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Nationalism and Tribalism as Obstacles to Pan-Africanism

**A Dissertation submitted in partial requirements for the degree of Magister in
language, Culture and Society**

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Dedication:

To my family, friends and teachers

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Abstract

This Magister dissertation is on the obstacles that faced the success of Pan-Africanism through the case study of the Gold Coast. We try to clarify the role of Pan-African leader Kwame Nkrumah in Pan-Africanism and his efforts to achieve national unity in Ghana and continental unity in Africa and the obstacles that faced him. We introduce a background picture of Africans' role within the Pan-African movement until 1945 Manchester Congress. After this period, the leadership of this movement moved from the West Indians and Afro-Americans to continental Africans like Nkrumah. For the period between 1900 and 1945, continental Africans had only a symbolic representation. They were not an influential part in the proceedings and the decisions taken at the Pan-African Congresses held during this period. Starting from the 1945 Manchester Congress leadership moved to continental African leaders like Jomo Kenyatta, the Sierra Leonean T. Wallace Johnson and the most fervent leader among them, Gold Coaster Kwame Nkrumah. The study particularly follows up Nkrumah's vision of unity within his country the Gold Coast after his return from England following the Second World War. Nkrumah worked tirelessly for the independence of the Gold Coast from the British rule. He saw the unity of Ghana under a single government transcending racial, tribal and regional considerations as an ideal to the unification of Africa under a union government surpassing racial, tribal and regional regards. The study follows up to examine Nkrumah's vision, policies and efforts to achieve the African unity starting from the national level to the continental one. It aims at understanding Nkrumah's actions in front of the practical obstacles that made his Pan-African project fail.

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

- **A.A.C.:** The African affairs Centre
- **A.A.P.C.:** All African People' Conference
- **A.S.A.:** African Students Association
- **A.S.S.:** African Students Service
- **B.A.A.:** Bureau of African Affairs
- **C.A.A.:** Council of African Affairs
- **C.I.A.:** Central Intelligence Agency
- **C.I.A.S.:** Conference of Independent African States
- **C.I.D.:** Criminal Investigation Department
- **C.M.B.:** Cocoa Marketing Board
- **C.N.R.A.** The National Council of the Algerian Revolution
- **C.P.C.:** Cocoa Purchasing Company
- **C.P.P.:** Convention people's Party
- **C.Y.O.:** Committee of Youth Organisation
- **G.C.P.:** Ghana Congress Party
- **G.N.T.C.:** Ghana National Trading Corporation
- **G.P.R.A.** The Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic
- **G.Y.P.M.:** Ghana Young Pioneers Movement
- **I.A.F.A.:** International African Friends of Abyssinia
- **I.A.S.B.:** International African Service Bureau
- **K.N.I.I.:** Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute
- **L.C.P.:** League of Coloured People
- **M.A.P.:** Muslim Association Party

- **M.I.:** Military Intelligence
- **M.N.C.:** National Congolese Movement
- **N.A.A.C.P.:** National Association for the Advancement of Coloured people
- **N.A.S.S.O.:** The National Association of Socialist Students
- **N.C.G.W.:** National Council of Ghanaian Women
- **N.C.N.C.:** National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroon
- **N.D.P.:** National Democratic Party
- **N.L.C.:** National Liberation Council
- **N.L.M.:** National Liberation Movement
- **N. P.P.:** Northern people's Party
- **O.A.U.:** Organisation of African Unity
- **O.C.A.M.:** Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache
- **O.N.U.C.:** Operations des Nations Unis au Congo
- **P.D.D. :** The Presidential Detail Department
- **P.A.F.:** Pan-African Federation
- **P.O.G.R.:** President's Own Guard Regiment
- **P.V.A.:** Party Vanguard Activists
- **T.C.:** Togoland Congress
- **T.U.C.:** Trade Union Congress
- **U.A.R.:** United Arab Republic
- **U.D.I.:** Unilateral Declaration of Independence
- **U.G.C.C.:** United Gold Coast Convention
- **U.N.:** United Nations
- **U.N.I.A.:** Universal Negro Improvement Association
- **U.P.:** United Party

- **U.S.S.R.:** Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- **V.R.P.:** Volta River Project
- **W.A.N.S.:** West African Nationalist Secretariat
- **W.A.S.U.:** West African Students' Union

Introduction:

Pan-Africanism started formally at the London Conference of 1900. It represented the reaction of the African and the Afro-American intelligentsia to European imperialism and white racism. The initiative was taken mostly by Afro-West Indians and the most prominent among them was Henry Sylvester Williams from Trinidad. After the death of Williams, the movement remained inactive. Thus it remained for W. E. B Du Bois to take the initiative in sustaining the movement. It was W. E. B Du Bois who transformed Williams' limited concept of Pan-Africanism into a movement of self-government and independence for African peoples. He organised a series of conferences which contributed to the spread of Pan-African ideas among people of African descent and continental Africans.

This study will give a brief account of the evolution of nationalism in the Gold Coast (present day Ghana). After the Second World War, African nationalist leaders took over the leadership of Pan-Africanism from African-Americans and West Indians during the Manchester Congress of 1945. The main architect of this change was the fervent Gold Coast leader Kwame Nkrumah who made his country a centre and a beacon of Pan-African propaganda by organising a series of regional and continental Pan-African meetings, especially after independence. After independence, Nkrumah wanted to make his country the future podium of Pan-African movement. Accordingly, he expressed his intentions to organise a sixth Pan-African congress in the Gold Coast a step that would transplant the centre of Pan-Africanism from abroad to African soil. At home, the emergence of regional, ethnic and secessionist movements and parties from the Cocoa producing region of Ashanti, the National Liberation Movement (N.L.M.), the Ga people of Accra region, the

secessionist movement of Togoland, the Muslim Association Party (M.A.P.) and from the North of the country, the Northern People's Party (N.P.P.).

Before and after independence, Nkrumah was strongly opposed to any form of religious, tribal or ethnic sub-nationalism. This went against his political convictions and against his ideal of African unity transcending such boundaries. At the continental level, especially the period between 1957 and 1966, Kwame Nkrumah fought vigorously for the creating a union of African states with a common government. He passionately advocated Pan-Africanism as the solution to the economic, social and political problems of Africa. However, his dream did not come true due to a fierce opposition from African leaders, most of whom fearing the loss of their sovereignty.

The choice of Pan-Africanism and the role of Kwame Nkrumah in propagating the Pan-African ideas as a part of this research work comes from the desire to provide a modest contribution to a basic understanding of the essence of this movement. This dissertation is an attempt to enrich the existing literature about Pan-Africanism, trying to tackle the topic from a different angle, hoping to incite more interest in it and encourage further studies in future.

This dissertation is, therefore, an attempt to discern and understand the meaning of Pan-Africanism for Kwame Nkrumah and its relation with his vision of nationalism. The Gold Coast (present day Ghana) was chosen as the field of study because it was the leader of African nationalism and the first country which adopted the Pan-African ideology through its leader. After the Second World War, the Gold Coast served as the propagator of the Pan-African ideology in the African continent through its nationalist leader Kwame Nkrumah.

Nkrumah's dual struggle was part of a broader Pan-African movement. Thus, it did not end with the Achievement of Ghana's political independence on 6 March 1957. What it implied, however, was that he needed to succeed in Ghana before he could succeed in Africa and its Diaspora. It was against this background that in his inaugural address on Ghana's

independence, he proclaimed in his now famous statement that “the independence of Ghana is meaningless unless it links with the total liberation of Africa.” (Nimako, 12)

Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana was the first African leader who transplanted Pan-Africanism into the African soil. Between 1957 and 1966, Kwame Nkrumah fought vigorously for the creation of a union of African states with a common government. His optimism for the unity of and cohesion of Africa as a lever for continental development was unparalleled. However, his dream did not come true because of the fierce opposition from other African leaders. Most of them feared the loss of their sovereignty and their vested interests if they entered in a continental union under the leadership of Nkrumah.

A lasting positive legacy left by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana for African development is his vision for a continental union government for Africa (Biney, 131). Biney stated that Nkrumah passionately advocated Pan-Africanism as the solution to Africa’s myriad economic, social and political problems and he clearly reiterated his belief that no single African country could progress without unifying politically and economically with other African countries in order to exploit the economic potential and resources of the continent for the betterment of its people. Earlier, Mazrui acknowledged that:

Nkrumah’s greatest bequest to Africa was the agenda of the continental unification. No one else has made the case for continental integration more forcefully, or with greater sense of drama than Nkrumah. Although most African leaders regard the whole idea of a United States of Africa as wholly unattainable in the foreseeable future, Nkrumah even after death has kept the debate alive through his books and through the continuing influence of his ideas. (qtd in Olaosebikan, 1).

The primary component of Pan-Africanism was a belief in the necessity for African unity either through political union or economic and technical cooperation (Legum, 67). It needed to be observed however that the identification of Pan-Africanism with supra-state political unification has resulted largely from the activities of Kwame Nkrumah. This was perhaps why the African Union (A.U.) in its July 2009 “Declaration on the celebration of 100th birthday anniversary of Kwame Nkrumah”. Hence any assessment of Pan-Africanism and African unity movements must take account of Nkrumah’s actions and postulations. (Olaosebikan, 1)

The main research questions that would guide the debate in this dissertation are as follows:

- How did the leadership move from West Indians to African intellectuals like Kwame Nkrumah?
- What was the relation between Nkrumah’s ideal of Pan-Africanism and the concept of nationalism during the liberation process?
- What were the foundations of Nkrumah’s project of African Unity?
- Finally, why did his project fail?

This study attempts to follow the efforts and policies of Kwame Nkrumah to realise the Pan-Africanist ideal on the African continent, from his return from England until his overthrow in a military coup d’état in 1966. It focuses on both actions and the obstacles that worked against Nkrumah’s project, in Ghana and in the continental level. Locally, his policies to unite Ghana under one single mass party the Convention People’s Party (C.P.P.) by eliminating opposition parties and movements that were based on ethnic, religious or regional principles. Through his most famous saying “Seek you first the political kingdom and everything will be added unto you.” Nkrumah wanted to make the unity of Ghana with

its several tribes, religions and ethnicities under a single national government as a model for the unity of the African continent under one single continental government by eliminating all the forces that kept the African apart and hindered the Pan-African project. At the continental level, Nkrumah made gigantic efforts to convince other contemporary African leaders to adopt his ideas of a Pan-African union government or The United States of Africa. However, he faced a fierce resistance from most of them and even animosity towards his policies due to nationalist and regional tendencies.

In order to analyse Kwame Nkrumah's vision of African Unity in reference to Pan-Africanism and the obstacles he faced, qualitative and quantitative methods are used in collecting and analysing data. References consist of books, articles and journals. The historical method, with an analytical and argumentative approach, is used to examine the causes and consequences of Nkrumah's political actions and policies from his return in 1947 until his overthrow in 1966. The comparative approach will be used also to highlight the differences in both political strategies and views of Kwame Nkrumah and his contemporary African leaders over the best method towards the achievement of the African unity. Finally, the Marxist theory is relied on in studying the political career of Kwame Nkrumah since he was Marxist and Socialist in his political, economic and social policies and a Marxist politician as well.

The first chapter introduces a background picture of Africans' role within the Pan-African Movement until the 1945 Manchester Congress. It explores how the leadership moved from West Indian to African Educated elements, like Kwame Nkrumah.

The Second chapter follows up Nkrumah's vision of unity within his country Ghana after his return following the Second World War. It looks at his actions against British rule as part of the Pan-African project of race emancipation. It also examines relations with other

nationalist movements in the continent to determine Nkrumah's understanding of nationalism in relation to pan-Africanism.

The third chapter moves on to examine Nkrumah's vision and policy to realise the idea of the African race unity, beginning from national to continental levels. It aims at understanding his ambitions in confrontation to the practical obstacles that made his project eventually fall down. We will also give a short account of the contribution of some Algerian leaders to Pan-Africanism and the nationalist struggle in the African continent.

Chapter One: The Role of Africans in the Pan-African Movement 1900-1945

In this chapter, we will try to provide a definition to Pan-Africanism though it is difficult to provide a clear cut definition to this movement. This is due to the fact that Pan-Africanism is a combination of ideas which evolved in three continents: The New World, particularly The West Indies and The United States; Europe, namely England; and finally Africa, especially the Gold Coast. And led by Pan-African leaders who came from different backgrounds and held different views about the best ways to undertake their struggle to restore the freedom and the dignity of the black race and improve its living conditions all over the world. Moreover, throughout the history of its evolvement, the Pan-African ideology was not limited to a specific field, but it comprised different spheres of activity, whether political, economic, or social. All these factors contributed, in one way or another to its complexity.

However, in this chapter one, will first limit our study of Pan-Africanism with the political aspect of this movement since it is mainly a political movement in its essence. Second, we will limit the study to the development of the Pan-African movement within the period between 1900 and 1945. In other words, the movement that was initiated by Henry Sylvester Williams and led by W.E.B. Du Bois, the Father of Pan-Africanism. Third, we will tackle the participation of continental Africans in the Pan-African congresses and meetings before 1945. Finally, we will also show how the leadership of Pan-Africanism moved from

African Americans and West Indians to continental Africans after the 1945 Manchester Congress.

1-1- The African Roots of Pan-Africanism

The history of Pan-Africanism can be traced all the way back to the time of slave trade and eventual colonisation of the African continent. Pan-Africanism was then a reaction against the oppression and the exploitation of the black race and the racial doctrines that marked the era of slavery. This gave rise to the Pan-African movement, which initially served as a tool against the enslavement of black people and racism, but later it evolved into an organised movement with cultural and political claims, especially after the Second World War. But before we deal with the origins of this movement, we have try to provide some definitions to it.

1-1-1 definition of Pan-Africanism

Most of the existing literature on pan-Africanism was the work of Pan-African leaders, nationalists, political scientists, anthropologists, sociologists and historians. Many of these writers interpreted this movement from their own perspectives and field of interest. It is difficult to provide a clear cut and precise definition to Pan-Africanism. Nevertheless, it is important to consider the definitions given by some scholars. Collin Legum, a journalist defined it as:

It is essentially a movement of ideas and emotions [...] in one sense Pan-Africanism can be likened to socialism; in other sense it can be likened to a World Federation, Atlantic Union or Federal Europe. And yet in its deepest sense, pan-Africanism is different

from all these movements in that it is exclusive. Its closest parallel perhaps Zionism. (Legum, 13)

According to George Padmore Pan-Africanism was a reaction against the oppression of the black people and the racial doctrines since the period of slavery and the slave trade. For him it started from a movement of self-assertion and resistance to enslavement. His definition goes back to the origin of the ideas and the earliest movement beyond the year 1900 which is often is regarded as a turning point for the beginning of an organised Pan-African movement (TeseemaTa'a, Pan-Africanism: A Historical Analysis, 03)

Another writer, Immanuel Geiss a German historian, suggested three definitions for Pan-Africanism:

a-an intellectual movement among Africans or people of African descent which saw Africa, Africans and people of African descent as a unit, designed to instil self-confidence by referring to the latter back to Africa as their 'Fatherland', without meaning necessarily physical return to Africa , **b-**any ideas which saw Africa as a unit, which stood for the political independence of Africa, the economic, technical and social modernisation of African society by adopting western techniques, **c-** the achievement of some kind of unity or close political cooperation (Geiss, 03).

Pan-Africanism is then a movement in the twentieth century of African racial consciousness which was born in the New World as a result of centuries of mental and physical suffering inflicted by the whites upon Africans. It called for self-pride and it glorified the African past. It aimed to unify Africans all over the world to form a defence front against the white domination, to liberate African territories from colonialism, and to promote the African race to higher ranks of modern civilization.

1-1-2- Origins of Pan-Africanism

Both slavery and colonisation were built on the principle of exploitation and caused so much suffering to the black race. As a slave the African lost his freedom, dignity, and his basic human rights. After he was emancipated, he had to endure the whites' racial prejudices, their contempt, and their violent actions against him like lynching. These feelings of frustration and rejection by the white race convinced the blacks living in the New World that the only way to restore all that had been taken from them was to unite their efforts to oppose white oppression and improve their conditions. African American leaders disagreed sometimes on the means and ways of undertaking their struggle, but they all agreed on the purpose. Their ideas constituted the sources from which Pan-Africanism drew its very essence. The movement came into being in the twentieth century and sought to save the black race from its servile situation and achieve its welfare all over the world.

On the African continent, the effects of European colonisation on the inhabitants were not so different since they, too were reduced to a debased situation. Colonial systems differed from one African territory to another and from one colonial power to another, and so did the colonial Africans. Nevertheless. The purpose of any colonisation is above all, the exploitation of the colonial territory for the benefits of the colonial power. The fact of being ruled by an alien authority which intended to meet its own needs at the expense of the natives' was in itself another type of servitude.

Contacts between the leaders of the New World Africans and continental Africans remained at the beginning very scanty; therefore, they knew very little about each other's conditions and activities. It was only in the twentieth century that some communication started to appear, especially after the First World War. In the 1920's, the launching of the Pan-African Congress movement by W. E. B. Du Bois, New World Pan-Africanists displayed a longing attachment to the land of their ancestors and endeavoured to contribute to

its development. The African nationalists admired the work that was being done by their exiled brothers for the betterment of the black race's conditions and welcomed their economic and educational assistance. Furthermore, representatives from Africa had attended many Pan-African conferences since 1900 and had tried to adjust the distorted image that many New World Africans held about continental Africans in general. However, until the Second World War Pan-Africanism remained largely a New World affair, and the movement was more interested in the welfare of people of African descent living in the western hemisphere.

Historians generally agreed that the term 'Pan-Africanism' emerged by the beginning of the twentieth century, during a conference organised by a West Indian lawyer called Henry Sylvester Williams in July 1900. Williams had founded the world first Pan-African Association, on 14 September, 1897. The African Association had a Pan-African tendency that it called for unity among black people the world over, and sought to secure and protect their rights (Geiss 08). However, the term 'Pan-African' was not yet in usage. The Pan-African Conference of 1900 was the first attempt to form a worldwide pressure group constituted of black people to voice the black's grievances.

Although the word has become popular since that date, its manifestations go back to the previous centuries. A number of historical events contributed to the conception of this movement and favoured its emergence as the world's most important Pan-movement in the twentieth century. However, "... it is futile to try Esedebe wrote, "As some writers have attempted, to ascribe the phenomenon to any one man or trace its origin to a particular year." (P. O. Esedebe, Origin and Meaning of Pan-Africanism 04). The exact period when the first Pan-African sentiments were expressed, and the exact man/men who first manifested such sentiments will undoubtedly never be known. Nevertheless, most views agree on the opinion

that slave trade, particularly the Atlantic one, the abolitionist movements and European colonisation had been the main factors that led to the emergence of the Pan-African ideology.

Actually, Pan-Africanism was the product of a protracted contact between two different races, namely the white European and the black African. The history of this contact is one of the white's subjection and domination over the blacks, and the effects of these processes on the latter in particular. The Africans' direct contact with Europe changed from friendly exchange and peaceful trade at the beginning to a master-servant relationship after a short period of time. This was due to the fact that Europeans' predominant motive for their presence in Africa was an economic one, as they sought to make as much profit as they could afford. This was amount to exploitation, both of humans and natural resources. Throughout the years, the exploitation of the African soil and people increased according to the profits gained by the Europeans, to reach a stage at which was regarded as a means of production only.

It is true that Europeans' intention when they first reached the West African Coast in the fifteenth century was not to enslave or rule over its people. Their explorations were the result of Europe's renaissance and a manifestation of her new-born interest in the world outside their own geographical boundaries (K. Nantambo, Pan-Africanism Versus Pan-African Nationalism 06, 07). However, a combination of historical events helped change the Europeans' minds towards their dealings with the African people. The Europeans needed a cheap and reliable labour force and the African manpower seemed to meet their requirements. Thus, they initiated the cruellest form of slave trade and the most dehumanising form of slavery known to history. These marked the first episode in the tragedy of Africa's direct connection to Europe.

1-2- The Participation of Africans in Early Pan-African Meetings and Conferences:

In 1897 Henry Sylvester Williams travelled widely in Britain and Ireland. In the same time, he formed an 'African Association' in London, which met on 19 November 1898 and issued a notice announcing the intention to hold a conference in London. The aims of the African Association were:

- 1- To encourage the feeling of unity
- 2- To facilitate friendly intercourse among Africans in general
- 3- To promote and protect the interests of all subjects claiming African descent, wholly or in part, in British colonies and other places, especially in Africa, by circulating accurate information on all subjects affecting their rights and privileges as subjects of the British Empire and by direct appeals to the imperial and local government (Geiss, 08).

The notice stated as one of its objectives “ to take steps to influence public opinion on existing proceedings and conditions affecting the welfare of the natives in the various parts of the world, particularly South Africa, West Africa, West Indies and the United States of America.” (Geiss, 08). Responses were very encouraging, and a series of preparatory meetings were held. Leading Africans and Afro-Americans were present. One meeting on 12th June 1899 was attended by Bishop J. F. Holly from Haiti, Bishop James Johnson from Lagos, Bishop H. M. Turner from United States, Rev. Majola Agbebi from Lagos and Booker T. Washington. (Geiss, 08)

But before we deal with the Pan-African Congresses separately, the resolutions passed at each of them and the participation of continental Africans in them, a brief account of some of the Pan-African meetings before the First World War is worth consideration.

1-2-1- Africans in The 1900 Pan-African Congress.

The Pan-African Congress of 1900 was held from 23 to 25 July 1900 in Westminster Town Hall and was attended by twenty four delegates. It was presided by Bishop Alexander

Walters, with a Liberian former Attorney General and Benito Sylvain, a Haitian scholar and activist as deputy chairman. Sylvester Williams from the West Indies was the organiser, but there was a genuine African, Bishop James Johnson of Lagos. He was specially honoured by the conference and received a memorial from the delegates, congratulating him on his recent promotion as an Anglican assistant bishop of the Niger Delta (Geiss, 09). The list of attendees included also A. F. Riberio a lawyer from the Gold Coast (Goking, 55). William Edward Burgardt Du Bois was the chairman of the committee on address, he wrote his well-known appeal *To the Nations of the World*: “The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of colour line – the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea.” (qtd in Legum 24). According to Legum the Conference announced the ill-treatment of Africans in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) (qtd in Legum 25).

The Appeal enlarged the original scope of the conference from Pan-Negroism to Pan-Coloured Peoples Movement. Practically it was a memorial to Queen Victoria demanding reforms in South Africa, including Rhodesia. Another practical result of the conference was the transformation of the African Association to the Pan-African Association, with officers elected during the conference for the central body and for national or regional bodies and the central headquarters was London. The president of the Pan-African Association was Bishop Alexander Walters; Benito Sylvain, General Delegate for Africa; Henry Sylvester Williams, general Secretary. Among the members of the executive committee was the Sierra Leonean S. Coleridge Taylor. The regional officers were Du Bois from U.S.A., Bishop Holly from Haiti, Johnson from Liberia, Edwin Van Loch from Natal, J. A. A. William and A. Lewis from Sierra Leone, J. Ottonba Payne, N. W. Holm from Lagos. The vacancies for Cape Town, Rhodesia, Canada, Orange, River Colony, Transvaal, the Gold Coast and Trinidad could not be filled during the Conference (Geiss, 09).

To ensure some organisational solidity, it was decided to have a Pan-African Conference every year. The 1902 conference was planned to be held in the U.S.A and the 1904 conference of in Haiti. Moreover, the Pan-African Association launched a journal, *the Pan-African*, edited by Sylvester Williams. Although the next conference was announced for 1902 in the U.S.A, no conference was ever held under the auspices of the old Pan-African Association. It remained a paper organisation and died unnoticed. Sylvester returned to Trinidad after a short interval in South Africa. He died in 1911(Adi and Sherwood, 200/201).

The 1900 Conference was not a completely isolated episode. Sylvester Williams was active in the Aborigines Protection Society of the Gold Coast and the conference was covered by the *Aborigines Friend and the Anti-Slavery Reporter* and was optimistic about its potentialities. Viewing the conference in the context of a colonial policy which was becoming more reactionary, an editorial of this Aborigines paper added prophetically and in anticipation of modern Pan-Africanists:

We predict that Africa will always remain what it always been – the black man’s continent. There may be fringes of population of whites here and there, but the main bulk of people will be black. We talk of Boer and Briton in South Africa [...] what if, at some distant date in the future, South Africa should belong neither to Boer nor Briton, but to the negro - his by right, by superior numbers, and superior power? We may smile at the idea, but it may easily become a tremendous reality (qtd in A. S. K. B. Asante, *The Aborigines Society, Kwame Nkrumah and the 1945 Pan-African Congress*, 04)

More importantly, the press in West Africa did not only report the conference but vehemently supported it and the foundation of the Pan-African Association. *The Lagos Standard* was quick in pointing out the historic significance of the London Conference. It wrote:

The last year of the present century will long be memorable to all people of African descent of an event in the history of race movement, which for its importance and probable results so far as its aims and objects are concerned, is without a parallel. The unprecedented spectacle of members of the negro race gathered in the World's metropolis, discussing their wrongs and pleading for justice for the race, is sufficiently striking to attract public attention in an unusual degree (qtd in Davidson, *Modern Africa: A Social and Political History* 31/32).

The Gold Coast press carried reports of the Conference and urged for the need for “the Negro” to “be protected” from the white conspiracies by depending largely on himself. The unprecedented spectacle of such race solidarity inspired the prominent Gold Coast nationalist Casely Hayford. In 1912 Casely Hayford's brother, Reverend Mark Hayford had attended Booker T. Washington's International Conference on the Negro, held at Tuskegee Institute in Alabama, where he delivered a speech and read a letter from his brother together with Dr. R. A. Savage, who had been the Nigerian delegate at the 1900 London Pan-African Conference. (Goking, 55)

In fact, the pan-Africanists of 1900 took up the two key problems facing Africa and all those of African descent worldwide namely colonialism and racism. But the resolutions they found were designed mainly to ameliorate the conditions of the oppressed negro in Africa, America and the British Empire and other parts of the world. The first Pan-African conference was considered as a beacon for all the people of African descent to join together

to campaign for their rights and stressed the necessity of enlightening public opinion about the plight of Africa and Africans, especially in Britain.

Although many writers revealed the significance of the Conference, they also underlined the inactivity and passiveness of the Pan-African Movement between 1900 and 1919. This inactivity could be attributed to the First World War which took place from 1914 to 1918.

1-2-2- The First Universal Races Congress, London 1911.

The next meeting was the First Universal Races Congress held in London in 1911. It was not really a Pan-African but rather a sentimental and well-wishing attempt to make for a better understanding between the various races, including the white, without challenging colonialism. But the presence of Du Bois and Dr. Majola Agbibi (1860 – 1917), a prominent figure from Nigeria represented a certain amount of continuity within the pan-African context. The Congress was organised by Du Bois and financed by John E. Mulholland, a wealthy American philanthropist, who also supported the newly founded National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (N.A.A.C.P). The attempt at founding a permanent organisation failed even during the Conference. A second Conference was expected to be held in Paris but it was thwarted by the First World War.

1-2-3- The Emergence of Mohamed Ali Duse

This short period witnessed also the emergence of Mohamed Ali Duse and his *The African Times and Orient Review*. Duse was surely the most colourful of all Pan-African leaders. He was the son of an Egyptian army officer and a Sudanese mother. At an early age he was sent to England to be educated but he couldn't return home frequently and lost his native language. In 1882 his father and brother were killed in the bombardment of Alexandria

which resulted in the British occupation of Egypt. His mother and sister whom he never saw fled to the Sudan.

Without the financial support of the family, he left school at 16. He worked as an actor in Britain and the USA, and wrote some plays. He visited India, North, South and Central America, and the Caribbean. Duse was provoked by a statement from the contemporary US president Theodore Roosevelt, inciting Britain to use violence and injustice in dealing with ‘uncivilised’ and ‘fanatical’ Egyptians as they demanded self-government. Duse wrote his book *In the Land of the Pharaoh* which was welcomed by the British press as the first history written by an Egyptian.

