> The question is once the budget revenue is restored, where was it to be channeled? What is noticeable in those reforms is that they further weakened the centrality of the state since they meant to help fostering privatization. The latter is regarded as the key of development in countries in transition to free-market economy. However, as far as Serbia is concerned, privatization did not achieve the wanted aims, since its key public enterprises have not been privatized; for instance Electric Power Industry of Serbia, Serbia Gas Company, Yugoslav Airlines, Belgrade Airport, etc. Only in 2009 the Oil Industry of Serbia was privatized 51% of its ownership were bought by the Russians<sup>222</sup>. This can be explained by the nature of the foreign policy of Yugoslavia, and the Russian presence in Serbia marks its coming back into the economic and political world scene as a potential rival of the US in the South European region. Indeed, the influence of the US over the IMF and the WB permits it to instrumentalize them to bring the ex-Warsaw Pact countries in general and Serbia in particular, under the free-market-umbrella that enables it to have roots and conquer new interests in the region. However with the emergence of potential rivals, their aim proves difficult to reach as Slavsa Orlovic notes:

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<sup>219</sup> Slavisa. Orlovic, op. cit., p. 271.

<sup>220</sup> Ibid, p. 274.

<sup>221</sup> Ibid, p. 268.

<sup>222</sup> Ibid, p. 270.

A large role in stimulation of economic and institutional reforms in Serbia has in recent years been played by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). The assistance was not only technical, but implied the linking of loans to reformative measures of the Government and the Assembly, through certain conditioning. [With] the consequences of the world economic crisis...[and] in order to reduce its dependence on the IMF, the [Serbian] Government achieved agreements on loans with other countries (the EU, China, and Russia).<sup>223</sup>

### **III.2. 3. Former Yugoslavia's Geopolitical Position, US Economic Interests, and IMF Lending:**

The US-Yugoslav economic relations from the end of the Second World War till today have witnessed ups and downs. This was due to the nature of the environment that surrounded Yugoslavia and the different actors it interacted with. For instance, the US-Yugoslav economic relations during the Cold War were at their zenith and that was because the US feared that Yugoslavia would turn to the Russian help and then adopt its socialist model of economic development. However, right after the fall of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia started to receive a highly conditioned aid and loans, which came from the US or the US-influenced IMF and hence to succumb to US pressures to leave its strategic areas that constitute part of US national security agenda.

As mentioned earlier, the US and Yugoslav economic relations go back to the early years of the post-Second World War. Indeed, through the movement of nonalignment, USAID poured money into Yugoslavia and assisted it financially. Another indirect assistance that meant to help Yugoslavia transit into free-market economy was represented in the educational exchanges in the field of economics. During the 1950s and 1960s, the US government and American 'philanthropic' foundations, such as the Ford Foundation saw the academic exchange as a means to fight socialist regimes and

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<sup>223</sup> Ibid, p. 280.

infiltrate American economic ideas and values.<sup>224</sup> Indeed, the Ford Foundation established exchanges with Yugoslavia in 1959.

However, what attracted our attention is a released official and sensitive document of the National Security Decision Directive 133, on ‘US Policy toward Yugoslavia’, on March 1984. The document’s interest is mainly economic, in which the importance of Yugoslavia in US strategy is seminal. Here is an excerpt that shows the motives for helping Yugoslavia and in exchange that country would further liberalize its economy:

Yugoslavia is an important obstacle to Soviet expansionism and hegemony in Southern Europe. Yugoslavia also serves as a useful reminder to countries in Eastern Europe of the advantages of independence from Moscow and of the benefits of friendly relations with the West... The severe financial situation facing Yugoslavia could pose a serious threat to Yugoslavia’s ability to maintain those policies which best serve our interests... It is in US interests that Yugoslavia be able to resist pressures from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. We will also continue to encourage Yugoslavia’s long-term internal liberalization... US policy will be to promote the trend toward an effective, market-oriented Yugoslav economic structure....<sup>225</sup>

Linking the economic situation in Yugoslavia with the national security strategy of the US shows the importance and the emergency of delivering loans to Yugoslavia via the US-led international institutions the IMF and the WB. We assume that IMF lending to Yugoslavia is influenced by the US geopolitical interest in the region<sup>226</sup>. Boughton (2004) supported the view *‘that the IMF involvement in the Eastern European countries was not purely financially driven, but rather ideological by ultimately encouraging the superiority of the market economy....creditors (G7 members) may use the Fund’s financing facilities to increase or serve their influence over debtors.’*<sup>227</sup>

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<sup>224</sup> Johanna. Bockman, Gil. Eyal, ‘Eastern Europe As a Laboratory for Economic Knowledge: The Transitional Roots of Neoliberalism’, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 108, No. 2 (September 2002), pp. 310-352. <[sociology.columbia.edu/files/sociology/4.pdf](https://sociology.columbia.edu/files/sociology/4.pdf)>.

