The People's Democratic Republic of Algeria

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BRITISHNESS BETWEEN A NOSTALGIC DAWN AND A FORETOLD DUSK: THE USE OF MYTH AND DISCOURSE TO HINDER EUROPEANIZATION AND THE BREAK UP OF THE UNION

Thesis Submitted in Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctorate LMD in English (Anglo-Saxon Cultural Studies)

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Academic Year: 2022-2023

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وزارة التعليم العالي والبحث العلمي
جامعة الجزائر 2 أبو القاسم سعد الله
كلية اللغات الأجنبية
قسم الانجليزية

دور الخطاب والأسطورة المعاصرة في مشكلة الهوية البريطانية

أطروحة مقدمة لنيل شهادة الدكتوراه الطور الثالث في الإنجليزية
تخصص دراسات ثقافية انجلوسكسونية

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I hereby declare that the substance of this dissertation is entirely the result of my investigation and that due reference or acknowledgement is made, whenever necessary, to the work of other researchers.

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Acknowledgments

In 2008, I obtained my first Baccalaureate degree but failed to join the faculty of my dreams -I had always aspired to become a doctor of pharmacy- I joined the department of translation and interpreting, loss and despair became my companions, but the courses of civilization were like a remedy to me, they were my haven, and there started my story with history, it saved me.

In 2010 and after another failed attempt to attain my former dream, I chose to study English, my ambitions were reshaped, and my motivation kept growing till it reached its peak with prof. Brahim Mansouri's and Prof. Foued Djemai's lectures.

I am so grateful to prof. Brahim Mansouri to whom I express my sincere gratitude, I am so indebted to him for his guidance, patience, inspiration, and support throughout my Master as well as PhD journeys.

I am so obliged to my doctorate formation's professors, Prof. Foued Djemai, may Allah have mercy on him, Prof. Houria Ait Amour, Prof. Amar Guendouzi, and Prof. Djamila Hanifi.

I would like to thank all those who taught me during my licence and master's years, I am thankful to Ms Assia Kaced, and Ms Amel BenKhalfallah, may Allah have mercy on her.

To My Beloved Family

Abstract

This dissertation sheds light on the role of the Britishness discourse in maintaining the UK's integration. I have endeavored to offer a critical perception of the British national identity's origins and symbols; I have also questioned its decline and discussed the future of the union as its political edifice. British unity has traditionally been based on a discourse of Britishness, which is promoted through the use of British symbols and ideals and is reinforced by moments of strength, such as during the era of the British Empire, or in times of threat during warfare. Yet since the second half of the 20th century, this discourse has been embedded in the Eurosceptics' and British unionists' discourses.

The work addresses the British identity from historical, political, and social perspectives. It investigates the concepts of identity, national culture, unity, and sovereignty to argue that these elements have been socially constructed by discourse and myth, used by political and social establishments and the Media to maintain the status quo. Hence, Roland Barthes' and Michel Foucault's approaches to mythical speeches and discourse are included to study the use of myth and discourse in the British nation's and Europe's representations. Isabela Fairclough and Norman Fairclough's political discourse analysis is also conducted to analyze the Scottish unionist discourse.

I have argued that the characteristics of the Britishness discourse changed throughout time. Protestantism and imperial nationalism provided Victorian Britain with a discourse of external othering that diverted the people from internal problems until the 20th century. After that, fissures occurred in Ireland, but the European

integration could calm regional nationalism in Scotland; simultaneously, it promoted Euroscepticism. However, Brexit brought the question of Scottish independence into the political arena as the Eurosceptic debate has been overshadowed by a unionist one, and both have been entrenched within a Britishness discourse.

Keywords: Britishness; identity; discourse; myth; Euroscepticism; unionism

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

BBC	British Broadcast Cooperation
CSA	Campaign for a Scottish Assembly
EC	European Community
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEA	European Economic Area
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
ERM	European Exchange Rate Mechanism
EU	European Union
Euratom	European Atomic Energy authority
F.R	Frank Raymond
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
indyref2	Second Referendum on Independence
IRA	The Irish Republican Army
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MP	Member of parliament
MSP	Member of the Scottish parliament
NHS	National Health Service
PM	Prime Minister
SCU	Scottish Conservative Unionist Party
SNP	Scottish National Party
T.M	Thomas Martin
T.S	Thomas Stearns
TCA	Trade and Cooperation Agreement
UK	The United Kingdom
UKIP	United Kingdom Independence Party
US	The United States

Introduction

Boris Johnson is the first British prime minister to grant himself the title of “the Minister for the Union”. A new appellation that implies a complete commitment of her Majesty’s government to the benefit of the United Kingdom of England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland as a whole. Paradoxically, Johnson’s anti-devolution attitudes and hard-Brexit position regarding the Irish border issue and the Scottish will to remain in the EU led some to question the possibility of his being the last prime minister of the British Union (Kenny). Indeed, regardless of Johnson and the Conservative party’s idealistic devotion to the union, they are accused of being the party of England only.

Brexit enabled the UK to take back control over its borders, economy, and politics. In short, the British sacred sovereignty was finally retrieved after 47 years of ambivalence. Nevertheless, the transfer of policymaking from Brussels to London triggered internal problems between Whitehall and the devolved governments of Scotland and Northern Ireland. The British government has been accused of solely grabbing powers related to the environment, agriculture, trade, and others to impose regulations and norms that were previously decided by the EU, whereas they must be dispatched to the devolved parliaments. Hence, A debate about a Scottish referendum on independence is increasingly gaining public; since Brexit, many polls showed that 50% of the Scots would vote Yes if a referendum takes place *(What Scotland Thinks)*. On the other side, the Northern Irish are still undecided about a similar referendum.

Consequently, Brexit awakened the “self and other” dichotomy inside the UK triggering many questions about the essence of the British identity as well as its future.

The question of identity has always been a problem per se; the fact that it is nurtured by difference and exclusion made it an issue in its essence and existence (Bauman 18). It has always depended on identifying oneself with a single affiliation (be it a religion, a nation, a class, an ethnicity, or even a political party), with complete insularity from the opposite other. Throughout history, the orientations of identification were ever-changing in Western Europe. In this regard, the main turning point was the shift from a religious identity to a national identity, which widened the extent of communal identities and strayed it from ethnicities that converged under a unifying political entity. Hitherto, even if the modern world has been encouraging individualism and chasing communal allegiances, national identities remain the most resisting form of collective identities.

In particular, the British national identity is hyphenated for a British person is also English, Scottish, Irish, or Welsh. Still, while some British consider themselves primarily British, others believe that being British is only an added value coming in second place (Langlands 63). Albeit the fact that this duality of identities destabilized British integrity in different contexts, it is believed to be a privilege that has to be celebrated and seized rather than lamented and stirred. The Lebanese author Amin Maalouf who offered a flexible perception of the concept of identity, in his book *On Identity*, asserted that having a French Lebanese identity was an advantage for him, although the former is western while the latter is eastern. He said in terms of the duality of identities:

> So am I half French and half Lebanese? Of course not. Identity can't be compartmentalized. You can't divide it up into halves or thirds or any other separate segments. I haven't got several identities: I've got just one, made up of many components in a mixture that is unique to me, just as other people's identity is unique to them as individuals. (*On Identity* 2)

This can be reflected in the British identity that is unique by its different components. It is worth mentioning that Maalouf related most of the world's problems of identity to clinging to one affiliation, be it religious, national, or ethnic as if it was a "fundamental truth" or an "essence" (2, 5). However, the case of Britain goes behind cultural and religious differences.

Maalouf's vision of belonging and identity inspired me to investigate the issue of identification, culture, and nationalism in Britain, with a particular focus on England and Scotland, as a part of Anglo-Saxon Cultural studies. The British case does not include cultures that are extremely different such as the eastern and the western ones, for the English and the Scottish cultures are very close. Nevertheless, the British identity is still considered a dual identity and the perception of being British differs from one person to another. Coincidentally, the problems of the British identity that emerged in the 20th century had cultural differences as a starting point, yet they moved beyond these factors to lie in economic and political interests, especially with the prominence of supranational states such as the EU.

The British press and social media are nowadays immersed in the economic burdens following the British hard break with the EU and the Conservative party's failure to reach a good deal with Europe. The world of big money still overshadows the crisis of identity that brings about a lost generation whose voices are crucial in the polls, in a country where elections still matter in politics, even if the voters' turnouts

are claimed to be in decline if compared to the past. The Scottish intention to hold a second referendum on independence is also widely discussed bringing to the political arena a dispute between Scottish Nationalists who desire to break with the UK to join the EU, against Scottish and English Unionists who breathe the British union and preach to preserve it. Hence, the political spectrum witnesses a debate between a discourse of Britishness and a discourse of Scottishness.

The British process of identification has always been based on the exclusion of others under the slogan: *"*You know who you are, only by knowing who you are not" (Cohen 1). Robert Cohen stated that throughout history, there have existed six fuzzy frontiers of the British identity: he insisted on the border between the Celtic Fringe (the Scots, Welsh, and Irish) and the English; besides, he discussed the British insular sentiment that separated them from Europe (9, 28) (see appendix 1). In fact, the second "frontier" united the British together during Britain's onset under British nationalism which succeeded in prompting a one-nation spirit for the sake of making it economically and militarily more powerful than the other nations. In recent times, Europe also helped solidify the UK's integrity because the European Union had a crucial role in easing Scottish nationalism.

In effect, Krishan Kumar said in "Nation and Empire" that discussions around British identity had been ignored until claims about the decline of the Union began (1). Beginnings are usually recalled when expecting an end, yet I still imagine Britain as a story; Boria Sax, the contemporary American author of "The Tower Ravens: Invented Tradition, Fakelore, or Modern Myth" said: "Britain is a story, and stories do not 'fall'; they do not really even end, but simply move on to new episodes and forms"

(239). Nevertheless, beginnings are always fundamental because they announced the chains of events that have led to the present. Eventually, the initial stages of British history can be traced back to the early Middle Ages, centuries before the union as it is known today, but the present study is concerned with the modern state that emerged with the Anglo-Scottish union of 1707. The Personal Union of the Scottish and the English Crowns (1603) was also crucial in the formation as King James VI of Scotland became King James I of England, Wales, and Scotland.

Once he became the Monarch of Great Britain, King James I delivered a speech to the upper house of Parliament in 1604, he declared: "Hath not God first united these two kingdoms, both in language, religion, and similitude of manners? Yea, hath He not made us all in one island, compassed with one sea…" ("The Kings"). The passage can be interpreted as follows: the geographical position of Great Britain is shared by the two countries, which would imply a resemblance of character hence a merit of being under the same state power; moreover, the unity that is blessed by God can scarcely be broken by humans. This assumption proved to be correct for centuries, yet the 20th century brought about Scottish nationalism which worked to particularize Scottishness and to claim that the UK government was not able to satisfy the Scots who started longing for their independence.

The pioneering Anglo-Scottish Act of Union (1707) paved the way for a new communion with Ireland in 1801. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland was formed and a succession of ups and downs was announced. As a matter of fact, the Irish question became strikingly apparent during the 20th century and the partition of Ireland occurred in 1921. Southern Ireland achieved more than home rule and

became a republic in 1949, whereas Northern Ireland has remained a part of the UK. Consequently, the hidden self-other dichotomy within the UK's border was evoked, and the debate about the British union's disintegration was ignited by the downfall of the British Empire and the emergence of Scottish nationalist parties. Yet, Scottish nationalism was calmed, at the end of the century, by Devolution which allowed the establishment of the Scottish Parliament by means of the Scotland Act (1998) in addition to the foundation of devolved assemblies in Wales and Northern Ireland. However, the current challenges of Brexit revived the British issue of union; it is worth mentioning that the majority of the people in Scotland (62%) and Northern Ireland (55.8%) voted to remain in the EU, contrary to the English and the Welsh; therefore, more questions about the future of the UK have been generated.

The issue of the British identity was widely approached as the challenges that migration, Europeanization, and Americanization posed to Britishness have been widely tackled. In the post-1950s, Asian and African migrants fled to the UK, and these different cultures' impact on the British identity created a huge dispute. The latter was twofold; some claimed that these aliens would have a negative impact on the British identity whereas others believed that the migrants' issue would strengthen the discourse of Britishness because it prepared the ground for many attempts to define it. Therefore, the literature devoted to exploring the British identity in opposition to foreign identities overshadowed the question within the UK's borders.

The changing aspects of the Britishness discourse influenced the thesis title: "Britishness between a Nostalgic Dawn and a Foretold Dusk: The Use of Myth and Discourse to Hinder Europeanization and the Break-Up of the Union". Literally, the

first part sums up the Britishness debates that have been stuck between a rhetoric of Britain's glorious past as the world's magnificent empire, the cradle of democracy, and another rhetoric that defies the status quo and promotes regional nationalism, this led many academics to predict the disintegration of the British union such as Tom Nairn in *The Break-up of Britain.* The second part of the title embodies the challenges that have been facing the British identity, namely Europeanization and separatism, besides the political and media use of myth and discourse to protect the British national identity from European hegemony and to prevent disintegration as far as Scotland is concerned.

The centuries that followed Britain's formation witnessed a British victory in the Napoleonic Wars; therefore, it was a period of Pax Britannica where Britain enjoyed total hegemony over the world without any serious rival. In "Britishness and Otherness", British historian Linda Colley maintained that Britishness emerged during this period as it was promoted by Protestantism and a Catholic other; however, she added that the British nation was still "artificial" (316). Besides, the loss of the British colonies in America stimulated more British expansions to feed its industry's need for raw materials. Since then, the British glorious empire where the sun never sets had nurtured Britishness for long centuries. The discourse of a British national identity was the key to giving a natural aspect to this artificial nation throughout the empire, which distracted the British from their local problems. As a result, the English hegemony and the centralization of London could be overshadowed particularly because it was a period of economic prosperity.

In the mid-20th century, Britannia started losing its colonies in Africa and Asia. As previously mentioned, troubles emerged in Ireland, but the two World Wars halted their prevalence in Scotland and Wales. Consequently, the discourse of Britishness was boosted by war as a material threat. Above all, the Second World War constituted a great opportunity for British politicians to propagate British unity and nationalism. For instance, the British conservative politician and former PM Winston Churchill used "we" and "together" in his war speeches and focused on the importance of the Empire and Commonwealth as a British common heritage to lift the peoples' solidarity. He also used the same justification to show his primary attitude towards joining the European Defense Community or any Federal European system; he said to Parliament in 1953, "we are with them, but not of them. We have our own Commonwealth and Empire" (Geddes 24); this point of view nurtured the Eurosceptics' arguments about the UK's exceptional statue. After the war, it was the reconstruction era and the welfare state's principles that cured the society's fissures and reinforced its unity. Nevertheless, the welfare state was overthrown by British former PM Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s. The discourse of Britishness started to be related to the British individual responsibility and a state retreat, which was not accepted by the Scots, and the union's integrity was put at stake.

Actually, British nationalism is believed to be basically imperial. Hence, the end of the empire created an atmosphere of British break-up, besides the emergence of Scottish nationalist parties whose popularity increased during Thatcher's years. Margaret Thatcher declared war on nationalized sectors such as coal and mines, both were the symbols of Scottishness, and she encouraged privatization which was blamed

for the misery of many Scottish workers. Hence, the Scots felt discriminated against, and they started longing for their autonomy; this attitude was undecided, yet it survived up to the current times regardless of Devolution.

Since the 1980s, the discourse of Britishness has been affected by European integration and Scottish nationalism, for it has been embedded in the Eurosceptic and the Unionist discourses. Both are inspired by a legendary vision of British sovereignty and exceptionalism which had to be saved from Europeanization or weakened by disintegration that would let down centuries of the world's successful union. In terms of the UK dominant parties, the Eurosceptic political discourse bears the same traditionalist[1] aspect of the Conservative unionist discourse to maintain a unified and distinguishable British national identity. Nevertheless, the Labour party has an empiricist[2] unionist discourse that tends to show their aspiration for more constitutional changes based on Britain's historical ideals to make it less centralized and realize a fair state for all its regions.

By the same token, efforts have been devoted to offering the British identity a definition that suits all British citizens. For instance, a British Socialist Organization, the Fabian Society[3] issued a Charter for a New Britain following a conference about the British identity in 2006. The charter included the writing of a British Constitution to renew the political system, the teaching of Britain's history, reviving British symbols, investing in the British Muslims, and equality …etc. (Katwala). Former PMs Gordon Brown and David Cameron also tried to redefine Britishness by referring back

[1] Anderson said that "traditionalism sanctions the present by deriving it from the Past" (31)
[2] Anderson said that "empiricism binds the future by fastening it to the present"
[3] British political think tank established in 1884 (*Fabian*).

to Magna Carta as the essence of British values such as individual liberty, equality, and the power of the Law. Cameron, however, linked it to the different British institutions such as the BBC and the NHS while considering England as the part that stands for the whole (Atkins 6). Nonetheless, these traditional and empiricist attitudes to define Britishness were believed to be "a comprehensive conservatism" by British essayist Perry Anderson (31). In other words, the idea of Britishness is still trapped between traditional values, whereas a rationalistic definition has been unfathomable.

The present work's purpose is to demonstrate that the discourse of Britishness has become outdated and less persuasive compared to a pragmatic discourse of Scottishness. This situation goes back to the second half of the 20th century, but it has been aggravated by Brexit and the successive conservative governments which are accused of being rhetorically unionist but English nationalist at their core. Subsequently, the dissertation refers the lacunas in the British identity to the fragile beginnings of the British Union built upon military and economic interests; notwithstanding the fact that they could be filled up throughout myth and discourse to assert continuity and coherence. Britishness has also leaned on national symbols such as the Monarchy and Parliament in addition to imperial nationalism, the world wars, and the welfare state which prevented any further fissures in the British union after the break with Southern Ireland. Furthermore, I argue that to leave the EU and to overcome current risks of disintegration, a discourse of Britishness has been included in the Eurosceptic and the unionist discourses. In so far as the former obtained its popularity from mythical representations of the EU's politics and migration policy as a threat to the British sovereignty, the latter has been based on mythical speeches whose

goal is to make the public choose between an uncertain future after independence, or a continuous belonging to the world's most prosperous kingdom.

In the light of these assumptions, identity, culture, nationalism, and their relationship with myth and discourse are put into question. Besides, the essence of Britishness is to be questioned i.e., whether being British is influenced by culture, history, or politics? and is it promoted by a core and factual achievements or furnished by mythical speeches?. Besides, the reasons behind its intermingling with Englishness at the expense of Scottishness are also interrogated. The work also discusses whether Britishness was an impediment to a British good relationship with Europe and hence lay behind its withdrawal. Finally, it scrutinizes the impact of Brexit on the union, particularly the Scottish case, and the unionist discourse to hinder Britain's Break-up.

A large amount of research has approached the brutish identity from different angles. In the present review, I have chosen some references that highly influenced the writing of this dissertation. The first main reference is Linda Colley's essay on the origin of Britishness and its development up to the 21st century in "Britishness and Otherness: An Argument". She stated that Protestantism distracted the different nations of Great Britain from their differences and united them against a single enemy i.e., Catholic France in the period between (1689-1815). Hence, the British had a proud national identity that was then promoted by the growth of the British Empire, yet when the latter fell, discussions about a British identity crisis began. She also argued that the UK's components kept their languages, cultures, and religions after their union with England denying that the Celtic fringe was dominated or colonized by London; she added that it was a credit for the Scots, for instance, to have a hyphenated

identity. However, she concluded that unity under Protestantism and empire was artificial if compared to the Labour party's Britishness which was based on values and British institutions rather than conformist characteristics and common belongings (328).

Peter Mandler's *The English National Character: The History of an Idea from Edmund Burke to Tony Blair* is also relevant to the current study. Mandler dealt with the national character which was stimulated in the 19th century when the people's national affiliation replaced patriotic and religious allegiances. Particularly, Mandler tackled the English character based on historical and journalistic sources. He traced back the Anglo-Saxon and Gothic origins of the British and discussed their influence on the national trait. He also discussed some periods when politics and history converged to make the discourses of Englishness and Britishness very close especially in the Victorian and the interwar periods as the English virtues extended to be British ideals. He also contrasted Liberalism that associated reforms with the people's characters with Edmund Burke's thought that considered traditions, religions, and rulers as the inspiration of national change and reforms, hence an opposition between whether the people's character is affected by the state or the contrary.

The main reference for the third chapter is Martin Holmes' *Eurosceptical Reader* which examined the UK's European integration in several articles. In fact, it is pertinent to draw a pattern between Britishness and Euroscepticism. Some articles dealt with the extent to which Britain's political system is exceptional and ancient (the ancient constitution) compared to the European systems manipulated by Roman principles. Eurosceptics declared that Europe's ideals, especially the objective of "ever

closer union", are mythical and originally Roman in comparison with the UK's real institutions. Moreover, some articles shed light on the British unwritten constitution in addition to parliamentary and popular sovereignties as steady icons of Britishness, in addition to discussions about the detrimental impact of the European political integration on them.

This exceptional view of the UK was not shared by some academics including the Scottish Tom Nairn who discussed the decline of the British union in *The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-nationalism* first published in 1977. Nairn predicted the disintegration of Britain for two contradictory factors. On the one hand, the fall of Empire led to British disarray because it had cemented the British union and made it prosper economically. On the other hand, the discovery of the North Sea Oil and the increasing growth of Scottish nationalism led Scotland to seek its independence in a period of a British need for its resources. The resolution for him was to decentralize the British government from London not throughout devolution but by rebuilding the UK as a multinational state.

Eventually, the future of Britishness was discussed by former Labour PM Gordon Brown in his speech "The Future of Britishness". Brown referred to the post-Second World War's British relative decline as a turning point in the British perception of themselves; he claimed that their self-confidence was shaken amidst an increasingly powerful and influential Europe. According to him, the problem of the British identity lies in its unchanging constitutional institutions that for some must remain constant as the continuous and perpetual icons of Britishness. Nevertheless, he suggested a new constitutional settlement to enable the different parts of the UK to

have strong local governments and to redefine citizenship. For him, the British National identity has to be inspired by the values and ideals that its components share together and required throughout their common history such as “creativity, inventiveness, enterprise … liberty for all, responsibility by all and fairness to all” (“The Future of Britishness”). Therefore, he offered a third way to britishness which was criticized for being not typically British but rather universal.

One can conclude from the above mentioned works that the certainty given by Empire to britishness could not be retrieved after its decline. Since the 1950s, defining this concept has become an issue. In fact, each author approached it from a certain stand that is generally influenced by their political values and bias. However, the present dissertation tries to view it from these different angles as a single whole that aims at imposing a specific order. It discusses Britishness as a discourse in times where discourses of the Scottish, Welsh, Irish and even English nationalisms became more persuasive because the former has been based on a melting of nostalgia, centralism, and universalism.

In post-modern thought, identities were deconstructed, de-rooted from society and history, and stolen by time from space. Hence, continuity became seen as a means to control and impose a hegemonic culture at the expense of other cultures. In this regard, the present dissertation is framed on an empirical approach drawn from the actuality but rooted in different theories. Besides, a historical approach is fundamental but with an emphasis on the fact that the national discourse is selective in terms of historical events. Indeed, the changes that have affected British nationalism cannot be studied apart from its context and circumstances. Nevertheless, the organic notion of

history and the reliance of the present on the past were challenged by Foucault who believed that history must be dealt with as a series of disruptions rather than continuities.

In this regard, the study is based on different works that mainly dealt with nation, nationalism, identity, and discourse. Ernest Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism* related the advent of nationalism to the Industrial Revolution which imposed an interrelation between culture and politics, hence the state's main interest was to control and maintain a unitary national culture. The latter is, according to Stuart Hall's argument in "The Question of Cultural Identity", constructed on national narratives which included a narrative about the nation, its perpetual existence, as well as myths to make the people believe in their nation and strive to protect it. However, the unitary culture that was forced by the advance of communication and the need for a stable state led to considering this culture as a hegemonic culture at the expense of other cultures, this paved the way to neo-nationalisms that stimulated the disintegration of multi-national state such as the UK.

Discourse is also important in conducting the analysis, this leads to Michel Foucault's different works, namely: "The Subject and Power" and "the discourse on Language" which dealt with the subjection of the individual who has become liberal in modern times, but not free from modern chains of subjugation. In fact, governments succeeded in imposing their power using a discursive system embedded in the smallest social organism starting from the family, to education, the media, and now the internet. Indeed, identity has become manipulated by these elements hence the works of Stuart Hall including "Who Needs Identity" and "The Question of Cultural Identities" are

crucial as he discussed various perceptions of identity throughout different phases of history, starting from the Cartesian rational subject to the sociological subject, to the post-modern view of the individual as subject to the state institutions.

Furthermore, the research also takes into consideration myth according to Roland Barthes' theory of mythical speeches which he considered as a second semiological chain coming after the linguistic chain. In *Mythologies*, Barthes treated myth as a type of speech used to convey hidden cultural and ideological messages. In fact, he approached myth not in terms of truth or falsehood, but he believed that any speech can be mythical if put in an adequate historical setting or contingency to achieve a social and political aim. In this dissertation's context, myth is used to assert continuity and the antique existence of the British nation, besides propagating stereotypes about external threats namely Europe.

These works and many others provided a framework to the writing of four interrelated chapters. The first chapter is to question the core of Britishness. Prior to that, an approach to identity is required. Indeed, the sense of identity and belonging strayed from ancient religious and patriotic affiliations and became related to nations. The 21st century also shook this notion, which has been lost amidst a globalized world. Furthermore, the British national identity witnessed centuries of identity stability; hence it is necessary to dive into the making of the British union in addition to the aspects of continuity and change in the Britishness discourse. The latter is approached throughout an idealist vision that viewed the British identity as an incarnation of similarity in difference and identity in change, and a poststructuralist sceptical perception of history and ideas.

The second chapter tackles the issue of national cultures, which tend to perpetuate the past and strengthen the present's unity and solidarity. The concepts of "culture" and "nation" are defined first, in addition to their intermingling within a national culture as required by the nationalist dimensions of the post-industrial age. This leads to the view of the British national culture as primarily English, hence the confusion between Britishness and Englishness. Meanwhile, the means that helped the strengthening and maintaining of a national culture are discussed including discourse and myths. The chapter ends with the Labour party's attempt to create an identity that is based on British values and shared institutions.

The third chapter discusses the British rejection of Europeanization that could be concluded from the British ambivalent attitude towards the European club. The latter was considered as a threat to the ever-existing British political institutions, such as Parliament and the British constitution; both are symbols of Britishness. The chapter also tackles the different stages of British European integration, noting that each stage had its share of rejection and Euroscepticism. This leads to the crossroads towards Brexit and how it was overwhelmed by a rhetoric of sovereignty and identity. The latter was propagated by politicians and the press. Finally, the public attitude towards Europe is dealt with.

The fourth chapter sheds light on the future of the British union -taking into consideration the case of Scotland- and its relation to the future of Britishnesss. It examines the impact of the British relative decline on the Scottish attitude towards the British national identity, in addition to the fact that it led to speculations about the UK's integration. This was revived by Brexit and nurtured by the growing popularity

of Scottish nationalist parties. Thus, the chapter studies the Scottish unionist discourse amid a Scottish aspiration for a second referendum on independence; the study is conducted throughout a political discourse analysis of the Scottish Conservative Unionist Party and the Scottish Labour party's manifestos in the period (2017-2021). The method used is Isabela Fairclough and Norman Fairclough's political discourse analysis that is based on practical argumentation.

CHAPTER ONE
BRITISHNESS, A QUEST FOR AN ESSENCE

This chapter's goal is not to arrive at an exact definition of Britishness, for this concept has always been subject to ambiguity. Furthermore, every attempt to determine its significance required speculations and sought political ends, yet it remains unfathomable. This might explain why the British theorist Bernard Crick said that defining Britishness "can be both philosophical and political folly" (149). However, the present chapter endeavors to discuss Britishness using two approaches: the first contains an idealist vision of history whereas the second is drawn from a post-structuralist theory.

On the one hand, in *Experience and Its Modes*, British idealist Michael Oakeshott viewed history as experience, i.e., a constellation of ideas stimulated by present evidence and judged to be true in terms of the complete coherence of its interrelated constituents. Hence, it must represent a coherent whole in which "entities, facts, or individuals" are strongly bound together to form a core that can be comprehended throughout investigating "its genesis and development" (Boucher 193-194). In this light, Britishness, as a historical individual[1] (concept), can be perceived as a complete whole whose unity lies on its components' shared experiences since the initial stages of the British union's existence, and whose consistent identity dwells in its continuous progress.

On the other hand, diving into the origins of a concept was highly criticized by Michel Foucault who considered it a means to impose a certain thread of historical events to serve a cultural hegemony. His analysis in *The Archaeology of Language* as well as "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" focused not on the continuity of history but

[1] "The historical individual can be a person, a concept, an institution, a battle, a religion, or whatever is identified as exhibitions of human intelligence which display certain sameness throughout diversity." (Boucher 213)

on its discontinuity and dissipation. For him, individuals are subject to a constructed rather than an occurred history, which must be rejected by a counter-memory. The latter permits one to realize who and what lay behind the historical continuity that was ensured by state institutions. Hence, the rhetoric of "core" and "essence" is a means of idealizing the British identity, perpetuating the nation's past, and asserting that it will endure for eternity.

In brief, if the starting point of the analysis is the present time, the world's current identity crisis is blowing more strongly in multinational states such as the UK, which encompass a duality of identities. The chapter begins by stating the present bewildered sense of identity that was decentered in post-modernity with the British identity as an example. The perception of a deep-rooted and essential affiliation that is related to society changed into viewing identity as institutionalized and subject to politics especially as individualism replaced dogma. Furthermore, the chapter investigates the making of the British union, as an essential icon of Britishness, hand in hand with the constant symbols of the British identity. Both elements have been used to promote an idealist vision of the British national identity.

A sense of Loss

In the late Middle Ages, European nations began to develop a greater awareness of their identity. Johannes Gutenberg's printing machine encouraged the spread of vernacular languages; hence an age of Latin hegemony and Roman rule elapsed giving way to the emergence of local identifications. Indeed, insofar as languages enabled the majority to know who they were, they awoke in them a sense of nationality and

belonging. In the case of England, not only language but even religion was affected in the sixteenth century as it broke with Catholicism and adopted Protestantism. The latter was introduced by Martin Luther, a German rebellious monk who was excommunicated from the Roman Church because of his critical theses against it. Thereupon, the English fervently believed in their English Protestant identity, unlike the Catholic French or Spanish. That is why they were thought to be the first European people who had a spirit of "the nation" in the pre-nationalist era. Furthermore, they carried this belief during their expansionist missions.

After the collapse of the Western Roman Empire in the 5th century, Medieval Europe was divided into conflicting small kingdoms that were dominated by a feudal system. This paved the ground for the premises of patriotism as each region pledged allegiance to their lord and declared devotion to their land and religion as well. Hence, people's collective consciousness was not attached to being English or French with a unified culture and language, yet it was a dynastic one, inspired by their ruler and based on religion and law (Clark 251). The end of feudalism led to the creation of nation-states and the emergence of nationalist sentiment by the end of the 18th century.

Nationalism was considered by British social anthropologist Ernest Gellner as "a very distinctive species of patriotism" (138). It marked the shift from regional loyalties to national allegiances nurtured by economic interests. As a consequence, a race over wealth between European states became fierce, they were competing to gain more wealth and influence over the continent. According to Gellner, this thirst for conquests was not due to these countries striving for wars yet it reflected the European

nations' economic orientation (42). The objective was to meet the industry's increasing need for raw materials.

Unexpectedly nationalism and competition paved the way for a century of doubt and absurdism. The notion of national identity was shaken by the 20th century's melancholic events manifested by war and blood. Therefore, modern men have been traumatized; they failed to recognize who they were. 'Globalization' has made it worse for it created confusion between what is local and what is universal and has led the sense of affiliation to shift from one's single nation to the globe. Identity awareness reached its minimum leading to oblivion, as well as indifference. This uncertainty and controversy became attached to studies about identity. British historian Timothy Garton Ash declared that "[i]dentity Studies … rarely arrive at any definite, clear finding", he came out with a "no-conclusion" about his question concerning the British identity and Europe, though he considered this ambiguity not only a conclusion but an important one (Quoted in Crick 149).

In the case of the UK, the road toward a fuzzy British identity was long and full of turning points. First, the English identified themselves with the Monarch up to the Glorious Revolution or the bloodless revolution of 1688. The latter ended with a Bill of Rights that made Parliament and law more powerful than the Crown which formerly had a divine right. The 17th century marked the making of Great Britain with the unification of England and Wales with Scotland, and the national identity became British rather than English. The new identity was nurtured by British patriotism against France.

Moreover, the accomplishments of the industrial revolution culminated with the joining efforts of Scotland and Ireland as one entity, which undoubtedly contributed to the sense of British belonging and solidarity. However, the spread of liberalist ideas and industrialization led to a British national identity that was urban and dominated by English traits. Liberalism and urbanization brought about secularization and less organized society. British community was shaken as its members fled from towns to cities, which led to adopting new habits and giving in other customs which represented the British different regions' characteristics. Besides, the movement of the Scots, the Welsh, and the Irish to London led to their adoption of English culture. All this generated a national culture that is highly influenced by English political and cultural features as will be discussed in the second chapter.

Furthermore, British identification that was previously dominated by Protestantism declined because of the social change and the British union with Catholic Ireland in 1801. Catholics and Jews' assimilation in the British society helped them integrate and gain more political power, consequently, the Catholics were emancipated in 1829 and the Jews afterward. Subsequently, the British society began to place greater importance on material wealth and social class rather than religion when defining itself. Religion stopped being the stimulus of wars giving way to the global economy, with Germany and the US emerging as prominent players. The traditional identities and conventions were supplanted by a desire for material gain, which contributed to colonization in an increasingly individualistic world.

As aforementioned, modern men confirmed their loss of faith not only in religion but even in science, humanism, and nationalism that had replaced religious

allegiance, especially after the First World War. The British case was particular for besides the obscurity that followed the collapse of its Empire glories and the independence of Southern Ireland, identity blurred in the middle of dual affiliations. Britain's loss of empire kept troubling the British, namely politicians, pride was superseded by nostalgia for an era of a well-known identity when Britons found no difficulty in defining who they were. William Hague, former leader of the conservative party (1997-2001), dramatically described the move from self-confidence to indifference in his speech "Identity and the British Way" in 1999. In this regard, he said the following,

> There used to be something very un-British about trying to define who the British were. We were so sure of ourselves that we felt faintly embarrassed about spelling it out on paper. We were the people who could never be conquered, whose freedoms were God-given, whose industry was the workshop of the world, whose empire brought civilization to far-off lands, whose navy kept the sea-lanes open, and whose Parliament was the mother of all Parliaments. (Quoted in Wellings 400)

In the quotation, Hague mourns old Britannia whose magnificence was shaken by the Empire's decline. He draws a peculiar picture of a time when everything appeared glorious and there was no room for disagreement among the four components. However, as decline set in, it stirred the fury of the British nations and even exposed their unequal treatment by Westminster's legislation. In "How can 'Britishness' be remade?", Professor Dennis Grube blamed the latter for the supremacy of boundaries, he said that the process of "un-britishing" started with rhetoric and ended up with law (632). The existence of multi-nations was disdained by politicians who tended to refer to England only when speaking of the UK, but this went beyond words and speeches, for the British Parliament has often been accused to be the parliament of England only.

The belonging of every part of the union to their own culture exclusively and to the British identity inclusively, although relative, nurtured a skeptical atmosphere with the decline of the empire. British author, Ian Bradley, claimed that the British consciousness about who they were had always been fragile in comparison to their continental and transatlantic neighbors (*Believing in Britain* 35). This lacuna paved the ground for the growth of nationalist sentiment in Ireland and Scotland. In "Briton's Changing Identities", Madeleine Bunting, an associate editor in *The Guardian*, stated that the proportion of people living in England who pride themselves to be English rather than British has been increasing since 1974 and the same for the Scots, the first chanters of Rule Britannia, contrary to the Welsh people (48). Indeed, the Welsh seem undecided compared to the other British nations in terms of their native allegiance.

By the end of the 20th century, as the union endured its ups and downs, there still existed claims about Britons' way of seeing themselves. Ever since it has been believed that the number of people who consider themselves British has been decreasing (English et al 349). For example, the rate of Scots who identified themselves as British in (1974) was reduced by half in (2005), and because of devolution in Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales, the English proportion decreased from 57% in (1997) to 44% in (1999) (Bunting 48).

The British sense of loss as far as their identity is concerned was discussed by Linda Colley when exploring the British duality of affiliation that fluctuated from a fervent identification with the union to its composed nations and vice versa. She illustrated that the Scots "have been fiercely Scottish in some contexts, British in others; immersed in their locality for the most part, say, but able in certain

circumstances to identify with the UK, and so on ("Does Britishness Matter" 22)". Alternatively, she argued that people can have different identities at the same time; she said "Identities are not like hats. Human beings can and do put on several at a time (*Britons* 6)". Therefore, belonging to two identities at the same time is possible and positive rather than negative.

The hyphenated identity of each British component was fissured by the calls for political decentralization and separation afterward. To be British usually came in the second place or as Professor Rebecca Langlands considered it an "added value" (63). In "The Britishness Question", Andrew Gamble and Tony Wright went further as they claimed that it is secondary and even no longer wanted compared to the primary national identity (1). All in all, the increase in the rate of nationalism at the expense of Nationalism, in Bernard Crick's saying, marked the outbreak of a discussion about the decline of Britishness noting that the former nationalism symbolizes separatism whereas the latter celebrates unionism (Crick 156).

In addition to the fall of the empire and the economic troubles that followed, one of the reasons that led to the British identity crisis was ambiguity. Even if those Britons who believed that the UK, as a whole, shared common ground for their identity, they ignored the nature of this ground, and the abundant attempts to define it created a sense of loss. In "What Britishness means to British", Peter Kellner mentioned a survey in which the question "What does the term Britishness mean to you?" was asked; the answers fell into two categories: "either geography/tradition (e.g., place of birth, monarchy, pride in British achievements) or values (e.g., democracy, fairness, free speech)" (62). The current apathy towards the British

identity is said to be on account of the lack of unity, which is generally established through sharing a consolidated communion, what Benedict Anderson calls “horizontal comradeship” that makes people sacrifice their lives for their nation (7). This justifies the rise of national sentiments during wars, however, when there is no sense of community, the power of difference leads to a lack of trust and attachment in addition to a reluctance to sacrifice and hence separatism (Uberoi and Mc Clean 45). Even though, some believe that this vagueness was one of Britishness’ greatest virtues (Bradley, *Believing in Britain* 35).

Deconstructing the concept of identity

The second half of the 20th century marked a noteworthy emergence of questions related to culture and belonging. Europe’s post-world wars survival created an atmosphere of doubt and uncertainties about Man’s vision of themselves and the world around them. Hence, previous essentialist understandings became out of date paving the way to a new vision of various concepts including identity. Indeed, a huge debate about the issue was launched at the time more than any other period in the modern era (Bauman 8). This concept became under the spotlight because its stable and conformist perception was shaken in so far as the social order was decentred. The British art historian and writer Kobena Mercer summed up the situation with the following: “identity only becomes an issue when it is in crisis, when something assumed to be fixed, coherent and stable is displaced by the experience of doubt and uncertainty” (259).

Britain witnessed hard times in the post-Second World War; economic recession persisted because of the wars, as well as the loss of her empire. The welfare state could unify the British around their labour government that nationalized important industries; hence social disunity was prevented by solidarity. However, discussions about the future of British integration loomed because the latter was believed to have been leaning on the empire. Such a concern was promoted by the independence of Southern Ireland and the emergence of Scottish nationalist movements. In brief, the post-war period of instability and speculations about the future diverted the British from defining themselves in relation to the wider world to thinking about identity inside the British borders, this was reinforced by the coming immigrants from Britain's ex-colonies.

Polish Sociologist Zygmunt Bauman said that identity "was a 'problem' from its birth -*was born as a problem*[2], could exist only as a problem" (18). It is a problem because one cannot identify oneself unless they have an "other" to exclude and consider as a foreigner. On the other hand, this concept has never been accurate because its aspects changed from one era to another. The British identity has had the same motives and has never been static. However, it was not tackled as an internal issue far from imperial settings until the 1950s. In "Britishness and Otherness: an argument" Linda Colley confirmed that "the identity of Britain only began to be seriously investigated (as distinct from being taken for granted) after the Second World War, a time when peace and imperial retreat fostered a highly introverted view of the British past" (311). In the same passage, Colley spoke of British historians who

[2] (the author's emphasis)

started viewing their nation's past not in terms of its status in the world as they tended to do, now they moved their focal point to "internal social, political, religious, and cultural divisions" (311-312).