Duse was invited to attend the Universal Races Congress in 1911. He was charged with publicity and entertainment. Among the few black men at the Congress were W. E. B. Du Bois and the Sierra Leonean John Eldred Taylor (Adi and Sherwood, 10). In July 1912, the first issue of his journal “*The African Times and Orient Review*” appeared in which he clearly pointed to Universal Races Congress:

The recent Universal Race Congress ... clearly demonstrated that there was ample need for a Pan-Oriental, Pan-African journal at the seat of the British Empire which would lay the aims, desires and intentions of the black, Brown and Yellow races (qtd in Geiss, 13).

The newspaper was clearly Pan-Coloured. It was concerned with West Africa, mainly British West Africa. In 1931 Duse went to West Africa, settled in Lagos and remained active in the Nigerian politics, ending up as the chairman of the meeting which founded the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroon (N.C.N.C) (Geiss, 14).

1-3- The Interwar Conferences

The interwar period witnessed the organisation of four Pan-African Congresses from 1919 to 1927; all of them were organised by W. E. B. Du Bois. These congresses contributed to the drawing of the attention of the world to the problems of Africans either in the continent

or the diaspora. They also contributed to the spreading of the Pan-African ideology among nationalist leaders, who eventually took it over from New World Pan-Africanists through their delegates who participated in the proceedings of these congresses.

1-3-1- The Role of Africans in The 1919 Congress.

The Pan-African Congress which most historians considered as the ‘first’ one and which draw most attention was organised by Du Bois in 1919 in Paris. This Congress was organised with the help of Blaise Diagne. Diagne was a Senegalese representative in the chamber of deputies, and more importantly was a High Commissioner in charge of recruiting native Africans for the French Army. During the First World War he set the target of recruiting forty thousand men, and his team actually enlisted 63378 men (Boahen, 319). Some of them took part in several battles. He was too much respected by the French as he was a close friend to the then French Prime Minister George Clemenceau (1841-1929). However, he was criticised by African nationalists as a French ‘stooge’ (Legum 27).

The first Pan-African Congress was attended by fifty seven delegates from fifteen countries. Twelve delegates were from nine African countries. Sixteen delegates were American, and twenty one were from the West Indies. The remainder were from Great Britain, Belgium, France and Portugal. (Contee, Du Bois, the N.A.A.C.P and the Pan-African Congress of 1919, 13). Most of the delegates were residents of France and this appeared to have been the main criterion for their presence at the Congress. The Congress was described by *New York Evening Globe* as:

The first assembly of its kind in history ... seated at long tables in the council room today were Negroes in the trim uniform of American officers, other American coloured men in frock coats or business suits, polished French Negroes who hold public office,

Senegalese who sit in the French chamber of deputies (qtd in Legum, 27/28).

Diagne was elected President and he delivered the opening speech. Du Bois was elected executive secretary. Diagne's speech was restrained and praising the French colonialism. Other speakers informed the delegates about the latest reforms done by Belgium in the Congo. Immanuel Geiss stated that though the immediate results of the Congress were meagre, it was important, because for the first time some kind of collaboration between English-speaking and French-speaking Africans and Negroes from the Caribbean was brought about.

Most of the French-speaking attendants were Caribbean, and only one, the Senegalese Blaise Diagne, was a genuine African. They identified themselves so much with French colonialism in a way that they were despised by the few African students and young intellectuals in Paris coming from French Africa. They were largely isolated and even considered as a kind of hindrance to the idea of Pan-Africanism by the early French-speaking nationalists. They left Du Bois as early as 1921 and 1923 (Geiss, 15).

Immanuel Geiss also stated that there "was scarcely any representative from West Africa. Casely Hayford regretted that British West Africa was not represented in the Paris Congress. Nevertheless, the Gold Coast press was in general agreement with the resolution passed in this Congress, particularly *The Gold Coast Leader* which commented that the first Pan-African Congress "... had brought representatives of fifteen Africa communities, including West Africa, into a common platform, and had presented a common a 'united front' on race question." (Goking, 55). Moreover, the newspaper encouraged the educated West Africans to present a true image of the situation of West Africa which was unknown to most New World blacks and predicted that more West African delegates would be present at the next Pan-African Congress.

According to Legum, the Congress adopted a lengthy resolution which nowhere spoke of Africans right to independence. It proclaimed the need for international laws to protect the native; for the land to be held in trust; for the prevention of exploitation by foreign capital; for the abolition of slavery and capital punishment; for the right of education, and finally it insisted that “the natives of Africa must have the right to participate in the Government as far as their development permits...” (Legum, 28)

The demands were then moderate and all the congressmen sought was the improvement of the black conditions throughout the world. There was no reference to the independence of African territories under European colonisation. Despite some criticism as the meagre accomplishments of the Congress, du Bois was very satisfied with the results and considered that the fact of gathering fifty seven delegates was in itself a great achievement in view the various obstacles he overcame. Nevertheless, the most important achievement of the First Pan-African Congress was that the voice of the black man was heard in the four corners of the world.

1-3-2- Africans’ Participation in The 1921 Pan-African Congress.

The Second Pan-African Congress met in August and September 1921 in three successive sessions in London, Brussels and Paris. The number of participants in the Congress doubled in comparison to the previous one. It was attended by one hundred and thirteen delegates. Forty one were from Africa, thirty five from the United States, twenty four from Europe, and seven were from the West Indies. The congress was addressed by a number of socialist leaning people; namely Sir Sidney Oliver. A former Governor of Jamaica; and Dr. Norman Leys, a leading authority on Kenya (Middleton, Pan-Africanism: A Historical Analysis and Critique, 05). The Gold Coast representative was W. F. Hutchison, a journalist who had been working in London since the closing years of the nineteenth century. In the

evening speech of the second day of the London session, Hutchinson presented a long paper about Africa and Europe.

The delegates endorsed a “declaration to the world”, drafted by Du Bois and stating in part that:

The absolute equality of races, physical, political, is the founding stone of world and human advancement. No one denies great differences of gift, capacity and attainment among individuals of all races, but the voices of science, religion and practical politics is one in denying the belief in existence of super races or of races naturally and inevitably and eternally inferior... the doctrine of racial equality does not interfere with individual liberty; rather it fulfils it. (qtd in Pracy, *Pan-Africanism and Pan-Africanists*, 09)

According to Jessie Fauset, a black American writer, the London meeting exemplified an atmosphere of cooperativeness and brotherhood “ we felt our common blood with almost unbearable unanimity.” The delegates who were present at this phase of the Congress from the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, Lagos, Grenada, United states, Martinique, Liberia, British Guiana, Jamaica and Africans resident in London (Watkins I. *The Du Bois Garvey Controversy*, 32).

When the Congress reconvened in Brussels on August 31, the unity that had been apparent in London had disappeared in Brussels. Negroes in the audience were outnumbered by whites. Many of Belgium’s economic and material interests centred in Africa, particularly in Belgian Congo. Any interference with the natives might result in an interference with the sources from which so many Belgian capitalists drew their wealth. These fears had been expressed early by a Brussels newspaper *the Neptune*, when the announcement of the Brussels meeting was made. The Congress was denounced as “ an agency of Moscow and

the cause of native unrest in the Congo.” The government was called upon to prevent the meetings of the Congress in Brussels. The editorial of the newspaper stated that:

It is interesting to note that this association (N.A.A.C.P) is directed by personages who, it is said in the United States, have received remuneration from Moscow (Bolsheviks). The Association has already its propaganda in the lower Congo, and we must not be astonished if some day it causes grave difficulties in the Negro village of Kinshasa (qtd in Pardy and Hons, W. E. B Du Bois and Pan-Africanism, 77).

Despite the criticism in press, the Congress was convened and for the first two days. Belgian spokesmen from the colonial office pointed out to the delegates the advancement of the Africans under the Belgian administration. On the last day of the meeting, Du Bois read the resolutions adopted at the London sessions and demanded their acceptance by the delegates. One of the resolutions criticised Belgian colonial administration though it also praised her plans for future reform. Du Bois action caused a ‘serious clash’ between the American-British delegation, who favoured a critical approach to colonialism, and the French- Belgian delegates who wanted an accommodation with the status quo (qtd in Pardy and Hons, W. E. B Du Bois and Pan-Africanism, 77). Diagne, as a chairman, refused to allow the London resolutions to be voted and accused the “black American radicals” of courting disaster. A white Belgian was permitted to present an alternative resolution in which it was agreed that the African could profit from education and asked the colonial powers to establish commissions to investigate the educational and the living conditions of Africans (qtd in Pardy and Hons, W. E. B Du Bois and Pan-Africanism, 78).

A noted participant in Brussels session was Paul Panda from the Belgian Congo, whose Pan-African activities caused serious concern with the Belgian government and resulted in

close supervision of Brussels session by the authorities. This was due to the fact that Paul Panda had been identified as a Garveyist agitator by influential Belgian newspapers, helped organise the Congress and introduced W. E. B. Du Bois to the colonial authorities in Brussels. So, by the time the Congress was convened in September 1921, the colonial authorities in Brussels and Boma (the capital of Congo) had gathered from the United States of America, Great Britain and France, a great deal of information which convinced them that Black Americans, led by Marcus Garvey, were determined to overthrow European rule in Africa and especially in the Belgian Congo (Kodi M. W. The 1921 Pan-African Congress at Brussels: A Background to Belgian Pressures, 03).

The declaration and resolutions adopted at the London session were endorsed and the delegates moved on to Paris for a third session of the Congress which met on September 5 and 6. This session attracted many Africans from the French colonial empire. It was presided by Blaise Diagne.

At this session, the Congress elected a delegation under the chairmanship of Du Bois to present a petition to the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations. The petition stated in part, that: “ The Second Pan-African Congress wishes to suggest that the spirit of the world moves towards self-government as ultimate aim of all men and nations....” (qtd in Middleton, p. 06)

Another important achievement of this Congress was the establishment of the pan-African Association in December, 1921. It was presided by Gratien Candace (1878 – 1953), a black representative in the French Chamber of Deputies from Guadeloupe and the general Secretary Isaac Béton a black high school teacher from Martinique working in Paris. The objective of the Pan-African Association was to improve the conditions of black people in the world (Logan, 08).

1-3-3- Africans’ Role in The 1923 Pan-African Congress.

The Congress was convened in London in the summer of 1923, with a smaller attendance than previous conferences. There were two separate sessions of this Congress which took place in 1923 in London and Lisbon. The London session was attended by the British novelist H. G. Wells and the distinguished sociologist Harold Laski, who were among the speaker in this session (Logan, 08). It reiterated the resolutions of the previous Pan-African Congress. The most important political demands were:

- 1- A voice in their own governments.
- 2- The right to access to the land and its resources.
- 3- Trial of juries by their peers under established forms of law.
- 4- Free elementary education for all; broad training in modern industrial techniques; and higher training of selected talent.
- 5- The development of Africa for the benefit of Africans, and not merely for the profit of Europeans.
- 6- The abolition of slave trade and liquor traffic.
- 7- World disarmament and the abolition of war; but failing this, and as long as white folk bear arms against black folk, the right of blacks to bear arms in their own defence.
- 8- The organisation of commerce and industry so as to make the main objects of capital and labour the welfare of the many rather than the enriching of the few (qtd in Middleton, 06)

The 1923 Congress drew attendance from America, the Caribbean and Africa. Besides, Rayford Logan and A.M.E. Bishop Vernon of the United States, Chief Amoah III of the Gold Coast and Kamba Simango of Portuguese East Africa attended and helped to formulate several substantive resolutions. The Congress called for representation on the League of Nations Mandates Commission, 'an institute to study

the Negro problem', the restoration or improvement of black rights throughout the black world, and freeing Abyssinia, Haiti and Liberia from the "grip of economic monopoly and usury at the hands of money-masters of the world." Du Bois personally took the resolutions to Geneva to place them before the League (Boahen, 794).

After that the congress moved to Lisbon for its second session which was held on 1-2 December of the same year. Du Bois intended to exert some kind of pressure on the Portuguese to introduce some reforms in their colonies in Africa, especially about slavery and forced labour. Two weeks after the end of the third Pan-African congress, Du Bois left Lisbon on the board of a German ship towards Liberia, where he set foot on the land of the black race for the first time.

The fourth Pan-African Congress was supposed to be held in the West Indies in 1925, as an attempt by Du Bois to move the Pan-African idea closer to the African centres. And also probably to deprive Marcus Garvey of some of his popularity because he challenged the position of W. E. B. Du Bois as the African representative at home and abroad (Geiss, 16). Du Bois plan was to charter a ship and sail across the West Indies to publicise his pan-African project and hold meetings in Jamaica, Haiti, Cuba and the French Islands but the whole idea was finally abandoned because of the exorbitant prices demanded by a French shipping line (W. E. B. Du Bois, *Africa and the American Negro intelligentsia*, 12).

1-3-4- Africans' Presence in The 1927 Pan-African Congress.

After 1923, interest in the Pan-African Movement continued to decline, and Du Bois himself lost some of his enthusiasm for it. Following the third Congress, he met in Sierra Leone with members and promoters of the Congress of West Africa that was founded by the Gold Coast lawyer and elder statesman Casely Hayford in 1920. But there were little contact between the Pan-African Congress and the Congress of West Africa; the latter became

inactive after the death of Hanford in 1930, (Logan, 10). Despite his declining interest, Du Bois participated in planning and served as General chairman of the fourth Pan-African Congress, which was held in New York in 1927, largely as a result of the determination of a group of women headed by Addie W. Hunton and Mrs. Addie Dickenson. The principal speakers included Dantes Bellegarde of Haiti and Chief Amoah III, a rich cocoa farmer from the Gold Coast. Chief Amoah contributed to expenses of the Congress more than any other individual. There were two hundred and eight delegates present at the Fourth Congress, and a total attendance of about five thousand people (Logan, 10). The majority of the American delegates were women. This congress did not carry the movement very much further forward.

An attempt was made to hold a conference on African soil, but it was thwarted by the French government. The French government told Du Bois he could convene the Congress in Marseilles or any French city, but not on African soil (Middleton, 06). It was the last series of Pan-African Congresses organised by Du Bois before the outbreak of the Second World War.

In addition to the fact that Du Bois had been the leading figure and the initiator of all Pan-African Congresses from 1919 to 1927, another common point between them was none of the resolutions passed at the four Congresses demanded complete independence of African territories which were under European colonisation. All that the Pan-Africanists advocated was some fundamental rights to be granted by colonial powers, and the betterment of black peoples' conditions throughout the world.

The interwar Pan-African Congresses had been organised amid an opposition of the colonial powers and the criticism of some black leaders like Garvey, who were sceptical about the ability of such meetings to achieve any substantial progress in improving the conditions of the black race. Nevertheless, the Congresses internationalised the coloured people's issue, in general, Pan-Africanism started to take form and attract more adherents. A

sense of brotherhood between black people the world over was created and bridges of understanding between the two shores of the Atlantic were established.

In fact, during the Pan-African Conferences and Congresses (1900 – 1927), The continental African representatives had only a symbolic representation. They were not an integral element of the executive bodies that defined both the objectives and strategies for the Pan-African Movement. At the 1945 Manchester Congress, however, the continental African representatives were not only superior in numbers, but they emerged as an integral part of the decision making body as well. But before we tackle the proceedings of the Fifth Pan-African Congress, we should deal with the conditions and the preparations that preceded the convening of the Congress in Europe and particularly England where most Africans and particularly West Africans were residing.

1-4- Conferences and Events Leading to The Manchester Congress.

By the 1930's, the centre of Pan-African activism started to move from the United States to Britain, especially to London which became the meeting point of several West Indian and African individuals and groups. Though the period between the last of Du Boisian Congresses in 1927 and 1944 was considered as the actual meetings that prepared for the Manchester Congress in 1945, their activities did not contribute largely to the Pan-African idea, "... several gatherings were held which, viewed historically, have the appearance of preliminary conferences prior to the Congress proper." (qtd in the Pan-African Thought and Practice, Tondi, 18). However, these gatherings could not in any way be linked directly to the Pan-African congresses that had been under the leadership of Du Bois between 1919 and 1927. Here are examples of such several gatherings mentioned above are considered.

The series of Pan-African Congresses convened by Du Bois between 1919 and 1927 maintained the momentum of this movement but little more. The delegates from the African continent were hardly representative and the appeals of the congresses to the big powers to

protect the rights of all those of African descent and especially and the rights of those in the colonies were ignored. As no clear strategy that might enable Africans to fight for their rights had been established.

Such strategy was presented at the 'Pan-African' gathering held in Hamburg, Germany in 1930, the first International Conference of Negro workers, convened under the auspices of the Profintern and the Provisional Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers. (Adi, *The African Diaspora 'Development' & Modern Political Theory*, 12). This communist-led conference clearly identified the enemy as 'capitalist exploitation and imperialist oppression'. But it was also the first Pan-African gathering to fully concern itself with the majority of the population both in Africa and in the diaspora, and to view the workers and the farmers as their own liberators alongside the working people of all countries. It was the first pan-African event to raise the demand for 'the immediate evacuation of imperialists from all colonies' and for 'complete national independence and right of self-determination.' It was also the first such gathering to include delegates from workers and farmers organisations in Africa, particularly West Africa.

1-4-1- The Hamburg Conference.

The Hamburg Conference, in 1930, was a Pan-African gathering of a very different type to those organised by Du Bois. It pointed to a new way to address Africa's problems, based on the ideology of Marxism and opened a path of struggle that could not be fully adopted at the time, due to both the undeveloped nature of the anti-colonial movement in most colonies as well as the oppressive measures taken by the colonial authorities. However, the ideas expressed at Hamburg were widely spread through the pages of the International Committee Worker's organ *Negro Worker* by a group of sympathetic organisations in Britain and the African colonies, and also by influential individuals, such as Wallace Johnson and

George Padmore. Padmore not only attended the Congress but was also for a time the editor of the *Negro Worker*.

1-4-2- The Paris Conference.

Another Conference was organised in Paris by Tiemoho Garan Kouyate (French Sudan, present-day Mali) at the beginning of 1935 (Tondi,19).Kouyate was a friend of George Padmore, a great Trinidadian journalist and Pan-Africanist, after his expulsion from the communist movement, (Adi and Sherwood, 161) he organised a conference to accomplish a programme on which African and Afro-Americans could unite on worldwide scale. However, this Congress did not achieve anything of significance.

1-4-3- The London Conference

After Kouyate's Paris conference on 14 and 15 July 1934, another Pan-African Conference on Pan-African themes took place, this time in London. The main objective of the conference was to address the racial discrimination that confronted coloured workers and students in Britain (Adi, Pan-Africanism and West African Nationalism, 11). This conference was attended by representatives of various organisations that ranged from those that were conservative Pan-Africanists and those that were radical Pan-Africanists. Some of the organisations that attended the conference were the West African Students Union (W.A.S.U), the League against Imperialism, the Ceylon Students' Union, and the League of Coloured peoples. The outcome of this gathering did not produce anything of significance for Pan-Africanism. The speeches of the speakers had nothing concrete, "... they mainly served to impart information on the situation of racial discrimination of people of African origin and descent." (Tondi, Pan-African Thought and Practice, 19).

But before we deal with the fifth Pan-African Congress and the preparations that preceded its convening, we tackle an event which was with such importance that it increased the feelings of solidarity and unity between Africans in the continent and those in the

diaspora particularly in Britain. This event was the Italian aggression on Ethiopia and its effects on the Pan-African Movement.

1-4-4- The Italo-Ethiopian Conflict and Its Impact on Pan-Africanism

One of the most important factors that kept the spirit of pan-Africanism alive during the second half of 1930s was Italy's unprovoked aggression on the symbolic and the only surviving black empire of Ethiopia in October 1935. Accordingly, black people in general and Africans in particular, had admiration and a great respect for this country. It was considered as a haven of freedom for the black race and a living example of the ability of Africans to rule themselves. This aggression acted as a catalyst to many Afro-Americans, West Indians and Africans resident in Britain who shared the belief that the league of Nations was biased in the handling of Italo-Ethiopian dispute. Pan-African ideas and activities then were centred on a small group of activists and intellectuals. The key figures in radical protest movement against fascism and colonialism were professional political activists like George Padmore, C. L. R. James a historian and novelist from Trinidad, Jomo Kenyatta from Kenya, Thomas Griffiths and T. RasMakonnen of British Guiana, I. T. A. Wallace Johnson, from Sierra Leone and Sam Manning from Trinidad. (S. K. B. Asante, *The Impact of the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis of 1935 – 36 on the Pan-African Movement in Britain*, 02) The Italian invasion was a great shock to the members of this intellectual group. They considered it as a second invasion of their homelands. They realised at once that Italy's aggression on Ethiopia symbolised not only the inability of the League of nations but also a betrayal of the black race by the super powers Britain and France. This event intensified the political activities of Africans and people of African descent in Britain in defence of the Ethiopian cause which they considered their own cause.

The period of the Italo-Ethiopian crisis was, therefore, one of the most stimulating and constructive in the history of Pan-Africanism. It was an important period of transformation of

Pan-African ideas. Significantly, it was also the period in which the intellectual leadership of Pan-Africanism was taken over from American Negroes by ambitious and politically disillusioned young Africans and West Indians. The new Pan-Africanists were intellectuals, like Wallace Johnson, Jomo Keyata and Nnamdi Azikiwi, a Nigerian nationalist and future president of Nigeria (S. K. B. Asante, *The Impact of the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis of 1935 – 36 on the Pan-African Movement in Britain*, 02).

The Italian attack on Ethiopia created one of the most complicated crisis that shook the international world during the 1930s. The reaction to this crisis was intense. In Paris, for example, societies such as the '*Rassemblement Populaire*' consisting of fifty organisations held mass demonstrations and passed resolutions favouring economic boycott of Italy. In New York, the 'Friends of Ethiopia' mobilised sentiment on national scale in favour of Ethiopia. In London, the attack was severely as a deliberate war of aggression and plunder by many organisations including the British League on Nations Union, the Abyssinia Association, the New Commonwealth. But it was the reaction of the blacks resident in Britain which was particularly significant for the development of Pan-Africanism (03). In Jamaica, for instance, about fourteen hundred people signed a petition asking King George V to allow Jamaicans to enlist in the Ethiopian army "to fight to preserve the glories of our ancient and beloved empire." (Robert G. Weisbord, *British West Indian Reaction to the Italian Ethiopian War: an Episode in Pan-Africanism* (03/04).

For the probability that the last remaining independent kingdom in Africa was to be destroyed struck a highly sensitive emotional chord among Padmore and his West Indian and African activists, in addition to such coloured organisations as the League of Coloured Peoples (L.C.P.) and the West African Students' Union (W.A.S.U.) viewing the Ethiopian conflict in the context of world imperialism. Padmore and his radical intellectual group published articles and studies in which they devoted pages to the Ethiopian question and

criticising the attitude of the Soviet Union towards the question since it failed to help Ethiopia. Jomo Kenyata, the then honorary secretary of the International African Friends of Abyssinia contributed to the debate on the Ethiopian crisis. Similarly, William Ofori Atta, son of Nana Ofori Atta I of the Gold Coast that Mussolini, the self-appointed champion of European civilisation, intended to bring peace and freedom to the ‘uncivilised’ and slave dealing Ethiopians by ‘civilised war’. He warned that when dealing with the imperialists Africans should be wide awake and alert all the time (Asante, 04). In 1936 Azikiwi and Wallace Johnson were involved in a cause célèbre which resulted in their deportation from the Gold Coast by the colonial authorities. The reason this was an article *in the African Morning Post* under the title “Has the African a God?” which included the following words:

The European believes in god whose name is deceit. He believes in a god whose law is ye strong you must weaken the weak. Ye civilised Europeans you must Christianise the pagan Africans with bombs poison gases! ... ye administrators make Sedition Bill to keep the Africans gagged, make Deportation Ordinance to send Africans to exile whenever they dare to question your authority (qtd in Rooney, 27).

For Nkrumah, he heard of the news of the Italian invasion of Ethiopia while he was in London. He maintained “my nationalism surged to the fore” (Brice Harris, *The United States and the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis* 03).

While criticising the attitudes of the powers to the Ethiopian cause, Padmore and his militant colleagues saw the Italian aggression as the right opportunity of uniting blacks together and emancipating coloured people from the oppressive imperialist government of foreign countries. They therefore attempted seriously to revive Pan-African organisations as institutional carriers of Pan-African ideas. Thus in anticipation of the Italian attack, the

Padmore group, together with other persons of African descent, formed in London in the Summer of 1935, an organisation known as the International African Friends of Abyssinia (I.A.F.A.) to arouse the sympathy and support of the British public for Ethiopia. (Adi and Sherwood, 161). A statement issued by Jomo Kenyatta, the general secretary of the organisation, said that the main object of the I.A.F.A. “to assist by all means in their power the maintenance of the territorial integrity and political independence of Abyssinia.” Among the executive committee of the I.A.F.A. were J. B. Danquah, S. R. Wood and G. E. Moore (members of the Gold coast delegation to England), Amy Ashwood Garvey, the wife of Marcus Garvey (treasurer) Peter Milliard of British Guiana and T. Marryshaw (vice chairman) of Grenada, C. L. R. James (chairman), Sam Manning (secretary of propaganda), and George Padmore. (Fikru Gebrekidan, In Defence of Ethiopia 20).

On the July 28th 1935, the executive committee of the I.A.F.A. issued a manifesto and an appeal in which it demanded that the League of Nations should take measures to restrain Italy from this “gross infringement of the international law and agreements”, and assured the Emperor and the people of Ethiopia that it whole heartedly supported them in their efforts to preserve and maintain their rights. It protested to the Italian government against its “immoral and barbarous attitude to Abyssinia” and finally demanded that the British government should use all their efforts to influence the League of Nations to assist Ethiopia to defend herself against this “unwarranted attack” (Asante, 05). With the collaboration of other coloured organisations in Britain and under the auspices of the Pan-African Federation, The I.A.F.A. organised a reception for Haile Selassie and the Ethiopian royal family when they arrived in London on June, 1936 to spend their years of exile.

The fall of Ethiopia in May 1936 convinced Padmore and his Pan-African organisation that “black men had no rights which white men felt bound to respect.” And they felt frustrated and disillusioned with the League of Nations particularly Britain and France. In

early December 1935, the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs Sir Samuel Hoare (1888 – 1959) and the French Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary Pierre Laval (1883 – 1945) plotted a secret peace plan to settle the Italo-Ethiopian war, a plan which was in favour of Italy. The plan proposed to grant Italy huge Ethiopian fertile plains while Ethiopia was to keep the central mountainous region in return for a truce. Fortunately, the plan was foiled and caused an outbreak of indignation in both France and Britain. (Robert Mallett, *Fascist foreign Policy and Official Italian Views of Anthony Eden in 1930s*, 17). The plan acted like an electric shock that awakened the nationalists to a bitter reality. They realised that Britain could not oppose the Italian aggression against Ethiopia. All these intensified the nationalist aspirations and increased the feelings of racial solidarity.

Thus the group resolved to form a Pan-African organisation known as the International African Service Bureau (I.A.S.B.) on May 17, 1937, this was in fact an outgrowth of the International African Friends of Abyssinia. Padmore became the chairman of this organisation and Wallace Johnson its general secretary. The executive committee included Christ Jones, the Barbadian trade unionist (organising secretary), Jomo Kenyatta (assistant secretary), T. R. Makonnen (treasurer), J. J. Oquaye (the Gold Coast), Louis Mbanefo and NnamdiAzikiwi (Nigeria), K. Sallie Tamba (Sierra Leone), Goran Kouyate (French Sudan present-day Mali), C. L. R. James (editorial director). The I.A.S.B. launched a monthly organ called *The International African Opinion* in July 1938 under the editorship of C. L. R. James. The motto of this journal was “Educate, Cooperate, Emancipate: Neutral in nothing affecting the African people” (Asante. 06). The I.A.S.B. appealed to all Negroes in the world for support in the columns of its journal wrote the following:

Problems differ from country to country but there is common bond of oppression, and as the Ethiopian struggle has shown, all Negroes everywhere are beginning to see the necessity for international

organisation and the unification of their scattered efforts. The crisis of the world civilisation and the fate of Ethiopia have awakened black political consciousness as never before (Asante. 06).