<sup>225</sup> The White House, ‘National Security Decision Directive on U. S. Policy Towards Yugoslavia’, (Washington, 1984), p. 1-3. <<https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-133.htm>>.

<sup>226</sup> Julien. Reynaud, Julien. Vauday, ‘IMF Lending and Geopolitics’, *Working Paper Series*. N° 965, European Central Bank 2008, pp. 1-54. <<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/.../ecbwp965.pdf>>.

<sup>227</sup> Ibid.

Treating the same issue, Storm C. Thacker<sup>228</sup> hypothesized on the political motives of IMF lending under the US influence. In his ‘The High Politics of IMF Lending’, Thacker tackles not only the economic but also the political incentives that condition IMF loans via the US. He assumes that countries which have interests close to US interests are highly likely to receive IMF loans than countries that oppose the US foreign agenda. For example, during the Cold War period, especially from 1950 to 1984, former Yugoslavia amongst other countries received many IMF loans. The period coincides with the move of former Yugoslavia from the USSR influence to the US influence. Knowing that Czechoslovakia, Poland and Vietnam were denied loans, although their economic worthiness. The writer continues by confirming the hypothesis that *‘the more closely a country aligns with the U. S., the higher the probability it will receive a loan from the IMF’*<sup>229</sup>. This shows that through controlling IMF lending, the US can control and safeguard its influence in the different spheres of influence in the world in general, and in Eastern Europe in particular.

It was also shown in a study, issued by the European Central Bank, concerned with the relation of IMF loans and US-led west geopolitical interests, where the authors, Julien Reynaud and Julien Vaudey, cited six variables that may condition the amount of the money credited to a geopolitically important country. The variables that contribute in setting conditions on loans may be energetic, nuclear, military, geographical area, unexploited potential, and pipelines infrastructure<sup>230</sup>. In the case of former Yugoslavia we assume that the US convinced the IMF to set conditionality on loans to control and appropriate the strategic geographical area of Kosovo and to set on it the oil and gas pipelines to transit energy from the Caspian to Europe. However, IMF loans were not the sole means to put pressure on former Yugoslavia, economic sanctions served as a means to discourage Yugoslav resistance and give up its strategic sites.

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<sup>229</sup> Storm C. Thacker, ‘The High Politics of IMF Lending’, *World Politics*, 52. October 1999. pp.38-75. <[www.bu.edu/sthacker/files/2012/02/imf.pdf](http://www.bu.edu/sthacker/files/2012/02/imf.pdf)>

<sup>230</sup> Julien. Reynaud, Julien. Vauday, ‘IMF Lending and Geopolitics’, *Working Paper Series*. N° 965, European Central Bank 2008, pp. 1-54. <<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/.../ecbwp965.pdf>>.

With the accentuation of nationalistic competition in former Yugoslavia and the different calls for autonomy in the industrialized republics, Yugoslavia was on the verge to change. The fall of the Berlin Wall, the Soviet collapse and the re-emergence of Germany as a potential power in Europe awakened the US pre-Second World War fears and had to stop the German European expansion diplomatically. In early 1990s, the Bush Sr. Administration introduced the 1991 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act which stipulates that *'any part of Yugoslavia failing to declare independence within six months would lose US financial support.'*<sup>231</sup> This represented the first turn in the US-Yugoslav relations. With the retreat and absence of its ancient rival, Russia, the US assumed it was high time to speed up the pace in appropriating their strategic interests in the region. Other economic sanctions were registered in the second half of the 1990s, this time during the second Clinton Administration. In 1996, Clinton brandished economic sanctions on Yugoslavia to put pressure on Milosevic to recognize the victory of the opposition in municipal elections. He did not stop here, but convinced the IMF to suspend talks on the normalization of relations between the IMF and Yugoslavia and threatened to re-impose UN economic sanctions against Serbia.<sup>232</sup> And with the ousting of Milosevic, US economic aid to former Yugoslavia fell due to the preparation of the ex-Yugoslav republics to have access into the Euro-Atlantic institution, after filling the 'terms and conditions' that cope with EU standards politically, economically and socially.

From this analysis of the US-Yugoslav relations, as far as economic aid is concerned we have come to the conclusion that this aid was highly conditioned by the US security agenda and the presence of potential rivals on the international scene. During the Cold War, having the USSR as a rival, the US smoothed its cooperation with Yugoslavia and was careful as far as sanctions were concerned. With the disappearance of that rival, the US became more confident and strengthened its tone in order to appropriate what it regards as strategic interests for its national security.

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<sup>231</sup> Noam. Chomsky, 'Crisis in the Balkans', *Z Magazine*. May 1999. <<http://www.chomsky.info/articles/199905--.htm>>.