Generally speaking, national identity is manifested in moments of pride or threat, during national days or football tournaments; in the meantime, people are busy living far from any nationalist sentiments. By the same token, the British people kept priding themselves on being British, and belonging to Britannia, until their empire fell. They used to control people in different countries around the globe but now these people from the British ex-colonies fled to the UK. The British people finally realized that they had an internal identity that is threatened by aliens who might have a negative impact on their identity. The latter was bound to a unified society that shared the same past, culture, and place, but the question of identity goes further than these three elements.

Stuart Hall is a British Cultural theorist with Jamaican origins. He traced back three concepts of identities throughout history in "The Question of Cultural Identity"; firstly, he spoke of the enlightenment subject, whose background goes back to the Reformation that unchained him/her from the church's hegemony, the Renaissance that put men at the centre of the universe, the scientific revolution which gave way to discovering "the mysteries of nature", and the enlightenment that created a "scientific man free from dogma and intolerance" (282). This "Cartesian Subject" -in reference to Descartes' famous saying, "I think, therefore I am"- was depicted as a "fully centred unified individual" who was born and would spend his/her life with an identical inner core (mind) that made him reasonable, conscious, and active, in brief, "the essential

centre of the self was a person's identity" (275). Identity was directly related to the individual's rationality and consciousness far from social influence.

In the same regard, Michel Foucault contrasted Descartes' self with Emanuel Kant's in "the Subject and Power", he considered the Cartesian I as "unique but universal and unhistorical" and related to "everyone, anywhere at any moment"; however, Kant determined the time and the persons by "us and our present" (785). Descartes' vision was idealistic compared to Kant's which indeed favoured reason but did not ignore experience and place. In fact, Kant believed in the power of ideas to form values far from cultural or ethnic instructions, hence identity lay in a person's self-generated rationality, as well as individuality (Gellner 131). However, his God-given self-determination went hand in hand with the human capability of associating with one another. On the one side, Men are free to have their own decisions and choices that enable them to live as happily as they consider, hence their individuality is rational and moral at the same time because their actions spring from what they consider their duties (59-60). On the other side, they must identify with their counterparts out of "utility" and "self-preservation" notwithstanding their self-determination (61).

Hall's second historical perception of identity includes the modern notion of the sociological subject whose complete unity and autonomy were lost amidst a crowded and complex society. This second concept depicted man as a social creature whose identity's values, meanings, and symbols were transmitted from without i.e., from others ("the Question" 275). Hall concluded that "identity thus stitches (sutures) the subject into the structure (276)". The subject's inner core or "real me", as Hall named

it, was not eliminated but promoted by the common characteristics shared in his/her society which became a part of him/her (276).

Amin Maalouf went through this concept of the sociological subject in his famous novel, *In The Name of Identity: Violence and the need to Belong*. He spoke of what he called a tribal notion of identity that still exists and is the source of identity problems all over the world (34). In other words, there are two opposite forces that determine a people's affiliation: On the one side, their surroundings push them to adopt their birthplace identity; on the other side, behind their society's borders live other people who exclude them from their identity, this exclusion pushes them to be exclusive too and to stay fervent to theirs (25). In the same regard, American historian Peter Sahlins defined national identity as "the social or territorial boundaries drawn to distinguish the collective self and its implicit negation, the other" (quoted in Colley, "Britishness and Otherness" 311).

By the same token, Hall said that the problem is not about relating our identities to a symbolic "other"; rather it is about the symbolic violence that might result from the negative discourse of otherness. Nonetheless, the latter has to be used in establishing a "dialogic relationship to alterity" which is "never fixed or finalized" (*Triangle* 128-129). As Maalouf declared, identity must be constituted of unlimited allegiances and there is no special ingredient for identity, all that men acquire in their lifetime have their share in its formation; in brief, everyone has a typical identity (*On Identity* 26).

Hall's third historical conceptualization of identity embodied the post-modern subject. The postmodern period came to put previous conventional concepts such as

the social subject “under erasure”. The social order was dislocated, and individuals were treated as lost and fragmented rather than conscious and coherent as perceived previously. Hall related this “de-centering” of the subject to four postmodernist movements in addition to Feminism.

He began with the re-readers of the German philosopher Karl Marx who came to believe that Marxism contradicted individualism because it asserted that men were not able to make history without depending on “the historical conditions made by others” as they interpreted Marx saying: “men (sic) make history, but only based on conditions which are not of their own making (“The Question” 285-286)”. Marxism related the individual characteristics to the mass that is influenced by economic interests. In this sense, the individual per se was not considered unless within the context of class and society.

In the second position, Hall dealt with Freud’s perception of the role of the unconscious in the making of the self. He said that according to certain psychoanalysis thinkers such as Jacques Lacan, identity has “a contradictory origin”: on the one hand, a child reaches a complete image about him/herself by imagining it “reflected -either literally in the mirror or figuratively in the mirror of the other’s look- as a whole person” (Quoted in Hall 287). On the other hand, this “mirror phase” paves the way for the infant to be exposed to different “systems of symbolic representation- including language, culture and sexual difference”, which would make him/her a “divided subject” split between what he/she wants and what he/she ought to be; nevertheless, he/she keeps the complete imaginary identity that he/she acquired in the first phase (287). Hall concluded that identity is not a fixed, whole entity, and therefore, one

should refer to "identifications" rather than identity. He added that “There is always something 'imaginary' or fantasized about [the identity’s] unity. It always remains incomplete, is always 'in process', always 'being formed' (287)”. Identity is composed of an incomplete inner self that derives its wholeness from “the ways we imagine ourselves to be seen by others” (Hall 287). In brief, identity is weakened by one’s reality and strengthened by a utopic conception of how others see us.

Post-modern perceptions of identity were also built on the theories of the structuralist and linguist Ferdinand De Saussure. In this regard, identity was dealt with as an expression of meanings or signs of identification which, on the one side, already existed in society because the relation between a sign’s signified and signifier was arbitrary; in other words, the way we identify ourselves is restricted within the rules of our language and cultural systems (288). On the other side, these meanings cannot be stable because they are manifested “in the relations of similarity and difference which words have to other words within the language code” (288). In this context, Hall mentioned Jacque Derrida who, being influenced by Saussure, believed that individuals could never have the same interpretation of words, for instance, the meaning of the word “identity”, because of the “multi-accentual” function of words, which were always understood differently from a person to another (288).

The fourth element that assessed decentring identity is Michel Foucault’s works on power and discourse. In “The Subject and Power”, Foucault focused on the subject as the pillar of his research and studied the transformation of human beings into subjects to a dominant culture. In fact, he referred to this alteration as “modes of objectification”; men were turned into objects by some so-called sciences that he

considered mere modes of inquiry rather than sciences, for instance, men were treated as “speaking subjects” in linguistic domains, besides workers who were described as “productive subjects” in economic analyses (777). Moreover, men found themselves split into two parts from within or without: either sick or sane, bad or good, and so on (778). Foucault also said that “men learned to recognize themselves as subjects of ‘sexuality’ [for instance]”.

Moreover, Foucault’s definition of a subject included two meanings: being subject to oneself or to others. Individuals turn into subjects to other persons or entities when the latter impose their authority and control upon them; hence they become dependent and chained (“The Subject” 781). The second meaning bears a voluntary dependency to one’s identity “by a conscience or self-knowledge” (781). Individuals are daily exposed to certain form of power that arranges them in a particular group, make them hold on to their identity, and force them to adhere to a precise “law of truth” that the others must realize in them (781). And the forms of power can be divided into ethnic, social, or religious domination; these three embody forms of exploitation, subjectivity, and submission (781).

Historical narratives revealed that these forms of domination stimulated sorts of struggles. The second half of the 20th century marked a prevalent struggle against subjection (“The Subject” 782). In retrospect, the feudal and the industrial eras’ conflicts were against ethnic and social control, as well as economic exploitation, yet the latter was more prominent than the former during the 19th century (782). Furthermore, Foucault spoke of the Reformation which was one of history’s remarkable revolts against religious forms of power. He drew a pattern between the

Reformation and the formation of the state, which he considered a political power resulting from an unprecedented "tricky combination in the same political structures of individualization techniques and of totalization procedures" (782). Men are conscious individuals and subject to the state's total institutions at the same time. He related this combination to the adoption of the "power technique" of the medieval church in the shaping of modern political institutions (782).

In fact, Foucault believed that the modern state's strategy was inspired by Christian institutions, especially during the 18th and the 20th centuries. In this regard, he considered the state "a new form of pastoral power" noting that the "pastoral power" was to describe the ancient power technique ("The Subject" 782-783). The medieval church dominated individuals' lives for the sake of their salvation in the hereafter, hence pastors devoted their life to serving people yet through commanding them because they had a power that was spiritually justified, they could also cross the individuals' inner self throughout confessions, therefore they had "a knowledge of the conscience and an ability to direct it" (783). Foucault asserted that the spiritual convention of the pastoral power disappeared by the 18th century, nevertheless, its functions were adopted by the non-religious organization of the state (783). The latter welcomes individuals just like the church did in the past, but this involvement is subjugation in disguise, it reshapes them and requires them to comply with "very specific patterns" (738).

The difference between what Foucault named church's individualization and the individualization that is exercised by the state is that the latter's salvation is deemed to be realized throughout worldly aspirations such as prosperity and security,

in order to reach such an aim, the state mobilizes public and family institutions. Therefore, men's knowledge is stuck between two bases: the first is related to the group whereas the second is related to the individual (784). Foucault believed that there must be a gateway from this "'double bind', [i.e.] the simultaneous individualization and totalization of modern power structures" (785). He noted that the state techniques to create individuals with certain features that are suited to the group norms must be rejected at the first place to be able to liberate oneself from them.

Furthermore, Foucault's theory can be included in the politics of individualism. The latter was tackled by postmodernist English philosopher Michael Oakeshott who discussed the contribution of different enlightenment thinkers in the establishment of this politics in a series of Harvard lectures (1993). He began with John Locke, the father of European Liberalism, who believed in the self-determination and the self-government of human beings who have two capabilities: a sense of experience, in addition to introspection, hence all their mental or physical orientations were influenced by their experience and reflection upon it, these two abilities are shared by all men who do not have "'innate' ideas" (*Morality and Politics* 53). Therefore, Men's individuality is acquired throughout their life experience that taught them "the Law of God" and made them work hard according to it with the use of natural resources, which were bestowed to them as their own property (54). Meanwhile, all men are free and equal, yet they need a government whose job is not to dictate rights and duties embodied in the law of God but to interfere in case of disagreement between an individual and another, this government is chosen by the consent of the majority as

every single person is responsible for “the good of the community” hence was the Lockean individualist political theory.

Moreover, Emanuel Kant’s individuality bound men’s self-internal determination and their connection with external others. This association of individuals represented the premise of civil society whose objective is to prevent human beings from acting at the expense of the others’ prerogative of self-determination (61). In this context, Kant insisted on the role of government, “the public authority of civil society”, in ensuring justice through enacting rules that guarantee individuality as well as freedom for all (63).

Furthermore, Oakeshott dealt with Edmund Burke’s view of individuality and the role of government. Burke believed that “self-preservation”, that is defending oneself against someone who tried to dispossess it of its rights, was a natural prerogative that made an individual worth being so (70). In addition to that, the relationship between different people is based on utilitarianism, and hence the government has to play the role of a moral disposition to restrain individuals from following their desires at the expense of the others (70). To attain this objective, rules of conduct have to be established to ensure equality in addition to the designation of a judge to find out solutions to the people’s disagreements (71).

All in all, according to Oakeshott, the modern state emancipated human beings from the chains of their communities, which led to the emergence of two kinds of subjects: the ones who are fervent about their individuality and consider their choices, interests, and thoughts as rights which must be secured by a sovereign government,

and those who fail to be individualistic and are dependent to the government which in this case must be sovereign and powerful at the same time (*Morality and Politics* 35).

To conclude, late modern approaches played a crucial role in the making of the post-modern perception of the concept of identity. The modern challenges of this issue were binding the subject to the central structures of society to create a solid identity around one centre. But the dislocation of the latter and the shaking of the social order revealed to what extent the politics of individualism tended to subjugate individuals by means that must be figured out in order to free oneself. This led to converting the concept into inclusivity and difference rather than exclusivity and fixity, thus the structure's centre was replaced by "a plurality of power centres" (quoted by Hall "Who needs identity?" 278). In "From Pilgrim to Tourist - or a Short History of Identity", Zygmunt Bauman concluded that if identity was created in modernity, then it was recycled in postmodernity, he added: "Indeed, if the *modern* 'problem of identity' was how to construct an identity and keep it -solid and stable, the *postmodern* 'problem of identity' is primarily how to avoid fixation and keep the options open" (Bauman 18).

Fragile Beginnings: Making the Union

The historiography of the making of the union of the English, the Welsh, the Scots, and the Irish peoples is crucial to better understanding the British union. In theory, digging into the beginning of what is today the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland helps to recreate and to revive what has been unmade by history and

politics. Yet, as a matter of fact, it induces one to claim that the union's pillars are not strong enough to make it survive internal contentions.

Union between England and the other three countries occurred in different periods under the form of acts of unions. To start with Wales, the union became effective in (1543) during Henry VIII reign while the Act was passed in (1536). Subsequently, the Anglo-Scottish Union started as a Union of Crowns in (1603); since then, the two kingdoms had been under the same monarch: James VI of Scotland and first Stewart king of England or as he crowned himself King of Great Britain. However, they were separate states. The Act of Union was achieved in 1707 with the unification of the English and Scottish parliaments, hence a single British legislature located at Westminster saw the light: the two chambers joined both Scottish and English members though the Scots constituted the minority. As for the economy, Scotland lost its autonomy and became subject to the English economic system. Nevertheless, it could keep its legal and educational systems as will be discussed in the fourth chapter.

The Anglo-Scottish Union did not come out in overnight, but it was issued after centuries of tensions between the two nations. Eventually, it had pragmatic reasons that included casting out the Scottish security threat and economic irritation (Hazell, "The English Question" 30). In terms of economy, before the Union of the Crowns, Scotland's trading system had always angered the English for economic ties between the two were unfathomable whereas Scottish commerce with the continent especially France was successful. Scottish historian, T. C. Smout, explained that the rivalry

between the two Crowns led to economic competition and warfare; he said in the following passage,

> The rivalry of kings involved the two nations in savage, if periodic, warfare, with the imprisonment of merchants, the looting of towns and the confiscation of ships: it also involved Scotland in a series of continental alliances of which those with France in particular gave the Scots extraordinary commercial privileges and encouragement to look beyond Britain for their cultural and economic ties. (465)

Smout's description reflected a kind of gang war between English and Scottish people in order to prevent one another from making a profit and succeeding economically. This led the borders between the two countries into anarchy (465). Professor James Bulpitt also linked the Anglo-Scottish union to "strategic and dynastic reasons" with the use of the economy to induce the Scots (Keating "The Strange Death" 369).

In effect, the most dreadful story of the rivalry between the English and the Scottish Monarchs was between the two half-sisters Elizabeth I and Mary Tudor, or 'bloody Mary', it was all about religion (Protestantism and Catholicism) as well as the English throne, but the end was dramatic with the execution of Mary of Scots. Nevertheless, the death of Queen Elizabeth I, leaving England without an heir, because she was childless, enabled her cousin James of Scotland to Succeed her and become the King of both England and Scotland in 1603 as previously noted. However, it did not mark the end of tension between the two nations; in addition, the custom union was halted after (1611) which made it impossible to achieve better economic relations between them.

During this period of time, most European countries were enduring economic difficulties, hence the Scots were enthusiastic about having free access to the English

market to grow their economy for "the commercial well-being of the Scots was increasingly related to their ability to sell on [it]" (Smout 457-459). Moreover, the English Navigation Acts in the 1650s prohibited Scotland from trading with its colonies in India and the Caribbeans. These financial problems, as well as, famine, at the end of the 17th century, affected the process of the 1707 Act of Union.

As a matter of fact, many pamphlets were written in the period between 1699-1705 attacking the Union of the Crowns and appealing for the enhancement of Scottish independence under a renegotiated Union that would allow free trade to Scotland (Bowie 231). In the lines of a pamphlet, G. Ridpath, then a Scottish journalist, warned about the "trouble and noise" that a single British parliament might cause; he added: "how do they think the People in Scotland in General, would ever part with their Crown, Parliament, and other Badges of their Souvraignty [*sic*], and Independency, and submit to new Laws and new Modes of Religion" (Bowie 233). The availability of the press helped the spread of these demands and thus increased the people's anger.

Nevertheless, the treaty was passed in the Scottish Parliament after England issued the Alien Act (1705) to induce the Scots to proceed with the union act's negotiations, otherwise, they would be prohibited from trading in England. Karin Bowie quoted Scottish historian William Ferguson asserting that the majority in the Scottish parliament was against the act. In brief, the passage of the Union treaty was claimed to be, on the one hand, pressured by bribery, economic sanctions, and patronage; on the other hand, it betrayed the majority of the people who opposed it (226).

Nevertheless, some believed that the Anglo-Scottish union was a savior to Scotland. Smout concluded that if the Union had not happened, the Scottish dramatic situation would not have been solved because the three other solutions, that is, to maintain the Union of the Crowns, to realize a federal union with more Scottish control on its political life, or to break from England would have worsened the situation, he added

> All these alternatives looked as though they would lead into the morass, the first because it removed none of the causes of the debilitating economic situation into which the country had already sunk, the second and third because England considered them too potentially dangerous to countenance, and would therefore have invoked economic reprisals that would have plunged Scottish trade into far worse straits. (467)

Therefore, the 1707 union was considered as the lesser of evils for the Scots, as the economy was in a deadlock. And England would not have left them in peace, one can say that nothing was more triggering to it than the Scottish ties with France that could have put English security in danger. In other words, the union with Scotland was a sort of safeguarding due to the English fear that the Scots would align with their French rival as they did in 1291 by terms of the "Auld" Alliance. They also apprehended the restoration of a Catholic monarch and therefore a return to the papacy.

The union witnessed a short-term intermission until the Jacobite uprising that took place in many stages; the most important outbreaks were in (1715) and again in (1745-6). The latter upheaval was led by Catholic Charles Edward Stuarts who sought the restoration of the Stuarts on the British throne, from which Catholics were excluded, and to proclaim his father James Stewart as the King of Scotland. Charles pushed the Scots towards invading England which they did but after they reached

England, they realized that his promise to them of being supported by English Jacobites was untrue, hence they retreated and their compliance with Charles was broken. However, some historians argued that this rising was not against the union, as it was believed to be, yet it reflected a patriotism that did not ultimately represent Scottishness, rather it had Britishness as its final goal, nevertheless, it bore a rejection of the discriminating policies against the Scots. Stephan Conway declared that "Jacobitism was a British movement; it might draw strength from the Celtic lands, but it could only succeed if the Stuarts controlled the levers of power in London" (868-869).

The Irish likewise did not choose to join England out of mutuality, yet the 1801 act of union resulted from centuries of maneuvering. The kingdom of Ireland and England were in personal union, i.e., under the same monarch since 1542 as the Irish Parliament, created in 1297, declared Henry VIII as the King of Ireland. In 1603, this union included Scotland as well after the union of the English and Scottish crowns. However, the Reformation of the English church troubled the relationship between the two nations afterward, because Ireland was mostly Catholic. The first bill to unify the British and the Irish parliaments was in 1799, it came after many attempts to settle the two countries' political tension and economic problems. Furthermore, this period marked the war between France and Britain and the possibility of an alliance between the French and the Irish required a British decision because their security was at stake.

Consequently, the British tory Prime Minister William Pitt introduced a bill to unify Britain and Ireland into one Kingdom with a merged parliament in 1800. The bill was defeated because it included repealing the Penal Laws, which forbade Catholics

from holding parliamentary or public offices amid a Protestant monopoly that was interpreted as a call for Catholic emancipation. Irish historian S.J. Connoly believed that, after issuing a gloomy report on the possibility of carrying union without Catholic emancipation, the cabinet redefined the act "as a means to the end of achieving a union rather than as a benefit to be expected from it" (404). In other words, emancipation was not meant to integrate Catholics but only to achieve the union.

However, Protestant members of the Irish parliament were not pleased with this article on emancipation. Afterward, English and catholic Irish members of parliament accepted the bill finally in 1801, it is believed that they were subject to bribery and patronage. Many periods of Irish rebellions, the troublesome dissenters as the English named them, followed in different eras due to economic and religious pressures because "there was always a gap between Irish aspirations and British willingness to conciliate" (Connoly 408). The disagreement progressed to the Irish War of Independence (1919-1921) between the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the British army, it ended with the Anglo-Irish Treaty (1921) and Southern Ireland became autonomous in 1922 with dominion status, i.e., it was still under the umbrella of the British Crown. The Republic of Ireland became independent in (1949) after the Republic of Ireland Act in 1948, hence its remaining bind with Britain -the monarchy- was broken.

In a nutshell, the making of the Union was fragile in terms of its "raison d'etre" far from the claims of cultural differences. In addition to the fragility of the Acts of Unions, even the British state per se is claimed to be less homogenous if compared to the other European states. The 18th century engendered many British societal

problems, such as inequality, however, France was enjoying its unity following the French Revolution regardless of some Englishmen' claims about the incapacity of the French national character (Mandler 107). In *The English Question*, Robert Hazell contrasted the British state with the French one. As aforementioned, the latter was the fruit of the French Revolution that led to a "one and indivisible" state, he claimed that:

> In the French Revolution, the Jacobins created a French Republic, 'one and indivisible', the purpose of which was to turn peasants into Frenchmen- Preferably anti-clerical Frenchmen whose sole loyalty would be to the French State. But the British State could never be one and indivisible because it originates in a treaty. (Hazel *The English* 27)

In effect, circumstances in both countries differed but the idea of a unified state can be derived from the quote. British unionism can be considered as a compromise rather than a nation's will since it was achieved through treaties of sovereign states. The acts were top-down decided by parliament and delivered to the people. Hence why the Scottish and Irish nostalgia for their old status indeed vanished in times of British glory but recurred in times of distress. Nevertheless, French elites led the French revolution in order to unify the people under the umbrella of a state institution far from group identification or common culture.

To conclude, Mandler believed that nations are made and not born (121). In this light, Britain was made out of the union of four nations each with its own culture, religion, and even language. These differences were overtaken in the United States of America since it is widely believed that it is a melting pot rather than a multi-nation. Indeed, it is the difference in circumstances that created a distinguished case in Britain. The fragility of the British identity can be linked to its early beginning, some Scots and

Irish consider the English as invaders rather than counterparts whereas some English believe that Britishness is but an extension of Englishness.

Continuity and change in the British National Identity

Many scholars declared that the concept of Britishness has always been changeable and inconstant (Bradley, *Believing in Britain* 34). Throughout history, the British identity was usually perceived through the self-other dichotomy. Eventually, since the perception of the self is judged by the external rather than the core, one can deduce that identity is inconstant; it is determined by the changing other. Particularly, Britishness is depicted by Crick as "a protean concept" (149), however, some aspects of this identity have always existed and are still its delineators.

An inconstant national identity can be linked to social and political changes that diverted the course of history. The spiritual side of identity acquired new aspects and rejected others as long as society progressed or regressed; Mandler said that *"*Homogeneities and long-term continuities do not exist in diverse and ever-changing societies" (3). Indeed, the British society has witnessed historical swings from the making of the union to the empire, the independence of Southern Ireland, the Commonwealth, joining the EU, and finally Brexit, notwithstanding the wars that it endured. The British could have periods of unity and single affiliation to common bounds, yet the latter differed from one era to another because of the shift in British history and the history of the ever-changing world as well.

British identity's symbols kept changing up to the second half of the twentieth century. It had been attached to the person of the monarch, religion, nation, and

empire. Britishness, as linked to religious allegiance, is worth dealing with for its tie to Protestantism was remarkable during the eighteenth century. Protestantism resisted as a delineator of Britishness up to the nineteenth century. Jews, Catholics, and even atheists had been considered "un-British" by rhetoric, as well as law. After the Reformation of the British Church and the break-up with Rome, to be British meant to be Protestant and not Catholic. That was bound with a historical Francophobic attitude generated by political and religious motives, it was also nurtured by war and rivalry between Britain and France. Catholics were depicted as the bad "others" who the British were not. This religious allegiance was twofold, on the one hand, it gathered the British together regardless of their cultural differences against one enemy; on the other hand, it created an interior problem with Catholic minorities. Hence linking the British identity to the majority's religion was a time bomb that exploded in the 20th century with the troubles in Ireland.

By the same token, non-protestants assimilated into the British society to be able to hold official posts or even seats in parliament, especially the Jews. Catholics were finally emancipated in 1829, whereas Jews' emancipation was gradually achieved in the aftermath; the most famous Jewish who could grasp a government post as a Prime Minister was Benjamin Disraeli, in the second half of the nineteenth century. Hence, the importance of Protestantism dropped to be secondary among the well-educated and the most prosperous, that is, the minority, however "Catholics as a category remained in popular mythology an omnipresent menace" (Colley "Britishness and Otherness" 317). Linda Colley spoke of the contribution of sermons, ballads, and folklore in making the British define themselves as Protestants and not Catholics,

considering the latter as outlandish i.e., foreigners and aliens even if they were born on the British soil (318-319). She added that "Britons were encouraged to look through the Catholic glass darkly so as to see themselves more clearly and more complacently (319)".

Nevertheless, the tendency of accepting those who, previously, were regarded as aliens in Parliament speaks volumes about religious tolerance regardless of the utilitarian reasons behind it. It, therefore, announced a partial break between religion and identity by means of permitting those ex-un-British to make laws. Besides, Britain's imperialistic mission challenged the idea of Protestant British after becoming an empire controlling different religions (Koditshek 390) and a commonwealth after. Paradoxically, this British expansion had as a pretext the global Catholic threat in the 16th and 17th centuries after the spread of the Habsburg Catholic Empire (Pettinato 98).

Nevertheless, religious differences contributed to destabilizing Britain on many occasions. In theory, religion could constitute a solid core for Britishness if it was a single one, at least during a certain era. Yet, although both England and Scotland are Protestant, they do not have the same church affiliation; the English are Anglican while the Scots are Presbyterian. King Charles I (reigned 1625-1649) wanted to impose the Anglican Church's prayer book on the Scottish Presbyterians who rebelled in the Bishops' War that took place after the Union of Crowns (1639-1640). Moreover, prior to the Treaty of Union 1707, religious writers issued sermons and pamphlets warning about any act of union's threat to the Scottish Church because of English dominance. David Bowie cited Robert Wyllie, a minister of Hamilton parish, arguing that: "a State design to conform us to England, upon the prospect of the Junction of the

two Crowns… was the first occasion under K. James 6 [sic] of the first Attempts to Subvert our Reformation, Constitution and to bring back Prelacy" (237). Hence, the imposition of the English religious establishment which was faced by Scottish rejection showed the degree of both nations' religious attachment regardless of being adherent to Protestantism. Whilst the Scottish religious men did not accept Anglicanism, the Catholic-Irish attitude was sharper.

Ireland's Catholicism made it more attached to the Roman Church that the English revolted against during the Protestant Reformation. In *Britons*, Linda Colley equated eighteenth-century Britishness, i.e., before the Anglo-Irish Union, with Protestantism, as a common religion that generated a British crusade against a Catholic other i.e., France (quoted in Koditshek 390). Colley emphasized that the spirit of British nationalism in this period was stimulated by conflicts with France amid the absence of a collective identity and the inexistence of a fusion between the different cultures (quoted in Robbins 121). In other words, "an artificial" British nation was promoted in the period of war with France (1689-1815) during which its different peoples started to "focus on what they had in common, rather than on what divided them, and that forged an overseas empire from which all parts of Britain could secure real as well as psychic" ("Britishness and Otherness" 316). Therefore, if Catholicism was alien to Britishness, then the Irish people were also seen as aliens and inferior, which explains centuries of bloodshed in the relationship between Great Britain and Ireland.

The war with catholic France had a religious pretext that hid behind it a fear of French control of Ireland, besides the commercial rivalry between the two countries.

Indeed, the fact that Ireland was catholic implied that it would align with France against Britain. Moreover, it provided an otherness for the British to distinguish themselves with a different unique identity. Inside Britain, the emergence of the Jesuits' Counter-Reformation that preached for the reconstruction of Catholicism was also perceived as dangerous to the British identity. Their missionary activities were feared because they could bring back Britain to the camp of Catholicism that was led by France. The threat was also from aristocratic Francophiles who were seen as a fifth column that worked for the benefit of the French (Conway 886). The British saw themselves as God's elect people unlike the poor Catholic French, and any defeat by the latter implied the loss of not only territories but also British democracy and liberty values that they were spreading in the world. In brief, Welshman Howell Harris, a leader of the 18th century's Welsh Methodist revival, said that the French invaders' intention would be "not only to take away all Toleration and Liberty of Protestantism but [to] re-establish Popery again" (cited in Conway 886).

As mentioned before, the perception of Protestantism as a fingerprint of Britishness excluded from consideration the Catholic Irish. Professor Terry Eagleton claimed that the Irish of the nineteenth century were the other against whom Victorian Britons defined themselves (quoted in Pettinato101). Protestantism was overtaken by other delineators of Britishness; yet, it is still taken into account in Parliament and manifested by the Crown. However, it is astonishingly claimed that "Britain is now more of a Catholic than a Protestant country. A head count of those in church on a Sunday morning reveals more Catholics than Anglicans in England and more Catholics than Presbyterians in Scotland" (Bradley 2007:61). In a Eurobarometer

report issued by the European Commission in 2019, 14% of the British people asked, said that they were Protestants whereas 13% declared to be Catholics (Eurobarometer T11).

What follows confirms the importance of having an "other" to be able to define oneself. In, "How can Britishness be Re-made?", Dennis Grube spoke of a shift from a religious otherness to a moral otherness. By the end of the Victorian Era, the British government became more tolerant of the difference in religious beliefs as mentioned before; yet, another category of people became excluded from society: moral deviants including homosexuals, prostitutes, and criminals. Therefore, being British implied being morally upright whereas the others were condemned by British law. Grube considered this move as the origin of the twenty-first century's debate about values-based Britishness led by Gordon Brown (628), this will be discussed in the second chapter.

The British Empire was also a temporary delineator to britishness as it kept uniting the British together for long centuries. In between the lines of imperialism lay a strong feeling of common military celebration and service to the state in addition to mercantilism that provided Britain with sufficient raw materials to serve the workshop of the world. This can also be wed with the idea of the gentleman as well as "the white man" with a Christian mission to spread civilization and liberalism as in Kipling's words "The White Man's Burden". Hence the British people had been united under the slogans of liberty, Protestantism, and prosperity that provided them with a feeling of exceptionalism. Their identity was linked to these elements up to the mid-20th

century; however, this superiority that Britons enjoyed in their era of imperial glory became a source of nostalgia and rhetoric after the collapse of the empire.

Amin Maalouf believed that "everything in history is expressed in symbols", and he accentuated the concept of identity (*On Identity* 73). In fact, unlike imperialism and wars, Monarchy can be seen as a continuous icon of Britishness because of its perpetual existence and symbolism in British history. It has also acted as a remedy for Britishness in moments of trouble. Following the decline of the British Empire, Paul Ward asserted that the Monarchy, although weakened by the loss of its imperial role, provided "a sedative to relieve some of the pain of the loss of Empire (41)". The British identity is personified in the person of the Monarch and the royal family that had exclusively been ritualized as a symbolic cult of national worship up to the nineteenth century (Koditshek 392). This notion degraded as the British spirit of nationalism shifted from the leader to the state. British academic David Eastwood claimed that one of the tragedies of modern Britain goes back to Victorian Britain when the local government at the king's command was transposed into local government at parliament's command (167).

Besides, Tom Nairn also highlighted the ancient importance of Royalty, namely the Windsor Crown, in uniting Britain and its status in the eyes of the English; yet he claimed that this vision vanished to be replaced by indifference (Nairn 12). Nevertheless, according to Bradley, the Monarchy is still a landmark of Britishness; he illustrated this by the British anthem "God save the queen*"* (appendix 2) which glorifies the monarch rather than the nation (*Believing in Britain* 46). However, some Scots still prefer their anthem "Flower of Scotland" (appendix 3), whereas the Welsh

have their unofficial anthem "Old Land of My Fathers". In this regard, the British flag is also considered as an icon of Britishness; Bradley considered it the “most simple and also most spiritual symbol of British identity (*Believing in Britain* 63)”. In fact, the Union Flag goes back to James of the Scots at the dawn of the 17th century, made of the St George’s cross and the St Andrew’s flag, that is, the English and the Scottish flags.

In addition to the crucial integrity of the Monarchy in the British identity, Bradley also put it in parallel with religion after claiming that Britons were not secular, he said: “Britishness (…) is also about established churches, sacred monarchy and putting the spiritual and the transcendent at the heart of national life” (18). Nevertheless, in “Britons Changing Identities”, Madeleine Bunting, emphasized the decline of what she named religious identity by displaying a raise in the proportion of people who either did not claim membership in a religion or said that they never attended a religious service to 60% in the first decade of the second millennium, not only that but even the proportion of the people who belong to a religion but never attended service increased (49).

In the same context of continuous symbols, Parliament is not only a static feature of the British identity but also an icon of British sovereignty and an expression of its democratic heritage. It is a source of pride for the British as it recalls the glorious Magna Charta (1215) that led to England’s judicial autonomy from Rome, and to the premises of local liberties. It is worth noting that the “Great Charter” resulted from a dispute between King John and his Barons who were weary of royal demands for

money, feudalism, and hierarchy were replaced by an unwritten Constitution that made the King subject to the law like everyone and preserved people's liberties and rights.

However, Grube claimed that Parliament is a British institution that can bind and divide at the same time as mentioned before during the era of religious and moral "othering" (631). Indeed, The Alien Acts encouraged the process of un-Britishing either the Jews (1905 and the Edict of Expulsion 1290) or moral deviants in the second half of the nineteenth century or even Muslims in the twenty-first century. Otherwise, Westminster played the role of the omniscient legislator for its four components, which gave a sense of unity to the British. However, devolution and the establishment of autonomous assemblies in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland were perceived as a means of separatism, this led the English to call for their autonomous parliament as well.

Furthermore, territories can be considered as a continuous element that draws Britons together and untogether at the same time if we refer to Ireland. The sense of place and territory consolidates any people's solidarity and unity; not only this but geographical elements are also said to be of great influence on the inhabitant's similitude, they can therefore be considered crucial to identity. Regardless, Gamble and Wright opposed this idea in "The Britishness Question" and declared that culture and communities are more important than territories in terms of identity (1).

To conclude, in *The Making of English National Identity*, Kumar admitted that British "was an altogether more uncomfortable term to work with, hard rather than soft and belonging to specific historical epochs rather than the timelessness of "tradition"

(16)". Indeed, the perception of Britishness has kept changing in so far as circumstances changed. In the twentieth century, these changes seriously hit the oneness of the union and forebode its decline. In Paul Ward's words, "the instability of Britishness led some to argue that it was always in the process of "unraveling" rather than forming a collective identity" (3). The alterations and discontinuity of history in determining the British identity gave way to political alternatives to revive Britishness that was led by elites which is to be dealt with in the next chapter.

Continuity and Ruptures in the history of ideas

The link drawn between the past and the present has been under the spotlight for ages. The Greco-Roman legacy's revival was used to offer Europe a renaissance whose accomplishments gave way to the enlightenment and modernity. Regardless, the latter brought about a materialistic society that alienated individuals from themselves. However, the coming of the romantic age was necessary to bring back medieval simplicity and transcend the 19th century's industrialism and scientific immersion by returning to nature, spontaneity, and emotions, consequently a sense of escapist positivism propagated. Hence, history was perceived by some as a constellation of progressive experiences that have the same core with changing aspects. This continuous thread was denied by others who believe in the discontinuity of historical development.

Political theorist David Boucher argued that British idealist Michael Oakeshott sought continuous identity in historical change (Boucher 210). Oakeshott introduced

the idea of a character that provided a historical individual[3] (the concept of the British identity in our case) with unified conformity; the latter was maintained through the connectedness of its diverse components which constitute a complete whole (212). The character (the constant characteristics of an identity) starts when a moment of discontinuity from a previous character happens, this leads to the birth of the new character, as well as its continuous survival until another break occurs, such a rupture would lead to its dissipation and so on. The same concerning historical events[4] whose individuality is marked by a discontinuity that declared the break of what existed before; continuity is required to solidify this new character, the same as birth and death in the case of persons (*Experience and its Mode* 122).

In fact, Oakeshott classified the investigation of the historical change, especially as related to politics, into two types: the first is based on considering every single situation, which is basically a fruit of human preference, as a sequence in a series of situations, each was "caused, determined or conditioned by earlier situations" (*Morality and Politics* 29). Hence, he believed in the existence of an interrelated thread of events as far as the history of a historical individual is concerned. The second kind of investigation focuses on the "general causes" that made politics or tries to force "some system of classification upon the different manners of governing" (29). In other words, it endeavours to show to what extent political development is affected by external conditions.

[3] "The historical individual can be a person, a concept, an institution, a battle, a religion, or whatever is identified as exhibitions of human intelligence which display certain sameness throughout diversity (Boucher 213)."

[4] A historical event: "not a mere point-instant … it is something with a meaning, and which can maintain itself relatively intact and self-complete" (Oakeshott, *Experience and its Mode* 121-122)

However, Oakeshott based his approach on the investigation of character. He defined character as the result of human choices, which become carved into a person's being and continue to develop and establish themselves steadily over time (30-31). He applied this theory in the study of the character of modern European politics, he wanted to show that the birth of the modern state in the mid-16th century indeed marked a turning point in the history of politics: on the one side, authority fell from the hands of kings and priests and became a matter of a sovereign government and he insisted on the sovereignty aspect; on the other side, since then, this political condition has resisted as an exclusive norm (32-33). In fact, no particular change occurred in terms of governing, for governments have always been sovereign, they control their subjects and institutions and no other power could take this privilege from them (34).

In this regard, the concept of Britishness can be traced back to the Act of Union of the English and the Scottish crowns that put an end to the previous continuous existence of their two separated kingdoms, both had been enduring centuries of rivalries and compromises. Great Britain emerged since then, and regardless of the changes that occurred to understanding the concept of the British identity, the latter is still determined by the continuous symbols of British sovereignty as was discussed in the section of “Continuity and Change in Britishness”. Hence, this can be considered as a “sameness in difference” and one can talk of a British political character. Furthermore, idealist thoughts, such as Oakeshott’s, asserted that reality was a mind’s deduction (Boucher 211); hence the mind can draw connections and make Britishness a complete whole and a coherent unity throughout assuming the existence of firm relations between its components.

Not only the mind but context also must be taken into consideration when dealing with the history of a concept. In effect, Oakeshott described "history as a mode of understanding", therefore it is a means of clarification, and the context, the origins, and the growth of an idea must be traced back in order to understand it (201-202). Moreover, in the present, pieces of evidence about a certain past still exist, the historian's role is to match all the similar pieces together to form a coherent whole because authenticity is judged by coherence (208). However, this is only the beginning of a historical inquiry that must not be satisfied with the evidence (Oakeshott named it past "survivals") but have to reach events throughout them (Boucher 209). Finally, an absolute conclusion is reached when the historian transforms the evidence into a world of coherent historical ideas, and this conclusion is what Oakeshott called a fact (*Experience and its Mode* 111-112). In brief, Oakeshott defined history as "a world of facts in which the truth of each fact is based, not upon specific attestation, but upon that world as whole" (118).

Indeed, Oakeshott said that "the past in history is, then, always an inference; it is the product of judgment and consequently belongs to the historian's present world of experience" (*Experience and its Mode* 108). Oakeshott also described the past as a "passing of events", each event is also "an assemblage of occurrences", that successively follows and results from its precedent (cited in Boucher 209). These occurrences are interrelated and extremely close that there seems no intervening time between them, in addition, they form "a continuous unity" throughout their contingent connection with events; nevertheless, "historical changes" occur but in a way that preserves "the continuous identity" of a "historical individual" (cited in Boucher 209-

210). The latter is considered by Oakeshott as “a changing identity” (*Experience and its Mode* 124). Finally, Oakeshott substituted the principle of cause and effect by exposing “a world of events intrinsically related to one another in which no lacunas tolerated” (143).

The vision of historical thinking as a continuous thread or a series of sequences tormented Michel Foucault who tended to fragment the history of ideas into series of transformations and ruptures rather than melting them in a single pot. His focus was on the ruptures and discontinuities that engender changes and are supposed to divert history from one direction to a completely different one. In *The Archaeology of Knowledge,* he announced that historians’ focus on what occurred in a certain interval of time had to shift to an interest in “the phenomena of rupture, of discontinuity” (4). In fact, events and concepts had been dealt with in terms of their stable and homogeneous historical stages whereas the poststructuralist objective endeavour was to expose their moments of “interruptions” (4). Foucault spoke of the emergence of various interruption’ forms, yet in terms of identity, the most adequate is what he named “architectonic unities” of systems. The latter emphasizes “internal coherences, axioms, deductive connexions, compatibilities” in historical relations rather than “cultural influences, traditions, and continuities” (5). In other words, interruptions were unwanted by traditional historians who tended to erase them from their records, but the post-structuralist thought believed that they were pivotal in historical analyses (8). Consequently, lineage was replaced by finding out the turning points to arrive at new foundations (5).

