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THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP IN THE AFTERMATH OF 9/11:
BLAIR AND BRITAIN'S ENGAGEMENT IN THE WAR ON IRAQ

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Submitted by: Supervised by:

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the substance of this dissertation is entirely the result of my own investigation and that due reference or acknowledgment is made, whenever necessary, to the work of other researchers.

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In Memory of Prof. Hamid Bensaou, May Allah Grant Him Jannah Insha'Allah.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

ABSTRACT

The present dissertation explores the Anglo-American Special Relationship, and how it developed after the attacks of 11 September 2001 on America during Blair's premiership and Britain's subsequent involvement in the War on Iraq along with its ally. This research work looks at the importance of the 9/11 attacks in strengthening the 'special relationship' after it was threatened to disappear following the end of the Cold War because of the lack of a common enemy between the two countries. The paper shows how the attacks not only provided Britain and the US with a common enemy against whom they would fight together, but also how these attacks have been used as justification to wage war against Iraq. The dissertation investigates the extent to which Blair was ready to go in order to accompany America in Iraq.

The research begins with an analysis of the history of the Anglo-American relationship and Britain's former position as the coloniser of America, and how this has impacted and tainted the relationship of the two nations despite the close political, economic, and military ties between the nations that exist today. The notion of the 'special relationship', as the close ties between Britain and America has been termed, is examined in detail, taking into account the pillars of the relationship and the partnership between the countries during key events, such as the Second World War which is considered the nativity of the 'special relationship'. The subsequent realignment of the positions of the United States and Britain after the war is examined, as is the Cold War period and the cooling of the relationship after the demise of the Soviet Union. The key political events of this period as regards the 'special relationship' are also covered. The collaboration of Tony Blair with the US and his interest in intervening in foreign conflicts such as Kosovo is analysed in the context of his motivations for his later involvement of Britain in Iraq.

The paper specifically investigates how the post-9/11 'special relationship' was transformed and strengthened after 9/11 under the leadership of the British Prime Minister and American President George W. Bush whose close personal relationship impacted the way their decisions were taken. In this regard, their unlikely friendship is analysed, arriving at the

conclusion that despite their surface differences, the two men shared similar ideas concerning intervention, neo-Conservatism, their strong Christian beliefs as well as their shared perception of their duty to defend Western democratic ideals through crusading against "evil doers" such as Saddam Hussein.

The effects of the 9/11 attacks are examined with the aim of reaching an understanding of Blair's reasons for aligning himself and Britain so immediately with Bush and the United States, despite the reticence of other key European countries such as Germany. The paper discusses how Blair faced vehement opposition to his war plans from the unconvinced British public and from within his own political party, and how he succeeded in taking his country to war against Iraq despite the serious doubts over the legal justifications for the war and all the opposition he encountered. Ultimately, the research concludes by acknowledging that Blair's support of the United States and his War on Iraq were motivated by a number of interlinking and complicated factors. While it is true that Blair was determined to maintain the 'special relationship', other factors were also involved in his unstinting support for the United States. Among these were a disturbing Christian fervour and evangelism that drove the push for military action, a disguised neo-conservatism, as well as an inflated perception of his ability to change the world.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

- "**United Kingdom**", "**UK**" and "**Britain**" are used interchangeably throughout the dissertation to refer to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
- The same applies to "**US**", **"USA"**, "**America**" and "**United States**" for the United States of America.

- **BBC**: British Broadcasting Corporation.

- **BSkyB**: British Sky Broadcasting (currently Sky UK Limited).

- **CIA**: Central Intelligence Agency.

- **CNN**: Cable News Network.

- **ESDP**: European Security and Defence Policy.

- **GCHQ**: (Britain's) Government Communications Headquarters.

- **IAEA**: International Atomic Energy Agency.

- **JIC**: (Britain's) Joint Intelligence Committee.

- **MI5**: (Britain's) Military Intelligence, Section 5 (Britain's domestic counter-intelligence and security agency).

- **MI6**: (Britain's) Military Intelligence, Section 6, also known as SIS.

- **MP**: Member of Parliament.

- **NATO**: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

- **NSA**: (US) National Security Agency.

- **PM**: Prime Minister.

- **SIGINT**: Signals intelligence.

- **SIS**: (Britain's) Secret Intelligence Service, commonly known as MI6.

- **SOE**: (Britain's) Special Operations Executive.

- **UN**: United Nations.

- **WMD**: Weapons of Mass Destruction.

NOTE

Where page numbers are not provided in the references/ footnotes, the respective article was found as an electronic resource where no page numbers were given.

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INTRODUCTION

Mine is the first generation able to contemplate the possibility that we may live our entire lives without going to war or sending our children to war.

Tony Blair, May 1997

Tuesday, September 11th, 2001 in Algiers, the day was warm and very sunny, as is usual during that time of year in this part of the world. Being still on holidays, I was comfortably seated before my PC playing a videogame a little after 2.00 p. m. when I suddenly heard my mother calling me urgently to come over and watch what was going on TV. What I saw then was something incredible: a plane had just crashed against a skyscraper somewhere in the United States and what made all the TV networks interrupt their programmes to air the 'incident' live was that the said plane was the second to crash against the identical building of the first skyscraper. I was flabbergasted; what was the meaning of that? A few seconds sufficed to make it clear that these were attacks we were witnessing almost live. The first thing that came into my mind was that these attacks must surely have been carried out by some Japanese kamikazes; the *modus operandi* strangely reminded me of the attacks against Pearl Harbour where Japanese suicide attackers crashed their planes against the US flotilla stationed in Hawaii in December 1941. I was mistaken; hours later, I learnt along with the rest of the world of the existence of a terrorist network called Al-Qaeda, "a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations"[1], under the leadership of some obscure individual named Osama Ben Laden and whom the US administration accused of masterminding the attacks. These two became household names just a few days after the attacks that were to be known as "9/11".

9/11 remains in the collective memory as one of the most shocking attacks the world had ever witnessed, not only because of the large number of instant deaths, but also because it had been possible for millions of viewers worldwide to witness the attacks on their TV sets almost on live. These attacks had a major impact on the landscape of international relations and thus the world as a whole, and marks the beginning of a new era in international relations.

According to reports by US authorities released in the days following the attacks, these were carried out by nineteen Middle Eastern terrorists affiliated to Al-Qaeda network, who had hijacked commercial planes to be crashed against the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon in Washington, and another one meant to hit either

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[1] *George W. Bush's Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People Following 9/11 Attacks* (20/09/01)
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>

the Capitol or the White House but which, the reports tell us, missed its target and crashed somewhere in Pennsylvania after a fight broke out between the passengers and the hijackers.

Following these attacks, the world expressed its deep sympathy for the United States and the American people, but one country made further steps and was more vocal and active in its support for the US: the United Kingdom. This led the then American president George W. Bush to declare on the 20th of September 2001, hardly nine days after the attacks, that "America has no truer friend than Great Britain"[2]. This statement was very significant in that it set the tone for the ensuing *exceptional* partnership of the two countries in what was labelled the "War on Terror" that was decided as a result of 9/11 to cleanse the world from "Islamist terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) [and] rogue and failing states"[3].

These two countries' ties have traditionally been described since the Second World War as the Anglo-American Special Relationship -henceforth 'special relationship'- because of a shared heritage, common history, blood ties, cultural affinity, as well as common interests. This was definitely true from the Second World War throughout the fight against Communism and the Soviet threat during the Cold War. The two countries, whose 'special relationship' has always been primarily based on military and intelligence cooperation[4], were busily united in fighting what they saw as their common enemy, the main target of their mutual commitments and cooperation. This was the case when they fought Adolf Hitler's Nazi Germany during the Second World War and the Soviet Union's Communism directly afterwards.

With the end of the Cold War symbolically associated with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 however, the uniting force that had been prevalent until then, i.e., the common enemy against which they worked together to uproot, was no longer there to give them a common purpose. This led many commentators to talk about the possible extinction of the 'special relationship' after the end of the Cold War. As Professor John Baylis, a renowned expert in

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[2] *George W. Bush's Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People Following 9/11 Attacks* (20/09/01)
[3] Jeffrey D. McCausland and Douglas T. Stuart eds. *US - UK Relations at the Start of the 21st Century.* 2006, 137.
[4] William Wallace and Christopher Phillips. *Reassessing The Special Relationship.* 2009, p. 267.

the field of international politics focusing on issues of strategy and arms control[5] put it in 1997:

> [T]he end of the Cold War threatened to undermine the whole basis of the "special relationship" [since] the absence of a clear and identifiable enemy meant that the close military partnership which had been at the core of the "Special Relationship" was no longer regarded as being of such crucial importance.[6]

It seemed his prediction was quite accurate until four years later, 9/11 happened, furnishing at once the two countries with what was lacking: a "clear and identifiable enemy" that would once again unite them into a common cause: "War on Terror".

This research work looks at the importance of the 9/11 attacks on the refashioning and re-forging of the 'special relationship' and the new life it gave to it after it was threatened to disappear after the Cold War because of the lack of a common enemy. I am specifically interested in investigating how this post-9/11 'special relationship' may have affected Britain's foreign policy. Hence, I propose to explore the way the 'special relationship' was transformed and strengthened after 9/11 under the leadership of British Prime Minister Tony Blair and American President George W. Bush whose close personal relationship impacted the way their decisions were taken. In this regard, I seek to understand how these two men succeeded in building such a strong relationship despite their seemingly different personalities and even ways of thinking. I will pay special attention to the way these leaders expressed themselves during key events where they explained their vision of the post-9/11 world and their perception of the way they would be dealing with it.

Whilst the 'special relationship' is concerned with the ties between the two nations, the focus of this proposed research will be mainly on the British side and how 9/11 impacted its transatlantic relationship that, in turn, impacted its own foreign and defence policies towards some parts of the world. I will attempt to show how the 9/11 attacks gave a clarity of vision to both British and American policymakers in that the attacks provided them with a clear and present danger, a plausible enemy, a 'global' threat, with which to replace the Soviet threat. In particular, how Blair succeeded in taking his country to War on Iraq despite the strong opposition he faced from the British people and from numerous Members of Parliament

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[5] College of Arts and Humanities, Swansea University.
<http://www.swan.ac.uk/staff/academic/artshumanities/baylisj/>
[6] Richard Little and Mark Wickham-Jones eds. *New Labour's Foreign Policy. A New Moral Crusade?* 2000, p. 234.

inside the government and even within his own political party. In order to place this opposition in context, and to understand how the engagement of Britain in the War on Iraq through its coalition with the forces of the United States came to happen, it is necessary first to discuss and analyse the long history between the two countries.

Indeed, the historical ties between the two nations have shaped their present connection, and it is crucial to examine them in order to gain an understanding of the basis of the relationship. In particular, the nature of America's origins as a British colony and its fight for independence from its colonial power is examined, as is the way in which the relationship underwent numerous peaks and troughs in which they came together and drifted apart again following their cooperation during conflicts such as the two World Wars. The opinions of academics are discussed, as regards their views on the origins of the 'special relationship' and the way in which the colonial past of the British in America fostered in the American collective psyche a certain resentment and drive for success. This may be argued as having left the British thinking of the relationship between the two nations in terms of sentimentality, to the extent that Britain failed to realise when its former colony had become so powerful and economically successful that it, the mother country, was no longer needed.

This paper identifies how the 'special relationship' developed over the years, and how it is founded primarily on three major bases or pillars. The relationship has been buffered over the years by several economic and ideological differences, and by outside influences, but in this age of globalisation and terror, the two nations have come together again. In the wake of the attacks of 2001, Blair immediately gave his support to the United States and he remained staunch in this support even whilst other European countries were distancing themselves from the exaggerated military rhetoric of President Bush. Blair held firm in the support that he offered to America even when his own people were protesting in the streets, and whilst his fellow members of the Labour Party opposed his plans for war.

The possible reasons for Blair's support of Bush despite the strength of the opposition are analysed, taking into account the history of the 'special relationship', the particular psychological make-up of Blair, his political aspirations and beliefs, and the relationship of Britain with the European Union and other States. The role that Britain played in successive military operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq is also examined, and the way that Blair was able to circumvent the legal opposition to the War on Iraq is discussed. The importance of the close personal relationship that developed between the Prime Minister and Bush as well as

the role and importance of rhetoric and the support of the corporate owned media and the close transatlantic relationships involved in this are also analysed, with regards to the way in which they bolstered the 'special relationship' and supported the War on Iraq. Whilst the views of Bush did, as will be discussed, diverge in some ways from those of Blair, their aims did merge at a significant moment in such a way that made Blair reject the advice of international lawyers, the opposition of government and British people as well as his own Party.

The methodology I will be following throughout my dissertation will consist in using historicism and discourse analysis. I have chosen to use the historicist method in order to be able to analyse the events in their historical context, whereas discourse analysis -that will be used to a lesser extent- will be applied given that it will allow me to peruse statement policies, speeches and public statements related to the two countries in the framework of the current study.

As the focus of the subject of this paper is recent history, this will involve the need to take into account the political environment and structure in which statements by Blair and Bush were made. As Kahan states, historicism "places great importance on cautious, rigorous and contextualized interpretation of information" rejecting "notions of universal, fundamental and immutable interpretations."[7] In other words, historicism represents the view that past events must be understood and judged within the context of their own times, because, as G. W. F. Hegel argued, all societies are the product of their history.[8]

Therefore, in using historical methodology to investigate the Anglo-American Special Relationship, its revival under Blair as British Prime Minister, and Britain's involvement in the War on Iraq, it will be useful to analyse events and speeches within their historical and political context. In particular as regards statements of policies, speeches by Bush, Blair and other political accomplices, and all documentation, both analytical and official concerning the relationship between the two countries and the conflict in Iraq.

It is also interesting, through the methods of discourse analysis, to discuss how the political leaders of both nations tried to procure the support of their citizens for their joint aims, and how they used discourse in the media to counter opposition. One useful example of

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[7] Jeffrey Kahan. **Historicism**. *Renaissance Quarterly*, (1997), Vol. 50, no. 4, p. 1202.
[8] Chris Baldick. **The Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms (3 ed.)**. Oxford University Press. 2008.

the way in which discourse analysis can be used, in addition to the analysis of media rhetoric, is through the dissection of what government ministers said privately between themselves.

I have thought it necessary to divide my work into three chapters: The first chapter is made up of four sections. Section one is a historical background of the 'special relationship' where I will be giving an overview of the origins of the bilateral relationship between the UK and the US to understand how it started and on what basis did it become 'special'. Then I will talk about the pillars upon which it is based and the importance of each one of these. Section three deals with how the relationship evolved after the Second World War (1945) through to the Cold War until 1989, to finally arrive to the fourth and last section of this chapter where I will be looking at the state of that 'special relationship' in the post-Cold War era and how its prospects seemed rather bleak even with the coming of Blair to 10 Downing Street and its seemingly positive impact on the transatlantic relationship then. Obviously, the whole chapter deals with the 'special relationship' *before* the 9/11 attacks.

Then, in the second chapter, I will introduce the 9/11 attacks and the way they were reported in the media, which contributed to the rise in patriotism in the United States in particular, and which in many instances degenerated into the propagation of anti-Islamic and anti-Arab stereotypes.

This leads into a discussion as to why the leader of a European nation, Tony Blair, was so quick to immediately support Bush and the US without any reservations, in contrast to other European countries, who urged diplomacy and negotiations, noting the fact that Bush and Blair's personalities and beliefs were on the surface rather removed from one another but had nonetheless a close personal relationship with shared religious beliefs and political views despite Blair being allegedly "left-wing".

In an effort to understand how these two outwardly different men succeeded in getting along so well despite their differences, it is necessary to analyse the key speeches of the two leaders, as well as to investigate the proclivities of both men for the Christian religion and for using Christian theology to justify their actions. This leads on to a discussion of the "War on Terror" as strategized by Bush and Blair, as well as an investigation of the motives of Blair in offering his support to the United States, rather than aligning himself with the leaders of other European nations. Afterwards, I will seek to show how 9/11 had been instrumental in the refashioning of the 'special relationship' under Blair's guidance.

It should be noted that throughout my dissertation I will be talking about the 9/11 attacks (*modus operandi*, number/identity of hijackers, etc.) as they had been related by the US administration, i.e., their official version. Taking into account all the investigative works that have been done to discredit the said version would not only take too much time but also be irrelevant to the present work given that what I am interested in is not so much how the attacks really happened or who is right or wrong, but the impact of the attacks and what happened as a consequence. What is relevant is that the attacks took place; and what is important here is what the UK and US decided to do following the attacks and the sense in which the attacks became justification for a certain set of policy decisions.

Last but not least, in my third and last chapter, which represents my case study, I will discuss the way Blair involved his country militarily in the War on Iraq along with the United States due to its particular relationship with America, its commitment to its ally after 9/11, as well as his personal beliefs and agenda relating to Iraq that stemmed well before 9/11. The conclusion I will be aiming at reaching will be that, were it not for 9/11, the 'special relationship' would have weakened to the extent that it could have faded away, and that were it not for that relationship and the American decision to wage war on Iraq, Blair's Britain would never have committed itself into Iraq without America, and that despite Blair's conviction in the righteousness of going against Iraq and toppling Saddam Hussein.

CHAPTER ONE

THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BEFORE THE 9/11 ATTACKS

The origins of the bilateral relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States go back to the seventeenth century when the latter was still subjected to British rule under the form of what is commonly known as the Thirteen Original Colonies that would become independent a century later. This relationship evolved gradually throughout the ensuing centuries to witness an unprecedented strengthening during the Second World War following which it became apparent that a substantial shift had occurred in the world. Indeed, at the end of the War, Britain was no longer the most powerful nation on earth "accustomed to controlling the destiny of much of the world"[9], leaving this 'privilege' to the all-powerful US after this latter emerged victorious from the War. Since then, and to cope with that new reality, Britain did its utmost to maintain a strong transatlantic relationship as one of the cornerstones of its foreign policy. Thus, this relationship came to be seen by the British as a way of coping with the decline of their own strength and finding a new role on the international stage. As Professor Mark Gilbert observes, "[t]he world is not replete with examples of former great powers that accept a demotion to junior partner status as the price of salvation."[10]

1 - The Anglo-American Relationship: from Antagonistic to 'Special'

What came to be known as the Anglo-American 'Special Relationship' is generally said to have originated from the strong bilateral alliance witnessed during the Second World War. In fact, while "drawing on prior cultural, linguistic and historical links", John Dumbrell notes, "the roots of the 'special relationship' between the United States and Britain [...] are widely and correctly seen to lie in the period of collaboration between the allies during the Second World War."[11] Before reaching that high point of cooperation during the War however, the two entities had to overcome their mutual enmity first, as they had not always been on good terms. Actually, transatlantic relations between the two countries did not even start auspiciously. The thirteen British colonies in America declared unilaterally independence in 1776 and fought a bloody war against their mother country that lasted until 1783.

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[9] Jeffrey D. Mc Causland and Douglas T. Stuart eds. *U.S. - UK Relations at the Start of the 21st Century*. 2006, p. 2.
[10] Ibid., pp. 99.
[11] John Dumbrell. *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations From The Cold War To Iraq.* 2006, p. 4.

Professor Ray Raymond asserts for his part that in contrast with "conventional wisdom", the relationship between the two countries was close even before the Second World War.[12] To be sure, until the 1770s, the loyalty of the immigrants to America to England and the King was unmistakeable, and they were proud of their British identity.[13] According to him, the original British colonists of America "envisaged a loose maritime commercial empire cemented by the 17th century Puritan concept of liberty which was rooted in resistance to the idea of an Absolutist monarch", which also comprised the essential concepts of taxation, trial by jury, and citizen protection from the arbitrary use of law and corrupt governments.[14] Hence, it can be affirmed that the American concepts of freedom and liberty stem directly from British values and influence.

Eventually though, the colonists who had undertaken the British proclamations of freedom began to feel that they had been betrayed by the British, and they rebelled against England ultimately because they strongly felt that they were the "custodians of the true British Constitution which had been abandoned by a corrupt oligarchy in London."[15] Raymond sees that this was the true reason for the American rebellion against British rule in America and the ultimate motivation for the American War of Independence, which was based on a legitimate reason and on the English common law.[16] Therefore, Raymond asserts, the roots of the 'special relationship' lie in the past of the United States as a British colony.

Following the end of the Revolutionary War, John Adams, one of the American Founding Fathers, was appointed as the first US Ambassador to Britain. After his arrival at St James's Palace on June 1st, 1785, he told King George III that he wished to restore "the old good nature and the old good humour between people who, though separated by an ocean and under different governments, have the same language, a similar religion, and kindred blood."[17]

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[12] Ray Raymond. *The US-UK Special Relationship in Historical Context: Lessons of the Past* in Jeffrey D. McCausland and Douglas T. Stuart, (2006), *op. cit.*, p. 3.
[13] Ibid., pp. 4.
[14] Ibid., pp. 3.
[15] Idem.
[16] Idem.
[17] David Reynolds. *Prime Ministers and Presidents: Special Relationships.* History of Government. July 2012. <https://history.blog.gov.uk/2012/07/01/prime-ministers-and-presidents-special-relationships/>

The same language, a similar religion, and kindred blood; these are the three knots that Adams chose to mention in his appeal for the British monarch as tying the two countries together highlighting at once the importance of these "intangibles" in their relationship then, as well as the role they would subsequently play in forging the special alliance between the two countries. Michael F. Hopkins and John W. Young assert that "such intangibles as a common cultural heritage and language have been as important as hard-headed security interests in tying Britain and America together". For them, it is improbable that their relationship would have its "'special' flavour" without these elements.[18]

To understand the nature and origins of the relationship between Britain and the United States, and how the "intangibles" abovementioned came to play such an important role in cementing the alliance between the two nations, one has to go back to the very beginning and the discovery of what would become known as the New World and the subsequent creation of the United States of America a few centuries later by the former British subjects.

The most widespread historical view about the "discovery" of America is that the Italian navigator Christopher Columbus claimed the continent for the Spanish Crown in 1492. Five years later, John Cabot, a Venetian sailor on a mission for the British king, arrived in Newfoundland (in present-day Canada). His journey was later to provide the basis for British claims to North America.[19] Nevertheless, it was not until almost a century later that the first attempt by English settlers to found a colony there took place. This was on Roanoke Island, off the coast of present-day North Carolina, in the 1580s. In 1607, the first of the British Colonies to take hold in North America was established in Jamestown, Virginia. This date marked the establishment of the first permanent English settlement in the New World.

In 1620, a vessel named the Mayflower landed at Massachusetts Bay off the American East Coast bearing people who called themselves pilgrims. These Puritans, who had separated from the established Church of England, founded the colony of Plymouth Plantation in what would be subsequently called New England which would become,

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[18] Michael F. Hopkins and John W. Young. *The Anglo-American 'Special Relationship'* in Paul Addison. *A Companion to Contemporary Britain 1939–2000*. 2005, p. 501-502.
[19] Bureau of International Information Programs. *Outline of U.S. History.* U.S. Department of State. 2005, p. 9. <http://usinfo.state.gov>

according to their leader, John Winthrop, a "city upon a hill", a place where they would live "in strict accordance with their religious beliefs and set an example for all of Christendom".[20]

Between the 1650s and 1750s, colonial society became increasingly varied. While in 1700, for example, the English and Welsh stock made up 80% of the population in the British American mainland colonies, the percentage dropped to 52% by 1755 as Germans, Scots-Irish, Irish and African slaves all grew in number.[21]

Then in 1776, the British Colonies in North America, which by then had forged a distinct identity and grew vastly in economic strength and cultural attainment and whose number exceeded 1,500,000 at the time,[22] decided to cut their ties with their mother country after they felt it became tyrannical in its grip on them. For Dumbrell, the Revolution "famously involved the airing of political ideas derived from the English radical and republican traditions. It rested on a growing sense of nationhood and impatience with London's imperial tug."[23] The war lasted seven years. Later, an era of trade disputes between the two countries started with the outbreak of war between Britain and France in 1803. Nine years later, a war broke out between the US and its former mother country due to trade and territorial disputes, as well as persistent impressments of American seamen by the Royal Navy. Dumbrell explains that the War of 1812 "resulted in a new awareness on London's part of the degree to which the US now had to be taken seriously as a territorial and trading competitor."[24]

In subsequent years, the two countries clashed over issues related to Latin American and West Indian trade, the future of the Canadian provinces, Central America, Oregon and slave trade. These issues were resolved by 1850.[25] The relationship improved considerably afterwards to the extent that the years immediately preceding the American Civil War (l861-5) were ones of significant Anglo-American amity and interdependence. Following the war, however, anti-British feeling in the Northern states was intense due to the fact that Southern warships had been constructed in British shipyards, as well as to the growing influence of Irish-American republican groups. During that period, "old" immigration from Northern and

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[20] Bureau of International Information Programs, (2005), *op. cit.*, p. 13.
[21] John Dumbrell, (2006), *op. cit.*, p. 7.
[22] Bureau of International Information Programs. (2005), *op. cit.*, p. 52.
[23] John Dumbrell, (2006), *op. cit.*, p. 7.
[24] Idem.
[25] Ibid., pp. 7-8.

Western Europe, including Britain, continued with English immigrants arriving in considerable numbers as a result of economic depressions in the 1870s and 1880s. From the mid-1890s, though, "new" immigration, from Southern and Eastern Europe, permanently changed US demography.[26] As a consequence to this situation of "'de-Angloing' of America", as Dumbrell puts it, politicians on both sides of the Atlantic started to speak about the desired unity of English-speaking peoples and of "Anglo America"[27].

Accordingly, in 1898, the then US Secretary of State Richard Olney wrote that Anglo-American "'close community', based on 'origin, speech, thought, literature, institutions, ideals', would prevent any future conflict between the two countries, and would make them stand together against common enemies"[28]. As a consequence, the Spanish American War of 1898 saw British support for the American side, while the Second Boer War (1899-1902) witnessed the American backing to the British side.[29] Hence, clever diplomatic manoeuvring in these two crises led the two countries away from the antagonism of the early conflicts of the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812.

Later on, the period between 1894 and 1914 was marked by mutual understanding and friendship despite the fact that, in John Young's words, "in some ways, the US represented a potential threat."[30] Indeed, by 1900, America had overtaken Britain in terms of share of world manufacturing output while by 1907, the US became, in tonnage terms, the world's second largest naval power.[31]

Scholars believe that at the eve of the twentieth century, certain uneasiness existed between Britain and America as the larger country was concerned with ensuring the perpetuation of its own economic power; a situation that was seemingly resented by the British.[32] Indeed, proof that the US was concerned with enhancing its industrial and economic prowess can be found in the speech of President Woodrow Wilson in 1916 at the World Salesmanship Congress in Detroit, when he encouraged those present to "go out and

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[26] John Dumbrell, (2006), *op. cit*., p. 8.
[27] Idem.
[28] Idem.
[29] Idem.
[30] Ibid., pp. 9.
[31] Idem.
[32] Kathleen Burk. *How Did the Anglo-American Relationship Become 'essential'?* 2012, p. 6.
 <http://britishscholar.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/KB-Anglo-American-Relations2.pdf>.

sell goods that will make the world more comfortable and more happy, and convert them to the principles of America." [33]

Despite the relative understanding and friendship that characterised the nineteenth century relationship between Britain and the United States[34][35], the situation changed by the First World War, which would radically alter not only Europe, but also the connection between the two countries.

During the first three years of the Great War as it came to be known, and despite the fact that there was a "clear British party" in Washington which believed American entry into the war on Britain's side to be inevitable, the US did not actually enter the war until the later stages of the conflict, with the then American President Wilson urging his fellow Americans in 1914 to be neutral "in thought and deed" as war raged in a divided Europe.[36] Hence, the first true alliance between the two nations developed during this period when they were joined together against Germany, meaning that they had what Professor Kathleen Burk believes is important for a strong alliance, which is shared international interest and a common enemy.[37]

After the American entry into the war in 1917, the US and British naval forces operated under a joint British command but despite the mutual efforts to defeat the enemy, the wartime relations were nevertheless put under a lot of pressure because of disagreements around the future world order as well as personal jealousies between the British and Americans.[38]

These strained relations were emphasised in 1918, shortly after the end of the War, when President Wilson became the first American head of state to visit Britain. During a state banquet in Buckingham Palace, he declared:

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[33] Kathleen Burk, (2012), *op. cit*., p. 6.
[34] Throughout the nineteenth century, the US presidents whose country was not yet a global power were immersed in domestic affairs and the relations between Britain and the US were conducted via ambassadors in London and Washington.
[35] Burk notes that throughout the nineteenth century, the Americans "disliked the condescension [of the British] but loved the landscape, disliked the empire but loved the social scene, disliked the class system but loved the literature."
 Kathleen Burk. (2012), *op. cit*., p. 7.
[36] John Dumbrell, (2006), *op. cit*., p. 9.
[37] Kathleen Burk, (2012), *op. cit*., p. 4.
[38] John Dumbrell, (2006), *op. cit*., p. 9.

You must not speak of us who come over here as cousins, still less as brothers; we are neither. Neither must you think of us as Anglo-Saxons, for that term can no longer be rightly applied to the people of the United States.' [No] 'There are only two things which can establish and maintain closer relations between your country and mine: they are community of ideals and of interests.[39]

This speech presented a very different tone to the one by Adams more than a century before; the War's effects were starting to show themselves clearly. As Professor David Reynolds states, "America, Britain and the world had moved on."[40] Certainly, at the end of the First World War, the two nations diverged due to issues of race, class, and differentiating opinions regarding international politics[41] and their relationship during the inter-war period was one of immense competition and distrust.

Following the Great War, the US Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles and declined to participate in the League of Nations. Anglo-American relations in the 1920s focused on issues of war debts and naval rivalry. According to John Callaghan, "economy and *realpolitik* ruled out a war with the United States and this was what really mattered to the British decision-makers, though some of them indulged in the rhetoric of "Anglo-Saxondom"".[42] This period of Anglo-American relations was ended by the start of the Great Depression and the rise of international trade protectionism and it was not until the Second World War that the alliance truly warmed up to the extent of becoming 'special'.