<sup>232</sup> D. Collins, Stephen. 'Democracy : Sanctions : An Assessment of Economic Sanctions as an Instrument of Democracy Promotion', *Taiwan Journal of Democracy*. Vol 5. N° 2. pp. 69-96. <<http://www.tfd.org.tw/docs/dj0502/069-096%20Stephen%20D.%20Collins.pdf>>.

However with the re-emergence of Russia in the 2000s as a potential power, nothing is gained for the US, for Russia still has a great influence in Serbia and would constitute a barrier to US expansion further east because the realization of the project of the Grand Middle East dear to the US is not for tomorrow.

# CONCLUSION



Through out this work, we have tried to show that the US policy for a post-Cold War world was based on enlarging its interests beyond the Berlin Wall. The latter's geopolitical significance became *insignificant* with the dismemberment of the Soviet Union. Through the 1990s, with a weakened Russia, the US won new assets in Eastern and Central Europe, by consent or by force; by using for its advantage the different international institutions politically (the UN), economically (the IMF and the WB), and militarily (NATO). Acting unilaterally or cooperating with allies, such as cooperating with the EU was a matter of strategic choice, but the policy was one: enlarging the horizon of free-market democracies to Eastern and Central Europe. However, no case of 'democracy transition' affected dramatically Europe more than the Yugoslav case which had on its record two major wars: the Bosnian War and the Kosovo War. Being the main part of the Balkans, Yugoslavia constituted a turning point in EU/ US relations in general, and in the US energy security strategy in particular, especially towards the Caspian Sea.

The policy of US Enlargement consisted of spreading the rule of democracy with its different institutions to the rest of Europe, opening the market by freeing trade barriers between Eastern European countries, and by then those countries would join the different international political, economic and military institutions, after filling the conditionality according to western standards. It is important to note that by the Enlargement policy, the US would enlarge its assets which are mainly energetic. As far as Europe is concerned, the ex-Warsaw Pact countries has constituted for the US-led West an important energetic route that transits energy resources from the Caspian Sea to European markets. Therefore, the control of both those energy assets with the routes constitute in itself a subject for US energy security that is also linked with the different international institutions of negotiations and execution that decide for the lot of the energy resources. Indeed, it is a whole energy market that is subject to the rules of the seller that decide for the price of a product and impose it on the buyer (demand/ supply). And here lies hegemony.

Thus we judged important to show that the studying of the enlargement of US hegemony after the end of the Cold War lies in showing the nature of this hegemony

and the different mechanisms that govern this hegemony. From the Gramscian point of view, hegemony is mainly consensual where international relations are more cooperative with less use of force. Indeed, the US conceived post-Cold War international relations more multilaterally through the different international institutions, but it did not negate the unilateral actions such as the examples of the two Iraq wars. Therefore, we assume that US hegemony had been enlarged eastward after the dismemberment of the Soviet Union politically, geostrategically, and economically through the different strategies of ‘Democracy Promotion’ and enlarging the different international institutions by admitting the ex-Warsaw Pact countries to what is considered the ‘Club of free-market democracies’.

The post-Cold War US hegemony enlargement consists of the different political, geostrategic, and economic policies the US judged important for the post-Cold War world order. Under the Clinton Administration, ‘Democracy Promotion’ served to convert what was considered as ‘illiberal’ states to adopt the democratic institutions after the ‘success’ of the democratic ‘model’ in the Western world. Many governmental and nongovernmental efforts were deployed for training the different civil societies of the ex-Warsaw pact counties in political party’s management, mass media, journalism, etc. The Yugoslav experience after 1990s showed the consent reached inside Yugoslavia, inside the US and on the international sphere, after the vehicled wars through mass media stuck the region and built the consent that legitimized NATO air strikes.

NATO’s presence in Southern Europe served the US as a guardian of the region for the future energy transit from the Caspian Sea to Europe. In fact, what links Europe, NATO, and the US is energy, and more specifically the Caspian energy resources which after the collapse of Communism and with a weakened Russia were to constitute the pivot around which the world order structure was subject to. Under this light, the main motive behind the dismemberment of Yugoslavia and the two wars that struck it seems to be other than human concerns, and what was subject of the events was not Yugoslavia, but what surrounds it; Yugoslavia’s geographic situation is to be taken into consideration. We cannot understand the Yugoslav phenomenon then

without relating it to the re-united Germany, the EU (mainly France and the UK), and Russia as potential rivals to the US in the region. The same is true if we do not go through the different international institutions (UN, NATO, WTO, IMF) of which those states are permanent members and have a say in decision-making. In fact, the international institutions in the post-Cold War world are agents of power with a weight and a potential that may define a strategy towards a given geostrategically important country.