Foucault's poststructuralist theory is considered by British academic Chris Weedon as "a version of history" just like Marxist and Liberalist theories since it is based on the "discursive evidence available" (115). However, the traditional view of documents as historical imprints that bear the past in between their lines was subverted by Foucault. Documents had been used to interpret the past's "monuments", i.e. they tended to refer to non-verbal traces and to explain their silence in a way that is far from reality (*The Archaeology* 7). Yet, the new role of history was to produce monuments from documents and not the contrary (7). Thus, instead of considering a document as an untouchable memory and placing it as a symbol of unity and cohesion, it must be exploited to find out disruptions and discontinuities. The analysis of the different discursive elements produces a "discourse on power, which is never definitive and is always shaped by the concerns of the moment in which it is produced" (Weedon 115). Therefore, a discourse is never static, it is influenced by its contextual background.

Furthermore, history is shaped by both supply and demand; the present not only determines the future, but also decides which historical stories should be revealed, discussed, and adopted in the present. This in turn influences how history is interpreted and used to shape the future. The British risk of disintegration led to an enormous focus on the continuous symbols and events that joined the British together, British unionists choose what suit their story to make the formation of the British union an ideal beginning, putting aside the moments of disruptions and discontinuities. In the case of Scottish independence, historians would explain the reasons behind such a fate

since 1707; however, if the union survives, they will focus on the union's potential to contain nationalism (Finlay 104).

Memory versus Counter-Memory

The UK is often depicted as a traditional nation that honours the past, and values her national symbols. Unionist politicians and elites aim to establish a sense of continuity between the past, present, and future by using the past to transcend the present. (Anthony Geddes, quoted in Hall, "Who Needs Identity" 277-8). As depicted in the previous section, British fervent nationalists choose their history's unifying icons to celebrate britishness either by referring to their Monarchs, Parliament, and glorious empire, but avoid dealing with the real process of the union's making considering it as the world's most successful union. This reliance on a certain past rather than another was criticized by postmodernists including Foucault who considered this discourse of the past as a form of power that aims at imposing continuity.

As a matter of fact, identity has always been determined by ethnic or historical identifications and allegiance to a symbol or symbols related to the people's common origin and shared experiences. These identifications altered throughout history: when western societies were traditional, simple, and narrow, they were related to tribal connections, people's solidarity, regional belonging, and religion; however, these allegiances shifted to the national culture with the emergence of nation-states (Hall, "Triangle" 136). The new social order required the binding of the nation with the state; this was reinforced by a national education that was drawn from a collective memory

be it real or mythical. This was meant to assert that the nation is ancient and inveterate to create a society that bears a national consciousness.

However, some believe that a nation's shared memory must be recalled launching a process of becoming rather than certifying that one has always existed. It is said that history repeats itself, especially with the same nation in the same place, but when the past is well-studied and the nation changes, the repetition can be avoided. In "Who Needs Identity", Stuart Hall declared that "identities are about questions of using the resources of history, language, and culture in the process of becoming rather than being, not 'who we are' or 'where we came from', so much as what we might become" (4). He also summed it up by linking the issue, not to the "so-called return to roots but a coming-to-terms-with [our] 'routes' (4)". This critical view of historical narratives about a nation's origins, generally propagated by state institutions, was named by Foucault as a counter-memory

Amin Maalouf also refuted the idea of roots and contrasted it to that of origins in his much-acclaimed novel *Origins*, in which he traced back his ancestors' memories, experiences, and fates in the middle of a multicultural Lebanese society. He began his book by referring to one's belonging as origin rather than roots because the latter is attributed to trees rather than human beings and when roots are removed from the soil, the body dies (7). Nevertheless, origins connote a spiritual tie with the past that does not prevent one to adopt or at least accept other cultures. In an age of a rapid pace of change, the only unchangeable is change itself. In *On Identity*, Maalouf divided personal heritages into two types as follows,

> In short, each one of us has two heritages, a "vertical" one that comes to us from our ancestors, our religious community and our popular traditions, and a "horizontal" one transmitted to us by our contemporaries and by the age we live in. It seems to me that the latter is the more influential of the two, and that it becomes more so every day. Yet this fact is not reflected in our perception of ourselves, and the inheritance we invoke most frequently is the vertical one. (102)

Amin Maalouf thought that what men acquire throughout their lifetime must be more apparent in their identity than their tribal heritages. However, humanity did not reach such a stage of identification that has always been related to one's ancestors. This led to intolerance and from here the world's problems of identity were generated (5). Limiting an identity to a single affiliation, be it cultural, linguistic, or religious exclude differences and might lead to violence (23).

He added that it was a privilege for one to have many identities. Indeed, speaking two different languages and having different cultures already enable one to have a different vision of the world compared with someone who has only one culture. Maalouf criticized individuals' tendency to hold on to a single cultural or national allegiance that "they [were] supposed to flaunt it proudly in the face of others" (2-3). He also believed that "identity is a false friend!" and that "it isn't given once and for all: it is built up and changes throughout a person's lifetime (23 and 33). Therefore, if the origin is perceived as a starting point for a whole career from which one built his identity, many problems would be avoided

In effect, Maalouf's attitude towards origins seems moderate in contrast with Foucault's perspective which inherently rejected the idea of origin. Foucault called the latter a "silent beginning" that is useless to be traced back or recalled in historical analysis, instead the latter must follow a new rationality that "cut the development in

the middle of its continuous evolution" because it is not a matter of the different stages of development, yet it concerns the milieu of its evolution (*The Archaeology* 4). Each historical phase has its own context and circumstances that made it as it is and that must be studied instead of dealing with origins as the source of the current situation. Besides, Foucault rejected basing the historical analyses of discourse on investigating and rehearsing an origin, or on reporting an allegedly "already said", he considered both themes as means to perpetuate a certain discourse that must be considered "as and when it occurs" (25). Hence the notions of tradition, causality, evolution, and symbolism have to be disposed of because all these aspects are part of a discourse of representation that is meant -in the case of identity- to force unity and coherence in a given society, as will be discussed in the second chapter.

Genealogy[5] is what comes to mind when continuity is mentioned, and origins are sought. However, this historical quest to tackle events and study concepts was criticized by Michel Foucault in "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History". Foucault agreed with Nietzsche's rejection of genealogists' usage of origins (ursprung in German), the reason behind this criticism lay in the fact that exploring origins implied seeking a "primordial truth" that would provide a steady essence and a pure birth to beautify the reality that came after and claim "the existence of immobile forms that preceded the external world of accident and succession" (142).

Foucault believed that genealogists' analysis must dispose of such a metaphysical quest for "a timeless and essential secret", instead they must "listen to

[5] The role of genealogy is to record its history: The history of morals, ideals, and metaphysical concepts, the history of the concept of liberty or of the ascetic life; as they stand for the emergence of different interpretations, they must be made to appear as events on the stage of historical process. (Foucault, "NGH" 152)

history" to be able to figure out that historical beginnings do not reveal an original identity or a static essence, yet they hide "the dissension of other things [:] …disparity" (142). Moreover, Foucault refuted genealogists' focus on historical beginnings as moments of truth, perfection, and sometimes utopia at the expense of historical contingencies. Thus, history must be used not to glorify mythical origins, but to chase them away (144). He concluded that genealogists had to understand "the events of history, its jolts, its surprises, its unsteady victories, and unpalatable defeats - the basis of all beginnings, atavisms, and heredities" (143-144). He added: "History is the concrete body of a development with its moments of intensity, its lapses, its extended periods of feverish agitation, its fainting spells; and only a metaphysician would seek its soul in the distant ideality of the origin" ("NGH" 145). Hence, the focus on the British inherent symbols such as the Monarchy or Parliament to show that the British identity has always existed -as it is now- can be considered as a metaphysical task. On the one hand, their origins go back to ages that completely differed from the modern age; on the other hand, they had a lot of accidents that were ignored while emphasizing their ideal continuity.

Furthermore, Foucault stated that the terms *entstehung* and *herkunft* are more adequate to describe the real genealogist' task rather than *ursprung* (origin). Notwithstanding the fact that the two former terms (*entstehung* and *herkunft*) also refer to origins, Foucault came up with his own interpretation of these Nietzschean concepts. To start with *herkunft*, he explained it as equivalent to descent, any group has its specific peculiarities including blood, race, social class, and traditions, which belong to their ancestry (145). Tracing back descents leads to qualifying the "strength

or weakness of an instinct and its inscription on a body" (150). In this light, genealogists do not explore individual characters or ideas, yet they dive into "the subtle, singular, and sub-individual marks that might possibly intersect in them to form a network" (145). This enables them to dissociate and displace what seems to be a coherent identity and a unified community and figure out the context of its formation. Foucault concluded that this process does not intend the restoration of "an unbroken continuity that operates beyond the dispersion of forgotten things" or to prove that the present is a perpetuation of the past, but this to deal with the events per se, and "to identify the accidents … the errors …the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist…" (146). Hence, Foucault altered the motif behind studying beginnings as a means to find out the source of an ideal and constant history and claim its unification, to a process to fragment it into a series of contradicted events that destructed its core and led to the present.

Entstehung or emergence was defined by Foucault as "the principle and the singular law of an apparition" ("Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" 148). He believed that referring to the end of historical development as emergence was an error. To illustrate he gave the example of thinking that punishment primarily emerged as a way to give examples, yet in fact, this act had passed throughout different "series of subjugations" before becoming such: "revenge, aggression victim compensation…" (148). Foucault drew the following conclusion:

> The metaphysician would convince us of an obscure purpose that seeks its realization at the moment it arises. Genealogy, however, seeks to reestablish the various systems of subjection: not the anticipatory power of meaning, but the hazardous play of dominations. ("Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" 148)

It is “the play of domination” that stimulates differences and conflicts, it lies “in rituals, in meticulous procedures that impose rights and obligations” (150). As a matter of fact, those who could control these means of domination were the ones who manipulated history according to their interest (151).

In the same regard, Gellner related the perpetual and continuous vision of the world to industrialization that provided the society with the “ideal of progress, [and] of continuous improvement” (22). He made an analogy between the discontinuous traditional social order and the unitary modern industrial society. In fact, traditional societies were made of separated and autonomous systems each with its typical characteristics, and every attempt to unify them were considered “social solecism or worse, probably blasphemy” (21). The languages of daily rituals such as hunting or harvesting differed from one another, and the council’s language was by any means similar to the formers; furthermore, the world contained disconnected stable “sub-worlds” with different characteristics and logics (21-23). These differences did not pose a problem because each community was separated from the others with no remarkable relationship.

However, modern society was treated as a complete unitary whole regardless of its sophisticated systems. Gellner said that “it is assumed that all referential uses of language ultimately refer to one coherent world … a unitary idiom” (21). Nevertheless, this new society was subject to “perpetual growth” which made it mobile and hence egalitarian: unlike agrarian societies that were overwhelmed by inequalities because the people were satisfied with their stable occupations, Gellner believed that they were “hallowed by custom”. Modern society’s need for change and

rapid productivity pushed men towards change and the division of labour became "complex and persistently, cumulatively changing"; in effect, the barriers that prevented a lower class from climbing the ladder of another class were removed by modernity, yet this does not imply that inequality did not exist at all, but it took new dimensions (25). This new environment paved the way for nationalism.

In brief, In *Nations and Nationalism,* Gellner said that nationalism was rooted "in the distinctive structural requirements of industrial society"; he added that it was the product of the new social order rather than ideology or national sentiment (35). Before reaching this conclusion, he spoke of the importance of education, universal literacy, and generic training in the modern society that demanded an organic division of labour and standardized communication because the economy overstepped regional borders; in other words, the old local acculturation and literacy, that was exclusively spread amongst religious men, did not satisfy the modern society's perpetual growth that thus requested a national culture (34) as will be dealt with in the following chapter.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that Foucault accentuated the difference between effective history and traditional or true history. Traditional history tends to see historical processes as a secession of complementary and continuous events. The latter are perceived as natural means to an end, he gave the example of "a decision, a battle, a treaty, a reign" to events (154). In fact, a decision might lead to a battle which can also lead to a treaty or a reign change, hence history appears consistent. However, effective history considers the moments of the previous examples' eruption as events, for instance, "the reversal of a relationship of forces, the usurpation of power" (154).

Therefore, it does not attempt to draw a link between an event and another, rather it seeks to find out its singularity and uniqueness amid what is portrayed as a natural process of history, this leads to looking down to the “periods of decadence” rather than looking high at “the noblest periods” (155). In short, traditional history uses nature and destiny to impose an ideal process of history that bears behind its continuous events values and meaning, nevertheless effective history focuses on the nearest conflicts that happened by chance and were met by forces that control history.

Consequently, Foucault believed that total history would be replaced by general history: the former attempts to bind different phases together to form “great units” of time with a coherent and steady centre that encompasses a set of values and implies a single society and a solid civilization; nevertheless, general history aims at finding out the moments of dissipations and develop them (10-13). For him, the history that was delivered to us must not be perceived as memory, yet it must be challenged by “a counter-memory”, which is a means to find out the systems that imposed the prevalent view of one’s origin rather than imposing the latter and reviving it (“Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” 162). Gellner said that nationalists or conservatives always try to give examples about “continuous institutions” and “continuous communities or speech, race or other notion” to prove the nations’ perpetual existence rather than focusing on other changing features (134).

To conclude this chapter, Britishness has been shaped, several times, through conflicts with a Celtic "other" from outside the empire. However, internal conflicts with so-called "domestic others" have repeatedly put the conception of this identity at risk. (Pettinato 96). Rivalry with France played a crucial role in the creation of the British

identity: on the one hand, one of the important factors that led to the union with Ireland and Scotland was the fear of their alliance with France at the expense of England. On the other hand, it identified an alien other for the British to distinguish themselves from it either in terms of religion or character. Yet economic and imperial competition was hidden behind religion, hence the making of the UK was promoted by interests.

Ben Wellings believes that the essence of Britishness can be extracted from the blend of politics and history (400). The question of Britishness might look anachronistic in an age of universalism; as any people's pretension to be unique became a matter of doubt and skepticism. The quest to identify the essence of British identity has been thoroughly examined over the centuries; however, current research can be approached from two different perspectives: a traditional one that adheres to past symbols as a pillar to Britishness to revive its typical origins and establish a shared memory. The second approach considers the former as a political discourse that aims at propagating an ideal image of the nation and imposing continuity. The latter is maintained through certain discursive representations of a longstanding British nation as will be discussed in the second chapter.

CHAPTER TWO

BRITISHNESS OR ENGLISHNESS, REFLECTIONS ON THE BRITISH NATIONAL CULTURE

The concept of culture has witnessed many alterations, yet post-modern approaches inserted it under the umbrella of discourse. In fact, “culture” has a Latin etymology, it is derived from “cultus” which denotes “care”, the term has also been related to “colere” which means “to till” or “to cultivate”. The word culture was attached to human early activities that were limited to tending and growing the soil. The latter was the haven of the primitives who strived to survive through hunting and then cultivating their small lands. Thus, culture was first understood as a human attempt to stimulate growth and to make the soil emit life and fertility.

With the advance of humankind, culture became more complex, it started to be tied with the mind and turned to refer to the fruit of a community’s use of their agrarian properties to become more urban and civilized, hence one of the meanings of cultured. The connection between culture and education was established in order to reach this stage. This connection was particularly strengthened with the rise of literacy, which was originally monopolized by the church and later institutionalized by governments after the formation of nation-states. Consequently, national cultures emerged to unify different cultures together under a single state.

This chapter deals with Britishness as a cultural national identity that is the fruit of the British nation representations throughout discourse and myth. Both are forms of communication that are constellated to produce a national culture based on a national story to secure the nation’s unity. Correspondingly, both are interrelated because they tend to inculcate values and maintain them according to political interests. On the one hand, in *Mythologies*, French literary theorist Roland Barthes defined myth as “a value, truth is no guarantee for it; nothing prevents it from being a perpetual alibi”

(122). Indeed, Barthes' myth is not about fabricated stories, yet, it connotes the fabrication of a historical concept, be it a particular context, a sudden change, or a contingency, endowing it with a strong speech that would naturalize it and make of it a fact, a common sense to be adopted by society. On the other side, discourse includes the manipulation of language to convey knowledge and assert a good relationship between the state and its individual subjects.

In this respect, the chapter starts with a theoretical background that sheds light on Barthes' myth, and Foucault's discourse, in addition to the concept of culture and national culture. Subsequently, it deals with the British unified national culture as a myth in contrast with the English dominating culture, which has led to the confusion between Britishness and Englishness. It finally deals with Gordon Brown's discourse of Britishness that is based on common values and institutions as an attempt to contain the British differences and make them melt together, hence prevents disintegration and regional nationalisms with a modern discourse of Britishness.

Understanding Myth

In *Mythologies*, Roland Barthes defined myth as "a type of speech", he admitted that this concept has different senses indeed, but he tended "to define things, not words" (107, 160). These senses include considering myth as an inherent traditional tale full of superstitions and fallacies, whereas he offered the word a new connotation that borrowed the part of distortion from the conventional meaning. In fact, he described a myth as a message or a system of communication that can be understood not as an idea or a concept but as a form which would be attributed with "historical limits, conditions of use, and reintroduce society into it" (107). As if he assimilated myth with machines

that have directives and a kind of expiry date because they are increasingly harmonized with modern technologies, otherwise they would not attract the people' attentions.

Myths are limited to the historical context in which they are produced under certain conditions, yet they are reinserted into the people's minds making them believe that the given situation has always existed as such. In other words, every speech is a myth if communicated in particular circumstances with the intention of showing that it is not a contingency, yet it is an ideal or a value. Furthermore, Barthes said that "everything can be a myth provided that it is conveyed by a discourse" (107). As will be discussed in the fifth section, unity is not a myth per se, but it required some historical and political ingredients to become so, the British unity and solidarity that emerged, thanks to some circumstances, were propagated in a way that made the people believe that they had no problems of difference as a political means to maintain the status quo.

Mythology is a science that does not stand alone in Barthes' perception. The same as structuralism, psychoanalysis, and other sciences, it owes a lot to Ferdinand De Saussure's semiology, which deals with signs and forms more than contents, it was also inspired by ideology in terms of the historical development of ideas and ideals, Barthes concluded that mythology "studies ideas-in-form" (111). In effect, Semiology reckons the relationship between the signifier and the signified, the latter (concept) is conveyed by the former (the acoustic image), hence the sign is generated as "the associative total of the first two terms" (111). Barthes considered the signifier as "empty" and meaningless unless it is accorded a signified, hence the result would be a

sign that is “full” and bears the meaning of the whole (112). He gave the example of a black pebble, a signifier that can have different interpretations, but it is promoted to a sign when provided with a precise signified such as “a death sentence” (112).

A Myth also comprises a signifier, a signified, and a sign. However, it is built on the previously mentioned semiological spectrum, in which the signifier is the image, the signified is the concept, and the sign is the relation between them (113). Barthes placed myth within a “second semiological order” and he offered the following figure:



Figure 1: Barthes’ Mythical Speeches Model (Barthes 113)

The sign that linguistically speaking associates the image and the concept is a mythical signifier, whose association with an adequate signified creates a myth. Barthes remarked that the latter overshadowed the language that conveyed it, he said that language is a “raw material … a sum of signs, a global sign, the final term of a first semiological chain” (114). He called this first language system *language-object*[1] for it is the structure by which myth establishes itself, and he named the second semiological chain or the myth as a *metalanguage* because he considered it “a second language, in which one speaks about the first” (114). The metalanguage enables one to “speak about things” whereas the language-object “speaks things” (143). In other words, the

[1] (the author’s emphasis)

latter point things out, while the former makes use of them, it refines and ornaments them to depict them as common sense (143).

Furthermore, Barthes described the myth's signifier as full and empty at the same time. The mythical signifier is made of an empty form that acquired a complete meaning stemming from history, values, ideas, knowledge, or memory, all provided by the linguistic chain. However, to become a myth all these meanings are set apart and the signifier regresses to an empty form, a signified (the concept) is needed to give this form a new meaning hidden behind previous meanings and appropriated to new situations and historical contingencies (117-119). For example, in the third chapter, we will discuss the British Media's portrayal of refugees and immigrants as a part of a Eurosceptic agenda: if we take refugees as a sign resulting from the primary semiological chain, it is made of its conventional meaning as far as refugees and migrants are concerned. In the second semiological order, the word refugee is a mythical signifier which is provided with different signified such as "mass", "invaders", and "flood", whereas its real signified, their real motive to move to the UK, is ignored and not accentuated.

As a result, a final sign emerges, Barthes called it the signification, and it is the superficial and the most apparent image of the whole story (120). He added, "we can see that the signification is the myth itself, just as the Saussurean sign is the word (or more accurately the concrete unit)" (120). The interaction between a mythical signifier, with its meaning and form, and the signified or the concept is based on "deformation" (121). In the mythical speech, this mythical signifier's meaning and the form remains present, yet the mythical concept's work is to distort the first meaning

that becomes unnoticed and “alienated”, it regresses to a mere empty form in need for a signification to provide it with a concept (121). Moreover, a signification is not arbitrary or natural, it results from a motivation that “contains an analogy” (123). This stimulus happens at the level of the form that has a lot of meanings, but the historical circumstances influence the choice of only one meaning which is appropriate to the desired concept (124).

Myth is meant to impose a certain order, it is inspired by a “historical concept” chosen at a moment of contingency in order to make “an historical intention a natural justification, and making contingency appear eternal” (123,142). Barthes believed that myth was the most adequate instrument that made French society adopt a bourgeois ideology. The bourgeoisie worked to propagate its representations everywhere by using the historical concept of the nation, hence its ethics became a national norm, Barthes added that “bourgeois norms are experienced as the evident laws of a natural order - the further the bourgeois class propagates its representations, the more naturalized they become” (139). Albeit the fact that their ideology was against the proletarians, the latter accepted it, more than that, it became common sense to them. Hence, society is affected by the cultural significations that are banalized and naturalized regardless of their accuracy.

Finally, Barthes stated that myth is a depoliticized speech in which the prefix de- meant “an operational movement … it embodies a defaulting” (142). This depoliticization is based on celebrating things rather than acting them (143). However, he considered the language that tends to change reality rather than maintaining it “as an image” that is not mythical, for example the language of revolution “generates

speech which is *fully*[2], that is to say initially and finally, political, and not, like myth, speech which is initially political and finally natural" (146-147). But once this revolution starts having a leftist status, its language is transformed into a myth that is poor and monotonous in a way that cannot compete with the Right's luxurious myth (148). Hence, the language of revolution intends to change an unacceptable reality with another reality, but when revolutionists become politicians, their language becomes utter discourse.

Culture and the National Culture

Nationalism flourished in Europe in the 19th century during which the newly formed nation-states' highest goal was establishing national unity and military strength. Populations became spiritually attached to their states, but this required the latter to nurture and maintain such an allegiance throughout the accomplishment of a national culture. In *Nations and Nationalism*, Ernest Gellner said that the advent of nationalism required cultural homogeneity that he considers an "essential concomitant" of industrial societies (39). In fact, modern states were not peacefully drawn from nations' shared cultures, but they were imposed by the industrial age's material interests that induced "a violent and conflict-ridden period" which allowed some cultures and rulers to win over others (40).

By the same token, state creation required the attainment of harmony between culture and polity, hence in a single state many cultures had to be accorded only one "political roof"; this alliance of culture and politics was considered by Gellner as the essence of nationalism (43). He also considered "the age of transition to industrialism"

[2] (the author's emphasis)

as an “age of nationalism” in which the agrarian cultural and political boundaries had to be adjusted to fit “the new nationalist imperative” (40). In the meanwhile, some cultures were lost whereas others became prominent. Nevertheless, Gellner insisted on the fact that nationalism did not force homogeneity to make a nation more powerful than another, yet, homogeneity, an angular stone of nationalism, was required to meet the needs of the new industrial age (46). A stable state with a prosperous economy and a powerful military had to have a unified national culture rather than diverse cultures.

A National culture allegedly contains a set of the different ethnicities that exist in its nation-state to form a national identity. In effect, the advance of industrialism made societies open to one another, therefore “exo-socialization” became essential for a culture to survive and prosper (Gellner 38). Some national cultures started as universal “high” cultures that were fortunate, in the earlier industrial age, because they progressed in industrialized regions; nevertheless, “low” cultures dwelled in the peripheries and had either to adopt a high culture and a national culture emerged or to revolt against it because of feeling oppressed and this led to the creation of another state. Gellner believed that high cultures were “school transmitted” rather than “folk-transmitted” and that they were maintained and protected by the state to ensure that only one culture was shared by the population of all the boundaries (37-38). These high cultures were linked to “a shared cognitive base and a global economy” (117). In other words, the need for a high level of production demanded literate workers who shared the same national aims of an economically strong nation-state.

Generally speaking, the ingredients of culture caused too many controversies in terms of social sciences. The Algerian prolific thinker Malek Benabi discussed the

question of culture believing that the latter existed before the modern age, but it was modernity that made of it an issue, because a "thing" cannot exist unless it bears an idea that one perceives, senses, and names (21-25). As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, "culture" was first linked to the soil and agriculture which, in its three pillars*:* ploughing, sowing, and harvest, had a crucial role in the birth of Western civilizations (26). Benabi described this preliminary perception as an abstract idea that was developed in the Renaissance where culture was defined as the fruit of the human intellect in terms of art, philosophy, law, knowledge …etc. (28). Subsequently, the 19th century brought about two different visions of the concept: a Western school that was inspired by the Renaissance humanist heritage, and a Marxist school that referred culture to society rather than the individual (29).

Furthermore, the American approach to culture was more prominent than the European one as it gathered its social sides including customs, religion, language, ideas, and education besides its material aspect that kept progressing throughout time and stimulated an alteration in the former inherited features (31). Indeed, Franz Boas, the father of the American anthropology, gave a relative definition to culture; he said: "Each people had its own culture, with its own peculiar traits, norms, values and 'personality', which it had evolved for reasons of its own, to suit its own environment and historical trajectory" (quoted in Mandler 158). Every society has its specific culture that is based on individualistic and social characteristics, both are determined by its history and settings. Boas put an end to disdaining a culture at the expense of another, for culture is not related to a particular race or caste, yet each nation developed its unique culture according to its conditions and circumstances.

Nonetheless, Benabi introduced his own definition of culture as a correlation between a psychological aspect represented by the individual, and a sociological aspect within a process of "cultivation" (43). The latter goes through two phases: a dynamic phase, as well as a static phase that precedes the former (44). The making of culture starts with ideas (static phase) which, if put in adequate psychological and social conditions, would shake the material world that also influences its development and movement (45). Culture results from individuals' interaction with their environment that at the same time affects them and is affected by them.

In "Culture is Ordinary", British socialist thinker Raymond Williams highlighted the fact that the word culture's nature is twofold. It embodies common and individual meanings, and both are interrelated, which makes culture both traditional and creative (93). Williams said that even if he was taught at Cambridge where he encountered "cultured" persons, he did not give in to his countryside's culture that kept changing throughout time (92). Men are first trained to "a whole way of life", then they develop their own meanings related to "the arts and learning" (93). Furthermore, Williams drew attention to the peculiarity of each society in terms of form, goals, as well as tenors, all these elements are manifested "in institutions, and in arts and learning" (93). For him, when a group of people discover their "common meanings and directions", a society is made, besides, it is "made and remade in every individual mind" (93).

However, he rejected some Marxist perceptions of culture, after expressing his agreement with their argument concerning the relation of arts and economic development, yet he disagreed with the fact that culture and education are restricted to

a class rather than another, and he considered culture as "common meanings, the product of a whole people, and offered individual meanings, the product of a man's whole committed personal and social experience" (97). Williams also stated the English literary critic F.R. Leavis' description of the English culture as primarily traditional and based on values that were cheapened by the modern industrial state's institutions (97). Nevertheless, he showed his disagreement with Leavis, whereas he believed in the possibility of a good common culture after disposing of the assumption that industrialism implied deformity (98).

Unlike William's common culture, In *Notes towards the Definition of Culture*, famous poet and essayist T.S Eliot had an elitist vision of the concept. He said that the word culture can be defined through the lens of "an individual, of a group or class, or of a whole society" (21). He believed that society is the most important in the story because the individual's culture is affected by their group's culture which is also subject to the society's culture. Eliot spoke of culture as an organic "way of life", and its primary "channel of transmission is the family" claiming that it is inherited (41,45). On the one hand, Eliot viewed culture in terms of class and elites, whom he believed to be the providers of a higher level of culture because they "represent[ing] a more conscious culture and a great specialization of culture" (48). This category includes a powerful minority compared to the weak majority with a lower level of culture (48). He added that "what is important is a structure of society in which there will be, from 'top' to 'bottom', a continuous gradation of cultural levels…" (48). On the other hand, Eliot tackled the issue of regional identities that must be seen as an advantage to

Britain, yet to overtake the problems it generates, “a homogenous general culture, associated with the traditions of one religion” is necessary (66).

Eliot’s perception leads to the national culture that was defined by Stuart Hall as a discourse throughout which meanings about the nation were constructed in a way that manipulates the people’s understanding of themselves (“The Question of Cultural Identity” 293). This goes hand in hand with Gellner’s belief that language is “a sufficient, if not a necessary touchstone of” culture, albeit the fact that having different languages generally and not necessarily presupposes different cultures (43-44). Gellner’s relative assumption was about cultures in general, yet national cultures are indeed related to language and discourse in particular. It is all about the narrative of the nation which is based on memories and sometimes myths that perpetuate the past, overcome the present’s differences, and tend to reassure continuity (“The Question of Cultural Identity” 293).

Hall said that the national culture’s narrative is told in five ways (293-295): The first one tends to engrave the past glorious or melancholic experiences in the people’s minds through national histories, literature, media, and pop culture. The second manner aims at generating in the individual a feeling of eternal attachment to his/her origins and traditions. The latter are sometimes invented to show their timelessness and continuous existence, i.e., they are performed on a modern stage in a way that makes them look ancient. The fourth and fifth elements that are embedded in the narrative of the national culture are Myths and the original people or folk which bring to life stories that are so old that it is difficult to determine whether they are based on reality or simply a creation of fantasy. Bradley spoke of the importance of

“icons, symbols, and myths” in the post-modernist identity discourse as they were considered “the performative language which brings into being the thing that it names: identity” (*Believing in Britain* 13).

The narrative of the nation leads to dealing with the essence of the nation. In fact, in his book, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, Benedict Anderson believed that nations were assumptions that the human intellect believed firmly in their existence. He said that a nation “is an imagined political community – and imagined both inherently limited and sovereign” (6). Imagination generally has ideal characteristics; otherwise, it becomes reality with all its misadventures. In this context, Anderson’s community is limited whereas it is large, sovereign, and hence free, finally, it is imagined as a “horizontal comradeship” whose people sacrifice their lives to protect (6-7). This sacrifice became under the name of nationalism as it was previously related to religious attachment.

On the other hand, Gellner said that nations were myths only when perceived “as a natural, God-given way of classifying men” and “as an inherent though long-delayed political destiny” (48). In other words, they are considered legends only when they are related to the distant past and an eternal future. He referenced Hegel's view that nations only began to exist once they became states (48). Instead, Gellner believed that nations were brought about by nationalism; the latter crystallized new political units that fit the modern industrial world by utilizing a selected pre-national culture and inventing or transforming its historical legacy (49, 55). Gellner concluded that nations were “a reality, for better or worse, and in general an inescapable one (49)”.

Power, discourse, and the national culture

Power and discourse are prominent Foucauldian themes that were introduced by Foucault in many works including his lectures at the Collège de France entitled "The Discourse on Language", in addition to his "Subject and Power" that was referred to in the first chapter. In fact, modernity bestowed human beings with physical freedom i.e., slavery and violence were somehow outdated. Yet a new power started to be indirectly exercised upon them to direct their behavior and lead them. In other words, Foucault argued that violence became a primitive meaning for power; instead, it was disguised in a liberal cloth with political and mental means that had a remarkable impact on the people's ways and perceptions of different aspects of life.

Foucault defined power as "a way in which certain actions modify others", hence it starts to exist only when it is "put into an action" by a person upon another or a group over another, furthermore the latter would react to the former's action by another action as well ("Subject and Power" 788). He illustrated his argument by referring to the 16th century's meaning of the term "government", the latter did not denote the state's authority over its economic and political institutions, to govern also meant to direct individuals as well as the community's behavior (790). He added that governing was meant to frame the people's actions and reactions, he said: "To govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field of action of others" (790). In brief, Foucault's power is not about fierce behaviors, contentions, or "voluntary linking", for these three are but some of its means, however, it is related to "the government of men by other men" (790).

In this regard, Foucault stressed the fact that modern society is controlled by a disciplinary power that replaced authorities' sovereign power, unlike the latter, the former is based on discipline and surveillance rather than punishment. The disciplinary power is a part of Foucault's poststructuralist theory that viewed society as a group of individual subjects manipulated by institutional bases such as "the family, the law, the work process and the education system" (Weedon 110). Behind these institutions lies a play of meanings and language embedded in a discursive system. In *Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory*, British academic Chris Weedon defined Foucault's discourse as follows,

> Discourses, in Foucault's work, are ways of constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms of subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such knowledge and relations between them. Discourses are more than ways of thinking and producing meaning. They constitute the 'nature' of the body, unconscious and conscious mind and emotional life of the subjects they seek to govern. (108)

The aforesaid social institutions are the modern state's means to conduct society according to specific social and political ends. In fact, knowledge is crucial in shaping modern societies that have been controlled by power relations. As previously mentioned, the latter is understood as a person or a group's ability to take an action that would lead another person or group to take a certain action as well (Foucault, "the Subject and Power" 792). Moreover, power relations are linked to the types of objectives adopted by those who act first to induce others to react, these objectives include financial, commercial, or entitlement aims (Foucault "Subject and Power" 792). Furthermore, they are arranged according to the "relations of class, race, gender, religion, and age" (Weedon 110). Discourse is usually founded on these conflicting

and polemic relations, which facilitate its spread and makes it more effective. Hence, to be able to take an action on a person or a group, knowledge is the means because it instructs the human mind about what is true and what is not, therefore the individual can be easily governed and manipulated. Foucault also defined discourse as a means of transmitting, as well as producing power, however, it also "undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it (quoted in Weedon 111)".

Weedon explained the link between power and discourse. She considered power as "a relation" that forces and stimulates either the progress or the retreat of the level "of control between discourses and the subjects" noting that the latter are -at the same time- the "agents" and the product of discourses (113). Indeed, subjects represent the raison d'etre and the target of discourse. Moreover, discourses are between the hand of the government that facilitates the diffusion of discourses that suit it and halts the discourses that are against its agenda.

Power is manifested throughout discourses per se in terms of their impact on the making and governing of the individual subject (113). For instance, the discourse of Britishness is exercised, on the one hand, to form British subjects who are fervent to their identity and nation; on the other hand, it asserts the continuity of the status quo and the perpetual existence of a British government that controls the kingdom. However, the discourse of Scottishness is a reverse discourse that aims at resisting the former discourse and hence undermining Britishness. Power can also be exercised at the level of "different subjects within or across discourses" (114). For example, prior to the mid-19th century, Catholics and Jews were prohibited by law to gain political positions in Britain, they were victims of a discourse of Britishness that was restricted

to Protestants, hence they had to resist until they were emancipated in the 19th century. Finally, Weedon considered Foucault's power-relations perspective as less certain if compared to Marxism which took into consideration economic and ideological factors before conducting the analysis, regardless of the fact that Foucault's method finally succeeded in reaching the importance of class relations and class power (114).

In fact, the making of discourse submits to some systems of exclusion that allow it to be "controlled, selected, organized, and redistributed" (Foucault, "The Discourse" 216). External exclusion inheres in three principles or rules: prohibition, division and rejection, and the will to truth. To start with the first element, Foucault argued that expressing oneself was limited to certain themes rather than others; in particular, dealing with politics and sexuality was dictated either by authority or even society, these topics were also restricted to some people rather than others; furthermore, time and place to speak about them were not a personal choice (216). The second principle is about the division between reason and insanity; the words that appeared uncommon and irrational to the community were always rejected by institutions that deciphered and excluded their utterers considering them as mad and insane, therefore even if medieval rejection to their speeches (uncommon discourse) had apparently expired, Foucault believed that it still existed in modernity, but it was now institutionalized (217).

The third system of exclusion included the opposition between true or false. Foucault went back in history to conclude that "the will to truth … survived throughout many centuries", but its criteria changed: true discourse was first exclusively said by the wise to be followed by the rest, then it became measured not by

its source, essence or effect but by the word by its very nature: “its meaning, its form, its object, its relation to what it referred to” (218). Therefore, the opposition between true discourse and false discourse replaced the dominance of truth. In the modern period, the will to truth was influenced by a will to knowledge and pressured by an “institutional support” including “pedagogy… the book system, publishing, libraries …” (218). For instance, a book that has many editions is more reliable and truth worthy than a book that has only one edition regardless of its content.

This final system of exclusion (true and false), considered by Foucault as powerful and tenacious, was a provider of a steady ground to the previous weak systems (words prohibition and insanity division) that had always “tended towards” it (219). Hence these two systems became included within discourse from which some themes and speakers have been excluded for the sake of knowledge, and the assertion of a single truth has been based on a system of institutionalization. These external systems of exclusion are related to the discourse that is treated in terms of power and desire (220).

Furthermore, Foucault described three internal rules of exclusion in addition to the above external rules. He inserted this internal set of principles within the discourse per se, which is manipulated by events and chance. The internal rules include commentary, the author, and discipline (220). The first element makes the secondary text more important and widespread than the primary text thanks to repetition even if the new discourse, which was inspired by the primary text, sometimes says what the latter “never said”, the author gives the text its author’s identity, and discipline plays

the role of an unknown “system of control” that produces new rules to limit discourse (224).

In addition to the internal and external principles, Foucault tackled the role of education in “the social appropriation of discourse”. For him, the systems of education are used by politics to maintain or modify discourses that have to be in accordance with a certain knowledge and power (“The Discourse” 227). The discipline taught to school children is studied and directed to form a generation with the same orientation and preferences that go hand in hand with the aspiration of politicians. Some of the latter tend to achieve national interests and patriotism, which would assert continuity and preserve the status quo. For instance, once the nationalist party (SNP) won the Scottish election in May 2021, the Scottish will for independence was declared with more pride and perseverance. Nevertheless, to ease such a desire’s progress, UK’s conservative MPs called for imposing the flying of the Union Flag outside every school building in the UK. Such a demand shows the importance of schools and education to linger the idea of the union by using national items in the minds of children, thus social harmony is guaranteed.

Foucault considered schools as disciplinary institutions that produce subjects by subjectivizing their pupils. Education is based on three interrelated instruments of power: technical capacities (adjusting the institution to certain norms and details that serve its objective), the relationship of communication (the curriculum and the activities), and the relationship of power (the school’s members restricting and punishing attitudes towards the pupils) (“Subject and Power” 787-788).

Consequently, a national education was meant to provide the nation with a national culture through universal as well as practical knowledge, as opposed to what Gellner described as the "locality tied, illiterate little culture or tradition", which limited the rural people's world vision in so far as their daily life was confined (35). A spirit of individualism and self-respect was also a part of this national culture to enable them to change their activities and improve their potential (35).

Foucault's "Discourse on Language" criticized ancient elision of discourse in three philosophical themes. Firstly, the theme of the founding subjects whose intuitions were said to give meaning to "the empty forms of language" throughout their objectives (227). Secondly, the theme of originating experience, as opposed to the first one, implied that the world is like a book endowing one with experience and words to tell (228). In the third theme of universal mediation, Foucault spoke of the truth about logos, that is, a discourse in itself or a holder of "things and events which insensibly become discourse in the unfolding of the essential secrets" (228). He concluded that these three reduced historical discourse into an activity of writing reading, and exchange, he added that they put it "at the disposal of the signifier", hence all about words rather than meaning (228).

To elucidate discourse, Foucault suggested the principle of discontinuity; he said that "Discourse must be treated as a discontinuous activity, its different manifestations sometimes coming together, but just as easily unaware of, or excluding other" (229). Specificity is another Foucauldian principle that frees discourse from having the world as a source of inspiration because it is just a violent imposition on discourse (229). Exteriority is the last principle that opposes digging into "the hidden

core of discourse" and calls for focusing on "the discourse itself, its appearance and its regularity" in addition to "its external conditions of existence" (229).