After the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe, and although the US vowed to stay neutral and not entangle itself in the European quagmire as it did more than two decades previously, it quickly used immense sums for rearmament and in September 1940 passed the first peacetime conscription bill ever enacted in its history. On the same month, the then American President Franklin D. Roosevelt concluded an executive agreement with the then British Prime Minister Winston Churchill giving the British Navy fifty destroyers in

[39] David Reynolds, (2012), *op. cit.*
[40] Idem.
[41] Christine Bolt. ***Public face and public space: the projection of Britain in America before the Second World War*** in Fred Leventhal and Roland Quinault eds. ***Anglo-American Attitudes: From Revolution to Partnership***. 2000, p. 208.
[42] John Dumbrell, (2006), *op. cit.*, p. 9.

return for British air and naval bases in Newfoundland (an island off Canada, also known as Terre-Neuve) and the North Atlantic.[43]

In December of the same year, Roosevelt declared that the US would be the "great arsenal of democracy."[44] In early 1941, Congress approved Roosevelt's Lend-Lease Program, enabling the US to transfer arms and equipment to any nation deemed vital to the defence of the United States. The amount of the Lend-Lease Program would exceed $50,000 million by the War's end.[45]

Although the US was by then neutral in name only, it did not actually enter directly into the war until the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Once it was directly forced into the war by these attacks, it fought closely side by side with the British with whom they enjoyed extensive economic co-operation, launched joint military operations in North Africa, Europe and the Far East, and developed agreed plans for the post-war world.[46] Hopkins and Young assert that:

> The fact that the two countries were brought together at such a desperate time helped forge a close relationship whose durability was reinforced by a common language, cultural heritage and commitment to an 'open' global trading system, a powerful combination of shared attitudes and shared national interests.[47]

The term 'special relationship' was first used publically after the Second World War by the British political figure Winston Churchill during his famous 'Sinews of Peace', best known as the 'Iron Curtain', speech of March 5th, 1946. In his address, delivered in Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri (USA), Churchill, who was then Leader of Opposition, urged the Americans to return to protect Western Europe from the rising threats of Soviet-led Communism and evoked the concept of the special quality of the Anglo-American partnership that should lead the "free world":

> [...T]he crux of what I have travelled here to say...[is that] [n]either the sure prevention of war, nor the continuous rise of world organisation will be gained without what I have called the fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples. This means a special relationship between the British Commonwealth

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[43] Bureau of International Information Programs, (2005), *op. cit.*, p. 220.
[44] John Dumbrell, (2006), *op. cit.*, p. 10.
[45] Bureau of International Information Programs, (2005), *op. cit.*, p. 220.
[46] Michael F. Hopkins and John W. Young, (2005), *op. cit.*, p. 499.
[47] Idem.

and Empire and the United States [...] Fraternal association requires not only the growing friendship and mutual understanding between our two vast but kindred systems of society, but the continuance of the intimate relationship between our military advisers [...][48]

Before the term came to public attention during that speech, however, Churchill used it in a private communication three years earlier in 1943, while in July 1940, Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax wrote about "the possibility of some sort of special association" between Britain and the US.[49] In 1942, Churchill told King George VI that "Britain and America were now married after many months of walking out." Later on, the British politician announced that "previously we were trying to seduce them. Now they are securely in the harem."[50]

[48] Robert Rhodes James. **Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches 1897-1963, vol. VII, 1943-1949**. 1974, p.7285-7293. Qtd in http://www.hpol.org/churchill/
[49] John Dumbrell, (2006), *op. cit.*, p. 11.
[50] Ibid., pp.4.

2 - Pillars of the Anglo-American Special Relationship

According to the British scholar Ray Raymond, the 'special relationship' is based on three pillars: common law, mutual investment and diplomatic and security partnership.[51] For him, "the real reason the special relationship is special, is that so much of the basic DNA of the infrastructure of the American political, legal, and economic system is British."[52]

The "great common law tradition",[53] as he describes it, derives its roots from the profound influence of the British system of law on first the American Founding Fathers that was then passed on to the subsequent generations so that "our shared conception of individual freedom, of a law-based state, and of the pragmatic common law approach to justice rooted in custom, experience, and precedent is now firmly embedded in the American legal system"[54]. The political and legal structures created by the colonists were deeply rooted in British constitutional history, political philosophy and jurisprudence.[55] This is why such documents as the US Declaration of Independence and the Constitution follow on Magna Carta and the English Bill of Rights. Moreover, in its form and content, the Declaration of Rights, which until 1776 governed Britain and the American Colonies, can be said to be a deeply British document imbedded in a centuries-old British tradition.[56]

Along the same lines, Churchill once declared that both the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution were not only American documents but follow on Magna Carta and the English Bill of Rights as "the great title deeds in which the liberties of the English-speaking peoples are founded."[57]

After the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the English Declaration of Rights of 1689 ended the reign of King James II and began that of William of Orange and his wife Mary. For the Founding Fathers, this declaration became a key source of inspiration, "a document which set out certain fundamental political and legal truths to inspire and shape the political and legal structures of the new American republic, as well as to proclaim the end of an old

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[51] Jeffrey D. Mc Causland and Douglas T Stuart eds., (2006), *op. cit.*, p. 6-12.
[52] Ibid., pp. 4.
[53] Ibid., pp. 6.
[54] Idem.
[55] Ibid., pp. 7.
[56] Idem.
[57] Idem.

regime".[58] As Margaret Thatcher put it in an address to the Joint Houses of Congress on February 20th, 1985, the UK and US:

> have a common heritage as well as a common language. It is no mere figure of speech to say that many of your most enduring traditions -representative government, Habeas Corpus, trial by jury, a system of constitutional checks and balances- stem from our own small islands. But they are as much your lawful inheritance as ours. You did not borrow these traditions: you took them with you, because they were already your own.[59]

The second pillar is "the extraordinary interpenetration"[60] of the British and American economies. The foundations of the modern investment relationship go back more than 200 years ago to Alexander Hamilton's tenure as the first U.S. Treasury Secretary whose "financial genius" and clever planning succeeded in achieving the financial stability necessary to attract the British investment that was vital for the American economy then.[61]

"If the investment relationship is special", Raymond argues, "the links between the London and New York financial markets are truly unique". The historical relationship between British and American capital dates back to the eighteenth century when British investment played an important role in the economic development of the original thirteen colonies and in stabilising US public finances after the Revolutionary War. Later, British investment bankers provided much of the capital that financed America's phenomenal economic growth in the nineteenth century.[62] Thus, Raymond explains how the UK "shaped U.S. thinking on deregulation, privatization of public services, and enterprise zones" while the US "taught Britain the importance of flexible labour markets, welfare reform, and having an independent central bank responsible for monetary policy."[63]

Michael Calingaert[64] explains that the most important factor of the economic aspect of the 'special relationship' between Britain and the US is the "shared belief in and practice of"

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[58] Jeffrey D. Mc Causland and Douglas T. Stuart eds*., (2006), *op. cit*., p. 6-12.
[59] Ibid., p. 13.
[60] Ibid., p. 8.
[61] Ibid., p. 8-9.
[62] Ibid., p. 35.
[63] Ibid., pp. 36.
[64] Michael Calingaert is a visiting scholar in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings and an expert on European economic integration, the European Union, Italy, transatlantic relations, and Western Europe. He is a former senior foreign service officer specialising in economic affairs.
< http://www.brookings.edu/experts/calingaertm >

what he terms the "Anglo-Saxon economic model". This model refers to a number of laws, practices, and attitudes which "reflect acceptance of a business culture and system that facilitate entrepreneurial activity (and permits failure), encourages wealth accumulation, promotes competition, and provides flexibility in the use of labour and other inputs."[65]

According to economists, the Anglo-Saxon economic model originated in England in the eighteenth century and is patterned after the classical liberal ideas of the Scottish thinker Adam Smith; it uses common law, which operates with lay judges, broader legal principles and oral arguments. Moreover, this model is based on the principle that government intervention in the economy should be limited. The best current real-world example is the United States.[66] In *Anglo-American Economic and Business Relationships: A British Perspective*, Raymond explains that the Anglo-American Model:

> aims to reduce the role of government as a regulator of economic activity and to change it from a provider to an enabler of services; to create flexible labour markets and entrepreneurship, promote competition, and encourage wealth accumulation through ownership of property and stocks, thereby creating an "ownership society".[67]

Erik R. Peterson[68] asserts for his part that economic and commercial relations are at the heart of the current 'special relationship' between the two countries who have long been bound by significant and longstanding trade, investment, and business ties, adding that:

> Owing to the shared grammar of the "Anglo-Saxon economic model" and commonly-held beliefs and practices when it comes to corporate culture, the level of effective interaction at both the government and private business levels has been pronounced.[...]More importantly, the economies are inextricably linked at one level after the other—through cross-investment, employment, trade of goods and services, trade in services, capital flows, and so on.[69]

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[65] Jeffrey D. Mc Causland and Douglas T Stuart eds*., (2006), *op. cit*., p. 18.
[66] Department of Economics; Iowa State University <http://www.econ.iastate.edu/>
[67] Jeffrey D. Mc Causland and Douglas T. Stuart eds*., (2006), *op. cit*., p. 36.
[68] Erik R. Peterson is currently a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS), a Washington-based bipartisan, nonprofit think tank on foreign policy and national security issues. Among numerous other positions, he has also served in the past as a fellow of the World Economic Forum and a member of the forum's Global Risk Network. In 2008, he was appointed visiting scholar at the John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. < http://csis.org/expert/erik-r-peterson>
[69] Jeffrey D. Mc Causland and Douglas T. Stuart eds*., (2006), *op. cit*., p. 44-45.

The exceptional strength of the economic relationship between Britain and the US is best translated by numbers, as in 2014 for example, each country was the biggest single country investor in the other's economy while trade between the two amounted to more than $200 billion over the same year.[70] What's more, one million British people work for American companies in Britain while a million Americans work for British companies in the United States.[71]

Even though close relationships exist in a number of industrial sectors between the UK and the US none is closer than in the defence industry because of the two countries emphasis on that vital sector which can be placed under the last pillar upon which the 'special relationship' is based.

This leads us to the third and most important pillar, which is diplomatic and security partnership. As is evident from Churchill's words quoted earlier, the emphasis had been then and still is put on defence/ intelligence/ military cooperation between Britain and the United States and which has always constituted the basis of that 'special relationship'. As William Wallace and Christopher Phillips put it, "[d]efence cooperation was at the heart of the 'special relationship' from the outset, and remains central to it."[72]

According to Raymond, it was Churchill and Roosevelt who "invented this unique defence and intelligence relationship". They not only gave it its "unique flavour", but also helped create the vast network of institutions and consultative arrangements to sustain the partnership.[73]

Intelligence cooperation between the two nations is key to the relationship and it initially began in the Second World War, when the US and Britain established a key partnership. This took place between the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and the various American agencies.[74] During the Cold War,

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[70] CNN Money. *U.S. and UK: Best business buddies?* May 1st, 2015.
<http://money.cnn.com/2015/05/01/news/economy/uk-election-us-special-relationship/>
[71] Idem.
[72] William Wallace and Christopher Phillips. *Reassessing the Special Relationship*. *International Affairs*. 2009, p. 267.
[73] Jeffrey D. Mc Causland and Douglas T. Stuart eds*., (2006). *op. cit*., p. 9.
[74] William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, (2009), *op. cit*., p. 273.

this cooperation remained crucial in countering the threat from the Soviets.[75] Through the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) of British intelligence in Cheltenham, the UK has observed the rest of the world and helped US intelligence agency the National Security Agency (NSA) by passing information on.[76] This cooperation has taken place since 1946 under the UK/USA Agreement on Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), which although ratified in the forties, "continues to serve as the foundation for cooperation in signals intelligence between the two nations."[77] Joined later by Canada and Australia, this intelligence web has been referred to as "an eavesdropping superpower."[78] However, during the Suez conflict in 1956, during which the US refused to give Britain its support, much to Britain's consternation, the United States also withdrew its intelligence cooperation, which Wallace and Phillips assert, resulted in the "relegation of United Kingdom intelligence to the role of junior partner that it has played ever since."[79] This intelligence network, termed ECHELON, was developed further during the 1990s. Britain has usually played the junior role in the partnership, and, as Aldrich notes, the situation was the same with ECHELON, as the partnership provided Britain with access to programmes that it would never have had the means to initiate on its own, as for instance, the shared purchase of the US Magnum SIGINT satellite.[80]

This intelligence partnership inevitably resulted in concerns regarding the extent to which the two countries are independent from one another, with, for example, the insistence of the United States that GHCQ employees in Britain should not be permitted to be members of trade unions, a move that was backed by the then Conservative Thatcher government, unsurprisingly causing great domestic controversy.[81] Although America did not provide Britain with direct military backing during the Falklands conflict against Argentina in 1982, the intelligence that was provided by the partnership did in fact play a significant role in assuring Britain's victory.[82] This is the case even though at the initiation of the conflict, the US did not automatically pass the information on to Britain, which, it is reported, left the UK

[75] William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, (2009), *op. cit.*, p. 273
[76] Ibid., pp. 274.
[77] National Security Agency. ***Declassified UKUSA Signals Intelligence Agreement***.
< https://www.nsa.gov/public_info/press_room/2010/ukusa.shtml>
[78] James Bamford. ***Body of Secrets: How America's NSA and Britain's GCHQ Eavesdrop on the World***. 2002, p. 41.
[79] William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, (2006), *op. cit.*, p. 273.
[80] Richard Aldrich. ***Transatlantic intelligence and security cooperation***. *International Affairs*. 2004, p. 731.
[81] David Gee. ***US and military intelligence bases in Britain - a Briefing***. *Sunday Times*. 1976, p. 26.
<https://www.quaker.org.uk/files/Us-bases-briefing.pdf.pdf>
[82] Richard J. Aldrich, (2004), *op. cit.*, p. 735.

completely dependent on gaining information clandestinely from American officials who were sympathetic to Britain.[83] Yet at the same time, America still gains much of its own intelligence concerning Europe from its relationship with Britain through GCHQ.[84] Despite the close working relationship of the two countries as regards their intelligence cooperation arrangements, there have been times, particularly during the cooling of the relationship in the 1990s, when political factors have been used as a reason not to pass information on. This can be illustrated by the fact that during Bill Clinton's tenure as president in the 1990s, Britain chose to withhold some intelligence because it suspected that there were sympathies within his administration for Irish nationalism.[85]

The 2003 British white paper, which focused on issues relating to defence and entitled *Delivering security in a changing world*, stresses the importance of Britain conducting military operations only within a coalition with the US, or with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), stating that it ought to place a "major focus" on shaping operations and their outcomes[86]. It is also important to note that Britain specifically organises its military operations so that it is able to maintain its influence with America regarding policy.[87] As will be discussed later, since the firm resurrection of the 'special relationship' following the 11 September 2001 attacks on America, and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, the military alliance between the two nations has only intensified. Indeed, in 2009, the British former Chief of General Staff, Sir Richard Dannatt, argued that Britain ought to increase its military commitment in Afghanistan, as it was important for Britain to retain its position as the US "partner of choice" due to the fact that this offers Britain "a degree of influence and security that has been pivotal to our foreign and defence policy."[88] Since the 9/11 attacks, Britain has consistently taken the role of the best military partner of the United States[89] and, as Betz and Cormack note, "Whitehall behaves strategically rather in the manner of an inveterate gambler with a small pot of chips. Britain wishes to stay in the strategic 'game',

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[83] Steve Marsh and John Baylis. *The Anglo-American 'special relationship': the Lazarus of international politics. Diplomacy and Statecraft*. 2006, p.174.
[84] David Reynolds. *A 'Special Relationship'? America, Britain and the International Order Since the Second World War. International Affairs*. 1985, p.5.
[85] Peter Riddell. *Hug Them Close: Blair, Clinton, Bush and the 'special Relationship*. 2003, p. 50.
[86] British Government. *Delivering security in a changing world: future capabilities*. 2003, p.19.
[87] The Economist. *Britain's Armed Forces: Losing Their Way?* 31 Jan. 2009.
<http://www.economist.com/node/13022177>
[88] Patrick Porter. *Last Charge of the Knights? Iraq, Afghanistan and the Special Relationship*. 2010, p. 358.
[89] Ibid., pp. 361.

the rules of which are set in Washington."[90] In order to stay in the game then, and to maintain the 'special relationship' therefore, Britain is required to use its army.

The military, intelligence and diplomatic operations of Britain and the United States became firmly intertwined after the entrance of America to the Second World War which constituted a turning point. Indeed, in European politics at that time, America and Britain became closely entwined[91]. The close personal relationship between Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister during the War, and his American counterpart Roosevelt, lent "legitimacy and strategic direction" to this cooperation.[92] Churchill, partly American himself through his American mother, divulged to his private secretary that "no lover ever studied the whims of his mistress as I did those of President Roosevelt".[93] However, this close relationship did not continue as closely in the immediate post-war years, as military goals and interests differed.

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[90] David Betz and Anthony Cormack. *Iraq, Afghanistan and British Strategy*. 2009, p. 324.
[91] William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, (2009), *op. cit*., p. 264.
[92] Idem.
[93] Lloyd C. Gardner. *Review: An Ocean Apart: The Relationship between Britain and America in the Twentieth Century*. *The Journal of American History*. 1989, p. 125.

3 - The 'Special Relationship' after the Second World War until the end of the Cold War (1945-1989)

The Second World War constituted a turning point for both the UK and the US and changed their relationship forever; by the end of the war, their partnership was no longer an equal one. The Royal Navy, which had been representing Britain's pride for centuries, was about half the size of the American one, the US was the one possessing the atomic bomb and had become the world's greatest creditor while Britain became its biggest debtor.[94] Indeed, by 1945, the UK's overseas debt constituted around 10% of its pre-war wealth, net income from foreign investment was worth less than 40% of pre-war value, and the country had debt liabilities of nearly 2 billion pounds.[95]

The Cold War was the most important political and diplomatic issue of the early post-Second World War period. It developed as differences about the shape of the post-war world created suspicion and distrust between the US and its Western allies on the one side, and the Soviet Union on the other side after having been allied during the War to counter the Nazi threat, downplaying their differences for the duration of the conflict. At the War's end, however, antagonisms surfaced again.

After the Second World War, both the UK and America played a leading role in trying to create a "liberal-democratic world order" through the creation of the United Nations (UN) and its economic and monetary equivalents, the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which were meant to promote a "stable trading environment" and prevent a return to the "slump" of the 1930s.[96]

However, following the end of the war, American troops who had been stationed in Britain left the country and military and intelligence operations were separated, with the dismantling of joint commands, code breaking operations, the closure of air bases, and the suspension of shared defence research.[97] As Burk notes, at the end of the Second World War,

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[94] Michael F. Hopkins and John W. Young, (2005), *op. cit.*, p. 500.
[95] Robert M. Hathaway. *Great Britain and the United States: Special Relations since World War II*. 1990, p. 10.
[96] Michael F. Hopkins and John W. Young, (2005), *op. cit.*, p. 500.
[97] William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, (2009), *op. cit.*, p. 264.

the Americans were adamant that they intended to maintain full control over nuclear research, using the 1946 McMahon Act "which effectively cut off any exchanges of information with any country, including the UK" as the legal means by which to do so.[98]

In an attempt to reverse this situation, Churchill requested the return of US troops to Europe to help protect the world of Capitalism from the increasing threat of Soviet Communism. In his 1946 speech mentioned earlier, he referred to the 'special relationship' between Britain and America, focusing on the brotherly bond that existed between the two nations, which involved close military cooperation, stating that this ought to continue with the sharing of facilities such as the naval and air forces in the possession of either country across the globe.[99]

Thus, troops from the United States returned to Britain in 1948, although this was originally in an informal way, but following British diplomacy, the US agreed to act as what would be essentially the security for the weaker states of continental Western Europe.[100] Wallace and Phillips assert that it was information that was held by the United States concerning Soviet plans at the time and its assessment of the Soviet Communist threat that finally resulted in the return of US troops and intelligence operatives to Britain and to European soil, rather than the entreaties of Churchill over the supposed fraternal Anglo-American alliance.[101] Burk goes along the same lines by saying that it was indeed the growing threat of Soviet Communism and the changing way in which the United States assessed this that was behind its return to Europe.[102] Indeed, a 1950 US policy paper confirms this, in which it is stated that "to achieve our foreign policy objectives we must have the cooperation of our allies and friends [....] the British share our fundamental objectives and standards of conduct."[103] The true attitude of the US towards the British is however evident in the line "this relationship is not an end in itself but must be used as an instrument of achieving common objectives [...] we cannot afford to permit a deterioration in our relationship with the British."[104]

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[98] Kathleen Burk, (2012), *op. cit*., p. 8-9.
[99] Robert Rhodes James, (1974); *op. cit*.; p. 7285-7293.
[100] William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, (2009). *op. cit*., p. 264.
[101] Ibid., pp. 265.
[102] Kathleen Burk, (2012), *op. cit*., p. 4.
[103] United States Department of State. ***Foreign Relations of the United States 1950, Volume III***. 19th April 1950, p. 872.
[104] Idem.

According to Dumbrell, Churchill, who was in John Charmley's words "fugleman and midwife" for the Anglo-American alliance, "foresaw the fact but not the extent" of the decline of post-war Britain in the international arena where the US emerged as the power at the heart of the non-communist world.[105]

In October 1948, Churchill spoke of the "three great circles among the free nations and democracies" in the world thus defining post-war Britain's role. According to him, the British Commonwealth and empire represented the first circle, then the English-speaking world including the United States stood for the second, while "United Europe" was the third. For him, Britain was the only nation that belonged to all three circles.[106] Within these circles, Dumbrell explains, the UK could operate as a "swing power: not totally integrated into any one circle, but wielding power as a fulcrum within a wheel".[107] He goes on saying that "however conceptualized, 'circles' thinking has greatly contributed to the idea that, for British foreign policy, closeness to Washington serves always to enhance, not to destroy, other dimensions of international British influence." [108]

Between 1945 and 1961 both Labour and Conservative governments along with the Foreign Office, wanted to maintain British membership of these three exclusive clubs. However, membership of the European circle did not imply the participation of Britain in supra-national organisations such as the Coal and Steel Community of 1950. Hopkins and Young explain that "[f]or Britain, the Foreign Office warned, entry into the community would involve the weakening of ties with the United States and the Commonwealth. It was simply not on."[109]

The role of Britain as the main ally of the US in Europe was confirmed through its success in the 1954-1955 negotiations that resulted in the sovereignty of Western Germany.[110] Nevertheless, the interests of the US and Britain did differ at important times, most notably in the joint British, French, and Israeli 1956 cooperation to invade the Suez Canal in order to overthrow the Egyptian regime, the refusal of the US to support the British

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[105] John Dumbrell, (2006), *op. cit.*, p. 12[106] Michael F. Hopkins and John W. Young, (2005), *op. cit.*, p. 500.
[106] Michael F. Hopkins and John W. Young, (2005), *op. cit.*, p. 500.
[107] John Dumbrell, (2006), *op. cit.*, p. 10-11.
[108] Ibid., pp. 12.
[109] Michael F. Hopkins and John W. Young, (2005), *op. cit.*, p. 17.
[110] William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, (2009), *op. cit.*, p. 265.

sterling currency when it plummeted, and the increasing lack of cooperation throughout this period.[111]

However, Macmillan, the British Prime Minister, achieved the Bermuda Agreement of 1957 through which the joint Anglo-American cooperation for military nuclear research on which the US had in 1946 defaulted on was restored, and in 1962 Macmillan again used his persuasion to induce President John Kennedy to provide submarines[112] even though the US had been reluctant to permit this, with Macmillan even threatening the end of British-American cooperation, stating "we have gone a long way in this nuclear business […] but if we cannot agree, let us not patch up a compromise. Let us agree to part as friends."[113]

During the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower between 1953 and 1961, and then the Kennedy administration until 1963, the British partook in the economic recovery of Western Europe, although the improved economic performances of both Germany and France placed Britain in a less privileged position than it had previously enjoyed with the US. Indeed, America was now seeking an alliance with the European Economic Community rather than with Britain.[114]

During this period, Dean Acheson, an immensely powerful figure in the post-war administration of the US Government, made a speech at West Point in the US, in which he asserted that "Britain has lost an Empire but has not yet found a role […] the attempt to play a separate power role -that is, a role apart from Europe, a role based on the 'special relationship' with the US, a role based on being head of a 'Commonwealth' which has no political structure or unity […] this role is about played out."[115] Unsurprisingly, the British greeted this declaration by Acheson of the death of the Anglo-American Special Relationship with horror and outrage, with newspapers such as the *Daily Express* raging about a "stab in the back" while *The Spectator* writing that "in this transitional period we have a right to ask that our friends should not make matters worse. It is the nature of nations diminished in power to feel humiliated when that fact is called to their attention."[116]

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[111] William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, (2009), *op. cit*., p. 265.
[112] Idem.
[113] David Nunnerley. **President Kennedy and Britain.** 1972, p. 58**.**
[114] William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, (2009), *op. cit*., p. 265.
[115] Peter Riddell, (2003), *op. cit*., p. 241.
[116] Douglas Brinkley. **Dean Acheson: The Cold War Years, 1953-71**. 1992, p. 177.

In the year following Acheson's statement, Macmillan resigned, and by the late 1960s, the majority of the government administrations of both Britain and the US were no longer comprised of the "wartime generation."[117] This, coupled with defence cuts and the growing calls for independence of the former British colonies in Africa and South-East Asia, added to the increased diminishing of British power.[118]

During the 1960s, American president Lyndon Johnson, whose country was embroiled in the very unpopular Vietnam War, tried several times to convince the then Prime Minister Harold Wilson to contribute a "token force" to support US troops in Vietnam going as far as arguing that even "a platoon of bagpipers"[119] would be sufficient as a symbolic commitment of the British in the face of world opinion. But even though the British were well aware of their dependence on America for military security and financial support, the Labour Government still refused to comply, providing instead diplomatic support.[120] This episode strained the relationship between the two countries.

In 1967, Edward Heath, who was at that time the Conservative opposition leader in the British government, followed on from Acheson's dismissal of the Anglo-American Special Relationship, asserting that with the culmination of factors such as the devaluation of the British currency and the loss of its colonies, a shift in global power had taken place, to which a future British government would be required to adapt.[121] Once in power, Prime Minister Heath enthusiastically encouraged Britain's involvement in the European Economic Community, but it is important to note that despite a certain distancing in Anglo-American relationships that had by this point certainly taken place, long-embedded structures still remained in place, particularly with regards to intelligence cooperation.[122]

Nevertheless, as Robb notes, despite the determination of Heath to cement Britain's place in Europe, and the cooling of the 'special relationship' during his administration, the interaction between Britain and America prior to the 1974 Washington Energy Conference demonstrated that Heath was "more than capable of working closely with Washington when

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[117] William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, (2009), *op. cit.*, p. 265.
[118] Idem.
[119] D. Mc Causland and Douglas T. Stuart eds. (2006), *op. cit.*, p. 204.
[120] Michael F. Hopkins and John W. Young, (2005), *op. cit.*, p. 506.
[121] William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, (2009), *op. cit.*, p. 265.
[122] Idem.

he believed British interests were best promoted by doing so."[123] Heath had ambitions to secure Britain's place within Europe rather than continuing the alliance with the US, which so many people thought was dead. In fact, as Robb asserts, it varied "between lukewarm and antagonistic."[124]

Cronin notes that the key changes of the 1970s and the 1980s firstly involved an "embrace of the markets", with the opening of markets both in the US and in Britain as well as overseas.[125] There was a growing trend towards international markets and away from national markets controlled by state governments and state economic strategies, with the ultimate aim of freeing up goods, services, and exports.[126] Another aim that Britain and America shared was the "resolve to maintain the military superiority of the United States and its most reliable ally" through continuing to develop nuclear weapons.[127] This became known as the "post-imperial strategy."[128] It has to be mentioned that globalisation as a world movement really began to become economically evident around this time, and with the opening up of the markets, people began to be more aware of what was happening across the world, both politically and economically. As Gill explains, globalisation is essentially the process of restructuring the state and civil society.[129]

In 1984, following the appointment of Lord Cockfield to the European Commission, the development plans were made for the European single market, which were followed by the appointment of Leon Brittan as European Commissioner who initiated the competition policy between 1989 and 1992, and then the trade policy between 1993 and 1999.[130] These developments were central to the growing free market as well as to the creation of the World Trade Organisation.[131] Britain was a key player in the development of the Single Market, free trade, and neo liberal economic policies in exactly the same manner as the US. Cronin argues that "just as British efforts in behalf of the Single Market extended the reach of market-

[123] Thomas Robb. *The Power of Oil: Edward Heath, the 'Year of Europe' and the Anglo-American 'Special Relationship'*. *Contemporary British History*. 2012, Vol. 26, Issue 1, p. 74.
[124] Ibid. pp. 76.
[125] James Cronin. *Markets, Rights and Power: The Rise (and Fall?) of the Anglo-American Vision of World Order, 1975-2005*. *Centre for European Studies*. 2008, p. 2.
[126] Idem.
[127] Idem.
[128] Idem.
[129] Stephen Gill. *Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism*. *Millennium- Journal of International Studies*. 1995, p. 399.
[130] Margaret Thatcher. *The Downing Street Years*. 1993, p. 547.
[131] John Gillingham. *European Integration, 1950:2003: Superstate or New Market Economy?* 2003, p. 303.

orientated policies within Europe, so the joint UK/US stance on the international economy rendered it more compelling."[132]

Therefore, notes Gill, even if the 'special relationship' was undergoing a phase in which the US and Britain were not as close as had been the case in the past, they were certainly developing along the same military, economic, and political lines.[133] By the end of the mid-1970s, the 'special relationship' had begun to disintegrate and Cronin believes that this was in part 'a natural, and reasonably amicable disengagement from a relationship that had been unusually intimate but whose original *raison d'être* no longer existed"[134], the *raison d'être* having been the sharing of a mutual enemy; first Nazism, and then the Communism of the USSR.

Both America and Britain were developing during this period and they were distracted from one another by smaller conflicts around the world. As Cronin states, "the bipolar world of the Cold War seemed about to be replaced by a multipolar world order." Yet, there was another reason for this growing coldness between the formerly close nations.[135] For example, Cronin believes that neither Britain nor America ever overcame the sense of betrayal that each side experienced over their disagreement regarding the Suez crisis, and this had been exacerbated by differences over Vietnam, after Johnson was disappointed by the failure of Britain to support his endeavours.[136]

It was not, however, until the coming to power of Ronald Reagan in January 1981 that a real revival of the 'special relationship' occurred. At the time of his inauguration as president of the United States, Margaret Thatcher was the then British Prime Minister; his two terms as president fell entirely within her period at 10 Downing Street and:

> Each admired the other's country; they were personally close, despite certain condescension in Thatcher's attitude towards her American counterpart; and, importantly, they shared a common ideology, based on strong anticommunism abroad and free market economics at home.[137]

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[132] James Cronin, (2008), *op. cit.*, p. 2.
[133] Stephen Gill, (1995), *op. cit.*, p. 399.
[134] James Cronin, (2008), *op. cit.*, p. 6.
[135] Idem.
[136] Idem.
[137] Michael F. Hopkins and John W. Young, (2005), *op. cit.*, p. 509.

It was indeed during this period that the sparks of the 'special relationship' began to be reignited. Thatcher and Reagan shared a common political ideology, and together they asserted that the opening up of markets and the encouragement of trade would be key factors in bringing about peace and democracy.[138] It has been argued that the leadership of Reagan and Thatcher heralded the start of politico-economic neo-liberalism, as Anglo-American governments "cast aside the received wisdom of post-war democratic capitalism, the basis of which was that unemployment would undermine political support for both governments, as well as for the actual concept of democratic capitalism itself."[139] One of the key components of the shared ideologies of Thatcher and Reagan could be found in their decisions to roll back the welfare provisions in their respective nations, and the commitment to what has been termed "conservative capitalism", as opposed to the previous era of "liberal capitalism."[140] Furthermore, it has been noted that Reagan and Thatcher

> like the middle-class voters who voted for them […] equated the planned capitalism of the post-war period with an elite political establishment […] they both challenged this establishment in the name of the virtues they thought their own lives embodied, and voters appreciated them for doing so.[141]

But despite the shared values of Thatcher and Reagan, relations were not always so smooth. The most significant of this was during the Falklands War, when Thatcher and Britain had anticipated the help of the US, but it was not forthcoming. When Argentina invaded the British territory of the Falklands islands in 1982, her relationship with Regan was so close that she was convinced that she would enjoy his unqualified support.[142] Although Reagan wrote to her explaining his reluctance to intervene, Thatcher was extremely disappointed by the fact that the US had chosen not to support Britain in its military action. Nevertheless, and although there was a brief diplomatic incident following Thatcher's voicing of her disappointment, the effect on relations between the two countries was not lasting.[143]

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[138] James Cronin, (2008), *op. cit*., p. 2.
[139] Streek Wolfgang. **The Crises of Democratic Capitalism**. *New Left Review*. 2011, Issue 71, p.14.
[140] Kenneth R. Hoover. **The Rise of Conservative Capitalism: Ideological Tensions within the Reagan and Thatcher Governments**. *Comparative Studies in History and Society*. 1987, p. 246.
[141] Monica Prasad. **The Politics of Free Markets: The Rise of Neoliberal Economic Policies in Britain, France, Germany, and the United States**. 2006, p. 98.
[142] Lawrence D. Freedman. **The Special Relationship, Then and Now**. *Foreign Affairs*. May/June 2006.
[143] Idem.