If the US pays attention to energy security, it is so because energy defines a whole life style. The latter is realizable only if the energy market was liberalized, and most importantly liberalized under the grip of the US. In fact, economic liberalism was the locomotive of the US to move further east after the fall of Communism by admitting the former social-oriented economies to Western free-market institutions. As economic liberalism consisted of privatization, less government intervention, and trade barrier suppression, Eastern European countries were to conform to those standards by introducing economic reforms that were not without consequences on the socio-political scene. As the Yugoslav case has shown, the motive behind the dismemberment was the introduced reforms based on decentralization that preceded the economic fall of the 1980s then led to secession and war between the different national constituents. However, most of international media represented the conflict as an internal war, caused injustice between the Yugoslav nations, by privileging one nation over another.

What U. S post-Cold War foreign policy did was to adapt to the spirit of a post-Soviet Union period. The negation of an enemy made it harder for the US to formulate a foreign strategy that would legitimize its actions, as Condoleezza Rice once put it. At the beginning of the nineties, the US had to find a new way for its forward expansion. The spirit of the age characterized mainly by the information revolution that conditioned the different facets of life, be it social, cultural, economic and political. Thus US expansionism would be faster by gaining more assets in a short lapse of time. Because of the information revolution, the job of the different NGOs (political, economic, social, or cultural NGOs) had an impact on regime change in Yugoslavia.

The Kosovo War came to be considered as the first 'Media War'. Through news coverage, the US succeeded, directly or indirectly, in deceiving Milosevic and international public opinion, by making the former believe in the invulnerability of the US-led West, and legitimizing (war in the name of human rights) its air strikes on Kosovo in the eyes of the latter. In fact, it was a war in the name of free-market economy with an enormous concern for energy security.

The present work has shown that the beginning of the 1990s made the world believe in US supremacy over the energy resources, and the retreat of Russia was the confirmation of that belief. However, the structure of the post-Cold War world order, characterized by multilateralism, represented in the different international institutions came as a negation to a unilateral world. It is true that the US succeeded in its advancement towards Eastern Europe through the Bosnian and the Kosovo wars. But the end of the 1990s and the decade of 2000s were years marked by the emergence of the potential rivals to the US: Russia and China. The return of Russia has constituted a hindrance especially in developing US energy security relations with the countries of the Caspian and the Caucasus. In addition, the creation of the different economic, energy, and financial institutions in East Asia, which are in competition with the US-led Western international institutions. Therefore, talking about US hegemony, in relation to Russian hegemony –since hegemony, as defined earlier has to do with consensual relations inside a given body, be it national, international, or transnational- cannot have a categorical answer. The 'New Great Game' of being hegemonic over resources continues, and the recent events in Syria confirms the issue. The race over energy resources between the US and Russia in the Middle Eastern region in general, and Syria in particular cannot be understood without a geopolitical or a geostrategic lecture of the events in Syria. For instance, the current war in Homs between what are named 'the Syrian Liberation Army' and the official forces has taken place and has echoes at the international level due to the strategic importance of the city, being as the central link between interior cities and the Mediterranean coast. Moreover, recent news concerning the discovery of natural gas in the triangle of Cyprus, Southern Syria, Lebanon, and Northern Israel come to confirm the US/ Russian race and the nature of the alliances and supports of one another. It seems that imposing full spectrum

dominance over the world's most rich regions is not the issue. What is the issue is the nature of the dominance and the way it affects the different agents it constitutes it. US hegemony through the Yugoslav wars was in zenith because it made use of both powers: hard and soft. They acted consensually (NATO intervention in Kosovo, UN mandates on Bosnia and Kosovo, the IMF, and the WB) when they had to, and unilaterally when they had to deal with their *vital* energy security (military intervention in Bosnia). But the game in the Balkans started to take another turn, and to apply other rules with the return of the Russian influence in the region. This has changed the nature of US hegemony and has prepared it to enter a new phase with new considerations.

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يشهد العالم منذ عام 2011 ، مرحلة من التحولات في العلاقات الدولية كنتيجة

للازمة المالية لعام 2008، و تعديلات جديدة على جميع الأصعدة، سياسية كانت، إستراتيجية، أو اقتصادية، للخروج من هذه الأزمة. أصبحت منطقة الشرق الأوسط و إفريقيا الشمالية في بؤرة هذه التحولات؛ أنظمة سياسية أسقطت في تونس، مصر و ليبيا و تعويضها بأنظمة 'ديمقراطية' حسب معظم التغطية الإعلامية المرتكزة على وجهة النظر الغربية. لكن الخالة الصحية للمشهد السياسي لمعظم دول منطقة الشرق الأوسط و شمال إفريقيا ابعده من أن تكون ديمقراطية. يوجد توافق عام فيما يخص المفهوم الضيق للديمقراطية مما يجعلها منحصرة في الممارسة الانتخابية عن طريق صناديق الاقتراع، و من خلاله الأكثرية تفرض إرادتها على الأقلية.