Wallace Johnson affirmed that the representative leaders of African descent had organised the International Service Bureau in order to cooperate with all-peace loving, democratic and working-class forces who desire to help the advancement of Africans. It supported the demands of Africans and other colonial peoples for democratic rights, civil liberties and self-determination. In short, the bureau aimed at agitating for constitutional reforms such as the granting of freedom of press, speech, assembly and movement, and the democratic rights, which were denied to millions of black subjects.

While the Pan-African association and societies which were established as a result of the Italian conquest of Ethiopia were short lived, the I.A.S.B. remained for about seven years (1937 – 1944) as the rallying point of radical coloured groups in Britain. Until late 1944 when it combined with the Pan-African Federation , the body which was responsible for planning the 1945 Pan-African Congress (Asante, 07/09).

1-5- The contribution of African Students to Pan-Africanism in North America

African students in the United States did not lose touch with their mother land and its problems. They endeavoured to voice the grievances of their continent through several organizations and societies they formed themselves or participated in its creation with their African American and West Indian brothers to represent them. They also attended meetings and conferences to expose and transmit the grievances of the African continent to the American government. They also tried to restore the Pan-African Congress movement that was inactive at the time. This period also witnessed the appearance of Kwame Nkrumah on the Pan-African scene.

1-5-1- The African Students Association.

By the early of 1940s, the number of African students in North American universities, mainly the United States of America, had substantially increased, so they decided to found their own student organisation to represent their interests. In January 1941, the African Students Service (A.S.S) was formed in Lincoln University largely thanks to the efforts of the two West African students: A. A. Nwafor Orizu from Nigeria and John K. Smart from Sierra Leone. In its first annual meeting which was held in September of the same year, the A. A. S. became the African Students' Association (A.S.A) (Adi and Sherwood, 151). Kwame Nkrumah played an important role in the foundation of the A.S.A and was elected as its president, a position he held until he left the United States in 1945 (Rooney30).

1-5-2- The New York Conference.

Nkrumah's first real appearance on the Pan-African scene was during the conference on Africa which was held in New York in April 1944. The conference was organised with the support of the Council of African Affairs (C.A.A.) which had been founded in 1937 by Paul Robeson (1898 – 1976), an African American singer, actor and politician; and Marx Yergan (1892 – 1975), an African American official and a political activist. The C.A.A. played a major role in the organisation of the Conference on Africa which was attended by more than a hundred delegates with active interest in Africa. Nkrumah's work for the preparation of the Conference was very important, since he was a leading figure in student circles in the United States (Biney, 41).

Besides African American and white American organisations and groups, the Conference on Africa was attended by some African and West Indian delegates; therefore, it was given a Pan-African character. Besides the C.A.A. and the A.S.A., the one hundred and twelve delegates present at the Conference represented the N.A.A.C.P., the Urban League, the First Abyssinian Baptist Church, the Ethiopian School of Research History, the Ethiopian

World Federation, the International goodwill Society, Pioneer Negroes of the World, the World Federation of African Peoples, the West Indies National Council and the Farmers' Committee of British West Africa (Geiss, 20).

The main resolution passed at the conference on Africa was an appeal to the American government to promote every effort in the direction of the achievement of development and self-government in the African continent, according to the right of self-determination as stated in the Atlantic Charter. Although this conference did not really have a significant political impact in favour of the black race, it was considered as an attempt to revive the Pan-African Congress movement which was dormant since 1927. In addition to this, the Conference was with such importance that it had introduced Nkrumah to the Pan-African movement and gave him the opportunity to meet leaders of African descent who shared with him a common interest in the motherland and the welfare of the black race in the world. But it was in Britain that Nkrumah really made his full entry on the Pan-African scene and to become an influential figure even undertake radical changes in the Pan-African thought.

1-6- Pan-Africanism in Britain

In 1934 Padmore settled in London, and from that time onwards, the centre of pan-African activities moved to London. Padmore found a fertile ground, both among African intellectuals and students and West Indian workers who had organised themselves in groups such as the West African Students Union, the League of Coloured People and the Negro Welfare Association, and among British Left and various groups who cooperated with the African nationalists (Geiss, 18). In the 1930s Padmore saw the Popular Front period as a great opportunity to achieve the aims of the Pan-African movement of independence for black people without having any links with fascism or communism. During the Second World War the Pan-African Federation had flourished under the leadership of T. Ras Makonnen and Dr. P. Milliard, both from British Guiana (Guyana). But it was Padmore who

played the main role in organising the important Pan-African Conference of 1945. Nkrumah was a joint secretary with him (Rooney, 42).

1-6-1- The West African Students Union (W.A.S.U.)

Shortly after his arrival to London, Nkrumah was introduced to the West African Students' Union (W.A.S.U.) by one of his A.S.A colleagues who was in London, Ako Adjei, and very soon Nkrumah became its vice president (Biney, 45). The W.A.S.U. was founded on 7 August by Ladipo Solanke (c. 1886 – 1958), a Nigerian law student, together with a number of West African students in London and with the support of Casely Hayford. At the beginning membership of the W.A.S.U. was limited to students from British West Africa but later it gained a Pan-African character when African American and West Indians joined it. The W.A.S.U. founded branches in the major towns of the Gold Coast and Casely Hayford was its President from 1927 until his death in 1930 (Logan, 10).

The arrival of Nkrumah to London with the active preparation for the organisation of the Fifth Pan-African Congress largely thanks to the efforts of the newly founded Pan-African Federation (P.A.F) and George Padmore. The P.A.F. published a journal called *International African Opinion* edited by C. L. R. James (Adi and Sherwood, 104).

1-6-2- The Fifth Pan-African Congress and African leadership

The preparations for the fifth Pan-African Congress consisted in a series of meetings and conferences between various coloured anti colonial groups and individuals in Britain to discuss issues related to the date and place of the congress, representation, and issues to be discussed. Du Bois maintained a constant communication with Padmore, in London. In this Congress had he only an honorary role and was elected president of the Congress. (Mboukou, 12). During this time, Nkrumah had a very influential role. As soon as he arrived to London, he was appointed as a political co-secretary of a special international conference secretariat which was assigned with the task of organising a future Pan-African Congress. The

secretariat consisted of Dr. Milliard (president of the P.A.F.) from British Guiana as a chairman, T. RasMakonnen as treasurer, Peter Abrahams from South Africa as publicity secretary, and Jomo Kenyatta as assistant secretary (Shepperson, the Fifth Pan-African Congress 06).

For the first time, most of the preparatory work for the Pan-African Congress was done by a new generation of West Indian and continental Pan-Africanists while the African American element was almost absent except for Du Bois who acted as more as an adviser than as a real organiser and the leadership of the movement moved to black continental Africans.

The Fifth Pan-African congress was convened from 15 to 19 October 1945 at Charlton Town Hall, Manchester. More Africans were involved in it than ever before. The conference committee was chaired by Dr. Peter Milliard from British Guiana and T. RasMakonnen was the treasurer. The West Indian contingent was still strong, led by George Padmore, C. L. R. James and Peter Milliard. But for the first time it was a congress of Africa's young leaders as Collin Legum put it "they are largely a collection of unknowns, soon to win fame, notoriety and power in their own countries." (Legum, 30). The list of attendees included: from the Gold Coast, Kwame Nkrumah, J. Annan Ghana's former Secretary of Defence, E. A. Ayikumi was director of large state industrial operations, Edwin J. Du Plan, a key figure in the Bureau of African Affairs in Accra, Dr.Kuranki Taylor and Joe Appiah, both of them later became bitter opponents of Nkrumah. From Nigeria: Dr. J. C. de Graft Johnson, the historian, Chief H. O. Davis, Q. C. Chairman of Nigeria's state sponsored newspapers, Magnus Williams representing Dr.Azikiwi, who had contributed largely to the growth of the Pan-African movement but could not attend the Congress himself. There was also a Baptist teacher, Chief S. L. Akinttola, who was Premier of Nigeria's Western Region, and Peter Abrahams novelist poet (Legum, 30).

For the first time, African political parties, trade unions, youth leagues, and student's associations sent representatives. The list of attendees included also representatives from the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroon (N.C.N.C.), the Labour Party of Grenada, from the West Indies, the West Indies People's National Party, the Nigerian Youth Movement, the Nyasaland African Congress Party from Malawi, the African National Congress (A.N.C) of South Africa, and the Gold Coast Farmers' Association. A list of individual participants included, besides the Conference planners, Wallace Johnson from Sierra Leone, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Chief H. O. Davis from Nigeria, J. E. Taylor from Ghana, Hastings Banda from Malawi, Mrs. Amy Ashwood Garvey (then representing Jamaica Women's Movement) and Jaja Wachukwu. (African Nationalism and Struggle for Freedom 19/20). W. E. B. Du Bois was the only African American present. But there were no representatives from Francophone Africa; two men were listed as 'fraternal delegates' from Somalia and Mursi Saad El-Din attended as an 'observer' from Egypt. (Sherwood, 03). Some of these people went to lead their countries for independence. In general, the gathering was the largest and the most representative Pan-African Congress ever held.

On the other hand, the young generations of African leaders, among them Nkrumah was the outspoken figure, maintained their political radicalism by using revolutionary path. They were no longer satisfied with gradual political reforms, but aspired for self-government and independence. Some of the African leaders who attended the Congress, like the Kenyan Jomo Kenyatta, the Sierra Leonean T. Wallace Johnson, and the South African novelist and poet Peter Abrahams, would later play an important role in their countries nationalist struggle for freedom (Legum, 31).

The resolutions passed at the Fifth Pan-African Congress were different from those of the previous pan-African Congresses. They concerned different regions of Africa, the West Indies, and the colour bar in Britain. The conference called on the Africans everywhere to

organise themselves into political parties, trade unions, cooperatives and other groups, in order to achieve political independence and economic advance. Du Bois proposed the first formal resolution, that the colonial peoples should determine the struggle for freedom – if necessary by force. Nkrumah proposed the second resolution; a demand for independence for all colonial peoples to put an end to colonial exploitation, a demand backed up by strikes and boycotts if necessary (Rooney, 44).

The resolutions passed in this Congress addressed different forms of racial discrimination, forced labour, and called for trade union rights and the granting of universal franchise in South Africa and the colonies. The main resolutions were for:

- 1- The complete and absolute independence for the peoples of West Africa.
- 2- The removal of British armed forces from Egypt
- 3- The granting of ‘complete independence from Egyptian and British rule’ to the Sudan
- 4- The recognition of the ‘demands of indigenous people of Tunis, Algeria, Morocco and Libya from the French and Italian rule’
- 5- Democratic rights and self-government for the people of Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Nyasaland, Somaliland and Zanzibar.
- 6- The non-incorporation of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland in South Africa
- 7- West Indian federation founded upon internal self-government based on universal adult suffrage
- 8- The withdrawal of British Military Administration from Ethiopian soil
- 9- The independence or at least self-government for all British, French and Italian colonies in Africa and the West Indies (Sherwood, 04)

Nkrumah claimed that he drafted the Congress’s Declaration to the Colonial People, which focused on the importance of forming a united front in the struggle against colonialism. “The struggle for political power ... is the first step towards, and the necessary prerequisite, to the

complete social economic and political emancipation.” (Nkrumah, Towards Colonial Freedom, 31).

Considering the resolutions passed at the Fifth Pan-African Congress and Nkrumah’s Declaration, it was obvious that despite the West Indian numerical superiority, the African leaders dominated politically and greatly influenced the proceedings of the Congress. By the end of the Congress, Africans were at the vanguard of Pan-Africanism thanks to the great dynamism and strength of personality demonstrated by Nkrumah and other leaders. Hence, Pan-Africanism became more African oriented. So, the belief that the struggle for African freedom could be conducted from Europe or the New World was given up, and young Pan-Africanists understood that the battle for independence should be fought by Africans in Africa itself.

1-6-3- The Objectives of West African National Secretariat.

By the end of the Fifth Congress, Nkrumah went on in his Pan-African activities in Britain. He was appointed as general secretary of a working committee of the Pan-African Congress Movement with Du Bois as a chairman. To carry out the resolutions of the Pan-African Congress in West Africa, Nkrumah and some West African leaders, like Wallace Johnson, took the initiative of founding the West African National Secretariat (W.A.N.S.). With the support of George Padmore, the W.A.N.S. was founded in London on 14 December 1945. Nkrumah undertook the position of general secretary and Wallace Johnson took up the chairmanship, the West African National Secretariat published its objectives in a pamphlet, which highlighted the words ‘West Africa, is one country: peoples of Africa unite!’ the objectives were:

- 1- Supply information ... with a view to realising a West African Front for United West African National Independence

- 2- To educate the peoples especially the working classes, in the imperialist countries concerning the problems of West Africa
- 3- To foster a spirit of national unity and solidarity within West Africa
- 4- 'To engineer the formation of an All-West African National Congress (qtd in Sherwood, 05)

The objectives of the W.A.N.S. reflected Nkrumah's Pan-African ideals and his political convictions, for the main aim of this organisation was the achievement of independence through the organisation of the masses for a more effective struggle. It also aimed at the unification of Western territories, transcending personal and tribal differences. It saw West African unity and independence as the basis for the wider unity of the entire African continent.

The fifth pan-African Congress was important in several ways: as already noted, it was the best attended by Africans from the continent. Many of those who attended went on to lead their countries to independence, becoming Presidents, Prime Ministers, or Cabinet Ministers. It marked the transformation of the Pan-African movement from a protest movement seeking moderate reforms including the right to form a trade union, to be paid a decent wage, to vote for representatives in local councils, to obtain health care and housing, to a "tool" of African nationalist movements fighting for self-rule. Nkrumah wrote of the Congress years later:

While the four previous conferences were both promoted and supported mainly by middle class intellectuals and bourgeois Negro reformists, this Fifth Pan-African Congress was attended by workers, trade unionists, farmers, cooperative societies and by African and other coloured students ... Its ideology become African nationalism....but the main reason why it achieved so much was because for the first time the delegates who attended it were

practical men of action, and not as was the case of the four previous conferences merely idealists contenting themselves with writing theses but unable or unwilling to take any active part in dealing with the African problem ... and it was this Fifth Pan-African Congress that provided the outlet for African nationalism and brought about the awakening of African political consciousness. It became, in fact, a mass movement of Africa for Africans. (qtd in Bracey J, Pan-Africanism and Pan-Africanists, 19).

The idea of independence was repeated throughout all the discussions at the Congress. Information was provided about other struggles elsewhere in the world that were being waged against the same colonial powers that Africans were facing, and the participants were able to draw some lessons that might be applied to the African struggles. The Congress allowed Africans in attendance to develop ties and relationships among themselves that helped them later in organising their people when they returned home. The African activists who attended the Congress said that they were inspired by the resolution passed and encouraged by the moral support they received from each other.

When one looks at the first forty five years of the twentieth century, one can identify three important objectives of Pan-Africanism, each one coinciding with a specific period. Pan-Africanism began as a protest movement against the racism endured by black people in the New World, slowly evolved into an instrument for waging an anti-colonial struggle dedicated to bringing African rule in Africa. And as an inspiration for African leaders and intellectuals who hoped that perhaps in the future African states might federate as the United States of Africa.

Chapter Two: Nkrumah's Project of National Unity in the Gold Coast

It was generally believed that the political agitation in the Gold Coast began with the arrival of Kwame Nkrumah in the Gold Coast in 1947 from his studies. In fact, political party history and political agitation and discontent began earlier than this period. Before we deal with the Nkrumah's era and the political changes that happened during his government, we have to look at the political picture in the Gold Coast and the history of nationalism and political agitation in this country before the arrival of Kwame Nkrumah.

The turbulent local conditions also added to the state of discontent in the Gold Coast. The most important was the cocoa swollen shoot virus (C.S.S.V.). By 1943 scientists had determined that virus, which gradually spread from infected to healthy trees and killed such trees, was carried by a mealy bug that could not be eradicated. It meant that to contain the outbreak, both infected and healthy trees on farms affected by the disease had to be cut down and burned, even while these trees were still productive (Gokin 81). This cutting down programme was met with fierce resistance and anger from the farmers.

As a result, the cocoa growing area was on the verge of a revolt. Likewise, the situation in the main trading towns and municipalities was equally explosive. The shortage of consumer goods that had developed during the war had continued, but the increase in the amount of money available had contributed to the increase in prices. Even though the amount of cocoa exported had dropped by a third from 1937 to 1938, as a result of the swollen shoot.

Between 1947 and 1948 the value of the crop had increased almost eight times, and there was four times the amount of money in circulation compared to the period before the war. The shortage of shipping meant that it was difficult to import and the shortage of consumer goods led to sharp rise in prices and black marketing. Black businessmen were also dissatisfied with the government's allocation of import licenses since it favoured big companies (Austin D. The Working Committee of the United Gold Coast Convention, 03) This meant that they were not to take advantage of the post war increase in prices.

In 1947 one of the businessmen. Nii Kwabina Bonne II, who was also a traditional chief in Accra began a boycott campaign that was directed against the big firms and the Lebanese merchants who felt had "a virtual monopoly" on the economy. At the beginning, he tried to get Accra Chamber of Commerce agree on accepted set of prices, but they refused, and quickly Nii Bonne was able to gain support all over the colony on his anti-inflation campaign. The high prices for imported goods seemed to be part of a larger plot on the part of European firms, who also bought the colony's cocoa crop to recompense themselves for the high prices they were paying for the cocoa. The government unwillingness to become involved seemed clear evidence for Africans that it was acting in favour of the European firms. The boycott lasted most of the month January 1948. It was directed against imported goods like cotton, textiles, canned meat, flour, and spirits and was so effective that major firms agreed to reduce their profit margins on these items from 75 to 50 percent. Quarrels between the boycott committee and petty traders who suffered from the shortage of goods also put pressure on the organisers.

The end of the boycott coincided with another tragic event when another discontent group was ready to take the streets. These were the ex-servicemen who had come back from the war to find no jobs after their demobilisation and their pensions were much less the cost of living. At the same time, their wartime experience had destroyed the prestige of the white

man and the myth of his inherent superiority and they were impatient to improve their condition. So in 1946, some of the more political had formed the Gold Coast Ex-Servicemen Union (Gokin 83). The Union played an active part in the boycott campaign, and as soon as it was over their secretary B.E.A. Tamakloe, had announced that the ex-servicemen were going to march in procession to Christiansburg Castle, the seat of the government. The procession soon departed from the authorised route and met with a small detachment of police, which tried to prevent them from approaching the castle. Stones were thrown, and in the confusion that followed, the European superintendent in charge of the police snatched a rifle from one of his men and opened fire on the crowd, and several marchers were wounded.

The marchers went back to the commercial centre of Accra and were joined by unemployed men who claimed that the large firms were not charging the agreed on prices. The shooting, looting and burning of European, Syrian and Lebanese stores continued late into the night. One of the government's prisons nearby was also attacked and the prisoners were released. News of the rioting spread quickly, and during the next few days there was similar rioting in Koforidua, Nsawam, Akuse, and Kumase. At last, the government declared a state of emergency and brought in troops from Nigeria. Twenty nine people were killed, 266 were injured and over £ 2 million of damage was done before order was restored (Gokin , 84). The belief in the Gold Coast as the model colony had suffered irreparable damage.

The government was surprised by the speed and the confusion of the events that it assumed the existence of a secret plot behind them, since many events had come together at just the right time. The most noticeable target was the executive of the United Gold Coast Convention (U.G.C.C.), which had been established just before 1947. The governor Gerald Creasy, ordered the arrest of the "big six" leaders including Dr. J.B. Danquah (1895- 1965) and Nkrumah and four of their colleagues of the U.G.C.C. and detained them in a distant part of the Northern Region. A commission of enquiry was established "to enquire into and report

on the recent disturbances ... and their underlying causes; and to make recommendations on any matters arising from their enquiry” (qtd in Gokin 84) The commission consisted of members who did not belong to the ranks of the colonial administration. The chairman Aiken Watson, was a prominent British barrister, Andrew Dagleish who was an authority on trade unionism and Keith Murray, a lecturer at Oxford University.

Undoubtedly the U.G.C.C. had taken advantage of the breakdown in public order. Dr.Danquah and kwame Nkrumah sent telegrams to the Secretary of State, the United Nations, and a major news organisation that civil government had broken down in the Gold Coast and called for the dispatch of a special commissioner, the recall of the governor, and the convening of a constituent assembly of chiefs and peoples to create a new constitution. In reality, the U.G.C.C. was much more conservative than these demands indicated. The arrest of the “big six” hastened the development in the Gold Coast and Nkrumah was blamed by his colleagues in the U.G.C.C. for what happened. When they appeared individually before the Watson Commission, the division between the Working Committee of the U.G.C.C. was apparent that they tried to disassociate themselves from Nkrumah. Nevertheless, the Watson Commission represented a turning point in colony’s history. It did not blame the police and the government for the way in which the riots had been handled, but it was highly critical for the Gold Coast government policies. The report listed sixteen causes for the riots, eight of them concerned issues like: the cutting down programme of diseased cocoa trees, discontent over ex-servicemen pensions, the housing shortage, and the concentration of economic power in the hands of Europeans and Lebanese and the high cost of living (Gokin 87). However, the most important of all was the government’s failure to see the indirect rule or the rule through the chiefs that was dictated by 1946 constitution was outdated.

During the two and half years that Nkrumah spent in Great Britain, he emerged as one of the leading critics of the colonial rule in the British colonies in Africa. With his organising

experience he seemed to be the ideal person to give the U.G.C.C the kind of direction and dynamism it needed to become effective political organisation. However, he was hesitant at first to accept the position of a general secretary since he felt “It was quite useless to associate [himself] with a movement backed entirely by reactionaries, middle class lawyers and merchants.” (qtd in Gokin 85). Like Nkrumah, the Gold Coast nationalists became aware that the struggle for independence should be fought at home and not in the metropolitan country, and the time of sending delegates or petitions to the colonial office was over. The Second world War gave rise to many changes at all levels and had a deep effect on colonial peoples; thus it was necessary to change the political strategies and nationalist tactics in the Gold Coast to keep up with the post-war conditions. The British colonial authorities followed a gradual policy towards self-government for the Gold Coast at a speed that did not satisfy the nationalist leaders. This situation led J.B. Danquah to establish the U.G.C.C. The party realised the importance of the masses to support it, especially after the appointment of Nkrumah as its general secretary. Moreover, the 1948 riots helped to increase the popularity of the U.G.C.C. and enlarge its base. But right after these riots, the first signs of disagreement between Nkrumah and other U.G.C.C. leaders started to appear.

Nkrumah welcomed the findings of the Watson Commission of enquiry that the Working Committee of the U.G.C.C. was directly involved in the disturbances, but the other members did not. Indeed shortly before the riots Nkrumah proposed strikes and boycotts and staging demonstrations to support demand for self-government during a meeting with the Working Committee (Rooney 62). Nkrumah maintained close relationship with the youth who constituted the basis of the U.G.C.C. and focused his efforts on organising them. He therefore enjoyed a great popularity among them and they regarded him as their leader, a leadership which was not always welcomed by the other U.G.C.C. leaders. Nkrumah obviously had much larger goals in mind than the U.G.C.C. executive, and he immediately

drew a plan for action that would lead to self-government. Moreover, he was determined to take the movement beyond the colony and include the Ashanti Region, the Northern Territories, and the Trans-Volta Togoland. In the space of six months he had expanded the number of the branches from at best 13 to 500. He did so by travelling all over the colony, appealing to audiences that consisted of farmers, petty traders, drivers, artisans, school teachers, clerks and letter writers and a growing number of elementary school leavers, many of whom could find no jobs. They were known derisively as “veranda boys” since they had no homes and were forced to sleep at night on the veranda of roadside trading houses. In 1948 Nkrumah established the Ghana National College for students who had been expelled from their colleges in May 1948 for going on strikes in sympathy with the “Big Six” (Gokin 86). He founded the Committee on Youth Organisation (C.Y.O.), that later became the nucleus of the Convention People’s Party (C.P.P.) on June 12, 1949, when the youth, representing the radical and progressive section of the U.G.C.C. broke away from the parent body to form an independent political party (Biney 53). Nkrumah also launched a daily newspaper, *The Accra Evening News* which had become very successful and maintained a strong opposition to colonialism, and later to the Coussey Committee and the U.G.C.C. (Gokin 92). When some of the U.G.C.C. leaders took part in the Coussey Committee, Nkrumah and his young supporters expressed their opposition to this decision; which was considered as a compromise with the colonial authorities that would further delay the granting of self-government. The Working Committee feared this development, as they realised that this organisation (C.Y.O.) represented potentially a serious political rival to the U.G.C.C. The C.Y.O. adopted the slogan “Full self-government now”, the Working Committee demanded “Self-government with the shortest possible time” (Gokin 92).

All these activities contributed to an increase in Nkrumah’s popularity among the common people, especially the youth, but they brought him the suspicion and hostility of the

Working Committee members. Disproving of Nkrumah's methods which were considered going against the policy of the U.G.C.C., the Working committee decided to remove Nkrumah from office and offer him, instead, the position of honorary treasurer, a position which he declined at the beginning but changed his mind and later accepted it (Asamoah 79). Divisions between Nkrumah and the C.Y.O. on one side and the Working Committee of the U.G.C.C. on the other continued throughout the late 1948 and the first half of 1949. The situation reached such a degree of disagreement that by June 1949 a total break between the two sides was noticeable.

Finally the Working Committee decided to expel Nkrumah from the U.G.C.C. However, Nkrumah preceded this attempt to remove him by breaking away from the U.G.C.C., and on June 12, 1949, at the Arena meeting ground in Accra, before an audience of 60,000 people, he announced the formation of the Convention People's Party (C.P.P.). Kojo Botsio became its secretary, K.A. Gbedemah its vice chairman (Gokin 93). The party which would lead the country towards independence less than a decade later.

The Gold Coast did not see any leader who had such a deep impact on the course of events in his country and on the Pan-African movement after the Second World War as did Nkrumah. His commitment to the Pan-African cause and his involvement in the nationalist struggle and his rise as an influential leader on national, continental and international levels was unmatched. His long sojourn in the United States and his relatively short stay in Britain enriched his academic and political achievements, and supplied him with experience and organisational skills which served him in his career as a Pan-Africanist and nationalist. Nkrumah's strong connection with the Pan-African movement and his unparalleled contribution to the nationalist struggle require a brief account of his life and career.

2-1- Kwame Nkrumah as A Pan-Africanist

Francis Nwia Kofi Kwame Nkrumah was born on 18 September 1909 (Rooney 21) to a poor illiterate couple in Nkroful, a small village near the coast in the extreme South Western part of the Gold Coast. His father was a goldsmith and was respected for his wise advice about traditional issues and domestic affairs (Asamoah 17). Nkrumah's family belonged to the Nzima region of the Southwest of the Gold Coast, his mother was determined that he received an education (Biney 26). In contrast to all Gold Coast leaders, Nkrumah originated neither from an intellectual background nor from an urban area where opportunities for an appropriate education and professional were bigger.