Foucault also dealt with the discontinuity of discourse in *The Archaeology*. He declared that a discursive unity was about the abruptions encountered by its concepts rather than the latter's collection in a group of general and coherent concepts (34). Foucault's discourse is "a discourse about discourses", in fact, he freed it from centers that were built by anthropological and historical factors including the origin, time, place, and persons; instead, his principles sought to create objects from differences, analyzing them and lastly designating their concept (203-207). He also believed in the role of chance in the making of events that are angular elements of discourse ("The Discourse" 231).

Britishness or Englishness?

Professor of Government and the Constitution at University College London Robert Hazell said that the British people, namely the elites, usually confuse the following three terms: "'national', 'English', and 'British'" (*The English Question* 25). Up to the 1980s, British history writing was claimed to be Anglocentric for it neglected Scottish, Irish, and Welsh legacies in the identity narratives. For instance, many history books were entitled *The History of England, The politics of England,* and more the same, yet their contents were about the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. Not only titles, but even the contents of books and political speeches contained the same interference. During the best of times, when Britishness was celebrated, Englishness and Britishness were melted together; for example, some English commentators were

said to be less reluctant to conceive themselves as British as they used to say, “English Ships”, “English Colours” in contexts where they referred to the union flag, and “Englishmen" in place of Britons (Conway 871).

British theorist Bernard Crick (1929-2008) said that he never heard of folks hailing Britain or Britannia; their glory was usually sung to “old England” or “auld Scotland”; and the famous songs of Rule Britannia and Hearts of Oak were but “government-sponsored theater songs” (151). This is not surprising, for according to what was said in the first chapter, the great majority of the people were against the acts of the union of England with Scotland and Ireland. Karin Bowie, in “Public Opinion, Popular Politics and the Union of 1707”, quoted Scottish historian Christopher Whatley claiming that the Anglo-Scottish union was a decision taken by the elite at the expense of the population (227). English and Scottish elites not only encouraged the making of Great Britain but also played a major role in publicizing the idea of Britishness thereafter.

In the same respect, Ian Bradley believed that Britishness was invented by the Scots, namely the elites (“Britishness”). Furthermore, Linda Colley also acknowledged that it was created by English, Scottish, and Welsh elites, yet its historical force was the working people (cited in Koditshek 390). Early in the union’s history, the contribution of the Scots to the literature of Britishness was prominent including James Thomson’s “Rule Britannia” in 1740. During the same period, Irish Catholic gentlemen and merchants submitted addresses and petitions identifying themselves and their co-religionists as loyal subjects of the Crown in order to induce their people

to participate in the Seven Years' War between the newly formed Great Britain and France (1756-1763), and to share the privileges with the English (Conway 869).

It is easy to draw a pattern between the English identity and Britishness symbols and values compared to the other nations' cultural features that are scarcely celebrated by the British identity. This is because different aspects of the latter were claimed to be originally English as concluded by Rebecca Langlands in "Britishness or Englishness? The historical problem of national identity in Britain," she said, "apart from some ambiguities in areas relating to the crown, religion and law, the British state established in the early eighteenth century was largely built upon pre-existing English institutions and governmental practices" (61). In this respect, British author Stephen Haesler assumed that "national identity" is "state identity" (quoted in Ward). Hence, Since the British state identity was based on English institutions, then the British national identity is fundamentally English.

England, the cradle of the British Common Law and institutions, is considered as the spring of the world's universal values including freedom, liberty, and civility. It offered the United Kingdom, as well as the world the key to civilization. In effect, the English people, being pragmatic, believe that this gift was not offered by nature, but it was an amalgam of their own experience and inventions ("The English Question" 48). British ideals were inspired by an English ideology; Kumar summarized this idea when he pointed out that "British history had been a one-way flow, with England as the fount and origin of all developments" (13). Furthermore, English author Roger Scruton likened England's position in the British Empire to Rome's in the Roman Empire. He also assumed that the English identity was adopted by other people

particularly the Scots, Welsh, and Northern Irish who might not have had an identity before, and therefore *"*It wasn't a multicultural idea at all, it was a monocultural ideal, focused on the imperial city and the culture that prevailed there" (English et al. 353). Scruton's argument depicts a prejudiced attitude towards the different British components' pre-union cultures, as he believed that England offered her identity to the rest of the UK.

Gordon Brown, albeit a Scot, also preached the English nature of British ideals. However, he was criticized for favoring the English Magna Carta and ignoring the Scottish Declaration of Arbroath (1320) when speaking about the source of the British sense of liberty (Crick 152); this was considered a departure of this Scottish politician from his ancestor's myth and history as he called for an English Britishness. But how could Brown promote this Declaration, which considered England as an invader and promoted Scottish independence? it says in one of its passages, "For, as long as 100 of us remain alive, never will we on any conditions be subjected to the lordship of the English". It is worth mentioning that some claimed that the declaration of Arbroath inspired the American Declaration of Independence rather than the Magna Carta as US senator Trent Lott told the BBC (Brocklehurst).

Brown's vision was not new; many politicians referred the British state pillars to English institutions claiming that the latter are superior to the other political systems. For example, disputes over Home Rule in Ireland took ages to be resolved, and during the home rule crisis between 1910-1914, Arthur Balfour, then leader of the Conservative Party, justified his rejection of the bill with the following: "The reason is not that the Englishmen was superior to the Irishman; the reason is that the English

polity is superior to the Irish Polity" (Mandler 126). Such an assumption can be referred to the fact that England became urban and civilized before her British neighbors, hence why her political institutions were imposed. In fact, the English identity has melted into the British one that although the former is a part of the latter, "the symbols of Englishness as opposed to Britishness are remarkably hard to find" (Hazell, "The English Question" 24).

As mentioned in the former chapter, royalty is a symbol of the British identity, thus it has to personify the binding of the four nations. Professor Rebecca Langlands asserted that the Crown is English in character; this can be associated with the Monarchy's residences rather than origin for the different kings and queens have had different origins: English, Scottish, Dutch, Welsh, and even German (61). However, their residences are mainly in England: Buckingham Palace since the 19th century, as well as Windsor, and Sandringham, in addition to Holyrood and Balmorals in Scotland. Therefore, other nations' vision of the Monarchy could be at stake compared to the English who adore it (Bradley 47). In effect, the English people consider that the queen might be a Britannic Majesty in the eyes of outsiders but for them, she is the queen of England (quoted in Kumar, "English or British" 2).

Moreover, the heart of the British economy and politics is London. Additionally, the Conservative Party, which has governed the UK for most of the post-1950 period, is claimed to be a de facto 'English National Party' with a British soul, while the 'Celtic Fringe' has been dominated by the Labour Party. Before 1997, English Tories entire focus is said to have been electoral success in the entire UK rather than stimulating British nationalism; in addition, they believed that devolution

would weaken the UK in the middle of a federal Europe. Ben Wellings called this orientation an "instinctual Britishness" which arose, according to him, "from the desire to defend Crown-in-Parliament sovereignty and hence Britain (396-397)".

After devolution, conservative representation fell to zero in Scotland and Wales as well pushing this party towards being for the English only, even if the number of their seats arose slightly in the years that followed, their fervent loyalty to the Union was still preached (Wellings 398). Besides, some conservatives, such as Roger Scruton, considered the Labour party and even New Labour as the enemies of England (English et al. 352). Hence, opposing the conservative party meant hiding an enmity against England, which confirms the bias that they have in favor of England.

Furthermore, the Tories adhere to an English cultural nationalism devoted to preserving British sovereignty and fighting against dividing the UK into pieces. To achieve this objective, they emphasize the historical and political importance of England as a center that binds the union together. This Anglo-British consciousness of sovereignty was one of the motives for the Tories' Euroscepticism considering the supranational aspect of the European community as a threat to the British institutions and peculiarities. Consequently, considering England as a pillar of British unity has been a means to perceive the future through the past, Stuart Hall said that the conservative party's portrayal of the British nation comprised "an attempt to capture the future by a determined long detour through the past" ("Culture" 356).

Paradoxically, the English claim to be less strong politically and the calls for devolution over the UK led them to think over their situation, Hazell quoted Crick

saying, “We English, must come to term with ourselves (“The English question” 51)”. In so far as the English have always prided themselves to be British, they were indifferent about their English identity unlike the Scots, Welsh, or Irish. In effect, the latter is said to be fervent adherers to their regional identities namely the Scots whereas the English, especially the masses, are believed to be indifferent about this discussion as Mandler said, “the English have always taken for granted who they are (4)”. If national days reflected people’s degree of nationalism, the English were the less enthusiastic about them: it is claimed that the Scots celebrate St Andrews day, the Irish do St Patrick’s Day whereas the English show no big interest in their St George’s day.

Krishan Kumar published an article entitled “Nation and Empire: English and British national identity in comparative perspective” in which he classified English nationalism as a “missionary” or an imperial one. He believed that the English are agnostic towards nationalism; instead, they have patriotism, royalism, and jingoism (3). Indeed, the English strong adherence to the Monarchy, army, and sovereignty is portrayed in their history. Moreover, many authors consider 19th-century nationalism, which is inimical to empire and based on nation-states, as a pathology that England was fortunate not to have (4-5). In fact, the English built their national feelings upon their past: their empire has gone but they are still haunted by its existence. Kumar explained that English nationalism opposed ethnicity and adopted a political, cultural, or religious mission to which the people were called regardless of their ethnic belonging (6). Hence contrary to the Celtic fringe, the English common purpose was not stimulated by a collective ethnicity but by an imperialistic past.

In “Englishness as class: A re-examination”, unionist author Arthur Aughey argued that the English identify themselves vis a vis a universal rather than local perspective unlike the other British regions (396). In this context, Kumar can be recollected again for he attributed this identification to empire, be it “internal” or “external” that is in terms of Scotland and Ireland or India: being at the core of a large entity distracted the English from establishing their own identity, therefore he concluded that “Britishness ‘trumped’ Englishness’” (“Nation” 20). In addition, unlike the Scots, Irish, and Welsh who considered the English as others, the English do not think the same about them. The features of the English identification were summarized in the following passage:

> Englishness has operated mainly through the contrasts people make with the English past (now and then), different places (north and south, urban and rural), different political persuasions (right and left), and, scientifically, different social classes (middle class and working class). (quoted in Aughey 397)

As aforementioned, many scholars claim that Englishness is not about ethnicity, rather it is peculiarly based on class. Perhaps that is why the English are more open to different nationalities and they do not consider the other nations of the United Kingdom as alien. Throughout history, one can notice that the Jews, for instance, could acquire status in society because they could move from a caste to a class. The latter is sought as the reason behind the absence of regional nationalism in England; According to Tom Nairn, the pursuit of nationalism in England is hindered by the unattainability of equality as well as the absence of a mythic identity (*The Break Up* 300). The English myths and values were embedded in Britishness, but the English attitude towards the latter changed after devolution.

The alleged English tolerance and acceptance of the other British regions and apathy towards their local identity changed when Scotland and Wales started having their own assemblies thanks to devolution. In an interview, Simon Heffer, a political journalist, spoke of an anecdote that led him to figure out his English identity as a citizen and surprisingly years later he called for the break of the Union (quoted in English et al 347). The story began when he saw the English waving their Saint George flag to support their football team in the 1996 European Championship, he added:

> when I started to talk to people - friends of mine who are interested in football, who understand football - a lot of them said, 'You know, it's not just that we want the English football team to win. It's that if you think about our friends who are Scottish or Welsh . . . they seem to have no problem in being Scottish or Welsh. But we have a bit of a problem in being English or thinking of ourselves as English.' And I suddenly realized - 1 had a sort of Kierkegaardian revelation - that actually my identity as a citizen was not a British identity: it was an English identity. And I am very English. (quoted in English et al 346)

Heffer believed that the English were disturbed by the waving of their flag instead of the Union's. It is worth noting that thirty years earlier, they waved the union flag during the 1966 World Cup that took place in England and was won by her as well. Such an attitude demonstrated the English mind's commitment to Britishness. It also asserted previous statements about the fine line between Englishness and Britishness. Regardless of this, a debate about the English fate after devolution was announced with the English question.

In this regard, the English question created a political controversy after the 1997 New Labour's devolutionary arrangements in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Those three started to have their own devolved legislative bodies: a Scottish

parliament, a Welsh assembly, and a Northern Irish assembly. English elites started appealing for a stronger political representation of their different regions. In 1998, Teresa Gorman, a conservative member of the British parliament called for a referendum to figure out the English opinion about an English parliament, she claimed that "what is good for the Scottish goose is good for the English gander", and nevertheless she declared that she is a proud unionist (Wellings 397). Arthur Aughey said that the confusion between Britain and England prevented a nastier and more xenophobic English nationalism from emerging (Hazell, "The English Question" 25).

Indeed, in addition to the English Parliament, conservative politicians have also floated the idea of an English passport (Bradley, *Believing* 3). This idea frightened some conservative writers such as Peter Hitchens who pinpointed the exclusiveness of Englishness in contrast with Britishness, in an interview, he said that he believed that both Britishness and Englishness shared almost the same features, but he added the following:

> Well, I feel it and to some extent also I fear it, because it's more Britishness, by being multi-national, is actually accessible. An immigrant person can come here and become British . . . Englishness - you've got it or you haven't got it, it seems to me. It's more exclusive. I think a danger that in encouraging Englishness, you encourage nationalism rather than patriotism. (quoted in English et al 350)

The English elite's pride to belong to a multi-national state still overshadowed the nationalist aspirations that they consider as inclusive compared to the exclusiveness of Britishness.

The English people's attitude towards their local identity was studied by Michael Skey who analyzed a group of London-based Middlesex university students'

attitude towards devolution; the question "Do you consider yourself British or English?" was asked in the research. The answers were full of ambivalence and uncertainty and affected by the political arena. Sky quoted the following interview:

> Interviewer: Do you consider yourself British or English?
>
> Keith: English.
>
> Roger: English first and then British.
>
> Paul: it was the other way round for me at one time…
>
> Jackie: Yes, me too
>
> Paul: yeah, but I have changed my opinion and attitude now… (113)

The rest of this interview unveiled the fact that some of the interviewees had Irish or Welsh ancestries; however, they favored being English as they were born and bred in England except one who considered it hypocritical to consider oneself English despite one's origin. Moreover, Skey quoted a Cheltenham group's response to the same question; their change of attitude was literally justified by the Welsh and Scottish nationalisms that enabled them to acquire some powers from Westminster:

> John: I used to be British but since they seem to have, made such a great play of wanting their independence (…), I'm English.
>
> Interviewer: Who's they?
>
> John: Well, the Welsh …
>
> Peter: Welsh, Scots… (114)

The two interviews showed that the English used to consider themselves as British first and foremost, yet this changed after the New Labour's constitutional arrangements in 1997. This change of attitude gave rise to what is known as the West Lothian question which is a debate about the inability of the English members of the House of Commons to vote on Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish laws, whereas the

MPs from the rest of the UK can vote on English issues. Many reports were published to solve this issue by creating an English legislative, but it was only ink on paper.

Furthermore, there are three types of English people in regard of nationalism, the indifferent, the cosmopolitan, and the resentful (Mann and Fenton 153). These three types were deduced from interviews and their proportions were equal. Indifferent people have no interest in identification which they consider as suspect and equal to racism, this category is characteristically young and well-educated (Mann & Fenton 153-154). Cosmopolitans are open to different nationalities in the world, they believe in an inclusive nationality contrary to resentful nationalists who defend an exclusive nationality (Mann & Fenton 154). These attitudes especially the third one is highly influenced by the Media.

In addition to the Media, schools play an important role in directing people's orientation. Due to the sense of loss amongst Britons about their identity in addition to indifference, elites including politicians favored the teaching of British history in other to entrench the spirit of British belonging in students. In 1902, a national curriculum was imposed on local school boards, that is, the study of history, citizenship, and patriotism whereas education was previously based on religion.

To conclude, the interference between Britishness and Englishness has been propagated throughout political rhetoric. Professor Stephan Conway, whose research focus is 18th-century British history, believed that the "persistence use of 'England' and 'English' rather than 'Britain' and 'British' stemmed from a complacent belief that Britain was merely an extension of England" (872). Besides, the monopoly of London

over the four nations' affairs pushed towards Southern Ireland independence and Scottish devolution. Meanwhile, the English who are supposed to be the more satisfied is split in terms of English nationalism.

Unity between Myth and Reality

National narratives were manipulated in a way that served the unity of modern nation-states. However, to attain such unification of various ethnicities, some cultures were neglected because of the hegemony of a single culture, this is what Hall called "a cultural power" ("The Question" 297). In the case of Britain, the British national culture was, at times, confused with the English one because the representations of Britishness have always been influenced by Englishness at the expense of the other cultures that were described only "as cultural contributors to the English culture" (297). As a matter of fact, since England was an industrial and military power, it attracted the Scottish, Welsh, and Irish scholars who were later accused of disdaining their original culture in favour of the English one, as will be discussed in the fourth chapter. As a result, England became not only an economic headquarter but also the centre of the society's intellectuals. This recalls Eliot's saying that "[i]t may be, too, that England has done more harm to Wales and Scotland by gently attracting their upper classes to certain public schools …" (46). This helped in the establishment and prominence of an English hegemonic culture.

However, many disagree with the idea of an English-dominating culture over the other four cultures. In "The Britishness Question", British authors Andrew Gamble and Tony Wright asserted that the forging of the British union was not achieved at the

expense of each nation's legacies and that the British identity was always celebrated by the Scots and the Welsh, hand in hand with their local identities, with the exception of the Irish (2). They added that many multi-nations failed because they tended to erase their components' different identities and loyalties and replace them with a unified national identity, however, the British case did not ever require an identity imposition because "Apart from the Irish, the other nations of the United Kingdom were full and willing participants, and accepted the British identity, seeing them as complementary rather than conflicting (2)".

Linda Colley also rejected the idea of a hegemonic English centralism that obliged the British Celtic fringes to adopt an English identity. She also disagreed with the assumption that England economically or culturally colonized them (315). Nevertheless, she considered these claims as "exaggeration" whereas the Scots, Irish, and Welsh kept their religion as well as language after the union notwithstanding the fact that integration did happen thanks to "the advance of communications, the proliferation of print, the operation of free trade throughout the island, and a high level of geographical mobility" (316). Indeed, this progress in humanity facilitated the interaction and acculturation between different neighbouring nations but the late revival of local cultures led to a new movement of nationalism that called for the disintegration of the modern state-nations.

Regardless of the controversy surrounding British national unity, whether it truly reflects reality or is merely a political imposition, the British forgot their cultural differences and held on to their unity on different occasions. Foreign threats and unstable conditions during wars induced the British to stand together against their

enemies. Indeed, War was a fatal element in British history, on the one hand, it made it climb the ladder of glory regardless of its disasters; on the other hand, it glued the British people together, especially in the Second World War or the People's War. In his essay "The State", Randolph Bourne exposed the power of war to establish a sense of herd mentality in society. During times of war, the state succeeds in unifying its people against the enemy while remaining fervently loyal to their nation and government despite any internal problems. Bourne famously asserted that "war is the health of the state (9)."

In effect, the war helped promote the British sense of belonging and solidarity from the 18th to the 20th century regardless of the people's dire social situation. Linda Colley believed that the British war against catholic France unified the English and the Scots against one enemy in the name of Protestantism (328). Great Britain's wars against France (1689-1815) contributed to strengthening Britishness not only in terms of Protestantism but in a way that reflected a unified British state. She said, "The fear and the actuality of recurrent war with France fostered a more united Britain" (Colley 322). Particularly, the battle of Waterloo (1815) against the French generated a spirit of nationalism, at the same time, it led the people, who were living in misery, to demonstrate against the Corn Law and ask for parliamentary reforms. The prominent demonstration was harshly oppressed, it is known as the Peterloo massacre of 1819, named in a sarcastic way after the Waterloo victory. This led to more protests in Scotland and Ireland. Hence, national pride generated social unity and solidarity for the sake of being better represented in Parliament, this paved the ground for the 1832 Reform Act that franchised propertied males.

Journalists and politicians believed in the power of war to unify; hence they have always used it as propaganda to induce the people to forget about their differences, and misery and join the army. Indeed, external danger retrieves the people's national consciousness and belief in their state. Besides, individuals tend to have a susceptibility to unity and patriotic discourses during such situations, Eliot said that populations are genuinely and spontaneously unified by wars (51). In 1755, a London Newspaper used a cartoon with Britannia saying, "be Britons, and be Brave" to call the people to arm (Conway 874). It did not address the English whereas it was based in London, because in periods of war, every part of the union is solicited, and the direct address to "Britons" must have made the Scots forget all the inequalities and join the Army.

Centuries later, in the Second World War, the British Ministry of Information oversaw war propaganda whose goal was to promote British national unity through different posters displayed in stations and shops (Goins 4). This ministry's role was two-fold: on the one hand, it informed the people about the war's news and the necessary precautions; on the other hand, it also kept the government informed about the public's attitude to be able to take the right proceedings to unite them (5). Propaganda was an efficient way to bind the British together under their government. The focus of the posters was on a rhetoric of British traits shared by the English, the Irish, the Scots, and the Welsh such as "sense of humour", "resilience", "pragmatism", in addition to "historical pride and patriotism" (see appendix 4) (8-9).

Most importantly, some of them displayed unity per se, the most famous was a poster depicting British soldiers either from Britain or the empire with the word

"together" on the image (see appendix 5) (39). Another poster depicted Winston Churchill's quotation, from his first Speech as a Prime Minister in May 1940: "Let Us Go Forward Together" (see appendix 6). He wanted to awaken the British patriotic spirit regardless of the fact that Southern Ireland had just grasped its autonomy in 1922, which was perceived as a premise for the British union's demise.

In a nutshell, the British government seized a contingency in order to make unity appear as the nature of the British nation. In Barthes' terms, if we consider "together" as a language object that speaks things, we see a real image of all the British people uniting around their government. Yet, if we consider it a metalanguage, then it was a historical contingency that imposed on the British to stand together against their enemy, but the task of the posters and slogans was to make this unity look eternal and banal. Barthes said that: "Myth does not deny things, on the contrary, its function is to talk about them; simply, it purifies them, it makes them innocent, it gives them a natural and eternal justification, it gives them a clarity which is not that of an explanation but that of a statement of fact" (143). No one can deny that unity existed during wars and also during the reconstruction era and the Falklands war in 1982. Nevertheless, sometimes it existed only during those periods, but politicians took advantage of that to hide another reality and highlight unity in diversity.

From another perspective, in *The English National Character*, Peter Mandler discussed the impact of the First World War on the British character and society. His depiction was related to the English case, yet he also referred to Britishness. He declared that society not only gained its unity, yet it also distanced itself from Europe and its problems following the Great War (143). The latter taught the people that their

only source of devotion was the union flag, as well as the UK's institutions that joined the people under British icons such as "the monarchy, parliament, the armed forces" (143). Besides, identifying with the British international ideals of liberty and civilization or imperial achievements was replaced by "a transnational consciousness" because the people became skeptic about international and universal ambitions that proved to be savage (145). However, the British attempted to dust out their country's military image to a spring of culture and education throughout the creation of the commonwealth (147). Even the characters that were typically English "'insularity', 'aloofness', 'self-sufficiency', 'reserve'" started to be portrayed as British (145).

The People's War also consolidated the ties of the British identity during the 1940s and afterward with the welfare state that followed the British military victory. This "common enterprise", as Gamble and Wright named it, was due to a constellation of the strength of the Labour and the Conservative parties all over the UK (4). Britons' striving to turn the ashes of the war into flowers boosted national feelings regardless of differences between Britain's four nations; it was all about debt payment and reconstruction. Besides, the government procedures to aid the needy and the unemployed in terms of the Beveridge report whose goal was to fight the five giant evils: Want, Ignorance, Disease, Squalor, and Idleness provided the British people with a positive attitude towards Westminster and therefore a better perception of their British belonging.

By the same token, in a *Guardian*'s editorial entitled "Patriotism has worked its old magic in the Falklands", it was said that the prize that the Falklands war brought to Britain was celebrated including waving the Union flag and singing Rule Britannia

with pride, that was considered as the rebirth of the British patriotism which came following years of decay. It also led to Margaret Thatcher's popular recovery as its popularity soared in 1983. Nevertheless, by the end of the article, the transience of such a nationalist feeling was described as follows:

> The "Falklands factor" in British politics will wane as the Falkland Islands recede into the distance of national concerns. Unemployment and inflation will soon be restored to the head of the list of the public's concerns. People will start saying that if we can afford task forces we can afford to pay hospital staffs, and that if we can win wars we ought to be able to run railways. ("Patriotism")

The hypotheses mentioned in the citation recall the previously mentioned reconstruction era after the Second World War. It was promoted by the welfare state that indeed provided a sense of British pride and solidarity in a period that mingled triumph with recession. However, Margret Thatcher declared war on this British institution considering it as a means of people's dependency on the state. In fact, she revived old Victorian British values such as self-reliance by setting another aspect of Britishness that of social integrity. Hence, the wars' patriotic speeches that led the British to unity were "depoliticized by a general metalanguage which is trained to *celebrate*[3] things, and no longer to '*act* them' (Barthes143)".

To stand together against a foreign threat, or even in support of a national cause as reconstructing the country, was part of a nation-oriented identity (Mann & Fenton 153). However, attachment to national identities that originated from moments of enthusiasm in a nation usually fades away once the motive vanishes, hence why it is but a mythical speech that might be true but cannot be eternal. In "English Nationalism

[3] (the author's emphasis)

and Britishness: Class and the "Substate" National Identities", Robi Mann and Steve Fenton believed that identities stimulated by circumstances that are advantageous to the people, such as "'nationalization' and democratic inclusion", would decline once these circumstances dwindle (153).

A Third Way to Britishness

The crisis of identity in Britain led political leaders including Gordon Brown to approach it starting from British values and institutions. In fact, Scots are thought to be the inventors of Britishness as they, on many occasions, advocated a vibrant, imperial, Protestant Great Britain from the leader of the Scottish Protestant Reformation John Knox in the 16th century to political leaders such as John Major and Gordon Brown in the 20th century (Bradley, "Britishness" 3). Undoubtedly Brown's Britishness differs from Knox's devotion to unifying England and Scotland under the same faith and Monarch. In an age where Protestantism is no longer perceived as a glue to the British components, Brown adopted a vision that is inspired by Britain's longstanding values and ideals.

In a speech entitled "The Future of Britishness", Brown sought an identity that is "bigger than the sum of [the UK] parts", and a union that is strong because of the values Britons share in addition to "the way these values are expressed" through history and institutions. These values were interpreted differently by politicians, for instance, the conservative former leader Michael Howard said that they embody "decency, tolerance and a sense of fair play" (cited in Bradley, "Britishness" 35). In the same regard, in an article, "British Values", which was published in *the Mail on Sunday*, conservative politician and former Prime Minister David Cameron stated the

following British ideals: the belief in freedom, tolerance of others, accepting personal and social responsibility, in addition to respecting and upholding the rule of law.

As a matter of fact, liberty dominated the literature that dealt with value-based Britishness in terms of its internal and external implications. This concept is understood as being free from any sort of oppression and subject to the legitimate law at the same time. It is rooted, as mentioned earlier, in the Great Charter or Magna Carta (1215) that initiated a British era in which the king's reign became limited and the law began to be the most powerful authority. The shift from the crown's sovereignty to parliamentary sovereignty was reinforced by the Bill of Rights (1689) and the subsequent reform acts which little by little enfranchised the British people. Consequently, the British unwritten constitution and the people's will have been placed above the Crown and the government. Besides, many international causes were believed to be inspired by the British idea of liberty, Voltaire said: "Britain gave the world the idea of liberty", the English poet John Milton also chanted "let not England forget her precedence of teaching nations how to live" (Kumar, "English or British" 8). In fact, the American Declaration of Independence (1776) emphasized the American people's right to *"*life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness*"*; liberty was also idealized during the French Revolution (1789) through the slogan of "Liberty, Fraternity, and Equality".

By the same token, the British spirit of freedom and liberty represented an incarnation of their religious convictions. The break from the Papacy of Rome that burst in the 16th century entrenched in Britons, on the one hand, a feeling of unrestraint and independence from the dominion of the Catholic Church that extended

to become a motto in all their life aspects. On the other hand, these protestant values led to perceiving Catholics as intolerant and dependent "others", who can cause harm to anyone in obedience to their "Lord God the Pope" (Pettinato 99). Paradoxically, in the name of these same values, the British followed the steps of the Catholic Crusaders for the sake of plundering wealth wherever it was available.

The idea of liberty is attached to British institutions, especially the British Parliament. The latter symbolizes British sovereignty, and obedience to its law is perceived as a feature of the British identity hand in hand with adherence to the Crown. To be British is therefore determined by being a good citizen and a faithful subject. Indeed, it is related to political accountability besides cultural and historical values that bind the British together, as Crick noted,

> To be British seems to us to mean that we respect the laws, the elected parliamentary and democratic political structures, traditional values of mutual tolerance, respect for equal rights and mutual concern; that we give our allegiance to the state in return for its protection. To be British is to respect those overarching specific institutions, values, beliefs and traditions that bind us all, the different nations and cultures, together in peace and legal order. (2003:3)

Bernard Crick placed the aspects of citizenship before the element of culture and tradition when determining being British. The latter is all about giving allegiance to the state and respecting its institutions and laws. On the other side, the British parliament is elected in a democratic way, and whatever springs from it is linked to popular sovereignty that is highly regarded. Culturally speaking, Crick stressed tolerance and focused on what joined the British together rather than what divided them. In "Do We Really Need Britannia", he said that "Britishness political and legal

institutions are real", yet the existence of four interactive cultures can motivate these cultures' local national identities even more than their nationalist political parties (151). British institutions, even if have always joined the British together, can be challenged by the UK's regional identities.

Besides this legislative establishment, Mark Leonard and many political elites regarded that the National Health Service, the BBC, and the Armed Force embody British values that are manifestations of the British identity, he said the following:

> The reason why these institutions stand out is because they remain the living embodiment of transcendental values which are at the heart of British identity: the NHS stands for fairness and solidarity, the armed forces for British internationalism, and the BBC for creativity. (Quoted in Bradley, *Believing in Britain* 46)

British ideals are entrenched in these establishments to promote and maintain their advantage in the whole society. Anglo-Irish philosopher Edmund Burke who moved from Dublin to London in 1750, joined the Whig Party and became an MP in the second half of the 18th century, was prominent in favoring a social order that is fulfilled thanks to the incorporation of conservative and religious values in a chosen government, hence the case of England. He emphasized the importance of institutions in maintaining order and leading progress rather than people or folk culture (Mandler 25).

Some linked these values to British politics throughout history; Mandler believed that "English" characters such as individualism was accumulated in the age of laisser-faire with self-reliance, and the period of state intervention brought about self-respect and high collectivism as the British started having more freedom of expression

(2). Also, the welfare state's principles were blamed for making the people dependent on the state. Furthermore, British institutions shaped history as Gordon Brown said "being creative, adaptable and outward-looking, [believing] in liberty, duty and fair play add up to a distinctive Britishness that has been manifest throughout our history and shaped it" (cited in Bradley 55). Hence even if these ideals appear universal, it is the British experience that made it typically British.

Robert Hazell attempted to give a more general perception of Britishness as he classified the interests that bind the British together into two: hard interests that include survival human interests such as prosperity and security, as well as soft interests including daily life history, culture, and the sense of the place ("Britishness" 105). He asserted that British institutions manifested these interests, either the political institutions, institutions of civil society, or the public service, and he referred to all these establishments as the institutions of Britishness. Gordon Brown also stressed the importance of Hazel's hard interests as he considered that the United Kingdom's economic success replaced the British celebration of empire and ancient glories because it created a new common national purpose that motivated the people to work harder in order to keep extolling their nation (cited in Gamble and Wright 4).

These hard and soft interests if joined together represent any people's common purpose and heritage. They are usually used by the state to revive Britishness through appeals to educate the people about their past to unite against any issues that would divide them. However, Bernard Crick believed that this common purpose and shared goals are but nonsense, for states are not really built upon them, he considered the fact of putting the British identity under their umbrella a teleological language in a world

where national and international politics can hardly be distinguished. He added what follows,

> We do not need a heightened sense of Britishness and clear national purpose to hold us together. Perhaps we just need good government and social justice. National leaders should be careful when they invoke "our common values". Perhaps our main common value has been to respect, on the whole, the values of others. (Crick 152-153)

The focus on shared values to determine the British identity was rejected by Bernard Crick. In fact, this tendency is criticized as being universal with a remarkable absence of a clearly defined "other" who generally determines self-identification. This was explained by Grube who stressed that a distinct "other" must exist to form a self-identity, he said that "with no point of reference, there is no identity, and "Britishness" becomes a grab-bag of universal values that can no longer effectively bind the nation together" (631, 633). Instead, pragmatic interests rather than abstract ideals can push people towards supporting the idea of an eternal union and a unified identity (Gamble and Wright 5).

In the same regard, some unionists consider the British Empire as the cornerstone of Britain's integrity even after its decline and blame Irish and Scottish nationalists for the national disputes that caused the independence of Southern Ireland and have been boosting Scottish independence. In effect, Professor Jennifer Todd identified three aspects of Unionists' British identity. The first aspect lies in a "set of culturally central historical memories and experiences" that constituted the cultural basis "on which an imagined British community was created"; collective memories included the Protestant heritage (namely with Scotland), the Industrial Revolution, and

different wars as well as their architectural legacy that can be seen all over the Union (11-12). The second aspect includes an identification founded upon British social and political institutions, which are based in London; Todd said that institutional networks including the British political system, the NHS, the Media, and others create in unionists "a sense of naturalness and beingness of British institutions, British symbols, British citizenship …" (12). The third aspect comprises a British identity that was constituted only in opposition to an "other" identity (13).

The value-based British identification was an alternative that would bind the British together, as achieving a single cultural, religious, or social affiliation proved to be unfathomable. Nevertheless, many critics claimed that the proclaimed British ideals of liberty, individualism and fair play were not typically British to be used as determinants of Britishness. David Cameron had a reply to these claims, he said that they could be universal, but it is the British settings that made them particular and typically British, he said: "To me they're as British as the Union Flag, as football, as fish and chips". However, Barthes spoke of the use of statements of fact or common sense as figures of mythical speeches (155). Hence this value-based rhetoric of Britishness can be understood under the same umbrella "For the very end of myths is to immobilize the world: they must suggest and mimic a universal order which has fixated once and for all the hierarchy of possessions (156)".

Some scholars condemned these ideals as being the cause of some British turmoil. For example, by the end of the nineteenth century, Germany and France flourished whereas Britain lagged. The blame was placed on the British persisting self-reliance and individualism which were thought to be obstacles to achieving national

cohesion compared to the French and the Germans (Mandler 135). The same concerning the spirit of enterprise that indeed worked well when England was the "workshop of the world", nevertheless, it turned out to be but a feature of bureaucracy and shopkeeping, and this recalls Napoleon's mockery about Britain as "a nation of shopkeepers (Mandler 136).

David Cameron considered that the combination of values and institutions constituted "the bedrock of Britishness". If we are to adopt the assumption of values and interests as determinants of Britishness, a big issue emerges about whether these institutions treat the four nations equally, but the fact that Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales could acquire their autonomous assemblies proves that Westminster failed to establish equality between them. Gamble and Wright suggested a focus on the characters that help the spread of tolerance and agreement between the people as the pillars of British society instead of linking these ideals to Britishness (6). They added: "this would not be a celebratory exercise, but one of advocacy, argument, and persuasion". Indeed, spreading such values would promote a tangible civilized society in lieu of glorifying abstract values.

The propagation of shared ideals that were shaped by British history and reinforced by institutions was considered by Foucault as a political apparatus to establish continuity and maintain the status quo. He considered institutions as a form of power throughout which one can analyze "power relationship". According to him, the core of the modern society lay on these power relations without which society is a mere "abstraction" ("The Subject and Power" 792). Furthermore, he believed that any power relation is stimulated by and result from a system of differentiations that

"permits one to act upon the actions of others", in other words, identifications defined either by law, traditions, personal, professional, or economic differences become meaningful only when put in front of opposite others (792).

Moreover, Foucault spoke of power relations' forms of institutionalization, they can take the form of "traditional predispositions" that one acquires from the family and are shaped by legal institutions, in addition to enclosed structures such as schools whose architectural as well as moral foundations are sophisticated, above all he mentioned the state that controls, organizes, supervises, and maintains all power relations in a particular society (792). Besides, the execution of power can be through discourse, and force, in addition to "economic disparities … systems of surveillance" (792). He concluded that "power relations have been progressively governmentalized, that is to say, elaborated, rationalized and centralized in the form of or under the auspices of, state institutions" (793).

To conclude this chapter, Britain would not have existed without the tolerance and open-mindedness of its different countries. In fact, ethnic differences did not generate a real problem of the UK disintegration until its four constituents started paying the price of the British decline more than the English. Kumar said that British nationalism was inspired by the British Empire rather than the "internal" empire ("Nation" 23). In addition, in so far as the Union was merely based on English pragmatism and interests, equality could hardly be achieved, and meeting the aspirations of all the nations has been unfathomable as well. That is why the fall of the empire generated local nationalism, hence a discourse of Britishness was needed to impose the British government control and unify its people. Bernard Crick explained that the word British

had a cold connotation compared to the warmth that its constituents symbolized, he said,

> To identify with "British" is not the same as identifying with the warmth and width of English, Scottish, Welsh or Irish. "British" is a limited utilitarian allegiance simply to those political and legal institutions which still hold this multi-national state together. (cited in Kumar 6)

In order to bring Britishness some warmth, the narrative of the National culture and identity has been required. It is based on discourse and myths.

Both types of speeches are hidden behind our cultural heritage and aim at maintaining the status quo. Thanks to discourse, identity became institutionalized as the state's institutions converge to subjectify individuals and made them nationalist citizens. Furthermore, myths work to make contingencies historical values, and spread stereotypes that are also conveyed throughout the discourse. Barthes said, "what the world supplies to myth is an historical reality, defined, even if this goes back quite a while, by the way in which men have produced or used it; and what myth gives in return is a natural image of this reality" (142). The same discourse was embedded in the representations of the European community to influence the outcome of the Brexit vote as will be discussed in the third chapter.

CHAPTER THREE

BRITISH EXCEPTIONALISM AND THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

The British antipathic attitude towards the EC/EU unveiled a sort of paranoia that had been nurtured by nostalgia for old Britannia. Britons always opted to be followed rather than followers, supra rather than infra. Hence, one of the reasons behind the UK's problems with the European club lay in believing that it was not British at its core. The British tendency to be solely decisive in Europe is not new; it was concluded in the first chapter that the Anglo-French old rivalry played a crucial role in the formation of Great Britain. The post-Second World War French aspirations in a European organization revived this old contention yet in peace rather than war.

The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was inspired by a French idea. It was established in 1951 with the Treaty of Paris after the French Foreign Minister Schuman's plan in 1950. The ECSC was pivotal in the creation of the European Union besides the treaty of Rome 1957 that announced the EEC (Economic European Community) and Euratom (European Atomic Energy authority). The fact that this European enterprise was plotted by the French led many British to consider it French rather than European. In "Britain and the Community: The Right Way Forward", Eurosceptic Nevil Johnson declared that: "the Community is in a profound sense a French construction. It was invented by a Frenchman, Jean Monnet, and its institutional structures and methods are predominantly French (368)".

Coincidently, the European Community wed Britain's old and new enemies. In other words, it melted in one pot a restored Francophobic attitude with a recent Germanophobia. Germany, Britain's twentieth-century fierce enemy, was also a founding father of this organization. The leverage of a war criminal to a leader caused much of British national resentment and led to perceiving the European Union as a protraction of Nazism or "a Third Reich in disguise" (Spiering 141). During the Eurosceptic dispute of the 1990s, *The Spectator*, a British political magazine, referred to the EC as but a "German racket" (141).

Nevertheless, Britain's imprint in the EC/EU is undeniable, namely, the achievement of a Single Market in 1993. Regardless, France and Germany were always believed to be the union's eternal superiors. In "The Myth of Europe", Russel Lewis said that it was well known by Ministers and Office Officials that "the EU is run by the Franco-German axis on an agenda routinely agreed between the two nations on the eve of each and every EU summit meeting (153)". During its decades of membership, Britain maintained its fierce reluctance compared to the other members, which pushed it towards isolation and finally withdrawal. This troublesome relationship between Britain and Europe had as one of the main reasons, the British sense of exceptionalism on which this chapter sheds light.

Skepticism towards EC/EU integration has been approached from different angles, especially in terms of economy, culture, and sociology. No doubt the issues of costs and benefits, regulations, as well as immigration, created a huge debate.