ما يثير الاهتمام في المشهد السياسي لمنطقة الشرق الأوسط و شمال إفريقيا أنه يوجد تغيير. تغيير 'سلمي' الذي لم يغير جذريا تركيبة مختلف الطبقات الاجتماعية (بما أنه لا توجد خلفية أيديولوجية لتأثير مختلف الحركات النضالية)، لكنه تغيير من حيث الطريقة في التعامل مع الأوضاع الحالية. خلال تجربتي الجد قصيرة و المتواضعة في إحدى الحركات الجزائرية الشبابية السياسية التي ولدت مع ما يسمى ب 'الربيع العربي' عام 2011، و التي لم تدم طويلا، شهدت و جربت ما أيقظ في ذهني تساؤلات حول الديمقراطية، المجتمع المدني، المصلحة الوطنية و الاقتصاد الوطني، و المجال أين كل هذه المعطيات تتداخل و تتوافق لتحديد السياسي لتركيبية اجتماعية معينة، جمعية كانت، أو منظمة غير حكومية، أو حزب سياسي، التي كل واحدة منها تشكل أداة لهدف سياسية.

بعد التدخل الأطلسي في ليبيا مباشرة، أين أصبح التدخل الأجنبي في الشؤون الداخلية لدولة واضحا، أصبحت التغييرات الحاصلة في تونس و مصر تحت مجهر الرأي العام لمنطقة الشرق الأوسط و شمال إفريقيا و الرأي العام العالمي. حيث جاءت المصالح الاقتصادية و الإستراتيجية للقوى العظمى

على سطح المطالب الديمقراطية التي حلمت و ما تزال تحلم بها شعوب منطقة الشرق الأوسط و شمال إفريقيا، و كما يجب على الغرب إيقاف الزحف الصيني و الروسي غربا. و جاءت الحالة السورية لتعزز نظرية 'أولوية المصالح الغربية'، و تعقد الحالة السورية هو أصل تدخّل جميع دول المنطقة (ما يجاور سوريا): تركيا، إيران، إسرائيل، العراق و لبنان. كلّ المعلومات حول تنافس القوى العظمى حول المصالح الاقتصادية و الإستراتيجية ليس بالأمر الجديد و لا المهم. المهمّ هو الطريقة التي تتبعها دولة مثل الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية لتحقيق مصالحها التي ترسمها و تحددها للمحافظة على مصلحتها الوطنية؛ هذه خريطة الطريق التي تتبناها الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية لسياستها الخارجية تحقّقها عن طريق جعل التوافق الوطني و العالمي بجانبها. هذا الأخير يمثّل أداة الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية في التعامل مع قضاياها الداخلية و الخارجية منذ بروزها كقوة عظمى بعد الحرب العالمية الأولى و كصانع للنظام العالمي ما بعد تلك الحرب. بالفعل، إنّ التدخّل الأمريكي في الشؤون العالمية و إصرارها على ربط ما يجري في المشهد السياسي العالمي بأمنها الداخلي أصبح أمرا مؤكدا عن طريق المؤسسات و الوكالات العالمية المختلفة المكوّنة لنظام عالمي ما بعد الحرب العالمية الثانية، و التي تمثّل أساس السياسة الخارجية الأمريكية للحرب الباردة.

خلال الحرب الباردة، تعهّدت الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية باحتواء الاشتراكية عبر وسائل اقتصادية و عسكرية التي مهّدت الطريق لنجاحها و بروزها كقوة عالمية بغير منافس، لكن، ما يرمز إليه ب'انتهاء' الحرب الباردة يعتبر في نظر أمريكا كبداية لتعهّد ثاني لتوسيع أسواقها، مصالحها، و هيمنتها. تغيّر السياسة الخارجية الأمريكية من سياسة الاحتواء إلى سياسة التوسّع يُبتغى به مواصلة بناء الإمبراطورية. بالنسبة لعالم التاريخ بول كنيدي، بما أنّ الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية أصبحت قوّة عالمية بعد الحرب الباردة، يستحيل عليها البقاء منزوية داخل حدودها الجغرافية و تحديد تعهّدها للشمال الغربي من العالم فقط؛ مثل الإمبراطورية البريطانية، وجدت الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية أنّ حدودها الجديدة بعد

توسّعها غير مؤمنة . يعتبر هذا التوسّع هدف الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية الذي لم تحقّقه خلال الحرب الباردة بسبب الحاجز الشيوعي في الشرق.

شكّل اختيار سياسة خارجية للولايات المتحدة الأمريكية إشكالا بالنسبة لصنّاع السياسات الأمريكيين. بعد 1990، كانت الآراء منقسمة بين الانعزاليين (ورثة توماس جفرسون) و العالميين (ورثة ألكسندر هاملتون وودرو ولسن). ركّز العالميون على أنه يجب على السياسة الخارجية للولايات المتحدة الأمريكية أن تقوّي المؤسسات داخل أمريكا لتقديمتها كمثل يحتذي به من جميع بلدان العالم، و بهذا تتجنّب الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية فرض نظرتها بالقوّة. بالنسبة للانعزاليين، تبنى المحافظون الجفرسونيون سياسة خارجية تساعد في نشر المبادئ 'الأمريكية' كالديمقراطية، الحرية، و حقوق الإنسان عبر العالم. بينما ارتأى متبعي التقاليد الهملتونية سياسة خارجية تركز على دمج الاقتصاد العالمي عبر فتح الأسواق العالمية، لأنّها في نظرهم، السبيل الوحيد و الأوحد لتحقيق السلم و الأمن العالميين.