During the Cold War Era, the 'special relationship' was an important asset. For James Callaghan, British Prime Minister between 1976 and 1979, it was clear after the Second World War that "Anglo-American joint decisions would shape the future." Henry Kissinger, national security adviser to President Nixon and secretary of state (l973-7), considered that the 'special relationship' involved "a pattern of consultation so matter-of-factly intimate that it became psychologically impossible to ignore British views." For him, the 'special relationship' was "not a favour the United States granted to the British; rather it was earned, first by conduct during the war and later by the enormous contribution in helping shape the Marshall Plan, [...]NATO, and what generally came to be identified as the Cold War pattern of international relations". What's more, Britain brought to the conduct of Cold War international relations "experience in a multi-polar world, a global orientation of mind, an experienced leadership, a commitment to security, overseas ties of not insignificant proportions, and the English language." [144]

Emphasis on British "influence" should not, argues Dumbrell, "be taken as a denial of the undoubtedly high degree to which the American alliance impinged on British sovereignty and freedom of action" leading the Anglo-American historian Burk to note in 1998 the dangers of "supporting the US even when the US does the seemingly insupportable." The British strategy aiming at ensuring that "Britain remains the US's most dependable ally, in the hope and expectation that the US will remain Britain's", as *The Independent* of 27 August 1998 put it, did not always work.[145] For Dumbrell, the 'special relationship':

> despite US support for European integration, to some extent deceived British policy makers into believing that there was a non-European home. [It] also unquestionably bolstered British pomposity and unrealism during the Cold War, making the management of decline even more problematic.[146]

This sense of "British pomposity" is exemplified by the British prime minister Harold Macmillan (1957 to 1963) who, during the Second World War, developed the analogy that the UK could act as Greece to America's Rome, steering "new world power" with "old world"

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[144] John Dumbrell, (2006). *op. cit.*, p. 13-14.
[145] Ibid., pp.16.
[146] Idem.

wisdom.[147] Thus, while stationed in the Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ) here in Algiers in 1943, Macmillan said to Richard Grossman (the then psychological warfare chief):

> We, my dear Crossman, are Greeks in this American empire. You will find Americans much as the Greeks found the Romans - great big, vulgar, bustling people,- more vigorous than we are and also more idle, with more unspoiled virtues but also more corrupt. We must run AFHQ as the Greek slaves ran the operations of the Emperor Claudius.[148]

Scholars argue that the "Greeks and Romans" rhetoric has through the years both exaggerated British influence and underestimated American self-interest.[149] It has also been in many ways an impediment to the smooth working of the 'special relationship'.[150]

Starting from the Second World War and especially during the Cold War, there "certainly was an institutionalized 'special relationship' with Britain, centring on patterns of consultation, nuclear sharing, defence and intelligence cooperation." The Cold War relationship was sustained by what Dean Rusk, US secretary of state under presidents Kennedy and Johnson, called "the transaction of common business."[151]

Dumbrell summarises the state of the bilateral relationship after 1945 as follows:

> After 1945, the relationship, by turns, developed, thrived and stuttered against a background of a[...] frequently strained community of interests in the conditions of the Cold War. Shifts in international power necessitated a reworking of the power relationships as understood by Churchill. [...] Though driven by common interests - essentially common perceptions of the Soviet communist threat - the relationship was nevertheless sustained by cultural sharing, by personal friendships, by institutionalized exchange of information and by complex and sturdy networks of military and diplomatic cooperation. [152]

The 'special relationship' was constructed during the Second World War and "continued, indeed thrived, in the conditions of the Cold War". As the then Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated before the British-American Parliamentary Group in 1952, he would not "bother language, history and all of that" adding that "What I do wish to stress is one

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[147] Jeffrey D. Mc Causland and Douglas T. Stuart eds*., (2006), op. cit.*, p. 138.
[148] John Dumbrell, (2006), *op. cit.*, p. 17.
[149] Jeffrey D. Mc Causland and Douglas T Stuart eds*., (2006), op. cit.*, p. 138.
[150] John Dumbrell, (2006), *op. cit.*, p. 17.
[151] Ibid., pp. 13.
[152] Ibid., p. 4.

thing we have in common, one desperately important thing, and that is that we have a common fate." It was certainly rooted in interests.[153] Dumbrell argues that:

> even in the conspicuous peaks of closeness -the eras of Kennedy and Macmillan and of Reagan and Thatcher - there were significant misunderstandings, squabbles and, indeed, near breakdowns in the relationship. By the same token, in periods of apparent coolness, for example, in the early 1970s, networks of bureaucratic cooperation continued to flourish. [154]

[153] John Dumbrell, (2006), *op. cit.*, p. 14.
[154] Ibid., pp. 12.

4 - The 'Special Relationship' from the End of the Cold War to the 9/11 Attacks (1989-2001)

The end of the Cold War is one of the most defining moments in international politics, with an academic commentator noting that it was the beginning of the nuclear age and that it precipitated the changing of relations in Europe.[155] As will be discussed, the end of the Cold War signalled a period of decline in the 'special relationship' between Britain and the United States, as the end of hostilities with the Soviet Union initially heralded a period of calm. However, international politics does not often function as planned, and therefore the predictions by commentators such as Allison and Treverton that at the end of the Cold War States would be required to consider security as carefully as they had always done proved to be correct.[156] The years that followed the end of the Cold War and the attacks on America in 2001 have even been termed by some academics as an "interwar" period, which Jeremi Suri describes as a period in which Americans "became convinced of their 'exceptional' ability to transcend the hard choices of international politics."[157]

When the Berlin Wall was finally pulled down in 1989 marking the end of the Cold War, Margaret Thatcher, the first female British Prime Minister, was at the head of the British government. During her years in office, and despite some disagreements with Washington on issues such as the degree of American support for Britain in the opening stages of the Falklands War in 1982, she managed to re-establish close personal relations with the then American president Ronald Reagan as a "cardinal principle of British foreign policy with the aim of exerting influence over US foreign policy" because she "had no doubt that Britain carried more global influence as a partner of the United States than as a member of a European caucus."[158] But despite her efforts, in 1989 the incoming Bush administration deliberately chose to meet the German chancellor before inviting her to Washington because Bush Senior's Secretary of State, James Baker, did not trust Reagan's 'indulgence' of

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[155] Charles W. Kegley. *The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Realist Myths and the New International Realities: ISA Presidential Address March 27, 1993 Acapulco, Mexico. International Studies Quarterly.* 1993, p. 141.

[156] N. J. Rengger. *Review: Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order. International Affairs.* 1993, p. 214.

[157] Jeremi Suri. *American Grand Strategy from the Cold War's End to 9/11. Orbis.* 2009, p. 612. <http://jeremisuri.net/doc/2009/03/orbis-article-fall-2009.pdf>

[158] William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, (2009), *op. cit.*, p. 266.

Thatcher, and intended to send a message signalling that American interests came before sentimental attachments.[159]

Nevertheless, the relationship between Britain and America did thaw following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990, and the subsequent first Gulf War as Britain proved to be the only ally of the US that was willing to provide an armoured division[160] "demonstrating that for extra-European deployments Britain remained America's most valuable partner."[161] Then, following the victory of the Democratic candidate, Bill Clinton, in the 1992 American presidential election, the relationship between Washington and London became cool. This was due to the fact that the Conservative Party at the time had openly sided with the Republican incumbent George H. W. Bush.[162]

Without the major threat of Soviet Communism to focus on and to unite the two countries, both Britain and the US concentrated the efforts of their international relations on other places scattered around the world, which were considered to be "strategically less significant."[163] The focus of these efforts included places such as Panama, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and Rwanda, and it was followed by the Democrats who succeeded them.[164] Although the political scientist John Mearsheimer had predicted that the 1990s would see a return of global power politics",[165] the US global strategy during the 1990s was motivated only by "small policy decisions, misguided political controversies, and half measures."[166] It seems that the US did not appear to be guided by any particular strategy during this period. It did not place its priorities on interfering outside the country, focusing instead on maintaining calm relations with other countries. For instance, in January 1993, the US publicly released the post-Cold War Defence Planning Guideline, which referred to the new "zone of peace" that "offers a framework for security not through competitive rivalries in arms, but through

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[159] William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, (2009), *op. cit*., p. 267.
[160] Ibid., pp. 274.
[161] Ibid., pp. 267.
[162] Jon Lunn, Vaughne Miller and Ben Smith. **British Foreign Policy since 1997.** House of Commons Library. June 2008.
[163] Jeremi Suri; (2009); *op. cit*., p. 613.
[164] William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, (2009), *op. cit*., p. 274.
[165] John J. Mearsheimer. **Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War.** *International Security*. 1990, p. 54.
[166] Jeremi Suri, (2009), *op. cit*., p. 612.

cooperative approaches and collective security institutions […] the combination of these trends has given our nation and our alliances great depth for our strategic position."[167]

As regards the relationship between Britain and America, although it was certainly not as active or close during this period, cooperation continued as before in certain areas. It may be argued that military cooperation has long been the mainstay of the 'special relationship' and the former British Ambassador to Washington, Lord Renwick, noted that "Britain has influence on American policy to the extent that it still has some power and influence itself in various parts of the world […] the price of consultation is presence and participation."[168] One example of such cooperation was the British contingent in the 1991 Gulf War.[169]

Despite this continued cooperation in some areas, Wallace and Phillips term the 1990s "lost years" for strategy, not because there was no actual decision to avoid the clear articulation of strategy but rather because the global circumstances meant that no clear enemy existed, with the fragmentation of Communist Russia and the demise of Communist ideology.[170] These threats had existed for so long in the American consciousness that there was now a vacuum, and with no real adversary the policymakers found it difficult to choose a new course. However, other historians have taken a different view, which concentrates on economic strategy rather than military or intelligence and defence.[171] One example is Cronin who argues that the lapse in the 'special relationship' did not occur in the 1990s, but rather, whilst it had "seemed past its useful life" in the 1970s, it was actually "reconstructed on a new basis" in the 1980s, as both the US and Britain began to reconstruct their societies and the globe following the collapse of Communism.[172] Obviously, this reshaping did not occur at once, but rather it developed gradually during the 1970s and 1980s.[173]

Although at an immediate glance, it might appear that there was during this period a significant cooling in the 'special relationship', both countries were developing along similar

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[167] Dick Cheney. ***Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy***. United States Government. 1993, p. 19.
< http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb245/doc15.pdf>
[168] Jeffrey D. Mc Causland and Douglas T. Stuart eds*., (2006), op. cit*., p. 3.
[169] William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, (2009), *op. cit*., p. 276.
[170] Ibid., pp. 278.
[171] Ibid., pp. 263.
[172] James Cronin, (2008), *op. cit*., p. 26.
[173] Idem.

lines in three main areas, these being militarily, economically, and in terms of human rights.[174] While for many years the US and Britain had shared similar economic ideals, as Wallace and Phillips observe, by 1997, it had become the duty of the newly rebranded New Labour to initiate a political dialogue between the two countries, firstly with the members of the Clinton administration, with whom the new British government shared more political ideals, and then later on with the members of the administration of the second George Bush:

> [I]t was left to New Labour, from 1997, to rebuild the political dimension of the special relationship, first with its progressive allies in the Clinton administration and then, more delicately, with the administration of the second George Bush.[175]

Clinton's foreign policy was concerned with gently directing countries towards democracy, and occasionally intervening in states that were deemed to have "failed".[176] However, Michael Cox argues that the US president was most successful in central and Eastern Europe in pushing countries towards embracing democracy as part of a greater campaign to increase the number of democracies in the world which were run on the free market, capitalist concept.[177] Although he was certainly liberal in his outlook, the aim of his administration was actually similar to that which had been espoused by the Republican Cheney who stated that the foreign policy aim was to "secure and extend the remarkable democratic 'zone of peace' that we and our allies now enjoy."[178] The main motivation of Clinton, and indeed, notes Guyatt, of those who came before him, was that capitalism and democracy were complementary and that democracies did not fight with one another.[179]

The British policy developed along the same lines, both on the subjects of the economy and as regards security. During this period, the increasing Europeanisation of Britain continued, and trade liberalisation increased, even though the British Prime Minister John Major did refer to the Anglo-American ties, in a speech in which he reaffirmed the "centrality of the American security relationship."[180] During this period, Major also achieved

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[174] James Cronin, (2008), *op. cit*., p. 262
[175] William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, (2009), *op. cit*., p. 267.
[176] James Cronin, (2008), *op. cit*., p. 22.
[177] Michael Cox. ***Wilsonianism Resurgent? Democracy Promotion under Clinton*** in Cox, Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi, eds., ***American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies and Impacts***. p. 224.
[178] Michael Hunt. ***The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained and Wielded Global Dominance***. 2007, p. 276.
[179] Nicholas Guyatt. ***Another American Century?: The United States and the World since 9.11***. 2003, p. 179.
[180] John Dumbrell, (2006), *op. cit*., p. 192**.**

further economic integration with the European Union, as well as enjoying the benefits of the liberalisation of financial services, in which Britain, with its capital, London as a European hub, was extremely competitive.[181] Robin Renwick, who was the British Ambassador to the US during the 1990s, noted that he and his staff worked extremely closely with the Americans in order to achieve a "successful outcome" to the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations which led to the establishment of the World Trade Organisation.[182] Michael Heseltine, who was then acting as the President of the Board of Trade, also pressed for increased open markets and trade liberalisation and in 1995 he stated that the reliance of Britain on "export-led growth demands further steps towards liberal markets, not a move backwards to protectionism."[183] In 1997, the Royal Institute of International Affairs commissioned a report that asserted that in the age of global free markets and competition, the goal of British policy ought to be the extension of global free trade, as overseen by the World Trade Organisation. [184]

Although during the 1990s the British and Americans were not involved in global political cooperation, their neoliberal economic theories of open markets and trade liberalisation were essentially developing in tandem. As regards political and military endeavours, the defeat of Saddam Hussein in 1991 resulted in an optimism for the US that "bordered on the utopian."[185] Under the Clinton administration, there arose a new hope of peace and democracy, so that it "became commonplace to theorise about the 'democratic peace' with its assumed links between democracy, capitalism and peace, and about the possibility of enlarging the sphere in "market-orientated democracies."[186] The First Gulf War was dependent to a large extent on the Anglo-American alliance, which proved that the 'special relationship' could be resurrected, although after the war the attentions of each nation were diverted.[187] Also, following the victory in Iraq, Britain and America did differ in their decisions as regards the necessity of intervention in Yugoslavia, although, in general, Britain and the US adopted a similar defence and security policy.[188]

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[181] Percy Cradock. *In Pursuit of British Interests: Reflections on Foreign Policy under Margaret Thatcher and John Major*. 1997, p. 192.
[182] James Cronin, (2008), *op. cit*., p. 22.
[183] Ibid., pp. 23.
[184] Laurence W. Martin and John C. Garnett. *British Foreign Policy: Challenges and Choices for the Twenty-first Century*. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997.
[185] James Cronin, (2008), *op. cit*., p. 24.
[186] Bruce M. Russett. *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World*. 1993, p. 39.
[187] John Dickie. *"Special" No More: Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality*. 1994, p.134.
[188] James Cronin, (2008), *op. cit*., p. 24.

The Clinton administration intended to continue with United Nations led peacekeeping missions, through the method that was termed "assertive multiculturalism."[189] Cronin asserts that the first Gulf War taught the US two valuable lessons, the first being the potential danger that could be posed by a "rogue" state, and the second being the dangers of the newly technologically advanced warfare.[190] Following the Gulf War, the US became more cautious about its intervention in other countries, with Anthony Lake stating that it was necessary to "make hard choices about where and when the international community can get involved."[191] An example of this new, more cautious policy on the part of the US was demonstrated by the reluctance to intervene in Yugoslavia, and Britain and the US also debated on "the means rather than the ends."[192] America was insistent that the problem with Yugoslavia was the responsibility of Europe, which ought therefore to be addressed and solved by the Europeans, rather than requiring American intervention.[193] They believed that the key problem in the conflict was the Serbs, although the British Prime Minister and Douglas Hurd, the British Foreign Secretary, took a more neutral approach, highlighting that any potential negotiation between the two sides would be extremely difficult to implement.[194] Ultimately, however, the effects of the massacres in Sarajevo and Srebrenica caused such public protests against the lack of foreign intervention that it led to the intervention by the Americans, Britain as well as the European Union, which resulted in the 1995 Dayton Accords.[195] This episode indicated the lack of common agreement between Britain and America, as well as the mistrust in international institutions such as the United Nations.

There was also disappointment in foreign policy strategy outside Europe. This was demonstrated in the failure of America in Somalia in 1993, and the failure to halt the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, a failure which fell also on the shoulders of the international community.[196] Thus, despite the optimism that had been palpable at the beginning of the 1990s, a series of foreign policy failures had highlighted the faults of "assertive multiculturalism".[197] As has been noted, the promise that had been made during the Cold War of a "new world order" that had been prevalent in the early 1990s had, by the middle of the

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[189] Nicholas Guyatt, (2003), *op. cit.*, p. 81.
[190] James Cronin, (2008), *op. cit.*, p. 24.
[191] Nicholas Guyatt, (2003), *op. cit.*, p.81.
[192] James Cronin, (2008), *op. cit.*, p. 24.
[193] Idem.
[194] Ibid., pp. 25.
[195] Brendan Simms. *Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia*. 2001, p. 52.
[196] James Cronin, (2008), *op. cit.*, p. 27
[197] Walter Russell Mead. *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World*. 2001, p. 264.

decade, been proved pointless to attempt to implement.[198] These failures resulted in a reluctance on the part of the US to commit forces and to finance operations when the outcome of these could not be guaranteed, which actually resulted, ironically, in a situation in which America, under the leadership of President Clinton, began to realise the benefit of the close alliance with the British and of that country's support.[199]

When Tony Blair arrived at the head of the British government in 1997, it became clear that relations between the two countries would improve. From 1997 to 2000, Blair "forged a close working relationship with President Clinton".[200] Even when Labour was still in opposition, Blair was already eager to tie close bonds with the US Democrats and was greatly influenced by Clinton's electoral campaign. Consequently, when Blair was elected to power he had already good relations with Clinton's administration. This was clearly demonstrated when Clinton, the then American President, who consciously avoided meeting the British government when he made his first visit to the UK after his electoral victory to receive an honorary degree from Oxford University, made a special visit to the UK soon after Blair's electoral victory and met the full cabinet making journalists and commentators at the time talking about the re-forging of the 'special relationship' despite the end of the Cold War.[201] But, notwithstanding their ideological proximity, Blair and Clinton did not always think alike; for example, there was some tension in 1998 over developments on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) when senior US officials feared that Britain was turning away from the 'special relationship' and downgrading the importance of NATO; and also their disagreement over Kosovo, when Blair worked hard during early 1999 to persuade Clinton to support a NATO ground invasion, when Clinton himself was not convinced by the necessity of doing so and was therefore hesitating to listen to him.[202]

In the 1990s, another international crisis arose, which concerned the Serbian influence on Kosovo regarding the region's push for autonomy. Amidst the reluctance of the international community to involve itself in another conflict, Blair took the lead, eager to prove his worth to his United States counterparts. In his 1999 Chicago speech, Blair asserted

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[198] Walter Russell Mead, (2001), *op. cit*., p. 264.
[199] James Cronin, (2008), *op. cit*., p. 26.
[200] Jane Sharp. ***Tony Blair, Iraq and the Special Relationship: Poodle or Partner?*** *International Journal*, 2004.
[201] Richard Little and Mark Wickham-Jones Eds. ***New Labour's Foreign Policy. A New Moral Crusade?*** 2000, p. 234.
[202] Jon Lunn, Vaughne Miller and Ben Smith, (June 2008), *op. cit*.

the great need for humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, in which he stated his view of the importance of the "international community."[203]

The collaboration of Britain and America in Kosovo was useful as it demonstrated that the 'special relationship' could still be useful to both countries, and it also, notes Cronin, provided a "practical template for military intervention outside of the United Nations", as according to international law, the intervention of the two countries in Kosovo was judged to have been "not illegal, but not legitimate", and it was just outside the boundaries of international law, by the Independent International Commission on Kosovo.[204] Blair was convinced that his course of action was an "ethical foreign policy", as was the Defence Policy Review in 1998, which permitted the reduction in military expenditure, but reinforced the view of the Labour Government that both convention and nuclear forces should be maintained, with the option of a reaction force that could be dispatched at very short notice.[205]

During the 2000 US electoral campaign, the British government was expecting Al Gore to win but made sure that they had interaction with members from both parties, to be prepared for either outcome. When George W. Bush was then declared the winner of the elections, the British media and commentators talked sceptically about the future of the partnership with the US. As Paul Williams states, "in early 2001, the issues atop the US-UK diplomatic agenda were Russia, National Missile Defence (NMD), the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and the European security and defence initiative. Disagreements were evident over all of them."[206]

Hence, when Bush came to power, British officials were worried that the relationship would deteriorate, a feeling underscored by Bush's answer when he was asked after his first meeting with Blair what they had in common and he replied: "We both use Colgate toothpaste."[207]

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[203] Robert H. Jackson. *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States*. 2000, p. 355.
[204] James Cronin, (2008), *op. cit*., p. 27.
[205] Louise Richardson. *British State Strategies after the Cold War* in Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye and Stanley Hoffmann. *After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991*. 1993, p. 514.
[206] Williams, Paul D., *British Foreign Policy under New Labour 1997-2005*. 2005, p. 40.
[207] Glenn Kessler. *Blair and Bush Are Duo Even in Descent*. *The Washington Post*. Friday, May 26, 2006.

Bush planned to reject the Kyoto protocols, the international framework on the global change of climate, as well as to reject the authority of the International Criminal Court, amongst other plans that involved the rejection of international authority in favour of American self-determination.[208] Blair continued his interventionist policy into his second administration, with the intention of continuing the success that he had achieved in Kosovo, following the political renown and congratulations that he received internationally for his role in helping to bring a certain level of stability to the Balkans.[209]

Interestingly, Cronin believes that Bush's plans at this time were not actually made with the intention of following through, and were actually motivated by the aim of avoiding political imbroglios and involvements with foreign politics.[210] However, this was not to be, as following the attacks on the US East Coast on 9/11, the Bush administration quickly formulated its response, which was to be the declaration of the "War on Terror" and the military action in Afghanistan. As regards the trajectory of the 'special relationship' prior to the 9/11 attacks, it has been remarked that from the mid-1990s, the 'special relationship' between Britain and the United States had gone firmly off track.

Dumbrell observes that the US-UK relationship has been surrounded at various stages in its recent evolution, by what he calls "end of the affair" literature; the end of the Cold War having stimulated one such wave. In the mid-1990s for example, Margaret Thatcher started lamenting openly the fact that her successor as British Prime Minister John Major, had "chosen" Europe over America so that the 'special relationship' was then marginalised, if not actually destroyed. For Dumbrell, "many observers argued that, following the Cold War, Washington no longer had any need for special relations with London". Citing the academic John Dickie, he goes on stating that the demise of the Cold War had removed the fundamental purpose of the alliance.[211]

Along the same lines, Suri argues that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War left a vacuum for the US, so that any reason that had previously existed for the

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[208] John Gerald Ruggie. *American Exceptionalism, Exemptionalism, and Global Governance*. in Michael Ignatieff. *American Exceptionalism and Human Rights*, 2005, p. 333.
[209] Oliver Daddow. *Tony's War? Blair, Kosovo and the interventionist impulse in British foreign policy*. *International Affairs*, 2009, p. 548.
[210] James Cronin, (2008), *op. cit*., p. 27.
[211] John Dumbrell, (2006), *op cit.*, p 5-6.

maintenance of the Anglo-American 'special relationship' no longer existed.[212] In addition to this vacuum, there was an "absence of grand strategy" on the part of the US in the late 1990s, which ultimately led to the emergencies in the 2000s.[213] Dumbrell believes that the Cold War's end "removed much of the rationale for intimate and 'special' US-UK cooperation" adding that "the sharpening, in the 1990s and into the twenty-first century of the European integration agenda also set what remained of the 'special relationship' in a new and unpredictable environment. [214]

Cronin observes that excessive mention of the 'special relationship' "elicits irritation, boredom, ridicule and confusion."[215] Perhaps that is because the phrase has become almost a cliché, filled with irrelevant historical sentiments that are no longer of any true concern to the politicians, both American and British, who use the phrase at times of political convenience. The term 'special relationship' appeals to different types of people. To those who position themselves as politically left-wing, the term represents "imperialism", with its overtones of British colonialism and a protection and responsibility that no longer exists for either the British or the US towards each other. Indeed, Britain is now, as discussed earlier, second-in-command, dependent more on America's benevolence than able to command its cooperation.[216]

However, as will be discussed in the coming section, the 'special relationship' was "spectacularly revived" after the attacks of 11 September 2001 on New York and Washington.[217] Michael Cox and Tim Oliver summed up well this period in the life of the 'special relationship' which

> became more intimate: first, between Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, as they took on communism and espoused the virtues of capitalism during the 1980's. Second, between Tony Blair and Bill Clinton as they tried to carve a new international 'Third Way' between social democracy and neo-liberalism during the second half of the 1990's. Third, between Blair and George Bush in the wake of   9/11.[218]

[212] Jeremi Suri, (2009); *op. cit*., p. 613.
[213] Idem.
[214] John Dumbrell, (2006), *op. cit*., p. 5-6.
[215] James Cronin, (2008), *op. cit*., p. 2.
[216] Idem.
[217] John Dumbrell, (2006), *op cit*, p. vii (preface to the 2nd edition)
[218] Patrick Dunleavy. ***Developments in British Politics 8.*** 2006, p. 175.

CHAPTER TWO

THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP AND 9/11: THE EMERGENCE OF A CLEAR AND IDENTIFIABLE COMMON ENEMY

We [...] here in Britain stand shoulder to shoulder with our American friends in this hour of tragedy and we like them will not rest until this evil is driven from our world.

Tony Blair, 11 September 2001

September 11th, 2001 is a date marking the start of a new era in world politics and at the same time standing for a better understanding between the British New Labour government and the American Republicans. As during the Cold War, it now again seemed that the British and Americans were battling against the same enemy, this time under the general appellation of international terrorism which first took the shape of Osama Ben Laden and the Taliban in Afghanistan, then Iraq's alleged Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and subsequently Saddam Hussein himself.

1- THE 9/11 ATTACKS AND THEIR AFTERMATH

September 11th will, as the academic Ahmad put it, "long be associated with unthinkable violence" due to the "sheer magnitude of the terrorist attacks, the visual imagery of the collapsing towers of the World Trade Center, and the extensive media attention."[219] According to the *Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*, the official report of the events leading up to the attacks, these latter were carried out on Tuesday September 11, 2001 by nineteen Arab terrorists affiliated to Al-Qaeda network. These individuals hijacked commercial planes to be crashed against the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon in Washington and another one to be crashed against either the Capitol or the White House but which missed its target and crashed somewhere in Pennsylvania after a fight between the passengers and the hijackers.[220]

The same source explains that fifteen of the nineteen hijackers were from Saudi Arabia, two from the United Arab Emirates and one from Lebanon, while their leader was Egyptian. The Commission goes on in its report, published in 2004, saying that all the hijackers were members of the al-Qaeda terrorist organisation, led by the Saudi national Osama Ben Laden.[221] As for the casualties, the total number of those killed reached almost 3000, with 2600 in the World Trade Center alone, 125 at the Pentagon and 256 on the four

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[219] Muneer I. Ahmad. *A Rage Shared by Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence as Crimes of Passion*. *California Law Review*, p. 1261.
[220] The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. *Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*. 2004.
<http://www.9-11commission.gov//
[221] Idem.

planes. The use of planes to commit the attacks against the World Trade Center was the single most deadly terrorist act known to have happened, while the death toll surpassed that at Pearl Harbor during the Second World War in December 1941.[222] [223]

The cost of these attacks on the United States is estimated to have been approximately one hundred billion dollars, according to the findings of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security. In addition to the large number of lives that were wiped out in the attacks, huge damage was done to property and services, as well as in stock market wealth, the loss of corporate profits and the resulting economic instability.[224]

Hours after the planes crashed into the World Trade Center in New York, President Bush announced that "Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts."[225] His statement was followed by the announcement soon afterwards of Donald Rumsfeld, who served as his Secretary of Defence, stating that "Yesterday, America and the cause of human freedom came under attack, and the first great crisis of America's 21st century was suddenly upon us."[226] One can note that immediately after the attack, Bush and his administration were already attempting to, as Donnelly put it, "redefine the international order."[227] The language that was employed by the president and his team in their public statements on the attacks were specifically designed to galvanise patriotism and support for the mission that they knew would soon become necessary. For Donnelly, the "justifications for the 2003 Iraq war were constructed against this backdrop."[228]

In the weeks after the attacks, President Bush gave a number of speeches addressed to his countrymen and women through which he steadily built a stereotypical vision of the enemy, building on a portrayal of Arabs and Muslims that had been constructed over

[222] Brenda Lutz and James M. Lutz. *Global Terrorism*. 2008, p. 1.
[223] 2,403 Americans were killed and 1,178 others were wounded as a result of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. <http://history1900s.about.com/od/Pearl-Harbor/a/Pearl-Harbor-Facts.htm>
[224] Institute for the Analysis of Global Security. *How much did the September 11th attack cost America?* 2004. < http://www.iags.org/costof911.html>
[225] President Bush Speech on September 12, 2001.
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010912-4.html>
[226] Donald Rumsfeld. *Secretary Rumsfeld Message to U.S. Forces, DoD Civilians.*
<http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=1621>
[227] Donnelly Faye. *Redefining the rules of the game: a critical analysis of the bush administration's foreign war on terror.* 2008. <http://www.pol.ed.ac.uk/psa_postgraduate/abstracts>
[228] Idem.

previous decades, and which intensified following 9/11, so that groups who appeared to be "Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim" were smeared as potential terrorists.[229] Merskin asserts that a textual analysis of the speeches of Bush in the weeks after the attacks "reflected an identifiable model of enemy image construction."[230] As noted, these images of the Arab/Muslim "other" had been constructed in the media and therefore in the subconscious of the American public for many years, and so people were willing to accept the representation of the new Arab/ Muslim enemy by Bush and his entourage.