Yet, this chapter considers these elements as superficial hiding behind the question of sovereignty and identity. This issue played a major role to prevent a happy marriage between the UK and EC/EU. Thus, the chapter aims at finding out a sequence between Britishness and British ambivalence towards the European club, it also emphasizes the role of the British press in creating a Eurosceptic atmosphere especially since few works have dealt with Media Euroscepticism.

The analysis is divided into six sections. Section one briefly tackles the impact of joining late on the process of integration and integration per se. Britain's absence during the making of the European Union's pillars exposed it to a series of Europeanization that urged British paranoia. Section two tackles the British sense of exceptionalism as related to Britishness. The European increasing spillover as a supranational entity is discussed in the third section for it inhibited the realization of good cooperation. The sections that follow approach Euroscepticism that had a big impact on people's opinions, vote, and hence politics.

Joining the European club

On June 23rd, 2016, the UK finally said its final word about the EU, Brexit then marked the end of an age of reluctance and the beginning of deadlock years before leaving on January 31st, 2020. Therefore, it survived more than four decades and its delay of joining the club until 1973 had a hand in this endurance. Indeed, the feeling of being led rather than leading, being an "ordinary" member rather than a founding member had never left Britons in peace. In *The European Union and British*

Politics, Andrew Geddes claimed that the two decades that preceded the British EC marriage represented "a 'path' of euro-ambivalence ... from which it ha[d] subsequently been hard to deviate (5)". Despite joining, Britain has maintained its Euroscepticism, particularly in relation to the European community's political and economic integration, such as the European Parliament, EMU, and the Euro.

"Better than never is late" proved to be un-British, despite some claims that it was first used by the English poet Geoffrey Chaucer in 1386 in *The Canterbury Tales*. Perhaps "better than late is never" is more adequate for a country such as the UK, especially given that some of the European Community's policies for the following thirty years were said to have been decided at the time of joining (cooper 1194). Not only this, but it needed a decade to be admitted after De Gaulle's vetoes in (1963) and (1967) because he feared that the UK would dominate Europe and place it under the US mercy (Geddes 67). Undoubtedly, Britain would not have accepted being humiliated by France if it had not been enduring dire circumstances.

As the economic progress of the EEC's six members became remarkable, Britain was suffering from a serious recession. In the midst of post-1950s decline and decolonization, it could not remain idle lagging behind the advance of others, and it had to request joining. The Conservative party known as the "patriotic party par excellence" was pushed towards becoming "the party of Europe" under Harold Macmillan. The world's changing prospects were behind such a change of attitude. In "Britain and Europe", Robert Cooper insisted that in 1973, uncertainty was

spread in the British entourage, following the US Watergate Scandal, per contra the same year was announced to be the year of Europe by the US Secretary of State Henry Kessinger (1193). It is noteworthy that the USA supported the idea of a European union starting with the 1948 Marshall Plan for strategic reasons; indeed, as a decisive pole in the Cold War; the US sought that allying with a united Europe was necessary to ensure the peace process in Western Europe and to halt the expansion of Communism.

Geddes believed that this "reluctant bride" joined Europe because of pragmatic calculations about costs and benefits far from the idea of converging (192). To remain out of the EC seemed to cause more losses, in addition to depriving it from the club's technological advances. For instance, the British industry was portrayed "out of date" in urgent need of being exposed "to a 'cold shower' of EU competition" that would lead it into efficiency, besides the tariff-free market to sell its goods (Sharpe 316). Notably, the UK endeavored to create a parallel alliance such as the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). The British government declared the following,

> The choice of Britain is clear. Either we choose to enter the Union and join in building a strong Europe on the foundations which the Six have laid; or we choose to stand aside from the great enterprise and seek to maintain our interests from the narrow - and narrowing - base we have known in recent years. As a full member of the Union we would have more opportunity and strength to influence events than we could possibly have on our own. (Sharpe 317)

The passage recognized that choosing to join included adhering to the foundations that the Six had already built. The British governments might have had objections about these pillars but the fact of perceiving Europe as "a great enterprise" had to make them overcome their concerns and aspire for more opportunities and influence within the community. However, some believed that at the time of British integration, the community's economy was in decline and that Britain's stay in the EFTA would have brought more advantages (316).

In effect, French President Georges Pompidou, whose relationship with the then British PM Edward Heath was termed good, replaced De Gaulle and opened the door for Britain to join. Yet the feeling of security brought by this good connection did not last for long because Pompidou died in May 1974. In addition, Heath was replaced by Harold Wilson who was less enthusiastic about the EC, he wanted to negotiate the terms and the first referendum about withdrawal took place in 1975. The latter's result was surprising as 67.2% voted to remain versus 33% who wanted to leave. In "British Scepticism and The European Union: A Guide for Foreigner," Professor L.J. Sharpe referred the British decision of remaining to the severe balance of payments which resulted from the increase in the world's oil price and a rise in world food prices if compared to EU prices (305).

The UK as well as the world's critical situation created an atmosphere of fear from the future; the only haven for Britain was to sorely join rather than remaining lonely. These reasons surpassed the British ego and challenged the British mind.

Still, these two elements kept damaging the UK Europe relationship because of the British sense of being exceptional compared to the other members.

British Exceptionalism

British nationalists depict the UK as exceptional in terms of history, culture, and institutions, all are interwoven aspects of Britishness. Despite the fall of the British Empire, the latter has always been celebrated considering the Commonwealth as its glorious fruit. British exceptionalism started along with the British Constitution (be it unwritten) and the idea of liberty, in addition to the context of its adoption as a break from Roman laws and a manifestation of individual freedom. These British traits are reflected on the UK's domestic as well as foreign political performance, for instance Britain is one of the founders of the United Nations. Thus, the British tradition of liberty is a red line that any attempt to surpass is considered a threat to sovereignty and even identity and here dwelled the British dilemma with the European integration.

British elites' rosy tinted perception of Britannia had stimulated their ambivalence and skepticism towards a European community till Brexit. For many, it is the difference in history that created a typical Britain compared to the other European nations. Conceptually, the British are so attached to their collective memories that they do not need to be given a hand by another nation to shine, contrary to Germany that, through the European Community, worked to cleanse its past by cooperating with strong countries. Nevil Johnson claimed that "the Germans

are so reserved about their own past; they remain ready to accept a substantial measure of French political guidance, even when this seems to go against well-defined German interests" ("Britain" 371).

The British pride is not only about their Empire, it goes beyond its borders and embarks in past days even before the creation of the Union. English distinctiveness was determined by many scholars from different angles. The English pride themselves of their anti-Roman origins and hence anti-European, their Gothic ancestors contributed to the fall of the Roman Empire and the birth of nation-states. That is why they can hardly accept to be controlled by institutions with a Roman background, Johnson believed that the French state with its Roman tradition had a big influence on the community's institutions:

> The institutional structures and administrative methods of the Community are predominantly French in design and character. They follow the Roman civil law tradition as transmitted to modern Europe by the French state both as it evolved before the revolution of 1789 and as it was transformed under the inspiration of Napoleon. ("Britain" 377)

The British Law was therefore used by many scholars to distinguish the English from the other European states. In *The English National Character,* Peter Mandler stated that during the Stewart decades, law, as the real delineator of English national character up to the 20th century, constituted the basis for English distinctiveness (12). He also referred to Sir Edward Coke's theory of the "Ancient Constitution" in which it was assumed that the English people had a Common Law that went back to their ancestors: some linked it to the Angles and the Saxons while

others referred it to the Greeks and the Trojans. Regardless of the English law's real origin, the theory of the Ancient Constitution assumed that the Norman Conquest 1066 caused an English relapse as it embroiled it in the authority of monarchy and religion (13).

In other words, the English Law is older than Europe's authoritarian law. The Norman (French) conquest retained Britons who previously entailed liberty from their ancestors who bestowed them with a law that expressed "popular habits and preferences" in a manner that was far reached by the Romans (Mandler 12). The English law was revived thanks to the Magna Carta in 1215 that marked an English divorce from Roman Law and dictatorship and launched a typically English then British Constitution, in addition to the Glorious Revolution (1688) that led to the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. As a matter of fact, liberty, and the British institutions especially parliament, as the incarnation of law and the bedrock of Britishness, have always been regarded as typically British delivered to the world under the name of civilization, Gorden Brown quoted that it was Britain's "gift to the world (Atkins 609)".

The peculiarity of the British institutions has created a singular population with unique characters and habits. In effect, the relation between the people's character and the state has always been controversial: liberalist ideas of the Enlightenment thinkers favored the influence of the state in determining the people's traits and society progress (Mandler 18). Since the English institutions differ from

the European ones, their qualities are thus distinct. History and politics have had a crucial impact on the British character, that is thought to be a transcendent form of Englishness, such as the impact of the Victorian laisser-faire on creating a self-reliant individualistic population. Nevertheless, the role of the individual is also considered decisive in the making of the state. Notwithstanding the fact that Margaret Thatcher believed that individual liberty was the essence of British nationhood, hand in hand with state authority, she had a different perception of the relation between the two. In 1991, when advising John Major to reconsider the British national character, she focalized on the impact of the peculiar British individual character on the state, she said:

> It has rightly been said that it is the character of a people which determines the institutions which govern them, and not the institutions which give people their character. Yes, it is about being British and it is about what we feel for our country, our Parliament, our traditions and our liberties. Because of our history that feeling is perhaps stronger here than elsewhere in Europe, and it must determine the way in which our government approach such fundamental matters. (cited in Lynch 79)

The philosophical dispute about the relation between the state and the people's character might seem unresolved. However, individualism remains a British peculiar tradition in Europe, indeed society is not judged as a whole, every individual is free, within the limits of the law, and has his/her own interests and preferences that must be met by the Government (Johnson, "Self-Government" 195). Social harmony is therefore achieved through the responsibility of every person.

In the aforementioned quote, Thatcher, who favoured cooperation rather than integration, mentioned that the British are very attached to their identity and institutions. Indeed, Geddes mentioned a comparison between British, French, and German national identities conducted by Thomass Risse (2001) who argued that "'Englishness' as a variant of British identity has been constructed as distinct from Europe and incompatible with federalism or supranationalism" (26). That is why the British prefer an intergovernmental structure which preserves the central role of national governments in which each nation does not lose its stature. The British liberal perception of the state can be applied to its preference in regard of a super state, that is, every nation state must act individualistically which leads to establishing a wholesome exterior government to satisfy every part of the union.

By the same token, Nevil Johnson discussed the difference between the British, French, and German views of the concept of the state in "Can Self-Government Survive?". He believed that the German state was held together by judicial interpretation of the constitution as well as the realization of the values upon which its political tradition was founded, in other words it coupled an idealist Hegelian moral unity with legal norms (194). The French perception mingled legal formalism and political mysticism; that is represented by a coherent and autonomous structure of powers grounded mysteriously upon the people's general will (193-194). Contrary to this continental stand, the British view is individualistic and utilitarian, it focuses on their established institutions: Crown, Parliament, and the

Constitution; Johnson justified this different vision of the state between the three countries with the fact that England achieved its "strong state" much earlier than the rest (194-195).

In terms of individualistic characters, English virtues have usually been contrasted with French vices. This contraction enterprise grew fierce during wars especially during and after the Napoleonic Wars. In *Frontiers of Identity: the British and the others*, Robin Cohen insisted on Thomas Carlyle's writing about the practical English versus the voluble French, this goes hand in hand with the personage of John Bull, a caricature who personifies the English as doers and not talkers in opposition to the "ever-talking, ever gesticulating" French (1994:193). It is noteworthy that Cohen said that such generalizations scarcely exist nowadays in the scholarly circles, yet it is still present in popular idioms (193).

In effect, the British national identity is a complex concept in which history and politics converge. Britons do not see that they have common history with Europe, theirs is perceived as exceptional and proliferous. Winston Churchill localized Britain in the center of three circles (Geddes 28). Europe was given the third position following the Empire first and then America. This special relationship between Britain, the commonwealth and the USA was linked to their shared language as well as monolingual culture (Startin 13). In brief, such cultural and security closeness was said to be undermined by EC/EU membership, especially as far as the USA is concerned.

To refer back to Churchill, he was an early supporter of a united Europe, he wished "if only Europe were united" for there would have been "no limit to the happiness, the prosperity or the glory which its three or four hundred million people would enjoy (Lewis 2001: 157)". In another context, he excluded his country from this happy land when he said "We are with them, but not of them, we have our commonwealth and empire" (Geddes 24). It is worth mentioning that in "Churchill and Europe", Max Beloff explained that this change of attitude was due to the length of Churchill's political career from 1900 to 1959 and considered that "consistency of opinion in a career of that length is hardly to be expected" (269).

In terms of economy, Britain's interests were also localized outside Europe whereas its European counterparts mainly traded in Europe. Sharpe mentioned that at the time of its entry to the EC in 1973, the UK proportion of trading with the original six member states was 14% that looked partial if compared with the 40% of trade with the British Commonwealth (330). The latter again occupied a prior place in Britain's agenda, L.J Sharpe cited Macmillan, who then was a Chancellor of the Exchequer, saying in a speech in the Commons in 1956, "I do not believe this House would ever agree to our entering arrangements which, as a matter of principle, would prevent our treating the great range of imports from the Commonwealth at least as favorably as those from European countries." (330).

The split between Europe and Britain is mental as well. The British people seem oblivious to their history with Europe, yet they always celebrate their "shared

history" with Britain's previous colonies and current partners. Political Scientist Simon Tilford, described this British mythical vision as clumsy and not seen the same way by the Commonwealth members, he said:

> India is a member, but sees no justification for privileged economic relations with Britain, as illustrated by the Indian government's rather bemused response to Britain's clumsy emphasis on the two countries' shared history as a reason for some kind of special economic relationship. Nor do the Indians, or any other Commonwealth country, see Britain as leading the organization in the way many British appear to. (2)

The belief in a shared history with Britain's old colonies has been preserved by cultural and educational ties in the Commonwealth. However, it is all about the shared privileges between the two sides. The common interest that the British celebrate hides an economic interest at the expense of the people of the commonwealth who, on their part, do not deny the cultural benefit as well as the status brought by belonging to the British Crown.

The British fate is also perceived exceptional in the eyes of those haunted by the rhymes of "Britons shall never be slaves". When its continental neighbors experienced defeats, Britain celebrated victory and as they were pushed towards allying from fear, it did not need to do because it stood alone. In this regard, Labour politician Peter Shore mentioned the tremendous impact of the Second World War traumatic years on the Continent that shared a "common destiny of defeat, ruin, occupation and liberation" which his country "could not and did not share" (228). Indeed, Britain was not affected contrary to its counterparts. Moreover, France was obliged to "construct an ever-stronger constitutional cage to contain Germany that

constituted an ever-stronger invader since 1870" (228). It is worth noting that the two countries signed a Treaty of Cooperation in January 1963 which declared a Franco German camp that is to be followed, Nevil Johnson explained as follows:

> This means that in reality there is already something like a two-speed Community: on one track are those states willing and able to proceed on the basis of the kind of timetable preferred by the Franco-German duumvirate, and on the other those who either cannot so far keep up with that or do not want to accept it anyway. Britain is clearly within the second category of the second group. ("Britain" 372)

In the same treaty a preamble was added to protect German commitments in NATO and its close relationship with the USA (386).

In the same respect, Sharpe assumed that Britain stood on its own comparing to the west European countries that admired fascism because it protected them from Bolshevism. This did not occur in Britain that was saved by the Channel from German occupation; hence Sharpe sought that the British memory of the Second World War was glorious, nothing to be forgotten or forgiven (329). In other words, it was needless to cooperate with the Nazis because the British neither admired nor feared them. Nevertheless, this memory is short because it disdained the number of countries Britain had to occupy in order to get over France's threat. Nevertheless, war victory was seen as a British peculiarity admitted also in "National Self-Hatred and the EC" published in 1996 as political theorist Kenneth Minogue asked the following question: "What do the British have to encourage self-contempt?" and his answer was their country's economic decline (265). That is, the only stimuli that

can lead the British to support cooperation between nations was economy because in war they were meant to be victorious.

Euro-enthusiasts saw in the creation of the European Community the resurrection of the Roman Empire. They attributed the wars that Europe endured to the emergence of city-states and nationalisms. For them unity reflects prosperity and hence the only solution to avoid tragedies was to sacrifice each state's sovereignty for the sake of the whole entity. However, British Eurosceptics sharply criticized this belief: as aforementioned Minogue spoke of the process of anti-nationalism as a "self-hatred" (1996: 261) that is why he mentioned "self-contempt" in the question above as he believed that the European club is built upon the aches of its components past defects which generated a feeling of shame upon the people making them look forward an ideal community as a shelter (264).

Russel Lewis considered the idea of a new Roman empire as a myth and highlighted the fact that history's great ancient scientific thinkers were not found in the Egyptian or the Roman Empires but in the small independent cities of Greece, moreover the modern scientific achievements did not take place in Great Spain but in "the little city Republics of Italy" where the wealthiest Europeans lived (159). Lewis concluded that unity gives way to despotism and thus hinders progress, he said:

> the worst enemy of scientific and economic progress is oppressive government. You don't get good science when research results have to

> conform to the bigotry of politicians or priests. You don't get sustained economic progress where regulation is stifling, taxation is ruinous and private property can be confiscated at the ruler's whim. (162)

For him, apart from the European Empire, Europe was lucky not to be controlled by a single authority. However, China, India, and the Arabs indeed had scientific discoveries, but they did not use them to prosper either because of despots' monopoly, confiscation, or religious Zealots (162-163-164). That is regardless of the claimed democratic European states, the latter would be shackled by the EU, which is not democratic and act only according to Brussel-style "democratic centralism" which limited their own scientific and economic prosperity.

Therefore, the European ideals of "*ever closer union among the European peoples*", that introduced the Treaty of Rome 1957, was hard to be absorbed by Eurosceptics. In fact, they did not motivate the UK's late engagement nor did common interests. Margaret Thatcher accentuated the fact that her country perceived the community from a different angle compared to the rest, far from its Utopian goals. Actually, she longed for a Europe that is a family of nations working together but not at the expense of national identities.

> Utopia never comes, because we know we should not like it if it did. Let Europe be a family of nations, understanding each other better, appreciating each other more, doing more together but relishing our national identity no less than our common European endeavour. Let us have a Europe which plays its full part in the wider world, which looks outward not inward, and which preserves that Atlantic community—that Europe on both sides of the Atlantic—which is our noblest inheritance and our greatest strength. (September 1988)

This passage is taken from Thatcher's Bruges Speech (1989) in which she strongly expressed her opposition to more integrations and political cooperation. Instead she insisted on preserving each states' autonomy because Europe would be stronger if France remained France and Britain remained Britain. Therefore, sovereignty is a limit for cooperation, in addition to the importance Britain holds about free enterprise and the primacy of NATO. Therefore, the EC for her was a means to acquire more wealth and hegemony rather than losing British sovereignty and being politically and financially led by the Brussel Empire.

David Cameron who promised the British to organize a referendum and met his promise three years after, also shared Thatcher's point of view. In his address at the London Headquarters of Bloomberg on 23 January 2013, he announced his will to negotiate the removal of the objective stated in the treaties of an 'ever closer union between the peoples of Europe' (Dauvergne 1). In other words, he believed in British exceptional status as an "island nation, independent, forthright and passionate in defence of sovereignty". He also declared that Britain considers the EU as a mean to an end "prosperity, stability, the anchor of freedom and democracy both within Europe and beyond her shores" and not "an end in itself" (cited in Dauvergne 4). Besides, in an interview on the BBC's Andrew Marr Show on February 21st 2016, he sought that 21st century's sovereignty in international affairs is "about securing outcomes, not about preserving autonomy" (cited in Niblett 24).

Perhaps the only admitted unexceptional fact about Britain was its economic decline that pushed it to join the European Community. Yet the British sense of liberty and thirst for influence made it difficult for it to accept to be an ordinary member especially following the EU's expansion to Eastern Europe in 2004. In brief, exceptionalism can be regarded domestically and in terms of foreign affairs. The British democratic way has always been deemed incompatible with federalist Europe whose authority was claimed to limit Britain's power in the UK as well as the world. As a result, the four decades of this ambivalent relationship finished up with withdrawal.

The Question of Sovereignty

The question of sovereignty created a huge debate since Britain joined the EC. It provided a solid ground for Eurosceptics to reject membership, resist more forms of integration, and even call for withdrawal. This issue overwhelmed discussions about Europe until the problem of immigration exacerbated the situation especially since the British tended to reject any supra power over their Parliament and Constitution considering both as the landmarks of their identity.

Edmund Morgan says that "Government requires make-believe" (Mitchell, "Sovereign, Sovereignties" 70). Sovereignty plays a big role in convincing the people of the legitimacy of political decisions. In fact, it started "from God to Monarch to Parliament" in addition to the embodiment of the crown in parliament through its unnoticed but effective prerogative (Mitchell 70). Eurosceptics played on

the ground of convincing the population that the European integration reduced their national sovereignty throughout political and economic interference.

In *The Politics of Nationhood: Sovereignty, Britishness, and Conservative Politics*, Philip Lynch sought three facets of British sovereignty: state sovereignty, constitutional sovereignty, and popular sovereignty. The first one includes the territory that draws the borders of the state's authority, the state's economic, social, and administrative role, besides its international or exterior function (81). Constitutional sovereignty is more critical because its statutes depend on the supremacy of Parliament, therefore, it is meant to preserve popular sovereignty. The fact that the British Constitution is not written made it flexible to any change, but it is all related to the people's will. Although the British think that they are privileged with this adaptable constitution, the other European nations consider the fact that no authority is higher than parliament as weird. In the view of Noel Malcolm, supporters of a federalist Europe attribute Britain's rejection to its emphasis on sovereignty, he added,

> Federalists often tell us in Britain that we have a special 'hang-up' about sovereignty because our sovereignty consists of a specially quaint and archaic system of parliamentary supremacy. Only Britain has this problem, they say, because only Britain has this bizarre 'sovereignty'; other countries with more rational constitutions can see nothing problematic about becoming part of a federal union. (358)

Popular sovereignty constitutes an angular stone of the whole issue for it covers the state's relationship with the constitutional community especially since successive EU political integration was considered by some as a disenfranchisement of the

electorate. In this regard, Professor Patrick Bijsmans cited the UK Democratic Party's leader Nigel Farage warning about political extremism caused by this disenfranchisement, he said in a debate published in *The Guardian* (3 March 2014):

> We are already, in some countries, beginning to see the rise of worrying political extremism. If you take away from people their ability, through the ballot box, to change their futures because they have given away control of everything to somebody else, then I'm afraid they tend to resort to unpleasant means. (87)

In brief, the mentioned trinity reflects the British political as well as cultural history and plays the biggest role in determining this nation's present and shaping its future. Hence why Eurosceptics see that sovereignty, namely, constitutional sovereignty is not about legal matters, yet it is about self-government and identity (Lynch 82). Political discourse made of sovereignty a myth that hides behind different connotations about the nation's past (the Magna Charta and the Glorious Revolution, the different Reforms Acts), and it is also facing a threat (Europe will be deciding instead of the people).

Conservative Enoch Powell is one of the earliest Eurosceptics who opposed Heath's integration. He believed that by joining the EC Britain would lose its sovereignty, that is, its political independence, self-government, and the legislative supremacy of parliament (Lynch 30). Instead, he suggested recalling the nations' glorious myths in order to get over the current situation that is dusted by bad and harmful myths (cited in Lynch 39). Therefore, UK governments must focus on the union with Northern Ireland, post-imperial nationalist strategy, repatriation, and

ending the Commonwealth immigration, in addition to the monetarist economy and neo-liberal economics (Lynch 38). Treating the British sicknesses throughout curing its interior by leaning on history and identity would revive Britain and reinforce its sovereignty contrary to the ready-made solution of integration that Powell believed to be harmful to these pillars.

In addition to sovereignty's political aspects, it is also a matter of monetary management: "the ability to run monetary, economic and fiscal policy lies at the very heart of what constitutes a sovereign state" (cited in Lynch 79). For instance, the EU power over taxation has never been accepted by the British who considered tax increases as "a crucial part of self-definition" that is exclusively legislated by the British Parliament ("Can Self-Government Survive?" 196). Nevertheless, many believe that the British economy flourished thanks to EC/EU integration, particularly in terms of investments and employment. Eurosceptics' great tormentor was the EMU because they believed that any monetary union with Europe would devalue the Sterling which expresses British sovereignty and symbolizes its independent nationhood (cited in Lynch 79).

However, euro-enthusiast politicians treated loosely the idea of sovereignty in an interdependent world. Edward Heath who "lived and breathed the air of Europe" accepted to share sovereignty with the EC members, yet he favoured an intergovernmental vision of the EC in which "essential national sovereignty" would be unscathed (Lynch 29). He declared that giving in some of Britain's sovereignty,

would not “alter the position of the Crown, nor rob our Parliament of its essential powers, nor deprive our Law Courts of their authority in our domestic life.” (Cited in Lynch 26). In “Sense on Sovereignty”, journalist and academic Noel Malcolm said that relating sovereignty to power led to accepting the idea of pooling it, whereas sovereignty is linked to authority, and not power. Therefore, sharing sovereignty implies putting the UK’s authority under a higher authority; he illustrated as follows,

> The simplest reason is that they think sovereignty means nothing more than power. Power can be 'pooled', obviously: when four men lift up a grand piano, they are pooling their physical power to achieve an effect which none could have achieved individually. But what can it mean to say that authority is 'pooled'? The weasel-significance of this word is that it suggests that you can both keep your authority and give it away at one and the same time. But if authority itself is pooled, a new kind of authority is created. (360)

Furthermore, Malcolm said that Heath believed that only the early 19th century’s colonial powers were sovereign because wealth made them powerful and hence they could do what they liked; however, in the modern world “no country is sovereign, and sovereignty is obsolete”; according to him this concept meant that the national will should by any means be affected by any exterior influence, and since Britain’s production depended on exports it was therefore not sovereign (352). Malcolm considered it an odd argument for if international trade was incompatible with sovereignty, then sovereignty should have gone out of fashion around the time of the Phoenicians (352). Nevil Johnson justified Heath’s position by saying that the government of the time was joining a common market whereas the political aspects

of accession to the Treaty of Rome were understated ("Can Self-Government Survive?" 190).

Although he was a euro-enthusiast, John Major also opposed a federal Europe with its political unity and budgetary impositions albeit his intention to put Britain "at the very heart of Europe" in his 1991 Declaration in Bonn (Lynch 71). However, British historian Anthony Seldon said that Major was less stirred up than Mrs. Thatcher in terms of national pride and sovereignty (quoted in Lynch 80).

Nevertheless, some consider sovereignty as a myth meant to fill out the people's opinion against membership. In "Britain, the EU, and the Sovereignty Myth", Robin Niblett believed that Britain was still largely sovereign under the EU. He suggested two ways to determine the limits of Britain's sovereignty within the community: policy determination and comparing the UK contribution to the EU budget with public expenditure. As for policy making, he stated that the British people were given the privilege of approving the vast majority of crucial policies via voting except for the immigration issues (6). He inserted the following table:

Determined at EU level with UK	Split between EU and UK	Broadly or exclusively determined by UK
• Trade policies, including tariffs and other trade measures	• Ratifying trade agreements	• Health policy
• Rules and standards for the EU Single Market	• Energy and climate policies	• Education
• Competition rules and state aid	• Environmental standards	• Fiscal policy and public expenditure
• Intra-EU migration	• Agriculture	• Monetary policy
• Fisheries	• Employment policies	• Income tax, corporation tax and capital gains tax
	• Consumer protection and transport	• Non-EU immigration
	• European cooperation on criminal matters	• Border control and security
	• Asylum policy	• Pensions
	• VAT	• Welfare
	• Cooperation on foreign policy	• Foreign policy decisions
		• Defence
		• Intelligence
		• Development cooperation and humanitarian aid
		• Local government
		• National policing and criminal justice
		• Media regulation

Table 1: Where is UK policy determined? (Niblet 6)

As for the cost of membership, Robin Niblett stated that “the British parliament (together with local government and the devolved administrations) still decided how to deplore

more than 98% of public spending (6). In addition, Britain's reluctance from the euro and Schengen zone retained its sovereignty over monetary policy and preserved its borders against non-EU citizens (7).

Undermining Britishness: Political Euroscepticism

In *the European Union and British Politics,* Andrew Geddes described the British attitude towards Europe as reluctant, awkward, and then semi-detached. Now divorce can be added to these adjectives for Britain became an "ex-partner" of the EU. The main British concern that stimulated this ambivalence is the EC/EU supranational structure. Brussel's influence on the community's member states had been increasing in a rapid pace since 1990 leading to a more articulated British Euroscepticism. By joining the EEC, the UK looked forward to developing a free trade zone that would benefit the British economy, which was then in decline, yet the EU's political interference condemned their coordination.

The economic benefit brought by the EC had calmed British academics' and politicians' concerns about its vices until the country's relief. Martin Holmes, the *Eurosceptical Reader*'s editor, claimed, in the introduction of the second volume, that the 1975 Referendum's "two-to-one majority" ended the 1970's debate about integration and declared a decade in which "Euroscepticism was dormant" (1). Indeed, anti-marketeers existed but their arguments were not given too much attention. Meanwhile, the Labour party opposed the EC whereas the Conservative Party expressed their agreement with the European idea. Margaret Thatcher, one of the greatest Conservative leaders, opposed the

1975 Referendum considering it “a device for demagogues” (Geddes 78). She was aspiring for a better economy within the European Market. Moreover, during a Conservative Party conference in 1981, she argued about the troubles that might be caused by Britain’s withdrawal as she said,

> Forty three out of every £100 we earn abroad comes from the Common Market. Over two million jobs depend on our trade with Europe, two million jobs which will be put at risk by Britain's withdrawal. And even if we kept two-thirds of our trade with the Common Market after we had flounced out—and that is pretty optimistic—there would be a million more to join the dole queues. That is only the beginning.

The blessing of the European Market seemed tremendous to Thatcher that the option of an exit would have been a big sin committed only by the inexperienced Labour. The competition created by integration went hand in hand with Thatcher’s preference for economic statecraft that would boost the economy to protect the nation. Surprisingly, her name is now attached to Euroscepticism more than any other leader especially since many heralded her Bruges Speech (1988) “as a turning-point in alerting the British public to the perils of 'ever closer union' with Europe (Daddow 1233)”.

The British domestic economic concerns started to loosen by the mid-1980s; consequently, the Iron Lady turned her attention to the British contribution to the EC Budget. She was adopting a monetary policy and hence the state control of the money supply was her priority. In 1979, she attacked the budget mechanisms at the Strasbourg Summit considering them “tantamount to theft of British money” (Geddes 79). She wanted Britain’s money back at the 1984 Fontainebleau Summit and an agreement of a rebate took place. This resolution enhanced her vision to see Single Market measures in

order to meet the British economy but not at the expense of the British sovereignty which would be undermined by further economic and political integration.

During the same Summit (1984), the British government suggested in a paper entitled "Europe-The Future" the attainment of a Single Market by (1990). The completion of this idea required implementing deregulation and liberalization to insure the freedom of movement of goods, people, services, and capital (Geddes 80). Such a proposal enabled the UK to have an imprint on the European community using Thatcherite principles: Geddes quoted Jim Buller, lecturer in British Politics, arguing that this project "was seen as a way of enshrining core Thatcherite principles at EC level" (80). France and Germany supported the Single Market and the Single European Act. The SEA was issued to guarantee the previously mentioned four freedoms, but, contrary to the British wishes the act paved the ground for the consolidation of EC institutions such as the EU Parliament and social and economic collusion. Indeed, the Single Market led to restricting national parliaments' role in EU political decisions. Therefore, the bogey of Britain's Europeanization awakened the British sovereignty question and gave more voice to Euroscepticism. In the House of Commons, Thatcher strongly criticized the hegemony of the European Community, stating the following,

> Yes, the Commission does want to increase its powers. Yes, it is a non-elected body and I do not want the Commission to increase its powers at the expense of the House…
>
> The President of the Commission, Mr. Delors, said at a press conference the other day that he wanted the European Parliament to be the democratic body of

> the Community, he wanted the Commission to be the Executive and he wanted the Council of Ministers to be the Senate. No. No. No.

The British vision of decision-making is focalized on Parliament which is elected by the people, the commission's new decisions transcended this entity and hence overthrew the people's will. As aforementioned, the British consider their political system different from the rest of Europe which is why they thought it unfair to be controlled by a super system that is inferior to theirs.

Furthermore, Thatcherism knotted Neoliberalism which includes individual liberty and a market-oriented system, with Neoconservatism which is based on a strong traditional state in which British values are incarnated. This British attachment to liberty but with respect to tradition is not a European feature: in "British Euroscepticism", Menno Spiering cited Margaret Thatcher's declaration in the 1993 BBC series *The Downing Street Years*, she said: "There is a great strand of equity and fairness in the British people. This is our characteristic. There is no strand of equity and fairness in Europe. They are out to get as much as they can. This is one of those enormous differences" (146). It is worth mentioning that the leader of the House of Commons sir Geoffrey Howe resigned following the above speech which showed Thatcher's change of attitude and ignited a division within her party leading to her retreat (Geddes 83).

Thatcher's resignation as a PM did not end the British troubles with the EC. Her successor John Major was challenged by the Exchange Rate Mechanisms and Maastricht treaty regardless of his euro-enthusiasm as previously mentioned. The ERM fuelled a division amongst the Conservative Party and led to their rebellion. Moreover, the

Maastricht treaty, which founded the EU and the Single European Currency EURO that Britain never joined, was signed in 1992. All these proceedings besides the ejection of sterling from ERM and the interest rates increase gave more opportunity to the Eurosceptics to rebel.

As a reaction to the Maastricht Treaty, the UKIP (United Kingdom Independent Party) led by Nigel Farage was created as an anti-European party considering Brussels as the source of the UK's problems. In the 2014 European Election, it made the exception of topping the poll which had been dominated by the Conservative or the Labour parties since 1910 (Startin 312). In fact, it polled 27.5 percent of the vote and won 24 seats in the Strasbourg Chamber. Moreover, pro-EU Liberal Democrats lost 11 members of the EU parliament out of their 12 members. This reflected the people's growing anger and distrust of the EU.

Subsequently, Tony Blair, though the most pro-European Prime Minister since Heath (Geddes 88), faced more challenges. Nevertheless, Labour leaders were among early Eurosceptics: Menno Spiering mentioned Hugo Young's labeling the ancient Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell (1906-1963) as "the first Eurosceptic", this title was also attributed to the Labourite James Callaghan (127). Spiering summarized the Labour party and its leaders' early rejectionist stand against the European Market in the following lines:

> It is the rejectionist attitude of much of the Labour Party and leadership which stands out, ranging from Hugh Gaitskell's passionate dismissal of 'Europe' in

> his 1962 Labour Conference speech, to Harold Wilson's contortions over EEC membership in the early 1970s, to James Callaghan's outcry of 'non, merci beaucoup!' in 1971, and finally to the 1983 pledge in the Labour manifesto 'to extricate ourselves from the Treaty of Rome and other Community treaties. (131)

However, the Labour party started backing the EC in the 1980s upon the process of modernization led by Neil Kinnock. After becoming Prime Minister, Tony Blair signed the social chapter in the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), but he preferred his model of "a social Europe that works" rather than an old social Europe. Furthermore, in the 1997 Manifesto, the Labour party declared their opposition to a "federal European super-state" (Geddes 206). As a matter of fact, Blair favoured the USA rather than Europe and his involvement in the Iraq War caused him troubles with the EU countries in spite of his wish to be a bridge between the US and Europe (Geddes 91).

Blair's Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown took his post as PM after Blair's resignation in (2007). Brown's first year of premiership was spent facing the World's financial Crisis of (2007-8) that diverted him from Europe. Besides, he lacked his master's courage in supporting the EU and fell into the trap of pleasing the electorate as well as the Media. In effect, He missed the Lisbon Treaty in (2007) and then signed it late to induce a more skeptic vision about the EU increasing expansion.

After him, Conservative David Cameron took office leading Britain to Brexit after decades of ambivalence. In an address (2013), he promised to organize a referendum about staying or leaving the EU. He intended to keep Britain in the EU provided that some reforms of the EU treaties would occur in order to strengthen the British position

within. He wanted to negotiate the free movement of people in Europe and especially migrants' entitlement to benefits, the relationship between member states which did not adopt the Euro and the members of the Euro area (Dauvergne). These were terms already agreed upon in previous treaties; therefore, achieving the agreement of the other member states was impossible. David Cameron resigned as a PM after the British people voted for leaving the EU 51.9% and 48.1% remain on June the 23rd 2016 and he was replaced by Theresa May.

Political position as far as integration into this intergovernmental entity witnessed many shifts. Conservative's consent switched to opposition the same as the Labour party's attitude changed from anti-Europeans to pro-Europeans. Britain's leading Parties' ideological orientation was not static but still, the direction of the European Community to a more federal Europe marred both of them. As for Scotland and Wales, the Scottish National Party (SNP) and Plaid Cymru in Wales started to be Eurosceptics in the 1960s and 1970s following decades of indifference. M. Spiering thought that this new attitude was twofold: it was partly driven by a wish to protect Welsh farmers and Scottish fishermen, and also to stand at the opposite position of the UK major parties (131). Nevertheless, in the 1975 referendum, their opposition was to the EEC and not to Europe "NO, ON ANYONE ELSE'S TERMS!" and "EUROPE YES, EEC NO!" (cited in Spiering 131). This developed into a pro-EU position after small countries such as Luxembourg became Independent EU members, which led them to prefer independence from the UK to join the EU as will be discussed in the fourth chapter (132).

In "The Myth of Europe", Russel Lewis, admitted the alteration in British political parties' points of view as far as European integration is concerned. He believed that any changes in the circumstances required different policies and the factors that led Britain to join no more existed in the 1990s. He referred to the Cold War, he said:

> Many, like the author, were enthusiastic supporters of greater European unity during the Cold War because they saw it as a part of strengthening the West against the threat of military conquest or political subversion from the Soviet Union. It then seemed sensible for the Common Market to be the right institution for improving the economies of the member states and allowing them to shoulder a bigger share of the burden of self defence. (154)

The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a Western era, therefore according to the author, Britain's motif to join expired. In fact, it was as much as the collapse of the Soviet Union as the fall of the Berlin Wall that announced a stronger Germany. Perhaps, the power of the latter triggered the British more than the fall of the former satisfied them because of Germany's threat. In terms of economy, Lewis said that Britain might have benefited from the other members' prosperity when it suffered from inflation, but things now were different (1990s) as the UK's standard of living was even better than in France and Germany (155).

To conclude, the political attitude towards Europe was mostly ambivalent giving way to different opinions. Yet the growing influence of the EU was met by political opposition that ranges from a soft disagreement about the EU's policies or interference in the national interest that is known with soft Euroscepticism adopted by some conservatives, to a hard reluctance that opposes membership per se, this is adopted by the

UK Democratic Party. The change of stance towards Europe affected not only politicians, but also journalists, and therefore the public as will be seen in the following sections.

The British Media Euroscepticism

Euroscepticism is a manifold concept that has occupied various studies namely in terms of party politics as discussed in the previous section. In effect, it is not only related to the political spectrum for the Media also had its angular share in generating anti-Europe attitudes in the public. However, it is argued that a little research about this issue was conducted if compared to political Euroscepticism. Nevertheless, it is highly believed that studying "the intermediary processes of communication, interpretation and framing through which knowledge and attitudes are shaped" is crucial to understand Euroscepticism (Galpin and Trenz 49).

The media is an active actor in biasing its audience political stands in general and the public attitude towards the EU in particular. Individuals are more influenced by their daily exposure to the news and commentaries; their repetitive encountering with anti-European messages gives them a negative impression of the topic. It was claimed that "euro-ambivalent voters differ considerably from moderate and pro-European voters in terms of their daily media use" and therefore "Euroscepticism is, at least partly, media-driven" (cited in Guerra 12-13). Nowadays, the power of spreading information is not related only to professional journalism as any person can create a huge debate about any topic via social media.

In effect, the media is supposed to inform and clear any ambiguities about the EU, besides diffusing the latest news to make the audience up to date. Therefore, it is meant to create a bridge between this entity and its member states' citizens. In reality, one can see that it functions totally in the opposite direction either by misinforming, or by distorting data, hence broadening the gap between the EU and its people rather than making them close. In "The Spiral of Euroscepticism", Galpin and Trenz cited that "journalists often prefer polemicism, excessiveness, and general negativity, leading to a 'spiral of cynicism", whereas they are expected to be "devoted to fair judgment and substantive critique" (50). They also said that according to the theory of news values, journalists classify the news according to relevance, familiarity, and negativity then need to be balanced (52). Hence the focus is on bad news especially when it comes to foreign news whereas domestically, the Media spread the good ones (Galpin and Trenz 52). In the UK, Europe is thought to be foreign which might explain the relationship between media negativity and EU News.