فسياسية أمريكا لفترة ما بعد الحرب الباردة، و خاصّة سياسة إدارة بيل كلينتون، و من خلال الخطب التي ألقاها، يلاحظ أن السياسة التي اتخذها في التعامل مع العلاقات الخارجية هي سياسة نصف طريق. بعض المحللين يطلقون على سياسة كلينتون الخارجية ب'البراغماتية الولسونية'، لأنه لم يهمل أيا من التقليديين الأمريكيين. بالعكس، تعمل غدارة كلينتون على ديمقراطية البلدان التي تدخل في حيز مصالحها، و تتدخّل عسكريا عندما يتحمّم عليها ذلك. يحصل هذا التدخّل حين تصبح مصالحها الحيوية تحت تهديد جدّي و مباشر. لهذا، بعد تفكّك الإتحاد السوفيتي، أصبحت الدول السوفيتية السابقة أحد العناصر التي تشغل الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية ما بعد الحرب الباردة، بالأخذ بعين الاعتبار الموقع الجغرافي لبعض هذه الدول و التي شكّلت لاحقا جزءا من تحقيق أمن أوروبا عامة و أمن الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية خاصّة.

كانت الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية خلال التسعينات من القرن الماضي حساسة للأهمية

الجيوستراتيجية لبعض دول الاتحاد السوفيتي سابقا، و هذا الواقع لا يجب أن يهمل بما أنه مرتبط بالمن  
الوطني للولايات المتحدة الأمريكية. ان تفكك الفدرالية اليوغسلافية يؤخذ كحالة لتحليل السياسة الخارجية  
الأمريكية في سياق ما بعد الحرب الباردة و كيفية تعامل إدارة كلينتون مع الأزمات الحاصلة في القارة  
الأوروبية آنذاك: كيفية استعمال سياسة الديمقراطية، ماهية الوسائل المستخدمة لتحقيق الديمقراطية، و الهدف  
المبتغى من هذه الديمقراطية. نفس الشيء يطبق على التدخل العسكري: ما هي الأزمات التي عرفتها  
يوغسلافية؟ كيف تعاملت الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية مع هذه الأزمات؟ متى و لماذا تدخلت الولايات  
المتحدة الأمريكية عسكريا في يوغسلافيا؟ مهّم جدا في هذه المرحلة من التحليل الانتباه إلى الزمان و  
المكان الذي تختاره أمريكا في أجندتها السياسية الخارجية.

في الحقيقة لا يمكن فصل هذا البحث عن الأحداث و التغيرات التي تضرب منطقة الشرق  
الوسط و شمال إفريقيا. تغيير الأنظمة السياسية، الصراعات الإثنية و الدينية هي خصائص تميّز البلدان  
التي تشكّل أهمية إستراتيجية في حماية مصالح الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية، و بالأخص المصالح المتعلقة  
بالطاقة. إذا في 11 سبتمبر 1990 أعاد جورج بوش الأب إدخال مصطلح 'النظام العالمي الجديد' في  
قاموس العلاقات الدولية، ففي 11 سبتمبر 2001 تمّ تسريع عملية تنفيذ هذا النظام العالمي. إذا، فإنّ  
التعديلات الجديدة التي تشهدها منطقة الشرق الوسط و شمال إفريقيا كنتيجة لما يسمّى 'الربيع العربي'  
لبست بصدفة. هي تعكس الترجمات المختلفة الأجندة الجيوستراتيجية للولايات المتحدة الأمريكية التي  
تمثّل القوة الرئيسية في عملية هذا التغيير، و البلدان الأوروبية (ألمانيا و فرنسا) كشركاء لتقاسم الكلفة  
المالية الباهظة لهذا التغيير.