From an early age, Nkrumah showed a great sense of observation, so his mother insisted on sending him to school. In 1915 he started his education at the Roman Catholic Elementary School at Half Assini. Nkrumah's skills in this school drew attention of the headmaster, Reverend Pater George Fisher, who made him a 'pupil teacher' after he completed the Middle School Leaving Certificate examination (Asamoah 18). In 1926 Nkrumah trained as a teacher at the Government Training College at Achimota, better known as Achimota College, which offered an instruction ranging from kindergarten to teacher's training. The four years that Nkrumah spent at Achimota College impressed his personality forever. At this college, he came into contact with Dr. James kwegyir Aggrey (1875- 1927), assistant vice principal of the government training college (Biney 27). one of the most eminent intellectuals of the Gold Coast saying:

To me he seemed the most remarkable man that I had ever met and I had the deepest affection for him. He possessed intense vitality and enthusiasm and a most infectious laugh that seemed to bubble up from his heart, and he was a very great orator. It was through him that my nationalism was first aroused (qtd in Biney 27).

After the death of Aggrey in New York on 30 July 1927, Nkrumah established Aggrey Students' Society to pay tribute to his teacher and to serve as a debating forum (qtd in Biney 27). After his graduation in 1930, Nkrumah worked as a teacher at Almina Catholic Junior School and the following years he was appointed as a head teacher of the Junior Catholic School at Axim. There he began to get involved in politics and also established the Nzima Literary Society. It was through this society that Nkrumah met S. R. Wood, secretary of the National Congress of British West Africa (N.C.B.W.A.), who had a great impact on his political thinking. Wood strongly encouraged Nkrumah to travel to the United States to further his studies at Lincoln University and wrote a letter of reference for him. In 1934 Nkrumah did not succeed in the entrance examination to the University of London, so he decided to follow the advice of his former teacher Aggrey and continue his studies in the United States. With the encouragement of Nnamdi Azikiwi, who was then the editor of *the African Morning Post* (Rooney 27) applied for an admission to African American University on Lincoln, Pennsylvania. With his admission to this university Nkrumah started a new stage in his life and a long sojourn (ten years) in the United States that was to form the cornerstone of his career as a fervent Pan-Africanist and a radical nationalist.

During his studies in the United States, Nkrumah acquired many skills and became interested in different subjects like sociology, economics, theology, education and philosophy. In 1939 he obtained a B.A Degree with honours in economics and sociology from Lincoln and he was appointed as assistant lecturer in philosophy at his Alma Mater. Between 1939 and 1942 Nkrumah studied theology at Lincoln University and undertook research in philosophy and pedagogy at the university of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. In 1942 he received a Bachelor Degree of theology at Lincoln and a master of science in education from the university of Pennsylvania from which he again obtained the Master of Art Degree in philosophy in February 1943 and started to work on a Ph.D. (Rooney 30/31). It's

noteworthy that Nkrumah achieved these degrees in very difficult conditions he had noticed and experienced racism which frustrated the blacks in the U.S.A. Throughout his time in the United States he remained short of money and often experienced real hardship. To overcome his financial difficulties, Nkrumah took several jobs. For instance, he had a part-time job at the university library; he wrote summaries of books for other students at one dollar a time; he sold fish in New York city; he worked as a waiter and then as a dishwasher (Rooney 30).

It was during the time he spent in the U.S.A that Nkrumah became politically active. He was influenced by those he came into contact with at university and meetings of various political organisations including the U.N.I.A. of Marcus Garvey, the Council on African Affairs and the Communist Party. It was also in the United States that Nkrumah became active in African Students' Association, which was formed in 1941 by West African students most of them were from Nigeria and the Gold Coast. Nkrumah was elected president of this organisation. He wrote in its journal *African Interpreter* and spoke at numerous meetings. In 1942, he demanded that A.S.A. should be open to all Africans, not just students. It was also during this period that he began to advocate many of his Pan-African views (Adi and Sherwood 151).

In 1945 Nkrumah went to London apparently to study at the university of London. At University where he became an active member of the West African Students' Union and was soon elected as its vice president. He met and worked with the Trinidadian Pan-Africanist, George Padmore of the Pan-African Federation, and was involved in organising the historic Manchester Pan-African Congress. It was in Britain that he began using the name Kwame and associate with those in the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist movement. Nkrumah played a prominent role in planning the Pan-African Congress and claimed to have drafted the famous 'Declaration to the Colonial Peoples of the World', which called for the unity of all colonial peoples against imperialism.

Following the Congress Nkrumah was one of the founders and general secretary of the West African National Secretariat, formed 'with a view to realising a West African Front for a United West African Independence', and was the chief editor of its journal *New Africa*. He also became the leader of the Circle, a secret revolutionary organisation dedicated to establishing a Union of African Socialist Republics. During this period Nkrumah travelled to Paris to meet Senghor and other African members of the French National Assembly, and to discuss plans for West African Unity. During his time in Britain, Nkrumah also became closely involved with the British Communist Party. It was during his time in Britain that Nkrumah published *Towards Colonial Freedom*, an analysis of colonialism and imperialism, and the call for the organisation of the colonial masses to achieve independence. Nkrumah spoke for the need for the complete national unity of the West African colonies to gain independence. At this stage he had been more preoccupied with West African unity, viewing it as a means to achieve the latter.

In 1947 Nkrumah left Britain when he was asked to become the general secretary of the United Gold Coast Convention (U.G.C.C.) which had been formed by constitutional nationalist in the Gold Coast in August of that year. On his way back to the Gold Coast, Nkrumah hold several meetings with political and trade union leaders in Sierra Leone, and Liberia, and continued to campaign for West African unity (Adi and Sherwood 152).

Nkrumah return to his country, the Gold Coast was followed by a respite in Pan-African Activities, but the idea of unity did not die out. Most of his African companions returned home and engaged in nationalist activities, focussing their efforts on the territory of their own countries in order to achieve independence. Convinced that he had to lead the battle for independence in his country, Nkrumah also returned to the Gold Coast in 1947. He would concentrate all his efforts on his country's political freedom at the beginning though he remained a strong advocate of Pan-Africanism as he himself pointed out, "when I returned to

West Africa in 1947, it was with the intention of using the Gold Coast as a starting off point for African independence and unity.” (Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite* 135). His devotion to the political situation in the Gold Coast at the beginning of his nationalist career in the country was an obligatory first step towards the achievement of the Pan-African ideal in Africa.

During the climax of his Pan-African activities, Nkrumah was called upon by his friend Ako Adjei to reinforce the ranks of the newly established U.G.C.C. Although Nkrumah responded favourably to Danquah’s request and returned to the Gold Coast, he claimed that he accepted the new post with some hesitation because of his involvement with the W.A.N.S and the preparations for holding of West African National Conference which was to be held in Lagos, Nigeria, in October 1948 (Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite* 135). The post-Second World War nationalists realised the crucial role of the masses in extracting political concessions from the colonial administration. They realised that the mobilisation of the people would exert an overwhelming pressure on the coloniser, a fact that had been experienced in India, for instance, where Gandhi and the Indian National Congress I.N.C. had pressed for complete independence and obtained it in 1947 thanks to the large support of Indian masses. Like Nkrumah, the Gold Coast nationalists became conscious that the battle for independence should be fought at home not in Britain, and that the time of sending delegates or petitions to the colonial office was over. The second World War gave rise to drastic changes on colonial peoples; thus, a change in political strategies and nationalist tactics became necessary in the Gold Coast to adapt with post war conditions. The British colonial authorities continued their gradual policy towards self-government for the Gold Coast but at a pace which did not satisfy the nationalist leaders. This situation led J.B. Danquah to found the United Gold Coast Convention (U.G.C.C)

2-2- Kwame Nkrumah’s Nationalism in the Pan-African Context

In his efforts to achieve the independence and the unity of his country, Nkrumah faced tremendous obstacles. So, in this part, we will tackle the actions and efforts of Kwame Nkrumah against the British colonial authorities that were culminated into the independence of Ghana in March 1957. We will also deal with his efforts to unite Ghana under a single government and to use the independence of and the unity of Ghana as a starting point to achieve the independence and unity of the whole African continent under a single continental government and the local obstacles that faced to reach his objective.

We will deal also with Nkrumah's defection from the U.G.C.C. and the formation of the Convention People's Party (C.P.P.), a mass-based party that would win the three successive elections over other region-based parties and lead the country to independence. These regional parties created a serious challenge to Nkrumah before and after independence. As they were against Nkrumah's conviction of national unity transcending ethnic and regional considerations. That's why Nkrumah did his best to outlaw and eradicate this sort of opposition by issuing legislations, bills and other draconic measures that culminated into establishing one-party state to protect the unity of the newly independent country.

2-2-1- Convention People's Party (C.P.P.) Appealing to the Masses

By this time Nkrumah was already a very popular nationalist figure who had concurred the hearts of thousands of Gold Coasters. He was well aware of the role of the masses that represented the backbone of any nationalist movement, so Nkrumah appealed to them using a simple and emotional language. His rhetorical abilities and charismatic personality were soon to secure a large following, consisting of teachers, farmers, junior civil servants, urban workers, unemployed school leavers, ex-servicemen, etc. Within a short period of time the C.P.P. became an overwhelming party which assumed a national character and even outnumbered the U.G.C.C. The objectives of the C.P.P. were divided between national and international ones. The main objectives at the national level were:

- 1- To fight relentlessly by all constitutional means for the achievement of “Self-Government Now” for the chiefs and the people of Gold Coast
- 2- To serve as the vigorous conscious political vanguard for removing all forms of oppression and for the establishment of a democratic government
- 3- To secure and maintain the complete unity of Chiefs and people of the colony, Ashanti, Northern Territories and Trans-Volta.
- 4- To work in the interest of the trade union movement in the country for better conditions of employment
- 5- To work for a proper reconstruction of a better Gold Coast in which the people shall have the right to live and govern themselves as free people
- 6- To assist and facilitate in any way possible the realisation of a united and self-governing West Africa (Rooney 70). To achieve these objectives of his party at the national level, Nkrumah adopted Gandhi’s philosophy of non-violence and advocated what he called “Positive Action” which consisted in boycotts, strikes, non-cooperation and mass-rallies.

Nkrumah won his battle against the U.G.C.C. leaders only to start a new and more important one against the British colonial administration, the battle for independence. Nkrumah explained the Positive Action as the strategy through which “the British government can relinquish its authority and hand over the control of affairs, which is the government to the people of this country and their chiefs.” (qtd in Biney 56). Nkrumah believed that there was one of the two ways in which self-government would be obtained: via “moral pressure” as exemplified by Gandhi and the Indian people or through armed revolutionary action. He defined the Positive Action as “ The adoption of legitimate and constitutional means by which we can cripple the forces of imperialism in this country. The weapons of the Positive Action are:

- 1- Legitimate political action
- 2- Newspaper and educational campaigns and,
- 3- As a last resort, the constitutional application of strikes, boycotts, and non-cooperation based on the principle of absolute non-violence (Nimako 09).

The idea of the Positive Action alarmed not only the chiefs of the country, the intelligentsia, and the British colonial administration, but also it was directed to the mass of the C.P.P.'s constituency. As Nkrumah wrote, "We must remember that because of the educational backwardness of colonial countries, the majority of the people of this country cannot read. There is only one thing they can understand and that is Action." (qtd in Biney 56) Nkrumah called for the creation of widespread political consciousness and a sense of national self-interest. He made it clear that "Nationwide Non-violent Sit-down-at-home Strikes, boycotts and non-cooperation" would constitute a last resort (qtd in Biney 56). The campaign of Nkrumah and his C.P.P. was also helped by the press that his newspaper the *Accra Evening News* published its first issue under the motto: "We prefer self-government with danger to servitude in tranquillity." He reached a wide circle of readers through the columns of this paper insisting on the message of full self-government and the need to organise for victory. He wrote in this newspaper: "the strength of organised masses is invincible ... we must organise as never before, for organisation decides everything." (Nkrumah, *Africa Must unite*,55)

On 26 October 1949, the Coussey Committee on Constitutional Reform issued its report which was welcomed by the colonial office. The Coussey Commission had been deeply divided over the role of chiefs in the new constitution, and presented a report which offered two alternatives. First, a two-chamber system including a senate of chiefs and an elected assembly; the second which was accepted by the Secretary of the State provided for a single chamber of seventy eight members. This included three officials – the Gold Coast

Colonial Secretary, the Financial Secretary and the Attorney General: also three representatives of commercial and mining interests. The seventy-two elected members included twenty-four indirectly elected from the territorial councils of chiefs, and forty-eight directly elected members. The Executive Committee, which rapidly developed into a cabinet, had the Governor as chairman, with three officials and eight members of the Assembly who would be the senior ministers of the government (Rooney 79).

After the government had accepted the proposals put forward by the Coussey Committee in 1949, the Coussey Report was also accepted by the Gold Coast Legislative Council in December 1949. However, as was to be expected from Nkrumah and the C.P.P., the Report was bitterly criticised and its proposals as they did not grant immediate self-government and dismissed the new constitution proposed as “the Trojan gift horse” that was “bogus and fraudulent” (Gokin 93) Nkrumah wrote to the British colonial governor, Sir Charles Arden Clark, on December 15, 1949, threatening that if the legitimate aspirations of the people represented by the Peoples Representative Assembly were not met, the C.P.P. would start the Positive Action. It was followed by the *Evening News* front page headline: “The Era of Positive Action Draws Nigh” (Biney 56).

The government responded by prosecuting and jailing several of the party’s newspaper editors who called for Positive Action. Nkrumah himself was fined £ 400. However, it was the Trade Union Congress (T.U.C.), an umbrella organisation of trade unions that had been formed in 1945, that eventually precipitated Positive Action by calling for general strike in support of Meteorological Employees’ Union, which was involved in bitter dispute with the government (Gokin 93). In an attempt to avert Positive Action, the colonial secretary H. R. Saloway, met with Nkrumah, but eventually the T.U.C. overtook the party by declaring general strike in January 1950. On January 8, 1950 the C.P.P. challenged the colonial government and launched a campaign of Positive Action at midnight (Rooney 84). However,

on this occasion the government was much more prepared for disorder than had been the case in 1948. A state of emergency was quickly declared, a curfew was imposed, and a new force mobile police was used to maintain order in the large towns. The government also was determined, without the need for a commission of enquiry, and rapidly began to arrest T.U.C and the C.P.P. members, prosecuting and convicting them for promoting illegal strike, attempting to coerce the government, and sedition. Nkrumah was the last one to be arrested, was convicted on all three charges and sentenced both in Accra and Cape Coast to one year for each of the charges which were to run consecutively (Gokin 94).

The colonial government hoped the conviction of Nkrumah and the C.P.P. leadership, combined with the end of the Positive Action would restore peace in the Gold Coast and support for the Coussey Report. However, as it just had happened with the arrest of the U.G.C.C. leaders after 1948 riots, the imprisonment of Nkrumah and his colleagues increased the popularity of Nkrumah and multiplied the C.P.P.'s membership. Amamo wrote:

“Certainly Nkrumah and the other leaders of the party became legendary figures, and Nkrumah was the symbol not only of freedom or national rebirth but also for sacrifice and courage. If outside the jail he was a problem to the government, inside he was the very consummation of a puzzle.” (Amamoo G.J. *The New Ghana: the Birth of a Nation*, 45).

While Nkrumah was in jail, the government announced the introduction of the new constitution which was drawn according to the recommendations of the Coussey Committee with slight modification. Despite his opposition to the Coussey Constitution, Nkrumah urged his followers to consolidate the organisation of the C.P.P. and participate in the general election which was planned for February 1951. Even though Nkrumah was in prison, he was still able to run in the election. He started a large-scale campaign for the C.P.P. He ran for

Parliamentary representative in Accra Central, the largest voting area of the Gold Coast. He passed messages written in toilet paper out to the party organisers. The notes were published in C.P.P. newspapers, which allowed Nkrumah to inform the people of the necessity of voting for the C.P.P. in order for the Gold coast to gain independence. The articles were read aloud in churches and village gatherings to further spread Nkrumah's message (Lawson 70/71).

Despite Nkrumah's absence, the C.P.P. remained a well-organised and strong party thanks to the efforts of Kobina Agbeli Gbedemah who had been in prison at the time of the declaration of the Positive Action and released shortly afterward. He was extremely successful in establishing a network of party branches across the southern half of the colony. The party strategy was to contest all thirty-eight popularly elected seats in the election of the new legislature that was scheduled for February 1951(Gokin 95).

2-2-2- National Unity and Road to Independence

The C.P.P. took part in the first general elections under the Coussey Constitution which was held in February 1951 and brought about an intensive propaganda throughout the whole country. These elections brought the chiefs and the intelligentsia together since they feared a C.P.P. victory. They realised that they were not likely to win many of the popularly seats, but the new constitution reserved eighteen territorial seats for chiefs. Voting in the North was to be for the nineteen delegates to the Northern Electoral College, and since the C.P.P. had little strength in this part of the colony, there was a hope that the opposition could win almost half of the seats in the proposed assembly (Gokin 97).

In addition to the C.P.P. and the U.G.C.C., there were five other parties that entered the electoral contest. They were highly local in their focus and unlikely to have any impact on the election. The U.G.C.C. and some independent candidates participated in the elections, but the C.P.P. candidates, including Nkrumah, obtained a resounding victory. They won five

assembly seats out of the five allocated to the towns and twenty-nine others out of the thirty-three country seats while the U.G.C.C. won only two of these seats. In Accra Nkrumah won one of the two seats contested with over 22,000 votes out of 23,122 that were cast. The results showed the great influence exerted by the C.P.P. upon the people and proved its success to rally the masses to the demand of immediate independence. British colonial authorities had no choice but to immediately release Nkrumah from prison and his closest supporters. Sir Charles Arden Clarke (1898- 1962), the last British Governor of the Gold Coast, held a meeting with Nkrumah and asked him to form a government (Gokin 97/98). Nkrumah accepted the Governor's demand to become the leader of the government business and agreed to work under Coussey constitution for a short period of time in spite of his criticisms.

After the poor results of the U.G.C.C. in 1951 general elections, it disintegrated and its members joined other parties that were established before the second general elections, like the Ghana Congress Party (G.C.P.). On the other hand, the victory of the C.P.P. was a huge political success to what was then termed as radical nationalism and considered an important step towards full independence. In 1952 the Governor agreed to an amendment to Coussey Constitution that allowed Nkrumah to acquire the title of Prime Minister and the Executive Council renamed the Cabinet (Asamoah 86).

As a Prime Minister Nkrumah was dissatisfied with the fact that three ministers (Defence and External Affairs, Finance and Justice) were held by British officials, he sought to replace them with members of his party. In addition, his main goal was the achievement of complete independence. Consequently on July 10, 1953 he delivered a speech in the Legislative Assembly in which he asked for the introduction of a new constitution to move towards self-government. As a result a new constitution came into being in April of 1954 and provided for, inter alia, the election of all the members of the assembly, whose number rose

to one-hundred and four (seven municipal members and ninety-seven rural ones), by universal adult suffrage; the abolition of ex-officio ministers; and retention of Defence and External Affairs in the Governor's hand (Rooney 109).

The period which followed 1951's election to 1957 was known as the period of diarchy or partnership. It was a politically turbulent period in Ghana's history. The position of the C.P.P. as a national party that represented the common people was challenged by the emergence of a number of opposing political forces from the cocoa producing region of Ashanti, the Ga people of Accra region, a secessionist movement of the Togoland Congress, and from the North of the country. These politically discontented elements later formed the National Liberation Movement (N.L.M.). Around the same time the C.P.P. was faced by Ghana Congress Party (G.C.P.) formed on May 4, 1952, in Accra. It effectively replaced the U.G.C.C. as the main opposition party representing the interests of the established Coastal elite. Its leader was Dr. K. A. Busia. (Biney, "The Political and Social Thought of Kwame Nkrumah" 61/68). Like the old members of the U.G.C.C., Busia claimed that the G.C.P. was morally and intellectually superior to the C.P.P. Thus in announcing the formation of the G.C.P., Busia stated:

Congress [G.C.P.] will show the country the right way. It will meet the C.P.P. squarely and defeat it . . . We cannot sit down and allow our country to be run and ruined by men who think of themselves only and who compromise principles without the least compunction... Of course the Congress means business. We cannot allow this fooling and thieving to go on any longer or else we are all doomed. The great array of great intellectual giants behind the party, the response of the chiefs and farmers and the joy and

support of the thinking man at the birth of the Congress give evidence to the strength of the new party (qtd in Nimako 06).

In June 1953, the C.P.P. government published its proposals for constitutional reform, which advocated a single parliamentary chamber of 104 elected members. The government had abandoned the proposal for a second chamber for the chiefs and the Legislative Assembly debated and approved the government proposals. This abandonment greatly disturbed the chiefs and lately became a source of considerable political tension (qtd in Nimako 74).

2-3- Nkrumah's Approach to Opposition

The period of the 1950's was a turbulent one in the Ghanaian history. The position of Nkrumah and his Convention People's Party (C.P.P.) as a national party was challenged by the emergence of opposing political forces from the cocoa producing region of Ashanti, the Ga people of Accra, the secessionist movement of the Togoland Congress, the Northern People party and the Muslim Association Party. All these were regionally and ethnically based formations that, according to Nkrumah, threatened the unity of the country. In addition to the institution of Chieftaincy that hindered the building of a modern nation.

2-3-1- The Question of Regional Parties

The second Gold Coast general elections under the new constitution were held from 10 to 15 June 1954, again the C.P.P. won a majority of seats against a number of other regionally based parties, most important of which were the Northern People's Party (N.P.P.) established by some Northern chiefs and elders who sought to protect and consolidate the position of the traditional authorities. During the elections, it allied with the Muslim Association Party (M.A.P.) which was founded shortly before these elections and had a religious and regional character since the majority of the Gold Coast Muslims were established in the Northern Territories and Ashanti (Biney 75). The M.A.P. sought the

support of the Muslims in the major towns. The T.C. was founded around 1950 by the Ewe people who opposed the annexation of the British mandated territory of Togoland to the Gold Coast and fought for its unification with the French mandated one. The results of the 1954 general elections were as follows: the C.P.P. scored an overwhelming victory winning seventy-two out of one-hundred and four constituencies. Independents won sixteen seats and the N.P.P. won twelve, while the G.C.P. almost swept away, winning only one seat. (Gokin 104)

2-3-2- Nkrumah and the National Liberation Movement (N.L.M.)

The turbulent years of 1954 through 1957 saw a violent political confrontation between the National Liberation Movement (N.L.M.), which was formed on September 19, 1954, and the Convention People's Party (C.P.P.) government. The causes that gave rise to this movement were: the loss of the Ashanti's historic hegemony over a country it once ruled. In addition to the fact that a large proportion of the country's major exports (gold, timber and cocoa) originated in Ashanti fuelled Ashanti grievances. They believed that their region's wealth was used to develop the coastal parts of the Gold Coast and that the people of Ashanti did not benefit from the wealth of their own land.

However, the critical factor that stirred some elements in Ashanti to launch the "Council for Higher Cocoa Prices" was the C.P.P.'s introduction of introduction of the Cocoa Duty and Development Funds (amendment) Bill in August 1954. Among the organisers of the Council was the ex-C.P.P. member E.Y. Baffoe. The Chairman of the movement was Nana Bafuour. Osei Akoto who was a senior linguist or spokesman of the asantehene (king of Asante) and a major cocoa producer. Akoto read out the "Aims and Objects of the National Liberation Movement" to the crowd of 40,000 people in the inaugural day. In short the movement demanded that the price of the cocoa be increased from 72 shillings a load to 150 shillings a load and a federal constitution be introduced to the Gold Coast. It stated the people

and movement had no confidence in the government of Nkrumah and the C.P.P. It warned that the Gold Coast had to be saved from the C.P.P.'s dictatorship (Biney 80).

In a politically charged atmosphere especially after the murder of E.Y. Baffoe on October 9, 1954, the C.P.P. a defected member Twumassi Ankrah Akoto appealed on October 12 to the Kumasi Council of Traditional Chiefs to lend its support to the movement. After examining the "Aims and Objects of the Movement", the Council gave its support to the movement and promise of funds. The impact of Baffoe's murder on the N.L.M. was huge. It led to an increase in the membership of the organisation as well as the creation of a Paramilitary wing known as the N.L.M. Action Groupers as counterpart to the C.P.P.'s Action Troopers. The confrontations between the two led to a growing instability in the region by the end of the year to the extent that the C.P.P could not operate in Ashanti region. On October 24, 1954, the N.L.M. invited other opposition members parties – the Ghana Congress Party (G.C.P.), Togoland Congress (T.C.), the Northern People's Party (N.P.P.), and the Muslim Association Party (M.A.P.) to attend a conference in Kumasi hoping for a federation. The N.L.M. and its allies gave support for a federal framework of government for the Gold Coast (Biney 81). On the other hand, Nkrumah's government was determined to defend and protect the territorial integrity of the country under a centralised government. The Ashanti had a strong argument for their own point of view, but Nkrumah's strong thrust for a united and independent Ghana and for the end of tribally divisive policies proved more powerful. For Nkrumah, cocoa was a national economic asset that was not the monopoly of one region or one group of people; its economic wealth belonged to the entire nation. He pointed out that the major factors in the success of the cocoa trade were labour from the north and the marketing facilities in the south, so Ashanti could not claim credit. Nkrumah personally pointed out that Kumasi had a new hospital, the foundation of a new university and a new library. All over Ashanti there were new roads and other public works. This refuted the

argument of the N.L.M. that cocoa money was only used in the south. Nkrumah tried to call the movement to consider regional councils, but the idea was rejected.

By the end of 1954, violence in Kumasi had spread to surrounding areas and led to hostilities between the C.P.P. headquarters and the N.L.M. party offices. As the violence in Ashanti had reached a dangerous level, the Governor issued the Peace Preservation Ordinance on January 7, 1955. Two days after, riots occurred in the Kumasi Zongo area leaving two N.L.M. supporters dead and several injured. The Ordinance forbade the “carrying of dangerous offensive weapons in any public place or any vehicle within 30 towns in Ashanti.” In February, Nkrumah issued another invitation to the leadership of the N.L.M. and representatives of the Asanteman Council to discuss the problems of a federal or regional system of government. This invitation was also rejected (Biney 83).

The N.L.M. and its allies insisted on their strong demand for federal structure of a government for the Gold Coast. The motto of the movement was “No Federation, No Self-Government.” The N.L.M. Action Groupers carried out violent actions, such as bombing and attacks leading to a “state of terror” in Ashanti in May which reflected the N.L.M.’s refusal to recognise the C.P.P. government in Accra. Tawia Adamafio a C.P.P. member and a minister described the situation in Kumasi as follows:

Acts of extreme vandalism were perpetuated in Ashanti but particularly in Kumasi, where the members of the C.P.P. were chased and ambushed like animals in broad daylight. Party adherents fled to Accra and other southern towns and their houses were dynamited, burned or turned into places of public convenience. The N.L.M. organised what they called “Action Groupers”. They were armed gangs who raided the C.P.P. strongholds and killed indiscriminately or destroyed the property at

will. Law and order had virtually broken down in Kumasi (qtd in Asamoah, B. 106).

Agitation for federal system of government had erupted into full scale rebellion, which brought the country almost to civil war. Nkrumah reacted by introducing proclamation Eight on May 24, 1955. The ruling demanded that all arms and ammunition be surrendered to the Kumasi police. In addition, police reinforcement was sent to the region (Biney 84). These violent attacks seemed to demonstrate the intolerant attitude of the opposition toward Nkrumah and the C.P.P. since 1951 elections. The C.P.P. government was in a serious dilemma either to yield to the demands of the N.L.M. or the movement would resort to violence to achieve what it couldn't achieve through the ballot box. In the light of the violent opposition in the Asante province to the C.P.P. government, the colonial government concluded that independence could not be granted. Nkrumah sought to avoid another election, and that if one was held there was real danger of violence, riots and blood. He argued that the 1951 and 1954 elections had been fought on the issue of "Self-Government Now", and that since 1954 election the C.P.P. had a substantial majority in the assembly. There was therefore no need for another election, and to impose new conditions at this stage would negate the very essence of democracy. By enforcing an election, the British would overlook the violent and unconstitutional attitude of the N.L.M., and create real danger of riots, bloodshed, intimidation and disorder. He said that his opposition to an election was not that the C.P.P. was afraid of losing, it was only to avoid the danger of strife and bloodshed (Rooney 155).