In order to sow polemic ideas and propagate negativity, newspapers have most of the time performed as mouthpieces for Eurosceptic politicians and academics who play a huge role in shaping public opinion. Besides, highlighting disputes between politicians, on the one hand, and between academics and politicians, on the other hand, has created cynicism towards the latter. This led citizens to distrust politics considering that its only objective was politicians' interests rather than the people's good.

Political parties also tend to mediatize their electoral campaign. Thanks to the internet, this objective became easy to reach for social media is more accessible namely Facebook and Twitter which push people to be involuntarily updated, biased, and even engaged in political matters. In fact, anti-Europe political parties' election victories are referred to as "their successful media strategies and campaigns" (Galpin and Trenz 50). Their success can also be attributed to the internet which offered new options to politicians to spread their ideas and bring more supporters to their ideals and parties:

> The Internet and Web 2.0 technologies (such as Twitter, Facebook, etc.) have become a crucial channel today and new spaces for political communication of parties and social movements, which increasingly use them to recruit members, make political propaganda, spread information about their electoral programmes and views, as for the coordination of collective action, also at the transnational and European level. (cited in Guerra 8)

Furthermore, Internet users who adhere to a party's cause can contribute to the spread of information and orientations perhaps more than recruited members. Furthermore, Fake news is easily circulated among these users, which might put a politician's career or a party's reputation at stake.

Readers' impressions and feedback after reading or watching became crucial in determining the track of politics, in addition to the emergence of citizen journalism. Stories are shared through "clickbait" that facilitates the spread of information giving way to "emotional reactions comments", yet the reliability of the news is rarely judged (Galpin and Trenz 58). It is worth noting that opposition to the EU is strikingly apparent in "the online public sphere" rather than any other sphere because it is all about the public's criticism of the EU (cited in Bijsmans 91).

The web revolution might have decreased people's exposure to the traditional mainstream media, but it did not overtake the latter's efficiency especially the press. In *Who Runs this Place?* Anthony Sampson considers the press as "unelected legislators" (223). Newspapers are free from regulations compared to TV channels, whose "broadcasters tend to achieve a greater balance" (Daddow 2121). The press is free to criticize politics and trace politicians, nevertheless, its bias is restricted to their owner's orientations, commercial objectives, and interests. Sampson declared that by the end of the 20th century, "newspaper owners and editors retained their power to provide the context and priorities of the news, to promote their favourites and ignore their enemies" (224). This does not concern only political radicals with their "black and white" style of thinking, but it has been argued "that also more moderate partisans and politically opinionated individuals primarily use information sources that best suit their own belief-system" (cited in Leruth et al. 98).

European integration has considerably interested British papers since the UK's joined the EC. Becoming a part of a European Community was celebrated at the beginning; during the 1975 referendum, British tabloids called the people to vote remain. Mathias Haeussler linked this orientation with the serious context of the time especially the oil shock and inflation in a blog entitled "British newspapers and the EU: was it always about sovereignty and crooked bananas?". He also illustrated from the *Daily Mirror* that warned: "we would be exposed – and ALONE – in an unfriendly world" as well as *The Sun* which believed that Britain should remain in Europe because

literally: “baby, it’s cold outside!”. Europe was portrayed as the only haven to survive in such a melancholic world.

British Politics researcher Oliver Daddow deeply analyzed British Papers’ change of attitude towards Europe in “The UK Media and ‘Europe’: From Permissive Consensus to Destructive Dissent”. He believed that the Media’s early consent namely the Yes campaign resulted from a constellation of pressure and financial support, in other words, the pro-EEC movement in the government and Civil Service persuaded the Media to support membership besides the fact that the Yes campaign was more financed and better organized than the No Campaign (1223). Daddow quoted that most of the mainstream national British Press supported the Yes campaign prior to the referendum, and others mentioned the papers that supported the No campaign including *The Daily Express*, in addition to “the Labour weeklies: *Tribune*, the *Transport* and *General Workers' Union* monthly Record”, and *Scottish Daily News* (1222).

The Media’s vision changed in so far as the European influence on Britain witnessed an increasing overflow. Haeussler again linked this alteration to circumstances, he asserted that the press attitude started to divert in the mid-1980s due to the economic ease and the discovery of identity politics following Thatcher’s Falkland war. Unsurprisingly, journalists’ nationalism is always recalled when it comes to the nation’s issues, namely, tabloid press in the UK “has become submerged by the weight of the emotional argument drawing on notions of sovereignty and identity” (cited in Galpin and Trenz 58).

It is worth noting that tabloids are more influential because they are daily read by ordinary people that represent most of the population, thus it has a large audience compared to quality newspapers. In effect, the latter is open to more diversity of opinion and therefore they are expected to show a more balanced politics (Bisjmans 77). However, some works suggested that "there is relatively little difference between the coverage of EU affairs by quality and tabloid media" (91). This can be justified by their having the same ownership. An expert survey conducted by Leruth et al (2017) dealt with Newspaper Euroscepticism in the UK, France, and the Netherlands from a comparative perspective, it questioned 355 experts from the UK about the degree of support of the EU in three papers: *The Guardian*, *The Telegraph*, and *The Sun*. The feedback of 54 British experts is summarized in the following table taken from the Audit Bureau of Circulations (UK 2014):

The News Paper	**Circulation**	**Political Orientation**	**Position on European Integration**
The Guardian	179,146	Centre-Left (4.22)	Euro-ambivalent to euro-positive (5.64)
The Sun	1,978,324	Right (8.59)	Eurosceptic (1.67)
The Telegraph	498,484	Right (8.31)	Eurosceptic (1.81)

Table 2: UK Selected Newspapers' Euroscepticism (Leruth et al 101)

Both *The Sun* and *The Telegraph* are highly circulated particularly because the first is a tabloid newspaper, and both are Eurosceptics. However, *The Guardian* ranges from euro

ambivalence that is in favor of EU membership but "not clearly partisan either way with regard to ongoing measures designed to foster closer European co-operation, and/or are not necessarily covering EU-related issues with any great regularity and as a matter of priority" to euro positivity which include being "supportive of the integration project as a whole and are broadly supportive of ongoing measures designed to foster closer European co-operation" (Leruth et al 100). It is worth adding that in addition to *The Guardian*, *The Independent* as well as the *Financial Times* are also classified as euro positives.

As aforementioned, every paper's agenda mirrors the orientation of its owners and serves their interests. In the 1980s two papers fell into the hands of severe Eurosceptics whose opposition to the EC/EU was then reflected in their Newspapers which constituted 40% of the national daily press up to the turn of the 21st century (Sampson 231). To begin with, Australian media mogul Rupert Murdoch, known for his opposition to the Euro, purchased The Times in 1981 despite objections from journalists; he also acquired The Sun (228). Murdoch's papers repeatedly encouraged Eurosceptics and rejected EU spillover and also had an impact on the way European affairs were reported in the British press with competitive means and business ends, which was termed the "Murdoch effect" (Daddow 1221). This includes his anti-Europe Sky channels.

The Times, a center-right newspaper, is presented as the paper that first published articles mentioning the term "euro-skeptic" hand in hand with "anti-marketeers" to refer to those "who had altogether rejected continued EEC membership during the 1975 referendum" (Spiering 128-129). Since the 1980s it has maintained its support to

Eurosceptics and urged its readers to vote for them in order to protect the UK's sovereignty. The supremacy of the British Parliament and the electoral community was deemed to be at stake in the Union because, unlike Britain's shining democracy, the other European states are less democratic or even undemocratic. In "EU Media Coverage in Times of Crisis: Euroscepticism Becoming Mainstream?", Patrick Bisjmans quoted a Reader from *The Times* of 30 January 2009 saying: "Britain's strength, which justifies her sense of separateness from the Continent, has always involved rejecting European models of absolutism. The EU is the most recent of these antidemocratic models (84)". Bisjman also remarked that this paper's Eurosceptic attitude softened in 2014 during the Brexit debate; in fact, EU countries' cooperation was supported by its editorials yet the EU was still "over-regulated" as mentioned in *The Times* (28 August 2014) causing the British Parliament to lose "too much power" (*The Times* 3 October 2014) (cited in Bisjman 86-87). *The Sun* also tended to treat Europe as alien. In 1998, it assured that the British people "have no desire whatsoever to become politically involved with foreigners with whom [they] have nothing in common" ("British Newspapers and the EU").

The second newspaper owner is the Canadian Conrad Black who owned the *Daily Telegraph* in 1985; he loudly opposed the EC and welcomed most Eurosceptics columnists (Sampson 230). This paper has maintained its support for the Conservatives and there comes its "Torygraph" nickname hand in hand with its EC/EU opposition (Bijsmans 78).

The *Daily Express*'s owner is also a fervent Eurosceptic, Richard Desmond who was a donor to UK Independent Party (UKIP); besides, its deputy chair Lord Stevens was a peer of the same party (cited in Galpin and Trenz 56). As previously mentioned, objection to EU integration has been the tabloid's tradition since integration and even before, Spiering mentioned that it greeted De Gaulle's veto with the headline "GLORY GLORY HALLELUJAH!" on 30 January 1963 (132). In 2010, it announced a "Get Britain out of Europe" campaign as part of its "struggle to repatriate British sovereignty from a political project that has comprehensively failed" and to help the British "win back their country"', its hard Euroscepticism called for withdrawal from the EU and the "alien, pan-European tribunal" referring to the European Court of Human Right (Daddow 1225-1226). Nicholas Startin mentioned that the *Daily Express* contributed in organizing "the 373 000 strong petitions" that paved the way to vote for national referendum on EU membership in the House of Commons (318).

These papers' Eurosceptic attitudes can be identified through their covers as well as their contents. But the uses of catchy covers to attract readers and sell more papers have entirely surpassed the content's rigor. They also tended to use fear to lead people to consider the EU as a threat either to the British sovereignty, identity, or even the people's welfare. The Leveson Inquiry conducted an investigation into the culture, practices, and ethics of the press in 2012 and concluded that EU reporting "accounted for a further category of story where parts of the press appeared to prioritize the title's agenda over factual accuracy" (687), it also quoted Mr. Campbell, a British journalist, saying,

> Several of our national daily titles – The Sun, The Express, The Star, The Mail, The Telegraph in particular- are broadly anti-European. At various times, readers of these and other newspapers may have read that 'Europe' or 'Brussels" or 'the EU superstate' has banned, or is intending to ban kilts, curries… the British Army …. In addition, if the Eurosceptic press is to be believed, Britain is going to-be, forced to unite as a single country with France …Europe is brainwashing our children with pro-European propaganda!... But there is a serious point: that once some of our newspapers decide to campaign on a certain issue, they do so with scant regard for fact. These stories are written by reporters, rewritten by subs, and edited by editors who frankly must know them to be untrue. This goes beyond the fusion of news and comment, to the area of invention. (687)

Certainly, the news business led to a focus on stories that provoke readers and stimulate their nationalism. This encouraged generalization and the spread of rumors in order to push citizens toward opposing a certain issue. For instance, before the 2016 referendum, the *Daily Express* launched a fierce war against EU immigration in order to urge the people to vote leave, Semon Guerra collected some of the paper's covers that said: "Britain has too many migrants"; "EU opens door to 79m from Turkey"; "Britain faces migrant chaos"; "Britain's 1.5 million hidden migrants"; "Soaring cost of teaching migrant children"; "Migrants cost Britain £17 bn a year"; "Migrants pay just £100 to invade Britain". N. Startin considered this cover page saga a bombardment approach that fostered the issue of a referendum on EU membership; the *Express*'s campaign was more intense notwithstanding the other Eurosceptic tabloids and broadsheets (319).

On another side, The Media's ability to make the EU more open to the public has usually been under scrutiny. It is even claimed that EU "negotiations and consensus-building processes" were "often kept outside the media columns" in order to maintain compromise solutions (Guerra 7). This gave way to spreading incorrect information which determined the direction of politics; Prime Minister Tony Blair said that his EU

policies were highly influenced by the inaccurate information about the EU in the press (Leveson 688).

However, the Media's impact on the people's vision of the EU has not always been detrimental; some scholars could see the full half of the glass. Media negativity in general proved that it can be advantageous at times. The public's reception of negative information or news about the EU triggered some of them to indulge in an inquiry to know more about the topic; it also shed more light on it which made it more accessible. This was assumed by Galpin and Trenz who said: "Some scholars have argued that media negativity is an important element of a healthy democracy, as it subjects governments, politicians and other elites in positions of power to scrutiny (54)". Negativity leads the electoral community, the basis of the democratic process, to be on the one hand dissatisfied and skeptic, hence any political decision would be well studied and dependent on the public's feedback. On the other hand, they become more conscious: "people became more aware of a problem when they read an article that criticized the ability of politicians to solve it than those who read other articles" (cited in Galpin and Trenz 54).

At times, the press negativity depended on the people's demand, whatever upraised populist ideas of national borders and interest is warmly adopted by the people, consequently, it receives more reactions, and more sales are accumulated. The use of EU news for public consumption takes into consideration the model of demand and supply. Hence "public judgments and emotions can equally be made responsible for the negative bias in news coverage, in turn informing the media frames and content (61). Furthermore,

"Eurosceptic individuals are likely to seek information from sources that would respond to their personal opinions, and that would in turn fuel their negative attitudes towards the EU (Leruth et al. 99). This public pressure and media propaganda halted most politicians from declaring EU advantages and benefits to the UK. This can be related to elections as well, to gain the public and the Media's support politicians tend to stress the EU's disadvantages to the UK. In a blog article entitled "Project Fear is the legacy of decades of Euroscepticism. Dare Cameron make a positive case for the EU?", Ros Taylor said the following,

> UK politicians have found it more convenient for electoral reasons to EU-bash rather than patiently explain to the public the many successes London has had in helping bringing the EU into closer alignment with Britain's national economic and political preferences.

Taylor believed that the British government succeeded in reaching a number of arrangements with the EU, whose regulations were adapted to British priorities. However, politicians prefer to focus on controversial issues especially those related to British national sovereignty because that is what the public and the Media want to listen to.

Media Euroscepticism is crucial in determining politics, particularly, the press and the internet as they receive fewer restrictions compared to television. Euroscepticism has become "mediated or even mitigated" not only by journalists but also by the people (Galpin and Trenz 66). Regardless of the Media's motives, it is highly believed that it has really influenced politicians and public attitudes towards Europe as will be dealt with in the next section.

Public Attitude towards Europe

The British population represent the heart of the British state that acquires its legitimacy from the electoral community. The latter is the basis of the people's sovereignty which caused the UK many troubles with the EC/EU. Geddes cited the British politician and writer Tony Benn saying: "When the British people speak, everyone, including Members of Parliament, should tremble before their decision" (211). Hence, the public perception of integration was crucial in influencing their country's EU decisions.

In effect, the British exclude themselves from the European continent to the point of talking about "going to Europe" or "the continent" (Geddes 24). The distance between the British Isles and the rest of Europe led the British to distinguish their nation from the other European nations, Daddow suggested that the English Channel not only separated the two entities in terms of geography but also led to the development of an "island mentality" in Britain (Startin 312-313). This detachment is not definite but partial, Geddes cited the British historian Garton Ash declaring that when the question "is Britain European? is asked", the answer must be "Yes, but not only" (29). The British mind is believed to be exceptional because it had a different history and experience than the rest of Europe. This "we" and "they" dichotomy has been embedded by the Media, Daddow mentioned Menno Spiering arguing that newspapers proprietors and editors alighted on "stories about foreigners trying to lord it over 'us', or about absurd rulings imposed on the UK by alien institutions" (1221).

British politics is one of the British irreplaceable peculiarities. Furthermore, public opinion really matters in decision-making. In “Britain, Europe, and the United States: Reflections of an Anti-Maastricht Europhile”, Oliver Wright cited a passage from a television discussion hosted by Jon Snow who asked a German Member of the European Parliament (MEP): “how it was that the German government intended to sign up to the euro when clearly a majority of Germans did not want to give up the Deutschmark.” And the reply was “if the German political classes had listened to public opinion in the past, Germany would not have been the success it has been” (179). This means that following the public rarely leads to national achievements.

Even the French population’s skepticism towards European policies was apparent at times, Nevil Johnson mentioned that a referendum held in September 1992 revealed a weak majority support of the Maastricht treaty, he added that this rejection targeted the government’s policies of the time as well (“Britain and the Community” 386). He also stated that the French reticence was related to their language whereas the German people were sensitive about the reaffirmation of their national identity (375). Fig.1 shows Eurobarometer data in different years about the percentage of respondents who had a positive perception of their own country’s EU membership (Conti and Memoli 123).



Figure 2: Citizens' perceptions about EU membership (EU member states**)**

One can perceive that opposition to the EU kept increasing in most European countries namely in the period between (2009) and (2011). In addition to opinion polls, Euroscepticism was also evidenced by decreased voter participation in European Parliament elections: Simona Guerra stated that in 2014 the proportion dropped to 41.62 per cent whereas it was 61.99 per cent at the first EP elections in 1979 (2). This growing passivity followed (2010) and (2011) financial crisis which led the 48 % who had a positive image about the EU in 2009 to become 31 % in 2011 according to the Eurobarometer (Guerra 2). Furthermore, half of the European Parliament members were of Eurosceptic forces (2). Guerra cited that: “the ‘permissive consensus’ of European

integration in many public opinions has changed into a 'constraining dissensus'" (3). However, the British voice kept being louder than the other populations.

In the same regard, democratic practices declared by Europe were seen as mere bureaucratization by the British because of the process of politicizing tours from one capital to another to come out with "inexplicable controls and regulations" (Sharpe 320). Bureaucracy was not only about policy-making but it also damaged the British citizens' smooth daily affairs, European regulations were claimed to have put constraints on the latter. Johnson explained that confining to the club, the citizen was perceived as *l'administé* who when dealing with public authorities must comply with the formal rules under the supervision of an official ("Britain and the Community" 379), this restriction contradicted the British way of "treating every case on its merits", he added:

> The administrator is not regarded in the first instance as an agent of the state, a *functionnaire* or a *Beamter:* instead he is seen far more often as a provider of services to individuals, as a problem-solver, and an adviser to ministers. Above all he (or she) is the servant of the public, regularly reminded of a relatively humble status in relation both to his political masters and to *les administres* themselves. (380)

Johnson emphasized the close relationship between the British civil servants and the public. The role of the administrator is to serve the public and to give recommendations to the government.

When the British government decided to join the EC, it was not a public issue. Andrew Geddes claimed that EU membership was an elite concern in the 1960s and the 1970s; the general public was not enthusiastic about joining, yet their tone was not strong

enough to be held contrary to Parliament'sharsh discussions (186-187). It took the 1975's referendum to make it articulate but the attitude then was positive rather than negative with a "yes" victory (186). Hitherto, Nevil Johnson said that Britain was hesitantly obliged to accept the EC's successive forms of integrations to achieve an "ever close union" and "there has never been any act of 'whole-hearted consent'" ("Can Self-Government Survive?":193). He added that most of the British electorate considered the community as an "alien rule".

The British people's concern lay in the successive European expansion all over Europe. Johnson sought that "the vast majority of people in Britain [did] not yet identify with a vision of 'ever-closer union' inside the Community, and [did] not see their future political destiny in those terms, whatever they might mean" (375). Indeed, they could maintain their acceptance of the EC/EU if the connection was mainly based on economic cooperation. However, their opinion kept changing because they believed that their political system was foreshadowed by entities that were not elected by them. Since they are haunted by their history, it took them many reform acts throughout different eras to be enfranchised; therefore, the subject of decision-making is sensitive to the point of considering European integration as "disenfranchisement". In "Separate Ways", Peter Shore declared that,

> British people simply do not share the widespread desire, among the governments and peoples of their neighboring European states, to develop an 'ever closer union' to the point where national decision-making has been largely replaced by either majority votes in the Council of Ministers or by supranational authorities in Europe. (Holmes 2001: 227)

For the British, any national decision-making is exclusively related to Westminster, unlike their European neighbors who accept the decisions of a supra power. This was promoted by the Media and politicians who tended to spread terror and panic about the EU's Council of Ministers and Parliament's interference in internal issues.

Moreover, some British politicians identify their country with the US and English-speaking countries rather than with their European counterparts. Shore proved that this can also be said about the public, he referred to a 1995 BBC report about the British people's attitudes to Europe in which two questions were asked to 2000 electors. The second question was about the extent to which the British feel most in common with six countries and the conclusions proved that "while 21 percent felt they had 'most in common' with three of our principal European neighbors, no less than 52 percent chose the three English-speaking nations (US, Canada, Australia) (229)".

The same report revealed that the British approval of the EU was lower than the others' approvals. The report's first question was "how European do you feel?" and the answers proved that the sentiments were very weak as a majority of 49% said, "not at all" in contrast to 8% and 15% who answered with "great deal" and "fair amount" (Shore 228). Another comparative EC survey about popular attitudes to the EC between (1972-1989) had shown that the percentage of those who approved membership in Britain was 42% compared to the 100% in the other member countries except Denmark with 87% (cited in Sharpe 304). However, in a (2014) survey, only 15% chose the European identity from a list presented by British Social Attitudes, but only 7-8% of them wanted Britain to

leave the EU whereas 43% thought it was necessary to reduce EU power ("Britain and Europe" 7-8). In conclusion, even those who identified themselves with Europe rejected increasing spillovers of the community.

The trouble of the British public with EU membership grew fierce following the EU's 2004 enlargement to central and eastern Europe which was coined "the big bang" (Niblett 12). Freedom of movement pushed towards more opposition than the one generated by the Maastricht treaty. The growing flow of EU immigrants to the UK triggered excessive pressure on public services, and housing and caused lowering wages in some sectors (13). Behind welfare competition, it was difficult for the British, who belong to a great power with an economy that is ranked among the best world's largest economies, to accept being equally treated in terms of jobs and insurance with people coming from ordinary countries. Furthermore, as mentioned in the second chapter, the welfare system is an essential feature of Britishness: on the one hand, it created a sense of solidarity; on the other hand, it insured the people's well-being. Therefore, immigrants were seen as an obstacle to the good performance of this system besides their negative impact on society and identity; here the notion of Euroscepticism is recalled, "It is in this conflict at the domestic level that we can understand Euroscepticism, its emergence, its drivers and its success" (cited in Guerra 24).

However, the advantages brought by immigration are undeniable in terms of economy and health services. It is claimed that "The majority of the British population falls into an 'anxious middle', aware of the benefits of immigration but also concerned

about the pressures it may bring" (cited in Dempster and Hargrave 10). But the focus of the media on negative news as well as blaming all the society's vices on migrants led to the overspread of criticism, especially since this question was not personal for it was considered a "state of the nation" issue (cited in Dempster and Hargrave 13). In other words, the Media tended to link the migrant's negative impact on the nation rather than the individuals or the state, which is an effective way to charge the people against them.



Figure 3: (Britain and Benefits from EU membership (1989-2011) (Guerra 35)

An "anxious middle" also existed in terms of UK benefits from membership where the British are approximately divided in terms of opinion. A Eurobarometer data (Figure 3) showed that during the Single Market Years (1989-1991), the majority of the Brits believed that the UK benefited from integration when answering the following question: Would you say that your country benefited from being a member of the EU as shown in the above figure (Guerra 35). In fact, the public's positions towards membership

loosened over the 1990s as it started to be perceived as “a good thing” (Lynch 90). Also, in 1991, 52% of people who were asked favored remaining versus 35% who supported leaving, this percentage rose from 31% of Brits favoring “European government, responsible to a European Parliament” (Cited in Sharpe 304).

Before that, the beginning of the 1980s witnessed public anger against the EC which went hand in hand with Mrs. Thatcher’s striving to bring Britain’s money back until achieving a rebate in 1984; besides her Falkland war which revived British patriotism. The British contribution to the EC boosted people’s dissatisfaction with its pique and so did the financial crisis (2010-2011). Besides, the above figure showed that half of the people asked believed that their country did not profit from integration especially in (1993) following the Maastricht Treaty and (2004) enlargement as ten states joined including eight states from central and eastern Europe; the same negative attitude was in (2007) as Bulgaria and Romania joined the club.

There existed a clear link between the public and the Media’s opinions. For instance, the above figure showed that few people believed that their country profited from the EU (35%), this percentage can be assimilated with the rate (30%) of the people who supported EU policies as demonstrated by *The Times* and *The Guardian* (Bisjmans 81).

In the above figure, the rate of “don’t know” has maintained an average of 10 to 20 percent except in (1995) and between (1999-2001) where it achieved 30%. However, the public vision of the European community has been characterized as “a self-declared lack

of knowledge" (Geddes 211). Indeed 2010 Eurobarometer data showed that 64% of respondents to question about EU functioning answered that they distrust the EU and 56% admitted that they did not know how it worked (Bonneau 2011).

The public's apathy about the EU can be related to their indifference to politics in general, the fact of being presented with negative news drive people to alienate themselves from any source of information believing that they would fall into disillusionment, thus they prefer tranquility to awareness and consciousness. Galpin and Trenz said that "studies into the effects of media negativity have also demonstrated that negativity can lead to a lack of political knowledge or awareness of the news (54)". The EU system is also said to be "difficult to understand by citizens; the executive and legislative power dynamics are unclear to most and definitely arduous to understand if compared to the way democracy works in their home countries" (Conti and Memoli 126).

The impact of popular attitude towards Europe has had a big influence on the political realm. In order to gain more voters, party leaders tended to meet most of the public concerns. For instance, their opinion vis immigration triggered David Cameron's main intentions in his 2015 electoral campaign to discourage migrants from getting into the UK or to reduce the privileges of those who entered (Dauvergne 7). Moreover, the Brexit referendum, which took place on 23 June 2016, was claimed to be the result of a "nasty" and "intense" campaign that "definitely impacted on citizens' emotions" (Guerra 34). Guerra referred to a study that he conducted with Guerrina Exadaktylos (2016) to examine citizens' attitudes and emotions after the referendum based on a YouGov survey

(6-7 July 2016) (34). In brief, he summarized what pushed Brexiters to vote leave in the following,

> While among the reasons to vote 'Leave', answers are as follows: 'Immigration'; 'Transport problems in London'; 'Unwanted mass immigration'; 'Sovereignty'; 'TO GET BRITAIN BACK FOR THE PEOPLE AND TO DEFEND OUR BORDERS'; 'Immigration and independence'; 'cost, regulation and immigration'; 'lack of UK control over our finances'; 'bring back control'; 'immigration out of control'; 'Control of our own country, borders and laws'; 'To get away from a European super state'; 'Regain sovereignty. Have the ABILITY to control boarders'; 'To get away from a European super state'. (Guerra 36)

This passage mentioned all the keywords that have been repeated throughout the chapter. It included rolling back the UK's control over its finances, borders, and institutions, all this is about British sovereignty. Besides, the answers also contained accusing the EU of broadening the relationship between the public and the British state that was overshadowed by the EU decision-making.

In brief, the public attitude towards the EC/EU kept changing in so far as the domestic situation was not static. Europe's values of ever-closer union scarcely interested the British whose integration in the European Market was a means to a pragmatic end. British pragmatism limited the British approval of the European Union which they consider as based on idealist ideas. That is believed by Guerra who said: "The affective dimension, embracing abstract values and commitments to an idea, generally correlates with the length of membership" (28). The UK's material intentions from membership made it leave as long as it felt less benefitting than deserved, per contra, the other European nations' long integration is due to their adherence to the EU's ideals.

To conclude this chapter, Britain's late integration into the European community caused decades of troubled membership. The British biggest fear was Europeanization whereas their greatest challenge was to make the union follow British instructions. The British aspirations could not be fully achieved whereas their identity was believed to be at stake because of Europe's spillover. Therefore, Euroscepticism kept growing fierce, especially with the increasing influence of the media which pushed the public to prefer withdrawal. This can be considered as a discourse of Britishness that aimed at halting Europeanization and restoring British sovereignty.

Now that the UK left the EU in order to preserve its sovereignty, the question lies in the extent to which these aims would be achieved. In fact, under the EU, "a system of 'multi-level' governance in which interest groups, national bureaucracies, sub-national authorities, and supranational institutions have a crucial role in shaping and implementing policy (cited in Lynch 89). Leaving the EU does not prevent Britain from being manipulated by these pressure groups and even the democratic process is influenced by the Media. Therefore, since the actors that push towards decisions are the same, expecting fully different results is quite absurd.

Moreover, saying "British" is quite fuzzy for taking into consideration the four components of the UK and Northern Ireland reveals a relative opinion as far as being part of Europe from one nation to another. In so far as England and Wales are Eurosceptics Scotland and Northern Ireland tend to be Euro enthusiasts. That can be seen in the difference in the 2016 referendum vote rate to leave the EU: in England and Wales, more

than 50% voted leave, 44.2% in Northern Ireland whereas only 38% in Scotland. As a result, the UK's decision to leave the EU is expected to further shake the already fragile British union as will be dealt with in the last chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE FUTURE OF THE UNION: THE QUESTION OF SCOTLAND

England and Wales voted to leave the European Union unlike Scotland and Northern Ireland which chose Remain. As mentioned in the previous chapter, political sovereignty, as a mark of Britishness, was one of the reasons behind the British awkward attitude towards the European Community. Now that the UK has taken back its authority over the country, another sovereignty battle was declared a day after the Brexit referendum's result, as the Scottish First Minister Nichola Sturgeon declared her parliament's will to hold an independence referendum which would put the British national unity at stake.

A political and academic debate has been launched after Brexit to discuss the fate of the UK. In fact, the campaign to preserve Britishness from Europeanization ended paving the way for another campaign to break the union not by the same parties though. Soon after Brexit, polls depicted high Scottish support for independence; the proportion that reached 55% in October 2020 has been unpredictable; in the last survey of January 2022, 50% of the people asked said that they would vote YES in a second referendum on independence (indyref2) (*What Scotland thinks*). Regardless of the accuracy of opinion polls, many believe that Scotland would acquire its independence either in the short othe a long term. Sir John Curtice, Professor of Politics at Strathclyde University, said that the British post-Brexit deal with Europe failed to satisfy the Scots, hence, Scotland has been perceived "as the weakest link in the Union chain" because most of the people all over the Kingdom believe that the Scots would obtain their independence in ten years' time ("How Brexit Shapes").

Speculations about the union's fate can be traced back to the second half of the twentieth century as Britain's break-up was tagged to the loss of its Empire, in addition

to the independence of Southern Ireland. Brexit restored this 1960s-1970s gloomy view of British unity. Politicians, journalists, and commentators have dealt with the detrimental impact of a hard Brexit on British integrity since June 2016. Peter Hennessy, a constitutional historian, believed that "23 June lit a fuse beneath the union" (quoted in Gillespie 511). Gordon Brown, former labour MP, said that the union could recover from many dangers, but the actual peril is cruel for the first time in three centuries (quoted in Gillespie 511).

The present chapter tackles the Scottish independence debate to investigate unionist politicians' discourse to hinder the UK's disintegration and stop the Scottish National Party's (SNP) independence agenda. It deals with the union as an intrinsic aspect of Britishness i.e., it is based on a political rather than cultural view of the concept. Firstly, it discusses the relationship between the British Empire's decline and the evolution of Scottish nationalism. Subsequently, it exposes the impact of Brexit on reviving the Scottish independence issue as well as the unionist discourse to prevent separatism. It argues that the Scottish Conservative and Labour party's unionist discourse is founded on ideal representations of the union's common achievements, values, and institutions to divert the Scots from Scottish civic and economic nationalism. Furthermore, the symbolic feature of Britishness, namely the monarchy, is likely to survive in the case of Scottish independence.

A Foretold Dusk of the Union

The British Empire had postponed the emergence of Scottish nationalism and helped to a great extent the survival of the British union. However, its collapse revealed an economic decline that the British government failed to overcome. Consequently, a

dramatic Scottish skepticism and indifference about remaining as a part of the UK emerged because the Scots realized that they scarcely benefited from the empire regardless of their unrecognized contributions to its economic and military success. This nurtured Scottish nationalism and generated a debate about the break-up of the union.

In "The Breakup of Britain? Scotland and the End of Empire: The Prothero Lecture", Scottish historian T.M Devine reviewed post-empire literature that speculated the end of Britain. He quoted Professor Dewar Bibb claiming that bounds between England and Scotland were held by an empire whose decline could imply the ebb of the union (164). He also mentioned that imperial historians such as Sir Reginald Coupland concluded that the growth of nationalist parties after decolonization declared a series of independence that would not end with Southern Ireland, this debate was spread namely during the 1960s and 1970s after the Scottish National Party's overwhelming election victory (164). Furthermore, in *Scottish Nationalism* H.J. Hanham gave two solutions to the post-empire Scottish weak economy either migration or "recreating the Scottish nation at home" (Cited in Devine 164).

Above all, Tom Nairn, who was portrayed as the prophet of the breakup of Britain by Anthony Barnet, discussed the mid-20th century's British estimated disintegration in *The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-nationalism.* He believed that Britain drew its economic and military strength from the Empire, to which it was deeply tied; consequently, imperial loss was expected to cause an internal abruption (*The Break Up* 13). The latter was in the form of Scottish neo-nationalism[1] that he designated as

[1] Neo-nationalism was a reaction to more advanced consequences of capitalism: the oil industry as well as multinationalism and the internationalization of capital. It shares some conditions with nationalism such as the uneven impact of development between a nation and another but neonationalism happened in regions which were

Western Europe's most distinguishable movement of the time (71). He referred to the neo-nationalist stream as "the disruptive trend of the periphery", which was twofold: on the one hand, it resulted from the British downfall after decolonization, on the other hand, it caused and anticipated a British "foreseeable end" (73). Besides, he considered that the discovery of the North Sea Oil constituted an imperial substitute for the British state and a reminder of the Scottish national potential to the Scots (72). Therefore, the fall of the empire paradoxically boosted both the British state's need for Scotland and the latter's belief in their ability to become autonomous. The resolution that would make the nationalist trend abandon their separatist aspirations required a British state break with "the old hierarchical burden", in reference to Westminster and the constitution's sovereignty, and reform into a federal "European multinational state" rather than "devolution" (91).

Hence, the British empire is believed to have had a major role in binding the UK's nations together. In effect, Scottish involvement in the British Empire from the 18th to the 20th century represented "vital economic cement" to the British union (Devine 165). Glasgow was given the title of "second city of the empire" in 1824; besides, Scotland's broader west was known as "the workshop of the British Empire" (169).

Nevertheless, Devine argued that relating the disintegration of the union to the empire's collapse was "fallacious" for decline made the integrity of Britain more important than before (167, 180). Nairn's expectations as far as Scottish independence did not occur at the near term of the book, yet this threat kept haunting the British fate

in the border of great powers and not colonized by the latter such as the case in 19th century nationalism (Nairn 128-9).

up to the current time because the British centre still clings to conservatism and rejects more reforms. Indeed, Scotland benefited from some devolved powers in 1997, but this did not stop nationalism, it rather nurtured it. In effect, hard times marked moments of solidarity and unity in British history as depicted in the second chapter. Nevertheless, in moments of prosperity, the British fissures reappear, Michael Keating said that when "Scotland [was] thriving", nationalism grew more vigorous, hence the Scottish case in the post-devolution era ("The Strange Death" 366).

The link between Scotland and the empire was also controversial, some perceived the Scots as victims of contributing to an English enterprise while others described them as "able and eager participants" (Mackenzie 732). On the one hand, it was argued that imperial matters were under English control, and the Scottish people were "only mercenaries in an essentially alien enterprise" (731). On the other hand, an amount of literature depicted the Scottish people as an inherently "empire-builder" or literally "a race of natural empire builders" (Devine 170). Scotland was portrayed as the only nation that had a crucial position in the empire alongside England if compared to Ireland and Wales (170). It was also believed that the empire combined English institutions and Scottish ethics including the legal, banking, and educational systems (Mackenzie 732, 737).

Such recognitions of the Scottish achievements did not exist in the 18th century which was dominated by an Anglo-centric portrayal of an "English empire"; yet the 19th century's historical writings started revealing the Scottish imperial imprints, and this was intensified during the following century (Mackenzie 714, 721). Early in the history of Great Britain, British narratives tackled Scotland, not as an integral part of Britain,

yet as a component of the British imperial identity (Stevenson 108). The Scottish identity was overshadowed by the union and empire through assimilation or absorption. It was represented by some unionists as "historic" and "… a spurious nationality" because "Scotland has passed the stage of nationhood. Her nationhood has been absorbed into a wider area." (Quoted in Finlay, "Scotland" 106-107). For some unionists, the 1707 Act of Union ended the era of Scottishness per se and declared an age of Britishness, hence the former existed only during the period that preceded the union.

In the same regard, some rejected the existence of any exclusive nation within the union except a British global one. British Conservative politician Robert Boothby denied Scottish potential for self-government and criticized home rule bills because he believed that the Scots owed a lot to the union made of them "an imperial race" (quoted in Finlay "National Identity in Crisis" 256). Pre-union Scotland was depicted as a region on the verge of civilization whose people had suffered from backwardness and poverty until it was redeemed after being exposed to England's civilization. The idea of Britain as an imperialist union continued to exist amongst British traditionalist and even Scottish unionist elites and politicians, even after the fall of the empire; the difference is that it took the form of nostalgia that nurtured their patriotism and blinded them from London's central rule.

Moreover, the blessings of the empire on Scotland were manifested by some and declined by others. Indeed, imperialism afforded raw materials to the Scottish industry including textile and heavy industries (ships and locomotives), but the products were exported to the imperial markets in favour of the upper and middle classes that had

abroad opportunities in terms of professions and military service (Devine 165). These classes also led explorations, religious missions, and imperial administrations (Rachman 26). Consequently, they became richer at the expense of the lower classes who suffered from low wages, high living costs, in addition, they were jobless, sick, and unsheltered (Devine 177; Finlay, "National" 243).

The working class was not only deprived of the empire's privileges but they were also described by some as indifferent and ignorant about it and if interested, their interest was claimed to be "superficial" (quoting Bernard Porter, Devine 170). In contrast, T. M. Devine denied the Scottish public's apathy towards the empire as he emphasized the role of the 19th century's educational narratives in creating a unionist consciousness amongst the Scots who learned about their imperial heroes and celebrated them in addition to feting the empire at schools as well as the institutions that promulgated not only Christianity but also dedication to the empire (171). As a matter of fact, not all working people were able to have an education and acquire such a consciousness.

To conclude, the previously mentioned literature as far as Scottish status in the imperial union is twofold, it promoted unionism and nationalism altogether. On the one side, the empire, indeed, solidified the British union, Scottish nationhood emanated from it and their nationalist feelings were "not contradicted with the union … it was within it" (Devine 170). Subsequently, this method was used in the narratives drawn to hinder the dissolution of the union through awakening in the Scots a nostalgia for their imperial past to divert them from their inner troubles with London. The Scots were hallucinated by imperial pride at a time where European small nations acquired their independence

(Devine 165). Hence, it had a detrimental effect on the Scottish people who were depicted as "empire Scots were lost Scots" (Mackenzie 730).

On the other side, the disdain for Scotland's role in the empire nurtured a Scottish disillusionment with their status quo. They figured out that they had little benefit from the imperial enterprise for they were enduring unemployment, immigration, and a simple industry that depended on imperial markets: 70% of locomotives and goods were directed to the empire (Mackenzie 723). Professor Richard Finlay said that between (1815-1939), about 2 million Scots fled to Canada and the USA in addition to 600,000 who migrated to England; as for unemployment, "over a quarter of the entire labour force" were jobless in 1932 (Cited in Devine 177-178). He also spoke of the high rate of poverty and the big problem of housing compared to the situation in England (177). Thus, Scottish Nationalism came as a reaction to the negation of the Scottish role in the empire, besides the fact that Scotland did not really benefit from it.

Towards Scottish Nationalism

Scottish nationalism was defined by contemporary British social anthropologist Anthony Cohen as "a lament for the continuing denial of the integrity and authenticity of Scottish nationhood" (803). It took the First World War and the 1929 economic depression to make the Scots grow aware of the necessity of rewriting their own history for many reasons. Finlay said that Scotland's involvement with the victorious British army in the Great War had shaken the Scottish traditional view of their identity that had to suit new circumstances ("National" 242). Scottish elites realized that although their country contributed the same as the English in the economic achievements of the empire, besides the military success, they did not benefit from these accomplishments; for their

living conditions were “the most shocking in western Europe” with a rate of unemployment that was 50% higher than England’s (242, 245).