Indeed, the link between Arabs/ Muslims and terrorism was well ingrained in the collective memory of American people[231] for, as Jackson had noted in 1996, in films, for instance, "barbarism and cruelty are the most common traits associated with Arabs" and Muslims, with these stereotypes tending "to lump Arabs, Muslims, and the Middle East" into an extraordinarily negative picture.[232] Furthermore, another intention of the American government and the media has always been to portray the country's enemies not only as a threat to the country and its people, but also as distinctly evil. One such example can be found in a cartoon that was drawn during the Persian Gulf War in the magazine *Atlantic Monthly* in 1990. The cartoon portrayed a man wearing a turban whose eyes were furious and which was drawn with the likeness of the American flag. As Keen observes, "there is nothing to suggest that the man has any humanity; rather, what is important is that he is 'unlike' us […] we need have no sympathy, no guilt, when we destroy him"[233] and it is through rhetoric and visual representations in the media that the American subconscious was manipulated into becoming especially fearful of its new enemy, the Arab/Muslim.

Such visual representations have been analysed by the 2006 documentary film "*Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People*."[234] This film[235] is an extension of the book of the same title by Jack G. Shaheen, a noted American academic and writer of Lebanese origins. Arguing that Hollywood deliberately corrupts and manipulates the image of the Arab,

[229] Leti Volpp. *The Citizen and the Terrorist*. *Immigration & Nationality*. 2001, p. 566.
[230] Debra Merskin. *The Construction of Arabs as Enemies: Post-September 11 Discourse of George W. Bush*. *Mass Communication & Society*. 2004, p. 158.
[231] N. B. Jackson. *Arab Americans: Middle East conflicts hit home*. In P. M. Lester eds. *Images that injure: Pictorial stereotypes in the media*. 1996, p. 65.
[232] Idem.
[233] Sam Keen. *Faces of the Enemy: Reflections of the Hostile Imagination*. 1986, p. 16.
[234] The documentary can be watched in its entirety here: <https://vimeo.com/56687715>
[235] The film has been directed by Sut Jhally, a professor of communication at the University of Massachusetts Amherst whose work focuses on cultural studies, advertising, media, and consumption.

"the Oriental other", in the documentary, Shaheen reviews 1000 films that have Arab characters dating from the late nineteenth to the twenty-first century. Out of these, only 12 were positive depictions of Arabs, 52 were neutral portrayals, while an astounding 936 were negative.[236] In the majority of movies, there was "a dangerously consistent pattern of hateful Arab stereotypes, stereotypes that rob an entire people of their humanity."[237]

In an interview with the American news programme *Democracy Now!*, Shaheen observes that the images of politics and Hollywood are linked, reinforcing one another. Asserting that "policy enforces mythical images [while] mythical images help enforce policy", he quotes late Jack Valenti, former president of the Motion Picture Association of America, who once said, "Washington and Hollywood spring from the same DNA."

Further, he explains that the Arab image in the US started to change after the Second World War: first impacted by the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, in which the United States unequivocally supported Israel, then the Arab oil embargo in the 1970s, which angered Americans when oil prices reached all-time highs, and then the Iranian Revolution, which increased Arab-American tensions when Iranian students took American diplomats hostage for more than a year. "These three pivotal events", notes Shaheen, "brought the Middle East into the living rooms of Americans and together helped shape the way movies stereotyped Arabs and the Arab world." For him, Islamophobia has become a part of the American psyche with words such as "Arab" and "Muslim" being perceived as threatening. If these words are threatening, he wonders, what about the images seen in the American cinema and on television screens? These stereotypes have become "so widespread that [they've] become invisible to people."[238]

Furthermore, the American entrance to the Iraq War was, according to him, "made a lot easier primarily because for more than a century [Americans] had been vilifying all things Arab", adding that after 9/11, instead of saying "that's the lunatic fringe" in reference to the perpetrators of the attacks, Americans directly started declaring that those attacks reflect the actions of 1.3 billion people. Something which he deems "dangerous" since it is not

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[236] *Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People*, documentary by Jack Shaheen, 2006
[237] *Interview with Jack Shaheen*
<http://www.democracynow.org/2007/10/19/reel_bad_arabs_how_hollywood_vilifies>
[238]Idem.

acceptable for instance to say that the actions of the racist Ku Klux Klan members, who are Christians, represent Christianity. He summarises the situation as follows:

> [...]if you take the same images and you repeat them over and over again, and the images teach us to hate a people and to hate their religion, what happens is that we, in spite of our intelligence, our innate goodness, actually turn around and let these images despise and vilify an entire people.[239]

After the Cold War, the United States was missing a focus for hostility. The disintegration of the Soviet Union meant that Communism and the USSR were no longer the focus of the antipathy of America, thus making it a "lonely superpower in a multipolar system."[240] As it has been pointed out earlier, nations "need" enemies, due to the fact that governments "use the idea of a common enemy as a method of social control, of reinforcing the values of the dominant system, and of garnering participation in the maintenance of those beliefs."[241] During the 1980s and the Cold War with Soviet Russia, the then American President Ronald Reagan talked of the Communist conglomerate as the "focus of evil in the modern world" and he requested that Americans "pray for the salvation of all those who live in totalitarian darkness."[242] Keen argues that the role of cultural factors in forming human behaviour cannot be discounted, in particular, the "phenomenology of the hostile imagination."[243] This was something that Bush played on to great effect and the discovery by America of a very real and threatening enemy served the function of unifying the nation.[244] America is an extremely large country, and hence the hovering spectre of terrorism became a unifying tool for the government to instil patriotism amongst citizens.

This creation of an identifiable enemy worked extremely well for the Bush administration in causing the American public to focus on this enemy amidst the rising swell of patriotism and thus accepting almost unquestionably the subsequent military plans of the government. 9/11 affected the different strands in the foreign and domestic policy of America, rendering the huge military power of the country ready to be utilised for interventions which would now be made in the name of security rather than for humanitarian reasons, with democracy being promoted "not merely by engagement but also by force" and

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[239] *Interview with Jack Shaheen*
<http://www.democracynow.org/2007/10/19/reel_bad_arabs_how_hollywood_vilifies>
[240] Samuel P. Huntington. *The Lonely Superpower*. *Foreign Affairs*. 1999, p. 39.
[241] Debra Merskin, (2004), *op. cit.*, p. 158.
[242] Sam Keen, (1986), *op. cit.*, p. 31.
[243] Ibid., pp. 16.
[244] Ibid., pp. 1.

the direction of this force would be made with scant regard for the opinions of the international community.[245]

Bush immediately branded the terrorist attacks as "acts of war", noting in 2001 that the "mind-set of war must change. It is a different type of battle. It's a different type of battlefield. It's a different type of war."[246] This combination of media rhetoric with strong leadership convinced of its own righteousness was crucial in increasing the level of patriotism amongst Americans following the 9/11 attacks as well as in preparing citizens of both the United States and to a lesser degree the United Kingdom for war.

Certainly, the level of trust that Americans had in their government rose tremendously following the 9/11 attacks with a poll demonstrating a huge rise in the trust that Americans had in their government as opposed to the previously high level of public cynicism in government.[247] This provides evidence that when the attention of the public is forced to change from concerns regarding their country's domestic matters to policies that concern issues of foreign threats, trust in government is highly likely to increase. Patriotism and a sense of solidarity with other citizens also increase in the face of international threats and concerns about the country's security.[248] As the Americans realised in the days following 9/11 that their country was now exposed to a new and terrifying type of terrorism, sentiments of fear, anger, nationalism and prejudice gripped the nation, American flags were placed on buildings and hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims took place.[249]

As Kellner discusses in his paper, following the attacks of 9/11, the United States government "dramatized the relationship between media spectacles of terror and the strategy of Islamic jihadism that employs spectacular media events to promote its agenda."[250] It is also important to note that the providers of news receive their sources from a limited number of global news organisations, as Fahmy notes, making it the "main context in which the news

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[245] Donnelly Faye, (2008), *op. cit.*
[246] President Bush Speech on September 12, 2001.
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010912-4.html>
[247] Virginia A. Chanley. *Trust in Government in the Aftermath of 9/11: Determinants and Consequences.* *Political Psychology.* 2002, p. 471.
[248] Idem.
[249] C. L. Coyle; J. Beale and K. M. Myers. *Response to September 11: Anxiety, Patriotism, and Prejudice in the Aftermath of Terror.* *Current Research in Social Psychology.* 2004, p. 166.
[250] David Kellner. *9/11 Spectacles of Terror, and Media Manipulation: A Critique of Jihadist and Bush Media Politics.* *Critical Discourse Studies.* 2004, p. 4.

making and framing of the 9/11 attacks and aftermath occurred."[251] Paterson refers to these news sources as "gatekeepers."[252]

In *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*, co-written by the great linguist and activist Noam Chomsky, the thinker explains how the news media editorially distorts the news and/ or selectively chooses what to cover because of its dependence upon private and governmental news sources, as well as due to personal agendas of the corporations and investors controlling these outlets, in addition to their desire to retain powers. If, for instance, a given newspaper or television station incurs governmental disfavour, it is subtly excluded from access to information and consequently loses readers or viewers, and ultimately, advertisers. This is why, it is argued, American news media businesses use editorial distortion on their reporting to favour government and corporate policies in order to stay in business.[253]

In the book, Chomsky and Herman introduce the concept of what they term the "propaganda model" which describes, according to them, five editorially distorting news filters applied to news reporting in mass media. One of these is "Anti-Communism" which was included as a filter in the original 1988 -during the Cold War- edition of the book, which Chomsky argues, since the end of the Cold War, has been replaced by the "War on Terror", as the major social control mechanism. For Cromwell, "A more apt version of this filter is the customary western identification of 'the enemy' or an 'evil dictator' [like] Colonel Gaddafi [and] Saddam Hussein"[254] among others. This filter, he explains, applies to the "demonisation of enemies" which is "useful, essential even, in justifying strategic geopolitical manoeuvring and the defence of corporate interests around the world, while mollifying home-based critics of such behaviour." He adds that:

> The creation of an 'evil empire' of some kind, as in postwar western scaremongering about the 'Soviet Menace' or earlier talk of the 'Evil Hun', has been a standard device for terrifying the population into supporting arms production and military adventurism abroad - both major sources of profit for big business. Iraq's Saddam

[251] S. Fahmy. *Emerging Alternatives or Traditional News Gates: Which News Sources Were Used to Picture the 9/11 Attack and the Afghan War? International Communication Gazette.* 2005, p. 392.
[252] C. A. Paterson. *The Transference of Frames in Global Television* in S. Reese, O. Gandy and A. Grant (eds.) *Framing Public Life*. 2001, p. 337-535.
[253] Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky. *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media.* 1988.
[254] David Cromwell. *The Propaganda Model: An Overview*. 2002.
<http://www.chomsky.info/onchomsky/2002----.htm>

Hussein has been a useful bogeyman for US arms manufacturers who have notched up sales of over $100bn to Saddam's neighbours in the Middle East.[255]

The reaction of countries across the world to 9/11 was predictable, as similar messages of sympathy poured in from leaders of both the West and the Muslim world. Condemnation of the attacks was widespread and consistently sympathetic. Algeria was one of the first nations to condemn the attacks and to express its sincere condolences to the American people. "Our strong bilateral relationship has only grown since then", former US Ambassador to Algeria, Henry S. Ensher, declared in 2011, adding that "President Bouteflika visited Washington twice after 9/11 – the first in November, 2001 – to show Algeria's solidarity and support".[256]

Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Grand Islamic Scholar and Chairman of the Sunna and Sira Council, strongly condemned the attacks calling on Muslims to unite against "all those who terrorize the innocents, and those who permit the killing of non-combatants without a justifiable reason."[257] For his part, Shaykh Muhammed Sayyid al-Tantawi, Grand Imam of al-Azhar mosque in Cairo, also unequivocally condemned the attacks calling those who attack innocent people "stupid and will be punished on the day of judgement" adding that "Al-Azhar is against terrorism, regardless of its source or target. The killing of innocent men, women, and children is a horrible and ugly act that is against all religions and against rational thinking."[258]

The response of the governments of the Western world was immediately supportive to the United States, with the Australian Prime Minister, for example, stating that Australia had a "steadfast commitment to work with the United States"[259] whilst the German Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, called the attacks a "declaration of war against the civilised world."[260] As for international organisations, on September 12, the United Nations Security Council

[255] David Cromwell, (2002), *op. cit*.
[256] Henri S. Ensher. *Ten Years Later: Partnership, Resilience, and the Triumph of the Human Spirit*. 2011. <http://algiers.usembassy.gov/9-11_01.html>
[257] *Muslim leaders' statements condemning terrorism, from 9/11 to ISIS/Islamic State atrocities in 2014*. <http://www.religioustolerance.org/muslim-leaders-condemn-acts-of-terrorism.htm>
[258] Idem.
[259] Tim Johnston. *Ally of Bush is Defeated in Australia. The New York Times*. November 25th, 2007, p. 8.
[260] New York Times. *Reaction From Around the World*. September 11th, 2001. <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/12/us/reaction-from-around-the-world.html>

members denounced the terrorist attacks and adopted Resolution 1368 (2001)[261] that, while condemning the attacks, did not authorise the use of military force.[262] NATO convened an emergency meeting of its members and Lord Robinson, the General Secretary, pledged support of the organisation to the United States.[263]

Despite the strong expressions of sympathy that came forward from many corners of Europe however, over the course of 2001, the sentiment of many Europeans and their governments towards the United States morphed into something substantially less sympathetic, as they became aware that President Bush and his supporters were intent on dragging the Western world into an unwanted conflict. Haftendorn encapsulates well the sentiment, noting that in the period that followed 9/11, "as seen from America, the world has changed, and while viewed from Europe it is America that has been transformed."[264] This can be seen in particular in the changing attitude of Germany towards the US. Although, as noted, Schroder originally offered his unlimited support to the US, his own attitude and that of the German government changed over the course of 2001 to a less eager disposition towards the country. This was marked by "vocal criticism and suspicion", notably demonstrated by his own electoral tactic of opposition to the subsequent military plans against Iraq, which resulted in an "angered response and cold-shouldered rebuke" from the Bush administration when Schroder was re-elected as the German Chancellor.[265] This was the start of what Haftendorn calls the "transatlantic divide" between Europe and the United States.[266]

Kagan believes that the development of this divide stems from the fundamentally different perspectives from which the United States and Europe view the world, and how these views impact on the way in which European powers and the US approach their foreign policy strategies. In this regard, he states that it is:

> time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world […]. The United States remains mired in history, exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world

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[261] United Nations. *Security Council Condemns, 'In Strongest Terms' Terrorist Attacks on United States*. <http://www.un.org/press/en/2001/SC7143.doc.htm>

[262] M. Byers. *Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law after 11 September*. *International Relations*. 2002, p. 156.

[263] New York Times. *Reaction From Around the World* September 11th, 2001.

[264] Helga Haftendorn. *One Year after 9/11: A critical appraisal of German-American Relations. The Thyssen German American Dialogue Seminar Series, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies*. 2002, p. 4. <http://www.aicgs.org/publications/PDF/Haftendorn.pdf>

[265] Idem.

[266] Idem.

where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might.[267]

Whilst the 9/11 attacks were not necessarily the cause of this divide, they certainly exacerbated it, resulting in a growing split between the United States and Europe; a divide that the United Kingdom, under Tony Blair's leadership, was only too eager to take advantage of. Perhaps the most obvious manifestation of this was demonstrated in the ways in which they responded to the new threat of terrorism. As Haftendorn notes, while the US views the use of armed force as a "legitimate and effective instrument of foreign policy, the Europeans prefer diplomatic negotiations and trade incentives"[268] which would soon become relevant in the context of the war on Iraq.

In contrast, the support that Blair offered to the United States was immediate and without any conditions attached. Immediately following the 9/11 attacks, he was extremely quick to support the US and his response was in stark contrast to the rest of Europe. A number of factors were at work, and in particular it is important to note the ideologies of the United States government at this time and the reasons for the willingness of Blair to not only accept them but ultimately to commit his country's troops to the cause of America.

Blair had been quick to intervene in Kosovo for "humanitarian reasons."[269] The speech he made in Chicago in April 1999 outlining his "Doctrine of International Community" revealed his strong belief in the need for humanitarian intervention and his conviction that he was taking military action for an important moral purpose, with academic commentators such as Daddow arguing that prior to his action in Iraq and commitment of the forces of the United Kingdom to that war, Blair was a firm believer in intervention from a keen sense of moral obligation.[270]

The administration of George W. Bush on the other hand was not concerned with the concept of an international community, and in fact Condoleezza Rice, who served as

[267] Robert Kagan. *Power and Weakness*. *Policy Review*. June/July 2002, p. 3.
[268] Helga Haftendorn, (2002), *op. cit*., p. 2.
[269] Chris Abbot. *Rights and Responsibilities: Resolving the Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention*. *Oxford Research Group*. 2005, p. 4
<http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/rightsresponsibilities.pdf>
[270] Oliver Daddow. *Tony's war'? Blair, Kosovo and the interventionist impulse in British foreign policy*. *International Affairs*. 2009, p. 548.

Secretary of State, had previously criticised Bill Clinton during his period in office as President for his commitment to humanitarian intervention.[271] Nye has discussed how the concept that the US could advance its strategy with the use of "soft power" has been criticised as extraordinarily naïve.[272] Indeed, such a view of the world was lambasted by the Bush administration as "utopian"; the Bush administration was significantly more concerned about maintaining the dominance of America than acting as the safeguard of an international society.[273] Certainly, America aimed to continue to concern itself with ensuring the principle of freedom, but its intention was that its overseas strategy would be based solely on the country's own interests and on its own maintenance of power in the global arena. As Ralph states, "America would remain engaged in the world, but this was a distinctly realist internationalism based on a much narrower conception of the national interest than the liberal internationalism" of the previous government under the leadership of Clinton.[274]

In summary, the main interests of the Bush administration lay in ensuring the maintenance of the global dominance of the United States, rather than attempting to make the world a better place, despite all the rhetoric that its leaders may have made. However, as Blair had a history of intervening in conflicts such as Kosovo on humanitarian grounds, the question remains why he was keen to not only cooperate with Bush and the US but also to actively support him and to take his own country to war despite strong opposition from the British people as well as from his own government. One academic asserts that the Bush administration was initially perceived by Blair as a form of neo-isolationism.[275] If this is the case, Blair may have believed that the US was reluctant to become involved in international affairs. It may be argued that to believe such a thing would have been extraordinarily naïve on the part of Blair and it is therefore improbable that this was actually the case. It is reported that in response to this belief, Blair stated that it was the duty of the United Kingdom to "turn these people (the United States) into internationalists."[276] It is indicative of a certain arrogance that Blair did not consider that the Americans actually were internationalists; simply that they did not share the same vision of international affairs as himself. Yet, the

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[271] Jason Ralph. *Tony Blair's 'new doctrine of international community' and the UK decision to invade Iraq*. *POLIS Working Pape*r. 2005, p. 9.
[272] Joseph S. Nye. *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alon*e. *Political Science Quarterly*. 2002, p. 7.
[273] Jason Ralph, (2005), *op. cit*., p. 9.
[274] Idem.
[275] Idem.
[276] Stephen Benedict Dyson. *The Blair Identity: Leadership and Foreign Policy*. 2009, p. 85.

situation was complicated, the world of global affairs is murky and the reasoning for the development of alliances is complex and based on a variety of factors.

It is for these reasons that it is difficult to discern the true mind-set of Blair for his immediate and unrestricted support for the United States following the 2001 attacks, when he stated that "we […] in Britain stand shoulder to shoulder with our American friends in this hour of tragedy and we like them will not rest until this evil is driven from our world."[277] Blair's view that the Americans required the unwavering support of Britain was supported by the diary notes of his former press chief, Alastair Campbell, who wrote that Blair was "straight onto the diplomatic side", insisting that the Americans could not be left to combat the threat alone and discussing the problem of Al-Qaeda and Ben Laden, about whom there had been a great deal of intelligence.[278]

The variety of reasons for Blair's support of the United States, with particular attention paid to his eagerness to maintain the transatlantic 'special relationship' will be considered; in the meantime, however, it is sufficient to note that the response of Blair to the 2001 attacks was

> one of unequivocal support for the United States, a framing of the situation in stark terms of good and evil, and elucidation of an ambitiously proactive foreign policy programme to prevent the re-occurrence of events of such magnitude.[279]

Therefore, despite the different political motivations of Blair and Bush, in addition to the varying impacting factors within their own administrations, the 9/11 attacks acted as a catalyst for the renewal of relations between the two countries, and the interaction between them and the two leaders became almost exclusive as European countries gradually withdrew their previously overt support.[280]

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[277] Adam D. Svendsen. *Exemplary 'friends and Allies'? Unpacking UK–US Relations in the Early Twenty-first Century*. *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*. 2011, p. 342.
[278] Idem.
[279] Stephen Benedict Dyson, (2009), *op. cit*., p. 70.
[280] Adam D. Svendsen, (2011), *op. cit*., p. 342.

2 - THE "WAR ON TERROR"

In *Britain and America Beyond Empire: Neo-liberalism, the 'Special Relationship' and the Search for Global Order*, James E. Cronin, from the Department of History of Boston College points out that:

> As the threat of confrontation with the Soviet Union evaporated, defenders of the military and defense industries began to focus upon the dangers posed by "rogue" or "outlaw" states with regional ambitions and the problems of nuclear proliferation and the more general availability of "weapons of mass destruction."[281]

To employ the terminology used in the excerpt above, the Taliban "government" that was ruling Afghanistan at the time of the 9/11 attacks constituted a 'rogue' and 'outlaw' state; whereas Saddam Hussein's Iraq had 'regional ambitions' and possessed 'weapons of mass destruction', constituting thus a threat to world peace and democracy. These two 'enemies' emerged to light after 9/11 and were hence the new targets of the Anglo-American partnership in their joint mission of "War on Terror" which was decided as a consequence of 9/11.

The "War on Terror" or "Global War on Terrorism" is the term that was given, following the attacks of 9/11, to the international military campaign that was instigated by the United States, which led to the coalition of forces from the members of NATO.[282] President Bush was the first person to use the phrase "War on Terror" on the 20th of September 2001.

Suri notes that the "War on Terror" which led to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and which resulted in conflicts that have lasted many years and are still ongoing, as well as affecting domestic law enforcement, travel provisions, and the treatment of prisoners captured in war, was "not inevitable", but it became "irresistible" as the United States and its citizens struggled for a solution to dealing with the fallout from 9/11 and the implications of the attacks for future American security, defence, and foreign policy strategy.[283] The response of the US to 9/11 was not unpredictable; in fact its "determined, if incomplete, strategy of force projection in areas of perceived threat and disorder" was a typical response that the US

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[281] James E. Cronin. ***Britain and America Beyond Empire: Neoliberalism, the 'Special Relationship' and the Search for Global Order***. 2006.
[282] Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker. ***US Officials Retool Slogan for Terror War***. *New York Times*. 2015.
[283] J. Suri ***Debating American Grand Strategy After Major War American Grand Strategy from the Cold War's End to 9/11***. *Orbis*. 2009, p. 612.

had used before.[284] The American motivations were clear; it was necessary to show a lack of fear, the strength of the country, to exact revenge for the deaths, to defend its borders and to maintain its dominance in the international arena. Some of these motivations were stated by President Bush himself in 2002 asserting that whilst the struggles of the US included the fight to guarantee economic and political freedom, it was also to "defend our Nation against its enemies" and to maintain its position of "unparalleled military strength."[285]

The question is, however, why did Blair entrust himself so staunchly to the US in its "War on Terror" and braved all the opposition he faced. One of the answers lies in "the resurgent Atlanticist identity which [was] shaping British security strategy after 9/11" as Dunne put it. Blair has always claimed that he genuinely believed in the need to commit to the United States in its moment of crisis, just as he had believed in the need for humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. Indeed, Blair's famous speech in Chicago in 1999 on the requirement to maintain a moral purpose in international relations, justified, he believed, his intervention in the war in Kosovo.[286] Nonetheless, this response does not sufficiently analyse the true motives for his support of the United States.

It is possible to put forward the point that in promising his full support to the United States, Blair may have been hoping to gain a powerful ally and maintain the 'special relationship.' He was fully aware that in the light of the events of 9/11, the international arena had suddenly and irrevocably changed, and this meant that a strong ally in the form of the US was necessary. It is also possible that he believed that the approach of other European countries such as Germany was insufficient in the face of terrorism, and he wanted to ensure that Britain was allied with America. This means that alliance with the US was a strategy that Blair pursued from the start with the intention of ensuring protection for Britain in the new world environment. Ultimately, when the events of 9/11 forced his hand and he had to make a choice, Blair chose immediately to align with the United States.[287]

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[284] J. Suri, (2009), *op. cit.*, p. 612.
[285] United States Government. ***National Strategy of the United States***.
< http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf>
[286] Oliver Daddow. (2009), *op. cit.*, p. 548.
[287] Rhiannon Vickers. ***The Labour party and the world: the evolution of Labour's foreign policy1900–1951.*** 2003, p. 12.

Blair had always sought to position himself and the United Kingdom as a bridge between Europe and the United States.[288] In fact, academic commentators have asserted that Blair "rejoiced" in his role as "interlocutor" between the United States and Europe although ultimately the truth revealed itself; "his pro-Americanism and anxiety to curb any overreaction to 9/11 fundamentally undermined Blair's much-vaunted role as a transatlantic intermediary."[289]

Academic commentators have observed that a key principle of the Bush orchestrated "war on terrorism" has been the assumption that "United States political and security interests are advanced by the spread of liberal political institutions and values abroad."[290] As he stated in a television interview in 2004, Bush was insistent in his "deep desire to spread liberty around the world as a way to help secure the United States in the long run"[291] and he had previously stated that "in Europe, as in Asia, as in every region of the world, the advance of freedom leads to peace."[292] This statement in particular is extremely non-specific, but it does provide an insight into the motivation of Bush for his actions. In another speech, he also argued that a powerful US provides a "moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe[…][the United States] will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets and free trade to every corner of the world."[293]

This was termed the "Bush Doctrine" which President Bush developed in his speeches, and which was noted by other officials in his administration in the *National Strategy of the United States* finalised in 2002.[294] This stated that the "great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom"[295] so that through the National Strategy, Bush, in 2002, compared his own doctrine and strategy in the "War on Terror" to the fight against the Nazis during the Second World War, thus evoking powerful imagery and harking back to the heroism of the Allied

[288] F. Carr. *Foreign and defence Policy*. in S. Savage and R. Atkinson eds. *Public Policy Under Blair*. 2001, p. 226.

[289] Robert Self. *British Foreign and Defence Policy Since 1945: Changes and Dilemmas in a Changing World*. 2010, p. 145.

[290] Jonathan Monten. *The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism and Democracy Promotion in United States Strategy. International Security*. 2005, p. 123.

[291] Larry King. *Live Interview with George Bush and Laura Bush*. CNN August 12th, 2004.

[292] President George Bush. *Remarks by the President at the 29th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy. White House Press Release,* November 6th, 2003.

[293] Robert Kagan. *America as Hegemon. In The National Interest*. 2003. Vol. 2, No. 29.

[294] Robert Jervis. *Why the Bush Doctrine Cannot be Sustained. Political Science Quarterly*. 2005, p. 351.

[295] United States Government. *National Strategy of the United States.*
< http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf>

powers[296], a powerful form of discourse that was intentionally designed to gain support from his own citizens and from abroad, and to justify his actions in intervening in another state.

The Bush Doctrine consisted of four basic elements, which essentially concentrated upon the idea that democracies are inherently peaceful and will not fight one another, and that democratic states will concentrate on building societies that are beneficial to not only their own interests, but also to economic prosperity, which in turn benefits the United States.[297] The second point of the National Strategy concerned the terrorist threat, which Bush linked closely with the weapons he insisted Saddam Hussein was hiding in Iraq.[298] The third element concerned the potential inadequacy of deterrence and defence, so that preventative action was necessary, and due to the lack of likelihood of gaining international approval for such actions, as was later proven, the US would have to be prepared to take action without support from other nations, none of whom would be permitted to restrict any of its actions.[299]

Bush was also extraordinarily vocal about what he termed the "Axis of Evil" in his speeches, designating North Korea, Iran and Iraq part of this group, which he called a threat to the West and democracy.[300] It was against such countries that Bush insisted that the use of pre-emptive force was necessary. Yet, both the ideas of Bush and the language that he used in his discourse have been severely criticised. Richard Falk, for example, has noted that the "ambition here is breathtaking and imperial", an indication to states that "America is the global gendarme, and that other states should devote their energies to economic and peaceful pursuits, leaving overall security in Washington's hands."[301]

Falk says that many Americans do in fact dream of such a borderless empire, but it has never been stated before in such overt terms. Whether Bush realised the imperial nature of his foreign policy plans or not, is not clear, yet, he was undoubtedly convinced of their necessity. His insistence on the placing of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea together as an "axis of evil" through the use of extremely persuasive discourse in his speeches created a new identity

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[296] United States Government. *National Strategy of the United States.*
[297] Robert Jervis. *Understanding the Bush Doctrine*. *Political Science Quarterly*. 2003, p. 266.
[298] Ibid., pp. 351.
[299] Idem.
[300] Tom Pyszcynski; Abdolhossein Abdollahi; Sheldon Solomon; Jeff Greenberg; Florette Cohen and David Weise. *Mortality, Salience, Martyrdom, and Military Might: The Great Satan Versus the Axis of Evil*. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*. 2006, p. 526.
[301] Richard Falk. *The New Bush Doctrine*. *La Rivista*. September, 2002.
<http://www.larivistadelmanifesto.it/originale/31A20020911.html>

of the enemy that he alleged was confronting the West and in particular the United States. Certainly, following 9/11, the language that Bush utilised in his public discourse became ever stronger as his rhetoric set the "limits of discursive definition, and the parameters of thought regarding the issue of terrorism."[302] One of the most important tricks that Bush used to inspire fear of the terrorist and existential threat in his public discourse was the way in which his narrative created in the minds of American citizens, and in the age of televised news, perhaps also on the sympathetic citizens and officials of other Western countries, fear of "rogue states who are dark, perverse and indomitable forces […] ineffably and potently violent and cruel that haunt and terrorise the civilised world."[303]

It is interesting to note that the "Bush doctrine" has been deployed against Afghanistan and Iraq, yet fifteen of the nineteen plane hijackers of the 9/11 attacks were nationals of Saudi Arabia, against whom the United States is far from hostile.