In August 1955, the N.L.M. warned the British government of the terrible consequences if the Gold Coast attained independence under the C.P.P. thus

“as far as we can see (this would lead to a road that) makes for the country (one) of riots, rebellion, revolution; the long road ago taken

by some unhappy countries where one can change only the Head of the State or the people who govern by armed insurrection after underground conspiracy and sabotage.” (qtd in Asamoah 93)

Dr. Busia, the leader of the N.L.M., travelled to London to plead the British government to deny the granting of independence to Ghana since in his view, the country was not ready for parliamentary democracy. He said: “We still need you in the Gold Coast ... your experiment there is not complete. Sometimes I wonder why you seem in such a hurry to wash your hands off us.” (109). According to Asamoah, Busia did not only advocate against the granting of independence by the British, he also called on the U.S. government to “impose sanctions” against Ghana in order to overthrow the Nkrumah’s regime. Therefore after wandering through Europe for support in vain, Busia found people to listen to him in the United States. On December 1962, Busia appeared before a congressional committee to plead for the overthrow of Nkrumah. For this reason, Senator Thomas J. Dodd stated that Ghana became “the mortal enemy of true freedom and independence of the peoples of Africa and the mortal enemy of African peace.” (qtd in Nimako, N. Nkrumah, African Awakening and Neo-colonialism 13/14)

Political tensions continued between N.L.M. supporters and C.P.P. in Kumasi until the day of the elections. On May 11, 1956 Lennox-Boyd announced to the British House of Commons that general election would be held in the Gold coast. Meanwhile political tensions continued between N.L.M. supporters and C.P.P. in Kumasi. The N.L.M. was so confident of its victory in the election that they sent a letter to the Governor in mid-July 1956, informing him that they expected to be called upon to form a new government led by Dr. K. A. Busia.

The five political contenders in the general elections were the C.P.P., the N.L.M., N.P.P., T.C. and the M.A.P. During the electoral campaigning, the main electoral competitors — the C.P.P. and the N.L.M. exposed the political issues clearly to the

electorates. The N.L.M. pointed to the increase in corruption; self-enrichment on the part of the C.P.P.; inefficiency in the housing ministry; little benefit returned to cocoa farmers as the result of the cutting out policy; and flagrant dictatorship of the C.P.P. The N.L.M. insisted that voting for the movement would bring about an increase in living conditions and extension of social services under federal form of government.

The election motto of the C.P.P., on the other hand, asked the voter to consider two questions: "(1) Do I want freedom and independence now – this year – so that I and my children can enjoy life in a free and independent sovereign state of Ghana thereafter? (2) Do I want to revert to the days of imperialism, colonialism and tribal feudalism?" (qtd in Biney, "the Political and Social Thought" 90).

Each side also employed abusive language against its opponent. However, to ensure that the law and order was maintained throughout the country during the electoral campaigning, a police presence kept a watchful eye at all party rallies. Nkrumah and the C.P.P. achieved an overwhelming victory over his rivalries. The C.P.P. won 71 of the 104 seats in the Legislative Assembly. This translated into 398,141 votes against the non-C.P.P. votes of 299,116. The C.P.P. had secured the reasonable majority demanded by Lennox-Boyd. The N.P.P. had secured only 15 seats in the North, while the C.P.P. had gained 11 seats. In Ashanti the C.P.P. had gained 8 seats while the N.L.M. and the M.A.P. had secured 12 and 1 respectively. The N.L.M. and its allies failed to gain any seats in the colony, while the C.P.P. had acquired 44 seats.

On August 3, 1956, Nkrumah introduced a motion in the Legislative Assembly calling for independence. Despite the walkout of the opposition, the motion was passed. In November 1956, the N.L.M. and the Northern People's Party (N.P.P.) sent a joint resolution to the Secretary of the State demanding separate independence for Ashanti and the Northern Territories. However, the voices calling for secession within the N.L.M. were declining and

moderate voices prevailed. The N.L.M. demanded a meeting with the Secretary of the State Lennox Boyd, and Nkrumah decided to invite the minister rather than allow the opposition to take advantage over him. Therefore, in January 1957, Lennox Boyd arrived in the country and a compromise was reached under his supervision. The proposed constitution of Ghana, which later than a month became a white paper guaranteed many of the N.L.M.'s concerns addressed; particularly, regional assemblies and an agreement that an amendment to the constitution to increase the number of regions that would seek referendum in the affected region. With a constitutional agreement that appeared to satisfy both sides, the C.P.P. government speeded up its preparation for independence scheduled for March 6, 1957. At midnight, on March 6, the beginning of the celebrations occasioned the end of the British rule in the Gold Coast (qtd in Biney, "the Political and Social Thought" 91/92).

2-3-3- Nkrumah's Attitude Towards Opposition After independence

After the independence had been gained and the conflict with the N.L.M. was over, Nkrumah was faced with other discontent people in many parts of the country. In fact, at that time the people of Southern Togoland were in open rebellion and boycotted the independence celebrations. Shortly afterward, the government was forced to send troops and police in the area, and three people were killed in the town of Kpandu. In Nkrumah's own constituency in Accra, discontent also developed. Local Gas felt they had been discriminated against in terms of access to public housing and jobs in favour of Akan outsiders. In July 1957 this discontent erupted into a movement known as the GaShfimo Kpee(GaStandfast Association). In an attempt to stop this movement, the government had suspended the Accra Town Council in April, but this measure had not curbed the movement shortly afterward the Kumasi Municipal Council controlled by the N.L.M. was also suspended (Gokin 122).

Nkrumah realised that local opposition of this nature could easily undermine the hold of the C.P.P. as a nationalist party. It was this fear that explained the introduction of the

highly controversial Ghana Nationality and Citizenship Bill. The legislation gave the Minister of Interior the right to determine who was a citizen without subject to appeal in the country's courts. Shortly after, in July 1957, the government passed the Deportation Act and immediately used this legislation to deport two leaders of the M.A.P. in Kumasi as well as a number of anti-C.P.P. Syrians and Lebanese in the country. At that time Nkrumah was criticised both in Ghana and Britain for being "power drunk" and a dictator in the making (Gokin 122).

In December 1957 the government passed the Avoidance of Discrimination Act, which banned the existence of parties based on regional, tribal, or religious ties. It was designed to thwart the efforts of the opposition which had come together to form the United Party (U.P.). Nkrumah stated that his government brought in the Avoidance of Discrimination Bill to deal with the control of political parties based on tribal or religious affiliations. Its full title was "an Act to prohibit organisations using or engaging in racial or religious propaganda to the detriment of any other racial or religious community, or securing the election of persons on account of their racial or religious affiliations." (Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite* 74). The amazing speed with which the new party spread pushed the government to pass the most stringent of all legislations was the Preventive Detention Act, in July 1958. This legislation enabled the government to keep someone in detention for up to five years, without the right to appeal to the courts, for conduct considered threat to the security of the state and its foreign relations. By November of that year 39 people had been arrested under this law, all of whom were members of the Ga Shfimokpee or the U.P. in Ashanti region, and all 16 arrested in 1960 were members of the U.P. in the Volta region. Reports of the plots against the government and well-publicised trials of suspects increased the fear of the opposition (Gokin 123).

The government moved also to consolidate its power in the rural areas. Soon after independence, regional commissioners replaced regional officers who had been civil servants and all of them were Europeans. Regional commissioners came from the ranks of elected C.P.P. members of the legislative Assembly. In Ashanti a number of pro-N.L.M. paramount chiefs were downgraded or removed and pro-C.P.P. chiefs were upgraded. In 1958 regional assemblies, as the independence constitution had promised to the opposition, were established, but only as advisory bodies. The opposition boycotted the election to these bodies and the C.P.P. won a resounding majority. Quickly these members agreed to a constitutional change that would establish these bodies, and in 1959 the National Assembly passed such legislation. All that was left were regional houses of chiefs, which could only concern themselves with chiefly matters. Finally, Nkrumah started to divide the Ashanti region by first creating eight new Brong states, and then in 1959 his government created the new Brong Ahafo region, which consisted 62 percent of the former Ashanti region.

The government also moved to control civic organisations in the country, the most important of them was the Trade Union Congress (T.U.C.). The Industrial Relations Act of 1958 established a centralised structure of a limited number of national unions under C.P.P. control. In addition the government created a National Cooperative Council in place of Independent Alliance of Cooperatives. Organisations like the Ex-Servicemen, the Women's Organisations, the National association of Socialist Students, and the League of Ghana Patriots were all brought under the party's control. Nkrumah likened them to the many branches of a mighty tree. At the tenth anniversary of the C.P.P., in 1959, he proclaimed that "The Convention People's Party is Ghana, and the party was [was] the state and the state [was] the party." (qtd in Gokin 124)

As the C.P.P. gathered power in its hands, the opposition began to lose even its strongholds. In 1959 it suffered the loss of a by-election in Kumasi. The leader of the

opposition, Dr. Kofi Busia, went into exile in 1959, and by 1960, of the 31 opposition members at independence, 3 were being held in detention and 12 crossed to the government side. Nevertheless, opposition still existed, and there were institutions, like the judiciary, the post of the Governor General, and the civil service, that were still outside the party's direct control (Gokin 124).

In most parts of the world, the citizens of newly independent states are still under the control of their traditional institutions. They are therefore unwilling to accept new loyalty, if the new loyalty is not homogenous with the traditional principles. As a strategy for centralising power to be strictly exercised by centralised state control, Nkrumah attempted to reduce the importance of the power enjoyed by traditional chiefs before and during the indirect rule system.

By the 1960 Chieftaincy Act, Nkrumah reduced the chief's status and became dependent on the government support. They were dependent for official recognition, on the C.P.P. government. The chiefs were also required to perform specific functions in accordance with the status laid down by the C.P.P. government. For example, the Chieftaincy Secretariat of the Office of the President was in charge of chieftaincy affairs, and this was a role the chiefs were performing prior to the C.P.P. administration. Thus, the chiefs were no longer going to play significant role in the social, political, or governmental life of the country. The power to enstool and destool (appoint or remove a chief) was given to local government (Boateng, A.C. *The Political Legacy of Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana* 91).

By introducing these reforms on the Chieftaincy institution, Nkrumah denied the chiefs their right to exercise their authority in the newly established political institutions. It appeared to the chiefs that the new political system had come to replace the old one, but not to coexist. Undoubtedly then, the traditional system of chieftaincy was a continuous source of opposition against Nkrumah and the C.P.P.

In fact, Nkrumah respected traditional institution as long as it did not interfere with the actions he considered necessary to create a modern state. Since tribalism had been a major drawback in the colonial era as a result of its divisive tendencies, Nkrumah believed in national reconstruction based on the national unity and the solidarity rather than on tribal ties. And regardless to one's ethnic origin, Nkrumah attempted to raise the standard of living and welfare of all Ghanaian citizens (not as Ashantis, Fantis, Ewes, or Gas). The fact that Dr. Limann in 1979 became the president of Ghana was an important contribution of Nkrumah in the solution of tribal problems in Ghana. Limann came from the Ntafo tribe in the north which had been considered the most backward at that time and consequently would not be expected to be an important contributor to the country. The Ntafos were mostly used on farms as labourers by other ethnic groups. (Boateng, A.C. The Political Legacy of Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana 92/93).

Nkrumah attributed the severe measures taken to curb the opposition as a response to the undemocratic and terrorist methods against national security interest. This threat forced the C.P.P. government to seek the necessary measures to consolidate the unitary system of government the people voted. The emergency measures taken by Nkrumah's government was a choice to achieve and protect a strong national unity free from both ethnocentrism and the danger of national fragmentation and rivalry. Nkrumah stated that:

In the highest reaches of national life, there should be no reference to Fantis, Asantes, Ewes, Gas, Dagombas, strangers and so forth, in contrast we should call ourselves Ghanaians the brothers and sisters, members of the same community – the state of Ghana ... he implored the Ghanaians to purge from their minds the ethnic chauvinism of one group against the other. Otherwise we shall not be able to cultivate the wider spirit of brotherhood which our

objective of Pan-Africanism calls for. We are all Africans and peoples of African descent, and we shall not allow the imperialist plotters and intrigues to separate us from each other for their own advantage (qtd in Asamoah 114).

2-3-4- Nkrumah's Ideal of One-Party System

On the occasion of the C.P.P.'s tenth anniversary, Nkrumah made several important announcements to party supporters. First, he informed them that the first revolution was a political revolution for attaining the political kingdom as he indicated "Seek you first the political kingdom and all things will be added to you." (Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite* 64) and the struggle to achieve economic kingdom. Second, Nkrumah affirmed his commitment to Leninist principles of democratic centralism. Third, he declared that "the party is the state and the state is the party." (qtd in Biney 101). In April 1960 Nkrumah's government conducted a plebiscite to determine whether Ghana should become a republic, with a president far more powerful than the Prime Minister had been. Voters were asked if they accepted a republican constitution contained in a government white paper and choose their presidential candidate: Nkrumah or Danquah. Nkrumah was convinced that a republican form of government was the realisation of Ghana's full sovereignty. The country was to achieve a complete independence from Britain, with Nkrumah rather than the Queen head of the state. The results of the plebiscite for Accra gave Nkrumah 16,804 votes and Danquah, 9035, while those in support of the republican constitution numbered 16, 739 and those against 9,207. The numbers of the people who abstained were significant: less than half of the electorate voted. The poll showed 1,008, 740 in favour of the new constitution (88.5 percent) and 131,425 against (11.5 percent) (Biney 103).

Nkrumah believed that he had enough support for the establishment of a new republic. It gave immense powers to the president who was both head of the state and chief executive. Elected for five-year term, the President had the power of appointment and dismissal over the civil service, the armed forces and the judiciary. In addition, he had the power to refuse assent to bills, and to pass laws by legislative enactment (Rooney 238). Furthermore, the real point of the new constitution was to rid Nkrumah of checks on his authority within the government machine, so that he could administer the country as he saw best. The republican constitution had transferred ultimate responsibility for the armed forces from the Queen's representative in Accra, the British Governor General, to the President. Nkrumah was not only head of the state but also commander in chief of the army (Biney 104).

From 1962 to 1966, Nkrumah reshaped the Ghanaian politics by continuing the detention of political opponents he believed were inimical to his nationalist policies and establishing one-party state. The one-party state was to become a trend in most African countries from the mid-1960's. Ali Mazrui was among those critics who had attributed the emergence of the single part phenomenon to Nkrumah. He wrote:

“by strange twist of destiny Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana was both the hero who carried the torch of Pan-Africanism and the villain who started the whole legacy of the one-party state in Africa. To that extent, Kwame Nkrumah started the whole tradition of black authoritarianism in the post colonial era.” (qtd in Biney, *The Legacy of Kwame Nkrumah in Retrospect* 12).

The criticism that Nkrumah established a one-party state in the face of the challenge of building a nation is a valid one. Yet Nkrumah reached the same conclusion as his contemporaries Sékou Touré, Houphouet Boigny, Leopold Senghor, Modibo Keita, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta. Nkrumah believed that the formation of groups based on ethnic

affiliation, religion and region were illegitimate bases for the organisation of political groups as they were obstacles toward progress, modernity and nation building.

In Ghana, the political life during 1962 – 1966 period was marked with further assassination attempts and increasing terrorist activity in the country. In addition, increasing corruption, the failure to democratise the political structures in Ghana, and economic decline deeply affected Ghanaian society. The overall effects of these developments produced political cynicism, and self-seeking subservience, and Nkrumah alienation from the electorate.

Contributing to the increasing discontent among ordinary Ghanaians in 1962 was the wave of protest in the country when many C.P.P. leaders in Nkrumah's immediate circle showed their new-found wealth by buying houses and furnishing them with exotic antique furniture. AyehKumi owned twelve houses, Asafo-Agyei fourteen, and Krobo Edusei twenty seven. Most of these houses were rented to increase the income of the owner. The wife of Krobo Edusei purchased a gold-embossed bed from a London furniture store for three thousand Sterling. Critics considered the purchase an intolerable affront to Ghana's austerity programme. These cases proved the increasing corruption that existed among government officials and C.P.P. ministers. Nkrumah was obliged to act after this affair to introduce new bills to deal with corruption. Any individual including ministers, found guilty of corrupt practices would be liable to a minimum of five years and maximum of ten years imprisonment with hard labour. Despite these intentions these laws were never strictly enforced.

In August 1962, Nkrumah escaped an assassination attempt in the village of Kulungugu, where he returned from a meeting with President Yameogo of Upper Volta. Nkrumah was hospitalized for two weeks in the northern town of Bawku in order to remove the shrapnel embedded in his back (Biney, “The Political and the Social Thought”106).

Adamafio, Okoh, Dei-Anang, Coffie Crabbe and AkoAdjei soon assembled after making sure that Nkrumah was not seriously injured, they discussed whether to tell the people about his injury. Adamafio's commented on the incident:

I considered that the political sagacity dictated that we should not give our enemies the satisfaction of knowing that they had hit Kwame Nkrumah's person who we had sold to the world by efficient propaganda as an invincible, impregnable and invulnerable personality. Kwame agreed that it was not politically wise to reveal his vulnerability to his enemies (qtd in Rooney 301).

The immediate political effects on Accra were week of furious press campaigns that blamed every exiled opposition leaders and Western powers for the attempt of the assassination. In addition to wild rumours, among the speculations in the country was the belief that the authors of the assassination attempt were members of Nkrumah's entourage: Adamafio, Coffie-Crabbe, and Ako Adjei who were said to have instigated the assassination. Later, on 28 August the three perpetrators were arrested for their alleged connection with the attack. The fact that Adamafio was not next to Nkrumah in the motorcade at Kulungugu, which was a major item of evidence against him.

Before Kulungugu, Adamafio and the radical group in the C.P.P. had effectively seized power in the party and in the Government, but they had made dangerous enemies and had created an atmosphere of suspicion, intrigue and distrust. Nkrumah returned to Accra shocked and depressed man. In the country as a whole Kulungugu started a period of severe repression. After the incident the government detained 500 people, and the Preventive Detention Act sustained the repression until the coup in 1966 (Rooney, "Kwame Nkrumah Vision and Tragedy" 301)

In all, between September 1962 and January 1963, five bombings took place in the capital, leading to tightening security measures through the country. A state of emergency was declared in Accra and Tema on September 1962, following a huge bomb explosion and emergency powers were granted to the army.

Kulungugu accident did not deter Nkrumah from the ideological trajectory he embarked on. To promote the political principles and ideas of the party, which were to guide the state of Ghana, Nkrumah founded *the spark* in December 1962. Nkrumah needed a new propaganda tool to spread his social and political ideology. The co-editors of the new paper were Kofi Batsa and S. G. Ikoku.

On January, 8, 1963, the capital was rocked by another bomb explosion at Accra Sports Stadium. Four people died and 85 others were wounded. Nkrumah had been at the stadium earlier to address a mass of 25,000 members of the C.P.P, and it is most likely he was the intended target. The government charged Obetsebi Lamptey for the involvement on the attack and he was therefore, imprisoned at Nsawam security jail.

On February 1, 1963, the Alien Act was brought into operation by legislative instrument. It consolidated the old Deportation Act (1957) and the Immigration Act with their amendments into one piece of legislation. It obliged the employers and employees to notify the minister of interior within seven days when an "alien" employee started or finished work.

It seemed that the climate of paranoia, suspicion, and Nkrumah growing concern for his personal safety caused by the recent bombing and assassination attempts motivated the introduction of this bill as well as the introduction of the Nation Security Service of 1963. The act brought several intelligence and special military services under Nkrumah direct control. The three main services established were the Military Intelligence (M.I.) set up in 1961 and led by M. M. Hassan, a Nzima who was disliked by the army; the Special Intelligence Unit established in early 1963 and directed by another Nzima, Ambrose Yankey;

and the Presidential Detail Department (P.D.D.), which was principally responsible for the personal safety of Nkrumah and headed by Eric Otoo. The formation of these three services was totally independent of regular armed forces and police, which gave rise to a growing gulf between Nkrumah and Ghana armed forces (Biney 108).

Alongside with these bills were long discussions about one-party system of government, which had begun in parliament on September 11, 1962. C.P.P. parliament members presented various justifications. Among them was the belief that the Western concept of parliamentary government had been imposed on Ghana by the colonial power. So it was a duty to unite Ghana first before achieving total unity of Africa; that it would automatically "bring an end to the evil of social inequality in Ghana and miraculously separatism will disappear." (109).

For Nkrumah, modern socialism required a centralized government to direct the operation and development of the economy, which was equivalent to a de facto one-party system. In his view multiparty system represented conflicting interests. He believed,

"a people's parliamentary democracy with one-party system is better able to express and satisfy the common aspirations of a nation as a whole, than a multiparty parliamentary system, which in fact a ruse for perpetuating and covers up, the inherent struggle between the haves and have-nots." (qtd in Biney 109).

Meanwhile, as the heated parliamentary discussions on the usefulness of one-party government continued, the trial before a special court for Adamafo, Crabbe and Ako Adjei, the three major suspects in the Kulungugu attack. They were tried under the Chief Justice, Sir Arku Korsah, and Justices Van Lare and Akufo Addo. The trial continued for months with strong feeling, encouraged by the government-controlled press and Nkrumah supporters. In December 1963, the Chief Justice announced a verdict of Not Guilty, it came as a shock to

Nkrumah. Two days after the verdict, he dismissed the Chief Justice, and introduced a bill through the assembly which gave the President the power, in the national interest, to set aside any judgment in the country's courts. This intervention in the work of the judiciary threatened the independence of the institution and provided an evidence for the world that Nkrumah had embarked on a path leading to dictatorship. Protests flooded in from Britain and America, and even Nkrumah's most loyal supporters became alarmed. C. L. R. James, who in 1962 had publicly thanked Nkrumah for being the greatest leader in the emancipation of Africa, now reproached him publicly and privately (Rooney 323).

On January 2, 1964, as Nkrumah walked through the garden of the Flagstaff House toward his residence, he was the target of a third assassination attempt by police constable Seth Ametewee. Two bullets killed Nkrumah's body guard, Salifu Dagarti. Nkrumah and members of the security team overpowered the assassin, leaving Nkrumah with a huge wound in his cheek. The effect of this third assassination attempt led to Nkrumah's increasing suspicion and mistrust toward those around him. Two days after the attack. E. R. T. Madjitey, the police commissioner, was arrested and detained with nine other senior members of the police force who were suspected of plotting the assassination. Evidence was produced that Ametewee was paid by senior police officers, and in 1965 he was hanged for the murder of Dagarti.

As for Adamafio, Adjei, and Coffie Crabbe, the three were convicted and sentenced to death. However Nkrumah changed their sentence to long term imprisonment using his presidential prerogative. Toward the end of 1963, Nkrumah passed a bill that gave him the power to annul any decisions of Ghana's special courts if he considered the matter in the interest of the security of the state. Following the elections on the proposal for a one-party state in January 1964, the "Yes vote" totalled 2,773,970 and the "No vote" 2,452 out of the registered 2,877,464. Considerable power was now concentrated in Nkrumah hands (Biney

110). Nkrumah asserted that there should be a one-party political system. He believed that "A multi-party system introduced into Africa results in the perpetuation of feudalism, tribalism, and regionalism, and in inordinate power struggle and rivalry". In the pre-colonial African political system there was no sectional interest and no permanent opposing, political groups. Though there was no mass popular electoral process, decisions were reached by consensus, involving the commoners. Colonialism destroyed this democratic system through the British indirect rule (Botwe-Asamoah 118).

By 1965 the economic situation in Ghana was so difficult as the country's economy was suffering; the country's budget deficit had expanded considerably because the price of the cocoa on the world market continued to decline: Dr. Frimpong-Ansah, a Ghanaian economist, depicted the gravity of the economic situation:

By 1965 it had become very desperate and I remember we decided to write a memorandum to Nkrumah to tell him the true state of affairs of the economy [...] that was the first time the whole cabinet acknowledged to the President that Ghana was bankrupt. When Nkrumah heard this he actually shed tears. He left us in the office in the cabinet room for half an hour. He broke down completely when he knew that Ghana was in fact poor (qtd in Biney110).

Nkrumah did not give too much attention to the financial matters which had its grievous impact on the country's economy as he was almost unaware to the economic situation of Ghana. Contributing to his distress and sadness was the death of his old ideological opponent, Dr. J. B. Danquah, who had died at 69 years of age in Nsawam maximum-security prison on February, 1965. He had been arrested and detained in October 1961 for suspected involvement in the Sekondi-Takoradi strike and was released in June

1962, and was arrested and detained again in early January 1964 on the suspicion of being the mastermind behind the attempt on Nkrumah's life.

It seemed during this time, Nkrumah's trust on the regular armed forces grew less and less, particularly after he established the National Security Services in 1963. He promptly dismissed the Chief of Defence Staff, Major-General Stephen Otu and his deputy, Major-General Joseph Ankrah. This action was not only hasty but also miscalculated. It was detected by the military intelligence that both men were involved in a conspiracy to overthrow the Government in April. Another plan was foiled in June 1965 while Nkrumah was attending a Prime Ministers' Commonwealth Conference in London. As a result of this plot, Nkrumah decided to dismiss his generals and replace them with officers he considered loyal. Brigadier Aferi who had been Commander of the Second Brigade since its creation in October 1962 was promoted to major general and chief of defence staff. Lieutenant-Colonel Barwah, a northerner was appointed in his deputy; Lieutenant-Colonel A. K. Ocran was put in charge of the First Brigade in Accra; and Lieutenant-Colonel E. K. Kotoka, an Ewe, who had been appointed to the less prestigious Second Brigade in Kumasi.

What motivated Nkrumah for the reorganisation of the military was his suspicions that the army and the police were complicit in attacks on his life. He, therefore, consciously sought to install a loyal security and military apparatus independent of the army through the M.I., Special Intelligence Unit, and P.D.D., all of which were personally controlled from the presidential office in Flagstaff House.

Meanwhile, Nkrumah's growing authoritarianism and his attempts to mobilise the C.P.P. produced indifference, distrust, and cynicism among the Ghanaians. Ironically. The changes imposed from above, such as the creation of the Party Vanguard Activists (P.V.A.s), the Ghana Pioneer Movement (G.Y.P.M.), the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute (K.N.I.I.), the Builders and Workers Brigade, and the All African Trade Union Front which

barely involved the majority of the population. Nkrumah's alienation was demonstrated on how he responded to the rise in the price of bread in late 1965. Bread had risen from half a crown to five shillings while the standard wage for workers in Accra was six shillings in a day. Nkrumah and his cabinet attribute the rise in the price of the bread to the corrupt forces in the Ghana National Trading Corporation (G.N.T.C.), who were selling flour to smaller bakeries at 14 pounds sterling instead of the normal price of 6 pounds per bag. The state bakery, which supplied about 20 percent of the bread in Accra, could not get flour except by paying black market prices. In short, the bread disturbance was an evidence of the level of corruption, deeper hostilities, and problems in trade with the Soviet Union. There was a change from Canadian to Russian supplies of flour, as the Russian could only make their delivery every four months. This was the great difficulty with the communist countries because their timetable for deliveries was rigid, which had to comply with their state planning system.

There was opposition in the G.N.T.C., as well as in the big foreign trading companies, to deal with goods coming from the communist countries. The conspiracy was wide involving the highest ranking personnel in the department of Finance, Trade and Commerce, Food and Nutrition, and Foreign Affairs, who knew about the decision to change over to Russian flour. Nkrumah was very angry and ordered for an investigation in the scandal, but the price of the bread remained the same. Important ministers, officials, and party members had vested interests in the continuation of the bread crisis. This example illustrated the widespread of government and state corruption; the political dishonesty of key ministers around Nkrumah and his inability to stop the decline in corruption. By mid-1965 there was a food crisis in the country and life was made very hard for the wage and the salary earner due mainly to flagrant profiteering in bread and other food products.