The inter-war period marked a lamentable situation in Scotland, this led to a huge discussion about national identity amid a Scottish political weakness (Finlay 243). The Scots became overwhelmed with uncertainty about their fate in the Union and their national confidence was dislocated (243). Therefore, a Scottish cultural renaissance took place, but this rebirth’s role in Scottish nationalism was highly debatable because its literature, such as Hugh MacDiarmid’s and Edwin Muir’s poems and writings, focused on Scottish folkloric symbols and synthetic language instead of recalling the nation’s achievements and lamenting its drastic situation. Indeed, this revival of folk cultures, traditions, and dialects was considered a sort of nostalgia and escape from reality that would not take Scotland out of its identity crisis. It was portrayed by *The Scots Magazine* (August 1926) as:

> a myth, believed in by nobody outside a very small circle -if indeed by them. To hark back artificially to older things or to dredge the dictionary for archaic Scottish words is to achieve nothing new. And this so far is the achievement. (cited in Finlay “National” 244)

The reinvention of “tartan” Scotland was traced back to the 1820s under the backup of Queen Victoria (Mackenzie 729). The Scottish renaissance literature, which was seen as sub-nationalism by some and called “tartanry” by others, was based on portraying archaic stereotypes of Scottish tartan dress and pipes. This was promoted by myths about the Scots’ achievements in the empire (Mackenzie 722). In this regard, political elites and commentators mimicked this literary and artistic movement by describing Scotland as “a dying entity”, “a hollow tartan sham”, “that distressed area: North

Britain", and as "an empty shell, painted tartan, drained to make a foreign and largely imperial omelet" (Finlay "National" 244; Mackenzie 731).

In retrospect, even if Scotland was a "small European nation", it was seen as a precursor of the enlightenment for 18th-century thinkers such as David Hume, Adam Smith, and Adam Ferguson, who influenced European modernist philosophy in terms of history, economy, and politics, were Scots. Consequently, Scotland was considered the bedrock of European modernity (Alexander 144, Craig 14). But this was disdained in industrious Scotland that could lead a nationalist movement, yet this did not take shape during the 19th century. Moreover, 20th-century Scottish nationalists denied the aforementioned Scottish thinkers' literature and considered that the latter did not represent the Scottish culture and Scottishness, it only "happened in Scotland but was not a part of Scotland" because it was written in English and did not object the union (Craig 14).

In fact, the 19th century marked the birth of nationalist movements throughout the European continent, but Scotland's nationalist wind did not blow until the following century. The industrial revolution created gaps between nations in terms of progress and development, this unequal destiny was coined as uneven development. Therefore, nations that felt underdeveloped witnessed an emergence of nationalist movements that recalled the past to re-establish the present. Tom Nairn spoke of three categories of the 19th century's nations: he considered England and France as the time's leaders; the second category include the nations which were on the road of recapturing their place in the world through revolt against the first category's hegemony (*The Break-up* 108). For instance, Italy's nationalist leaders were inspired by their roman legacy to raise the

Italian people's awareness about their past and enable them to recreate their historic pride, as a means to overtake the humiliating situation they were enduring under foreign aggressors.

Between 1800 and 1870, Scotland did not belong neither to the leaders nor to the second group, it constituted alone the third "odd-group". Indeed, her economic growth was remarkable, yet this prevented a nationalist movement from seeing the light, in Marxist terms, the material progress caused the decline of the superstructure that had already evolved and matured early in the 18th century (Nairn 108, 113, 117). Scotland's cultural and educational systems produced intellectuals, yet the time's materialist atmosphere led to abandoning humanities elites who were celebrated during the 18th century, instead, the country's interest was in natural sciences, technology, and medicine; consequently, social science scholars preferred to emigrate to England where they contributed in the making of an Anglo-centric imperial culture (124,125). Besides, the shining of Scottish universities dimmed in favour of English universities that hosted Scottish students (Mackenzie 729). Nairn called this process "provincialization" as the Scottish intelligentsia left their land, which had a history and culture as if it were a hinterland and preferred to benefit the developed capital (125). In other words, the enlightenment was the mouthpiece of nationalism, nevertheless Scottish production of literature that existed before the 19th century halted during the latter, and this prevented a political nationalism from emergence (114).

Post-World Wars' Scotland was therefore jammed between a negated 18th century Anglocentric enlightenment legacy led by Walter Scott and a Highland culture based on myths and stereotypes at the expense of the near past and the present.

Regardless, some consider that the narratives of Scottishness based on myths marked a reaffirmation of the Scottish identity, even if it was based on invented traditions (Mackenzie 737).

The importance of the Scottish rural past was reconsidered in the 1990s as Scots literary works were used to portray Scottish continuity and deep roots to distinguish it from English ones such as Edwin Morgan's poetry. In "Constituting Scotland", Scottish Professor Cairns Craig stated that the 1990s Scottish literature and ideas focused on showing the bright side of the Scottish culture and traditions which survived even if the country went through different phases in the union from industrialization to de-industrialization (20).

Regardless of whether Scottish writings were founded on folklore or myths, they were promoted in one way or another Scottish nationalism. By the same token, the emergence of Scottish literature reflected the presence of a nationalist spirit. John Mackenzie, professor of imperial history, believed that "nationalism energize [s] the writing of history" (714). In fact, Scottish modern written history was given a typically Scottish and Presbyterian dimension to distinguish it from Anglican features and strengthen the Scottish identity, which would be used by parties for political ends (Finlay, "Scotland" 104-107).

In contrast, Scottish writings and political statements in the 19th century were labeled unionist nationalism[2] because their objective was to protect the Scottish rights to their typical institutions which were guaranteed by the 1707 Act of Union such as the

[2] Concept of Scottish Professor in modern history Graeme Morton.

Church, the Educational System, and the Law System. Politically speaking, home rule bills were discussed at the end of the 19th century, yet their goal was not a Scottish autonomy or prerogative to choose their governors but only to keep the country's status quo and ensure that England would not repeal the 1707 union Act's agreements. Craig mentioned that Scottish politicians declared that they would never wish to have their own parliament as in the 17th century because being under Westminster's mercy was much better than the "darkness" they were living in before (5-6).

As opposed to unionist nationalism, separatist nationalism did not emerge until during the inter-war period. The 1920s marked the creation of some nationalist parties such as The National Party of Scotland (1928), but this did not represent a threat to British integration. As a matter of fact, the Scottish bourgeoisie had no interest in nationalism because they benefited from the economic and commercial advantages of empire, as Nairn put it; everything meant "nonsense" to them except business (*The Break-Up* 169-170). Moreover, they still leaned on the British government and had London as the centre of their interests, yet when the British economic decline persisted, Scottish railways and banks started to be possessed by the English, and London was giving little attention to Scottish affairs in Parliament that also ignored the Scottish legal system; the scope of nationalism widened and became a threat to unionism (Keating, "The Strange Death" 369).

Consequently, unionist parties started losing their Scottish seats in Westminster by 1965; such a loss softened the labour party's attitude towards Scottish nationalist demands that were still unconcerned with independence (369). This Scottish nationalism was described as civic neo-nationalism that sought the Scottish legitimate right for

making political decisions; it was detached from myths and adopted the post-modern spirit of pluralism (Craig 20-21). By the same token, Tom Nairn saw that the Scots' nationalist ideologies placed ethnic and linguistic peculiarities in the second position after socioeconomic matters (71). It was a quest to be fully Scottish citizens who enjoy their typical history and tradition and are governed by their inveterate institutions.

Devolution "a process not an event"[3]

Michael Keating traced back the process of devolution to William Gladstone's idea of decentralizing the British state towards "a federation of self-governing nations", in (1886) ("Reforging" 217). However, Scottish modern historians located "the root of devolution" in the period of the 1960s-1970s which marked a Scottish disillusionment with the Labour and Conservative parties' failure to solve the problems of inflation and to settle "an economic welfare" (Devine 166). Hence, the breakthrough of the Scottish nationalist movement was not so much about the empire's decline than the failure of the UK's parties to manage the situation. Yet, only a proportion of 33% of the electorate favoured a devolved Scottish parliament in 1979. This majority's opposition led Tom Devine to believe that the post-empire circumstances were not sufficient to lead to a Scottish consensus about constitutional changes, rather it was the 1980s economic crisis as well as Thatcher's rejection of social policies, which were like a straw that broke the camel's back as they led to "a general hostility in Scotland" during the 1990s (166).

The Scottish National Party (SNP) was born amid British politics dominated by a static power race between two major parties: the Tories and the Labour party. The

[3] Quoted in Laffin and Thomas page 96.

Liberal Party (the Whigs) disappeared from the political arena by the 1950s, their Scottish home rule objective was adopted by Labour politicians who soon gave it in, they gave huge importance to British interests (Finlay "National" 244). Therefore, the SNP was to run this Scottish political lacuna, it wed a left-wing party, the National Party of Scotland, with a right-wing party, the Scottish Self-Government Party. In fact, after its creation in 1934, the SNP walked unnoticed, except for the fact of winning its first seat in 1945; three decades later, it started to have remarkable progress. Still, in the 1960s, the SNP founders were perceived as "minor players" and their Scottish question was considered "a busted cause" (Stevenson 112).

Unexpectedly, Scottish nationalism, drawn from this party, started to be a threat to the Conservatives and a project of investment for the Labour party in October 1974 general election because the SNP won seats that competed with the Labours' (30% of voices in Scotland, 11 seats in Westminster). Historians dealt with the advancement of this party from scratch to a parliamentary actor, it was believed that the process was unpredictable because the SNP's fate was subject to changing circumstances. This was asserted by Finlay who added that the party's career caused too much ambivalence in the end of the 20th century because its breakthrough was unpredictable and related to the time's conditions ("Scotland" 103).

In 1967 by-election, the SNP won a seat of the Labour Party in Hamilton, Scotland; this led Harold Wilson, the then Labour Prime Minister[4] to run for devolved governments, and many foresaw a Scottish independence in the 1970s (Mitchell 80). In this regard, the Kilbrandom Royal Commission was installed by Wilson's government

[4] 1964-1970, 1974-1976

to discuss constitutional changes regarding the UK's structure in 1969, four years later the commission sought the creation of a Scottish Assembly that would share devolved powers with Westminster except for economic policies, and would remain loyal to the British Monarchy. This coincided with the loss sustained by the Labour Party under PM James Callaghan (1976-1979) in different by-elections including Glasgow's. Scotland bills were forcibly passed in the British Parliament in 1978, however, a post-legislative referendum took place in 1979, the bill put a hurdle to the YES supporters' proportion by 40% of the total electorate, otherwise, the bill would be repealed. Such a proportion was not achieved as only 32.9% of the electorate accepted said YES, even if 51.6% supported establishment of a Scottish assembly. Consequently, the following government under Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990) repealed the bill. In the same year, the SNP lost nine seats from eleven, therefore it witnessed a dramatic decline in its popularity and the story of devolution fell into oblivion.

The Scottish question was considered as an "irritating anomaly" by Margaret Thatcher and John Major's governments (1979-1997) which opposed the "balkanization" or division of Britain (quoting James Mitchell in Laffin and Thomas 92). Before becoming a PM, Thatcher promised that if the conservative party were elected, a Scottish assembly would be the government's prior concern in order "to ensure that more decisions affecting Scotland are taken in Scotland by Scotsmen", however, she put the UK's unity as a condition to allow such an alteration ("Speech in Glasgow"). In fact, her Conservative reign abolished the former labour government's efforts to achieve "elected assemblies in Scotland and Wales" (Laffin and Thomas 92). The 1980s monetarist policy required controlling the money supply which led to cutting

investments in nationalized industries. Coal, steel, and shipbuilding, the pillars of the Scottish economy, were ignored by the Conservative government that prioritized nuclear, gas, and fuel, therefore, the unemployment rate surged in Scotland, besides the miners' strike 1984-1985 crashed by Thatcher, as a part of her battle against trade unions. Furthermore, the poll tax[5] was imposed on Scotland one year before England against the Scottish will and pressure; all these conditions charged the Scots against Thatcher. Indeed, heavy industry was a symbol of the Scottish identity and history and the source of its people's income, the state retreat from promoting it and the privatization of some industries such as steel was a war declared against Scottishness. Political disillusionment was depicted in the 1988 Scottish Cup Final as the audience waved red cards when the Iron Lady came along to the stadium (Appendix 7).

Thatcher's rejection of socialism was felt more in Scotland than in any other region of the UK because the Scots are said to be "more social democratic values adherers" (Keating "The Strange Death" 372). This tendency was seized by the 1980s and 1990s conservative unionist rhetoric to depict them as dependent on government and short of business inventiveness (372). By the same token, the period of consensus politics approached Britishness to Scottishness since the latter is known with its welfare and egalitarian preferences; Keating said that both identities "were reformulated at the same time" (367).

In contrast, some disagree with the fact that Thatcher's years were disastrous to Scotland, their opinion was built upon the growth of the Scottish economy throughout the decades that followed her reign as it became one of the wealthiest regions in the UK.

[5] The community charge where the poor would pay as much as the rich.

The Spectator Columnist Alex Massie said that undoubtedly Thatcher's passivity towards deindustrialization was not only a "political mistake" but also "a moral blunder", yet she also prevented the closure of Ravenscraig steel mill twice until it was closed in 1992. A positive view of Thatcher's reign in Scotland was also shown by former SNP leader Alex Salmond, now pro-independence, who declared that the Scots disappointment with her was caused by her social policies rather than the economic ones; he added that paradoxically Thatcher's "un-Scottish" attitude paved the way to the SNP's blossom (Massie).

Certainly, Thatcherism was considered a "fuel to nationalism", and Margaret Thatcher was considered "the mid-wife of Scottish devolution than the factor of imperial decline" (Rachman 26; cited in Devine 166). However, her attitude towards trade unions, civil societies, and local governments was considered beneficial to the Scottish question by some commentators. The deprival of the Scots, namely the Scottish political elites, from politics provided them with a warrior's rest during which they gathered their force, traced back their national identities, and reviewed their perception of devolution which was simmering (Laffin and Thomas 93). Therefore, Scottish national identities were awakened and a desire to stop the UK government-imposed instructions made devolution "a more compelling idea than before" (93).

The oblivious attitude of the conservative governments towards the Scottish ambition was not the only reason behind public and politicians' tendency towards Scottish nationalism, Scotland's changing economic situation also had its share in it. Scottish dependency on coal and steel industries which became out of date during the late 20th century damaged Scotland's economy. The turn of the century marked a

noteworthy shift in global economic powers to the United States of America and Germany whose industries progress was interconnected and inimitable compared to the Scottish simplistic products (Devine 178). As previously mentioned, since the First World War economic crises succeeded which gave way to high unemployment, immigration, and Scottish loss of their firms that became between the English hands (179). Furthermore, the economic recovery following the Second World War coincided with decolonization, but the Scots found themselves amongst the poorer world populations.

The founding of the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly (CSA), later became the Campaign for a Scottish Parliament, as a non-party organization that was created a year after the 1979 referendum, was pivotal in the future of devolution. It introduced a new constitutional settlement entitled "Claim of Right for Scotland" which was signed in 1989, the following passage is extracted from it:

> We, gathered as the Scottish Constitutional Convention, do hereby acknowledge the sovereign right of the Scottish people to determine the form of Government best suited to their needs, and do hereby declare and pledge that in all our actions and deliberations their interests shall be paramount.
>
> We further declare and pledge that our actions and deliberations shall be directed to the following ends: To agree a scheme for an Assembly or Parliament for Scotland; To mobilise Scottish opinion and ensure the approval of the Scottish people for that scheme; and To assert the right of the Scottish people to secure implementation of that scheme. (cited in Mitchell 84)

The settlement was a clear recognition of the Scottish people's sovereignty; it gave them the absolute right to decide about the form of their government that must work for their benefit. It also ensured the Scots about the creation of a Scottish Assembly or Parliament. This could gain Labours' support and was encouraged by the trade unions

and Churches; it was the basis of a scheme for Home Rule in 1992 which was supported by a majority of Scottish vote: 58/72 seats (Keating "Reforging" 224).

Besides the Scots growing nationalist sentiments and the initiatives of the CSA, some stressed the role of international factors in pushing toward devolution. Keating spoke of "the crisis of the nation-state" amidst an age of "globalization and Europeanization" (221). The Scots wanted to make their culture a part of a universal one and to progress in European and international markets (222). They were attracted by the European Union's "committee of the Regions" which acknowledged the role of different regions in European development. Not being a direct member of the EU posed an obstacle for Scotland in terms of boosting their economy and gaining cultural recognition for Scottish traditions. For instance, the Scots language was not recognized by the Scotland Act 1998 the same as Gaelic, yet it was recognized by the second part of the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages in 2000 (Lawson 146). Through such privileges, the EU has attracted nations that are under the umbrella of multi-national states. In addition to economic factors, for the Single Market and Customs Union facilitated the Scottish devolution process and improved it. (Gillespie 514). This was because "nationalist movements" are nurtured by "economic nationalism", which stimulates them to struggle to make their country free from any economic restrictions imposed by another entity (Roux 12).

In retrospective, Scottish nationalists opposed British integration into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973 and promoted a no-vote campaign in the 1975 referendum on the EC. The time's SNP leader Billy Wolfe expressed his concern about Scotland's future within the EEC, he said that if the UK remained a

member, the Scots would sustain "a political dark age of remote control and undemocratic government" (*Insigh*t). Furthermore, the Scottish labour party linked British disintegration with Europe unification (Keating, "The Strange" 375). In the 1980s, this anti-European Market position took the opposite direction, just like the labour party. However, unlike the latter's primary opposition, the SNP followed "a vaguely pro-European line in the 1950s", which changed to the opposition in the 1960s (375).

In effect, Scottish nationalists' objection to remaining in the community was influenced by a mistrust of the conservative party; they considered integration as a "Tory free-market project" that would have a negative impact on the Scottish culture and economy (Rioux 16). Europe was depicted as a threat to Scotland as a nation, in addition to Brussel's centralization and control of the North Sea Oil (*Insight*). Today, a pro-European discourse warns about shifting some powers from Brussels to Westminster, moreover, in *Scotland's Place in Europe*, Sturgeon declared that her country benefited a lot from Europe and still hopes to benefit more not only in regard to economy, but also in terms "of peaceful co-existence, mutual solidarity and support, and prosperity built on co-operation".

The story of the Scottish European rapprochement was triggered by economic cooperation. In the 1980s, the SNP was still against being a full member but supported the idea of "a bilateral trade agreement between an independent Scotland and the EEC"; at the time the party did not wish to become a member of the community until the 1990s where its vision of Scotland was extended to an independent state in Europe (Rioux 16). In this era, international ideals embraced regions rather than centralized states, and

regional development became a universal objective in which sub-governments had to be created to invest in the growth of its locality. Nationalists' perception of a Scottish economy transcended Scotland's position in the UK to the global market (Keating "The Strange" 371).

In 1997, new labour was in power under the leadership of Tony Blair whose major target was to modernize the UK and to enable every part of it to have a say in the UK's affairs, according to a white paper entitled *Scotland's Parliament*, that was published in July 1997, besides another paper for Wales *A Voice for Wales*. A second devolution referendum was organized the same year, this time it took place before legislation, unlike the 1979's post-legislative referendum. The Scots showed a strong desire to have their own parliament: 74.3% voted yes to the first question about whether they wanted their own parliament, although they were hesitant about the ability of this parliament to raise taxes, hence 63.5 responded yes to the second question about whether they wanted this parliament to have tax varying power. Consequently, the *Scotland Act* 1998 was passed in Westminster, and contrary to the 1978 act which was anti-Scottish economic autonomy, it gave the Scots the right to economic legislation. John Mitchell concluded that "Parliamentary Sovereignty had been attenuated; Scottish popular sovereignty appeared to have won out" (85).

In fact, the basic rate of the income tax was not the only policy that remained under Westminster's control with a Scottish ability to put it up or down by 3 pence. Holyrood, the Scottish Parliament, had limited power as far as foreign affairs, defence, macro-economy, and social security. These elements are part of British statecraft that binds the shared British national, economic, and social interests. In brief, Westminster

includes a separate Scottish legislation body, and the Scottish parliament uses the Scots law in primary legislative powers besides the executive led by a First Minister (Keating 226). However, the British parliament still holds the fate of the devolved governments and their rules, it can even abolish them as it did in the abolition of the Northern Ireland Parliament in (1972). This limited prerogative of the devolved parliaments distinguishes it from federalist which is "a legal guarantee to sub-national tier of government" (Bogdanor 288). In terms of European policy, Scottish ministers discuss with the Council of Ministers and the Scottish parliament deals with scrutinizing legislatures that are typically directed to the Scottish people. It is argued that the Scottish establishment adopted a European way more than the English institutions (Mackenzie 738).

To conclude, many reasons led the Scottish people to change their opinion as far as devolution is concerned. However, EU privileges and the Scottish desire for economic growth and internationalism have had a crucial role in making the people support having their own parliament, hand in hand with the New Labour's commitment to Europe that induced the British government to facilitate the process. Hence, it was argued that devolution was not so much "an aberration in the context of the constitutional evolution in the UK than "a European norm" (Laffn and Thomas 93).

The Brexit Deadlock

After Brexit, the UK government promised to seek a deal that benefits the four regions of the UK and to "bring the country back together" ("EU Exit" 3). But Brexiters alleged restoration of sovereignty, borders' control, and self-determination have engendered a union's dilemma because Scotland and Northern Ireland voted to stay in the EU. Brexit

awakened Scottish desire for independence that was silenced by 2014's rejection of the first independence referendum.

The territorial sovereignty crisis generated by Brexit is more than a question of borders. It has coincided with a debate about the source of sovereignty, namely whether the latter should be decided throughout parliament or referendums (Gillespie 510). The British withdrawal from the EU was chosen by the people's ballot; this speaks volumes about the pivotal role of the vote in determining the UK's future including the union's integration. The latter generated a big discussion: on the one hand, anti-self-government elites and people defend the supreme sovereignty of the British parliament besides the British union's integrity. On the other hand, Scottish nationalists strive to acquire the Scottish people's sovereignty and intend to put the independence decision in the Scottish hands. Regardless of the fact that Scotland has its devolved parliament and government, London is still accused of interfering in Scottish issues, especially after Brexit.

Consequently, four constitutional trajectories were put into question: a break-up of the UK, a renegotiated UK, a differentiated UK, and finally a federated UK (Gillespie 509). The first hypothesis suggests a hard Brexit[6] with London as the centre of the union; which might lead to the independence of Scotland and Wales, in addition to the reunification of Ireland, which would promote English nationalism and abolish unionism (515). Secondly, a soft Brexit that even if applied with a centralized British government would re-establish the status quo of the disillusioned devolved governments (515). The third option requires a breakup from the EU that does not prevent Scotland from having a close relationship with it (515). A federal UK was the last trajectory that

[6] A complete divorce from the EU.

would guarantee a soft Brexit as well as a decentralization of power with a written constitution, which makes of unionism a new project (515).

The debate about these resolutions was deemed a part of "a constitutional moment"[7] that did not occur since the Glorious Revolution (1688). The issue represents a "turning point" that can be met only if the British traditional state minimizes its centralism to reach stability all over the UK (Gillespie 510). In fact, none of the suggested hypotheses satisfied conservative unionists who cling to keep the union intact by any means, including the former Prime Minister Boris Johnson who, when he came into power on the 24th of July 2019, was granted a new title as the Minister of the Union. Hitherto, he has striven to ensure Westminster's control over the four nations and bring back sovereignty from Brussels to London, to achieve "union-proof government policies" and to solidify the union (quoted in Gillespie 521). It is worth mentioning that article 30 of the 1998 Scotland Act allows the Scottish Parliament to pass independence referendum legislation but this must be approved by the British PM who keeps expressing his rejection of the idea.

Soon after Brexit, the Scottish government issued *Scotland's Place in Europe* with some proposals to lessen Brexit and guarantee Scotland's interests in the EU. The paper first insisted on the fact that both the Scottish majority and the Scottish government share a "strong desire" to stay in the EU. The Scottish First Minister Nicholas Sturgeon admitted that the best option to meet this preference was Scottish independence because the latter would enable Scotland "to become a full member of the

[7] " a period of time where the people and politicians launch discussions about creating 'a new frame for future politics through critical junctures or crises'" (quoted Gillespie 510-511).

EU". However, three proposals were put forward to reach a compromise with the UK government. The Scottish government did not prefer these compromising options which were suggested just to reduce the turmoil caused by obliging Scotland to leave the EU (*Scotland's Place in Europe*).

Scotland's Place in Europe proposed that the UK remains in the European Single Market via the European Economic Area (EEA) and the Customs Union. This was considered "the softest of soft Brexits", which was interpreted by Adam Tomkins, former MSP for the Scottish Conservative Unionist Party, as an option to remain a member of the Single Market while leaving the European Parliament and Court of Justice which cannot be legally recognized because a nation can "have access" or "participate" in a market rather than joining it like an organization ("Scotland" 130). Furthermore, the Scottish government wanted the UK to stay integrated into the European Single Market and benefit from some EU privileges, which comprise the systems of "immigration, business regulation, health and safety, and employment law", this was claimed to be unfathomable because of the British government's preference of a hard Brexit (Biagi 124), as well as the very principle of Brexit of taking back control that is contradicted with EEA access, the latter requires free movement "of goods, services, workers, and capital" and adherence to EU rules (Tomkins 130). Former British PM Theresa May declared on many occasions that any deal with the EU after leaving must not be at the expense of the Union's borders or domestic market. Her three red lines as far as the UK's relationship with the EU excluded membership in the Single Market and Customs Union, which were not accepted by Scotland and Northern Ireland. Particularly, the issue of free movement has discarded the Scottish wishes particularly

because it was one of the main factors that led to leaving the EU. The same was argued by unionist parties, such as the Scottish labour and Conservative parties, who both proposed federalism or a renegotiation of the union instead of EEA membership (Gillespie 522).

The second proposal included a differentiated deal with Europe by means of Scotland's accession to the EEA. The SNP's wish for such a deal was stimulated by Northern Ireland's Belfast Agreement which gave the latter a differentiated settlement in EU matters (Gillespie 522). Yet, this second suggestion was not accepted by the Scottish Conservative Unionist Party because, on the one hand, Scotland was not a state; on the other hand, the British market is more beneficial to Scottish trade than the EU markets. Scotland's profit from her trade with the UK is four times more than her benefit from the EU market. Scottish exports to the UK reached 60% in 2018 whereas Scottish EU exports proportion was 40%; moreover, British enterprises in Scotland are more than the European ones which have a less Scottish workforce (Tomkins 131, Rioux 17). In this regard, *Scotland's Place in Europe* highlighted the fact that the proposal does not exclude the UK market from Scottish trade, it remains a priority, yet the objective was "to secure the benefits of the European Single Market for Scotland in addition to - not instead of - free trade across the UK". Furthermore, Scottish demands to have a special deal with Europe are preached by unionists to be against the British constitution and hence the British identity, labour politician Douglas Alexander believed that "Constitutional politics involves much more than a ledger of accounts: it speaks to who we are, how we see ourselves, and how we relate to others. It is about a common journey, a shared story and who we choose to share that journey with (137)".

The third compromising argument required giving Scotland an extension of her devolved powers except for the prominent reserved powers to Westminster including defence, monetary policy, and foreign policy. It is meant to enable Holyrood to legislate in areas that were under EU regulations on matters which concern Scotland and fall into the Scottish government competencies including fishing, farming, employment law, immigration, and international agreements "to meet the regulatory and administrative requirements of continued European Single Market membership". This was considered a threat to British unity except for "fisheries, agriculture, and environmental regulation" but still these were also seen as detrimental to the British state (Tomkins 130).

Far from these suggestions, the transition period in which the UK kept abiding by the EU rule ended in December 2020. The UK finally left the Single Market as well as the Customs Union in January 2021 under the terms of the Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration. Besides, the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) was accomplished in April 2021 to permit the EU and the UK to trade with each other with "tariff free and quota free access", but this concerns only the movements of goods rather than services. Nevertheless, many issues are still unresolved namely the question of the Irish border besides fishing rights.

The Question of Independence

The question of an independent Scotland has been highly debatable between its opponents and supporters. Since June 2016, Pro-independence Scottish politicians have shaped their arguments within a rhetoric of "hard Britain" and "tory Brexit" (Biagi 128). According to them, leaving the UK implies "a fairer Scotland", whereas remaining means a continuous current status quo that would lead to more unemployment and

damage employees' rights, in addition to the troubles that free trade with the US can cause as far as public services are concerned (126). It is also argued that if Scottish resources are exclusively put in the Scottish government's hands, including the North Sea Oil, the Scottish economy will flourish because a Scottish parliament that is free from Westminster's restrictions would come out with "better economic policies" and "higher economic growth rates" (Kennedy 8).

In fact, the Scottish faith in the British government was lost amid the latter's denial of the Scottish government's insistence on a soft Brexit. The aforementioned Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) decided on the establishment of a Parliamentary Partnership Assembly to discuss the agreement's application. Scottish nationalist politicians criticized the fact that this assembly is formed by members of the European as well as British MPs with no mention of Scottish MSPs. Hence, the British government is accused of initiating a process to undo devolution and retrieve the control given to Scotland by the 1998 devolution act. The MSP Michael Russel said that Whitehall keeps on overlooking the Scottish government's perception and negotiation objectives concerning Brexit, he added that Westminster is legislating in devolved policy areas without consulting the Scottish government, the EU Withdrawal Act dismissed Holyrood (the Scottish parliament) from some powers and the UK ministers are having some authority over devolved areas. He gave the example of the Internal Market Act that forces the Scottish government to abide by "market access principles" without the consent of its parliament.

Besides, the British policies in dealing with Covid 19 pandemic aggravated the situation. A *Guardian* editorial depicted the crisis as "terminal strains within the UK's

four-nation union" and Britain's disintegration as Johnson's Covid policy's "most lasting political legacy" (*The Guardian View*). Indeed, the whole world has faced the virus' dilemma; powerful states have appeared unable to overcome the health situation notwithstanding the economic troubles, but the case of Britain coincided with the Brexit transition period, which presented an unfortunate moment for the British government.

Rhetorically, Boris Johnson maintained that he would reassert the British Union and ensure policies that would benefit the UK's four nations altogether. In contrast, he was accused of taking decisions for the whole country in areas that are supposed to be tackled by devolved parliaments and not Number 10. For instance, his declarations to ease the lockdown in May 2020 were supposed to be for England only but were addressed to the whole UK without consulting the Scottish and Welsh governments; therefore, they were rejected by devolved first ministers in Scotland and Wales. His tendency to impose his policies without taking into consideration or informing the devolved governments was branded "muscular unionism" (Elgot, Brown).

Adam Tomkins, a former Conservative MSP, criticized the oversimplified notion of attributing Scotland's push for independence solely to Brexit, Covid, and Prime Minister Johnson; nevertheless, he considered it an SNP[8] campaigning fruit whose seed goes back to decades ("A Union"). Therefore, to save the union, a counterattack is needed by looking ahead to the future rather than looking back to the past. He addressed the conservatives who reject any kind of change and stick to the traditional view of the union whose centre is London with its sovereign parliament.

[8] He called it the UK's supreme campaigning organisation

In November 2020, BBC Scotland published a series of opinion polls related to Coronavirus that revealed the Scottish public's rating of both their government and the British government's procedures to cope with the pandemic. According to a poll's results, 74% believed that Nichola Sturgeon better managed the situation compared to Boris Johnson as 62% rated him negatively. Besides, only 25% answered that his government well handled the crisis whereas 72% chose the Scottish government. The success of the Scottish first minister was related to her "factual accuracy, sensible advice and caution" compared to "Johnson's intermittent and sometimes hyperbolic and error-strewn briefings" ("The Guardian View"). Furthermore, 39% thought that if it were independent, Scotland would better handle the crisis compared to 19% who believed in the opposite (Curtice, "Covid in Scotland"). Another *Sunday Times* poll showed that 42% (versus 23%) of respondents felt that the crisis would be better faced if Scotland were independent ("How Brexit"). The surveys also depicted that 20% of those who voted No in the first independence referendum in 2014, now wished that Scotland were independent.

However, opponents of independence launched a project fear since Brexit. They have associated independence with an uncertain fate, whereas staying in the UK has been depicted as a way toward a more stable and secured Scotland (Biagi 125). The issue of independence is linked not only to Scotland's future, yet it is also portrayed as decisive to the future of the British Union. Therefore, anti-independence political or media discourse aims at securing the future of the union that is stuck between a stubborn Eurosceptic British government and a Europhile Scottish one.

Furthermore, anti-independence campaigners base their argument on the economic disadvantages that would be engendered from leaving the UK. They claim that the Scots' living standards would eclipse because Scotland's taxes are less than its public expenditure (Kennedy 8), in other words, the UK spends on Scotland a lot of money but receives little in return. Hence, if Scotland acquires its independence, it would realize to what extent the UK financed it. Unionists also believe that depending on the North Sea Oil is risky because it is unpredictable and has a "limited life span" in addition to its small contribution to the Scottish GDP (Kennedy 8, Stevenson 111). Independence would give way to other questions such as the National debts and Clyde's nuclear base that would require negotiations with London especially since the SNP is "anti-nuclear theology" (Hazell 102, Rachman 28).

Moreover, Eurosceptics relate independence to the Europeanization of Scotland which would become subject to a foreign entity "Europe" instead of the UK with which it has had historic links. The United Kingdom Independence Party's (UKIP) leader Nigel Farage used to make jokes about the SNP's endeavour to "win power from London to hand it over to Brussels" (Biagi 127). However, there are many obstacles to Scotland's integration into the EU. An independent Scotland must seek the consent of 27 EU members[9], thus its bid can be vetoed by some European members including Spain because that could provoke its inner problems with Catalonia.

The question of currency is also used in the project fear that warns the Scots of the damages of joining the Euro or creating a new currency. *Scotland in Union,* as a non-party campaign against independence since 2015, launched a petition entitled "Save our

[9] Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (See appendix 5)

pound" to show to what extent do the people want to remain in the UK and save their currency. In fact, the pound sterling is a powerful currency that survived many ups and downs throughout British history, it could survive the Euro's imposition over the UK which then was a member of the EU, and it is worth mentioning that Scotland was not against the EURO at the time. However, if an independent Scotland joins the European community, the question lies in whether it would have enough strength and support to keep it, especially since polls depicted that the majority of Scots prefer not to adopt the Euro after independence. A 2019 survey of 1000 Scottish adults showed that 65% opted for staying on the pound, whereas 13% supported a new currency (McCALL). For unionists, Scotland's strength rests on the pound's strength that is a long-standing and unfading currency; hence any changes related to it would cost Scotland its economic growth and the people's well-being.

A Second Independence Referendum

Since its establishment in 1999, the Scottish parliament had been dominated by labour majority for about a decade. May 2011 marked a turning point in the short history of Holyrood as the SNP won the majority of seats, this put the option of independence on the table. Alex Salmond, former SNP leader, and current Alba party leader promised to organize an independence referendum. He was then elected for the second successive term as the First Minister; the difference is that in 2007 he formed a minority government.

The SNP's 2011 victory did not automatically mean that the majority of Scots wanted independence. It was argued that the Scottish people chose the SNP just to squeeze the English and increase the Scottish bargaining power against them (Kennedy

9). In 2012, David Cameron's government agreed on a Scottish independence referendum, whereas opinion polls showed that most of the Scots refused the idea, a proportion that diminished in 2014 (Rachman 25). By accepting the SNP's project, Cameron was likened to Lord North who led Britain during the loss of its American colonies (Rachman 26). Now, this malediction is chasing Boris Johnson as a second referendum is looming.

The first referendum on independence took place on 18 September 2014 and the electorate voted to stay in the UK; 55 percent voted No, and 45 voted yes to the question: "Should Scotland be an independent country?". Regardless, the "get out the vote" and "Yes Scotland" campaigns were said to be "better organized" and stronger than the "better together" campaign, particularly in terms of the SNP leader Alex Salmond's TV debates (Rachman 26 and Lawson 148). Early in September, YouGov polls showed that the public would vote to leave, Peter Kellner, the time's YouGov president said that the Yes camp was "in touching distance of victory" (Brooks).

Many argued that Scotland's consideration of its future in the EU lay behind the negative result of this referendum (Greene et al. 307). The Scots feared that an independent Scotland's demand to join the EU would be rejected by the UK. Unlike the SNP Leaders' urge, the Scots chose to remain in the UK to maintain their benefit from the European membership. As a matter of fact, those who identify themselves as Scottish more than British or only Scottish are less Eurosceptic than those who pride themselves on being British rather than Scottish (cited in Roux 12). Hence, voting to stay in the union was considered a tactical vote to preserve the Scottish place in Europe.

However, some linked the result to the last moments of the No campaign, which were described as effective, politicians such as the leaders of the UK main parties David Cameron, Ed Miliband, and Nick Clegg, pledged to give Scotland more devolved powers if the people choose to remain in the UK ("Scottish Independence"). Furthermore, former PM Gordon Brown warned the Scots of the economic troubles that would result from irreversible independence (Watt). Albeit the fact that most Scots voted against the SNP's aspirations, the party's membership grew by 100,000 after the referendum with the coming of Nicola Sturgeon as the party's leader; noting that some of the new members have previously adhered to other parties (Biagi 123).

In the following year, the idea of an independent Scotland was overshadowed by the SNP's campaign to remain in the EU. However, Sturgeon declared on many occasions the unfeasibility of another independence referendum that was "once in a generation event". However, in a debate on BBC Scotland during 2015's General Election, she said "Something material would have to change in terms of the circumstances or public opinion before I think it would be appropriate to have a proposal for a referendum" ("Election 2015"). The SNP's manifesto also recognized the Scottish Parliament's prerogative to go through another referendum project if 2014's state of affairs witnesses "a significant and material change", and Brexit was considered a material change that took the Scots out of the EU as opposed to their wishes

Eventually, Brexit anticipated another referendum not long after 2014. Indeed, most Scots voted yes 62%, i.e., they wanted the UK to stay in the EU whereas the leave proportion reached 38%. This was not surprising, for as previously mentioned the rejection of the 2014 independence referendum was linked to a Scottish fear of being

rejected from the EU after independence. However, opinion polls showed that some of the pro-independence people voted to leave the EU as well.

A group of researchers including Zachary Greene, Jae-Jae Spoon and Christopher J. Williams conducted a study about the 38% of Scottish voters who voted leave in the Brexit referendum, it started from a theoretical standpoint that relates present referendum results to previous or future referendums (309). In other words, some of those who opted for leaving the EU were classified as tactical voters who, by voting leave, aimed at shaking British stability and stimulating a second referendum on independence (308). It was figured out that most of the voters who supported independence in 2014 chose to remain in the EU, however, among those who voted yes to Brexit, from which a few percentages are SNP supporters, did this "to set the future agenda" even if they did not want to leave Europe (309).

This strategic vote was meant to create a material change that would stimulate the need for a second referendum. In brief, some of the Scots who supported withdrawal from the EU were not fervent supporters of leaving, yet they wanted to stimulate national change that would "lead to a new status quo supporting a third potential outcome" (Greene et al. 310). Such public behaviour was encouraged by former SNP leaders' views, for instance, Gordon Wilson, SNP leader, from (1979) to (1990), declared his support for Brexit as a route to another referendum. Alex Salmond also spoke during a televised debate about a second referendum possibility if the people voted to leave the EU (308, 311).

Indeed, soon after the Brexit vote, Sturgeon announced that the independence referendum became "highly likely" (Biagi 123). Now that the SNP was re-elected in

May 2021, she said in her acceptance speech that since the Scottish people have shown their support to pro-independence parties, the process of a referendum was unstoppable, however, it was just a matter of recovery from the Covid pandemic. In a nutshell, the vote was related to the previous vote on independence and was meant to decide future political directions (Greene et al. 309).

During the 2021 Scottish election, the SNP promised to organize a referendum if it gets the majority number of seats (65 seats or more) against the pro-union parties: the Conservative, labour, and liberal democrats, in addition to pro-indyref2 parties such as The Green and Alba. In fact, acquiring a majority of seats is hard to be achieved in the Scottish parliament because the vote is based on a complicated additional member system[10]. As expected, the SNP won the election but needed only one seat to acquire the majority, the party gained 64 seats and had to share a pro-independence coalition government with the Green (8 seats), nevertheless, the conservative party won 31 seats whereas Labour secured 22 seats. Now that the Scottish parliament is conquered by pro-independence members of the Scottish parliament, the referendum became "a matter of when- not if" said Nicola Sturgeon but working with the UK government to fulfill economic and health recovery from the pandemic crisis was declared to be prior to the referendum nonetheless ("Nicola Sturgeon").

The Scottish vote for pro-independence parties might lead the result of an indyref 2 to be positive. However, opinion polls still show hesitant support of independence, in

[10] a two-vote system that starts with electing constituencies members (73 constituency and hence 73 seats). The 56 remaining seats are supplied throughout a party vote, in every region from the 8 Scottish regions 7 members results from the following equation: (the regional vote of an x party ÷ (number of the party's MSPs won in the region's constituencies + 1)

a recent survey (January 2022), 50% said they would vote YES in case of the referendum ("How Would you vote"). The proportions appear approximate and depend on the political circumstances that are unpredictable. Brexit might have led the Scottish people to prefer independence, at times, as shown by opinion polls, but the latter does not always imply that the same proportion would support it (Hazell, "Britishness" 102). However, it is widely assumed that another referendum would receive a yes ballot, Alex Salmond, announced on many occasions that an indyref 2 would be "winnable" (Biagi 123).