The Taliban emerged at a time in the history of Afghanistan when its people were, as the Afghan tribal leader Hamid Karzai, who would become the post-Taliban President of Afghanistan attested in front of the congress of the United States, "looking for a saviour" and they were supported by the majority of Afghans, who believed that they would support "peace and stability."[304] Following the collapse of the Communist government in Afghanistan in the 1990s, the *mujahedeen* fighters had not established a central government, the rule of law, or a judiciary, but instead were marauding around the country, blocking medical supplies and food.[305]

Osama Ben Laden, the Saudi billionaire who fought alongside the *Mujahedeen* in Afghanistan against the USSR in the 1980s and who was backed, financed and even trained by the CIA then, was in control of al-Qaeda that had masterminded the 9/11 bombings while being harboured by the Taliban in Afghanistan.[306] Following the September 2001 attacks, President Bush requested the Taliban to deliver Ben Laden, as he was hiding in Afghanistan,

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[302] J. Maggio. *The Presidential Rhetoric of Terror: The (Re)Creation of Reality Immediately after 9/11*. *Politics & Policy.* 2007, p. 810.
[303] Richard Devetak. *The Gothic scene of international relations: ghosts, monsters, terror and the sublime after September 11*. *Review of International Studies.* 2005, p. 621.
[304] Hamid Karzai.. *Statement: The Taliban: Engagement or Confrontation? Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate*, 106th Cong., 2d Sess., S. Hrg. 106–868. July 20, 2000.
[305] Hannibal Travis. *Freedom or Theocracy: Constitutionalism in Afghanistan and Iraq*. *Nw. Univ. J. Int'l Hum. Rts.* 2005, p. 6.
[306] Idem.

and threatened war against them and their country if they refused his demands.[307] Instead of acquiescing, the Taliban declared that they would be willing to give up Ben Laden if the United States provided proof of his responsibility for the attacks, but the US refused stating that it was willing to provide this evidence only to its "key allies"[308] and so despite these threats, the Taliban refused to hand Ben Laden over.[309] As the situation did not progress, and the Taliban were intractable in their refusal to give Ben Laden up, on October 7th 2001, the United States initiated aerial bombardment of targets that it had identified as hives of Al-Qaeda activity in Afghanistan, whilst special forces units on ground level provided intelligence, thus destroying a great deal of Taliban infrastructure and greatly weakening the regime.[310] The United Kingdom partnered with the United States in the invasion named *Operation Enduring Freedom*, from the first day. This war had the support of NATO, and the operation did not end until 28th December 2014 when full security responsibility for the country was formally transferred to the Afghan government.[311] The participation of the United Kingdom in this conflict was key to cementing the 'special relationship' with America, as it separated itself from the other partaking European allies in the mission as the second largest contributor after the US itself to the military spending on the mission.[312]

The invasion of Afghanistan was performed with the agreement of international western organisations such as NATO. Whilst the scope of this paper does not make it possible to delve into the details of the international legal arguments that preceded the invasion, it suffices to note that of all the legal arguments available, such as humanitarian intervention, intervention by invitation from the Northern Alliance, the United States chose to use the legal justification of self-defence.[313] This is, as Byers notes, a legal area that is "particularly contentious and difficult to analyse."[314] Article 51 of the United Nations Charter does provide a right for nations to use self-defence for a threat against them, and is a key concept of customary international law.[315] Whilst Article 2 (4) of the United Nations

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[307] Hannibal Travis, (2005), *op. cit*., p. 6.
[308] *Taliban Repeats Call for Negotiations. CNN.com*. October 2nd, 2001.
<http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/10/02/ret.afghan.taliban>
[309] Idem.
[310] Yvonne Abraham. *UN Backs Reports of Mass Execution*. *Boston Globe*. November 14th, 2001, p. A 33.
[311] Sune Engel Rasmussen. *NATO ends combat operations in Afghanistan. The Guardian*. 28th December 2014
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/28/nato-ends-afghanistan-combat-operations-after-13-years>
[312] John Dumbrell. *The US-UK special relationship: taking the 21st Century temperature*. *British Journal of Politics and International relations.* 2009, p. 69.
[313] Michael Byers. *Terrorism, the use of force and international law after 11 September*. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly.* 2002, p. 404.
[314] Idem.
[315] Ian Brownlie. *International Law and the Use of Force by States.* 1963, p. 232.

Charter[316] prohibits threats or the use of military force against the political independence and territorial integrity of a state, there is the option of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter, although it is not defined.[317] Even though the invasion of Afghanistan was not specifically approved by the United Nations, it was nevertheless viewed as legitimate self-defence under Article 51, and the British contingent of the military operation in Afghanistan was specifically approved by the United Nations.[318]

The problem with the use of Article 51 and the justification of self-defence is that acting against both proven and suspected terrorists does not fall under the category of acting against a sovereign nation. But despite the intricacies and complexities of the legal arguments regarding military action against Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq was significantly more complicated.

It is worth noting that in 2007, the British government renounced the use of the term "War on Terror", stating that they had not found it to be particularly helpful.[319] It is also interesting to note that in 2011, the former head of the British intelligence service MI5 stated that she "never felt it helpful to refer to a war on terror" as she was of the opinion that the 9/11 attacks were a "crime, not an act of war".[320] Thus, whilst Bush and Blair were conspiring to take their countries to war on the grounds that the 9/11 attacks had been a provocative act of war, the British head of intelligence's own opinion conflicted with this theory.

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[316] United Nations Charter Article 2(4)
[317] United Nations Charter Article 51
[318] Ben Smith Ben and Arabella Thorp. *The Legal basis for the invasion of Afghanistan. House of Commons Library, International Affairs and Defence Section.* 24th February 2010, p. 10.
[319] Paul Reynolds. *Declining use of 'war on terror'. BBC.* 17th April, 2007.
[320] Richard Norton-Taylor. *MI5 former chief decries 'war on terror'. The Guardian.* 2nd September, 2011.

3 - BLAIR AND BUSH: A CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP

The 'special relationship' that had fluctuated greatly in strength and intensity over the years, was thoroughly revitalised by the meeting of George W. Bush and Tony Blair following the 9/11 attacks. Although there were differences between the two men, they found great similarities in each other, most notably in their approach to foreign policy and in pursuing what they personally viewed as the defence of the West. Rarely have a US president and a British PM worked so closely in pursuit of common foreign policy objectives as Bush and Blair did after 9/11 which had a strong "galvanizing effect"[321] on their relationship.

As discussed in the first chapter, the future did not look bright between the newly elected American president and the British PM in early 2001 and "few observers on either side of the Atlantic anticipated as close a relationship between Bush and Blair as between Blair and Clinton."[322] Indeed, prior to 9/11, the relationship between the two leaders "was cordial and correct, but hardly as warm as the Blair-Clinton bond had been."[323] Moreover, the two countries had, as stated earlier, disagreements over all the issues that were atop the UK-US agenda then.

Outwardly, Blair and Bush appear to be totally different to each other. While Bush is "a conservative Texan who speaks inelegant English"; Blair is "an eloquent speaker who promoted the 'third way'" with his friend former president Bill Clinton.[324] But, "personality traits, religious conviction, personal understanding of the logic of global power, the obligations of the Special Relationship, British interests: all these forces conspired [eventually] to push Blair in the direction of the Bush administration"[325] particularly so after 9/11 when the two men were "brought together by the drama and shared purpose."[326]

Although Blair and New Labour are much more "obviously ideological twins of Clinton and the New Democrats" than of Bush and the neo-conservatives, and in addition to persuasive foreign policy reasons for staying close to the Bush administration, there was in Blair's personality one important aspect "more akin to Bush's than to Clinton's": it was his

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[321] Jeffrey D. McCausland and Douglas Stuart eds., (2006), *op. cit*., p. 8-9.
[322] Jane Sharp, (2004), *op. cit.*
[323] Idem.
[324] Glenn Kessler, (2006), *op. cit*.
[325]John Dumbrell. *Reflections on the Contemporary US-UK Special Relationship: Structure and Agency in Anglo-American Relations*. 2007.
[326]Lloyd C Gardner. *'Damned High Wire' On the Special Relationship that Unites Bush and Blair in Iraq*. Rutgers University. 2005.

"missionary zeal."[327] Hence, the two men went on to form an unlikely friendship, which some attributed to their shared Christian faith.[328]

According to Dumbrell who cites Will Hutton, Blair "believes in the West of the Christian Enlightenment. Any global initiative, whether it's action against climate change or the fight against terror, requires the West to stand collectively together, even when the US is wrong."[329] Blair even described the background to the 2003 invasion of Iraq decision in religious terms: "Well, I think if you have faith about these things then you realise that judgement is made by other people" adding that "If you believe in God it (the judgement) is made by God as well"[330]. For Dumbrell, Blair's religious conviction is "derived from an Anglo-Catholic muscular, Christian reforming outlook" and he shared the moral certainty and some of the policy implications of American neo-conservatism.[331]

On the other hand, Bush is considered one of the most openly religious presidents in US history. A daily Bible reader, he often talks about how Jesus changed his heart and he even spoke, publicly and privately, of hearing God's call to run for the presidency and of praying for God's help since he came into office. Moreover, he has said many times that he is a Christian, believes in the power of prayer and considers himself a "lowly sinner."[332]

It has been noted that "evangelical sentiments" and overtures were necessary from the start of the relationship between Bush and Blair; Svendsen asserts that these overtures were necessary in light of the overt political differences between the two men and the controversy over the 2000 elections in the United States that brought Bush to power.[333] Svendsen even asserts that Blair sought to quickly establish a close working relationship with Bush, because of, rather than in spite of, their surface political differences.[334] This is due to the fact that following the election of Bush in 2000, Blair and his entourage may have originally felt that there would be little common ground between the two men because of the differences in their political beliefs.

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[327] Anthony Seldon and Dennis Kavanagh. ***The Blair Effect 2001-5.*** 2005.
[328] Jon Lunn, Vaughne Miller and Ben Smith, (2008), *op. cit.*
[329] John Dumbrell, (2007), *op. cit.*
[330] Idem.
[331] Idem.
[332] Alan Cooperman. ***Openly Religious, to a Point, Bush Leaves the Specifics of His Faith to Speculation***. *Washington Post*. Thursday, September 16, 2004.
[333] D. M. Svendsen. ***Exemplary 'friends and allies'? Unpacking UK–US relations in the early twenty-first century***. *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*. 2011, p. 342.
[334] Idem.

A common characteristic of the post 9/11 relationship that developed between the two leaders was religion. Both men were religious in their own way, and for Blair, Christianity was a fundamental part of his identity, with it shaping his moral code and his political beliefs. His biographer, John Rentoul, states that Blair's "contemplative Christianity ran deeper and was more established earlier than I realized"[335] whilst another biographer has commented that Blair's Christianity "explains why he became the person he did, why he holds his beliefs, how he relates to others, and from where he derives much of his inner strength and convictions."[336] British society is quite secular, which means that whilst Blair never flaunted his Christian beliefs, the fact that it is known to have shaped his political beliefs and style does make him stand out as a politician and Prime Minister. It is not surprising therefore that Blair's faith may have been instrumental in the choice he made to take his country to war, despite the numerous protests he faced. When considering the importance of religion in Blair's life and in the shaping of his government policies, however, it is important to remember that although faith is not supposed to play a major part in politics in the United Kingdom where any hint of religion influencing politics is more frowned upon than in the United States, Blair's faith still played an important role in guiding him in his decisions.[337] This inclination is something that he is known to have discussed with President Bush in 2001 during their first meeting at Camp David, when they discussed religion, their beliefs in a monotheistic god, as well as the issue at hand, which was the potential for solutions in the Middle East.[338]

Although on leaving office, Blair converted to Catholicism, the religion of his wife Cherie, he was for many years a member of the Christian Socialist Movement, and he verified on several occasions his strong belief in the importance of values that are relevant to politics and to Britain as a nation.[339] However, as noted, the influence of religion on politics is discouraged in Britain, and it has been noted that on several occasions members of Blair's team found themselves obliged to step in to prevent him from revealing his religious inclinations to the nation. One example is how in an interview with the upmarket magazine *Vanity Fair*, Alastair Campbell, who was Blair's director of strategy and communication, found it necessary to step in when the discussion turned to the influence of religion on Blair's

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[335] John Rentoul. *Tony Blair: Prime Minister*. 2001, p. x.

[336] Anthony Seldon. *Blair*. 2005, p. 515.

[337] Ibid., pp. 516.

[338] Alastair Campbell. *The Blair Years*: *The Alastair Campbell Diaries*. 2007, p. 507.

[339] Tony Blair's Speech to the Christian Socialist Movement at Westminster Central Hall, 29 March 2001. <http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20040315011120/http://pm.gov.uk/output/Page3243.asp>

politics, stating "We don't do God. I'm sorry. We don't do God."[340] The executive editor of *The Guardian* newspaper, Kamal Ahmed, noted in 2003 that Blair was aware that a number of his main officials "feel uncomfortable about the central role that God plays in his life"[341] making it clear that Blair was aware of the mistrust of religion in Britain and the possibility of a Prime Minister looking to God for guidance; yet he continued to do so.

It may be argued that in the period that followed 9/11 and leading up to the military campaign against Iraq, each man followed his beliefs in formulating foreign policy. As will be discussed in the following chapter, Blair faced great opposition from other Members of Parliament and huge protests from his own citizens opposing taking the United Kingdom to war against Iraq; people were not at all convinced of the justification for the war. Blair argued the case for war, stating that "the moral case against war has a moral answer: it is the moral case for removing Saddam [. . .] it is the reason, frankly, why if we do have to act, we should do so with a clear conscience."[342] It is also possible that it was not only Blair's sense of conscience, but also of obligation, due to his strongly Christian ethics and beliefs, that led him to support the United States so strongly after 9/11.[343]

Whilst some argue that Blair's Christianity influenced his politics in terms of making him empathic to the suffering of others, and influenced him in the direction of socialism, which he viewed as the political ideology that most closely embodied the values of Christianity; the Christianity of Bush might be stated in contrast to have been closer to a more evangelical style of Christianity. This inclination was demonstrated in several speeches that Bush made, notably in the 20th September speech of 2001 to the US Congress. In this speech, he announced the initiation of the "War on Terrorism" and he rallied the nation to the cause. The language that he used was extremely religious in nature; it has even been compared to the rhetoric used by the Puritan Christians in which later generations of Puritans were brought into the church, and Bush entreated younger generation Americans to uphold the national covenant.[344]

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[340] Colin Brown. ***Campbell interrupted Blair as he spoke of his faith: 'We don't do God'***. *Telegraph*, 5th March 2003.
 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1429109/Campbell-interrupted-Blair-as-he-spoke-of-his-faith-We-dont-do-God.html >
[341] Kamal Ahmed. ***And on the seventh day Tony Blair created . . .*** *The Observer*, 3rd August 2003.
<http://observer.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,4725586-102279,00.html>
[342] David Gordon. ***Iraq, War and Morality***. *Economic and Political Weekly*. 2003, p. 1117.
[343] James Naughtie. ***The Accidental American: Tony Blair and the Presidency.*** 2004, p. 231.
[344] Denise M. Bostdorff. ***George W. Bush's post-September 11 rhetoric of covenant renewal: upholding the faith of the greatest generation***. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*. 2003, p. 294.

It has been noted that domestic politics often influence a government's foreign strategy,[345] so it would not be unreasonable to assert that the Christian beliefs of Bush also guided him in his determination to invade Iraq. It is necessary in reference to this to consider the close relationship of many members of the Bush administration with neoconservative politicians and thinkers and with religious conservatives.[346] As Kougentakis states, the worldview and the personal ethics that a leader holds provide clues as to his influences and of the style in which he is likely to govern, and given the military and political power of the United States abroad, it is crucial to consider the ways in which Bush was influenced by his religious beliefs.[347] Bush himself announced his Christian beliefs and the fundamental role that Christianity played in his life, stating that the principles on which he made decisions are "a part of me."[348] Particularly in a time of political crisis, the beliefs of leaders such as Bush become even more important, and given the history between Christians and Muslims, as regards the Crusades in the Middle Ages, in which marauding groups of knights crossed the Middle East, raping and pillaging in the name of Christianity, and which "left a powerful legacy of mistrust in the Arab world and throughout the Muslim world"[349] and the fact that the 9/11 attacks had been committed in the name of the Islamic religion, it became a significant factor.

Furthermore, the connection between neoconservative ideology and American Christian evangelisms is close. This is to do partly with the nature of this strand of Christianity itself, partly to do with the type of people who are sympathetic to the Republican Party in the United States, but also greatly connected to the fact that the Church was always extremely hostile towards Communism, an antipathy which became extremely pronounced throughout the Cold War.[350] Indeed, during the Vietnam War, in which the United States fought against the Vietcong, the Vietnamese Communist Party, the American National Association of Evangelicals made a statement in which they objected to "any action by our government that would weaken the security of the non-communist nations of the world"[351] and advised the US Government to remain resolute. Bush also used the traditional and deeply

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[345] A. Kougentakis. *How the Influence of Religion Makes the Foreign Policy of the Bush Administration Revolutionary, and How This Has Affected Our Relations with European Allies.* *CUREJ*. 2007, p. 66.
[346] Idem.
[347] Idem.
[348] *George W. Bush on Faith.* Third Presidential Debate, October 13, 2004.
<http://www.beliefnet.com/story/149/story_14930_1.html>
[349] Hugh Goddard. *A History of Christian-Muslim relations.* 2000, p. 91.
[350] A. Kougentakis, (2007), *op. cit.*, p.7
[351] Ronald J. Sider and Diane Knippas. *Toward an Evangelical Public Policy political strategies for the health of the nation.* 2005, p. 46.

entrenched idea of the United States as "God's chosen nation" in conjunction with the closely related notion of the "manifest destiny" of the country, which was an idea that gained a foothold during the nineteenth century and which has enjoyed support amongst certain Christian groups, notably the Evangelicals and the Protestants, ever since.[352]

This religious view has become entwined with the political beliefs of neo conservatives, as an article written in the 1990s demonstrate, stating that the foreign strategy of the United States "should be informed with a clear moral purpose, based on the understanding that its moral goals and its fundamental national interests are almost always in harmony."[353] Whilst the issue of the extent to which neoconservative and Christian evangelical principles are linked could be debated, during the period that Bush governed the US, this was the situation. Whilst Ikenberry, a renowned scholar of international politics and relations, notes that "a set of hard-line, fundamentalist ideas have taken Washington by storm and provided the intellectual rationale for a radical post-11 September reorientation of American foreign policy",[354] it was actually Chancellor Schroeder of Germany who made the connection between neoconservative foreign policy and Christian evangelisms, and who described his dislike of it. He stated that in his conversations with Bush, the President had "constantly made clear just how much this president considered himself 'God-fearing' and indeed saw God as his ultimate authority […] the problem begins when the impression is created that political decisions are a result of this conversation with God."[355]

The strong Christian nature of the Bush administration was also demonstrated in the Cabinet meetings where prayers were recited and the huge increase of Christian supporters who appreciated an openly Christian president.[356] The impact that this personal evangelism had on the foreign policy of Bush was evident in his speeches, in which he used overtly simplistic vocabulary, even talking of the fact that his administration "has a job to do and we're going to do it. We will rid the world of the evil-doers."[357]

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[352] A. Kougentakis, (2007), *op. cit*., p. 10.
[353] Idem.
[354] John Ikenberry. ***The End of the Neoconservative Moment***. *Survival.* 2004, Abstract.
[355] Gerhard Schroeder. ***Schroder on US President Bush: 'Almost Biblical Semantics'***. *Spiegel Online International*, 25th October, 2006 <http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,444751,00.html>
[356] A. Kougentakis, (2007), *op. cit*., p. 11
[357] Mabuel Perez-Rivas. ***Bush vows to rid the world of 'evil-doers'***. CNN.com. 16th September, 2001.
< http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/16/gen.bush.terrorism/>

In contrast to Bush, the personal religiosity of Blair did not bring him supporters, and, as has been noted, Blair was advised by his personal consultants against, and restricted by his own ministers from, discussing the subject with journalists. While this attests to the difference between the way that religion and in particular the religion of government leaders is regarded in the United Kingdom and the United States, it also highlights the fact that whilst a large proportion of the American public may have been content to accept that the President was guided by Christian beliefs in forming his strategy for foreign policy, the British public were significantly more sceptical. Indeed, it has been noted that the intense Christianity of Blair was noticeable in British politics, which is mainly secular, and where one commentator has noted that "the only circumstances in which religion would be likely to become an important national issue would be if a leading figure appeared too devout."[358] Blair himself has acknowledged the importance of Christianity in his life and politics stating that Christianity "helped to inspire my rejection of Marxism."[359]

It is probable that in embarking on military action against Iraq, and in supporting the United States, Blair felt that he was fulfilling his duty as a Christian. Harata asserts that the "clear proactive principle" of Blair in foreign policy indicated his "characteristic 'messianic' resolve."[360] When discussing the fact that Bush and Blair shared a strong belief in Christianity in common, it is at the same time necessary to note the differences between how the two men were guided by this religiosity. Notably, it has been observed that the Christianity of Blair was founded upon the values of justice from tyranny, and "international idealism", which was actually quite dissimilar to the Christianity that was personal to Bush, who was right wing and religiously conservative.[361] Harata also observes that in his dealings with President Clinton, for example, Blair was the one who was pressing for intervention in conflicts on a moral basis, which he asserts undermines the claims that Blair was the "poodle" of Bush.[362] Yet, this is not necessarily true, all relationship dynamics are different and Bush might have been more overbearing than Clinton; with Blair being more readily inclined to bend to his will. On the other hand, their interests may simply have aligned, as was most probably the case. In light of the plethora of articles, academic views, numerous original

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[358] James Naughtie, (2004), *op. cit.*, p. 111.
[359] John Rentoul, (2013), *op. cit.*, p. 25.
[360] K. Harata. ***The Christian Politics of Tony Blair: Faith and Values in the Modern World***. *Journal of political science and sociology*. 2013, p. 49.
[361] Idem.
[362] Idem.

sources, newspaper reports from the key periods, and an assertion of revisionist theory of the conflict, it is difficult to discern the truth.

As the Labour Prime Minister, Blair was the representative of an ideology that proposes certain values, which it describes as "social justice, strong community and strong values, reward for hard work, decency, and rights matched by responsibilities."[363] What's more, traditionally, Labour has represented the working class.[364] In contrast, George W. Bush was the President from the Republican Party, which is based on the American version of conservatism.[365] While the Labour Party of the United Kingdom, which is composed of people who, whilst they have views that range across the political spectrum from socialism to at least a rudimentary belief in the provision of social welfare, the Republican Party ideology is based firmly on the belief in free market capitalism, the opposition of regulation of labour and even labour unions, as well as social policies that may be deemed rather conservative, which have included "free market Capitalism, Christian morality, and the struggle against Communism."[366]

Therefore, whilst politics is constantly changing in response to economic and social factors, in addition to the ever changing shifts of political alliances, it is possible to state that originally, Bush and Blair came from different ends of the political spectrum. One a Labour British Prime Minister with a belief in social welfare and community, the other an American Republican President with a belief in Christian values, conservative social and economic policies, and the requirement for trade and the economy to be free of all government involvement, regardless of the negative impacts such a policy may have on citizens.

It may hence be regarded as rather surprising that such a friendly relationship developed between the two men. It is necessary to understand however, that in addition to the two men finding factors in common, other issues such as the change of the Labour Party itself under Blair also contributed hugely to the understanding between them. It is notable that prior to the election of Blair in 1997, the Labour Party had been riven with division, with some members aiming at a return to the more old fashioned, traditional socialism on which the party was originally founded, whilst other party members realised the need to appeal to a

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[363] Labour Party, United Kingdom, About Us. < http://www.labour.org.uk/pages/what-is-the-labour-party>
[364] Stephen Driver. *Understanding British Party Politics*. 2011, p. 99.
[365] Ellen Grigsby. *Analysing Politics: An Introduction to Political Science*. 2008, p. 106.
[366] Paul Gottfried. *Conservatism in America: Making Sense of the American Right*. 2009, p. 9.

significantly larger and broader section of society in order to gain power in Parliament as well as the need to respond to social, economic and geo-political changes such as globalisation. As Driver put it, under Blair, the philosophy on which Labour was founded developed, and "with political memories of the 1970s still reasonably fresh, Labour had to send a signal to voters that a Labour administration would not make the same mistakes as past Labour governments, especially in terms of management of the economy."[367]

Nevertheless, it can be argued that rather than being opposites in terms of their politics, Bush and Blair actually strongly influenced and encouraged one another. The subject of neo-conservatism arouses debate, with some scholars rejecting the idea that it influenced either Blair or Bush, whilst others have cited neo-conservative ideology as the driving force behind the foreign policy actions of the two leaders. Neo conservatism is an ideology that is an extension of conservatism, which began to be practiced in government in the 1970s and 1980s, when it is noted that the welfare state first began to be severely criticised in the United States and this was given "new impetus by intellectuals of the neoconservative movement who now had a conservative administration in power to put their ideology into effect."[368]

Definitions of neo-conservatism abound, but it is explained in simple terms as a political ideology that arose in the 1970s as a response to the anti-materialist values of the preceding decades.[369] It has also been defined as supporting the free market in domestic politics, but recognises the need for a welfare state at the same time.[370] Neocon is deeply influenced and shaped by the ideas of the Jewish German-born American Leo Strauss (1899-1973)[371] and neo-conservatism has even been called a "Jewish intellectual and political movement."[372] The controversial part of neo-conservatism is the ideology's insistence on intervention abroad. As Professor C. Bradley Thompson puts it, neocons pursue "a muscular foreign policy—one that includes military intervention abroad, war, regime change, and imperial governance" that will keep America "perpetually involved in nation-building around the world" creating "a condition of permanent war, a policy of benevolent hegemony, and the

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[367] Stephen Driver. *Understanding British Party Politics*. 2011, p. 99.

[368] David Stoesz. *A Wake for the Welfare State: Social Welfare and the Neoconservative Challenge*. *Social Service Review*. 1981, p. 398.

[369] M. Minkenberg. *The New Right in Germany*. *European Journal of Political Research*. 1992, p.55.

[370] Ben Rawlence. *Tony Blair is the original neocon*. *The Guardian* 23rd October, 2004
<www.theguardian.com/politics/2004/oct/23/foreignpolicy.iraq>

[371] Encyclopaedia Britannica, *Leo Strauss American political philosopher*
< http://www.britannica.com/biography/Leo-Strauss >

[372] Kevin MacDonald. *Neoconservatism as a Jewish Movement*. 2010
<http://www.npiamerica.org/research/category/neoconservatism-as-a-jewish-movement>

creation of a republican empire". Arguing that the neo-conservatives share some common features with fascism, he continues that neocons are "preparing [America] philosophically for a soft, American-style fascism—a fascism purged of its ugliest features and gussied up for an American audience."[373]

It has also been argued that "democracies don't fight one another, and that if powerful nations can increase the democratic number of regimes in the world, they should."[374] In this sense, it may well be said that Blair was a neoconservative in the most typical sense of the word, bearing in mind his past interventions in conflicts such as Kosovo.

Whilst it is easy to become caught up in the arguments of the extent to which Blair was influenced by Bush, or whether Blair influenced Bush, the facts remain that following 9/11, both leaders developed a close relationship as Blair offered the United States President his unconditional support. Sampson explains that in addition to the fact that both men were "self-disciplined and religious", the relationship was eased by British ambassador to Washington, Sir Christopher Meyer, "an agile and media-friendly diplomat" and Blair's foreign policy adviser, David Manning, a former ambassador to Israel who was "a trusted friend" of Bush's national security adviser Condoleeza Rice.[375]

Blair's views were shaped through his own experience and his own philosophy of the world and the threats that the United Kingdom faced, however close he may have been in his ideas to Bush. In contrast to Bush, and his aims for a pseudo-imperialist dominance of world affairs by the United States using armed forces, it has been argued that it was actually the theory of a world community that was central to Blair's beliefs, as opposed to Thatcherite individualism, which had insisted that society as a community did not exist.[376] Blair talked incessantly of the "third way", which was neither socialism nor the individualism of Thatcher. In January 1998, Bair gave a speech to the European leaders at the Hague, in which he outlined his intentions to distance Britain from the remnants of Thatcherism, which he intended to achieve through a:

[373] C. Bradley Thompson. *Neoconservatism Unmasked.* 2011
< http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/03/07/c-bradley-thompson/neoconservatism-unmasked>
[374] Ben Rawlence, (2004), *op. cit*.
[375] Anthony Sampson. *Who Runs This Place? The Anatomy of Britain In the 21st Century*. 2005, p. 142.
[376] Jason Ralph, (2005), *op. cit*.

> […]third way, between unbridled individualism and laissez-faire on the one hand: and old-style government intervention – the corporation of the 1960's social democracy – on the other[…] we don't want to live in a society without rules, without compassion, without justice, without any sense of obligation to our fellow citizens. I want the politics of Britain [. . .] to be based on solidarity, on the common good.[377]

Ralph notes that such concepts are extremely difficult to translate into foreign policy, particularly in an era as fraught as that following the attacks of 9/11, and also in the international environment, where the personal interests of countries are considered all-encompassing, to the exclusion of any real possibility of cooperation between states.[378] With this in mind, despite the close relationship of Bush and Blair, their cooperation and their joint aims, it certainly appears that they approached these aims from two very different perspectives. Blair focused on the vision of an international community, whilst Bush was concerned with projecting American dominance and ensuring that it maintained its powerful position in the international arena. In 1999, Blair made his famous speech in Chicago, delineating his vision for the interaction of the UK and the US with the rest of the world. During the campaign in Kosovo, Blair had inserted an "ethical dimension" into British foreign policy[379] and he elaborated on the "doctrine of international community" in Chicago in 1999. In this speech, Blair made a clear statement of his belief in the moral purpose of foreign policy, and he made an emotional appeal to his listeners on the need for intervention, drawing a vivid picture of the horrors that were happening, describing the "awful crimes[…] ethnic cleansing, systematic rape, mass murder."[380] He talked about the intervention being justified and the fact that NATO military intervention in Kosovo was a "just war."[381]

It has been argued that Blair truly believed in his definitions of the international community in his speech in Chicago, but he also acted with George Bush out of a shared fear of terrorism, rather than from an arrogant belief in the power of Britain to make systematic changes in the governance structures of other countries.[382] The rhetoric employed by Blair

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[377] Tony Blair. ***Change: A Modern Britain in a Modern Europe***. Speech given at Church of En in the Ridderzaal, The Hague Netherlands, January 20, 1998
<http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20040315011120/http://pm.gov.uk/output/Page1150.asp>
[378] Jason Ralph, (2005), *op. cit*.
[379] Idem.
[380] Tony Blair. ***"The Blair Doctrine" Chicago Speech***, 1999 *PBS New Hour*.
<http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international-jan-june99-blair_doctrine4-23/>
[381] Idem.
[382] Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and Rhiannon Vickers. ***Blowback for Britain? Blair, Bush, and the war in Iraq***. *Review of International Studies*. 2007, p. 205.

reiterated that the UK would stand by the US as a staunch ally, but also as a power that owed duty to the international community. Nonetheless, inherent in his speech was the implication that the United States shared his vision and would help him in achieving it.[383] In October 2001, the speech of Blair at the Labour Party Conference aimed to reassure certain sections of Labour that had been mistrustful of the foreign policy intentions of the US government as regards the way in which it was likely to respond to the 9/11 attacks. Blair assured the delegates at the conference that the United Sates intended to work with the international community against terrorism, with the aim of achieving a progressive environment in the international arena.[384] Blair is a convincing orator; his presentation has been described as carefully delivered, emotional, and extremely persuasive.