By the end of the year, Nkrumah's attempts to revolutionize Ghana and transform Africa into a model of economic and political strength fell short of the desired result. His attempts to strengthen the C.P.P. through the P.V.A.'s, the ideological school, integration of the trade unions, women's groups, and youth were unsuccessful. Increasing corruption, inflation, indifference, cynicism and hostility to Nkrumah's authoritarianism existed. There was a wide gap between Nkrumah's political ideas and their application. The C.P.P. and Nkrumah imposed socialism on the people without their consult. This due mainly to Nkrumah's politics that were founded on a clear conception of centralized power and personal control. He established a system of government based on top-down institutions which excluded the majority of the Ghanaians. Nkrumah did not distinguish between the state and the party. For him, the C.P.P. and the state were one and the same. Nkrumah could not imagine that the C.P.P. would act against the interests of the people. This paternalistic notion of power over the people was an intrinsic in his concept of the C.P.P. as the commoners' party. Such a notion denied the right of the commoners to exercise the freedom to disagree with the party.

Nkrumah's policies in the Gold Coast on a central and unitary government that transcends ethnic, religious and regional boundaries. He considered parties or groups formed on the previous considerations as a threat to the unity of the country; he regarded them as source of national fragmentation and division of the newly born state. He strongly believed in a central government with the President with far more powers in his hand to enable him to protect the unity and the hard won independence. In his efforts of nation building, Nkrumah introduced draconian measures, for example, the Ghana Nationality and Citizenship Bill, the Deportation Act, the Avoidance of Discrimination Act and the notorious Preventive Detention Act to protect the political kingdom and ban ethnically based parties. Furthermore, he established one-party system with the Convention Peoples' Party as a nationalist party

which encompasses all the classes of society regardless to their race or tribe. His actions and policies were culminated with the establishment of the republic to achieve full independence from the British crown and exercise complete sovereignty over the country.

However, these measures and policies which were carried out by Nkrumah to establish one-party state and eliminate the opposition led to the concentration of power in the hand of one man and plunging him further into authoritarianism. Nkrumah's domestic policies provoked lot of criticisms from his opponents including his iron fisted dictatorship and his abuse of human rights through his reckless use of the Preventive Detention Act even by his followers. Nkrumah's unawareness to the financial matters caused an irreparable damage and loss of wealth and resources of the country and leading the country to near bankruptcy and economic collapse. This desperate state of affairs and the absence of any political solution led to a growing suspicion and attempts on assassination of Nkrumah.

Chapter Three: Continental Obstacles to Nkrumah's Pan-African Project.

In his efforts to achieve the independence and the unity of his country, Nkrumah faced tremendous obstacles. We have seen in Chapter Two the actions and efforts of Kwame Nkrumah against the British colonial authorities that culminated with the independence of Ghana in March 1957. In this chapter we will deal with his efforts to use the unity of Ghana under a single government as a starting point to achieve the independence and unity of the whole African continent under a single continental government and the obstacles that faced his ambitious project.

3-1- Nkrumah Foreign Policies 1958 – 1966

Nkrumah eagerly believed in a central role for Ghana in international affairs. Undoubtedly, from the beginning his personality dominated Ghana's external relations, because he felt he had a specific mission for Africa which could be fully achieved under his leadership. Nkrumah's vision of African unity, together with the strategies he employed to fulfil his foreign policy objectives caused conflict and animosity among some of his contemporary African leaders, such as Felix Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast, Sylvanus Olympio of Togo and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. Nkrumah's efforts to achieve African unity and the obstacles which worked against his Pan-African project will be the focus of this part.

To begin with, the leader of the newly independent Ghana wanted to make of his country a beacon for the African liberation. In his independence speech, he spoke of the need to create the African personality and identity. Moreover, it was in this occasion that he made his most famous commitment to the liberation struggles of other colonised nations when he said: “We have done the battle and again we rededicate ourselves not only in the struggle to emancipate other countries in Africa – our independence is meaningless unless it is linked with the total liberation of Africa.” (Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*, 150).

Nkrumah believed that a political union would secure economic and technical transformation of the African continent, which was necessary to support Africa’s increasing population to obtain standards of living comparable with those in the most advanced countries. He also considered Pan-Africanism or an African union government as a protection against neo-colonial domination.

“We need the strength of our combined numbers and resources to protect ourselves from the very positive dangers of returning colonialism in a disguised form. We need to combat the entrenched forces dividing our continent and still holding back millions of our brothers. We need to secure total liberation.” (Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*, 217).

He warned that “at present most of the independent states are moving in direction which exposes us to the dangers of imperialism and neo-colonialism.” (Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*, 218) For Nkrumah continental economic planning would increase Africa’s industrial and economic power. Similarly, the establishment of a military and defence strategy would be of overriding importance. Nkrumah considered the consequences of the failure to combine military and defence strategy are likely to give rise to insecurity and the opportunities to enter in defence pacts which could endanger the security of all African states. Lastly, common

foreign policy would enable Africa “to speak with one voice in the councils of the world, such as the United Nations and other international bodies.” (Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*, 220).

Nkrumah envisaged a continental parliament composed of a lower house to discuss the problems facing Africa and an upper house to ensure the equality of the associated states, regardless of size and population. He urged that the process toward continental government should begin with a nucleus of a few states and committed to the objectives of political and economic unity and “leave the door open for attachment of others as they desire to join or the freedom would allow them to do so.” (Asamoah 121). For Nkrumah, the United States, Soviet Union, Europe and Canada were models of positive benefits of union. However, he was prudent in emphasising that any supranational structure for Africa did not mean the elimination of national sovereignty. He emphasised that African states “would continue to exercise independent authority except in the fields defined and reserved for the common action in the interests of the security and orderly development of the whole continent.” (121/122). He expressed confidence that a continental structure could be devised to enable these objectives to be achieved and preserve some extent the sovereignty of each state within a supranational framework of African unity.

3-1-1- First Conference of Independent African States (C.I.A.S.) Accra, 1958

With his reliable adviser on African affairs George Padmore, Nkrumah started preparations for the First Conference of Independent African States (C.I.A.S.) in April 1958. It called for the coordination of foreign policies in Africa; that Africa should see the international situation in the light of her own interest; and the setting up of a permanent institutional framework for cooperation among African states. Even before the conference, differences and suspicions emerged between Liberia and Ghana. President Tubman of Liberia demanded that the draft proposal condemn subversive ideologies and coups to overthrow

legitimate governments, as Ghana was hosting political activists and refugees from different African countries. The small team visited all seven participating states to reassure them that Ghana was not seeking leadership in Africa (Biney 151).

Representatives from Libya, Ethiopia, Liberia, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, and the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.), which was short lived union between Egypt and Syria, attended the Accra Conference. It opened on April 15. Nkrumah declared, “the first time in history that the representatives of independent sovereign states in Accra are meeting together with the aim of forging closer links of friendship, brotherhood, cooperation and solidarity between them.” (qtd in Biney 151). He referred to the problems of colonialism and racialism prevailing on the African continent and it was in this occasion that he spoke for the first time of the new forms of colonialism which were then appearing in the world, with potential threat to our precious independence. The resolutions of the conference were a reaffirmation of 1945 Pan-African conference objectives: namely to accelerate the struggles in dependent territories and to combat racialism on the African continent through economic and social development as well as cooperation (151).

3-1-2- The Ghana – Guinea – Mali Union

Inspired by the example of the thirteen states that came together to form the United States of America, Nkrumah held series of meetings with Sekou Toure of Guinea and formed Ghana Guinea union on November 23, 1958, serving as the nucleus of a Union of West African States. Sekou Toure announced on May 1, 1959 that the Union is open to all African nations. The Ghana – Guinea – Mali later replaced the Ghana – Guinea Union, formed on April 29, 1961 to serve as the future of the United States of Africa. Its charter declared that its membership open to every African country of federation of African states that accepted its goals. Specifically, its goals sought to strengthen and develop the ties of friendship and fraternal cooperation between the member states politically, diplomatically, economically and

culturally, and to combine their resources in order to consolidate their independence and preserve their territorial integrity (Asamoah 121).

As a part of Ghana – Guinea agreement resident ministers were exchanged and the coordination of defence, foreign and economic policies were to be developed as Guinea was facing economic collapse. After independence, Sekou Toure with his “No” vote refused to join the Charles de Gaulle’s proposal on devolved power to Francophone countries within a broader framework of French Union led to the immediate departure of French aid, technicians and bureaucrats from Conakry. Ghana agreed to grant a loan of twenty eight million U.S. Dollars to Guinea (Gokin 126).

3-1-3- All – African People’s Conference (A.A.P.C.)

Nkrumah assigned to Padmore the organisation of the forthcoming all-African people’s Conference (A.A.P.C.). It was held between December 5 and 8, 1958. It brought together non-governmental level political parties, movements, trade unions, cooperative associations, youth and women's organisations from territories under colonial rule. Almost 200 delegates sponsored by 36 nationalist organisations that were invited to Accra. The Agenda of the conference was to formulate concrete plans to carry out the Gandhian tactics and strategy of the African non-violent revolution. The leading figures from all over the continent discovered one another; among them was Patrice Lumumba of the Belgian Congo and Holden Roberto of Angola. These nationalist leaders went back to their home countries determined to intensify the struggle against colonial rule. The conference resolved to establish a permanent secretariat in Ghana and to hold a similar conference each year, its purpose would be “accelerate the liberation of Africa from imperialism and colonialism.” (Gokin 126).

3-1-4- The Sanniquellie Declaration 1959

Following the year, Nkrumah and President Tubman of Liberia and President Sekou Toure of Guinea met in Sanniquellie, a small Liberian village to discuss the question of African liberation and unity. On July 19, 1959, the three leaders issued a Declaration of Principles in which each state and federation, which is a member of the community, shall maintain its national identity and constitution structure. They agreed to form a Community of independent African states. The Sanniquellie Declaration marked a new phase in the conflict between Pan-Africanists about the best way of developing African unity. Tubman considered a loose association of African states based on economic cooperation to what he considered Nkrumah's inflexible political union (Legum 45)

3-1-5- The Second All – African People's Conference 1960

The Second All- African People's Conference (A.A.P.C.) was held in Tunis on January 25. There was greater emphasis given to African unity at this conference than at the Accra gathering. It was at this conference that the establishment of an organisation to manage all necessary assistance and solidarity of all African countries was founded. They also agreed on sending of African volunteers to fight in the Algerian war of liberation from France. Furthermore, the conference adopted a policy of increasing closer economic and cultural cooperation. Nkrumah's proposals for the establishment of an African common market, an African bank and a technical research institute were approved; but his proposal on the political union was refused (Asamoah 122).

As an eager Pan-Africanist, Nkrumah advocated the African liberation causes. In 1960, he expresses his condemnation of what he called "nuclear imperialism" carried out by the French government's second explosion of an atomic bomb in the Sahara in February. At the Positive Action Conference for Peace and Security in Africa, held in Accra from April 7 to

10, 1960. He condemned the brutalities committed by the French in Algeria and the recent Sharpeville massacre in South Africa. In this Conference, Nkrumah expressed his strong opposition to nuclear weapons and the territorial integrity of the African continent or the involvement in the Cold War (Biney 154).

3-1-6- The Second Conference of Independent African States – Addis Ababa 1960

The Second C.I.A.S., which was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in June 1960 gave rise to an open conflict of views on Pan-Africanism and some hints of animosity towards Nkrumah. The Ghana delegation led by Ako Adjei, as a minister of foreign affairs, hoped that the conference would accept Ghana's proposals for a union of African states, saying: "political union would provide the framework within which any plans of economic, social and cultural cooperation can, in fact, operate in the best advantage of all – to us in Ghana the concept of African unity is an article of faith. It is a cardinal objective in our policy." (qtd in Legum 46). Guinea was the only country that supported his point of view. A number of speeches in the Conference indicated that many of the leaders of newly independent states rejected Nkrumah's ideas and his methods. Opposition to Ghana's approach to Pan-African unity came from the leader of the Nigerian delegation Yusuf Maitima Sule. He openly attacked Ghana, maintaining that African unity was premature; that the unity must come from the bottom up, not from the top down. He indirectly criticised Nkrumah saying: "if anyone thinks he is the messiah who has got a mission to lead Africa, then the whole purpose of Pan-Africanism will be defeated." (47). Collision of attitudes and approaches to Pan-African unity surfaced at this meeting and turned into antagonistic positions.

3-2- Nkrumah and the Institutionalising of Pan-Africanism 1961 – 1963

After the murder of the Congolese prime minister Lumumba, Nkrumah was determined to set up a union government of Africa. He contributed to the setting up of permanent machinery to achieve such an objective locally and continentally. Another significant

development during this period was the ideological gap that emerged on the African continent between the moderate group, so called Brazzaville group (formed in December 1960), which later became the Monrovia group in May 1961 and the more radical Casablanca group formed in January 1961. Ghana was an important member of this radical group (Biney 158).

Locally, Nkrumah showed his distrust of civil servants trained under the colonial administration. This distrust influenced his attitude toward the ministry of Foreign Affairs. This led him to the establishment of the Bureau of African Affairs (B.A.A.), the African Affairs Secretariat (A.A.S) and the African Affairs Centre (A.A.C.) as institutions parallel to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to deal with Ghana's increasing responsibilities in Africa (158). The cost of such endeavours were criticised by Nkrumah's opponents and critics as wasting Ghana's wealth in Pan-African projects and to assist other countries to gain political independence. Nkrumah's critics and detractors such as Peter Omari accused Nkrumah of "sacrificing Ghana on the altar of Pan-Africanism" (qtd in Biney, *The Legacy of Kwame Nkrumah in Retrospect* 07). But for Nkrumah Ghana progress is inseparably linked to the fundamental economic, social and political progress of the entire African continent. For Nkrumah, Ghana and Africa were inseparable. Their destinies and future were one. Nkrumah stated that "economic unity to be effective must be accompanied by political unity. The two are inseparable, each necessary for the future of our continent, and the development of our resources." (Nkrumah, *Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism* 30).

3-3- Nkrumah's Rivals and Opponents

At the First Conference of Independent African States, Nkrumah began to support the African liberation movements across the African continent through the apparatus of the B.A.A., the A.A.C., and the A.A.S. the function of the B.A.A. were to provide assistance to freedom fighters in colonial territories, to offer training, and to provide accommodation

through the A.A.C. Some African countries were suspicious about Nkrumah's actions and began to perceive that he was instigating subversion against their governments. At the beginning of 1962, the Nigerian Prime Minister Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafewa Balewa convened a meeting in Lagos to bring the rival opposing groups, the Casablanca and Monrovia, together. Balewa had unilaterally decided not to invite a representative of the Algerian Provisional Government, (G.P.R.A.) as it was not a fully independent state. Yet Algeria had participated fully in the last Conference of Independent States (C.I.A.S.) in June 1960. This action caused dispute in the meeting. Another issue that gave rise to discontent of the Casablanca group was that the latter had not been consulted in the arrangement of the conference. In a meeting of ministers of foreign affairs of the Casablanca group held in Accra on January 20 that the radical states decided not to attend the Lagos Conference on the principle of non-participation of Algeria. Their decision caused resentment in Monrovia group. Thus the Nigerians and other African leaders considered the boycott an effort to undermine the conference planned by Nkrumah (Biney 160).

3-3-1- The Lagos Conference – 1960

The Lagos conference took place on January 25 – 30, 1962, and was attended by 20 African countries. The most important achievement was that all the participants agreed to establish a general secretariat to act as an administrative organ and council of ministers to look for areas of cooperation between states. Nkrumah increased his efforts to influence his contemporaries to create a continental institution for achieving African unity. His role in the formation of the Organisation of the African Unity (O.A.U.) was reflected on his personal communication with all the heads of states and the use of propaganda. He was supported by Sekou Toure and Emperor Haile Selassie in mobilising African heads of state for the first meeting of the O.A.U. in Addis Ababa, held in May 1963 (Biney 160).

3-3-2- Nkrumah's Criticism for the Organisation of the African Unity (O.A.U.)

At this historic first summit meeting, Nkrumah gave a lengthy address in which he repeated his political convictions. He stated.

African unity is above all, a political kingdom which can only be gained by political means. The social and economic development of Africa will come only within the political kingdom, not the other way round. The United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Canada, Australia, Switzerland and Venezuela were the political decisions of revolutionary people before they became mighty realities of social power and material wealth.

(Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite* 219)

He attacked the gradualist approaches to unity. Nkrumah's Minister of Information Kofi Batsa gave a glimpse of Nkrumah's address to his contemporaries at the historic summit of the O.A.U. He wrote:

I sat behind Nkrumah when he spoke to the O.A.U. conference in Addis Ababa in 1963 and I watched the faces of leaders as he left his prepared script and pointing at each in turn, at Haile Selassie, at Tafewa Balewa, at Modibo Keita, at Maga; he said

“if we do not come together, if we do not unite, we shall be thrown out, all of us one by one – and I also will go.” He said, “ the O.A.U. must face a choice now – we can either move forward to progress through our effective African Union or step backward into stagnation, instability and confusion – an easy prey for foreign intervention, interference, and subversion.”

He got a standing ovation for that speech and although we felt he should have been calmer and that perhaps he had gone too far, his reaction was, “Let me tell them, let me tell them.” (qtd in Biney, *The Legacy of Kwame Nkrumah* 09)

The establishment of the O.A.U. covered the desire of regional unity and ideological differences that continued to exist on the African continent. The O.A.U.'s charter was signed on May 25, 1963, by the then 31 independent African states. It was a compromise between the aspiration of the Casablanca group and Monrovia group. Principally the charter advocated the support of liberation struggles in the Portuguese territories in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and the armed struggles as a means to achieve national independence. It maintained the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of a member state (Biney 161).

Despite the existence of the O.A.U., it did not meet the ambition of African unity that Nkrumah envisaged. The institutional framework of the O.A.U. was entirely different from the one that Nkrumah wished to achieve. His ambition was the political unification of Africa as a necessary condition for effective unity but most of his contemporaries saw the ideal unity as an association of sovereign governments similar to that of the United Nations. Nkrumah supporters chose to describe this as “a trade union of African presidents” (Legum, *The Organisation of the African Unity – Success or Failure?* 03).

The criticisms of Nkrumah's planning to become the ruler of Africa or as being pro-Soviet by his opponents could not deter him from his repeated call for a union of African states. He considered that a loose association of African nations would only enable the former colonial powers and imperialists to manipulate the African nations to their advantage. Nkrumah further explained his theory of political economy when he pointed out that: “Political freedom is essential in order to win economic freedom, but political freedom is meaningless unless it is of nature which enables the country, which has obtained it to maintain its economic freedom.” (qtd in Asamoah 107). Nkrumah considered that political freedom was inseparable from economic freedom. Political freedom is the vanguard to Africa's total social, economic and cultural freedom. At the final conclusion of the charter of

the Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.), Nkrumah used the occasion to put forward his argument for the total liberation and immediate political unification of Africa. In order for the O.A.U. to meet its commitment to the total liberation of the African continent and a common policy for defence and foreign policy, Nkrumah proposed five commissions. They serve as examples of an African union government. These commissions were: a commission to draw up details for a common foreign policy and diplomacy; a commission to produce plans for common system of defence and a commission to make proposals for a common African citizenship. A commission to work out a continental plan for a common economic and industrial programme for Africa, include (i) a common market (ii) African currency (iii) an African monetary zone (iv) an African central bank, and (v) a continental communication system. Nkrumah considered that a compromised O.A.U. charter which was weak and ineffective would result in making a loose organisation; an organisation without a clear shape. He further criticised the O.A.U. charter:

What are we looking for? Are we looking for charters conceived in the light of the United Nations example? A type of United Nations whose decisions are framed on the basis of resolution that in our experiment have sometimes been ignored by member states? Where groupings are formed and pressure develops in accordance with the interest of the groups concerned? (qtd in Asamoah 107).

The O.A.U charter was designed to become a loose association and it did not meet Nkrumah's vision of a political union government. It was, according to Nkrumah, weak and ineffective, and became what he described it as "a charter of intent, rather than a charter of positive action" (qtd in Asamoah 108). Nkrumah's proposals toward African unity were met with opposition from the other member states. The issue of the African High Command and African Union Government were rejected. For this reason Nkrumah warned that " in unity

lies strength. African states must unite or sell themselves out to imperialists and colonialist exploiters for a mess of pottage, or disintegrate individually” (Nkrumah, *The Handbook of the Revolutionary Warfare* 35) Nkrumah was, in fact, isolated at the founding of the O.A.U. his radical appeal for greater unity was ignored.

Nkrumah failed to convince African leaders who, as he viewed them, tending to block the path to African political union as imperialist protagonists and puppet leaders. For Nkrumah, the political union meant a common foreign and defence policy, common currency, one citizenship, intercommunication system, as well as rapid social, economic and industrial development. Africa is endowed with incredible natural resources, yet the post independent African nations were still dependent on the former colonial powers for simple goods. With an African common market of three hundred million producers and consumers, Africa could be in control of productivity and purchasing power similar to any of those trading blocs which now control the commerce of the world. Yet most member states of the O.A.U. did not see it that way.

3-3-3- The Cairo Summit – July 1964

Another source of conflict appeared during the O.A.U. summit of July 1964 hosted by Cairo. When President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania entered into an ideological debate with Nkrumah over their opposing views on how African unity could be attained. The speech of Nkrumah and Nyerere at the O.A.U. summit reflected the polemical political discourse on Pan-Africanism. It was at this summit meeting that Nkrumah put forward a proposal of an African High Command which was met by a fierce criticism from Nyerere, the most eloquent advocate of gradualist approach. Nyerere believed the idea of the United States of Africa could not be achieved in one step and could not happen overnight. Nyerere made a scathing

attack on Nkrumah when he accused him of employing the notion of Union government for propaganda purposes. He declared:

“I am becoming increasingly convinced that we are divided between those who genuinely want a continental government and will work patiently for its realisation, removing obstacles, one by one; and those who simply use the phrase ‘Union government’ for the purpose of propaganda.” (qtd in Biney, *The Legacy of Kwame Nkrumah in Retrospect* 10).

Nkrumah address at Cairo Conference emphasized the urgent need for accepting, at least in principle, the idea of establishing a Union Government for Africa. In his speech he criticised “the economic subservience of many African countries.” He insisted that he did not “spurn foreign trade.” He maintained that “the appeal for a Union Government of Africa is therefore not being made merely to satisfy a political end. It is indispensable for our economic survival in this modern world.” Nkrumah’s proposal at the meeting was considered as premature. There was an agreement that favoured economic cooperation as opposed to Nkrumah’s political union. It was decided by the majority to refer to Nkrumah’s radical proposal for the establishment of a Union Government for Africa to the O.A.U.’s specialised commission for study. But the decision was a clear attempt to neglect the proposal (10)

3-3-4- The Accra O.A.U. Summit – October, 1965

It was members of the Ghanaian delegation who proposed the next summit in Accra. Though Ghana did not have the necessary facilities to host such a meeting, Nkrumah decided to build a new O.A.U. complex accommodation and conference room. The entire project cost the country £ 10 million and was completed in a short period of time. Despite the serious economic crisis that Ghana was going through, Nkrumah was determined to follow his Pan-African ambitions in detriment of the domestic issues.

Nkrumah was greatly disturbed by the failure of the previous conferences to support his Union Government proposals for Africa. Moreover, the issue of political refugees in Ghana became an obstacle to convene the 1965 O.A.U summit. A number of African leaders from the 13-member Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache (O.C.A.M.) states, threatened to boycott the summit if Nkrumah did not deport the political refugees settling in Ghana. In order to succeed in holding the O.A.U. summit, Nkrumah agreed on the eve of the summit to deport the refugees in a joint communiqué on October 13, 1965. Nkrumah, President Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast, Yameogo of Upper Volta, and Diori of Niger signed the communiqué under the chairmanship of President Modibo Keita of Mali. The document settled the differences between them according to the principles affirmed by the O.A.U. charter, particularly those related to no-interference in the internal affairs of states and friendship among states. Independent O.A.U. observers confirmed the deportation. Nevertheless, the O.C.A.M. remained dissatisfied and decided not to attend the summit. Yet the summit went ahead and opened on October 21 (Biney 146).

Nkrumah spoke in his usual asserting tone and stated that it was necessary to strengthen the charter of the O.A.U. by providing effective machinery in the form of an executive council of the O.A.U. to act as an arm of the assembly of the Head of State and Government. The council responsibilities would be to implement the decisions of the assembly of the Heads of state and Government. Unfortunately for Nkrumah, the two-third vote needed to establish a council was never obtained (Biney 165). Nkrumah was angry at the outcome of this summit that he threatened to pull Ghana out of the O.A.U., but Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and Sir Albert Margai of Sierra Leone managed to convince him not to do this (Gokin 131).

3-4- The Causes of the Failure Nkrumah's Pan-African Project

In this part of the chapter we will concentrate on the causes which eventually led to the coup d'état which overthrew Nkrumah's regime on February 24, 1966 and the halting of his Pan-African project. The leaders of the coup were: Major Kotoka, Commander of the 2nd Infantry in Kumasi; Colonel Afrifa, Staff Officer of the 2nd Infantry in Kumasi; and Inspector General J.W.K. Harlly, Head of the Ghana Police Service (Boateng 145). The major causes of the coup according to its perpetrators were related to Nkrumah's internal and external policies. Domestically, they accused Nkrumah for having led Ghana to one party regime and the elimination of the opposition. He was also accused of his inability to abolish social inequalities, waste of resources, corruption, the declining of the economy, lack of respect for the traditional institutions (Chieftaincy), his leaning to the communist bloc and his reliance on foreign aid.

In addition to the military and the police, there were other forces opposed to Nkrumah's policies: the chiefs, the former opposition parties like the National Liberation Movement (N.L.M.) and the United Party (U.P.), as well as most of mass public. All of these forces felt antagonised by the C.P.P. Government. Therefore, they supported the military. The chiefs had virtually lost their functions. The farmers and other workers suffered greatly as a result of Nkrumah's economic policies.

3-4-1- Domestic Problems

The military that ousted Nkrumah accused him of leading Ghana to a one-man regime. Nkrumah managed to consolidate all power in his hands. This effectively undermined the U.P., the N.L.M. and other opposition parties. Nkrumah's decline into authoritarianism was marked with the introduction of the Preventive Detention Act (P.D.A.) in 1958 and its subsequent amendments which led to the detention of political opponents. Hundreds of

people were held in detention under this Act. Dr. J.B. Danquah, one of Nkrumah's fierce opponents, died at Nsawam prison in February 1965 (Rooney 317). On February 1, 1963, the Alien Act was brought into operation by a legislative instrument. It consolidated the old Deportation Act of 1957 and the Immigration Act with their amendments into one piece of legislation. It imposed upon the employers and employees the responsibility of notifying the minister of interior within seven days when "alien" employee started or finished work (Biney 108). Moreover, the non-existence of civilian groups and political bodies which were not affiliated to Nkrumah's ruling party (C.P.P.), increasing security measures after 1962 and the lack of independence of the judiciary. Nkrumah dismissed Sir Arku Korsah as a Chief Justice on December 11, 1963. Korsah was the president of the special court which acquitted three prominent Ghanaians charged with treason on December 9, 1963. They were Tawia Adamafio, former minister of information; AkoAdjei, former foreign minister; Coffie Crabbe, former party executive secretary (Boateng 146).

In Ghana, the political life during 1962 – 1966 was marked with assassination attempts on Nkrumah's life and an increasing terrorist activity. In addition, the increasing corruption, the failure to democratise the political structure in Ghana, and economic decline deeply affected Ghanaian society. The overall effects of these developments produced political cynicism, and self-seeking subservience, and Nkrumah's alienation from the electorate.