منذ تدخل الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية في الشؤون العالمية، تعهّدت بنشر مبادئ 'الديمقراطية' و

الاقتصاد الحرّ، و التي أصبحت تمثل 'الفطرة السليمة' التي يستوجب نشرها عالميا. منذ 1947، كانت  
أوروبا الغربية أول منطقة تبنت تلك المبادئ من خلال مخطّط مارشال الذي احتوى التوسّع الشيوعي

غربا. بعد سقوط جدار برلين في 1989، شكّلت منطقة وسط و شرق أوروبا موضوع توسّع 'المبادئ الأمريكية'. في الواقع، تمّ ذلك من خلال الانضمام للإتحاد الأوروبي و فيما بعد للحلف الأطلسي، لكن بعد توفّر الشروط المبدئية التي توافق المبادئ الغربية التي تحددها المؤسسات العالمية. بعد 9 سبتمبر 2001، امتدّ التأثير الأمريكي في أوروبا إلى شرقها وصولا إلى الشرق الأوسط و إعلان الحرب على العراق و أفغانستان. بهذا الفعل، خلقت الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية دائرة حول بحر قزوين الذي يشكّل أهمية جيوسراتيجية بالغة في خريطة طريق الأمن الوطني الأمريكي. و في وقتنا الحالي، لا يمكن لمنطقة الشرق الوسط و شمال إفريقيا أن تُستثنى في هذه التغيّرات الأساسية، بما أنّ المنطقة تشكّل أيضا نقطة تصادم مصالح الدول الكبرى، على رأسها الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية و روسيا.

هكذا تتقاطع تقاليد السياسة الخارجية الأمريكية، انعزالية كانت أو عالمية، لإتمام مهمّة أمريكية. ليكون لنا مفهوم جيّد لهذه 'المهمّة المميّزة'، من المهمّ معرفة متى تبنّت الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية سياسة خارجية انعزالية أو عالمية. بالنسبة لولتر لوفبيير، 'إنّ الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية لم تكن يوما منعزلة أو خارج الصراعات العالمية. ولدت الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية وسط هذه الصراعات، و مشكلتها الكبرى كانت - و لا تزال - في كيفية تعايشها مع هذه الصراعات بينما تحافظ على الحرية الفردية داخل حدودها.' إذا مررنا عبر السياسات الخارجية الأمريكية المختلفة من 'معتقد مونرو' على سياسة 'الباب المفتوح' لروزفلت، إذا فسياسة 'الاحتواء' لترومان و 'التوسّع' لكلينتون أو ما يعرف بسياسة 'تعزير الديمقراطية' هي سياسات خارجية موحية. إنما توحى بتورط الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية بالأزمات العالمية أينما كانت و حيثما وجدت. إذا حدث انسحاب للولايات المتحدة الأمريكية من صراع ما، ما هو إلا خيار تكتيكي.

في الواقع، لا تتطلّب فترة ما بعد الحرب الباردة من الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية صياغة

استراتيجيات و نظريات جديدة للتعايش مع العلاقات الدولية بعد 1990. إنها تعايش و جهات النظر



التقليدية مع وضع جديد، نفس الشيء يقال عن بحثنا. للتعامل مع توسع هيمنة الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية بعد الحرب الباردة، تعاملنا مع الموضوع من الجهة السياسية، الجيوسياسية و الاقتصادية. و يجب الذكر أنّ إدارة كلينتون تبنت إستراتيجية متكاملة و شاملة لعالم ما بعد الحرب الباردة؛ كلُّ المجالات تداخلت من أجل صياغة رؤية جديدة.

كما هو الحال بالنسبة لأيّ بحث أكاديمي، يتوجب تحديد إطار نظري من أجل صياغة مخطّط تمهيدي واضح، لتوزيع الكمية الكبيرة من المعلومات التي بين أيدينا. لهذا وجدنا أنّ نظرية أنطونيو غرامشي المتعلقة بالهيمنة ووت بيعتها نظرية ما بعد الغرامشية، أكثر تناسبا مع موضوعنا لتحليل العلاقات الدولية و الاقتصاد السياسي العالمي عن طريق تحليل الأفكار و المبادئ المؤسّسة على الصعيد العالمي. هذا يتناسب مع بحثنا بما أنّ الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية بعد الحرب العالمية الثانية جعلت من المؤسّسات العالمية كمنظمة المم المتحدة، صندوق النقد الدولي، و البنك العالمي سلاح نجاح سياستها الخارجية، بعد 1990، نجحت الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية في نشر إيديولوجية السوق الحرّة من خلال جعل الأمم المتحدة، الإتحاد الأوروبي، الحلف الأطلسي، و صندوق النقد الدولي وسائل في التعامل مع الدول الشيوعية سابقا و بالتالي بسط هيمنتها.

تقع أهمية أطروحتنا في إبراز الطبيعة و الميكانيزمات المختلفة لتوسيع هيمنة الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية شرق أوروبا بعد تفكك الإتحاد السوفيتي؛ إبراز هيمنتها السياسية، الجيوسياسية، و الاقتصادية، من خلال سياساتها الخارجية المختلفة و المتمثلة في 'تعزيز الديمقراطية' و توسيع المؤسّسات العالمية المختلفة من خلال انضمام الدول السوفيتية سابقا إلى 'نادي الديمقراطيات'. لهذا، ارتأينا أن نأخذ فيدرالية يوغوسلافية سابقا كمثال لدراسة السياسة الخارجية للولايات المتحدة الأمريكية في أوروبا بعد الحرب الباردة. علاوة على ذلك، خلال التسعينات من القرن الماضي، كانت يوغوسلافية سابقا قلب الصراعات العالمية عامّة و الأوروبية خاصة، و التغيرات الجغرافية التي طرأت على هذه

الجهة من القارة الأوروبية، كان لهل تأثير كبير على السياسة العالمية. و افهم جيّد للموضوع، ارتأينا أن نقسّم البحث إلى ثلاثة فصول.