Nevertheless, in light of what is known about the intentions of Bush and Blair regarding Iraq, it is notable in his rhetoric that after 9/11, Blair's concentration on the threats of the "forces of evil" grew more emphatic. Naughtie has noticed the change that occurred in Blair following the 9/11 attacks, stating that it is "often possible to detect in Blair a moment when he changes gear. The language becomes fiercer and imbued with the feeling of a personal crusade."[385] This change in Blair was demonstrated through his language at the press conference the day after 9/11, when he asserted that there now existed a need on the part of the international community to take decisive action against those responsible for the attack and against those harbouring them; stating his certainty of the malice behind the event, and the need for America to act against the "new menace that there is that threatens our world" and the new responsibility of the international community "as well as responding to this particular atrocity, considers the nature of these groups, how they are financed, how they operate and how we defeat them."[386]

Studies have proved numerous times that the people who control the media are also able to mould public opinion, particularly if people lack access to different media sources and are willing to accept the version of events that is handed to them by the elites.[387]As such, it is unsurprising that Bush and his administration were able to so effectively gain the support of

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[383] Jason Ralph, (2005), *op. cit.*, p. 12.
[384] Tony Blair Labour Party Conference Speech
[385] James Naughtie, (2004), *op. cit.*, p. 21.
[386] Blair's Statement including Questions and Answers, 12 September 2001.
< http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1597>
[387] Thomas Nelson and Zoe Oxley. *Issue framing effects on belief importance and opinion*. *Journal of Politics*. 1999, p. 1045.

the American people for the invasion of Iraq. Examples of the way that Bush used language to create a link between 9/11 and Iraq included a hypothetical situation he posed to listeners on the radio in March 2003, in which the terrorists of 9/11 might have been provided with WMD by the government of Iraq, and he asked his listeners to consider how such a situation might have played out, before asking them to consider the possibilities of such a thing occurring in the future. He stated, "we will not wait to see what terrorists or terror states could do" with the supposedly destructive new weapons of mass destruction.[388]

The speeches of both Blair and Bush in the period following 9/11 and before the invasion of Iraq consistently referred to the threat to the system of democracy and the Western way of life. However, whilst with his rhetoric Bush drew a vision of a threat to the typically American values of freedom and patriotism, he also drew on the popular sport of basketball to draw support from American citizens, in order to invoke "compassion, pugnacity, and sporting masculinities"[389] thus invoking a popular concept in his speeches in an attempt to appeal to the common masses; an attempt which, given the level of popular support for the invasion of Iraq in the United States, appeared to have worked as intended. In contrast, the rhetoric of Blair may be considered to have been rather more intellectual in both tone and scope, as he focused on the concept of an international community.[390]

Returning to the subject of the media, the Blair government was one in which public relations predominated; Blair even had his own press chief in the form of Alastair Campbell. In addition to the other qualities that made him so successful and which enabled his rise to power, Blair also understood the necessity of making powerful connections, and he appears to have foreseen the necessity of making friends with powerful figures in the media. As Chenoweth observes, foresight is necessary in the media, where new technologies abound and "virtual" appearances are of primary importance.[391] The rise of the media mastermind Rupert Murdoch and his massive control of the media was therefore a matter of great importance to Blair and the two men cultivated their relationship.

An Australian American who had acquired huge media corporations such as Twentieth Century Fox in the 1980s, Murdoch is known to have supported Margaret

[388] Louis Klarevas. *The 'essential domino' of military operations: American public opinion and the use of force*. International Studies Perspectives. 2002, p. 418.
[389] Johnson. *Defending Ways of Life: The (Anti-) Terrorist Rhetorics of Bush and Blair*. Theory, Culture & Society. 2002, p. 211.
[390] Johnson, (2002), *op. cit*., p. 211.
[391] Neil Chenoweth. *Virtual Murdoch: Reality Wars on the Information Superhighway*. 2001, p. 337.

Thatcher.[392] Blair made his support of Murdoch public in 1995 at an entertainment economy conference[393] and he also supported him in his efforts to create the media group BskyB and insistence that Britain should refuse to join the monetary union of the European Union.[394] As it has been stated, Murdoch has enjoyed possessing a huge power on the politics of the United Kingdom, and on manipulating it through the media, and indeed, the "Murdoch effect has rippled from country to country around the globe."[395] Furthermore, Murdoch is something of a chameleon. In Britain, he succeeded by understanding the social structure and class system while in the United States he was successful through the manipulation of popular culture and the exploitation of popular sentiments.[396] Blair and Murdoch became close friends to the extent that they were godfathers to one another's children. Furthermore, it has been alleged that Murdoch "pushed Blair hard to back George Bush in invading Iraq."[397]

Murdoch's media conglomerate has been described as the "only real media company that covers the world" and it has been noted that its characteristics include an "almost frenzied fetishisation of the value of 'entertainment'" as applied to news, in addition, it is inherent in the media that the company broadcasts an "expression of open support for the current paradigm of ruling elite hegemony, neo-liberalism."[398] Neo-conservatism, as described earlier, as an ideology that is generally considered to be the economic and political ethos that capitalism and the resulting economic prosperity brings democracy and thus peaceful relations between countries, is closely related to, yet at the same time distinct from, neo-liberalism. It is difficult to define, but it has been described as a strong belief in free trade that has over the past few decades come to dominate the senior thinking of international economists.[399] Neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism are in many respects similar and they do overlap. Whilst the discussion of globalised economics is beyond the scope of this paper, it suffices to say that both ideologies have been severely criticised as devaluing the notions of the law, political equality and liberty, and instead favouring the power of the state and

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[392] Neil Chenoweth, (2001), *op. cit.*, p. 62.
[393] Ibid., pp.273.
[394] Ibid., pp.277.
[395] Ibid., pp.295.
[396] Ibid., pp.20.
[397] Michael White. ***Tony Blair and Rupert Murdoch: the deconstruction of a friendship***. The Guardian. 14th February, 2014. <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/feb/14/tony-blair-rupert-murdoch-deconstruction-friendship-wendi-deng>
[398] Dennis Broe. ***Global Commodification and the New Cold War***. *Cinema Journal*. 2004, p. 97.
[399] Alfredo Saad-Filho and Deborah Johnston. ***Neoliberalism: a critical reader***. 2005, p. 99.

capitalist values of market economics and profits.[400] Broe asserts that Murdoch and his global media corporation, which operates channels in several countries, including, most relevantly to this paper, the UK and the US, is typically neoliberal in his business practices and media control and the way in which the rhetoric of his news channels endorses the "formal trappings of democracy", but at the same time massively contributes to global warfare. [401]

Therefore, Murdoch, as a close friend of Blair and foremost owner of a great many media stations, was in a prime position in which to control the way the news was broadcast and presented and to justify the case for war. Murdoch also had a similar power in America as he did in Britain, for, whilst he was not a close friend of Bush, he was nevertheless the owner of several media stations, most notably Fox News, one of the most watched news stations in the United States, from which he was able to aid the "neoconservative mandarins" in gaining influence in the nations, as well as to present the story relating to the alleged hidden weaponry in Iraq and to persuade citizens to support the war and Bush and Blair, based on his own "ideological proclivities."[402] As the war progressed, public relations and indeed propaganda came to characterise it, as the government "framed the issues, story line, and slogans to serve its purposes."[403] Another relevant point is that it is now generally accepted that Bush and Blair knowingly misled the public into supporting the war on Iraq, and by failing to properly question the evidence that they were provided with, the mainstream media failed in both its role and purpose, and by doing so they actively aided in the deception of citizens.[404]

The Bush administration consistently used rhetoric, which the media faithfully reported and in doing so it advanced the agenda of the government. Academic commentators have profusely criticised the media in this respect, arguing that Bush and Blair were not impeded in their march to war by the media as they ought to have been, due to the coverage, the perspectives presented, the angle that the mainstream media took in support of the neoliberal ideology and actions of Bush and Blair in both Britain and America, and the total

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[400] Wendy Brown. *American Nightmare: Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism, and De-Democratization. Political Theory*. 2006, p. 691.
[401] Dennis Broe, (2004), *op. cit.*, p. 98.
[402] Hobbs, M. *Neo-conned: The Murdoch press and the Iraq War*. *International Journal of Media & Cultural Politics*. 2010. 1 September 2010, p. 201.
[403] Ray Eldon Hiebert. *Public relations and propaganda in framing the Iraq war: a preliminary review*. *Public Relations Review*. 2003, p. 243.
[404] Kumar, Deepa. *Media, War, and Propaganda: Strategies of Information Management During the 2003 Iraq War*. *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies*. 2006, p. 49.

failure to question the action, the ideology behind it, and the false evidence that was presented as justification for war.[405]

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[405] Danny Hayes, Danny and Matt Guardino. *Whose Views Made the News? Media Coverage and the March to War in Iraq. Political Communication.* 2010, p.59.

4 - THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP: THE REVIVAL

In *Britain, Europe and the World,* Michael Smith summed up well the post-9/11 'special relationship' in the following statement:

> Post 9/11 the British – US relationship – and that of Tony Blair and George Bush- led to Britain playing a leading role in the US-led war on terror, embracing the October 2001 intervention in Afghanistan and the March 2003 invasion of Iraq. It had long been clear that one of Tony Blair's central diplomatic aims was to stay close to the US.[406]

According to the official *Memorandum of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on US-UK relations* published in October 2001 to reiterate that Britain was firmly supporting the US after the 9/11 attacks and "the very public, enduring and unequivocal commitment taken by the UK to stand shoulder to shoulder with the Americans", the attacks emphasised dramatically the strength of the British-US relationship and "emphatically underlined the importance of each strand in strengthening the single rope of the overall relationship."[407]

Thus, as regards the 'special relationship', it can be said that after the attacks it was easily reignited as regards military, defence, and security cooperation, particularly because, as Cronin notes, Blair and Clinton, as well as Reagan, the first President Bush, and Thatcher had all previously used "the rhetoric of human rights and democracy as a complement to arms."[408] This ideology was further bolstered by the shared neo-liberal economic vision of open markets, free trade and globalisation of the two countries. Immediately following the 9/11 attacks, Britain offered its military support to the United States. There are many factors involved in this, and, as discussed, it does appear that following the Second World War, Britain has always played second fiddle to the US, essentially following that nation's whims. It also seems to be dependent on maintaining its support particularly due to the fact that it is technologically inferior to the United States. Britain refers to this need to work with the United States as "interoperability", as the British former defence minister Geoff Hoon stated

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[406] Patrick Dunleavy; Richard Heffernan; Philip Cowley and Colin Hayeds. **Developments in British Politics**. 2006, p. 170.
[407] House of Commons. **Memorandum of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on US-UK relations.** October 2001. <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmfaff/327/1112002.htm>
[408] James Cronin, (2008), *op. cit*., p. 24.

in 2007, when he revealed that "the first principle of British defence planning was to be interoperable with the United States forces."[409].

The attacks of 9/11 may be said to have had impacted on the 'special relationship' between Britain and America in the sense that Blair could be argued to have seen and to have seized the opportunity he could use to rekindle the ties between the two nations; ties that had considerably loosened since the demise of the Soviet Union, and which had left the United Kingdom somewhat adrift without the support of its former powerful friend, and as it lost its former colonial powers and thus its international standing. The influence of 9/11 on the relationship between the two countries cannot be overemphasized, as it changed the positions of both Bush and Blair as regards their future strategies and approaches to foreign policy. Although Blair had long been an advocate for intervention on humanitarian grounds, he became convinced that Iraq needed to be dealt with, even though it may be considered that Bush approached the invasion from a motive of retaliation. This was the case, despite the fact that the two leaders presented the case for the invasion of Iraq as a form of peremptory defence in international law.

In the aftermath of 9/11, Blair immediately offered his support to Bush and both men implemented legislation in their countries, with Bush creating the Patriot Act 2001[410] that was designed to prevent future terrorist acts, whilst Blair created laws such as the Terrorism Act 2000[411] and the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act in 2001.[412] These laws expanded the powers to detain suspects and to stop and search them, and they were a direct result of the fear of the United Kingdom government of terrorism in the wake of 9/11.[413]

Nonetheless, in Britain, there was great resistance to the new legislation, with fears about the impact on civil liberties, and the Law Lords ruled that the detention of terrorist suspects without charge was unlawful.[414] Although by the time this occurred, the bond between Britain and America had grown closer than ever, the incident still made an impression and highlighted the disparities between the two nations; in the United States, it

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[409] Louis R. Golino. *Europe, the War on Terrorism, and the EU's International Role. Brown Journal of Word Affairs.* 2002, p. 65.
[410] Patriot Act 2001 (United States)
[411] Terrorism Act 2000 (United Kingdom)
[412] Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act in 2001
[413] Liberty (the National Council for Civil Liberties) Briefing on Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill 2001 (November, 2001) < https://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/sites/default/files/nov.pdf>
[414] Michael Clarke. *Foreign Policy*. in Anthony Seldon, *Blair's Britain 1997-2007*. 2007, p. 614.

was accepted that certain civil liberties would have to be sacrificed in order to ensure national security, whilst this was not the case in the United Kingdom, where opposition to such infractions was more aggressive. [415]

Such a difference however did not majorly affect the relationship between the two nations. One important aspect of the revitalised friendship between the United Kingdom and the United States is the fact that they once again shared a common enemy. Communism and the Soviet Union were deceased; but the shared threat of terrorism became the new threat that instilled fear in the populations of both countries, and which their leaders bonded together to fight. It is undeniable that the threat of terrorism did present Bush and Blair with a plausible new enemy. The Soviet threat had retreated into the past, but the very real possibility of terrorists targeting citizens in their home countries, in London and in New York, did mean that the new spectre of Weapons of Mass Destruction and leaders of unfriendly regimes and rogue states replaced old concerns.

Therefore, in the aftermath of 9/11, Blair offered President Bush his unwavering support and he maintained his loyalty as the support of other countries such as Germany fell slowly away. Although the two men approached the terrorist threat and the potential for invading Iraq from different beliefs and political premises, they nevertheless shared rather more in common than would at first have been imagined and they developed an extremely close working relationship. Despite the fact that Blair came from a perspective of socialism and George Bush was a Republican, it may be argued that Blair was in fact more sympathetic to neoliberal economic ideals than his Labour Party membership suggested. Furthermore, both men were strong Christians, although the belief of Bush was of a significantly more evangelical nature. They launched a joint operation in Afghanistan and revelations that they made a secret pact only a few weeks after the 9/11 bombings to launch a military campaign on Iraq are shocking, yet not necessarily surprising. Through their joint cooperation with the media mogul Rupert Murdoch both men were able to campaign for the support of their people in implementing anti-terror legislation and the discourse of both men was of a fervent nature, with rousing rhetoric about the need for self-defence against terrorism and the linking of the 9/11 attacks to Iraq. The question that remains is why Blair was so willing to take Britain to war?

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[415] Michael Clarke, (2007), *op. cit.*, p. 614.

Some years ago, the elder President George Bush described the 'special relationship' as "the rock upon which all dictators this century have perished."[416] He was referring to the importance of the 'special relationship' in combating Nazism and Communism in the twentieth century. Some years later, his son, then president of his country, observed that "just as America and Great Britain stood together to defeat totalitarian ideologies of the 20th century, we now stand together against the murderous ideologies of the 21st century."[417] The following chapter will deal with the "rock" upon which Iraq was invaded and Saddam Hussein "perished" and the way the UK "stood together" all the way through to the war with its US ally.

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[416] Jeffrey D. McCausland and Douglas T. Stuart eds*., (2006), op. cit.,* p. 3.
[417] Ibid., pp. 193.

CHAPTER THREE

BLAIR'S WAR ON IRAQ: COMMITMENT TO THE POST-9/11 SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP?

No decision I have ever made in politics has been as divisive as the decision to go to war in Iraq.

Tony Blair, 5 March 2004

The War on Iraq (2003) and the circumstances surrounding the road to it constitute one of the most debated and controversial topics of the twenty-first century. Twelve years after it has been launched, it is still generating debates, feeding news headlines and constituting the topic of numerous books and scholarly articles. The present research does not intend to study this war in detail, nor give an in-depth discussion of the US role in the conflict, but focuses on portraying the British side of the involvement in the war; specifically the way that Blair followed in order to engage his country in that war in the framework of its relationship to its ally the US. One of the main aims of this chapter is to relate what Blair did to take Britain to War on Iraq and the problems he faced in finding the legal grounds that he could use in order to participate in a coalition offensive there with the United States.

1- IRAQ AND THE WEST: FROM FRIEND TO FOE

Saddam Hussein's Iraq was initially an ally of the Western world; Europeans and Americans even supported the development of its military capabilities by providing technology, supplies and expertise. Furthermore, they encouraged him in his war against Khomeini's Iran between 1980 and 1988. The cooperation between the West and Iraq continued up to 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait. This was the turning point of the relationship; Iraq's alliance with the West was over, the First Gulf War ensued and severe international sanctions were imposed against the country.

The longest conventional war of the twentieth century,[418] the Iraq-Iran War started in September 1980 when Iraq invaded Iran on the pretext of border disputes. The main motivation of Saddam for this invasion was over the disputed Shatt Al-Arab waterway[419] over which the most contentious territorial disagreement resided. In addition to territorial disputes however, the two countries had a number of grievances. Indeed, relations between the two deteriorated rapidly after the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran when Ayatollah Khomeini became the supreme leader of what he called the Islamic Republic of Iran. This tension was the result of not only personal hostility between Saddam and Khomeini, but also because of the political ambitions of both nations as well as ideological disputes. It is also

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[418] Encyclopaedia Iranica. *IRAQ vii. IRAN-IRAQ WAR.*
<http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/iraq-vii-iran-iraq-war>
[419] Spencer Davidson. *War in the Persian Gulf. Time Magazine*. 6th October 1980.

important to note that Khomeini was expelled on October 1978 from Iraq, where he had been living in exile since 1963, at the request of the government of Mohammad Reza Shah.[420]

Initially, the position of the United States was claimed to be neutral, refusing to overtly side with either Iran or Iraq.[421] However, evidence emerged later that it gave much needed help to Iraq with American weapons, revealing that despite the insistence of the Reagan administration that the US was neutral throughout the conflict, his country actually provided aid and weaponry to Iraq due to its concern that neither side would come to dominate the oil rich region.[422] The revelation that intelligence reports from the time noted that the United States not only assented to Iraq's chemical attacks on Iran with nerve gas, but that they actively supplied the country with weapons, may seem shocking to some, but is nevertheless an example of the constantly changing reality of international relations. As *Foreign Policy* magazine notes, in the 1980s, the United States applied a "cold calculus" regarding the use by Saddam of powerful chemical weaponry against his own people and against Iranian citizens, as America then resolved that it would be advisable to permit the attacks to continue as it was to its benefit at the time to do so.[423] As Kettle put it, "Iraq's decision to attack the newly created Islamic state offered a huge opportunity for the United States to re-establish its regional influence."[424]

The Reagan administration also ignored human rights violations by Saddam during that war, and actually assisted Iraq with satellite intelligence and loans, even after Iraq used gas on villages in Kurdistan.[425] Although relations between Iraq and the United States had disintegrated following the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, the US not only supported Iraq in the war against Iran but also removed it from the list it maintained of states that supported international terrorism in 1982, thus massively improving trade relations between the two countries.[426] What's more, in December 1984, it reopened the American embassy in Baghdad

[420] Encyclopaedia Iranica. *op. cit.*
[421] Peter W. Galbraith. *The End of Iraq*. 2006, p. 34.
[422] Shane Harris and Matthew M. Aid. *U.S. knew Hussein was launching some of the worst chemical attacks in history -- and still gave him a hand*. *Foreign Policy*. August 26th, 2003.
<http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/26/exclusive-cia-files-prove-america-helped-saddam-as-he-gassed-iran/>
[423] Shane Harris and Matthew M. Aid, (2003), *op. cit.*
[424] Steven Kettel. *Dirty Politics? New Labour, British Democracy and the Invasion of Iraq*. 2006, p. 30.
[425] Ronald C. Kramer and Raymond J. Michalowski. *War, Aggression and State Crime: A Criminological Analysis of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*. *British Journal of Criminology*. 2005, p. 449.
[426] Efraim Karsh. *The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988*. 2002, p. 44.

and began to supply Iraq with intelligence.[427] That same year, the United Kingdom and France also joined with the United States in maintaining a military presence in the Persian Gulf with their navies.[428] These events clearly undermine the claim by Britain and America that they intended to intervene in Iraq in 2003 out of humanitarian concern as well as from concern about the supposed presence of dangerous weaponry.

A decade after attacking Iran and just two years after the end of its war with that country, Saddam turned to the Emirate of Kuwait and invaded it on 1st August 1990. There were several reasons that led Saddam to the decision to invade. One of these is the Kuwaiti refusal to permit Iraq to forgo its repayments to Kuwait, despite Saddam's argument that in the war with Iran, Iraq had taken on the duty of defending all Arab nations.[429] At that point, Iraq was greatly indebted to several Arab countries to finance its war against Iran, including Kuwait to whom it owed 14 billion dollars. Earlier that year, Iraq had accused the Emirate of producing too much oil leading up to the flooding of the market. It also demanded compensation for oil produced from a disputed oil field located on the two countries' border.[430] Frustrated by the financial situation of his country, Saddam then resolved to use aggression against his "rich, but weak neighbour, Kuwait."[431]

The force and extent of the Iraqi invasion was terrifying to Kuwait, as ground troops were supported by a virulent campaign from the air, and despite international and Arab outrage over the invasion, Saddam was not deterred and declared Kuwait to be annexed territory of Iraq,[432] making it the 19th province of the country. The government of Iraq justified its invasion by claiming that Kuwait was a natural part of Iraq, originally an Iraqi province arbitrarily cut off by British imperialism, and that the annexation of the Emirate constituted a retaliation for the "economic warfare" that Kuwait waged through its slant

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[427] Efraim Karsh, (2002), *op. cit*. p. 44.
[428] Bryan R. Gibson. *Covert Relationship: American Foreign Policy, Intelligence, and the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988 (PSI Reports)*. 2010, p. 23.
[429] Christian Alfonsi. *Circle in the Sand*. 2006, p. 36.
[430] BBC. *1990: Iraq invades Kuwait*. August 1990.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/august/2/newsid_2526000/2526937.stm>
[431] Christian Alfonsi, (2006), *op. cit*., p.39.
[432] Ibid., pp. 60.

drilling[433] into Iraq's oil supplies as well as through the overproduction of oil and consequent flooding of the market at the expense of Iraq economic recovery.[434]

In Response, the UN Security Council condemned the action on the same day and demanded Iraq's withdrawal in Resolution 660 followed by Resolution 661 which held that all states should thwart the importation of all products originating in Kuwait or Iraq, as well as placing a ban on activities that would promote the export of products that had as their origin either Kuwait or Iraq, the sale of military equipment to them, as well as on any funding of these countries, except for medical or humanitarian reasons.[435] Resolution 678 ultimately initiated military action to push Iraq out of Kuwait.[436] The United States led an international coalition in an operation that came to be termed "Operation Desert Storm" as the conflict became international and thus what would be subsequently called the First Gulf War started on January 1991.[437] Hence, "the decision to invade and annex Kuwait [...] transformed Iraq from being a geo-strategic ally [to the West] into being one of the world's leading deviant regimes"[438]

When the first Gulf War ended, with the withdrawal of the Iraqi army from Kuwait, further sanctions were imposed in connection with the imposition of Resolution 687 in 1991, which concerned the forcing of Iraq to remove and destroy all chemical and biological weapons as well as ballistic missiles which had a range greater than 150 kilometres.[439] The results of the sanctions were extreme poverty and malnutrition amongst the Iraqi people.[440] These sanctions have been termed one of the most "brutal sanctions regimes" in history. If the aim of these sanctions was that the Iraqi people would eventually turn on Saddam and force him from power, with a pro United States leader in his place[441] as some historians claim, it did not happen. Instead, the middle class of Iraq was destroyed, Saddam was given total

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[433] Slant drilling is a non-vertical form of well drilling typically used in natural gas and oil production. This form of drilling is generally for extracting oil or gas resources that cannot be accessed through traditional vertical drilling. < http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-slant-drilling.htm>
[434] Persian Gulf War
<http://www.sheppardsoftware.com/Middleeastweb/factfile/Unique-facts-MiddleEast10.htm>
[435] United Nations Resolution 661 (1990)
[436] United Nations Resolution 678 (1990)
[437] Stephen Schmid. *Gulf War II (1990/91) - Iraq Between United Nations' Diplomacy and United States' Policy.* 2007, p. 2.
[438] Steven Kettel, (2006), *op. cit.*, p. 32.
[439] Resolution 687 (1991)
[440]Thomas George Weiss. *Political gain and civilian pain: humanitarian impacts of economic sanctions.* 1997, p. 106.
[441] Jacob G Hornberger. *A lesson in interventionism in Iraq. The Future of Freedom Foundation.* November 12th, 2014 < http://fff.org/2014/11/12/lesson-interventionism-iraq/>

control over the economy of Iraq, and the sewage treatment facilities that the US had destroyed in the war meant that the rate of infectious diseases rocketed.[442]

In addition to sanctions, Britain and America imposed "no-fly" restrictions in the north and south of Iraq, flying patrols over the country.[443] As a result of the UN sanctions, Iraq was also restricted in using the income from its oil exports and the Oil for Food Programme meant that the government of Iraq was able to use its oil income to pay for food, medicine, and the maintenance of infrastructure from 1996.[444] Nevertheless, smuggling and illegal exports highlighted the inefficiency of the sanctions regime.[445] The United States also persisted with its policy of "aggressive containment" which they pursued through "sanctions and the occasional resort to force."[446] It was not unanticipated that the United Kingdom joined the US in the First Gulf War, due to the fact that both nations were at the time ruled by interventionist, Conservative governments and because Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was clearly in breach of international law.[447]

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[442] Jacob G Hornberger, (2014), *op. cit.*
[443] Anthony H. Cordesman,. *Iraq's Military Capabilities in 2002: A Dynamic Net Assessment.* 2002, p. 15.
[444] United Nations. *Observations on the Oil for Food Program and Iraq's Food Security*. 2005.
[445] Anthony H. Cordesman, (2002), *op. cit.*, p. 15.
[446] Martyn Indyk. *Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East.* 2009, p. 36.
[447] Charles Hass and Melissa Haussmann. *Comparative Politics: Domestic Responses to Global Changes*. 2002, p. 97.

2- TONY BLAIR AND IRAQ

2.1. Before 9/11 (1997-2001): ON THE LOOKOUT

In a speech delivered at a White House ceremony on February 5th, 1998, Tony Blair declared about Iraq and the possibility of war against it:

> Is it a specific objective to remove Saddam Hussein? The answer is: it cannot be. No one would be better pleased if his evil regime disappeared as a direct or indirect result of our action, but our military objectives are precisely those that we have set out. Even if there were legal authority to do so, removing Saddam through military action would require the insertion of ground troops on a massive scale – hundreds of thousands [...] Even then, there would be no guarantee of success. I cannot make that commitment responsibly. [448]

Seen from today's perspective, this statement seems grotesquely paradoxical with what subsequently happened in Iraq a few years later. As Christopher Hill put it "Tony Blair evidently changed his mind about a range of things: the balance of risks, the legal authority for regime change, military feasibility and responsible leadership."[449] So, what happened since then that the Prime Minister should change his position so drastically? The answer is 9/11 and his reaction to the US response to these attacks.

If one looks at the abovementioned excerpt, what one understands is that Blair could not in 1998 make the commitment to involve his country militarily to topple the then Iraqi president Saddam because that would require the insertion of ground troops on a massive scale in Iraq and even then success would have not been guaranteed. But, that is exactly what happened five years later, because Britain did so in the company of the Americans who were the decision makers for going to war in Iraq. This does not mean that Blair was not keen for intervening in Iraq nor that he was not against Saddam, and that well before 9/11. It simply means that, prior to 9/11, he could not fulfil his agenda on Iraq without the presence of the US without whom he would never have ventured on the Iraqi adventure.

In fact, Blair has always detested Saddam. A year after becoming New Labour Prime Minister in 1997, he ordered British troops into Iraq in a joint operation with the United

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[448] Anthony Seldon and Dennis Kavanagh eds. ***The Blair Effect 2001-5***. 2005, p. 396.
[449] Ibid., pp. 397.

States, using as justification for the military campaign the refusal of Iraq to cooperate with United Nations resolutions. The bombing of Iraq in 1998 was termed "Operation Desert Fox"[450] and constituted the first aggressive use of the armed forces by the New Labour government.[451] The official objective of this operation as explained by Blair was "to degrade [Saddam's] capability to build and use weapons of mass destruction [and] to diminish the military threat he poses to his neighbours."[452]

The international community was in agreement that Saddam had consistently refused to comply with resolutions, but there was not any consensus as to the joint military action against Iraq.[453] Indeed, only America and Britain as members of the United Nations Security Council favoured action; whilst France, Russia and China were opposed.[454] Furthermore, the arguments that were put forward in favour of *Operation Desert Fox* and the aerial bombardment of Iraq have been accused by analysts of having been legally invalid; the two nations were not enforcing the will of the United Nations Security Council, neither were they reacting to a breach of the ceasefire that had lasted since the end of the 1991 Gulf War, nor were they pre-empting the use by Iraq of WMD.[455]

Operation Desert Fox, "Blair's first tentative foray into military action" as Kampfner described it, had in fact set back the disarmament process by ensuring that the inspectors could not return.[456]

The British government came under severe criticism over the legality of the move because of the lack of authorisation from the United Nations while the government's claim was that while UN approval "would have been desirable, it was not in this event necessary on the grounds that the action was supported by previous UN resolutions."[457] For Blair, the Operation constituted "the right thing to do" while insisting that "[w]hen the international

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[450] Sean M. Condroni. *Justification for Unilateral Action in Response to the Iraqi Threat: A Critical Analysis of Operation Desert Fox*. *Military Law Review*. 1999, p. 116.
[451] Steven Kettel, (2006), *op. cit*., p.37.
[452] Tony Blair (1998) as quoted in: John Kampfner, *Blair's Wars*. 2004, p.33.
[453] Sean M. Condroni, (1999); *op. cit*., p. 116.
[454] Steven Erlanger. *U.S. Decision to Act Fast, and Then Search for Support, Angers Some Allies. N.Y. TIMES*, Dec. 17, 1998
[455] Marc Weller. *The US, Iraq and the Use of Force in a Unipolar World*. *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*. 1991, p. 81.
[456] John Kampfner, *Blair's Wars*. 2004, p. 385.
[457] Steven Kettel, (2006), *op. cit*., p. 38.

community agrees certain objectives and then fails to implement them, those that can act, must"[458].

It has been argued that in Operation Desert Fox, the doctrine of international humanitarian law was undermined.[459] Steven Kettle asserts that the Operation has been widely regarded as a "cynical attempt" by President Clinton to divert attention away from his imbroglio over the Monica Lewinsky scandal. For him, Britain's engagement in the military campaign alongside the US "put Britain's transatlantic-bridge strategy under growing strain".[460] This Operation can be said to belong within the context of Blair's vision of what he would call later his "doctrine of international community."