Regardless of the result of any probable referendum, the form of independence would be controversial. In fact, the Scottish government expressed in many post-Brexit papers their will to enhance the Scottish economic relations with the EU, which might create a border between Scotland and England. However, the fate of the union's social cement is still undecided, Unionists claim that any frontier would cause "family break", whereas a 2007 You Gov survey showed that the Scots do not have such concerns (Keating, "The Strange" 377).

The Monarchy's position after independence is also unresolved since the Scottish attitude towards the Crown is not clear, unlike the case with Southern Ireland. It was argued that the 1603's Union of the English and the Scottish crowns does not cause as much Scottish fury as 1707's union of parliaments, especially since the Scottish parliament goes back to the 13th century. In effect, Westminster's interference in Scottish affairs distracted the Scots' attention from the monarchy's issues; hence Scotland represented a "limited republicanism", notably amongst young people in Glasgow, compared to Ireland (Mitchell 69-70, 76).

In retrospect, when the idea of independence was proposed by the SNP president Robert McIntyre committee for an independent Scotland in the 1970s, the party members were split about the monarchy, this was shown during a party's conference in 1977 that recognized Elizabeth II as "the head of state of an independent Scotland" (Mitchell 82). However, this identification was considered one of the reasons behind the 1979 Referendum failure, as a result, a controversial SNP faction was founded: the '79 group that launched a discussion about a Scottish Republic that is fully independent based on a "socialist distribution of wealth, power, income" (82).

After devolution, the queen spoke of "the pragmatic balance between continuity and change" at the opening of the Scottish Parliament in 2004 (85). The monarchy remains a perpetuation of the Scottish past and a symbol of Scottish history that a great number of people would not like to abandon, especially the elderly. Furthermore, the 2014 white paper on the independence referendum *Scotland's Future* acknowledged the queen as "the head of state, just as she is for sixteen commonwealth countries" (86). However, some believe that the crown is an imposition of an archaic system in an age of modernity. In this regard, a 2017 survey showed that 57% of the SNP's members admitted that "the monarchy has no place in a modern democracy" while 58% of the Greens agreed with the same (87). However, both parties' members of parliament pledged allegiance to Elizabeth II in the opening of the new-elected parliament in May 2021. Above all, the future of the monarchy would be decided by the people whose attitude towards it is determined by the extent of its involvement in politics which is supposed to be naught.

Some commentators claim that Queen Elizabeth II power to subvert the referendum's result from independence was used by the British government. They refer to Prince William's visit to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in Edinburgh and his declarations about Scotland's "special place" in his heart, he also conveyed the Queen's letter that wished that the hard times of the pandemic would be used to remake a better UK: she said, "These new bonds have been forged in times of emergency but they will serve us all well in the future as the United Kingdom seeks to rebuild and reshape community life" (Nutt). It was argued that ahead of the 2014 referendum, the Queen urged the Scots to "think carefully about the future" at her Balmoral's castle, and the vote was claimed to be influenced by her statement (Nutt). However, the monarchy's effort can have a counter-result because some people consider it an intrusion in politics to save the union.

Scottish Unionist Discourse

The SNP's enthusiasm for a second referendum on independence led the conservative and the labour parties to embed a unionist discourse in their political statements, speeches, and manifestos. Generally speaking, the conservative party adopts a traditionalist vision of the union that was slightly moderated throughout time, whereas the labour party tends to be more realistic and opts for reforms to make Britain decent to modern democratic criteria. The present section focuses on the political discourse of these Scottish unionist parties notwithstanding the fact that newspapers and social media also promote unionism and warn about the losses engendered from taking Scotland away from the UK.

Traditionalist politicians especially the conservatives view the UK as an exceptional "unitary state"[11] unlike the USA or Germany because the British parliament and unwritten constitution are still sovereign above a harmonious political life. The survival of these ancient political institutions is seen as proof of the union's ingrained pillars and a guarantee of its perpetual unity. This view was namely spread amongst English unionists between the 1950s-1960s; Michael Keating said that such a perception reveals to what extent their universe was limited to England alone ("Reforging" 218). Margaret Thatcher also considered parliament and the constitution as the supreme source of sovereignty, but it was argued that behind this claimed parliamentary sovereignty, an unlimited power of the cabinet, and sometimes of the PM, has been hidden (218).

Others think that the UK is not a unitary state but "a balance constitution" for no power can get over another with the "limited scope of the state" which is restrained by the institutions of civil society, in addition to the autonomous trade unions and local governments that act within the scope given to them by Westminster (218). The civil service is believed to be a "unifying force" of the UK since it is politically neutral and designed to check the executive, however, it is sometimes alienated by ministers (Laffin and Thomas 104). Another opinion views the UK as a "union state" that was built upon the different structures of its constituents forged together through agreements and treaties, for instance, Scotland kept its educational, legal, and municipalities systems that were guaranteed by the Act of Union 1707 (219). This prerogative was promoted

[11] Albert Venn Dicey's theory of parliamentary sovereignty in his *Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885)*

by a more incorporation of the Scots in their local politics throughout the 19th, 20th and 21st centuries.

Scottish political discourse was studied by many researchers from different angles within various contexts. Sociologist Atsuko Ichijo, of Kingston University, investigated the impact of devolution on political elites' representations of national identity in Scotland in an article entitled "Entrenchment of Unionist Nationalism: Devolution and the Discourse of National Identity in Scotland". The author dealt with post-devolution unionist discourse, she examined the latter's inculcation in the Scottish national identity and the Scottish sovereignty's limitation that resulted (25). She analyzed different Scottish politicians' speeches and parliamentary debates in the ten years following devolution, the study was set up on Glaser and Strauss's grounded theory. The latter starts with a first reading of the material in which "open coded categories" are highlighted such as "national identity/devolution/ the union", these are "repeatedly revised during subsequent readings" because from each reading pertinent concepts emerge; this phase is backed by the context of the language including history and culture (26). She concluded that devolution paved the way to the entrenchment of "unionist nationalism" which is an adoption of Scottish nationalism that is in harmony with the Union and cannot be separated from it; in other words, the Scottish and the British identities are represented as interwoven and interdependent. Hence, devolution resurrected the 19th century's unionist nationalism that encompassed a small Scottish nationalism and more inclusive unionism, whereas separatist nationalism was lessened during this period.

Stewart Whigham, Oxford Brookes University, analyzed the political discourse of the three major parties in Scotland: the SNP, the Labour party, and the Conservative Party during the first independence referendum campaign in "Nationalism, party political discourse and Scottish independence: comparing discursive visions of Scotland's constitutional status". He used Isabela Fairclough and Norman Fairclough's political discourse analysis basing his study on different works on nationalism, he approached the parties' discourse from the angle of Scotland's position in the UK. In fact, each party has its own position regarding Scottish sovereignty which they used to consolidate their attitude towards independence. The SNP narratives depicted independence as a revival of Scotland's ancient and historic image which was foreshadowed by the 1707 act of Union (11). They also focused on the economic asymmetry that has been centralized in London with Scotland as a fringe region even if the latter possesses the North Sea Oil (12). Finally, the SNP discourse complained about Tory's interference in Scottish politics, besides the Scottish parliament's limited authority (12). These declarations aimed at convincing the electorate to vote "Yes" in the referendum to enable the SNP to solidify the Scottish political and economic sovereignty (14).

As far as unionist parties whose goal was to make the Scots vote NO, Whigham started with the Labour party whose narratives lay in the brighter side of both the union and devolution. Their story of Scotland starts with the 1707 Act of Union as a foundation of a sharing union that joined together the interests of England and Scotland (15-16). The labour party recognized the Scottish rights for more devolution but "within the 'circumstances' of the union", for instance, it rejected Scotland's "full fiscal

autonomy" (16,18). Whereas Labour focused on the union's benefit to Scotland in terms of "values of social justice and solidarity", the Conservatives, or the party of the union highlighted the element of economic and security advantages brought by the union (19). The Conservatives also showed their change of attitude towards devolution, in addition to their willingness to promote it in a way that would "boost economic growth and lower the tax burden for the Scottish electorate", however, they focused on the economic disadvantages that the country would sustain in the case of leaving the UK and the possibility of being rejected by the EU if they seek membership (22).

In a nutshell, Ichijo's analysis focused on the re-establishment of unionist nationalism in the Scottish political discourse. It assumed the demise of both traditional unionism and traditional nationalism which were replaced by neo-unionism[12] and neo-nationalism[13] (Keating "The Strange" 385). Whereas Whigham's article proved that separatist nationalism still existed, it dealt with the political discursive struggle between the SNP, the Scottish Conservative and Unionist party (SCU), and the Labour party; both camps aimed at biasing the electorate vote during the 2014 referendum. In this context, the Scottish choice to remain in the UK proved to what extent the unionist nationalism's discourse was more persuasive than the SNP's. But the threat of independence that might have been cooled by devolution and the 2014 referendum remerged again after Brexit.

[12] Based on shared "civil, political, and social rights" besides a limited scope of devolution (Keating "The Strange" 385)

[13] "Scotland as the main focus of citizenship, loyalty, and social integration. It is nested within multiple unions, in the United Kingdom, in the 'isles', Europe and the North Atlantic" (385)

Since 2016, unionist parties' utmost goal became gaining more seats either in Westminster or in Holyrood to stop an indyref 2. The following discussion sheds light on their manifestos and some political declarations in the period between Brexit and the latest Scottish general election in May 2021. The analysis focuses on the unionist discourse to hinder the break-up of the union. It approaches the parties' use of their perception of Britishness in their discourse and to what extent this was persuasive.

Isabela and Norman Fairclough's *Political Discourse Analysis (2012)*, is used in the following discussion because it approaches different categories of political discourse by mingling Critical Discourse analysis and Social and linguistic Theories. It is grounded on practical argumentation i.e., what should be done rather than what is true or right to be done. The former is founded upon five interrelated premises. All in all, the theorists summarised the process of practical reasoning in the following:

> Agents combine knowledge of their circumstances and of their goals with a presumptive means-end relation that might take them from the circumstances they are in to the future state of affairs which is their goal. Agents choose certain actions over others not just in view of the goal, but also because they find themselves in particular circumstances and not others… The action that emerges as (presumably) the right action, is supposed to transform the present set of circumstances so that they match the agent's goal, which is in itself informed by the agent's values. Thus, circumstances will be brought more in line, so to speak, with the source of normativity that underlies the action. (44)

This can be explained as follows: to achieve a Goal (G), the agent is supposed to "conjecture" a course of action (A) according to his educational and life background (43). (A) is the route that leads from the real present to an imaginable future with respect to the agent's values. Circumstances and goals which are founded upon the latter

(deontic modality[14]) are the initial premises in practical arguments (43). Noting that the agent is not always the arguer, Isabela, and Norman Fairclough suggested two types of practical arguments: the first is drawn from consequences and goals, hence the action is a hypothesis that can be wrong; the second type or the "counter-argument" is based on criticizing the consequences that would not lead to the goal and decide that the action should be eliminated (49-50). The agents make a deliberation that is "balancing each argument against a counter-argument" until figuring out the right action (50-51). Let us give an elaborate exposition of the premises:

To start with the agent's goal (G): the agent has in mind a future (an imaginary state of affairs), which can be desired as it can be imposed by external normative conditions (42). This premise is generated by Values (V) that constitute the source of the agent's concerns or "what he/she ought to be concerned with"; they are either produced by the agent's desires or commitments (47). The above premises are related to the context or the circumstances (a present/ real state of affairs) (C). Besides, one's vision of the world (view of the circumstances) is directly linked to his/her values or concerns that were dictated by "natural, social, institutional facts (44, 46).

Based on Isabela Fairclough and Norman Fairclough's practical argumentation, the following diagram[15] shows the process of the Conservative and Unionist Party's practical argumentations in their manifestos from 2017 to May 2021.

[14] The source of modality (obligation) is the speaker of the sentence, not the putative agent of the action proposed (45). That is to say A is not definitely what the agent wants to do, but what "he/she ought to do", hence he/she has to desire it.
[15] based on the authors' structure, see Appendix 8



Figure 4: The conservative party's unionist discourse from Brexit to the recent Scottish election

The Conservative Party's campaign in the 2017 UK General Election was unionist par excellence. To begin with, the manifesto appealed for *a Stronger Scotland, a Stronger Britain, and a Prosperous Future.* Unlike the SNP which kept warning about a declining economy after Brexit, the SCU insured the Scots about employment, they claimed that the economy had been promoted in an unexpected way despite the Brexit deadlock ("Forward Together" 8). Ruth Davidson, the then-party leader, said that times will be hard in the case of independence, she said that the latter "would drag Scotland back to more division and uncertainty. That will damage Scotland's economy and will divert the Scottish Government from the day job – tackling the crisis in our schools and the NHS. We cannot allow this to happen" (6). The party preached that the post-Brexit period was not ripe for a referendum on independence because those hard times were meant to "pull together, not apart" (34).

The 2017 SCU Manifesto also praised the union as "the most successful political union in modern history" and said that its strength was created by the UK's four nations long standing "unity" in addition to the benefit of devolution that enabled every single person all over Britain to give his/her voice (33). It is worth mentioning that the Scottish conservative seats in Westminster increased by 12 (from 1 in 2015 to 13) seats whereas the SNP's dropped by 21 from 54 in 2015 (out of 59 Scottish seats in Westminster).

The 2019 General Election marked a change of the UK's Conservative leaders from Theresa May to Boris Johnson, the Scottish party's leader was Jackson Carlaw who came after Ms. Davidson's resignation and served from August 2019 until July 2020. He proudly announced that his party "unashamedly believe [s] in the Union" (5). Hence, uniting the country was a priority hand in hand with improving public services.

The *NO to indyref2* manifesto recalled the 300-year-union's benefits and promised to enhance it, it included the following passage "our mission to be a government working for the whole of the United Kingdom, delivering for all of its people wherever they live" (6). The 2012 and 2016's Conservative proceeding of the Scotland Act, which gave more tax powers to Scotland, was also mentioned as proof of their goodwill to increase the Scottish government that must join the UK government to work together, namely in terms of UK investments and single market.

Boris Johnson's foreword to the manifesto promised to halt any SNP's attempt to hold a second referendum and to preserve the country's unity. He praised the UK as the world's 21st-century leader in terms of technology. He said that his country had "many of the best universities on earth" and hence the best education ever. He also promised to get Scotland out of its cage and to make it roar by renovating the public service, and living costs, in addition to supporting Scottish farmers and "continuing the great tradition of shipbuilding" (*No to Indyref2* 2). He mentioned the values of democracy, enterprise, success, and aspiration (3). Nevertheless, during this general election, the SCU lost 7 seats and the SNP won 13 seats.

The 2021 Scottish Election Manifesto *Rebuild Scotland* aimed at stopping indyref2 from taking place and rebuilding Scotland. It blamed the SNP for prioritizing independence rather than the economy, which led the latter to degradation and would prevent the country's recovery from the pandemic. Hence why the SCU party will give the priority to recovering the public services and economy from the pandemic's tragedy as it was impossible to "recover with a referendum hanging over [the] future" (5). In fact, the manifesto did not mention unity but ending division from the UK whose

vaccination program benefited the Scots and would have a pivotal role in recovery. During this Scottish Parliament election campaign, the aim was to prevent the SNP from having a majority to hold an indyref2, but the opposite happened with the SCU winning 31 seats far from a 65 majority.

Conservative political speeches have also demonstrated their efforts to ensure the Union's survival amidst present challenges. It was previously mentioned that the crisis of Covid ignited tension between the UK government and the devolved governments. The situation was seized by British unionists as a moment of difficulty that can be defeated only by the people's union all over the Kingdom. Coree Brown Swan and Daniel Cetrà, from the UK's Centre on Constitutional Change, spoke of Boris Johnson's "wartime spirit" and "Churchillian language" to promote a British union during a crisis just like during wars, in other words, the picture of the Second World War's British solidarity was recalled with the virus as an enemy which cannot be fought unless together. Conservative Scottish Secretary Alister Jack's speech to commemorate the 75th anniversary of VE Day[16] also likened the wars' dramatic scenes to the pandemic troubles and remembered the Scots' wartime generation whose courage, sacrifice, and force were devoted to the sake of the UK and its Monarch (Swan & Cetra). It is worth mentioning that Johnson is described as not only anti-Europe but also anti-devolution as he declared in a private conservative MPs meeting that devolution was a "disaster north of the border" and he added that it was "Tony Blair's biggest mistake" ("The Guardian View").

[16] Victory in Europe Day that marks the end of the Second World War.

All in all, the conservative party's highest goal was to be elected besides the other goals to maintain the UK's union and insure Scotland's well-being. One can say that the source of the first goal is desire whereas the other goals are part of the party's either traditional commitments to the union, democracy, and enterprise or other obligations that were imposed by modern and European norms such as devolution. Their discourse depicts a unionist nationalism and a vision of Britishness that mingles the four nation's longstanding union and its benefit to Scotland as well as the Scottish right to decide through their devolved institutions. The party contrasts its achievements in the British government with the SNP's failures in Scotland. This argument seems to oppose English hegemony and support popular sovereignty as the pillar of policy-making rather than Westminster's sovereignty (quoted in Gillespie 521). Finally, if one takes the Scots as an agent, their actions are decided through balancing the party's arguments and counter-arguments: some share their desires with the conservatives' ideals and history while others are persuaded by the party's critic of the SNP's incompetence and the dramatic consequences of independence and uncertainty, that is why they ought to vote for them either to achieve their desires or to prevent the worst from happening (tactical vote). As a matter of fact, despite the SCU's attempt to develop a pro-Scottish identity attitude, they could not attain the majority. But since 2017 they have been classified as the second party of Scotland after the SNP. In 2017, they achieved 13 seats out of 59 for the first time after two decades amid high tension caused by the Brexit issue, this revival was deemed to be the party's message of unity and economic security against division and uncertainty.

The following diagram exposes the Labour Party's discourse since Brexit up to the 2021 Scottish election.



Figure 5: the Labour Party's unionist discourse from Brexit to the recent Scottish election

The Scottish labour party's manifesto in the 2017 General Election was entitled *To a Better Fairer Scotland*, its leader Kezia Dugdale promised to reject any attempt for an indyref2. The latter was considered "unwanted and unnecessary" besides the economic troubles that would blow Scotland in the case of separation: austerity and a £ 15 billion deficit which would be sustained mostly by the poor. The party declared "Scottish Labour will never support independence; because [the labour] believe that together we're stronger". The Manifesto suggested the emplacement of a constitutional convention to discuss a fundamental reform of the UK's constitution to extend democracy and fulfill "a more federalized country", to reduce Brexit's negative impact on devolution because it moved the central authority from Brussels to London. In this election, the Scottish Labour won 7 seats out of 59 Scottish seats in Westminster.

In the 2019 General Election, the Scottish labour's slogan was *Real Change for the Many not the Few*. The Labour Party's leader Jeremy Corbin and the Scottish Party's leader Richard Leonard both promised to make more investments in Scotland by renovating the NHS, providing home as well as jobs, and achieving a green industrial revolution (6-10). The manifesto insisted again on staying a part of a reformed UK. It suggested a new Scotland Act that would give the Holyrood the power to legislate in terms of the employment law in addition to replacing the House of Lords by an elected Senate of Nations and Regions to "refresh democracy" (99). The party found itself with one seat after losing six.

The 2021 local manifesto was about the party's national recovery plan from Covid 19 pandemic. The Scottish party's current leader Anas Sarwar said that the 2020-2021 crises brought to life the Scottish solidarity that must remain even after recovery

because if national disputes persisted, the problems of the NHS, education, and employment would keep getting more complicated. Hence, he called the Scottish people to unify around the party for the sake of a better future for "a fairer and a stronger Scotland" (4-5). In addition to the party's national missions whose objective was the recovery of five sectors: employment, education, NHS, climate, and communities; it aspired to achieve "a radical redesign of the UK's democratic institutions, more powers of scrutiny for Holyrood, and a radical transfer of powers from Edinburgh into communities" besides "as a close relationship with the EU as possible" (29). This can happen in Scotland which is a part of the UK as labour rejects independence and separatism, instead, they believe that Scotland's strength in terms of democracy must be "within a democratically and economically renewed United Kingdom" (29). The party again insisted on giving Holyrood more devolved powers and reforming the UK's immigration system. The labour won 22 seats in the Scottish parliament (in 2016 they had won 24), this was considered the lowest in the history of the Scottish local elections.

In terms of political speeches, current Labour leader Keir Starmer summarized the party's perception of Scotland within the UK in his speech on "a socially just Scotland in a modern United Kingdom". It was delivered in December 2020; he started by saying that the whole UK "entered together" to the pandemic crisis and would leave it and rebuild it "together" as well. He insisted on the fact that the UK's strength lies in the pooling and sharing of its four nations' resources and the union was not only formed by the "shared institutions" but also by "the people who made them" in addition to the common history, experiences, and achievements. He emphasized the importance of devolution "To empower. To democratize. And to deliver social justice" and he

designated the conservatives as anti-devolution. He declared that Labour's utmost challenge was to fight for "greater devolution" and defeat separatism because the latter "won't solve inequality, injustice, or poverty" and will weaken the British international position.

With hindsight, in August 2016, Gordon Brown, the UK's Labour PM from 2007 to 2010, who is of Scottish origins, declared that the British are "better together" during the Brexit tide and that the damages of any Scottish independence would deprive the Scots of about one million jobs in addition to the troubles brought by disintegration in areas such as public services and defence ("We're Better Together"). He perceived the union as an incarnation of Scottish patriotism or the latter's "highest form", he believed that not only Scotland, but the four nations contributed to the making of the UK's historic and universal values that were enhanced by the welfare state and the NHS (Gillespie 521). Now a referendum about independence is within a stone's throw, Brown's hopes to save the union lie in the middle of Scotland that divides those in favour of independence from those who support the union, there exist Scottish patriots who still cling to a Britishness which is based on cooperation. ("Many Scots"). He described the NHS as a "unity symbol" and a "British Icon" because it has established a sense of cooperation among the British people. Brown's view brings to mind the Second World War reconstruction era during which the British identity was re-established based on solidarity and social welfare that were to replace the empire as a cement to the union (Finlay 180).

Gordon Brown also spoke of the urgent need for adopting a new way of thinking far from "tired old slogans" to stop Scotland from leaving the UK, alluding to the

conservative traditional judgment that does not intend to consider giving Scotland more devolved powers. This is because any such attempt would hurt Westminster's sovereignty and hence the conservative view of Britishness; by contrast, he acknowledged the Scottish parliament's legitimate right to legislate in domains such as agriculture, fisheries, and employment rights in addition to Scotland's entitlement to sign international treaties on devolved affairs ("We're Better Together")

To sum up, since 2016, Labours' campaigns committed their party to make the UK government less centralized by moving towards federalism to treat the four nations equally and enable each part to be self-governed; they also emphasized the importance of cooperation and solidarity which depicts their vision of Britishness. They have declared their intentions to reform the government and abolish the House of Lords. Unlike the Conservative party which focuses on the benefit brought by the union to Scotland, Labours insists on the Scottish contributions to the union's achievements; besides, the two parties' discourses highlight the dangers of leaving the UK. Regardless, the Labour party dramatically lost Scottish support since Brexit. In fact, the party represented the Scots for about a century since the creation of the Scottish Office in the 1880s; yet, since 2010 it lost its leading position and then its second position in favour of the SCU.

To conclude this chapter, May 2021's Scottish election revealed that Scotland is split as far as its constitutional future. It is stuck between two extremes either independence since the majority supported the SNP or the status quo of the union as the second position was given to the conservatives. The labour party disappeared from the spotlight although it was the party of devolution whose objective was to "contain separatism" that is to

preserve the union. The labour's declining popularity in Scotland proved that the Scots want a radical change and no more accepted settlements. At the same time, an important number of the people still fear change and uncertainty.

Conclusion

The emergence of international organizations such as the EC/EU led to unprecedented economic and political integration amongst some European states. In a set of lectures given at Harvard University in 1994, Stuart Hall said that cultural identities became homeless in modernity because the people's movement from one country to another and the advance of technology simplified distant social interactions that tore space away from time; pre-modern societies, however, were dominated by presence and hence space coincided with time (Triangle 109-110). The cultural homogeneity imposed by industrialization in classical modernity was widened by globalization, now polity has moved from the control of nation-states to the regulations of supra-states, consequently, identity became out of control.

Indeed, regional identities were revived in multinational states such as the UK. Eventually, Nationalism which united the states in the 19th century is being replaced by separatist nationalism which aims at pulling them apart. In fact, many country regions started longing for their autonomy to join supranational organizations. The tendency towards a more universal state was influenced by Globalization in two paradoxical ways: it came as a response to the global dimensions of the new world and as a reaction to them as well. On the one side, the resurgence of regional cultures was necessary to prevent them from disappearing in a world that has increasingly become a small town. On the other side, it announced an age of global economy which attracted many regions and induced them to seek their independence, particularly after the revival of their history and identity.

Since the second half of the 20th century, British politicians and the press cultural objectives have been to save the British identity from immigration,

Europeanization, or disintegration amidst a discussion about a British identity crisis. Indeed, the most satisfying way to define being British has been by contrasting it to an external threat or "others". However, different identities exist inside the UK's borders with growing nationalisms, which have overshadowed British Nationalism. In this context, the present dissertation has aimed at reflecting on the British identity, discussing its pillars, questioning its decline, and considering the future of the union as a concrete aspect of it amidst a Scottish will to break away from the UK and join the EU.

Throughout my work, Britishness was approached as a discourse of the British national identity that is inherently political i.e., related to the state and citizenship. Bernard Crick said that "'British is a political and legal concept best applied to the institutions of the United Kingdom state, to common citizenship and common political arrangements" (quoted in Schnapper 3). Nevertheless, cultural icons such as the Monarchy are undeniable symbols of British identity. In effect, the British state was formed in modernity by acts of unions that halted centuries of rivalries, this led some to consider the UK as "an invented nation, not so much older than the United States" (quoted in Schnapper 1). Regardless, the discourse of Britishness has always been idealistic and inspired by the idea of the nation, in other words, it has depicted the British identity as an embodiment of sameness in difference, and as a complete whole that shares longstanding history and values entrenched in deep-rooted symbols such as the Monarchy, Parliament, and the Constitution.

I have started by comparing the traditional view of history based on ethno-symbolic icons and nurtured by a typical origin, with a critical vision of history.

Michel Foucault considers the former as a discourse of memory that has sought to preserve the status quo. Actually, individuals have always been subject to the state that has exposed them to a selected chain of history in which events succeed in a continuous way starting from an ideal origin. According to Foucault, this representation must be rejected by a process of "counter-memory". He suggested going through an effective analysis of history whose goal is to find out the unique moments of dissipation amidst the apparent continuous history to figure out to what extent this continuation was imposed to construct a coherent society. Along with the changing perception of identity that shifted from communal identities to individualistic and universal identities, the lacuna of this imposition is clearly mirrored in the British national identity whose adherents are lost between a duality of affiliations.

Subsequently, I have exposed the British nation's discursive portrayals which have been directed to solidify the UK's different regions' correlation. In effect, state creation was recommended by industrialization which, according to Ernest Gellner, required the pre-existing cultures to harmonize under a single political entity. This transition entailed nationalism and brought about nations with a unified national culture. Furthermore, the industrial revolution led to the hegemony of some cultures over others to establish homogeneity between different ethnicities and their state, on the other hand, it gave way to acculturation as cultures were intermingled because the movement of people was intensified. These two elements lay behind the intermingling of Englishness and Britishness since England has always been the headquarter of the British union since its creation.

Besides, I have dealt with the inclusion of Roland Barthes' mythical speeches in the Britishness discourse since it has been used to divert the people from their real disillusionment with their government. Politicians and the Media tend to seize moments of national threats such as wars and address the people with messages conveyed through posters, slogans, or speeches to make them forget about their differences, stand together against their enemy, and believe that they have always been a unified nation. Myth is also present in Gordon Brown's attempt to give a third way to Britishness starting from British ideals and institutions. Barthes considered such use of common senses and universal truths as figures of myth since they strive to banalize reality and make the British unity, in our case, appear natural; hence this notion of unity becomes a socially constructed truth.

I have also endeavoured to expose the interference between the Britishness discourse and the Eurosceptic discourse. The UK had always been hypersensitive to joining a European camp. First and foremost because it was not a British idea but a French one, besides, the UK did not participate in the early negotiations in the 1950s. It finally joined two decades later because it felt waning in front of a progressing Europe even if its membership bid had been vetoed twice by French president Charles de Gaulle. More essentially, I have insisted on the fact that a discourse of Britishness was embedded in the Eurosceptic rhetoric, particularly from the 1980s on. At the beginning of the UK's European membership, it was the British contribution to the European Market's budget that angered Eurosceptics who considered finance as an aspect of the British national identity; this argument was reinforced by Britain's position against the Euro that it never joined. However, the economic benefit brought

by being a part of the EC postponed the public's outrage. Afterward, the European further economic and political spillover and the successive enlargement of the EU were propagated depicting the EU's influence as an abuse of British sovereignty and intimidation of British pride. Besides, the question of immigration and refugees across Europe aggravated the situation, as politicians, the press, and social media have tended to show that these newcomers menaced society, social welfare, as well as economy. The use of myth was apparent in the Eurosceptics' representations of Europe as a "super-state" dominating the UK, besides their portrayal of refugees and immigrants as masses, waves, invaders … etc. These representations played a role in the unexpected outcome of the Brexit referendum.

Furthermore, I have discussed the case of Scotland whose nationalism progressed to become economic and civic rather than cultural, hence motivated by the Scottish economic ambition in the global economy. Scottish nationalists' aspiration for autonomy was strengthened by the discovery of the North Sea Oil (the 1970s) and Thatcher's process of privatization (1980s) and anti-society attitude. Moreover, the advance of the European community also nurtured Scottish nationalists who wanted Scotland to be independently a part of Europe. Yet the UK's EC/EU membership lessened the situation and prevented any serious attempt to leave the UK, except for the 2014 Scottish Referendum on independence that was rejected by the public (55.30% said No). however, Brexit has resurrected the independence question noting that the actual dominant parties in Scotland are pro-indyref2. In fact, 62% of the Scots voted remain in June 2016, hence Scottish politicians declared that they were driven

out of the EU against their will. On the other hand, the Britishness discourse has been endorsed with unionist ideals.

The study of Britishness led to conclude that the aspects of national identity are changeable, they are influenced by a changing national context besides political and economic conditions. However, this unsteadiness has always been overtaken by celebrating a rooted past, as well as, historical symbols. Indeed, the organic notion of identity has always been rejected by conservative political establishments that relate it exclusively to the past and use it to impose norms and the status quo. As a matter of fact, the national culture is framed through a discourse of representation to ensure continuity and halt any sort of revolution. In the UK, the constitutional monarchy, the unwritten constitution, and the sovereign parliament are the norms that have always guaranteed the existence of an exceptional British identity. By the same token, the conservative party reluctantly accepted the New Labour constitutional changes, which reduced some of Westminster's powers over Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales.

The British national identity can be approached from different angles. If we consider it in terms of culture, the English culture seems prominent and hegemonic at the expense of the other British cultures. I have discussed different definitions of culture including a comparison between Raymond Williams' definition that attached it to society and T.S Eliot's elitist vision of the concept. Whereas Malek Benabi insisted on the importance of both society and the individual in the process of cultivation. Indeed, culture is not only about ethnicities, but it also englobes whatever men acquire throughout their lifetime including social values offered by society and education, notwithstanding the Media impact, all these elements shape their behaviour,

personality, and actions. In fact, during the making of the British union, the English culture could shift from a custom-based culture to a sophisticated culture, whereas the neighbouring cultures lagged behind it. Besides, the advance of communication and industry facilitated the movement of the English culture towards Scotland and Ireland and made England the centre of economy and education. The other cultures were still controlled by customs and traditions; hence they were influenced by the English culture and did not have a huge impact on it.

Moreover, British institutions had an important role in maintaining an originally English ideal of liberty, individualism, and enterprise. The British parliament has always been referred to as the fruit of the English Magna Carta and the Glorious Revolution. Furthermore, England has always been at the façade of the UK. Consequently, on the one hand, Britishness is sometimes confused with Englishness. On the other hand, Westminster and British institutions have always been blamed for being biased in favour of England, especially before devolution. Albeit the fact that Scotland has its devolved parliament and Government, Scottish nationalists namely the SNP want more powers for their parliament and reject Westminster's interference.

If we consider Britishness in terms of nationalism, English nationalism prevails as well. In fact, British nationalism is inherently imperial; some believe that the fall of the Empire led to its demise, except during the Falklands War. In addition to the empire, wars were effective motivators of nationalism which is why during the British war against France, British nationalism was claimed to be at its peak, as it was during the World Wars. However, once the material threat dissipated, the public paid less attention to the concept of unified nationalism, even if it was still being preached. Yet,

in so far as the Britishness discourse still exists, British nationalist tendency never ended, it just took new dimensions to hinder Europeanization and the union's break up.

In fact, the similarities between the conservative unionist discourse whose objective is to maintain British integration intact, and the Eurosceptic discourse, mainly the conservative one, are remarkable. The conservative party's Britishness discourse reflects their values of union, Brexit, enterprise, and democracy. They celebrate the importance of the UK's typical and longstanding shared history in addition to the fact that its components have succeeded in pooling their cultural and political systems since the fulfilment of the acts of union. Moreover, they tend to show that the European integration and the Scottish independence implied uncertainty and a weak Britain whose strength lies in the imperial past, parliamentary system, and popular sovereignty, in addition to the internal integrity and control over the internal market. Nevertheless, the Labour party abandoned its 1970s Eurosceptic tradition, yet their unionist discourse is inspired by their ideals including unity, solidarity, equality, employment, health, and education. They preach a value-based national identity that is entrenched by British institutions such as the NHS, the Armed Forces, and the BBC, it is also nurtured by promises of a more decentralized Britain whose four regions are able to exercise their powers without London's interference. Nevertheless, they lost their popularity in Scotland as their unionist rhetoric became out of date.

The dissertation has analyzed the discourse of Britishness through press and political speeches, yet further representations are worth investigating. Television's role in perpetuating and publicizing Britishness is an interesting topic, either by exploring

the BBC's claimed bias in favor of England in addition to its movie production to promote Britishness and the monarchy. The impact of education on maintaining a Britishness discourse can also be dealt with. Moreover, the focus of the research was on the unionists' discourse and how they strive to save the British Union from disintegration. Still, nationalist discourse is worth studying, namely the Scottish National party's discourse and the English nationalists' discourse as well.

Overall, British unity has been preserved on numerous occasions in the past, but current conditions are said to be the most challenging in comparison to any previous period. Furthermore, the changing opinion polls leave the possibility of Scottish independence open to time and circumstances. However, the Scottish fate is still a matter of wait-and-see. If the Scots vote yes in the second referendum on independence, the question is whether this divorce would be total or partial. Scottish social attitudes surveys depicted that many Scots prefer British identity rather than EU identity (Biagi 125) especially since the Scots are said to be less republican, hence the Monarchy is a Britishness symbol that is highly likely to survive any form of disintegration, knowing that symbols and myths are believed to join the British together more than the union as a political edifice.

If Scotland obtains its independence, it would probably keep its social and cultural links with the UK throughout the Commonwealth. Whereas its European membership is debatable as some believe that it would be rejected by European members that are state nations and have internal nationalisms such as Spain. Its world position would also be at stake because the US has shown its rejection of any form of British disintegration. However, in case of remaining under the UK's umbrella, the

British government will be under pressure to give the devolved parliaments more powers. Finally, the question is whether the discourse of Euroscepticism and unionism would be silenced with Brexit and Scottish independence because the UK still has to interact with its European neighbours and Scotland will always remain north of the English border.

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Appendices

Appendix 1



Figure 1.1 The fuzzy frontiers of British identity

Appendix 2

God Save the Queen

God save our gracious Queen,
Long live our noble Queen,
God save the Queen:
Send her victorious,
Happy and glorious,
Long to reign over us:
God save the Queen.

O Lord our God arise,
Scatter her enemies,
And make them fall:

Confound their politics,
Frustrate their knavish tricks,
On Thee our hopes we fix:
God save us all.

Thy choicest gifts in store,
On her be pleased to pour;
Long may she reign:
May she defend our laws,
And ever give us cause
To sing with heart and voice
God save the Queen.

Appendix 3

Flower of Scotland

O Flower of Scotland
When will we see your like again?
That fought and died for
Your wee bit Hill and Glen
And stood against him
Proud Edward's Army
And sent him homeward tae think again

The Hills are bare now
And Autumn leaves lie thick and still
O'er land that is lost now
Which those so dearly held
That stood against him
Proud Edward's Army
And sent him homeward tae think again

Those days are past now
And in the past they must remain
But we can still rise now
And be the nation again
That stood against him
Proud Edward's Army
And sent him homeward tae think again

The Hills are bare now
And Autumn leaves lie thick and still
O'er land that is lost now
That though so dearly held

O Flower of Scotland
When will we see your like again?
That fought and died for
Your wee bit Hill and Glen
And stood against him
Proud Edward's Army
And sent him homeward tae think again

Appendix 4 (Goins 22)

Appendix 5 (Goins 40)



Appendix 6 (Simpson)

Appendix 5

Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union

Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union. The European Parliament and national Parliaments shall be notified of this application. The applicant State shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the consent of the European Parliament, which shall act by a majority of its component members. The conditions of eligibility agreed upon by the European Council shall be taken into account.

The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union is founded, which such admission entails, shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant State. This agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

Appendix 7

Thatcher is at today's cup final. This is your chance to send her off.

When she appears show her the red card and let her know what you think of her ... and what she's done to Scotland's health service.

Why not accompany your protest by some appropriate "community singing"!

Enjoy the match. But let's make Thatcher realise that Scotland's United against the Tories.

Appendix 8



Figure 2.2 The structure of practical reasoning: a more detailed representation.

العنوان: دور الخطاب والأسطورة المعاصرة في مشكلة الهوية البريطانية

الملخص

تلقي هذه الأطروحة الضوء على دور خطاب الهوية البريطانية في الحفاظ على وحدة الأمة في المملكة المتحدة، لقد سعيتُ من خلالها لتقديم تصور نقدي للهوية البريطانية بما في ذلك أصولها ورموزها كما ناقشت ضعفها ومستقبل الاتحاد البريطاني باعتباره صرحا سياسيا لها. طالما استند حس الانتماء والوحدة البريطانية على خطاب مستوحى من مختلف رموز ومُثل الأمة البريطانية المتجذرة، كما ساهمت الامبراطورية البريطانية في تعزيز هذا الخطاب وغذته الحروب. منذ النصف الثاني من القرن العشرين، أصبح هذا الخطاب يصاغ ضمن الخطاب المعارض للاتحاد الأوروبي الذي ظل يحذر من امتداد الاتحاد الاوروبي و خطر ذلك على السيادة البريطانية من جهة و ضمن خطاب الاتحاديين البريطانيين من أجل الابقاء على وحدة المملكة المتحدة من جهة أخرى.

وترتكز هذه الأطروحة على النظرية التأريخية وما بعد البنيوية لدراسة تاريخ وأيقونات الهوية البريطانية. كما تم تضمين نهج بارت للأسطورة لتحليل استخدامها في تصوير الأمة، و ارتكز التحليل على مفهوم الهوية والثقافة الوطنية والوحدة والسيادة ليجادل بأن هذه المفاهيم قد أصبحت مستهلكة اجتماعيا نتيجة التعرض المستمر للخطاب والأسطورة المعاصرة التي تستخدمها المؤسسات السياسية والاجتماعية فضلاً عن وسائل الاعلام بهدف الابقاء على الوضع الراهن.

طالما تطلب الحفاظ على الهوية الوطنية البريطانية خطاباً للأمة البريطانية. زودت البروتستانتية والقومية الإمبريالية بريطانيا بعد تأسيسها وخلال العهد الفيكتوري بخطاب "الآخر" الأجنبي الذي جنب حدوث مشاكل داخلية حتى القرن العشرين؛ كما خفف الانتماء البريطاني إلى الاتحاد الأوروبي من القوميات الإقليمية، بينما أعاد البريكسيت قضية استقلال إسكتلاندا و خطاب الاتحاديين البريطانيين إلى الساحة السياسية.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الهوية البريطانية، الخطاب، الأسطورة المعاصرة، الشكوكية الأوروبية، الاتحاديين