أقّدم في الفصل الأوّل النظريات التي تستند على أفكار المفكّر الإيطالي أنطونيو غرامتشي و التخصّص في العلاقات الدولية روبرت كوكس حول الهيمنة الوطنية و العالمية. إرتكز إختياري على طبيعة النظام العالمي الحالي المتعدّد الأقطاب، أين مختلف عوامل القوّة تتداخل لصياغة قرار. من المهمّ معرفة أين تكمن قوّة العالم و القدرة على تحديد طبيعتها. لهذا، توجّب علينا العودة عقدين من الزمن وراء. بعبارة أخرى، تسليط الضوء على تسعينات القرن الماضي، و بالخصوص على الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية بما أنّ منافسها، الإتحاد السوفيتي سابقا، أصبح ضعيفا، توجّب على أمريكا توسيع نطاق مصالحها شرق أوروبا و ذلك عن طريق خرائط طريق مُعتمدة على سياسة 'تعزيز الديمقراطية' كقوّة 'ناعمة' في التعامل الخارجي. تمثلت هذه الأخيرة في تحريك و تمويل المنظمات غير الحكومية التي ستثير درب الدول السوفيتية سابقا لتسير على درب ديمقراطيات الاقتصاد الحر. مثال يوغسلافيا سابقا يُظهر نجاح سياسة الديمقراطية في إسقاط سلوبودان ميلوسوفتش عن الحكم، هذه السياسة لم تكن ممكنة لولا التأثير الإعلامي الحاد. نناقش أيضا في هذا الفصل أهمية الحروب اليوغسلافية في السياسة الخارجية للولايات المتحدة الأمريكية.

في الواقع، كان اختيار يوغسلافيا سابقا ليس لإظهار السياسة الخارجية للولايات المتحدة الأمريكية و حسب، بل بحثنا هو أكثر اهتماما بما يُجاور يوغسلافيا. بمعنى آخر، ما هو مهمّ هي تلك الصورة الكاملة لأوروبا و آسيا بعد الحرب الباردة. و هذا ما نحاول التطرّق إليه في الفصل الثاني: أهمية الجغرافيا السياسية، أو الجيوبوليتيك، في صياغة السياسة الخارجية للولايات المتحدة الأمريكية بعد الحرب الباردة. إذا كان 'التوسّع' إستراتيجية الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية لنظام عالمي ما بعد الحرب الباردة، يجب أن نعرف عن أيّ نظام نتحدّث و تحديد أهدافه. تهتم إستراتيجية 'التوسّع' بتوسيع الإتحاد الأوروبي المؤسسات العالمية المختلفة كالحلف الأطلسي و صندوق النقد الدولي، وحدث كلُّ هذا خلال

مرحلة كانت فيها روسيا ضعيفة. يجب التذكير أنّ موضوع المنافسة بين الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية و الإتحاد السوفيتي سابقا خلال الحرب الباردة كان متعلق بالموارد الطاقوية، طرق نقلها، و تسويقها الذي لا يزال يزن بثقله في الموازنات الدولية و هو جدُّ الأهمية في نظر صنّاع قرار الأمن القومي الأمريكي.

الحديث عن تحرير الدخول لمناطق الموارد الطاقوية في الشرق، كمؤشّر قوّة يتناغم مع تحرير أسواق الشرق من الحدود الجمركية. لهذا فالفصل الثالث مخصّص لمناقشة الدمج الاقتصادي العالمي خلال تسعينات القرن الماضي و ما حلّفه من نتائج سلبية على يوغسلافيا سابقا. بعد انهيار النموذج الاقتصادي الاشتراكي، توجّب على معظم الدول دمج إقتصاداتها لنموذج الاقتصاد الحر. و هكذا فازت موجة ما بعد الليبرالية كنظرية اقتصادية للدول الاشتراكية سابقا. يُتعامل مع الحالة اليوغسلافية بشكل مختلف بما أنّ يوغسلافيا كانت في حركة عدم الانحياز و مع ذلك كانت لها علاقة مميّزة مع الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية، فلم يكن اقتصادها اشتراكي بحت. سنظهر كذلك في هذا الفصل أهمية يوغسلافيا سابقا في السياسة الاقتصادية للولايات المتحدة الأمريكية، لكن قبل ذلك، نحاول إظهار الأسباب ذات الطبيعة الاقتصادية التي أدت لتفكيك يوغسلافيا.