In a speech in Chicago in 1999, which constituted his first major statement on New Labour's foreign policy, Blair stated that he was to "make the British presence in the world felt" by combining "a strong defence" capacity with Britain's pattern of "historic alliances" to form "an instrument of influence" for the projection of British power overseas.[461] And, at the same time, he spoke about focusing attention on "the long-running problem of Iraq" while insisting that his "government's resolve to deal with this matter was "unshakeable.""[462] Blair's vision of a more "assertive" foreign policy for Britain, apparent in his "doctrine of international community" speech is reinforced by the leaked memo of the Prime Minister's discussion with his advisor Philip Gould in which he complained that the involvement in Kosovo had not "laid to rest any doubts about our strength of defence."[463]

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[458] Steven Kettel, (2006), *op. cit*., p. 38.
[459] Marc Weller. **The US, Iraq and the Use of Force in a Unipolar World.** *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy.* 1991, p. 81.
[460] Steven Kettel, (2006), *op. cit*., p. 38.
[461] Ibid., pp. 35.
[462] Idem.
[463] Tony Blair, memo to Philip Gould (29/4/2000) as quoted in: Steven Kettell, (2006), *op. cit*., p. 45.

2.2- From 9/11 Onwards: THE TURN OF THE TIDE

When the United States decided to invade Afghanistan, shortly after 9/11, in order to overturn the Taliban regime that hosted the Al-Qaeda bases, Britain did not hesitate to join its ally. For Hill, "most British opinion accepted that 9/11 was an act of war which would require the defeat of the enemy, to the extent that it could be traced."[464] Blair committed his country in Afghanistan without much difficulty, especially that it took only the British and American troops from October 7th to November 13th to topple the Taliban regime and enter Kabul. The operation at that time seemed highly successful but on one point: the neutralisation of Osama Ben Laden who remained nowhere to be found until his killing was announced almost ten years later on May 2011 by the American Army in a military operation in Pakistan.

As we have seen in the preceding chapter, *Operation Enduring Freedom* was presented as a response to the 9/11 attacks within the framework of the US-led "war on terror". The United States based the claim to the right of invasion on the customary right of self-defence.[465] Although it was not Afghanistan as a nation state that attacked America, this latter decided to launch a military response against the state of Afghanistan because the Taliban regime harboured Al-Qaida. Hence, in this case, the traditional notion of self-defence was widened to attack non-traditional actors - here a terrorist group - and those who harbour them.[466]

After the Afghan episode, turning to Iraq was a matter of time. The road to war did not seem easy because of many issues regarding international legality and the fact that this country was not as undeveloped as Afghanistan and its military as disorganised as the Taliban combatants, despite more than a decade of severe international sanctions against the country. Hill explains that Blair's "willingness to support the US turn towards Iraq after the end of the Afghan war was consistent with [...] his policy of unconditional support for the United States on matters of declared vital interest."[467]

Iraq had been in the US/UK agenda well before the attacks of 9/11 and many actors were determined to go after Iraq before these fateful events, but it was problematic to gain

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[464] Anthony Seldon and Dennis Kavanagh eds., (2005), *op. cit.*, p. 393.
[465] Paul D. Williams. ***British Foreign Policy under New Labour 1997-2005***. 2005, p. 51.
[466] Ibid., pp.51-52.
[467] Anthony Seldon and Dennis Kavanagh eds., (2005), *op. cit.*, p. 395.

enough support for such an undertaking. Therefore, when the attacks of 9/11 occurred, they seemed to open up completely new opportunities for presenting a valid case to go to war because the "mood" in the aftermath of the attacks was right to swing the public opinion and to have enough domestic and even international political backing. The widespread outrage at the attacks made it seem much easier to argue that the next step the terrorists would seek would be to get in possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Thus, the US and its ally Britain could develop the argument that it was important to go after so-called "rogue states", like Iraq, that had WMD or were about to obtain them.

President Bush had long been keen to ensure the destruction of Saddam Saddam's regime, and reams of books and academic commentaries have been written on the various motivations for the launching of the invasion of Iraq. It is sufficient to state that even though the attacks of 9/11 on the United States were said to be the primary reason for the invasion, Bush and his advisers, particularly Donald Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defence, and Dick Cheney, the Vice President, two of the so-called neo-conservative hawks of the American administration, had aimed at the destruction of Saddam since the First Gulf War in 1991.[468]

A 2004 article in *The Guardian* newspaper claimed that President Bush asked Blair for his support in the removal of Saddam only nine days after the 9/11 attacks.[469] Sir Christopher Meyer, the former British Ambassador to Washington, related that Blair told Bush that the issue at hand was the invasion of Afghanistan with the intention of toppling the Taliban and destroying the Al-Qaeda terrorist network harbouring Ben Laden, but Bush replied that whilst the first goal was the invasion of Afghanistan, the ultimate aim was the invasion of Iraq in order to ensure its change of regime.[470]

The implications of this conversation are huge; indicating that immediately following 9/11 the two leaders were forming a plan to invade Iraq, and that Blair never had any doubts about the intentions of Bush nor did he doubt that the United Kingdom and its resources would be fully utilised in the pursuit of these goals. The most damaging implication for Blair of these revelations is that the political turmoil and citizen protests that accompanied the preparations of the United Kingdom for the war in Iraq were always ultimately doomed as

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[468] Mary Beth Norton; Jane Kamensky; Carol Sheriff; David W. Blight and Howard Chudacoff. *A People and a Nation: A History of the United States, Brief Edition*. 2014, p. 863.
[469] David Rose. *Bush and Blair made secret pact for Iraq war. The Guardian*, April 4th 2004.
  <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2004/apr/04/iraq.iraq>
[470] Idem.

Blair would never have had any real intention of partaking in honest debate about the realities and benefits of invading Iraq; already he had committed to Bush that the United Kingdom would support him. In 2004, a Government spokesman would only comment for *The Guardian* that Iraq had been a focus of concern "for a long time and was discussed at most meetings between the two leaders. Our position was always clear: that we would try to work through the United Nations, and a decision and military action was not taken until other options were exhausted in March last year."[471]

This implies that Bush had been waiting for an opportunity that he could utilise as an excuse for initiating a military campaign against Iraq, and for his own reasons, Blair was content to acquiesce to the requests of Bush. However, in order for such a campaign to be accepted by their own people as well as by international organisations such as the United Nations, and for a campaign to be at all legal under international law, it was necessary for Bush and Blair to provide a link between Al-Qaeda, terrorism and Iraq, specially related to the attacks in September 2001. In the aftermath of 9/11, therefore, officials of the United States administration began to claim that Saddam had between 1992 and 2003 nurtured a secretive relationship with Ben Laden, that concerned training in not only explosives but also in the alleged Weapons of Mass Destruction, and that training camps and safe havens in Iraq were provided to Al-Qaeda.[472]

The United States initiated the hostilities against Iraq in 2002, when the team of nuclear weapons inspectors searched Iraq for evidence of nuclear weapons under the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441. This resolution offered Saddam a "final opportunity for Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligation", stating that Iraq had breached the ceasefire terms of Resolution 667, concerning the construction of missiles, the purchase of prohibited weaponry, and the continued refusal to provide compensation to Kuwait following its invasion and annexation of the country from 1990 to 1991.[473] It has to be noted that Resolution 1441, agreed at the UN in November 2002, was deliberately ambiguous because it neither provided an automatic trigger for war, nor did it explicitly require a further mandate.[474]

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[471] David Rose, (April 4th 2004), *op. cit.*
[472] Stephen F Hayley. *"Case Closed" The Weekly Standard,* 24th November 2003
< http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/003/378fmxyz.asp>
[473] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441
[474] Kampfner, *Blair's Wars*. 2004, p. 378.

Saddam refused to comply, as the United States and its allies, particularly the United Kingdom, had envisaged, and Bush began to press for an invasion of Iraq.[475] He claimed that Saddam supported terrorism, mainly through the funding of families of Palestinian suicide bombers to Israel, and that he had close ties with Al-Qaeda and that he and his regime were therefore closely linked with the 9/11 attacks.[476] Although the United Nations Security Council denounced Saddam for refusing to comply with the weapons inspectors, it was unhappy with the new resolution that the United States proposed concerning the issuing of an ultimatum to Iraq.[477]

Hill argues that the British PM would not have envisaged an invasion of Iraq if the US had not put the issue on the agenda[478] and that "Blair himself would hardly have pressed for regime change in Iraq in the absence of US enthusiasm."[479] It is now also "tolerably clear", notes Robert Skidelsky, that Blair agreed to back Bush in a war to overthrow Saddam when the two met at Crawford, Texas, in April 2002. The only problem, he goes on, was to "manufacture a plausible *casus belli*, since the objective of regime change could not be openly avowed. WMD was to be the justification and their removal the only ostensible object of their war preparations."[480] Moreover, if Bush had the impression from spring 2002 that Blair would ultimately decide to join him in a war, then, Hill asserts, the PM's freedom of manoeuvre was lost because of "the diplomatically inept commitment made early 2002 to stand beside the United States in the event of a war to change the regime in Iraq."[481]

A war on Iraq would be a 'pre-emptive war', Sampson notes, whose justification would rest on providing convincing evidence that the enemy was becoming such a threat to Britain's security that the government had to authorise an invasion, involving a major deployment of troops.[482] But most of the motivation for war came from Washington and the UK had to justify the war.

After 9/11 then and although Iraq had no explicit ties to the attacks, the US took the decision to wage war on the country and Britain followed. The official reasons for invading

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[475] Mary Beth Norton; Jane Kamensky; Carol Sheriff; David W. Blight and Howard Chudacoff, (2015), *op. cit.*, p. 863.
[476] Idem.
[477] Idem.
[478] Anthony Seldon and Dennis Kavanagh eds., (2005), *op. cit.*, p. 397.
[479] Ibid., pp. 395.
[480] Ibid., pp. 442.
[481] Ibid., pp. 405.
[482] Anthony Sampson, (2005), *op. cit.*, p. 152.

Iraq put forward by the US changed several times from the onset of the conflict. Initially, the Bush administration claimed that Saddam had been harbouring and supporting terrorist cells and thus represented a "legitimate" target in the "War on Terror". Then, there was the claim that Saddam posed a threat to the global security since he was developing or was already in possession of WMD. After that, they spoke of the need for regime change. Saddam's fall would bring "democracy, peace and prosperity" to the country. Bush often called this the "liberation of Iraq".[483]

The British side generally followed, and that despite the fact that right after 9/11 British intelligence categorically ruled out an involvement of the Iraqi regime in the attacks. John Scarlett, the Head of the British Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) then, told Blair that there was no concrete evidence whatsoever that Saddam had been involved in the planning of the terrorist attacks.[484] The JIC even deemed any future cooperation highly unlikely between Saddam and al-Qaeda on the grounds of ideological differences between the Iraqi leader and Ben Laden. This intelligence was largely in harmony with the US intelligence at that point. However, in contrast to the US, Britain did not try to find evidence to link Iraq to 9/11, nor spoken of it publicly. In fact, as Kampfner points out, "Blair's political aides and senior intelligence officials agree that Saddam posed no greater threat on 12 September 2001 than he had on the 10th. They accept that the intelligence on that is clear."[485] But since Blair was decided to "preserve the [special] relationship and to be seen to be at America's side in its hour of greatest need"[486], he and core executive tried to tie up Iraq and terrorism indirectly.

This evolved through emphasising the alleged WMD threat that stemmed from Iraq and the possibility that those weapons could either be used by Saddam or land in the hands of terrorists. The main official argument of Blair's government was then that the UK had evidence that Saddam was developing or already in possession of WMD, culminating in the claim that some of these dangerous weapons were deployable within 45-minutes.[487] Except that, as it became later known, parts of the so-called "evidence" were in fact fabrications and did not come from intelligence. Notably the "dodgy dossier" that was put together by Blair's team who browsed the internet and picked up three articles one of them a PhD thesis by an

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[483] Bob Woodward. **Plan of Attack**. 2004.
[484] Anthony Sampson, (2005), *op. cit.*, p. 152-160.
[485] John Kampfner. **Blair's Wars**. 2004, p. 157.
[486] Jeffrey D. McCausland and Douglas T. Stuart eds., (2006), *op. cit.*, p.131.
[487] Anthony Sampson, (2005), *op cit*, p. 152-160.

Iraqi student in the US and which was "doctored to exaggerate Saddam's wickedness".[488] Thus, entire parts of the so-called "evidence" consisted in the plagiarising of whole parts of the PhD "with the same grammatical errors" leading the Iraqi student, "who was never consulted", to worry about the safety of his family back in Iraq who would suffer from the publicity.[489] This, then, appeared in the "dossiers" which were supposed to convince the public, media and Parliament that the UK had a solid case for going to war in Iraq. If one looks at the state of intelligence at that point it is clear that neither the JIC nor the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) nor the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had any solid proof that Iraq possessed WMD.[490]

It is interesting to note how, over the summer of 2003, Blair gradually changed his rhetoric, "talking not so much of weapons as of "programmes""; while Bush, who is not "usually known for his verbal dexterity", would, over the course of 2003, shift his descriptions from "weapons of mass destruction" in March, to "weapons of mass destruction programmes" in June, to "weapons of mass destruction-related programmes" in October. And then later to "weapons of mass destruction-related programme activities".[491]

As Hill notes, "it remains the case that the intelligence provided [by the British] went in one direction only, towards the conclusion that Saddam was amassing WMD."[492] Furthermore, the IAEA inspectors, most notably Hans Blix, were repeatedly asking for more time in order to complete their investigations. So, despite the fact that the intelligence was not clear and the UN inspectors had been pleading for more time to determine whether Iraq had WMD, the US and UK began to deploy troops to the region at the beginning of 2003 and finally, on March 20th of that same year they started their attack on Iraq, by air strikes, followed by ground troops in the beginning of April. Iraq posed no imminent threat to Britain at the time as Blair himself stated in 2004:

> The truth is, as was abundantly plain in the motion before the House of Commons on 18 March, we went to war to enforce compliance with UN Resolutions. Had we believed Iraq was an imminent direct threat to Britain, we would have taken action in September 2002; we would not have gone to the UN.[493]

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[488] Anthony Sampson, (2005), *op cit*, p. 157.
[489] Ibid., pp. 158.
[490] Idem.
[491] John Kampfner, (2004), *op. cit*., p. 359.
[492] Anthony Seldon and Dennis Kavanagh eds., (2005), *op. cit.*, p. 398.
[493] Tony Blair. ***Speech on the justification of Iraq War and the continued threat of global terrorism***, Sedgefield, 5 March, 2004.

The decision to wage war on Iraq led Clare Short, the Secretary of State for International Development and Robin Cook, the Foreign Secretary, to resign; the "first time since 1914 that two Cabinet ministers had resigned over a matter of foreign policy."[494]

At the Chilcot hearings investigating the background to the invasion of Iraq, the former head of Britain's domestic intelligence agency MI5 testified that both British and US intelligence were aware that Saddam posed no serious threat and that the invasion was likely to increase terror.[495] The US 9/11 Commission also later acknowledged that:

> There have been reports that contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda also occurred after bin Laden had returned to Afghanistan [in 1996], but they do not appear to have resulted in a collaborative relationship […] We have no credible evidence that Iraq and al Qaeda cooperated on attacks against the United States.[496]

The decision of the United States and the United Kingdom to invade Iraq took place under the shadow of international law. In the field of international humanitarian law that governs war, *Jus ad bellum* is the principle that governs the initiation of armed conflict, and it is distinguished from the legal norms that govern the conduct of states during war, which is termed *jus in bello.*[497] *Jus in bello* means justice in war and is derived from the United Nations Charter. *Jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* are distinct concepts, although they are linked. As Thackrah notes, "the justifiable use of violence in a war is linked to a morally defensible cause" while "the loss of life in war should be kept at a tolerable level."[498] The role of *jus in bello* is to ensure that the aim of the war and the inevitable harm that will be caused must be proportionate, and it also acknowledges that a state's civilian population are likely to be affected by war, so that it is "an attempt to reduce the impact of war on civilians."[499]

Both wars waged by Britain and America in Afghanistan and Iraq after the attacks of 9/11 have been legally questioned, as although Blair and Bush have attempted to justify their

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[494] Anthony Seldon and Dennis Kavanagh eds., (2005), *op. cit.*, p. 403.
[495] Noam Chomsky. *9/11, was there an alternative?* September 7th, 2011.
[496] The 9/11 Commission Report. (2004), *op. cit.,* p. 334.
[497] George Agamben. *The State of Exception*. 2005, p. 42.
[498] J. R. Thackrah. *Military Conflict since 1945*. 2009, p. 134.
[499] I. Henderson. *The Contemporary Law of Targeting: Military Objectives, Proportionality and Precautions in Attack under Additional Protocol 1*. 2009, p. 3.

actions, they have been severely criticised by the legal community.[500] It is important that the justifications used by both leaders for the invasion of Iraq be examined, as there is the danger that they may become accepted as a precedent for future wars.[501]

The use of military force must be lawful under United Nations Charter, and Article 2 (4) prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.[502] An exception to this is for humanitarian intervention or to stop the abuse of human rights.[503] Another option is for self-defence, which is codified in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.[504] This rule is also established in customary law, the international legal principles that derive from custom, and which the International Court of Justice Statute defines in Article 38 (1) (b) as "evidence of a general practice accepted as law."[505] The International Court of Justice recognised the use of self-defence in *Nicaragua v. United States of America,* which concerned various military and paramilitary activities that were overseen by the government of the United States in Nicaragua between 1980 and 1984[506]. The court held that the United States had breached customary law and Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, and it held that self-defence was allowable only when necessary, in proportion to the goals, and not as a form of reprisal.[507]

Yet, whilst the military action in Afghanistan was accepted -even though acting against both proven and suspected terrorists does not fall under the category of acting against a sovereign nation- as it was immediate, and Afghanistan provided protection to Al-Qaeda, this was not true of the invasion of Iraq.[508]

Regarding pre-emptory self-defence, this is debated by academics, although a number of commentators assert that pre-emptory self-defence is a feature of modern warfare.[509] As

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[500] *Ellen Jean Creighton. **Jus Ad Bellum in the Iraq War: A Matter of Interpretation?** Atlantic International Studies Organisation. 2005
<http://atlismta.org/online-journals/0506-journal-government-and-the-rights-of-individuals/jus-ad-bellum-in-the-iraq-war/>
[501] Idem.
[502] United Nations Charter Article 2(4)
[503] Richard N. Gardner. **Neither Bush nor the 'Jurisprudes'.** 2003, p.589
[504] United Nations Charter, Article 51
[505] International Court of Justice Statute, Article 38 (1) (b)
[506] *Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports, 1986* at 14.
[507] Yoram Dinstein. **War, Aggression, and Self-Defense**. 2001, p. 183.
[508] Ibid., pp.25.
[509] Ellen Jean Creighton, (2005), *op. cit.*

already seen, both Bush and Blair pressed their case for military action in Iraq but in different ways.

One example of this is how Colin Powell, the Secretary of State in the Bush administration, presented the Security Council with what he qualified as "solid" proof that was in reality merely blurred satellite images and fragments of telephone conversations that the US intelligence had managed to intercept.[510]

Blair's argument for war depended on the legal analysis of the British Attorney General Lord Goldsmith, who asserted that the joint forces of Britain and America were authorised by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 678, which authorised the "use of all necessary means" to remove the Iraqis from Kuwait, and the establishing of a ceasefire in so far as demands for disarmament were met.[511] Resolution 1441 followed, which warned that Iraq would be submitted to "serious consequences" if they failed to disarm.[512]

Whilst these arguments have been termed "credible" by Slaughter, she asserts that they are contrary to the "spirit" of the Charter, which is "antiethical to any kind of blank check"[513] by which she means that the Charter could not be used by states to initiate any military campaign. Furthermore, other states such as France were opposed to military action.[514] Blair depended on Resolution 1441, but ultimately, the Security Council was "so divided about what to do that no action could be taken."[515] In this perspective, the inaction of the Security Council is also to blame. It is important to note that up to a month before the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Lord Goldsmith was opposed to supporting the invasion and insisted that a fresh resolution from the United Nations was necessary.[516] However, close to the invasion, he accepted that force was necessary after all, using accords of the United Nations that dated back to 1991 to do so.[517]

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[510] Colin Powell. ***Presentation of U.S. Case to Security Council regarding the Failure of Iraq to Disarm***, UN News Centre, February 5th, 2003.
<http://www.un.org/apps/news/storyAr.asp?NewsID=6079&Cr=iraq&Cr1=inspect>
[511] United Nations Security Council Resolution 678
[512] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441
[513] M. Slaughter. ***An American Vision of International Law?*** *American Society of International Law Proceedings*. 2003, p. 126
[514] Ellen Jean Creighton, (2005)*, op. cit.*
[515] Idem.
[516] BBC News. ***Goldsmith admits to changing views over Iraq***. 27th January 2010.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8481759.stm>
[517] Idem.

Indeed, documents related to the legal case of the War on Iraq were published by the Chilcot Inquiry in 2010, showing "the grave reservations of the Attorney General, his remarkable U-turn, and how the basis for the Iraq war was built on sand" as *The Independent* put it.[518] In the documents[519] released more than seven years after the start of the War on Iraq, Lord Goldsmith repeatedly stated that an invasion without a fresh UN resolution would be illegal, and warned against using Saddam's supposed WMD as a reason for attack.

Among the documents released, there was a letter to Blair dated 30 July 2002 and marked as "Secret and Strictly personal – UK Eyes only", where the Attorney General made it clear that:

> in the absence of a fresh resolution by the Security Council which would at least involve a new determination of a material and flagrant breach [by Iraq] military action would be unlawful. Even if there were such a resolution, but one which did not explicitly authorise the use of force, it would remain highly debatable whether it legitimised military action – but without it the position is, in my view, clear.[520]

In his letter, copied to the then Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, and Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon, Lord Goldsmith warned that any form of military assistance offered to the US, however limited, such as "the use of UK bases, the provision of logistical or other support [...] would all engage the UK's responsibility under international law. We would therefore need to be satisfied in all cases as to the legality of the use of force" adding that WMD development is not enough to indicate "such imminence." For him, "on the basis of the material which I have been shown [...] there would not be any grounds for regarding an Iraqi use of WMD as imminent."[521]

After the UN had passed resolution 1441, Lord Goldsmith wrote to Blair in January 2003 that he remained of the view that the correct legal interpretation of Resolution 1441 was that it did not authorise the use of military force without "a further determination by the

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[518] Kim Sengupta. *How Goldsmith changed advice on legality of war*. *The Independent*. 01 July 2010 <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/how-goldsmith-changed-advice-on-legality-of-war-2015252.html>

[519] The Iraq Inquiry. *Declassified Documents.* < http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/transcripts/declassified-documents.aspx>

[520] Idem.

[521] Idem.

Security Council." Less than a month later, he sent a draft advice to the PM stating that Resolution 1441 clearly did not expressly authorise the use of force and that it "may only be relied on as providing the legal basis for military action if it has the effect of reviving the authorisation to use force contained in Resolution 678 (1990)" before stressing that "it is clear that the [Security] Council did not intend the authorisation in Resolution 678 should revive immediately following the adoption of Resolution 1441." He continued:

> The language of 1441 is not clear and the statements made on adoption of the resolution suggests there were differences of views within the Council. The safest legal course would be to secure the adoption of the further Council decision [...] If action were to be taken without a further Security Council decision, particularly if the UK had tried to and failed to secure the adoption of a second resolution, I would expect the Government to be accused of acting unlawfully.

After the Attorney General was asked for a clarification of his advice by the Government, the final version was delivered to Cabinet on 7 March 2003, days before the invasion. Lord Goldsmith had decided a new resolution was not needed, after all, to justify war. In 2010, in a six hour questioning of the events inside the United Kingdom government that led up to the invasion of Iraq, Lord Goldsmith insisted that he had not been placed under political pressure to change his mind, and that he had arrived at the conclusion under the United Nations Resolutions 1441, and 678, which was formulated at the end of the First Gulf War, and which had stated that "all necessary means to restore international peace and security" in the region of Iraq could be used to justify the invasion.[522]

In contrast, the arguments of Bush changed a number of times.[523] The first argument Bush used was that of pre-emption due to the alleged involvement of Saddam in the attacks of September 11, and the need to use self-defence as a form of pre-emption in November 2002,[524] but later on he joined the United Kingdom in arguing the need for collective security.[525] Much later on, in May 2004, long after the initial invasion, Bush accepted that one of the key motivations had been the aim of regime change.[526] It may be questioned as to why Bush continued to change his arguments regarding the reasons that necessitated the

[522] BBC News. *Goldsmith admits to changing views over Iraq*. 27th January 2010.
[523] Jason Ralph, (2005), *op. cit.*, p.15
[524] Ivo H. Daeder *Policy Implications on the Bush Doctrine of Pre-emption*. *Council on Foreign Relations,* November 16th, 2002
[525] Jason Ralph, (2005), *op. cit.*, p.15
[526] Ellen Jean Creighton, (2005)*, op. cit.*

invasion of Iraq. Such a question is as relevant as asking for the true motivations of Blair, and it is one on which the Chilcot Inquiry continues to deliberate. A possible, if potentially simplistic answer, is that in abandoning its previous foreign policy of moderation, Bush used the United States' position of power to "re-make the world according to its own interests", and in constantly changing his arguments he was seizing at reasons to convince the world and the United Nations of the need for the invasion.[527]

It has been asserted that the joint Anglo-American arguments for the invasion of Iraq were based on a list of "assumptions" which included the alleged existence of Weapons of Mass Destruction, which Saddam was purported to have ready to launch, and that he intended to hawk them to terrorist groups; with all these "assumptions" stated by the United States and the United Kingdom as "facts."[528]

When Powell presented the need for war, he neglected to discuss the use of pre-emptory self defence as a justification,[529] which in conjunction with his use of the grainy satellite images in an attempt to link Iraq to Al-Qaeda, suggest that America was convinced of the need to attack Iraq either with or without international approval, so that what it was merely hoping for was grasping at legal justifications to gain the Council's approval.

The events leading to the invasion of Iraq snowballed from autumn 2002, when Blair presented Parliament with the dossier that contained details on Iraq's supposed illegal weaponry.[530] The dossier contained information that claimed that the Iraqi government was building its weaponry of mass destruction and that "the Iraqi military are able to deploy chemical and biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so."[531] This dossier became known as the "dodgy dossier", with particular reference to this 45 minute claim.[532] There followed an unprecedented dispute with the BBC, which although a corporation that is independent from government control, was formerly a public service broadcaster and it still

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[527] Carol L. Yordan *America's Quest for Global Hegemony: Offensive Realism, the Bush Doctrine, and the 2003 Iraq War. Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory*. 2006. Vol.52, No.2, Issue 110
[528] John Kampfner, (2003), *op. cit.*, p. 161.
[529] Ellen Jean Creighton, (2005), *op. cit.*
[530] UK Government. *Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of the British Government*, September 24th, 2002. < http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/documents/>
[531] Idem.
[532] Paul Hoggett. *Iraq: Blair's Mission Impossible*. *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations*. 2005, p. 419.

operates today under a Royal Charter.[533] Blair and his communications director Alastair Campbell were essentially accused of having pressured the Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, and of having falsified the dossier, which was claimed to contain the secret information on the alleged links between Saddam and Al-Qaeda, in order to make the justification for the pending invasion appear more valid.[534] The source for the BBC story was revealed to have been the former weapons inspector for the United Nations, Dr David Kelly, and from July 2003, when found to have committed suicide, the Hutton Inquiry was quickly established, which concluded that the claims of the dossiers on Iraqi weaponry were genuine and that the allegations of the BBC were therefore baseless.[535] As a consequence, the Hutton Report has been decried as a "whitewash."[536]

In March 2003, Blair attempted to secure full authorisation from the Security Council which was not forthcoming, and he never succeeded in convincing the United Nations or in achieving a second resolution for the invasion.[537] Much of the British public and a smaller section of Americans remained completely unconvinced by the arguments of Bush and Blair and there were huge anti-war demonstrations on the streets across the United Kingdom as citizens marched to avert the war.[538] In February 2003, 121 Labour Members of Parliament defied their own Party and asserted that the "case for military action was as yet unproven."[539]

In this way, it seems, Blair ignored his own people marching in the streets against war; he ignored the findings of a senior United Nations weapons inspector who died, allegedly through suicide, in circumstances that are still debated, and he committed his troops to a war that the United Nations Security Council did not support and which a large number of his own Party members would not approve. The former government minister Clare Short has asserted that the "decision by Blair's government to participate in the United States invasion of Iraq bypassed proper government procedures and ignored opposition to the war

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[533] Leighton Andrews. *"A UK Case" Lobbying for a New BBC Charter* in *The Handbook of Public Affairs*. 2005, p. 247.
[534] Glen Segell. *Disarming Iraq*. 2004, p. 511.
[535] Alan Doig. *45 Minutes of Infamy? Hutton, Blair and the Invasion of Iraq*. *Parliament Affairs.* 2005, 58, 1 p. 109.
[536] Jason Ralph, (2005), *op. cit*., p. 9.
[537] Anthony Seldon, (2005), *op. cit*., p. 515.
[538] Jason Ralph, (2005), *op. cit*., p.15.
[539] Peter Riddell, (2004), *op. cit*., p. 247.

from Britain's intelligence quarters."[540] Robin Cook was another Labour government minister who was fully opposed to Saddam and his regime, but who opposed the proposed invasion of Iraq to the extent that he resigned on principle due to the lack of legal legitimacy.[541]

Cook resigned after Lord Goldsmith accepted that the previous United Nations resolutions were sufficient for the invasion of Iraq, and in an article in *The Guardian* newspaper, he explained his decision, stating that Blair's actions were contrary to Labour's foreign policy, that a second resolution from the United Nations was necessary, and that to invade Iraq without having achieved one was a violation of Labour's principles.[542] Cook aptly gauged the mood of the general British public at the time, writing that although people were aware of the evil nature of Saddam and his regime, "they are not persuaded that he is a[…]danger to Britain. They want the inspections to be given a chance. And they are suspicious that they are being hurriedly pushed into conflict by a US administration with an agenda of its own."[543] Indeed, in March 2003, 139 Labour Members of Parliament supported the amendment that urged the government not to join the United States in war, and this was the largest rebellion in one hundred and fifty years. [544]

Whilst France, Russia, and China were insisting that weapons inspectors required more time and to attempt further diplomacy, the United States and the United Kingdom were adamant that the invasion was necessary, and so on March 19th 2003, they jointly invaded, with the United Kingdom contributing around 45,000 soldiers. [545]

There are various opinions as regards the motivation of Blair in overcoming the resistance of his own people and Party to the invasion of Iraq, as well as the opposition of the United Nations on grounds of international law. Some commentators have attempted to argue that Blair was a victim of hubris; of pride in himself and his own abilities, with David Owen, who served as British Foreign Secretary in the late 1970s, stating that for many politicians, the "very experience of holding office seems to develop into something that causes them to

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[540]BBC. *Claire Short says cabinet misled on Iraq war legality*.< http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8492526.stm>
[541] BBC News. *Cook Quits Over Iraq Crisis*.
< http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/2857637.stm>
[542] Robin Cook. *Why I had to leave the Cabinet*. The Guardian, 18th March, 2003.
[543] Idem.
[544] Terrence Casey. *The Blair Legacy: Politics, Policy, Governance, and Foreign Affairs*. 2009, p. 185.
[545] Mary Beth Norton, (2015), *op. cit*., p. 863.

behave in ways" that are not only uncharacteristic but also dangerous.[546] Yet it may be asserted that to argue that this was Blair's motivation would be naive. Certainly, it has been noted that Blair "stretched and manipulated the institutional capacity and […] created an autonomous leadership."[547] It is true that Blair had the confidence and the self-belief in the righteousness of his actions that he was able to ignore the United Nations, the doubts of his own Labour ministers, and the opposition of the British people. Seldon and Kavanagh appear to have some faith in this claim writing that Blair was "always driven more by the desire to win power than to use power" and that he "failed to work out until too late exactly what he wanted to do with power."[548]

The motivations of Blair in joining the mission of the United States in Iraq remain difficult to discern. Amongst numerous other academic commentators, Dunne has asked what the reasons were for Blair sending a huge amount of soldiers from Britain to "fight a war that lacked explicit United Nations Security Council authorisation, not to mention being opposed by 139 MPs in his own party and a significant proportion of the British people?"[549] He asserts that the "resurgent Atlanticism", meaning the revival of the 'special relationship' between Britain and the United States, can explain Blair's convictions and actions.[550] In a speech to the American Congress, Blair had proclaimed his belief that "any alliance must start with America and Europe. If Europe and America are together, the others will work with us."[551] Certainly, Blair sought to maintain the 'special relationship' with the United States; certain factors enabled him to ensure the continuance of this, such as the fragmentation of relations between France/ Germany and the United States, which allowed the United Kingdom to consolidate its position with the United States.[552]

In a 2014 article in *The Telegraph* newspaper, Boris Johnson, the eccentric Mayor of London, who himself voted for the decision to go to War on Iraq, called upon Blair to acknowledge that his Iraq Invasion was a "tragic mistake" and a "misbegotten folly". Explaining that before the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, there was no al-Qaeda presence in

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[546] David Owen. *The Hubris Syndrome: Bush, Blair and the Intoxication of Power.* 2012, p.3.