Contributing to the increasing discontent among ordinary Ghanaians in 1962 was the wave of protest in the country when many C.P.P. leaders in Nkrumah's immediate circle involved in bribe-taking and the abuse of office for personal advantage. The large houses that C.P.P. ministers had built and their extravagant lifestyles indicated how much the party became a means of self-enrichment and corruption. It was becoming what Nkrumah admitted "a new ruling class of self-seeking careerists." (qtd in Gokin 101). These cases proved the increasing corruption that existed among government officials and C.P.P. ministers, to such a

degree that the C.P.P. had become “a very profitable source of wealth for those who held power within.” (134). Nkrumah was obliged to act after this affair to introduce a new Bill to deal with corruption. Any individual including ministers, found guilty of corrupt practices would be liable to a minimum of five years and maximum of ten years’ imprisonment with hard labour. Despite these intentions, these laws were never strictly enforced (Biney 106). Corruption became a major factor in Nkrumah’s industrial enterprises. For example, the huge luxury complex built for the 1965 O.A.U. Conference, it caused the postponing of Conference because it was not ready to host the meeting and cost ten times its original estimate, plunging Ghana deeper into bankruptcy (Rooney 263).

By 1965 the economic situation in Ghana was difficult as the country’s economy was suffering; the country’s budget deficit had expanded considerably because the price of the cocoa on the world market continued to decline. Ghana depended largely on the exportation of cocoa to support its economy. Nkrumah did not give much attention to the financial matters which had its dangerous impact on the country’s economy as he was almost unaware to the economic situation of Ghana.

Nkrumah embarked on socialist planning for Ghana’s economy in general and agriculture in particular, which depended on state enterprise. State enterprises in the agriculture proved to be disastrous. Nkrumah ignored the failure of the Gonja scheme in 1950’s which had attempted to establish a large-scale farming in the north (Rooney 263). Determined to set up a large scale mechanised farming, Nkrumah established over 100 state farms by 1965. With a dire shortage of agricultural experts, the farms were largely staffed by C.P.P. supporters and their families and friends. Almost all these large scale agricultural projects were marked with inadequate planning and corruption with machinery and experts of the East bloc countries.

The declining economy caused by the ever-changing in the economic plans and policies. In 1961 the Second Development Plan, which was to run until 1964, was publicly abandoned. Instead, in 1961 the drafting of the New Seven Year Development Plan began which led to the “socialist transformation of the economy and the complete eradication of the colonial structure.” (Gokin 134). New foreign experts were recruited for this purpose. In this new economic plan, the state was to dominate the economy. The Ghanaian National Trading Corporation, established in 1961, became the main importer and distributor of goods in the country. Most of the gold and diamond mining in the country was nationalised. Construction was taken over by the state construction corporation. The state also took over the banking and insurance industries. Industrial development was also taken over by the state, and by 1965 there were 22 wholly owned state industries with more than 20 in the process of construction. State farms were set up and relied on the mechanised technology most of which was imported from the East bloc countries and competition from the private sector was not allowed (Gokin 134).

The new economic policies succeeded in breaking the powerful control that foreign capital exerted in Ghana. However, the consequences for the country’s economy were disastrous. The inefficiency of the National Trading Cooperation and Nkrumah’s insistence on importing goods from East-Bloc countries resulted in terrible shortages of imports on which Ghanaians depended. Essential goods like sugar, rice, milk, flour, soap, medicines, and motor vehicle spare parts could not be obtained in the country. Dramatic increases in the price of goods followed. People had to line up in sports stadiums in Accra to purchase single packets of sugar. The state farms work so inefficiently that the Workers Brigades that farmed them were unable to feed even themselves. The poorly planned, often unworkable industries stumbled and Ghana had to resort to short term loans from financial institutions in Europe to make it possible to import the basic items that the country needed. Economic discontent

erupted into strikes between 1958 and 1966. Thousands of workers went on strike to protest against government austerity programmes and increase in the price of basic commodities like flour, sugar, soap and other staples (Boateng 152). By 1965 external reserves had been close to \$ 500 million in 1957 had sunk less than \$ 1.5 million. In addition to Ghana's economic problems was the continuing decline in the world price of cocoa. By 1964 – 1965 it had declined to \$ 347 a ton. In these difficult times, corruption was widespread and made the mismanagement of the country even worse. It stretched from the very top to lowest echelons of society (Gokin 134).

On October 1st, 1960, Nkrumah set up the President's Own Guard Regiment (P.O.G.R.), comprising older soldiers, their duty was to guard the Flagstaff House. The status of the P.O.G.R. among regular armed forces would create an increasing friction and eventually the 1966 coup. Nkrumah established the P.O.G.R. as his own army because he began to question the loyalty of the army and the police since the attempts on his life in December 1958. The military and police were displeased as Nkrumah made efforts to weaken the regular army and the police by cutting their expenditures. For example, the regular army's fringe benefit such as rent, water and telephone allowances were cut. The regular army accused Nkrumah of mismanagement of country's the nation's scant resources to develop his private forces instead of the nation's army. The regular army was threatened by the P.O.G.R. which was favourably treated and all had fringe benefits the regular army used to enjoy. Colonel Afrifa described the state of the regular army in 1965.

Our clothes are virtually in tatters. We had no ammunition. The burden of the taxation was heavy. The cost of living for the ordinary soldiers was high. The army was virtually at the hands of politicians who treated it with arrogance and even with open contempt. We are also aware that the President's Own Guard were

receiving kingly treatment. Their pay was higher and it was an open fact that they possess better equipment. The men who had been transferred (to the P.O.G.R.) from regular army no longer owed allegiance and loyalty to the Chief of Defence Staff, but to Kwame Nkrumah who had become their commanding officer (qtd in Boateng 149).

The military and the police blamed Nkrumah as a selfish element who was concerned with his own security, but not the security of the entire nation. It was against this background of suspicion and apprehension that the thoughts of overthrowing Nkrumah started to take shape in the mind of the army and police officers.

Nkrumah growing concern about his safety caused by the bombing and assassination attempts led to the introduction of the Nation Security Service of 1963. The act brought several intelligence and special military services under Nkrumah direct control. The three main services established were the Military Intelligence (M.I.) set up in 1961 led by M.M. Hassan a Nzima, who was disliked by the army; the special intelligence unit established in early 1963 and directed by another Nzima, Ambrose Yankey; and the Presidential Detail Department (P.D.D.) which was principally responsible for personal safety of Nkrumah. The formation of these services was totally independent of regular armed forces and police (Biney 108). This gave rise to a growing gulf between Nkrumah and the armed forces.

On January 2, 1964, as Nkrumah was walking through the garden of the Flagstaff House toward his residence, he was a target of a third assassination attempt by police constable Seth Ametewee. Two bullets killed Nkrumah's body guard. Nkrumah and members of the security team overcame the assassin, leaving Nkrumah with a huge wound in his cheek. The result of this third assassination attempt led to Nkrumah's increasing suspicion and mistrust toward those around him. Two days after the attack, E.R.T. Madjetey, the police

commissioner, was arrested and detained with nine other senior members of the police force who were suspected of plotting the assassination. It was proved that Ametewee was paid by senior police officers, and in 1965 he was hanged for the murder of Nkrumah's body guard (109/110)

Nkrumah's mistrust and suspicion extended to the regular armed forces, particularly after he established the National Security Services in 1963. He quickly dismissed the chief of defence staff, Major-General Stephen Otu and his deputy, Major-General Joseph Ankrah. This action was not only hasty but also miscalculated. It was detected by the military intelligence that both men were involved in a conspiracy to overthrow the government in April. Another plan was foiled in June 1965 while Nkrumah was attending a Prime Ministers Commonwealth Conference in London. As a result of this plot, Nkrumah decided to dismiss his Generals and replace them with officers he considered loyal. Brigadier Aferi who had been commander of the second brigade since its creation in October 1962 was promoted to Major-General and chief of defence staff. Lieutenant-Colonel Barwah, a northerner was appointed in his deputy; E.K. Kotoka, an Ewe, who had been appointed to the less prestigious Second Brigade in Kumasi.

What pushed Nkrumah to the reorganisation of military forces was his suspicion that the army and the police were complicit in attacks on his life. He, therefore, consciously sought to install a loyal security and military apparatus independent of the army through the Military Intelligence (M.I.), Special Intelligence Unit (S.I.U.), and Presidential Detail Department (P.D.D.), all of which were personally controlled from the presidential office in Flagstaff House (111).

3-4-2- External Obstacles

Nkrumah attributed his overthrow to a conspiracy planned by Western intelligence agencies, especially the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) helped by local agents from the

army and the police. According to Nkrumah, “Ghana had been captured by traitors among the army and the police who were inspired and helped by neo-colonialists and certain reactionary elements among population.” (Gokin 139). The accusation was made against Western Intelligence sources led by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) as one of the main forces behind the coup. In fact, there was a history of such subversions as early as 1961 when C.I.A. agent had been in touch with Komla Gbedemah, a former minister of finance left the government because of a suspected bribe (Rooney 244). Asamoah stated that when Nkrumah accepted the Soviet offer to train some of the Ghanaian military students, the U.S. Secretary of State Dean Dusk predicted to president Kennedy that “if Nkrumah went through his plans, Ghana’s British-trained officers’ corps might depose him.” In late August Mahoney, the son of the U.S. ambassador in Ghana at that time, indicated there was a conspiracy among the senior Ghanaian military officers, but the plot collapsed because of the death of the chief conspirator Brigadier General Joseph E. Michel in an airplane crash in Ghana September 1961(Asamoah 99). The C.I.A. had also offered financial assistance to J.B. Danquah in 1962 and revelations about the C.I.A. subversive activities in Africa in general had become common knowledge (Gokin 99).

While Nkrumah had been away, Gbedemah, one of the three Presidential Commissioners running the country in his absence, had certainly considered the possibility of staging a coup. He visited the American ambassador Russell, who offered him support. He was also in touch with the C.I.A. which had a powerful team in the U.S. embassy in Accra. The thread of the U.S. influence and activities continued until the 1966 coup. The C.I.A. found that Gbedemah gave up the actual decision to stage a coup, and his plot was demolished when a coup supporter telephoned the details to the United States on an open line which was tapped by the Ghana police. This incident had damaged the reputation of both Gbedemah and C.I.A. that Gbedemah fled soon afterwards, in October 1961. In exile he

continued to plot and it was known that in November in New York he visited the a U.S. agent who had been his associate to his previous plan. Gbedemah, an Ewe, who was respected as an able minister but never had a wide popular following. At the same time, other opposition leaders were also plotting, many from bases in Togoland, their activities were monitored by the C.I.A. (Rooney 296).

Another most important factor that halted Nkrumah's Pan-African project was the fierce opposition to his plans by some African leaders. Nkrumah identified and sometimes effectively proclaimed himself as the leader of Pan-Africanism. Nkrumah managed to achieve this in Ghana, but on the continental level, it proved to be a hard task. The formation of the Continental Union Government of Africa with Nkrumah as the first president failed because other African leaders saw it as a threat to their countries sovereignty and also in violation of the article 3 of the O.A.U charter which calls for member states to respect other member countries' sovereignty and should therefore, abide by the clause of "non-interference" in the internal affairs. (Elias, O. T. The Charter of the Organisation of the African Unity 06).

Nkrumah's vision of unity and strategies he used to achieve his foreign policy objectives caused conflict and animosity with other African leaders. His vision that African unity must be sought through a merger of sovereignties into a new political did not find many supporters among the African leaders. The reason for this rejection was the unwillingness to accept the leadership of Nkrumah himself in a potential African Union and the loss of their countries sovereignty. In fact post-independent African states were led by nationalist leaders who fought vigorously to achieve their independence. So it was very difficult for them to give it up for the sake of African unity. African leaders regarded themselves no less important than Nkrumah himself. Several African leaders pointed out clearly enough that they had not fought the battles for independence in order to abandon it again in favour of

someone else's rule. Thus the Prime Minister of Nigeria with unfriendly reference to Nkrumah remarked that his country had not waited for one hundred years for freedom and did not propose to throw it away. Houphouet-Boigny similarly protested that his Ivory Coast had not come to independence in order to be subjected to a backward African country (Emerson, R. Pan-Africanism 15). For this reason that Nnamdi Azikiwi in 1959 warned that:

It would be capital folly to assume that hard-bargaining politicians who passed through the ordeal of victimisation and the crucible of persecution to win their independence will easily surrender their newly won power in the interest of a political leviathan which is populated by people who are alien to one another in their social and economic relations (15).

However, in quest for African unification, Nkrumah was dealing with leaders of sovereign states and not young aspiring revolutionaries who had little or no responsibilities as was the case in Ghana. These leaders were as much eminent nationalists to their followers as Nkrumah to Ghanaians. Through hard struggles against colonialism, some of the leaders had gained prominent leadership positions which they could not be expected to give them up easily. Even more importantly they had national responsibilities such as economic development, the security and well-being of their citizens. No responsible political leader would sacrifice his country for the pursuit of goals which he believed did not serve his followers. It was this fact that Nkrumah considered unreasonable. He stated that:

In the early flush of independence, some of the new African states are jealous of their sovereignty and tend to exaggerate their separatism in a historical period that demands Africa's unity in order that their independence may be safeguarded. I cannot envisage an African union in which all the members, large or small,

heavily or thinly populated, do not enjoy legal equality under a constitution to which have laid their hand. But the insistence on not wanting to cede certain functions to central unifying political authority in which all the members will have an equal voice is unrealistic and unfounded (Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite* 148).

Nkrumah's idealism pushed him to regard his ambition of a continental government as a sacred objective, while his impatience to achieve this goal made him hostile to those who proposed gradual alternatives to African union.

Nkrumah's most famous announcement that the independence of Ghana is meaningless if it is not linked with the complete liberation of African continent translated into moral, logistical and material support for dependent territories across African continent to become politically free. He set up military training camps for freedom fighters in Ghana. Nkrumah provided material, financial and human resources to African liberation movements and governments. Finally, he made Ghana a haven or "Mecca" of freedom fighters and victims of colonial oppression, even outside the African continent. However, in the post-independence period, these actions brought him contempt and animosity from the leaders of the neighbouring African countries. They considered his actions in helping political dissidents as interferences in the sovereignty of other states. In fact, Ghana's hosting political refugees caused serious problem that threatened to damage the convening of the 1965 Accra summit (Biney 161).

Indeed, there are lots of historical documents which confirm the conflict between Nkrumah and his neighbours over the hosting of political refugees from the Ivory Coast, Niger, Nigeria, Upper Volta, and Togo, who were accommodated by the Bureau of African Affairs (B.B.A.). Nkrumah's West African neighbours accused him of causing subversion against them. At the O.A.U. Conference, informal discussions between presidents

Houphouet-Boigny and Nkrumah took place over the Sanwi dissidents. The Sanwi were an ethnic group inhabiting the Ghana-Ivory Coast border. Some of them sought political asylum in Ghana and formed provisional government on May 14, 1959. This caused considerable friction between President Houphouet-Boigny and Nkrumah.

Nkrumah allowed the Sanwi and other dissident groups and individuals to stay in Ghana for political reasons: first, as he explained to Houphouet-Boigny, “the existence of refugees in nearly all the independent African states is a manifestation of the artificial barriers imposed by the imperialists and colonialists upon Africa, thereby creating disunity.” (qtd in Biney 162). Second, Nkrumah used the presence of political refugees for bargaining purposes with other African leaders. In fact, the presence of these political refugees in Ghana caused too much damage to friendly relations between Ghana and other African states. Similarly, the case of the three Nigerian fugitives who had been in Ghana since 1960 gave rise to conflict between Ghana and Nigeria. Nigeria accused Ghana of subversive activities designed to undermine the government of Sir Tafewa Balewa.

Nkrumah’s troubled relations with Togo originated in 1950’s over the unification with the Gold Coast. In addition, Nkrumah’s support for the pro-C.P.P. Togolese opposition party, Juvento, which had split from the Togoland Congress Party led by President Olympio, contributed to the hostile relations. From 1962 onward, Ghanaian political dissidents such as Busia sought refuge in the Togolese capital where they received presidential treatment. However, the real source of conflict was President Olympio refusal to accept Nkrumah’s proposal of political unification with Ghana during the post-independence period. Olympio preferred closer union with the French Community and a West African Federation with his neighbours Nigeria and Dahomy (Benin) (162).

It was for this reason that Nkrumah was widely suspected for having instigated the murder of Sylvanus Olympio in January 1963. Within a few days after Olympio’s murder,

Nkrumah recognised the new regime and announced a series of measures aimed at improving relations between the two countries. And he did the same again after January 1966 coup d'état in Nigeria which resulted in the assassination of Sir Abubakar. In both cases, he assumed that the new leaders would be more responsive to his project of a continental union government. (Tunteng, K.P. Kwame Nkrumah and the African revolution 09). These incidents made a significant number of African leaders worry about their safety, but they were even more frightened by the possibility of working together with him in a united government. Thus, they made sure that the union government would never be achieved.

However, and after Nkrumah's overthrow, his weaknesses and failures have been forgotten. Now he is seen as the Ghanaian leader who was respected both by the West and the East, the man with an aspiring, confident, and comprehensive vision. In the bleak years of 1980's young Ghanaians say, "we need our heroes" (Rooney 350), and they looked back enviously to the excitement and the idealism of Nkrumah years. As Ghana continues to face problems of ethnicity, the present generation of Ghanaians see Nkrumah as the leader who fought for the united nation state against the ethnocentric and divisive forces exemplified by the N.L.M. and other regionally-based parties and organisations. They see him as the leader who created the concept of national economy and a managerial class which was national and not regional in outlook.

Though Nkrumah did not succeed in achieving the political unification, he laid the foundation for future African leaders to pursue it. Also, the liberation struggle he sparked in 1958 continued after the sudden overthrow of his government. The military coup halted all Nkrumah's plans for Ghana and Africa. Especially his crusade on the African unity and the restoration of African personality as a factor for African socio-economic development. During the 1960's supporters of African unity considered the prospects of various forms of supra-national federations. However a lack of political will and increasing self-interest made

the realisation of such objectives unattainable. As Cooper claims, “Nkrumah’s hopes for a United States of Africa achieved little support from African leaders’ intent on protecting the sovereignty they strenuously fought for.” (qtd in Biney, *The Legacy of Kwame Nkrumah in Retrospect* 22) Yet, there is no political figure on the African continent who waged the struggle for Pan-African unity with such indefatigable energy and sincerity of commitment than Nkrumah. He was the embodiment of a specific period in Ghanaian and African history. Moreover, he was a political prophet ahead of his time for many of his pessimistic cautions for the African continent have been fulfilled. Indeed Nkrumah left an indelible stamp on Ghanaian history that continues, long after his death, to fascinate and inspire many of his countrymen as well as people of African descent all over the world.

4- The Contribution of Algeria in Pan-Africanism

In this part of the chapter we will give an outlook of the Algerian contribution to Pan-Africanism and the efforts of Algerian nationalist leaders to support and defend African countries and African liberation movements throughout the whole continent before and after independence. Particularly, the historical period between the outbreak of the Algerian war of independence in 1954 until late 1970s. In fact, Algerian role in defending and supporting African causes is no less important than that of Nkrumah’s Ghana. Therefore, it is noteworthy here to highlight Algeria’s prominent role in Pan-Africanism and its undeniable and relentless effort to help African peoples to free themselves from the yoke of colonialism and imperialism. Algeria went through the ordeal of colonialism and fierce and long-time struggle against colonialism which consisted an inspiration and a model for other African countries to follow. Moreover, Algeria was one of the founders of the Organisation of the African Unity (O.A.U.) and a stronger advocate of African unity and independence.

4-1- Algerian Foreign Policy Towards Africa Before Independence

Algeria had been one of the most active participants in international politics. Its leaders gave too much importance to foreign policy to increase its influence in world politics. Algeria had emphasised political consciousness as an instrument to defend the interests of developing countries. This approach had particularly important in Algeria's relations with black Africa. Algeria quest for political consciousness is a legacy of the war of independence. The political elite that emerged out of the country's long military struggle was influenced by the ideas that served the cause of freedom. The leaders of National Liberation Front (F.L.N.) argued that the Algerian war of liberation sounded the knell of colonialism in Africa. Algerian leaders spoke of a 'vocation' to lead post-colonial movement from economic and political exploitation to economic sufficiency and political dignity. This sense of a political mission had influenced the governments of both Ahmed Ben Bella and Houari Boumediene.

From independence in 1962 until late 1970, Algeria adopted a strong anti-imperialist stance. Within the Organisation of the African Unity (O.A.U.), Algeria focused on supporting national liberation movements, African unity and fairer global economic exchange. Because of legitimacy earned through their involvement in the fierce anti-colonial war against France, Algerian nationalists assumed a leadership role in the O.A.U. Before the country's independence, The National Council of the Algerian Revolution (C.N.R.A.), the supreme organ of the National Liberation Front (F.L.N.) that guided the war against France, had established close ties with African liberation movements and decided to multiply and consolidate relations with the newly independent African states and liberation movements. During the war of independence against France, Algerian revolutionaries participated in all inter-African meetings. They secured solidarity with independent African states and real support from liberation movements fighting for independence. Algeria's own struggle also served as an inspiration for other liberation movements on the continent and beyond. Furthermore, the F.L.N. secured positions of leadership in various Third World organisations,

especially with the acceleration of the decolonisation that had begun in the mid-1950s. Henceforth, the relationship that the nationalists established with various movements in Africa and Asia allowed the Algerian question to be placed on the agenda of the U.N. General Assembly, where it gathered support among Afro-Asian and Latin American countries in 1955, one year after the launching of the war against the French occupation.

Barely a month before independence, the June 1962 Tripoli Programme clearly stated that Algeria's foreign policy objectives would be "concerted" and based on "total solidarity in the struggle against imperialism ... support for national liberation movements ... enlargement of the movement of the struggle and the reinforcement of the front for unity" (qtd in Eriksson M. and Gelot L., *The African Union in Light of the Arab Revolts* p.41). the programme left no doubt that solidarity with the Third World, sub-Saharan Africa in particular and the socialist nations in particular, as well as the progressive forces in western countries was an integral part of the Algerian foreign policy.

Algerian leaders were aware that Africa constituted an ambitious theatre of operations and Africa emerged as receptacle for the Algerian revolution. "The Africans expect a great deal from us", Ben Bella once said; "We cannot let them down." (qtd in Mortimer A.R, *The Algerian Revolution in Search of the African Revolution* 3). But in order to understand Algeria's deep involvement in the turbulent waters of inter-African politics, it is necessary first to review the F.L.N. African experience prior 1962.

When the war of liberation broke out in November 1954, the F.L.N. created a need for allies wherever they might be found. After turning first to the Arab states and Asia where the Bandung Conference an early international audience, Algeria looked increasingly beyond the Sahara for friends solidarity and coalition of colonised countries to form a bulwark against imperialism. Algeria's first diplomatic representative in Africa was Frantz Fanon, a Martiniquais who joined the F.L.N. leadership in Tunis in 1957 after three years practice as

psychologist in Algeria. He represented the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (G.P.R.A.) which opened permanent offices in Ghana and Guinea. He was named a representative in Accra (Ahlman S. J. *The Algerian Question in Nkrumah's Ghana* 04). His essential message was to urge the development of a coherent radical ant-colonial ideology, which he found missing in much of black Africa. He expressed his personal vision of a continental unity of combat in which all Africa's peoples would join, to establish freedom and dignity:

Having carried Algeria to the four corners of Africa, we shall return with all Africa towards African Algeria, towards the north, towards Algiers, continental city. What should I like to see? Great lines, great channels of navigation across the Sahara. Demolish the desert, deny it, rally Africa, create the continent ... Grasp the absurd and the impossible against the grain, and launch a continent upon the assault of the last rampart of colonial power. (qtd in Mortimer A.R. *the Algerian Revolution in Search of the African Revolution* 05).

Through his ambassadorship, Fanon served as Algeria's foremost voice in African affairs in 1960, attending several Pan-and-inter-African conferences. Moreover, while in Accra, Fanon maintained the additional responsibility of advancing the Algerian cause to wider African audience through a series of news bulletins covered a set of issues ranging from speeches by prominent Algerian leaders to the role of Africa in bringing an end to the Algerian struggle. However, his most ambitious project during his ambassadorship was his attempt to establish a supply route connecting Algeria to the south via the Sahara. According to him the Sahara the "African front" in Algeria's revolutionary war, for much like Nkrumah, he viewed the Sahara as a bridge bringing together the supposedly disparate people of the

“Arab” north and “Black” south, yet, in contrast, to Nkrumah, who in his speeches and writing celebrated the two regions’ histories of cooperation and mutual benefit, Fanon promoted a present and future rooted in the shared experience of the revolutionary armed struggle. The struggle that he was waging in sub-Saharan Africa as he was representing the G.P.R.A., despite the difficulties that he and the G.P.R.A. faced from the onset of the battle for independence.

The G.P.R.A. found its independent African neighbours reluctant to grant it the official recognition that most of the Arab states and some Asian governments had accorded promptly upon the its formation in September 1958. The G.P.R.A. participated with full rights in the Conference of Independent African States with a delegation under the leadership of Mhamed Yazid (1923 – 2003) who became later the Minister of Information of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic. (Quaison-Sackey A. *Africa Unbound: Reflections of an African Statesman*, 66/67). The Conference voted resolutions favourable to Algerian independence though they did not fulfil Algeria’s objective of unconditional support. In the All-African People’s Conference (A.A.P.C.), the F.L.N. participated very actively in these meetings and held a seat on the executive. It won resolutions advocating regular contributions to the F.L.N. and statements condemning France and the N.A.T.O. powers. The F.L.N. established friendly ties with such parties as the Senegalese African Independence Party (P.A.I.), Cameroon’s Union of the Peoples of the Cameroon (U.P.C.), and Niger’s Swaba. It made contacts with other opposition and liberation movements, and made the first agreements to train other Africans for guerrilla warfare. At the A.A.P.C., the F.L.N. used the continent rising contempt for French actions in north Africa by building upon the moral support offered to its movement a year earlier in Accra as it called for the creation of an all-African volunteer brigade. According to Ahmed Boumendjel, the head of the F.L.N. delegation, this brigade was to serve a larger purpose than that of Algerian liberation, for it

would allow Algeria's "African brothers to come to learn alongside the National Revolution Army, the methods of the revolutionary war of liberation" (qtd in Ahlman S. J. *The Algerian Question in Nkrumah's Ghana, 1958 – 1960*, 15). The uncompromising support that nationalists received in these non-governmental conferences encouraged the radicalisation of Algerian attitude towards anti-imperialism, neo-colonialism and emphasis upon Third World solidarity.

4-2- Algeria and the Congo Crisis

When the Congo crisis broke out, Algeria aligned itself with the states that supported Patrice Lumumba as the leader of genuine Congolese nationalism. The collapse of order in Congo because of the mutiny of soldiers that was followed by an intervention by western forces mainly Belgian supported by The United States in favour of the secessionists in Katanga and brought in The United Nations forces was described in *El Moudjahid* as "the demonstration of the existence of a conspiracy of western powers to implant neo-colonialism in Africa." (qtd in Mortimer A.R. *the Algerian Revolution in Search of the African Revolution* 07). Western intervention led to weakening of Lumumba's position and later to his assassination. The G.P.R.A. recognised the Ginzenga group as the legitimate Government, and the Congo became as the symbol for Algeria of the west's readiness to protect political and economic interest in Africa.

As the civil war was raging in the Congo, a series of meetings began which divided Africa into two groups: the radical Casablanca group and Brazzaville group, later Monrovia group. The G.P.R.A. participated in the founding of Casablanca group which included Ghana, Guinea, Mali and the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.). Each of the states gathered in Morocco in January 1961 to discuss the situation in Congo. Algeria sought through the Casablanca group to consolidate allies in its national cause. The group was dismantled after the independence of Algeria.