[547] Terrence Casey, (2009), *op. cit.*

[548] Anthony Seldon and Dennis Kavanagh, (2005), *op. cit.*, p. 423.

[549] T. Dunne. *'When the shooting starts': Atlanticism in British security strategy. International Affairs. 2004*, p. 894.

[550] Idem.

[551] Lloyd C. Gardner. *'Damned High Wire': On the Special Relationship that Unites Bush and Blair in Iraq.* 2005, p. 41.

[552] Jane Sharp, (2003), *op. cit.*, p. 66.

that country, he added that Saddam, though "a ruthless Ba'athist tyrant who treated his population with appalling brutality" had no link whatsoever with the 9/11 attacks, neither did he possess Weapons of Mass Destruction.[553] Regarding the reasons behind Blair's decision to go against Iraq, he asserted that while

> the Americans were motivated by a general strategic desire to control one of the biggest oil exporters in the world, as well as to remove Saddam [;] Blair went in fundamentally because he (rightly) thought it was in Britain's long-term interest to be closely allied with America, and also, alas, because he instinctively understood how war helps to magnify a politician. War gives leaders a grandeur that they might not otherwise possess. If you hanker after Churchillian or Thatcherian charisma, there is nothing like a victorious war.[554]

John Burton,[555] considered Blair's "mentor", claims in his book *We Don't Do God: Blair's Religious Belief and Its Consequences*,[556] that Blair's religious conviction had influenced all his key policy decisions, including the decision to go to war on Iraq. Indeed, according to him, Blair viewed going to war in Iraq as part of a "Christian battle" to fight evil. For him, "it's very simple to explain the idea of Blair the Warrior [...] it was part of Tony living out his faith." The book explains how the Prime Minister was "determined to follow a Christian agenda despite attempts to silence him from talking about his faith." Burton asserts that Blair's religion gave him a "total belief in what's right and what's wrong", leading him to see the "War on Terror" as "a moral cause" adding that "[Blair's] Christianity affected his policy-making on just about everything [including] intervening in other countries when he thought it was right to do it."[557]

These "revelations" may indicate that Blair saw the Iraq war in a similar light to Bush, who used religious rhetoric in talking about Iraq and Afghanistan going as far as describing them as "a crusade."

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[553] Boris Johnson. *Blair's Iraq invasion was a tragic error, and he's mad to deny it*. The Telegraph. 15 June 2014. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10901651/Blairs-Iraq-invasion-was-a-tragic-error-and-hes-mad-to-deny-it.html>

[554] Idem.

[555] John Burton has been Blair's political agent in his Sedgefield constituency for 24 years and is credited to have launched Blair's career in 1983.

[556] John Burton and Eileen McCabe. *We Don't Do God: Blair's Religious Belief and Its Consequences*. 2009.

[557] Jonathan Wynne-Jones. *Tony Blair believed God wanted him to go to war to fight evil, claims his mentor*. The Telegraph. 23 May, 2009. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/5373525/Tony-Blair-believed-God-wanted-him-to-go-to-war-to-fight-evil-claims-his-mentor.html>

As already shown in the previous chapter, being openly religious in British politics is not regarded as a positive trait in Britain. In this regard, Blair complained in 2007 that he had been unable to speak about his faith while in office as he would have been perceived as crazy:

> It's difficult if you talk about religious faith in our political system [...] If you are in the American political system or others then you can talk about religious faith and people say 'yes, that's fair enough' and it is something they respond to quite naturally. You talk about it in our system and, frankly, people do think you're a nutter.[558]

Accordingly, Burton claims that Blair wanted to "buffet the secular society that dominated life in Britain" and thought it was "time to nudge it in the other direction".[559]

The decision to go to war against Iraq substantively affected Britain's foreign policy. One example is how for years after Blair left office in 2007, huge problems in Iraq continued with sectarian violence, and this was due to the fact that Blair did not pay sufficient attention to what would replace Saddam's regime.[560] As Kampfner put it, in post-Saddam Iraq, "one form of fear -tyranny- had been replaced by another - lawlessness."[561] Furthermore, close association between Bush and Blair seriously damaged the opinion that many British citizens had of Blair, who had once been an extremely popular Prime Minister, and he actually began to be called "Bush's Poodle."[562] Although it is argued that he was motivated to go to war in Iraq by several factors, he stated that his reasons were simple, asserting that "the price of influence is that we do not leave the United States to face these tricky issues alone."[563] It is true however that in return for his loyalty, the United Kingdom did not achieve massive gains in reward, and Ralph asserts that Blair would have expected a more supportive United States regarding his roadmap plans for Israel and Palestine.[564]

American troops began disengaging from Iraq in 2007 and this was finished in 2011, when President Obama and the Prime Minister Al-Maliki met to cooperate on security,

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[558] ***The Blair Years part three: Blair in Power***. BBC. 2007.
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/stories/2007/11_november/25/blair.shtml>
[559] Jonathan Wynne-Jones**. *Tony Blair believed God wanted him to go to war to fight evil, claims his mentor. The Telegraph.* 23 May, 2009.
[560] L. Freedman. ***War in Iraq: Selling the Threat***. *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, Vol. 46, Issue 2. p.34.
[561] John Kamfner, (2004), *op. cit*., p. 384
[562] Hugo Young. ***Blair has not been a poodle, but poodleiism still beckons***. The Guardian, 14th November, 2002 <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/nov/14/iraq.foreignpolicy>
[563] Tony Blair. ***Speech to British Ambassadors and Senior Advisors. London***, 7th January 2003.
[564] Jason Ralph, (2005), *op. cit*., p. 15.

economic development and other relevant issues.[565] The Chilcot Inquiry, also known as the Iraq Inquiry, is the current investigation into the role that the United Kingdom played in the Iraq war; its initiation was announced by former Prime Minister Gordon Brown in June 2009, and initially was meant to be private.[566] This decision received so much criticism in both the British media and in the House of Commons that it was then reversed.[567] The inquiry is headed by Privy Counsellors who have investigated the role that the United Kingdom played in Iraq between 2001 and 2009. However, the report from the inquiry has yet to be released, and is currently delayed, which has been challenged by both Conservative and Labour MPs,[568] the reasons for the delay are currently unknown. Yet the Iraq Inquiry remains unpublished with some blame being placed on the reluctance of authorities within both the United Kingdom and the United States to reveal the private correspondence of Tony Blair and George Bush.[569]

Blair's second term in office, in fact, his whole premiership, will always carry the "taint of Iraq,"[570] "the most controversial military adventure since Suez."[571] As we have seen, 9/11 opened up a new opportunity for the US and its ally the UK to deal with Iraq which had previously been thought of as impossible because of the unfavourable legal, domestic and international climate. After the attacks in the US then, it was thought that the world would be easier convinced of the imminence of Saddam's threat. Because Blair was determined to stay "shoulder to shoulder" with the Americans, he decided to consecrate his whole government to construct a solid case for dragging his country to war; the result of which was the manipulations of the "intelligence" in order to provide "evidence" on Iraq's WMD programmes. In Peter Riddle's words, "[Blair] was bolder than all but perhaps Margaret Thatcher would have been in committing British troops" and that because of his unwillingness "to jeopardise the Atlantic alliance."[572]

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[565] Julie Pace. **Obama, Maliki chart next steps for Iran**. *Associated Press*. 12th December 2011.
[566] BBC News. **Iraq war enquiry to be in private.** 15th June, 2009.
< http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8100432.stm>
[567] Siddique Haroon. **Public war enquiry 'essential' says chairman**. *The Guardian*. 22nd June, 2009
[568] Jamie Doward and Chris Ames. **Angry MPs challenge 'stitch 'up' over delay of Chilcot report on war in Iraq**. The Observer, 10th January, 2015
<http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jan/10/chilcot-report-stitch-up-delay-general-election-iraq-war>
[569] Nicholas Watt. **Iraq inquiry: Chilcot admits he cannot set publication date**. *The Guardian,* 4th February 2015. < http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/feb/04/iraq-inquiry-chilcot-mps-fight-secret-documents>
[570]Anthony Seldon and Dennis Kavanagheds eds., (2005), *op. cit*., p. 395.
[571] Ibid., pp. 442.
[572] Ibid., pp. 395.

From what has preceded, it is quite clear that the cooperation between Saddam and the IAEA was to no avail. It seems that if the WMD had been found the US and UK would have obviously gone to war; if inspectors had not been allowed to enter Iraq, the two countries would certainly have gone to war; and if Iraq complied, as it did, and nothing would have been found, they would still have gone to war on the premise that Saddam was concealing something. This means that the invasion was decided upon and it is hard to see how Iraq could have proved its case and avoided invasion. As Hill put it:

> [It] is a simple but often over-looked truth about the whole Iraq affair, that Britain could never even have contemplated moving against Baghdad had the United States been opposed to the adventure, *whatever the facts about WMD*. [573]

For Dumbrell, Blair's decision to go alongside the US for war against Iraq is based on "his own personal beliefs about the logic of the 'special relationship' and in terms of the convergence between his own liberal internationalism and the priorities of American neo-conservatives". However, he continues, "the structures and generalized expectations of the 'special relationship' inclined London towards supporting the invasion, but did not determine Blair's choices", meaning that Blair could have avoided going into war but he chose to go alongside the US instead. In the 1960s, Harold Wilson resisted enormous American pressure to participate into the Vietnam War at a time when the US had far greater power over Britain's economy than was the case in 2003.[574] Despite all this, Wilson stayed firm and refused to commit any troops to Vietnam while Blair did the exact opposite.

Blair, "buoyed up by a sense of mission"[575] had "firmly followed the signpost pointing to Washington."[576] The invasion of Iraq was essentially a response, not to a surge of British public opinion or to a perception of immediate danger to Britain, but to the decision of the American president; and Blair's decision was based on his very personal trust in George W. Bush.[577] It seems that Blair stayed true throughout his mandate to his word back in March 2001 when he declared that "I've been as pro-America a prime minister as it is possible to

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[573] Anthony Seldon and Dennis Kavanagheds eds., (2005), *op. cit*., 392 (my emphasis)
[574] John Dumbrell, (2006), *op. cit*., p. 214.
[575] Anthony Seldon and Dennis Kavanagheds., (2005), *op. cit*., p. 395.
[576] Anthony Sampson, (2005), *op. cit*., p. 365.
[577] Idem.

have. There is not a single issue I think of in which we haven't stood foursquare with America"[578] and the Iraq episode bears testimony to what he said, especially considering that:

> It is clear to any unprejudiced observer that there was no defensible casus belli for the joint Anglo-American invasion of Iraq either on terms of national interest or international law. Saddam Hussein had no weapons of mass destruction, and the most that could be justified was a continued policy of surveillance and pressure to make sure that he did not develop or acquire them. [579]

The question that remains to be asked is what did Blair gain from his support? As Dumbrell notes, "it is difficult to see what concessions and policy shifts were extricated from Washington as a price of [Blair's] support". Adding that "far from revealing the inherently determined nature of the US-UK war-making partnership, the Iraqi invasion may come to be seen by future British leaders as a warning against excessive loyalty to American war agendas"[580].

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[578] Anthony Seldon and Dennis Kavanagheds eds., (2005), *op. cit*., p. 387- 388.
[579] Ibid., pp. 442
[580] John Dumbrell, (2006), *op. cit*., p. 215.

CONCLUSION

The missionary Blair, the man who had travelled light in opposition, who had known little of the world, had convinced himself that he, the Prime Minister, could change that world. Blair had acquired a passion for military intervention without precedent in modern British political history and without parallel internationally. Five wars in six years was a remarkable record. [581]

John Kampfner, *Blair's Wars*, 2004.

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[581] John Kampfner. *Blair's Wars*. 2004, p. 385

The Anglo-American Special Relationship should not be idealised, as "it is as much a product of national interests as of cultural affinities and historical affections."[582] In the hard-nosed world of international politics, it would be extremely naive to imagine that either nation ensures the continuance of the 'special relationship' for reasons of sentimentality. Each country serves a purpose for the other, and even when they worked closely together, the element of competition based on national interests still persisted.[583] As seen in the preceding chapters, the relationship has not always been smooth or unspoiled by disagreements. In fact, the concept of the Anglo-American Special Relationship is "one that falls in and out of favour".[584]

Great Britain and the United States share an "affinity of purpose, rooted in a shared heritage of law, traditions, blood ties, and culture."[585] However, as its former mother country, Britain has always maintained greater attachment to America and a possessive attitude towards the 'special relationship' due to a British awareness of the need for close ties with the US. Accordingly, "London's close connection with Washington permitted Britain to exercise the kind of global role it could increasingly not have hoped to have on the basis of its own resources alone."[586]

In contrast, these are ties that America shook off long ago as it struggled to free itself from Britain's colonialist yoke, and once it had gained its strength, it viewed Britain as a useful ally, jettisoning it when it reasoned that it could be of little use. As Professor David Raynolds puts it:

> When ideals and interests diverged, the outcome for British-American relations was disastrous – as in the Suez crisis of 1956. But when both countries felt a community of ideals and interests – as in the two world wars and the Cold War – their relationship was extremely close.[587]

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[582] Jeffrey D. McCausland and Douglas T. Stuart eds., (2006), *op. cit*., p.138.
[583] Michael F. Hopkins and John W. Young, (2005), *op. cit*., p. 503.
[584] Janet Beer and Bridget Bennett. ***Special Relationships: Anglo-American Affinities and Antagonisms, 1854-1936***. 2002, p. 1.
[585] Jeffrey D. McCausland and Douglas T. Stuart eds*,*. (2006), *op cit.,* p . v.
[586] Patrick Dunleavy, (2006). *op. cit*. p.175.
[587] David Reynolds. (2012). *op. cit*.

Whilst the common political ideals of the US and Britain united them during the Cold War, following its end and the demise of Soviet Russia, the two countries drifted apart, pursuing different agendas as the end of the Cold War had removed the fundamental purpose of the alliance.

Things, however, changed significantly after the attacks of 9/11. Blair and Bush saw themselves brought together on a "war footing" following the attacks, with the Prime Minister deciding that the "war on terror" provided an opportunity to demonstrate British commitment to its relationship with the United States[588] as well as *l'occasion en or* to fulfil his agenda on Iraq and get rid once and for all of the "evil" Saddam.

The history of Britain and America with Iraq is intricate and complicated, and tensions between the two Western powers and Saddam's Iraq were high long before the invasion of 2003. Both the British and Americans watched Saddam for many years, particularly during Iraq's war with Iran in the 1980s. Iraq's invasion of its neighbour Kuwait in 1990 precipitated the first Gulf War, which resulted in the ultimate withdrawal of the United States-led coalition from Iraq and the mass starvation of the Iraqi people through a heavily enforced regime of sanctions that was imposed by the US in the years following the war.

From the moment Tony Blair became Prime Minister, he had nurtured a hatred of Saddam and his regime. In 1998, he sought the help of President Clinton for a joint operation in Iraq, intended to be "a brief but sharp warning to Saddam Hussein not to impede the work of UN weapons inspectors"[589] but that achieved nothing except to effectively end the work of the inspectors and thus undermining the disarmament process. It was during that period that Blair started to think of himself as a tough leader capable of putting his weight on the international arena and consequently decided to jump head first on the foreign policy table where he had no previous experience.

The attacks of September 11, 2001 on the United States were a catalyst for the change in the foreign policy strategies of both America and the United Kingdom. A key characteristic of this period was the replacement of the old enemy, Soviet Russia, with the new threat of Middle-Eastern controlled terrorism. Thus, the former antipathy of the United States under President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s acted as a useful tool in the American

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[588] Jon Lunn, Vaughne Miller and Ben Smith, (2008), *op. cit*.
[589] John Kampfner, (2004), *op. cit*., p. 385.

subconscious and the mutual dislike of Communism acted as a bridge between the United States and Britain. Since the end of the Cold War, this bridge was in danger of disintegrating and the reappearance of a common enemy in the form of Islamic terrorism in the wake of 9/11 acted as a focus for the leaders of both countries to once again extol the benefits of Western democracy and to realign their former partnership.

Both Bush and Blair during this key period cemented their relationships with the various domestic and international media outlets to ensure their sympathy to their cause. The media in both countries, but especially so in the United States, took on this role with gusto, portraying, in some cases, both Arabs and Muslims with a vehemence that was at times bordering on the offensive. The way the 9/11 attacks and their aftermath were reported in the media contributed to the rise in patriotism and even chauvinism in the United States in particular, and which in many instances degenerated into the propagation of anti-Islamic and anti-Arab stereotypes. In Britain, the media was more restrained; nevertheless, the post-9/11 Anglo-American media certainly played a crucial role in the realignment of the 'special relationship' between the two nations.

As such, the attacks of 9/11 acted as the impetus for the final thaw in Anglo-American relations, as the two countries then collaborated in their so-called "War on Terror" as well as the search for justifications to wage war on Iraq and for the legal grounds that they could use to persuade the United Nations to sanction their planned incursion into that country.

9/11 evoked a desire for vengeance in the United States, as well as a fear of further attacks and a need to find the perpetrators and their protectors. This motivation, combined with a right-wing neocon President who held a strong Christian religious fervour, and the support of the media, made for a dangerous combination. This danger was multiplied when President Bush developed a close personal relationship with Blair and they discovered that in addition to their neo-conservatism-based principles and evangelical-style Christianity, they shared a similar political agenda over Iraq.

The true strategies and policies of Bush and Blair following 9/11 are complex and it is difficult to collate all the various sources to attempt to discern this. There are also different perspectives and opinions from various commentators as to how the relationship between them developed following 9/11. As noted, Blair immediately stated his support for Bush and the United States and from that moment on he was resolute in committing the United Kingdom to the plans of America. Although, as discussed, the invasion of Afghanistan was

performed with the implicit approval of the United Nations and in conjunction with supporters of the United States from NATO, the invasion of Iraq was an altogether more difficult matter.

Bush and Blair may be accused of having conspired together to initiate war against Iraq, and rather than having intelligence that justified such action, they actually sought out snippets of intelligence which they manipulated so they could use to justify war. Other factors were also at work; both men developed a close personal relationship, despite seemingly coming from different political and ideological viewpoints; Bush a conservative Republican, and Blair a Labour politician with socialist-leaning tendencies. Additionally, they both held strong Christian beliefs, which they allowed to guide them in their march towards war.

Furthermore, despite the tenuous nature of the links between Al-Qaeda and Iraq, and their failure to convince the United Nations Security Council of the righteousness of their cause, the two leaders had the support of the media, and specifically of the powerful media tycoon Rupert Murdoch, another neo-conservative sympathiser who was a close friend of Blair, and who controlled huge sections of global media, which was a key factor in manipulating people into believing in the requirement for war through a sustained propaganda.

The arguments that Bush and Blair used in their justifications for war changed at various times, from the need to intervene on humanitarian grounds, to the need to remove Saddam to save the world from terrorism. Many people remained unconvinced by these arguments, and in the United Kingdom in particular, huge numbers marched against the war in protest and Members of Parliament refused to support Blair.

The President and the Prime Minister sought and failed to gain the approval of the United Nations to go to War on Iraq and despite all the opposition he faced from several quarters, Blair was determined to join the United States in invading Iraq. To do so, he depended on the opinion of the British Attorney General Lord Goldstone, who assented to the invasion just days before the coalition forces entered Iraq, even though he had refused to acquiesce to Blair previously, leading to claims that he had been pressured into changing his mind at the last minute.

Bush and Blair based their intentions for the invasion of Iraq on faulty intelligence, which failed to convince the United Nations Security Council, and which Blair succeeded in using to convince a number of MPs into supporting him. There were those who did not support him, such as David Kelly, the experienced United Nations Weapons Inspector who leaked to the BBC his doubts about Blair's claims regarding the true level of the threat actually posed by Saddam. Yet, Kelly committed suicide, and Blair ignored the concerns of MPs who voiced their apprehension about military operations in Iraq, and the millions of marchers on the streets of the United Kingdom who protested against it. In this way, the Prime Minister succeeded in bypassing British democracy, and completely ignoring the concerns of his own ministers and the United Nations Security Council.

Yet, Blair was convinced of the justification for his alliance with the United States and was prepared to take huge risks to maintain the relationship and go to war against Iraq. The numerous sources available, including academic articles, Blair's own speeches and those of government ministers, and the memoirs of ministers such as Alastair Campbell, as well as newspaper reports from the relevant periods, provide important information that gives some idea as to Blair's motivations. Although it is never possible to know the exact truth, it is possible to discern that amongst Blair's motivations was the need to maintain the 'special relationship'.

In light of the drifting apart of Britain and America that had occurred following the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is quite probable that if the long standing relationship of mutual support and friendship between his country and America had not existed, Blair would not have dragged his country to war; the multiplicity of factors described above, in addition to the friendship that developed between him and Bush and their shared beliefs, meant that 9/11 certainly contributed to the resurrection of the 'special relationship'.

It is difficult to discern the exact extent to which Blair's desire to maintain and strengthen the Anglo-American Special Relationship was significant in his decision to join with the United States in its invasion of Iraq; this is a topic which the publication of the findings of the Chilcot Inquiry might reveal. Blair was willing to face the opposition of the British people, the wrath of his own party, and the hostility of other European nations and the opposition of the United Nations in order to support his ally. As discussed, the media played a key role in supporting him, mainly due to the strong alliance that he had nurtured with the media mogul Murdoch, which helped to manipulate the public perception regarding the threat

posed by Iraq and the need for war. Nonetheless, it is certain that Blair was motivated by several reasons to join with Bush. Although a partnership between him and Bush at first seemed unlikely, it was cemented through their Christian as well as neo-conservative beliefs and conviction that they were acting in the common good, crusading against the forces of evil.

Discerning the true reasons for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 is a complicated task and beyond the scope of this paper, of which the aim is to investigate the 'special relationship' between the United States and the United Kingdom in that regard. Certainly, both countries had their own reasons for reasserting the old alliance between them and in joining together with the invasion of Iraq, and both saw benefits in doing so.

From what precedes, it can be said that the entire premise for the invasion of Iraq was wrong, and had a great deal more to do with the personal ambitions, political beliefs, and even the religious inclinations of the leaders of the United States and the United Kingdom, Bush and Blair themselves. Indeed, the Bush administration might be accused of having always intended to invade Iraq, and of having used the 9/11 attacks and the fear of their aftermath to build a case for war against the country; a war that Blair was only too happy to join. In summary, therefore, Bush was planning military action on Iraq without any concern for the validity of necessary factual evidence, evidence that may not ever have been available or even in existence. This then implies that Blair was aware of this, and that together both leaders corroborated the misinformation of the other and disregarded both international law and the will of their own people, a factor that is particularly applicable to Blair, who faced great opposition prior to the invasion of Iraq.

To summarise the possible reasons that led Blair to take Britain to the War on Iraq, let us echo Kampfner with his question: "So why did he do it?"[590]:

> His was a combination of self-confidence and fear, of Atlanticism, evangelism, Gladstonian idealism, pursued when necessary through murky means. His was a combination of naivety and hubris. These were not his government's wars, least of all his party's wars. These were Blair's wars.[591]

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[590] John Kampfner, (2004), *op. cit*., p. 387.
[591] Idem.

Ultimately, the true reasons as to why Blair chose to join with the United States in the War on Iraq remains open for debate, and although his intention to maintain the 'special relationship' was certainly a motivating factor, it does not fully explain his actions. What is sure is that the lack of accountability to democracy became the defining feature of Blair's term as Prime Minister and caused irreparable damage.

Iraq, the Cradle of Civilisation, fell into a whirlpool of blood and smoke amid a general chaos. It has become a breeding ground of every kind of violence, from Shi'a militias to Sunni insurgents to al-Qaeda operatives, to Da'ech and the like. This violence, that never ceased since its inception in 2003, spilled, through time, over neighbouring countries like Syria, another beautiful country which has also been torn apart.

In the meantime, Blair, the man who was in no small part responsible of that Iraqi inferno, and as if to add insult to injury, had been appointed as the head of the Quartet on the Middle East involved in, ironically, mediating the peace process in the so-called Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In other words, he had been appointed as the *peace* envoy for the Middle East, triggering disbelief and anger among a large section of people and politicians alike, to the extent he was labelled a 'standing joke' with 'no credibility.'[592]

During his eight years period at the head of the group (from June 2007 until his resignation in late May 2015), the occupied territories of Palestine did not witness any positive outcome. On the contrary, the situation is as bad as ever, with the Israelis effectively destroying the Gaza Strip through the apartheid-style restrictions imposed, as well as the genocidal full-fledged military operations, to not say war (as a war is a two-sided affair), against the 360 km^2 in 2008-9 and 2014. As retired British ambassador, Oliver Miles, declared after news of Blair's resignation surfaced, "In the world of justice Blair would be brought to the Hague as war criminal",[593] then let us hope that our world will one day become a "world of justice".

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[592] Rose Troup Buchanan. *Tony Blair labelled a 'standing joke' with 'no credibility' amid rumours he will step down from his role as envoy to the Middle East*. The Independent. March 16, 2015.
[593] RT News. *'In the world of justice Blair would be brought to Hague as war criminal' – frmr British ambassador.* <https://soundcloud.com/rttv/blair-war-iraq-british>

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ABSTRACT IN ARABIC

ملخص البحث
العلاقة الأنجلوأمريكية الخاصة في أعقاب 9/11:
بلير و انخراط بريطانيا في الحرب على العراق

تستكشف الأطروحة الحالية العلاقة الأنجلو أمريكية الخاصة وتطورها بعد هجمات 11 سبتمبر 2001 على الولايات المتحدة الامريكية خلال عهدة توني بلير كرئيس وزراء بريطانيا وتوريطه لبلاده لاحقا في الحرب على العراق الى جانب حليفتها امريكا . كما تبحث هذه الدراسة في أهمية هجمات 9/11 في تعزيز "العلاقة الخاصة" بعد ان كانت مهددة بالزوال بعد انتهاء الحرب الباردة بسبب عدم وجود عدوا مشتركا بين البلدين. الى جانب ذلك يبين البحث كيف أن الهجمات وفرت لبريطانيا والولايات المتحدة عدوا مشتركا يقاتلانه معا و كيف انها إستخدمت كمبرر لشن الحرب ضد العراق. كما يستظهر البحث الى اي مدى كان بلير على استعداد للذهاب من أجل مساندة الولايات المتحدة في العراق.

يبدأ البحث بعرض وتحليل تاريخ العلاقة الأنجلو أمريكية بداية من عهد أمريكا كمستعمرة بريطانية ، وكيف ان هذا كان له اثرا سلبيا على العلاقة بين البلدين رغم العلاقات السياسية والاقتصادية والعسكرية الوثيقة الحالية بين الدولتين . كما تتم دراسة فكرة "العلاقة الخاصة" والعلاقات الوثيقة بين بريطانيا وأمريكا بالتفصيل مع أخذ بعين الاعتبار ركائز العلاقة والشراكة بين البلدين خلال الأحداث الرئيسية للقرن العشرين مثل الحرب العالمية الثانية التي تعتبر مهد "العلاقة الخاصة" كما نعرفها اليوم . كما يتم فحص تقلب مكانة الولايات المتحدة وبريطانيا بعد الحرب، و فترة الحرب الباردة وفتورالعلاقة بعد زوال الاتحاد السوفياتي .و يشمل البحث أيضا الأحداث السياسية الرئيسية في هذه الفترة المرتبطة بـ"العلاقة الخاصة". من اجل فحص دوافع بلير لتوريط بريطانيا في الحرب ضد العراق ، يتم تحليل تعاونه مع الولايات المتحدة ورغبته في التدخل في الصراعات الخارجية مثل كوسوفو.

يركز البحث على كيفية تحول "العلاقة الخاصة" ما بعد 9/11 وتعزيزها بعد الهجمات تحت قيادة رئيس الوزراء البريطاني والرئيس الأميركي جورج بوش الابن اللذان طورا علاقة شخصية وثيقة بينهما أثرت على الطريقة التي تم بها اتخاذ قراراتهما . في هذا الصدد يتم تحليل صداقتهما الغير محتملة، وصولا الى استنتاج مفاده أنه على الرغم من الاختلافات الظاهريّة ، يتقاسم الرجلان أفكارا مماثلة بشأن تدخل المحافظين الجدد و كذلك معتقداتهما المسيحية القوية، فضلا عن تصورهما المشترك لواجبهما في الدفاع عن الديمقراطية الغربية من خلال شن حروب صليبية ضد "الأشرار" مثل   صدام   حسين.

ويتم فحص آثار هجمات 9/11 بهدف التوصل إلى فهم أسباب انحياز بلير الفوري مع بوش والولايات المتحدة، على الرغم من تحفظ الدول الأوروبية الرئيسية الأخرى كألمانيا . ويناقش البحث كيف واجه بلير معارضة شديدة لخطط حربه من طرف المجتمع البريطاني وحتى من داخل حزبه السياسي، وكيف نجح في أخذ بلاده إلى الحرب ضد العراق على الرغم من الشكوك القوية حول المبررات القانونية للحرب و تلك المعارضة الشرسة التي واجهها . في نهاية المطاف، يخلص البحث من خلال الاعتراف بأن دعم بلير للولايات المتحدة والحرب على العراق كانت الدافع وراءه عددا من العوامل المعقدة والمترابطة و ان كان حقا أن بلير كان مصمما على الحفاظ على "العلاقة الخاصة"، فقد شاركت عوامل

أخرى أيضا في دعمه غير المحدود للولايات المتحدة ومن بين هذه العوامل كانت حماسة كبيرة للمسيحية والتبشير الملائكي التي قادته للعمل العسكري، محافظين جدد متنكر، فضلا عن تصوره المبالغ فيه من قدرته على تغيير العالم.