4-3- Algerian Foreign Policy Towards Africa During Ben Bella's Government

In July 1962, Algeria joined the world political scene with its rich and unique liberation experience which draw admiration from oppressed people all over the world and in Africa in particular. Ben Bella saw Africa as the theatre within which Algeria could play a dynamic role. Therefore, from the beginning, Algeria considered Africa as a source of continuity linking the anti-colonial revolt to the post-colonial struggle for revolutionary socio-economic change. The liberation of the southern third of the continent was chosen as an objective in Algerian post-independence policy towards Africa. The first country to receive unconditional support from Algeria was Angola. After the Angolan nationalist Holden Roberto visited Algeria, Ben Bella announced that arms had been delivered to Roberto's National Liberation Front of Angola (F.N.L.A.) within 48 hours of his request of aid.

As Angola was torn between the warring factions: Holden Roberto's F.N.L.A. and the People Movement for the Liberation of Angola (M.P.L.A.), Ben Bella decided to send a delegation to reconcile these factions to form a common front against Portuguese colonialism. Though Algerian mediation did not succeed to bring the two faction together, it continued to train Angolans for guerrilla warfare.

The setback with the Angolan issue did not deter Algeria from establishing ties with many other African liberation movements. Algiers became a haven and a Mecca for African nationalists and a centre of anti-colonialism. Facilities were made available to exiles from the continent. Representatives of the African National Congress (A.N.C.) and the Pan-African Congress, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique, the Zimbabwe African's Union (Z.A.P.U.) of Rhodesia (present day Zimbabwe), the Party for Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (P.A.I.G.C.) and The Liberation Front of Portuguese Guinea and Cape Verde

(F.L.N.G.). All of these parties and movements established operations in Algiers, so did opposition movements from a few independent African states, anti-Salazar Portuguese groups, Palestinians, and Vietnamese making Algiers a “veritable breeding ground of revolutionary movements.”

Algeria participated in Addis Ababa meeting of African heads of state in May 1963 which signalled the birth of the Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.) and was one of its founders. Algerian delegation in Addis Ababa was very active that it took part in preparing and drafting the charter of the O.A.U. Ben Bella wanted to make Algeria an outstanding spokesman and advocate of a strong form of African unity organisation. His speech on the meeting was reported as one of the most outstanding enthusiastic speeches. He took the rostrum after a long morning of formal, solemn speeches of other African leaders. He put outside his text to make a brief emotional plea.

Why had we not heard more about Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa? It is my duty to say that the Charter that we are going to adopt will resemble all other charters that all other assemblies in the world have adopted. It is my duty to say all the fine speeches that we have heard will be the best weapon against our unity we have spoken of a Development Bank. Why haven't we spoken of a bank of blood to come to aid of those who are fighting in Angola and elsewhere in Africa. (qtd in Mortimer A.R. *The Algerian Revolution in Search of the African Revolution* 13).

Ben Bella implored his fellow heads of state to assume their responsibilities in helping their brothers who are still under the yoke of colonialism with military and humanitarian aid, or “unity” was an empty slogan. To realise this objective, the Algerian delegation pressed hard

for the creation of an organism to urge for a coordinate aid to the liberation movements, and became one of the initial members of this committee.

Algeria enlarged its African contacts through several state visits: Julius Nyerere, Sekou Toure, Modibo Keita, and Alphonse Massemba-Debat led delegations to Algiers, and Ben Bella visited Africa West Africa, and spearheaded the campaign against South Africa at the United Nations. Algeria refused to recognise the Government of Moise Tshombe and regarded him as an example of treachery to Africa, puppet of western interests, agent of neo-colonial intervention, a secessionist and a political assassin of Patrice Lumumba, the legitimate Prime Minister of the Congo. Ben Bella announced that he would refuse to sit at the same table with Tshombe, obliging the Algerian delegation to the preparatory session of the Cairo O.A.U. Conference in 1964 to work hard for the exclusion of Moise Tshombe.

During the Congo crisis, Algeria sided with the legitimate Government of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba against the secessionist movement of Katanga province led by Moise Tshombe. Algeria criticised fiercely the Belgian-American intervention at Stanleyville, ostensibly to rescue a number of Europeans who were being held by rebels as hostages against the advancing mercenary forces. But, in fact, they wanted to protect their vested interests in the mineral rich region of Katanga (qtd in Mortimer A.R. the Algerian Revolution in Search of the African Revolution 15). Algeria was in the forefront of the bitter controversial argument against this incident. The intervention was condemned by virtually all African states, encouraging Algeria to renew its efforts to consolidate African opinion against Tshombe and against the neo-colonialism that was represented in Tshombe from the beginning of the crisis. Ben Bella felt that the O.A.U. Charter principle of non-interference should not be used as an excuse to protect the puppets of foreign interests. Speaking to a protest rally, he maintained puppets of foreign interests should not be shielded by this principle:

We know what Tshombe represents ... Formerly Tshombe did everything to rescue Katanga's secession from the Congo ... The situation is graver today when Tshombe was imposed from abroad by imperialism. It is no longer Katanga that threatens Congolese unity, it is the whole Congo that has become the Katanga of Africa. Tshombe in power in the Congo threatens all the countries that surround the Congo, he threatens the Congo-Brazzaville, Tanzania, Zambia, Uganda and Angola (qtd in Mortimer A.R. the Algerian Revolution in Search of the African Revolution 16).

The political events in the Congo, notably that of the foreign intervention represented a legitimate concern for Algeria and all other African states. If Africa could not stand together against western manipulation in one state, it could expect its potential force to be undermined state by state through the economic and military powers of the west. Ben Bella asked rhetorically: "what business is it for Algeria's to take this position? ... There is no isolated struggle in Africa, and I shall say that there is none in the whole world." Since 1960, the Congo represented a painful lesson that a vulnerable Africa could undergo.

Moreover, Algeria was one of the 15 countries to request a Security Council session. Unlike the moderate states which proved reluctant to escalate the issue for fear of damaging African western relations further. Committed to the Congolese plight and its sympathy with Lumumba's legitimate government, Algeria began the shipment of food, medicine, and arms to Congo maquis (qtd in Mortimer A.R. the Algerian Revolution in Search of the African Revolution 16). However, the division of African states over the Congo crisis and complicity of some African countries in it thwarted the efforts of Algeria to resolve the crisis and restore the legitimate government. Ben Bella did not give up the fight though. He participated in two meetings with Mali, Guinea, and Ghana over the Congo. He also planned to hold an Afro-

Asian conference, scheduled to meet in Algiers in June. Ben Bella saw this conference as a 'second Bandung' and the culmination of three years of Algerian diplomacy and made every effort to convene as many African states as possible at this conclave of the Third World. However, the overthrow of Ben Bella's Government in June 19th, put an end to hopes of Bandung II.

4-4- The Algerian Policy Towards Africa During Boumediene Government

Boumediene Government criticised Ben Bella's personal diplomacy of being too ambitious and entangling the country beyond its means. In fact, Boumediene Government was rather moderate in its international ambitions; Boumediene had travelled less and less and was inclined to spontaneous policy pronouncements. Yet, the change in style did not affect the content of the Algerian policy in Africa or elsewhere. Under Boumediene Government, Algerian diplomacy had developed new emphases especially under the Arab-Israeli six day war, which increased the country's role in the Arab world. The conflict in the Middle East had become the most important international issue for Boumediene Government, reducing African issues to a slightly less central place. Nevertheless, Algeria had taken prominent positions on Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Biafra in Nigeria. Throughout the 1960s, Algeria gave a strong support of the Palestinian resistance movement and at the same time warning African governments of Israeli imperialism.

Thus, when the Rhodesian crisis broke out and the most extreme white settlers took the leadership of the country under a government led by Ian Smith, they rebelled against Britain in November 1965. They declared that Rhodesia was an independent state under their minority rule in what was called Unilateral Declaration of Independence (U.D.I.) (Davidson B. *Modern Africa: A Social and Political history* 20). This declaration was met with fierce condemnation from most of the African countries. As a consequence, Algeria convened the African group at the U.N. after Ian Smith U.D.I., and became a member of a special

committee to defend the African point of view. As under Ben Bella, Algeria pressed for a serious African response, and supported the unanimous O.A.U. ultimatum to break relations with Great Britain if it did not suppress the secession by mid-December (Mortimer A.R. 20). Algeria was one of the few states that carried out the ultimatum. In the summer of 1966, after the International Court of Justice had delivered its opinion on South West Africa, Algeria became a member of the special committee to define a new policy strategy. It continued to send high ranking officials to the United Nations to debate key issues like Rhodesia. It continued to welcome major international conferences to Algiers, such as the 1967 meeting of the underdeveloped states' 'Group 77', the 1968 O.A.U. Summit, and the Pan-African Festival of 1969. Similarly, the country maintained extensive diplomatic representation south of the Sahara, with embassies in 11 countries (Mortimer A.R. 21).

Though President Boumediene had not travelled as frequently as Ben Bella, he attended all the O.A.U. summits during a period when attendance by heads of state had been steadily declining. In spite of the failure of the Organisation to evolve as Algeria had hoped and in spite of the initiatives to reconsolidate the core of radical Africa, Algeria still regard the O.A.U. as political instrument of African influence. Through the participation in the O.A.U. Liberation Committee, Algeria had sustained her policy of aiding the liberation movements. During the 1968 Conference, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bouteflika was influential in reevaluation of the Committee's policies; it decided to withdraw support of the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (G.R.A.E.) in favour of the M.P.L.A. which had long enjoyed Algeria's support.

The Algiers O.A.U. Summit meeting also debated the Biafra issue. Algeria had consistently condemned the Biafran secession, as virtually as it previously attacked Katanga, as a foreign-instigated manoeuvre of division. Sympathy for Biafran cause had grown by autumn 1968, and Algeria assumed a prominent role in supporting Lagos. It refused entry

visas to Biafran delegation waiting in Tunis for an opportunity to address the conference, and rallied support for a resolution supporting the Federal Government.

At the O.A.U. Summit, attended by only twelve heads of state, Boumediene reiterated the Algerian view that secession was “an imperialist plot against Africa” which could be explained only by “the cupidity of colonialism and imperialism, and by their will to sap Africa’s energies and dissipate her forces, and to dissolve her great unity in order to stifle her more readily before re-appropriating her.” (Mortimer A.R. 22). Algeria considered Biafra another Katanga, Ojukwu replacing Tshombe, and Lagos received the firm diplomatic support that Lumumba and his successors in Stanleyville had earlier enjoyed from Algeria. The fact that the Nigerian Federal Government had been dominated by the Muslim North may have influenced Algeria’s interpretation of the Nigerian civil war, but opposition to ‘Balkanisation’ and deep antagonism to western intervention remain the basic policy guidelines.

The most effective and important support of the Arab countries to the federal government of Nigeria came from Egypt and Algeria. Algeria and its President Houari Boumediene strongly supported Nigeria. The General Yakubo Gowon had confirmed this: “Algeria’s support of Nigeria is the most important that we have received from an O.A.U. country and the Arab world.” (qtd in Elaigu I. J. and Wai. M. D., *The Historical and Socio-cultural Relations Between African the Arab World from 1935 to Nowadays*). Algeria did not only offered some equipments to Nigeria, but most of the equipments received by Nigeria were transmitted through Algeria. Perhaps the most important help that Nigeria got from President Boumediene was his firm support of the Nigerian cause at the O.A.U. Conference that was held in 1968 in Algiers. This consisted a turning point in the battle fought against the internationalisation of the Nigerian civil war. Therefore, it became certain that the world

would not interfere in the Nigerian affairs, which were at the first place, Nigerian and African affairs.

By the 1970's, the anti-colonial, anti-imperialist ideas and the sovereignty of developing states over their natural resources were promoted at the U.N. in the struggle for a New International Economic Order (N.I.E.O.). These principles were promoted by Houari Boumediene and defended at the U.N. General Assembly in April 1974. In fact, three years before, at the June 1971 summit of Addis Ababa five months after Algeria nationalised its hydrocarbon resources, the O.A.U. adopted a resolution on the sovereignty of African states over their resources. A resolution Boumediene defended at the U.N. which was consistent with the anti-imperialist role that Algeria espoused and served as a model for other African states. In its role as a supporter of liberation, Algeria was instrumental in O.A.U. decision to admit Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (S.A.D.R.) as the 51st full member of the Organisation. (Eriksson M, and Gelot L., *The African Union in the Light of the Arab Revolts* 44). Algeria's position on Western Sahara was consistent with many African states support for national liberation movements and the right of self-determination. Algeria also contributed a great deal to the Afro-Arab dialogue and to economic and financial cooperation between Africa and the Arab world after the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. It was also influential in enticing the O.A.U. and its members to show solidarity with the Arab states and build a common front against Zionism, apartheid, colonialism and other forms of oppression. The basic plan, initiated by Algeria was, to incorporate Arab-African dialogue into an independent global strategy for countries to control their natural resources.

Undoubtedly, Algeria significantly shaped many of the O.A.U. decisions in the political and economic realms. Algeria deployed some of its diplomats to strengthen the O.A.U. establish solid bilateral relations with African states and liberation movements. Algeria's activism within the O.A.U. to promote its ideas and gather support from member states

proved successful. According to Ali Mazrui Algeria was among the Arab oil producers that seemed most genuinely Pan-African rather than merely Pan-Islamic. Its relatively radical orientation has made it more responsive than other oil-producing Arab states toward Third World solidarity regardless of religion. In terms of material support for southern African liberation movements, Algeria is more available and ready to help than the great majority of African states, both black and Arab. Algeria, and of course Nigeria, are the strongest voices for African interests within O.P.E.C. elsewhere on the organization front, it had been proposed to establish special links between the Arab League and the O.A.U. within the Arab League, Algeria was one of the strongest voices for black African interests. (Mazrui A. Black Africa and the Arabs 17)

Though its support for the liberation movements and the right of self-determination had placed the country among the prevailing majority of moderate African countries, Algeria had not abandoned her radicalising mission, which was reaffirmed during the O.A.U. Pan-African Cultural Festival. Algeria undertook extensive and costly organisational efforts to assure the success of a spectacular celebration of Africa's cultural heritage. Culture was considered as a political force by Algeria, and the Festival was "an integral part of the struggle that we all continue to wage in Africa." (Mazrui A. Black Africa and the Arabs 22). This statement from Boumediene revealed Algeria's intention to use the festival as a political instrument. Moreover, the presence in Algiers of delegates representing the Black Panthers, El Fatah, Cuba, Brazilian radicals and other groups with revolutionary ideas. The festival objective was to define Africa's cultural heritage as a force of revolutionary consciousness. In inaugurating the festivities, Boumediene insisted on the relation between culture and politics:

Our continent, three quarters liberated but in full control of its destiny, is undertaking in this first Pan-African cultural festival the greatest assemblage of arts and letters in history, continental in

scope and expressing the full range of achievements. It undertakes equally a new stage in its consistent struggle against every form of domination ... the Festival ... is at once the primary affirmation of African unity in its thought, spirit, and soul, and a recognition of the role that this Africanness has played in the preservation of our national personalities and in our liberation struggle (Mazrui A. Black Africa and the Arabs 22).

Africa's cultural achievement was a weapon to destroy colonial alienation. It was a source of pride, around which Africa could rally to complete the process of a genuine independence. Algeria's African 'vocation' was a mission to clarify and fortify Africa's consciousness of its shared destiny. Algeria had sought to forge political awareness where economic ties were limited and to breathe life into a political conception of solidarity. Political consciousness remains the most effective vehicle by which Africa can move toward genuine independence and full participation in world affairs. Political action expressed through an active diplomacy, a willingness to assume its responsibilities, an aspiration to achieve goals that may appear beyond Africa's means, remains the foundations of Algeria's approach to the continent. Algeria's active involvement in African issues reveals an important function of foreign policy in the Algerian political system. In fact, the prime objective of the Algerian foreign policy is to promote and protect the Algerian interests. Nevertheless, both Ben Bella and Boumediene, like the G.P.R.A., had defined Algerian interests as inextricable part of a larger system of Third World interests.

Conclusion

Centuries of slave trade and slavery were the direct causes that gave rise to Pan-Africanism though the term emerged for the first time only at the beginning of the twentieth century. Pan-Africanism started formally by 1900 Pan-African Conference organised by Henry Sylvester Williams which gave birth to a movement that would attract thousands of supporters and produce a huge amount of literature. Throughout the years, Pan-Africanism began to take shape, particularly after the First World War, the period which witnessed the emergence of the two most influential leaders of the Pan-African Movement: W. E. B. Du Bois and Marcus Garvey. Though both of them had antagonistic attitudes towards each other, they shared a common goal which was the salvation of the black race and the assertion of their rights. Du bois started the Pan-African Congress movement and organised a series of meetings from 1919 onwards, which contributed largely to the evolution of the pan-African idea. The Pan-African Congress movement succeeded in drawing the world's attention to the cause of the black people. And most importantly it drew the attention and the involvement of continental Africans.

During the Pan-African Congress movement between 1900 and 1927, the continental black Africans were not isolated from this movement. They had their own delegations and representatives who attended the different conferences and meetings organised during this period. However, their presence was not very influential as the pan-African movement was still under the domination of New World Africans, particularly the Afro-Americans and the west Indians. On the other hand, the issues, the causes and the grievances of continental black Africans were present in these congresses. They protested against the treatment of Africans in South Africa and Rhodesia. They demanded laws to protect the natives, the prevention of exploitation by foreign capital and the abolition of slavery. They asked for the right of

education and the right of the natives to participate in their colonial governments, but they never demanded independence or at least self-government from the colonising country.

In fact during the Pan-African Conferences and Congresses between 1900 and 1927, the continental black African had only a symbolic representation. They were not essential component of the executive bodies that set the objectives and the strategies for the Pan-African movement. It was until 1945 Manchester Congress that continental black African representatives emerged as an integral part of the decision making body and outnumbered both the Afro-Americans and the West Indians. The 1945 Manchester Congress brought about a radical change on the Pan-African movement. It changed from an elitist movement to a mass movement with a revolutionary thought and practice. This radical change was brought about by Pan-African leaders like Jomo Kenyatta, the Sierra Leonean T. Wallace Johnson, the South African Peter Abrahams, and many others. It was, however, the Ghanaian Kwame Nkrumah who played the key role in the Pan-African movement. He contributed to the organisation of the Fifth Pan-African Congress in 1945 in which the leadership of the movement moved from the New World Pan-Africanists especially W. E. B. Du Bois to new African nationalists, like kwame Nkrumah, who transplanted it to the African soil.

After his return from England, Nkrumah set out his struggle for self-government against the British rule within the body of the U.G.C.C. as he assumed the position of the secretary general of this party. His staying in the U.G.C.C did not last long. He disagreed with the leaders of this party since he regarded them as elitists, reactionaries and were not in touch with the masses and slow in demanding the self-government. As a result, Nkrumah split from the U.G.C.C. and formed his own party the Convention People' Party (C.P.P.) to achieve what he couldn't achieve with the U.G.C.C. He believed to unite the Gold Coast under a mass party.

So he started agitating for self-government and independence from Britain using the Gandhian policy of non-violence which he called the Positive Action. After the independence, Nkrumah wanted to make the Gold Coast the podium of Pan-Africanism by organising regional and continental conferences. Nkrumah eagerly advocated Pan-Africanism as the solution to Africa's multifaceted problems. He believed that no single government could progress without unifying politically and economically with other African countries to use their economic potential and resources of the continent for the welfare of its people. Thus, he declared that the independence of Ghana is meaningless unless it is linked with the total liberation of the African continent.

Nkrumah saw the unity of Ghana under a single government led by a single mass party, the C.P.P. as a starting point towards the unification of the whole African continent under the leadership of one single continental government. A government transcending all sub-national, racial, tribal or regional considerations. So at home, he worked hard to eliminate the political parties and the secessionist movements built on this way since this was against his conviction and regarded them as a threat to national unity. Accordingly, he undermined the power of the Ashanti which was represented by the National Liberation Movement (N.L.M.). Before the independence, the N.L.M. showed a fierce resistance and refusal to the policies of the government of Nkrumah and the C.P.P., with hostilities and bloody clashes between the supporters of the two parties. He undercut the power of the Northern People Party (N.P.P.), which represented the northern region and the Muslim Association Party (M.A.P.) and the Togoland Congress. Nkrumah regarded all these political parties as entities built on tribal, religious and regional affiliation and must be eradicated. He had also undermined the power of the chiefs and instituted a law permitting detention without trial in an attempt to protect national unity. Subsequently, Nkrumah decline into authoritarianism was marked by the introduction of the Preventive Detention Act (P.D.A.) in 1958, the detention of political

opponents, the non-existence of civilian groups and political bodies which are not affiliated to Nkrumah's ruling party (C.P.P.), in addition to stringent security measures after the attempts for his assassination in 1962 and the lack of independence of the judiciary. This was followed with the inauguration of one-party state in 1964 and the widespread of corruption, the mismanagement and the squandering of the country's resources.

At the continental level, Nkrumah worked tirelessly to convince his contemporary African leaders to adopt his views and ambitions towards African unity. He formed the Ghana-Guinea-Mali union on April 29, 1961 as a nucleus for a larger union of African countries but it was short lived. He wanted the Accra Summit of 1965 to establish a Union Government for the whole independent African countries but he failed. Nkrumah attributed the failure of his Pan-African project under a union government to forces of neo-colonialism and imperialism and their agents in the African continent, who had vested interests in keeping the African continent divided. These same forces were behind the assassination of Patrice Lumumba and the assassination attempts on his life and eventually his overthrow from power in 1966. Nkrumah argued that the failure of African unity was also due to the fact that the jealousy of sovereignty, African leaders could not surrender their newly gained independence in whole or in part, in the wider interest of the African unity.

The study included also an outlook of the Algerian participation to Pan-Africanism. Algeria was one the most active participants in international politics, particularly in the African scene with its anti-imperialist and ant-colonialism attitude. Before independence, Algerian revolutionary leaders participated in all inter-African meetings and conferences. They gained support from most of the newly independent African countries and supported liberation movements and political parties throughout the whole continent. So, the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (G.P.R.A.) supported the legitimate Government of Patrice Lumumba when the civil war broke out in Congo because of western

intervention and condemned the intervention as an attempt to implant neo-colonialism in Africa.

After the independence in July 1962, Algeria joined the world political scene with its rich and unique liberation experience which consisted an inspiration for oppressed people all over the world. Algerian post-independence policy towards African was not changed. It kept on its unconditional support to liberation movements and African countries which were still under the yoke of colonialism like Angola. Moreover, Algeria became a haven for African freedom fighters from all over the world and particularly Africa. Facilities were made available to exiles from the continent. It was one of the founders of the Organisation of the African Unity (O.A.U.). Ben Bella, the first Algerian President, wanted to make Algeria an outstanding spokesman and advocate of a strong form of African unity. He launched a campaign against the Apartheid regime of South Africa and refused to recognise the illegitimate Government of Moise Tshombe in Congo and regarded him as a puppet of western interests.

Under the Government of Boumediene, Algerian did not only kept its unconditional support to Africa, it also extended its diplomacy to the Middle East through its support to Arab states against the Israeli imperialism. It condemned the secession of Rhodesia under white minority rule and defended the African point of view concerning this problem in the U.N. It also condemned the Biafran secession from Nigeria and Boumediene strongly supported the federal Government of Nigeria. Moreover, Algeria was one of the strongest advocate of the sovereignty of developing countries over their resources and New International Economic Order (N.I.E.O.). These principles were promoted and defended by Houari Boumediene at the U.N. General Assembly in April 1974. It also supported the right of Self-Determination of countries which enabled the Sahrawi Republic to admit as the 51st full member of the O.A.U. and promoted the Afro-Arab dialogue. Furthermore, Algeria's

contribution to Pan-Africanism was not only through material and diplomatic support, it also contributed to the revival of the African cultural heritage through the organisation of the Pan-African Cultural Festival in June 1975. Culture was considered as a political force by Algeria and the festival was an essential part of the struggle for African freedom and identity.

The current findings of this study add to a growing body of literature on the theme of Pan-Africanism. First, it shows that the New World, especially North America and the West Indies were the first cradles of the Pan-African movement. Second, African leaders living in the diaspora like W.E.B. Du Bois and George Padmore sought to unite the Africans all over the world to form a bulwark against white domination, and to promote African race to higher ranks of civilisation. When we look at the efforts of the New World leaders for the betterment of African continent, we can regard them as another civilising mission, but this time was carried out by Africans who live in the diaspora.

Third, the participation of continental Africans in the proceedings of the Pan-African congresses was marginal before the 1945 Congress. It was only in the 1945 Manchester Congress that continental African leaders took a leading role in the Pan-African movement thanks to a new generation of African leaders, like Jomo Kenyatta, I.T.A. Wallace Johnson and the most eminent leader among them was Kwame Nkrumah. Fourth, Kwame Nkrumah and his colleagues of African leaders realised that African emancipation struggle should be waged from the African soil not by sending delegations to European governments to plead for political reforms. Nkrumah realised the crucial role that might be played by the masses, that's why he worked relentlessly to mobilise them for the struggle of independence. Nkrumah understood that the previous political movements failed mainly because they were elitist in their character and were not in touch with the masses, as it was the case for the U.G.C.C. leaders. Nkrumah considered them as a group of middle class reactionaries who refused to engage in a serious political confrontation with the British colonial authorities that

might lose them their privileged positions. Similarly, Nkrumah faced fierce resistance and rejection from the African leaders when he was pleading for the African union government. They feared the loss of the sovereignty and their vested interests.

This study is limited by the lack of information particularly in the first chapter that deals with the participation of continental Africans in the Pan-African congresses before 1945. This was due to the paucity of sources either on the net or in the university library. Therefore, the study relied on a dearth of information from a few books or journals. That's why more research is needed to shed the light on the dark corners of the history of Pan-Africanism and explore the facts about the presence of continental Africans in African meetings and congresses before the 1945 Manchester Congress and provide more understanding of this movement.

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ملخص الدراسة

هذه الدراسة تهدف إلى دراسة المعوقات التي واجهت نجاح حركة الجامعة الأفريقية من خلال دراسة حالة دولة الساحل الذهبي. و سنحاول من خلاله إيضاح دور الزعيم الأفريقي كوامي نكروما في حركة الجامعة الأفريقية و جهوده لتحقيق الوحدة الوطنية في غانا و وحدة القارة الأفريقية و المعوقات التي واجهته. و سنقوم توطئة لظروف مشاركة الأفارقة في حركة الجامعة الأفريقية حتى مؤتمر مانتسستر سنة 1945. و بعد هذه المرحلة، ندرس انتقال قيادة هذه الحركة من الأفارقة الأمريكيين وأفارقة بلاد الهند الغربية إلى الأفارقة الأصليين مثل نكروما. وذلك لان مشاركة الأفارقة الأصليين في مؤتمرات حركة الجامعة الأفريقية بين سنتي 1900 و 1945 كانت رمزية فقط. ولم يكونوا عنصرا فعالا في مجريات وقرارات هذه المؤتمرات خلال هذه الفترة. ولكن بداية من مؤتمر مانتسستر 1945 انتقلت قيادة الحركة إلى الأفارقة الأصليين مثل الايفواري جوموكنياتا والسيراليوني ولاس جونسون وأهمهم الزعيم كوامي نكروما من الساحل الذهبي. و تقوم الدراسة بتتبع رؤية كوامي نكروما للوحدة داخل بلده الساحل الذهبي بعد عودته من الدراسة من إنجلترا بعد الحرب العالمية الثانية. عمل نكروما دون هوادة من اجل استقلال الساحل الذهبي من الحكم البريطاني. نكروما يرى وحدة غانا تحت حكومة واحدة تتجاوز الاعتبارات العرقية والدينية والجهوية والقبلية كنموذج لتوحيد أفريقيا تحت حكومة وحدة وطنية تتجاوز الاعتبارات السابقة. وتتطرق الدراسة أيضا إلى رؤية سياسات وجهود نكروما لتحقيق الوحدة الأفريقية بداية من المستوى الوطني إلى المستوى القاري. تهدف الدراسة إلى فهم أفعال نكروما اتجاه المعوقات الواقعية التي أدت إلى فشل مشروعه الوحدة الأفريقية.